

The Shah's Lebanon Policy: The Role Of Savak

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Iranian-Lebanese relations during the reign of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi can be viewed in two distinct phases. The first phase, which lasted from the mid-1950s until the June War of 1967, was shaped by Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the Shah's reaction to what he saw as Nasser's brand of radical Arab nationalism. The Shah feared that instability caused by Nasser would lead to regional inroads by the Soviets and local Communist parties. To address this perceived threat, Iran aided and worked with the other conservative governments in the Middle East. Iran also initiated political actions to influence regional states that were less committed than itself. When Egypt's less than successful performance in the June War hampered Nasserism's appeal, the Shah's perception of Nasser as a threat diminished. By the second phase, from 1967 through 1978, a new concern for Iran had emerged: the training being given to Iranian dissidents by Palestinian military organizations in Lebanon. This concern became acute after the expulsion of PLO militants from Jordan after the 1970 civil war (also known as Black September) and their establishment in southern Lebanon.

Iran's major instrument for the conduct of sensitive foreign policy was Sazeman-i Ettela'at Va Amniyat-i Kishvar (SAVAK), the National Intelligence and Security Organization, which shortly after its formation in 1957 staged several operations to influence political events in Lebanon. Probably because of the inaccessibility of SAVAK sources, scholars have not been able to examine thoroughly SAVAK's role in Iranian-Lebanese relations. By using heretofore untapped sources to follow the career of Sayyid Musa Sadr, the man credited with giving Lebanon's Shia population a sense of community, this article will attempt to fill in this historical blank spot.¹

The late 1950s were a time of great political unrest in the Middle East, and Lebanon was no different from any of its neighbours. These events were of great concern to the Shah, and when he met President Camille Chamoun in December 1957 the two leaders announced their intention to 'oppose any foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of their countries'.² A number of the Middle East's other conservative governments also were concerned by regional stability and met to discuss intelligence and security issues.³ Representatives from the intelligence services of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey attended these meetings. Israel later participated in these meetings, but when it did the Jordanians refused to attend.⁴

In May 1958 Chamoun had turned to Iran and Turkey for help in his struggle with his internal opponents, some of whom were supported by the UAR or United Arab Republics, which had been formed earlier that year.⁵ The Shah decided to aid Chamoun because he believed the Lebanese crisis resulted from the threat of Nasserism and Arab nationalism. Iranian aid consisted of the provision by SAVAK of small arms and ammunition to Chamoun and his allies.⁶ Arms captured by Israel in the 1956 war with Egypt also were flown into Lebanon via Iran. This operation was run by Ahmad Azima, a naval officer in SAVAK's foreign intelligence section. Farid Shihab, head of Lebanese Intelligence, served as Chamoun's intermediary, travelling frequently to Tehran for coordination purposes. Chamoun also turned to the Arab League and the United Nations for help. The Arab League failed to resolve the crisis and in July the UN announced that its Observer Group (UNOGIL), the monitoring efforts of which had been hampered seriously by its lack of personnel and the interference of pro-Nasser Sunnis and Druze, had failed to find any evidence of massive UAR infiltration.⁷

On 14 July the Iraqi coup took place, resulting in the brutal overthrow of a pro-Western government. This turn of events was too much for Chamoun, and he appealed to the United States to honour its earlier commitment to him to intervene militarily if necessary. Saudi Arabia's King Saud made similar demands on Chamoun's behalf.⁸ The United States responded by landing US troops, commencing on 15 July. The landing was made despite US recognition of the adverse Arab reaction such an act might engender. This was because US officials realized that their Middle Eastern allies would lose confidence in the value of friendship with the United States if no action was taken. Also, the United States thought the events in Baghdad were the work of the Nasserists.

Chamoun was persuaded to step down at the end of his term, and on 31 July 1958 Army commander Fuad Shihab was elected to the presidency. After taking office in September, Shihab set about bringing new faces into Lebanese politics because he recognized that the 1958 crisis was the result of Chamoun's attempt to freeze out popular Sunni and Druze leaders, all of whom wanted a greater voice in national affairs. Shihab hoped to help the Muslims by increasing their role in the government without challenging Maronite control of the presidency. Shihab hoped that such actions would make the Muslims more loyal to the state and less receptive to Nasserism, and he largely succeeded. His expansion of the political playing field, plus his refusal to use the Army to suppress the rebels, earned Shihab the enmity of many Christians, especially Chamoun, but he had the support of the majority of the population.

Lebanon's importance to Iran increased after the Iraqi coup, when SAVAK's foreign intelligence chief, Colonel Hassan Pakravan, initiated efforts to restore the Iraqi monarchy.⁹ To this end, Major Mujtaba Pashai, head of SAVAK's Middle East branch, occasionally accompanied by SAVAK chief Brigadier General Teimour Bakhtiar and his assistant Colonel Hassan Alavi-Kia, would travel once a month to Beirut, where he would meet with Iraqi exiles, such as Abdul Hadi Chalabi, Abdul Karim Usri, Jawdat Ayyubi, Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, Mahmud Mukhtar Baban, and Major General Abdul Majid. Maj. Isa Pejman, who was in charge of SAVAK's Kurdish operations, also would travel to Lebanon to meet with Iraqi Kurds there. Talks with the Iraqis resulted in little action, as the Iranians came to the realization that the old elites had no real base of support. SAVAK had greater success with the Kurds, who received promises of greater autonomy in Iran, more attention to their welfare and support in their fight against Iraq's Abd al-Karim Qasim, who had refused to grant them administrative self-rule. Mulla Mustafa Barzani's followers were soon at war with the Iraqi government. At one point, 80 per cent of the Iraqi military was deployed against the Kurds. The Kurds also were used to collect intelligence on the Iraqi regime.¹⁰

The Iraqi revolution alarmed Jordan's King Hussein, whose country had briefly federated with Iraq in early 1958. The first cause for alarm was the brutal killings of King Faisal II (King Hussein's cousin), Crown Prince Abdul-Ilah (Faisal's uncle), Premier Nuri Es-Said, and members of the Royal household, and subsequent stories of atrocities. The second cause for alarm were the broadcasts by Radio Baghdad criticizing King Hussein as a traitor and agent of imperialism and calling for the Jordanian people to overthrow their King. Third was the fact that the first state to extend diplomatic recognition to the new Iraqi Republic was the UAR. By 17 July King Hussein requested military aid, which came in two forms: the arrival of English paratroopers and the provision of petroleum products via US aircraft.¹¹

A less obvious form of assistance was the journey by Bakhtiar, Pashai and Pejman to Jordan to meet with King Hussein and discuss plans to restore the Iraqi monarchy by supporting the Iraqis mentioned above.¹² At this time, King Hussein asked that SAVAK assign an officer to Amman, and the Iranians agreed, posting Colonel Ali Motazed to Amman as a military attache, while

Colonel Umar Madani was sent to Iran as Jordan's military attache. Bakhtiar suspected that King Hussein himself wanted to assume the Iraqi throne. For this reason, Bakhtiar actually cancelled a shipment of arms and cash to Jordan. Western assistance and King Hussein's own actions, however, succeeded in eliminating the threat to his throne; in fact, his position on both the domestic and international stages was greatly strengthened.

Following these events, the Shah sent an order to Bakhtiar to come up with a way of containing Nasserism. Pashai conceived the 'Green Plan' (Tarh-i Sabz), in response. When he met with Bakhtiar, Alavi-Kia, Pakravan, and Azima, Pashai said that 'we should combat and arrest the danger (of Nasserism) on the beaches of the Mediterranean so we do not have to shed blood on Iranian soil.' Lebanon was also important because of its role as a neutral entrepot and financial centre. Pashai and Pakravan saw Lebanon as the only democratic Arab state, where all religions had a political identity and there was intellectual freedom as exemplified by the universities. They believed that all of these would be lost if the Nasserists came to power.¹³

Pashai believed that if the Lebanese populace identified more closely with Iran, it would distance itself from a pro-Arab stance.¹⁴ He favoured building on the existing Muslim ties, particularly those with the Shia. Previously, the Shia political structure would have been difficult to influence, because it was dominated by clans, but in the late-1950s parties, such as the Communists, the Ba'th, the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Progressive Socialists, and the Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS), began to attract younger Shia males. At the same time, younger Shias began heading for the cities, leading to a diminution in the importance of land-based wealth and the traditional zuama (political bosses). The government's educational system also had an urbanizing effect, leading to migration to towns and cities (Beirut in particular) by Lebanese of all religions, as they sought jobs which required their new-found skills and provided a more modern lifestyle. Pashai believed that the Iranian government could take advantage of these political, demographic and social changes. At that time, however, the Iranian government was very close to the Lebanese Christians because of the friendship of the Shah and the Iranian ambassador, Ahmad Atabaki, with Chamoun. In an attempt to gain access to different parts of Lebanese society, Iranian Air Force officer Hamid Nasserri was assigned to Beirut as SAVAK Chief of Station.¹⁵

The Iranian government began making contributions of approximately \$33,000 a year to the Lebanese Shia community. This altered the relationship between the Shah, the Iranian Shia establishment, and the Lebanese Shia community. Previously, the Shah, via the Pahlavi Foundation (Bonyad-i Pahlavi), had given money to the marja-i taqlid in Qum, Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Borujerdi, who had directed it to Lebanon.

Under the Green Plan, Nasserri distributed about 80 per cent of the money directly to Shia schools in Lebanon, while the rest was given to individual Lebanese mullahs as gifts in the form of money or goods. The recipients knew that SAVAK was the source of this money, but because the organization did not have the notoriety it later acquired, they felt no compunctions about accepting it.¹⁶

Lebanese parliamentary elections were scheduled for June and July of 1960, and SAVAK's leadership, possibly encouraged by Chamoun, decided that several anti-Nasserist representatives should be elected.¹⁷ Pashai devised a plan to meet the desired electoral results, and he warned that it could get expensive. His superiors believed that it was an issue which could affect Iran's existence, so they were prepared to spend whatever was necessary. In the end, approximately \$330,000 was spent.

The mostly Maronite Phalanges (Kata'ib) party was chosen as the main recipient of Iranian aid.¹⁸ Nasser offered aid to Phalanges leader Pierre Gemayel, who said that \$100,000 was needed for publicity. While the money was being prepared, however, the Phalanges leadership said they did not want the money because they did not want the party to lose its independence and be indebted to Iran. The Phalanges, nevertheless, maintained close relations with Iran, and Phalangist newspapers often printed articles attacking Nasser and promoting Iran.¹⁹

Raymond Edde's Bloc National party was also the target of SAVAK money. Edde himself was never offered any money, because he and Gemayel were running for the same seat, but many of the party's candidates took the money they were offered, and SAVAK helped fund and produce some of their publicity. Bakhtiar hand-delivered \$50,000 to Chamoun himself.²⁰ In this case, Israeli insistence overcame the objections of Bakhtiar's subordinates, who knew that Chamoun had sold many of the arms donated by Iran and Israel and kept the proceeds.

The friendship of the Dashnak (a right-wing Armenian party) candidates was won by promising them that flights from Yerevan to Lebanon would have the right to pass over Iran, and they would have easier transit between Iran and Lebanon. Two priests from Lebanon were allowed to come to Iran to establish churches. Permission was given to conduct more courses at Isfahan University in the Armenian language, use of which had been restricted to religious instruction. SAVAK also helped in the printing and distribution of Dashnak election publicity.

Aid to the 25,000 member Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS) was also advised, because it was viewed as a tough, combatant group, and it was believed that it would be receptive to the Iranians' approach because it had received Iraqi aid before the 1958 coup and sided with the Chamounists during the 1958 crisis.²¹ The Shah refused to permit dealings with the PPS, objecting to their concept of a Greater Syria at a time when Syria was a member of the UAR. He also objected to their anti-royalist nature and wrote a sharp letter to Pashai to this effect. Ironically, Chamounist candidates did relatively poorly in the elections, while the Phalangists did quite well. Gemayel, in fact, became the Minister of Finance. Four Dashnak candidates were elected. The Communists, Ba'thists and PPS all failed to win any seats.

The SAVAK station in Beirut maintained contact with Lebanese newspapers and magazines through SAVAK officer Fariborz Farzaneh, who had diplomatic cover as the press attaché and had served in a similar post in other countries.²² Apparently, none of the newspapers was aware of Farzaneh's SAVAK connection. Most of the Arabic-language newspapers which he approached made direct requests for money, with the exception of the strongly anti-Nasser Kamal Mruwa, who owned Al-Hayat and The Daily Star. Mruwa did not receive any direct payments to print anti-Nasser articles, but SAVAK did buy his newspapers and distribute them in the Persian Gulf region in an attempt to counter broadcasts by the Voice of the Iranian Nation and the Voice of the Arabs based in Cairo.²³ In 1960 Mruwa's offices were bombed after he printed an article criticizing Nasser for his break in relations with Iran over the Shah's announcement of de facto recognition of Israel. At this point SAVAK gave Mruwa about \$15,000 to help with the repairs.

The SAVAK station had particularly good relations with two French language publications, L'Orient and Le Soir, which were willing to print articles provided by SAVAK. These articles emphasized Nasser's expansionism and quest for hegemony, saying that these were a result of Egypt's internal economic problems. Such articles also sought to cause disunity between the more radical Arab states of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. No person-to-person money transfers took place, but SAVAK would buy advertising or several thousand copies and distribute them in Lebanon, Jordan and the Persian Gulf states.

The available evidence does not suggest that these SAVAK activities were inspired by the United Kingdom or the United States. The Shah was deeply concerned by Nasser's activities and he did not need to be goaded into action on that issue. Interviewees have stated that Western intelligence officials were aware of SAVAK's efforts in Lebanon, but the extent of this knowledge is not clear. It is also possible that, although aware of SAVAK activities, the CIA and MI6 wanted to act unilaterally and maintain strict compartmentalization. Archival records indicate that the Shah, unconvinced of US commitment, was encouraging the United States to make a move, since he urged President Eisenhower to act when they met in July 1958 and he congratulated Eisenhower after the troop landings.²⁴ What the Shah knew of covert US and UK activities is also unknown.²⁵ The Shah's initiation of SAVAK's political actions may have stemmed from his lack of confidence in the US commitment.

This was the state of SAVAK activity which greeted Sayyid Musa Sadr upon his arrival in Lebanon in 1960. Born in Qum in 1928, Sadr was from a family who claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. His Lebanese-born grandfather, Sayyid Ismail Sadr, became one of the great marja -i taqlid (a Shia religious figure who through his learning is viewed as a reference point for emulation) in Iraq, as did his father, Ayatollah Sadr alDin Sadr, in Iran. Musa Sadr attended the University of Tehran Faculty of Law and Political Economy and studied Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) at a Qum madrasah. In 1953, a year after his father's death, he moved to Najaf to study fiqh under Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim (1889-1970).²⁶

In December 1957 the Shia leader of Tyre, Sayyid Abdul Hussein Sharaf al-Din, died. The local Shia invited Sadr, who had visited there earlier in the year, to replace him. Sadr accepted the offer and moved to Tyre in 1960. The reason that Sadr often gave for his acceptance of this offer was that his family originated in Lebanon and the move was a return to his roots.²⁷ He also claimed that Sayyid Abdul Hussein had referred to him as a worthy successor.²⁸ Intelligence and political sources also alleged that Sadr moved to Lebanon due to encouragement he received from General Bakhtiar, whose close associate, Sayyid Ahmad Tabatabai-Qomi, was related to Sadr through the latter's maternal grandfather, Sayyid Aqa Hussein Qomi.²⁹ Allegedly, when Bakhtiar heard of the Lebanese Shias' search for a new marja', he summoned Sayyid Hussein's son (Sayyid Nasser alDin), who had been studying in Qum. Bakhtiar wanted to send Sayyid Nasser back as his father's replacement so he could help the Lebanese Shia community and promote ties with Iran. Word of this got to a relative of Sadr, who went to Bakhtiar and promoted Sayyid Musa. Bakhtiar met Sayyid Musa and was favourably impressed, as was Sayyid Musa, with the idea of his going to Lebanon. This is not to imply that Sadr had been recruited as a SAVAK agent, although Bakhtiar's position as SAVAK's chief was common knowledge. It was traditional, at the time, for high-ranking Iranian officials to maintain ties with members of the religious community. There was, furthermore, a coincidence of interests: Iran sought greater influence in Lebanon, and Sadr needed a position offering more rapid advancement than was possible in Iran.³⁰

Sadr's opportunities for promotion were not optimal because by the late 1950s the Iranian religious community had become very quiet. The ulama had inspired a brief spate of violence against the Bahais, and a few years later voiced concern over women's enfranchisement. Most clerics, however, had allowed themselves to be bought off by the government, and some participated in pro-regime activities.³¹ The marja-i taqlid in Qum, Ayatollah Borujerdi, pursued an apolitical line. This quietism (some would say conservatism) may have discouraged an ambitious cleric like Sadr who probably perceived more opportunity for influence in the smaller, less formal Shia community of Lebanon.

Upon his arrival in Lebanon, Sadr made a good first impression: tall (6'6"), flamboyant, and elegant, he spoke fluent and stylish Arabic.³² Sadr increased his exposure immediately by providing practical assistance to the Lebanese people, whether or not they were Shia.³³ He gave classes on Iran and the Persian language at the Amaliyah school, where he achieved great popularity due to his good rapport with young people. He then taught at a Sunni school called Al Maqasid. He revitalized Jami'at al-Birr wa al-Ihsan, a religious and charitable foundation founded by Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, and raised money for al-Mu'assasa al-Ijtima'iyya (The Social Institute), a Tyre orphanage. In 1963 Sadr established Bayt al-Fatat (The Girls' Home), a sewing school and nursery, started Ma'had al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya (The Institute of Islamic Studies), and taught Islamic philosophy at Beirut's St. Joseph University. He began to give the Shia a sense of community, whether they were from Beirut, the south, or the Bekaa Valley. He attracted support from all groups of Shia society, including wealthy merchants and urban youth, and he called on people to struggle and not to accept misfortune.

Sadr also stayed in contact with SAVAK. Sadr never met with SAVAK COS Nasser, since their time in Lebanon only overlapped by a few months. Pashai succeeded Nasser and was stationed in Beirut from 20 November 1960 to 20 December 1963, and Sadr, fully cognizant of the fact that Pashai was a SAVAK officer, met him about once a week. During this period, Pashai served as Sadr's entree to the Lebanese political elite, a part of society to which a Shia cleric normally would not have access. Pashai also arranged for Sadr and the Shah to meet. Although he accepted such help from Pashai, Sadr never asked the Iranian government for any money. In fact, in 1962 he was offered some money to use in whatever way he saw fit, but declined the offer of a direct payment and warned against giving money to any individuals. Sadr recommended a continuation of a social approach, such as sending teachers, helping schools, and building hospitals.³⁴

The Iranian government continued to attempt to wield influence in Lebanese governmental affairs, but the April-May 1964 elections were not very favourable to the Iranians' preferred candidates. Chamoun failed to be re-elected to the parliament. Gemayel, with backing from the Dashnak, as well as the Phalanges, managed to retain his seat as one of East Beirut's representatives. Shihab's term had ended and in the balloting for the Presidency Pierre Gemayel received only five votes, while Charles Helou had ninety-two.

Also in 1964 Sadr established the Bur al-Shimali Technical Institute near Tyre with funding from Shia benefactors, bank loans and the Lebanese Ministry of Education. He had approached the Iranian Embassy for financial assistance, but the Shah was not feeling very charitable towards the religious elements, it being so soon after the riots of June 1963. Both the Shah and SAVAK's chief, General Pakravan, blamed Nasser for these riots, but a number of clerics were arrested for playing a leading role in them.³⁵ Sadr, furthermore, had been one of several clerical signatories to a letter to the Shah which listed objections to Iranian governmental policies (such as women's enfranchisement, ties with Israel and land reform). When confronted with this, Sadr assured the Embassy that he was only going through the motions in an attempt to strengthen his credibility with the Shia clergy. Sadr reassured the Embassy of his continued friendliness and loyalty.³⁶

Although Sadr worked through the established political system in order to show his fidelity to Lebanese institutions, he followed a path which differed from that which was considered acceptable for a cleric. In what has been termed the Shias' 'quietist interpretation', the belief that man must bear the burden of being the oppressed minority until the return of the twelfth imam, it was traditional for a cleric not to become involved in politics, thus absolving him of responsibility. According to this viewpoint, one must accept what one gets, even if it includes death, just as Hussein did at Karbala. To bring about social reform required greater commitment,

but clerics were not expected to be active - they were supposed to be interested in religious scholarship.

This was not the route that Sadr chose, because he wanted Islam to be more than ritual. In his writings, too, Sadr endorsed an activist role for a cleric, embodying another and different Shia expectation that a religious leader also had political obligations. He tried to attract civil servants and lawyers to a movement under his leadership, although such people normally resisted the clerics. He took advantage of this by condemning religious figures who kow-towed to people in power. This was not a way to earn friends, and old-style politicians tried to portray Sadr as a client of the Lebanese intelligence service, while the old-style clerics wanted him to conform to their restrictive system.

Sadr's criticism of the land-owners came at a bad time for them. They were already suffering a loss of influence because many of their clients were going to the cities. These events coincided with Sadr's increase in public exposure. The zuama's loss was the Sayyid's gain, as the newly urbanized Shia heeded his rallying call. One of Sadr's targets was Kamil al-Asad (Kamil Bey), who in 1964 had been made Speaker of Parliament, the highest position to which a Shia could rise. They competed for power in the Supreme Shia Council (al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi'i al-A'la), where Sadr was elected chairman. Another target was Kazem al-Khalil (Kazem Bey), who had been a government minister in 1958. The zuama retaliated with claims of Sadr's sexual improprieties.³⁷ There were also claims that Lebanese intelligence wanted him to weaken the zuama because they threatened Shihab's reforms.³⁸

Throughout the 1960s Sadr's leadership position among the Shia continued to improve, and some even ascribed certain charismatic qualities to him, referring to him as 'imam'. In Shia tradition, a mujtahid was not supposed to claim the traits of an imam, which were baraka, divine charisma, and ma'sum, moral infallibility.³⁹ The followers of certain charismatic mujtahids, however, sometimes attributed such divine powers to their preferred clerics. This distinguished the mujtahid from the common man, who was seen as weak, sinful, and given to temptation. In Arabic, furthermore, the term 'imam' is used to signify the leader of any organized group activities, particularly prayers.

During the 1960s relations between Sunnis and Shias continued to deteriorate. The Sunnis were largely city-dwellers, and Shia peasants, on coming to the cities, found themselves on the bottom rung of the social ladder. Even the wealthier Shia never fit in. The few Shia, such as civil servants or physicians, who succeeded were resented and envied by other Shia. Yet the Shia took pride in being in the minority, seeing Sunni Muslims as an illegitimate group which did not have a proper understanding of Islam as it had been passed down through the Imams.

THE PALESTINIANS' INFLUENCE

When the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created by the Arab Summit in 1964, the Lebanese government insisted that no armed Palestinians should be stationed in Lebanon. This concern was natural, but it was unrealistic, and eventually hypocritical, to hope that the PLO would avoid Lebanon. There were several reasons for this. First, Palestinian refugee camps had existed in Lebanon since the creation of the state of Israel. Second, the Sunni Muslim populace of Lebanon sympathized with the Palestinian cause. Third, the Lebanese Army, emboldened by the outbreak of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, had briefly trained dozens of Palestinians at Army facilities in the South.⁴⁰ Finally, the first chief of the PLO, Ahmad Shuqayri, lived in Lebanon until 1968, and it was believed that the grounds of his summer residence were used for the training of PLO guerrillas.⁴¹

In January 1965 Fatah (a PLO faction) began raids on Israel, mainly from Jordan, but also from Lebanon and Syria, resulting in Israeli retaliatory raids. The retaliatory principle eventually expanded, and Israel launched raids on Lebanon in return for PLO attacks on targets outside Israel. Israel used all of its military resources for these attacks, from air strikes to commando raids. The Israelis selected targets such as high-ranking PLO officials and the headquarters of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), but they also attacked guerrilla training centres in the Nahr el Barid and Badawi refugee camps, where Palestinians, Chinese, Japanese, Turks, Cypriots, and Iranians allegedly had been trained.⁴²

Palestinian and Israeli operations forced the Lebanese government to act. In April 1969 a state of emergency was declared, and in May the Lebanese Army initiated operations against the Syrian-backed Al-Sa'iqqa, which had established itself in southern Lebanon. Fighting resumed in October 1969, after the guerrillas violated an agreement not to move near inhabited areas and expose civilians to Israeli reprisals. An agreement between the Lebanese government and the PLO was reached in late 1969, but in January 1970 Palestinian units based in Amman accused the Lebanese government of trying to restrict guerrilla activities. Clashes between the Lebanese Army and the Palestinian guerrillas, after a brief hiatus, increased in 1972-73.⁴³

To gain acceptance in the Arab world, Sadr had to be pro-Palestinian, but relations between the PLO and Sadr were never harmonious. When the PLO moved into southern Lebanon, Sadr's warnings that this would be counterproductive were ignored. When the PLO and the Lebanese Army clashed in 1972-73, Sadr criticized the Sunnis for supporting the guerrilla forces, the government for not defending the south from Israel, and the PLO for shelling and provoking Israel. Sadr said the PLO was a military organization, that it was a factor in the South's anarchy, and it terrorized the Arab world by using extortion to gain money and sympathy. The PLO saw Sadr as a creation of Lebanese Intelligence or an agent of the United States.⁴⁴

When the PLO fighters pushed into Lebanon, the Maronite elites lost interest in Sadr, who had been courting them because of their shared anti-Sunni interests. Sadr had prepared for this contingency by cultivating Syrian President Hafez al-Asad. In a late-1969 meeting of the Supreme Shia Council, Sadr had stated that the Alawi sect, of which Asad was a member, was a part of Shia Islam, and in 1973, Sadr issued a fatwa that Alawis were a Shia community. Syria's Sunni majority had traditionally ruled the country, and they had questioned whether Alawis were really Muslims, so the passage of this fatwa was very helpful to Asad.⁴⁵ The Alawis needed quick religious legitimacy, and the Lebanese Shia needed a powerful patron, so both sides gained.

Such pragmatism led Sadr to change political partners frequently. While this may have been done with the sole purpose of advancing the Shia cause, it lost Sadr needed support, because people could not tell where he stood, and they questioned his sincerity and his agenda. There was also some debate about whether he identified more with Arabs or with Iranians, because Sadr would talk about the 'Arabian Gulf', while at the same time there were a number of Iranians in his entourage and he would meet often with SAVAK officers.⁴⁶

In January 1975 both the Phalanges and Chamoun's Parti National Liberal (PNL) made statements attacking the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon and called for a referendum on the presence of the PLO in Lebanon. In February, demonstrations in Sidon resulted in fighting between civilians and the army. Chamoun, Gemayel, and other right-wingers supported the Lebanese Army and accused the PLO of inciting the violence. Then, on 10 March, Muslim leaders called for a change in the political balance of power so it would take into account the increase in the size of the Muslim population but this proposal met with Christian opposition.

By May 1975 the fighting between various armed factions had reached such a level that President Suleiman Frangieh was forced to appoint a government of military officers after the previous cabinet resigned. One of these armed factions, the Fityan Ali (the Knights of Ali), claimed an association with Sadr's Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived), but this group was so brutal that Sadr disassociated his movement from it.⁴⁷ The Military Cabinet resigned only a few days later. On 27 June Sadr began a fast in a Beirut mosque to protest at the violence in Lebanon. Lebanese of all factions (Christian and Muslim) came to see him, as did his followers. On 1 July he was visited by Yasser Arafat and Syrian Foreign Minister Abd alHalim Khaddam. As a result of their meeting a national unity cabinet was formed, and the newly designated prime minister, Rashid Karami, appealed to Sadr to break his fast, which he did after having fasted for a total of five days.

Sadr's appeal for peace achieved temporary success because he was seen as having clean hands and as a peaceful alternative to the bloodshed. Five days later (on 5 July), however, he admitted to the formation of a Shia militia, Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya, Lebanese Resistance Detachments). This revelation came about after thirty to forty Lebanese Shia and their Fatah instructors were killed in a training accident in a camp in the Bekaa Valley. Somehow, even this was turned to Sadr's advantage when the funeral turned into a rally with chants for the 'Imam of the Disinherited' and the 'Imam of the Mojahedin'.⁴⁸ Amal's creation was an understandable indication of the Shias' need for fighters, since the Palestinians and Maronites already had militias, and the Druze had a long martial tradition.

THE IRANIAN OPPOSITION

After the Iranian government's suppression of the June 1963 demonstrations, and inspired by the armed struggles taking place in Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa, and by the Shia concept of martyrdom, opposition units decided to make their activities more clandestine and more violent in order to achieve their goals. To this end, the Nihzat-i Azadi-i Iran (Liberation Movement of Iran [abroad], LMI[a]) leadership initiated a search for a foreign sponsor.⁴⁹ Meetings in Algeria did not bear fruit, but Egypt's Nasser was willing to aid the LMI(a). In December 1963 Ebrahim Yazdi, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh and Mustafa Chamran went to Egypt. In July 1964 these three established Sazeman-i Makhsus-i Ittihad va Amal (SAMA), Special Organization for Unity and Action, and Chamran ran its guerrilla training programme. The relationship with Egypt was not as fruitful as the LMI(a) had hoped, because Nasser's pan-Arab and anti-Iranian behaviour was no longer tolerable for the Iranian nationalists. For example, Nasser wanted the Iranians to broadcast anti-Shah statements on Radio Cairo, while the LMI(a) preferred to continue preparations for armed struggle. So in 1966 SAMA left Egypt and effectively disbanded.

In 1970 Chamran moved to Lebanon. Lebanon came to serve as the base for LMI(a) Middle East operations, and it was also a place from which the LMI(a) could maintain contact with other Iranian opposition groups. Chamran settled outside of Tyre as director of Bur al-Shimali Technical Institute, which by that time provided ideological as well as technical training.⁵⁰ The school happened to be near a PLO camp, and since some LMI(a) members had been trained in Egypt by Fatah, their relations improved after 1970. The Iranian Mojahedin also trained at PLO camps.⁵¹ Mojahedin and LMI(a) relations, however, soon deteriorated. After Amal and PLO relations deteriorated, LMI(a)-PLO relations also deteriorated. The LMI(a) was also in contact with Sayyid Musa Sadr, who introduced Ghotbzadeh, Yazdi, and Chamran to Syrian President Asad, and Ghotbzadeh had a Syrian passport and travelled with cover as a reporter for a Syrian newspaper.⁵² Chamran helped found the Shia Harakat alMahrumin and had dealings with Amal. Members of Iran's Islamic opposition got military training at Amal facilities.⁵³

The People's Mojahedin of Iran (PMOI) was founded in 1965 by younger LMI members who had been radicalized by the events of June 1963.⁵⁴ In 1968 the PMOI made contact with the PLO in Dubai and Qatar and arrangements were made to train PMOI volunteers at the Palestinians' camps. In July 1970 the first group of volunteers went to PLO camps in Jordan and Lebanon. From 1972-onward, the Mojahedin worked to strengthen ties with revolutionary movements in other countries, meeting with representatives of the PLO, Libya and South Yemen, The Mojahedin also stayed in contact with the Confederation of Iranian Students and the Islamic Student Association. *Bakhtar-i Imruz* (Today's West), a publication printed in Beirut by young National Front members who were sympathetic to Marxism gave the Mojahedin some publicity.⁵⁵ Through these contacts, the Mojahedin message got to many foreign-based Iranian students.

Iran's militant Islamic opposition was headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini from his exile in Najaf. Little is known about the underground network that Ayatollah Khomeini had established in the 1960s, although it is believed that it started with small cells organized by Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Beheshti and Ayatollah Morteza Mottahari.⁵⁶ It is known that it was a close circle including Mustafa and Ahmad Khomeini, and several frequent visitors, such as Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr (future president of the Islamic Republic), Chamran, Yazdi and Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani. This network grew, but its members did not participate in antiregime violence until 1978. Instead, they concentrated on propaganda, recruitment and organization. The Khomeini camp maintained contact with the LMI(a) and may have provided money for the PMOI.

Members of these cells also received guerrilla training in Lebanon. There was some participation in activities at Amal facilities. There were more extensive contacts with the PLO, particularly after Sayyid Musa broke with the PLO over Palestinian activities in the South. After Yasser Arafat met with Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, more formal ties were made between their two organizations, and trainees were sent to Lebanon. In an interview with Tehran Radio on 20 February 1979, the PLO's Hani alHassan claimed that the PLO had trained 10,000 anti-Shah guerrillas.⁵⁷

The Sazeman-i Cherkha-yi Fedai Khalq-i Iran (the Marxist Fedai) was established by Tehran University students who had decided to join up for anti-regime activities in 1970.⁵⁸ Among them were individuals who had gone to Lebanon and trained at Fatah facilities. The Fedai later received training in Lebanon from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), according to Bassam Abu Sharif, a PFLP spokesman. It is the Marxist Fedai which is credited with starting Iran's guerrilla movement, when, on 8 February 1971, the gendarmerie post in Siahkal was assaulted.

SADR'S BREAK WITH THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT

From the above, one can see that the Iranian government's need to collect intelligence in Lebanon was obvious. Lebanon was the base for opposition organizations' martial operations. Lebanon was also, at the time, a centre of Middle Eastern intrigues, comparable to Lisbon during World War II or Vienna in Cold War Europe. In such an environment, however, Iranian access to important intelligence was severely limited for two reasons. First, Lebanese president Suleiman Frangieh had purged the Lebanese intelligence organization (known as G-2) in 1970 because it had grown too powerful and because of Frangieh's concern over its leadership's Shihabist sympathies.⁵⁹ Second, diplomatic ties between Tehran and Beirut had been broken on 2 April 1969 because of the presence in Lebanon of General Teimour Bakhtiar. Bakhtiar had arrived there on 2 May 1968 and was arrested and jailed for gun-running. The Iranian

government sought his extradition to face 1967 charges of making an illegal fortune while heading SAVAK. In September 1969 he was tried in absentia and sentenced to death for treason. The Lebanese were reluctant to extradite Bakhtiar, and he was allowed to leave Lebanon on 4 April 1969.⁶⁰

Relations were not resumed until 16 July 1971, shortly after Camille Chamoun had met the Shah in Tehran. The first Iranian ambassador to Beirut after the resumption of relations was Rokneddin Ashtiani, a diplomat from Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ashtiani was from a religiously connected family and was popular with both the local clerics and the Embassy employees. Ashtiani's deputy, Lavasani, was also a Foreign Ministry diplomat with religious connections.

At this point Major General Mansour Qadar enters the story.⁶¹ Born in 1923, Qadar attended the Military Academy and then served in Army Intelligence. He was transferred to SAVAK in 1958 and was assigned to Department II (Foreign Intelligence Collection). He was given diplomatic cover as Second Secretary and was assigned to the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, and when that was closed he was posted to Beirut as a commercial attache. In 1961 he was made the chief of the Middle East branch in Department II. About a year later he was made chief of Department II and stayed in that position until late 1963. From 1964 to 1967 Qadar was stationed in Beirut as SAVAK Chief of Station. From June 1967 to 1972 or 1973 he served as SAVAK COS in Jordan with diplomatic cover as Iran's ambassador. He was then assigned to Lebanon as Ambassador, while simultaneously serving as Chief of Station, and stayed in this post until November 1978.

Qadar's career track differed from that of most military personnel because of his duties and his political skills. He became a Brigadier General and then a Major General more rapidly than was normal. His promotions were considered unusual because normally one could not advance to the rank of General without having attended the General Staff College, which Qadar had not. Furthermore, if a military officer transferred to and stayed in a civilian job (SAVAK was a civilian organization, despite the preponderance of active-duty and retired military personnel) for over three years, he forfeited his right to return to the military for promotion purposes. Throughout this time Qadar earned a reputation as a man ambitious for the rank and the perquisites of high office. He reputedly could not tolerate anyone who did not agree with him completely, and he would set out to destroy those individuals who disagreed with him. He usually accomplished this through the Iranian bureaucratic art of *parvande* *sazee*, which calls for building a dossier of real and falsified personal information which can be used against one's enemies.

The COS Qadar replaced was Colonel Abbas Shaghaghi, who had been transferred back to Tehran. Qadar had been lobbying to replace Shaghaghi and had built up a dossier against him, and General Nematollah Nassiri, SAVAK's director, had disliked Shaghaghi since they had served together in the Imperial Guard in 1953.⁶² Qadar also moved to replace Ambassador Ashtiani, accusing him of disloyalty based on Ashtiani's having served under Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq's closest adviser, Foreign Minister Hussein Fatemi.⁶³ When Qadar became the ambassador he set about establishing his authority in the Embassy, reducing his Ministry of Foreign Affairs deputy, Kiafar, to translating documents. Several of the station's SAVAK officers requested transfers, and the Foreign Ministry personnel staged a work go-slow.⁶⁴

In late 1971 or early 1972, Sadr had travelled to Iran to ask the Shah for a contribution of \$30 million to build a hospital and university complex. The Shah and Court Minister Asadollah Alam decided the money should come from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Red

Lion and Sun Society (the Iranian Red Cross). When Qadar got word of this financial arrangement, he was very unhappy. Qadar had Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida attempt to postpone the dispensation of the money. Qadar urged that the money come from the Foreign Ministry, which would put it under his control. This would allow him to dispense the money to Sadr at his leisure, and it would also allow Qadar to take a cut. When the Shah heard of Qadar's interference, he angrily ordered that the hospital and university project get underway immediately. When Qadar's plan was not accepted his animosity toward Sadr increased. ⁶⁵

Qadar also became hostile toward Major Janus (author's pseudonym), the SAVAK officer who had been given control of the Sadr account by Department III (Domestic Security) chief General Nasser Moghaddam. This was because Janus, whose area of responsibility was the LMI(a) and the Lebanese Shia, was a member of SAVAK's Department III, which ran operations that bypassed the COS. (Overseas SAVAK stations were under the control of Department II, but events and personalities which affected the opposition to the Shah were dealt with by Department III). Janus was sympathetic when a delegation of the local Shia convinced him that Iran should support the Palestinians, and he also believed that such support could discourage the PLO from co-operating with the Iranian opposition. Janus travelled to Tehran and reported his new-found convictions to Parviz Sabeti, the new chief of Department III. Sabeti listened politely, then showed Janus a file which documented SAVAK's payments to the PLO leadership. ⁶⁶

Feeling disillusioned, Janus returned to his post. Qadar did not believe that pay-offs to the PLO would guarantee better intelligence on the opposition, so he decided that more and better placed agents were needed. Qadar decided he would recruit Lebanon's most high-profile Shia, Sayyid Musa Sadr. Qadar and Sadr had met in the early 1960s, during Qadar's first tour in Beirut as COS. At the time, however, Sadr was not enough of a political entity for Qadar to give him much notice. The original reason that Qadar's predecessor, Pashai, had paid attention to Sadr was because of the perceived need to encourage the cleric's unwitting efforts on behalf of the Green Plan. With time, a friendship had developed between Sadr and Pashai. ⁶⁷

The desire to collect intelligence on the opposition was Qadar's purported reason for trying to recruit Sadr. It seems much more likely that Qadar's principal motivation was the desire to get his hands on the hospital money. Even a 5 per cent cut would have earned him \$1.5 million. Qadar put a great deal of pressure on Sadr to enter a case officer-agent relationship with him, but Sadr demurred, protesting that he was a man of God. ⁶⁸ In a more precise and practical vein, he went on to say that it had taken him years to build up a good position in Lebanese politics. If people thought he was working for SAVAK, whose name by then had become synonymous with torture and repression, he would be completely discredited, as would all his work. Sadr had many enemies, from the zuama to the PLO, who would be more than happy to denounce him as a SAVAK agent. He told Qadar that he was a patriotic Iranian and loyal to the Shah but he was unwilling to let Qadar destroy all his efforts.

The Shah, receiving mixed reports on the situation from Sadr, Qadar, and General Hussein Fardust, a close friend of both the Shah and of Qadar, ⁶⁹ decided to turn the situation over to a disinterested party, Ambassador Bahrami in Egypt. During this time, Sadr was travelling extensively throughout the Middle East (often accompanied by Chamran). A stop in Cairo, then, did not raise any suspicions. While in Cairo, Sadr met with the local SAVAK COS and Bahrami. Sadr told them that he was a sincere patriot, but his position as a religious leader made Qadar's proposal impractical. Bahrami had Sadr write out his comments, purportedly as an aide-memoire to Bahrami. Bahrami then forwarded this 'letter', in which Sadr again declared his patriotism and loyalty, as his report to Iran. When the Cairo COS's report matched Bahrami's, Qadar contacted the COS and accused him of calling Qadar a liar, since Qadar had reported that Sadr was disloyal

to the Shah and to Iran. The Cairo COS stuck to his position that Qadar was in the wrong, that Sadr was a loyal Iranian who would be of the greatest help to Iran if he was allowed to operate unhindered.⁷⁰

A firm conclusion was not reached, so a commission, consisting of Manucher Zelli (former Ambassador to Lebanon), Abbas Ali Khalatbari (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Nassiri, and Sabeti, met to discuss the issue. Nassiri stated that the issue concerned Iran's security, it was out of the diplomats' domain, and Sabeti should decide what to do. The MFA officials deferred to the SAVAK officers out of their fear of SAVAK and their recognition of the fact that the Shah paid greater heed to Nassiri. At these meetings it was decided that Sadr should enter a case officer-agent relationship with Qadar, and he again demurred. The reward for his stubbornness was withdrawal of his Iranian citizenship.⁷¹ (Sadr had been granted Lebanese citizenship by President Shihab in 1963).

Major Janus, the SAVAK officer who had been dealing with Sadr, was never consulted, and he was unwilling to report his own views.⁷² This reluctance stemmed from several factors. The first was his relative youth (he was thirty-three years old) and newness to the job, which resulted in self-doubt. His superiors, furthermore, would discount his views because of his youthfulness. The second was the way that Qadar ran the Embassy. He was authoritarian and brooked no second-guessing from his staff. Both he and Janus were military officers, so Janus instinctively deferred to his superior and obeyed orders. Finally, Janus had no way of appealing or going over Qadar's head. To do so would have been anathema to a military officer. Qadar was, furthermore, very close to General Fardust, who not only had the Shah's ear for reasons of personal friendship, but was also a very highranking intelligence officer, being chief of the Special Intelligence Bureau (Daftar-i Vizhe -yi Ettela'at) and the Imperial Inspectorate (Bazrasi-i Shahan Shahi), both of which functioned as oversight organizations.

By 1974 the Shah was considering terminating support for the Lebanese Shia and Sadr. Sadr's behaviour had not been living up to the Shah's expectations, and the Shah believed that Sayyid Musa was getting paid off by Iraq and Libya. The Shah decided to give Sadr one last chance to terminate his contacts with countries hostile to Iran. To this end, Qadar was ordered to relay the Shah's sentiments to the cleric.⁷³ In light of the fact that Sadr did not conform with the Shah's suggestion, and in light of Qadar's record of animosity towards Sadr, it is questionable whether Qadar actually relayed the Shah's comments. In fact, Qadar tried to have Sadr replaced as head of the Supreme Shia Council by Sayyid Hussein Shirazi, an Iraqi-born mullah who had been expelled from Najaf by the Ba'thist regime, but he did not succeed.⁷⁴

Expectation of Sadr's co-operation (by providing information and by serving as an agent-of-influence) was justified, since his activities had benefited from the Shah's largesse. It is not clear what Sadr thought he was getting paid for. Sadr realistically could not have thought that the payments were made out of religious conviction or real desire to help the Shia of Lebanon. When Qadar demanded Sadr's co-operation, however, the latter balked. Qadar's persistence would have been justified had his desire to recruit Sadr as an agent been real. Sadr had been friendly with the Iranian government and its representatives, and there is no doubt that a gift of \$30 million would have ensured that he stayed friendly. Qadar's strong-arm tactics and the final decision to revoke Sadr's passport put an end to that.

Sadr's political standing improved from 1974 to 1976. As a show of Sadr's success in having Lebanon's Muslims show unity, in May 1974 Lebanon's Supreme Official Islamic Council declared its support for the Shia, and in September the Executive Committee of the Islamic Associations presented the government with a list of Muslim demands which included the

demands of the Supreme Shia Council.⁷⁵ To show his national, rather than Shia-only spirit, Sadr participated in the Greek Catholic metropolitan's movement, al-Harakat al-Ijtima'iyya, and his sister, Sayyida Rabab, encouraged Lebanese Shia females towards greater political activity. By September 1975, Lebanon was in a state of civil war, with clashes between the Phalanges, the PLO, conservative Christians, leftwing Muslims, the Druze, and the Shia. As the civil war worsened, Sadr's criticism of Druze leader Kamal Junblat and of the PLO increased. Sadr's criticisms were not well received: he was accused of being an American agent, and reportedly several attempts were made on his life in the summer of 1976.⁷⁶

Sadr also became openly hostile towards the Iranian government, accusing the Shah of suppressing religion in Iran, criticizing the Shah's pro-Israel stance and calling him an 'imperialist stooge'. When Ali Shariati, an opposition figure, died in 1977, Sayyid Musa officiated at his burial at Zeinabiyeh, the tomb of Imam Hussein's sister in Syria. In the spring of 1978, when Iran sent troops to Lebanon as part of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a number of its members were SAVAK personnel charged with 'identifying and isolating' Sayyid Musa's Iranian followers.⁷⁷ Iran also aided Kamil al-Asad in raising a Christian and Shia militia to supplement the Maronite forces of Major Saad Haddad, who was working with the Israelis. The Shah also worked with Chamoun, Kazem al-Khalil, and his son Khalil, who was deputy leader of Chamoun's PNL. In August 1978 *Le Monde* published an article by Sadr which was critical of the Shah.⁷⁸

On 25 August 1978 Sadr travelled to Libya with two companions, allegedly to meet with President Muammar Gaddafi. Scheduled to leave on 31 August, Sadr and his companions never arrived at their destination, Rome, nor were they ever heard from again. The Libyan regime claimed that Sadr had left, but there have been allegations that Sadr was killed by his hosts in either a dispute over the disposal of Libyan contributions to his movement or over his relations with the PLO. King Hussein asked Gaddafi to assist in locating Sadr. From his exile, Ayatollah Khomeini made a similar request, and the issue was raised again when a Libyan delegation visited Iran in April 1979.⁷⁹ Despite the interest of so many people, Sadr was never located. This only added to his charismatic reputation, and Sadr's followers began to refer to him as a martyr, some even going so far as to say that he was in occultation.

CONCLUSION

By following Sayyid Musa Sadr through his career in Lebanon, one sees how the Shah of Iran tried to influence Lebanese affairs via SAVAK, his secret police instrument. The Green Plan, as it was first conceived, was supposed to discourage the Lebanese Shia from supporting Nasser and pan-Arabism by winning their loyalty through the provision of money, teachers, schools, and perhaps even a mullah. Sadr gained the support of the Lebanese Shia, the fastest growing and changing part of the Lebanese populace, and he taught them to think as a community. In terms of the Shia community, the Green Plan seemed headed for success. Although it cannot be stated definitely, in the long run the Green Plan probably would have succeeded in discouraging pan-Arab and Nasserist sentiments among the majority of the Lebanese population for the very reason that the Shia minority was growing larger and was gaining a political voice through Sadr. The success of the other operations was not so clear. From the 1958 provision of military aid to Chamoun, they were geared mainly towards helping conservative Christian politicians win office, but from 1958 onward, other Lebanese minorities were demanding and gaining a greater voice in national affairs. This expansion was initiated by President Shihab, and was continued, albeit more modestly, by Presidents Helou and Frangieh.

By the 1970s the Shah needed intelligence on the Iranian opposition which was being trained in Lebanon. Sayyid Musa could have been very useful as a source of intelligence and an agent-of-influence in dealing with the opposition. Through Qadar's interference and SAVAK's overwhelming influence in the Iranian decision-making apparatus, Sadr's potential was lost to the Iranian government. Instead, the Shah, in an attempt to save his throne, was forced to work closely with the Christian and Shia elites. It was these very elites, however, who were becoming increasingly marginalized in Lebanese politics. As they were marginalized, it became evident that the new players in Lebanese politics were the very ones (the PLO and Shia groups), that were active in aiding the Iranian opposition. This was one of the major reasons why SAVAK failed to counter the armed opposition that participated in the eventual overthrow of the Shah of Iran.

FOOTNOTES

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1. Much of the information in this study was secured in interviews with ten SAVAK officers whose duties touched directly on this issue; an Iranian Military Intelligence officer stationed in Iraq; and two retired CIA officers with duties in Iran and/or Lebanon. Many of these sources have requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of this subject. Unless otherwise noted, any information secured in interviews has been corroborated by at least one other source. These interviews were supplemented by interviews from the Oral History of Iran Collection of the Foundation for Iranian Studies (FIS) and the Harvard Iranian Oral History Project. Information in this study from diplomatic archives is from the US National Archives (NA), the US Library of Congress (LOC), Foreign Relations of the United States volumes (FRUS), the British Public Records Office (PRO), the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), or the Asnad-i Laneh-yi Jasusi (these are the documents taken from the US embassy in Tehran in 1979).

2. 'Summary of communique on the talks between President Sham'un and the Shah of Iran, Beirut, 23 Dec. 1957,' in M.S. Agwani (ed.), *The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study* (Bombay, 1965), p.29.

3. Information on these meetings is from interviews with SAVAK chief Bakhtiar's assistant for all expenditures and special operations, H. Alavi-Kia (2 May 1992, San Diego), and former SAVAK Deputy-Director for Plans and chief of Middle East operations, M. Pashai (24 June 1993, Denmark).

Footnote:

4. The Shah had strengthened his ties with Israel by sending a representative to Paris and Rome in September and October 1957 to meet with Israeli officials and offer Iranian co-operation against Nasser's activities. In December 1957 a Mossad officer was sent to Tehran to enter into practical talks on establishing a strategic relationship between Iran and Israel, according to interviews with former Mossad chief Isser Harel and his deputy, Yaacov Caroz, in S. Segev, *The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in the Iran-Contra Affair* (New York, 1988), pp.31-2. 'Trident', a formal relationship between Mossad, SAVAK, and the Turkish Milli Istikbarat Teskilati (National Intelligence Organization), was established. Israel and Iran exchanged intelligence on Egyptian activities in the Arab world and participated in joint operations, such as aiding Yemeni royalists and the Iraqi Kurds, and the Israelis provided information on Iraqi, Egyptian, and Communist activities affecting Iran. (Confidential Report,

'Minority Groups,' May 1972, in Asnad, Vol.8, p.38; CIA Survey, Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services, March 1979, in Asnad, Vol.II, p.24.)

5. State Department telegram, 4 May 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.XI (Washington, DC, 1992), p.29.

6. Interview with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark), telephone interview with Alavi-Kia (17 Dec. 1992), and telephone interview with Iranian Embassy officer F. Farzaneh (18 April 1994).

7. Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1957-1958, pp.16294-95.

8. Memorandum of Conference with President, White House, 14 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.XI, p.212.

9. Letter from Isa Pejman, reprinted in M. Alamuti, *Iran dar Asr-i Pahlavi*, Vol.II, *Jang-i Qodrat dar Iran* (London, 1992), p.521; interviews with Pejman (15 Oct. 1992, Paris) and Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark); telephone interview with Pashai (19 Dec. 1992).

10. Interviews with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992 and 24 June 1993, Denmark); the reminiscences of Colonel Isa Pejman (May 1983, Paris), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS; National Foreign Assessment Center, 'The Kurdish Problem in Perspective' (Aug. 1979), in Asnad, Vol.31, p.15.

11. As a result of the coup, Jordan lost access to its Iraqi fuel supplies and was forced to rely on fuel from Lebanon transported by aircraft overflying Israel; see H.M. King Hussein of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (London, 1962), p.168. British airborne personnel also overflew Israel to get to Jordan; see Editorial Note in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.XI, p.317. For a very thorough discussion of events in Jordan, see L. Tal, 'Britain and the Jordan Crisis of 1958', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.31, No.1 (Jan. 1995).

12. Information on Iran and Jordan is from interviews with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992 and 24 June 1993, Denmark) and a telephone interview with Pejman (17 Dec. 1992). On Motazed, see also US Army Weekly Update, 788.00 (W)/26 June 1959, Box 3814, Record Group-59, NA.

13. Information on the Green Plan is from: Pejman letter, in Alamuti, pp.521-3; interviews with Pejman (15OCT92, Paris) and Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark); confidential interview with a retired CIA officer (21 Dec. 1992); and a letter from Pashai to the author (26 April 1993).

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. The Green Plan was not just Lebanon-specific. SAVAK officers with cover as teachers were sent to Syria to conduct classes on the Persian language and Iranian culture and history. Connections were made with other Shia communities, such as the one in Iraq. Sizeable contributions were sent to the grand ayatollahs in Najaf (about \$520,000 a year in 1959 and 1960) via the Royal Court, the Endowments Organization (Sazeman-i Awqaf), and through Iranian intelligence assets in Europe, so a SAVAK connection which would upset the Iraqi regime could be denied. The Shah also tried to influence the selection of a successor to Ayatollah Borujerdi, who died in 1961. There was a growing consensus in favor of Marja alKabir (Grand Marja) Ayatollah Mohsen alHakim, and it was believed that the Shah was encouraging the departure to Najaf of the supreme Shia leadership. ('Some Comments on Recent Religious Agitation in Iran', Department of State Airgram A-404, 788.00/29 Dec. 1962, FOIA.) This was

because the Shah wanted to keep outspoken religious leaders out of Iran, so they could not wield what he saw as undue influence.

17. Pejman letter, in Alamuti, p.524; interview with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark).

18. Information on aid to the Phalanges is from Pejman letter, in Alamuti, p.524; and is confirmed by Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark). On the Phalanges, see F. Stoakes, 'The Supervigilantes: The Lebanese Kataeb Party as a Builder, Surrogate and Defender of the State', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.II, No. 1 (Jan. 1975), p.224; and J.P. Entelis, 'Structural Change and Organizational Development in the Lebanese Kata'ib Party', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.27, No.1 (Winter 1973), p.28.

19. Pejman letter, in Alamuti, p.524; interview with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark); Stoakes, p.233.

20. Telephone interviews with Pashai (19 Dec. 1992) and Alavi-Kia (17 Dec. 1992).

21. Interview with Pashai (24 June 1993, Denmark). The PPS may have been linked to the CIA, also; see D. Little, 'Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.44, No.1 (Winter 1990), p.64.

22. Interview with Pashai (24 June 1993, Denmark) and telephone interview with Farzaneh (18 April 1994).

23. On the radio broadcasts, see CIA 'Intelligence Memorandum: The Arab Threat to Iran,' 21 May 1966, in the Declass. Docs. 1988, #3107, LOC, and M. Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (London, 1969), pp.246-7.

24. White House Memorandum of Conversation, 1 July 1958, in the Declass. Docs. 1985, #626, LOC; State Department telegram, 16 July 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol.XI, pp.306-308. The Shah's doubts are seen again in 'Internal Political Situation in Iran', State Department Memorandum, 788.00/11 Feb. 1961, FOIA; and CIA, 'The Arab Threat to Iran'.

25. On CIA activities in Lebanon in the 1950s, see W.C. Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East* (London, 1980), p.252; M. Copeland, *The Game Player* (London, 1989), p.216; and J. Randal, *The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers* (London, 1983), p.160. The British delivered aircraft and rockets to the Chamounists in May 1958; see 'Vampires for the Lebanon', 28 May 1958, # 133 855NV1193 57G (PRO).

26. A.R. Norton, *Amal and The Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin, TX: 1987), p.39; F. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and The Shia of Lebanon* (London, 1986), p.44. Other English-language works on Sadr are M. Halawi, *A Lebanon Defied: Musa alSadr and the Shia Community* (Oxford, 1992); T. Khalidi, review of *The Vanished Imam*, in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.XVI, No.3 (Spring 1987); Norton, 'Musa AlSadr', in B. Reich (ed.), *Political Leaders of the Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary* (New York, 1990); S. Shapiro, 'The Imam Musa al-Sadr: Father of the Shi'ite Resurgence in Lebanon', *Jerusalem Quarterly* (Fall, 1987); and P. Theroux, *The Strange Disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr* (London, 1987).

27. Ajami, p104.

28. Halawi, p.124.

29. The allegation on Sadr and Bakhtiar was related in confidential interviews (16 Oct. 1992 and 30 Dec. 1992) with individuals who had heard it from a member of Sadr's family. Former Iranian prime minister Shahpour Bakhtiar made similar assertions; see C. Bakhtiar, *Ma Fidelite* (Paris, 1982), p.217, and Bakhtiar interview with Theroux, p.15. Shahpour Bakhtiar may have discussed Sadr with his cousin, Teimour Bakhtiar, particularly after Teimour became openly opposed to the Shah. Shahpour Bakhtiar, furthermore, had a number of SAVAK personnel in his entourage after leaving revolutionary Iran, and he could have learned about Sadr's involvement with the Iranian government through these individuals. Information on the relationship between Bakhtiar, Tabatabai-Qomi, and Sadr is from a letter to the author by Pashai (26 April 1993).
30. Two sources claim that after meeting with Bakhtiar, Sadr underwent a four-eight week training course and was given 1,500-2,500 Lebanese lira (about \$470-780); see the reminiscences of Mansour Qadar (30 April and 4 May 1986, Washington, DC), in the Oral History of Iran Collection of the FIS, and 'Sayyid Musa Sadr Keh Bud?' Elm va Jameh, Sixth year, No.40, July-August 1985, p.42. A later article dismissed such claims; Moq, 'Zindigi va Napadid Shudan-i Musa Sadr', Elm va Jameh, Seventh Year, No.42, February-March 1986, p.45.
31. 'Rally Against Anti-Iranian Radio Broadcasts', Foreign Service Despatch 16, 788.00/29 Aug. 1959, Box 3812, Record Group-59, NA; and 'Establishment of Mashad Branch of National Defense Society', Foreign Service Despatch 11, 788.5/19SEP59, Box 3819, *ibid.*
32. Norton, *Amal and The Shi 'a*, p.40.
33. Interview with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark); and Halawi, pp.135-136.
34. Interview with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark); and letter from Pashai to the author (26 April 1993).
35. On the role played by the religious community in the 1963 riots, see 'Politico-Economic Assessment: Iran: March-September, 1963', Department of State Airgram A-231, 8 Oct. 1963, FOIA; and on the arrests of clerics, see 'Year-End Report on the Political Situation in Iran', Department of State Airgram A-361, 31 Dec. 1963, p.7, FOIA. On the suggestion that Nasser was behind the unrest, see *New York Times*, 6 June 1963, p.1, and *The Times (of London)*, 6 June 1963, p.12.
36. Interview with Pashai (10 Dec. 1992, Denmark).
37. H. Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (London, 1985), p.172.
38. M. Johnson, 'Factional Politics in Lebanon: The Case of the 'Islamic Society of Benevolent Intentions' (Al-Maqasid) in Beirut ', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Jan.1978), p.74, n.31.
39. M. Zonis and D. Brumberg, 'Khomeini, The Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Arab World', *Harvard Middle East Papers*, Modern Series: No.5 (Cambridge, MA, 1987), pp.5-6.
40. Y. Sayigh, 'Turning Defeat Into Opportunity: The Palestinian Guerrillas after the June 1967 War', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.46, No.2 (S pring 1992), p.260.
41. K.S. Salibi, *Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976* (London, 1976), p.26.
42. Keesings, 1965-1966, pp.21515-16; *ibid.*, 1969-1970, p.23216; *ibid.*, 1971-1972, p.25501, 25644; *ibid.*, 1973, pp.25757, 25868.

43. Keesings, 1969-1970, p.23520, 23704, 23843; *ibid.*, 1971-1972, p.25644; *ibid.*, 1973, p.25932.
44. Norton, *Amal and The Shih*, p.43; Ajami, p.175.
45. P. Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London, 1988, 1990), p.173.
46. Sadr's references to an 'Arabian Gulf' were taken out of context and used against him in Iran; see A.R. Nourizadeh, 'Imam Musa Sadr, In Imam Qaib-i Hazir', *Rouzegar-e No*, Vol.7 (fifth year), July -August 1986, p.45; and Moq, 'Zindigi va Napadid Shudan-i Musa Sadr', p.46. Both Pashai and a SAVAK interviewee (25 Jan. 1992) who requested anonymity met with Sadr often, and Major General Mansour Qadar also claims to have met with Sadr often; see the reminiscences of Qadar in FIS.
47. Salibi, p.104.
48. Ajami, p.169.
49. H.E. Chehabi, *Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini* (London, 1990), pp.198-9. The LMI was founded in Iran in 1962 as an off-shoot of the National Front and the National Resistance Movement. The LMI(a) was the group's external wing.
50. Chamran (b. 1933) was well-qualified for his cover, since he had earned a BA, with honours, in electrical engineering at Tehran University, an MS at Texas A&M, and a Ph.D. in civil engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. He had also worked for Bell Laboratories in New Jersey. After going to California for graduate studies in 1961, Chamran founded the Muslim Students Association. He served as Islamic Iran's Defense Minister
51. US intelligence believed that in exchange for training at Burj al-Shimali, the Iranians helped Fatah secure false documents, make travel arrangements, and acquire weapons; see Defense Intelligence Agency, *International Terrorism: A Compendium, Volume II - Middle East (U)*; in Asnad, Vol.43, pp.19, 27.
52. Ajami, p.195; Seale, p.352. Ghotbzadeh (Islamic Iran's Foreign Minister) also linked up with a Paris-based terrorist-support service called Solidarite; see C. Sterling, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism* (London, 1981), p.55, and confirmed by a retired CIA officer in a confidential interview (11 April 1992). On Solidarite, see also CIA, *International Terrorism in 1978 (March 1979)*, p.3.
53. Norton, *Amal and The Shi'a*, p.57.
54. E. Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin* (London, 1989), pp.85-9, 98, 126-7, 137-9; S. Chubin, 'Leftist Forces in Iran', *Problems of Communism*, July -August 1980, pp.15 -18.
55. DIA, *International Terrorism*, in Asnad Vol.43, p.27.
56. E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton, 1982), pp.473-79; C. Mallat, 'Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon', *Papers on Lebanon*, no.7 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, April 1988), p.12; S. Bakhsh, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York, 1984, 1986), pp.38-40.
57. A. Taheri, *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution* (London, 1985), pp.166-67, 224, 254, 271; Bakhsh, p.63, 110, 244.

58. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp.483-89; 'Palestinian Activity in Iran , 1979, in *Asnad*, Vol.42, p.92; Sterling, p.322 fn 24. See also Chubin, pp.11-15.

59. Stoakes, p.220.

60. Keesings, 1969-1970, p.23297, 23580; A. Alam (A. Alikhani, ed.), *The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977* (London, 1991), p.38, 62. Another account has it that relations were broken when three employees of Lebanon's General Security Directorate were suspected of giving information to SAVAK; see Y. Caroz, *The Arab Secret Services* (London, 1975), p.355.

61. Biographical information and information on Qadar's SAVAK career was secured in confidential interviews with four SAVAK Department chiefs, two COS's, two other SAVAK officers, two retired CIA officers, one MFA official, and from the reminiscences of Qadar in FIS. An abbreviated version of Qadar's biography is presented in *Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat i Pahlavi*, Vol.II, *Jostarha-i as Tarikh-i Moaser-i Iran* (Tehran, 1990), p.479. A sanitized version is presented in *Echo of Iran, Iran Who's Who*, 3rd ed. (Tehran, 1976), p.426. Qadar declined three requests for an interview, once in May 1992 and twice in Oct. 1992.

62. The dossier on Shaghghi contained claims that he had played a part in blocking Bakhtiar's extradition.

63. Musaddiq had been born into the Ashtiani 'clan', and Mohammad Hussein Ashtiani allegedly had phoned a warning to Musaddiq that Nassiri was on his way with the royal decree dismissing him; see Dr M. Musaddiq (H. Katouzian, ed.), *Musaddiq's Memoirs* (London, 1988), p.69.

64. Confidential interview with a SAVAK officer serving in Beirut at the time (16 Oct. 1992).

65. On the proposed hospital and the Shah's reaction to Qadar's interference, see Alam, p.301. Information on the proposed break-down of funding sources is from confidential interviews with a SAVAK Department head (29 Oct. 1992) and a SAVAK officer serving in Beirut at the time (16 Oct. 1992).

66. Confidential interview with a SAVAK officer serving in Beirut at the time (25 June 1992). On money from the Shah to the Palestinians, see also Alam, p.215. The existence of these payments was confirmed in confidential interviews, two with SAVAK Department chiefs (29 Oct. 1992 and 10 Feb.1993) and one with a SAVAK official who met with Arafat in Jordan (27 Oct. 1992). The Shah was funding Arafat in an attempt to help King Hussein preserve his throne, because the PLO was a threat to King Hussein's rule, and Iran preferred a Hashemite Jordan to a Palestinian one. A Palestinian Jordan would be, furthermore, a direct threat to Iran's major regional ally, Israel. By May 1972, however, the Shah was sufficiently irritated by PLO training of Iranian terrorists that he considered termination of the funding; Alam, p.215.

67. Allegedly, the friendship between Pashai and Sadr involved them in plots against the Shah in 1963, when Teimour Bakhtiar visited Lebanon and allegedly met with Pashai, Sadr, Iranian embassy official Parviz Atabaki, and a Khomeini representative at the Coral Beach Hotel. At this meeting it was decided to send a \$1 million contribution by Nasser to Iran to sponsor anti-Shah demonstrations. See 'Sayyid Musa Sadr Keh Bud?', p.44. Both Pashai and Atabaki were recalled and confronted with this story by SAVAK, and they both denied (and still deny) this story emphatically. Atabaki described the questioning he underwent in a letter in the author's possession.

68. Confidential interview (16 Oct. 1992). See also, Nourizadeh, p.47.

69. Fardust's 'autobiography' states that Qadar, far from trying to recruit Sadr, actually furnished him with intelligence; see Zohur va Soqut-i Saltanat-i Pahlavi, Vol.1, Khatirat-i Arteshbod-i Sabegh Hussein Fardust (Tehran, 1980), pp.468-71. This work was compiled by the Islamic Republic's Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and it consists of Islamic Republic propaganda, the imprisoned Fardust's confessions, and some inaccurate historical filler.

70. Information on Sadr's trip to Cairo is from interviews with the Cairo COS (27 Oct. 1992), a SAVAK officer based in Beirut at the time (16 Oct. 1992), and two SAVAK Department chiefs (24 Oct. 1992 and 29 Oct. 1992). Information on the actual meeting was confirmed by the COS. The two Department chiefs personally saw the letter, as did the COS.

71. From the sources in the previous note. The withdrawal of citizenship or suspension of passports was a common SAVAK method for dealing with expatriate Iranians who were believed to be opposed to the Pahlavi government. Said trouble-makers would be kept out of Iran so their revolutionary ideas would not infect the general population. The only thing this tactic really accomplished was further irritation of the person whose passport was being held. For a discussion of this tactic, see the interview with Hassan Alavi-Kia by H. Ladjevardi for the Harvard Iranian Oral History Project (1 March 1983, Paris).

72. Confidential interview with a SAVAK officer based in Beirut at the time (30 Dec. 1992).

73. Alam, p.366. The belief that Sadr may have received Iraqi money in early-1974 is repeated in Norton, Amal and The Shi'a, p.41.

74. Confidential interview with a SAVAK officer then stationed in Lebanon (16 Oct. 1992); confirmed by Amb. Jafar Raed (27 April 1993, London). On Shirazi, see also Shapiro, p.139.

75. Halawi, p.190.

76. Theroux, p.41. See also R. Calis, 'The Shiite Pimpemel', The Middle East (Nov. 1978), p.52.

77. On 'stooge', see Norton, Amal and The Shi'a, p.41. On Shariati's burial see Chehabi, pp.209-10, and Ajami, p.220. Information on UNIFIL and SAVAK is from J.K. Cooley, 'Shah promotes security in Lebanon', Christian Science Monitor, 19 April 1978, p.7, and a confidential interview with a SAVAK Department chief (10 Feb. 1993).

78. M. al Sadr, 'L'appel des Prophetes', Le Monde, 23 Aug. 1978.

79. Asnad, Vol.18, p.129.