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COPY

PRELIMINARY PROJECT DEVELOPMENT PLAN

FOR AN

ADVANCED MANNED SPACE PROGRAM

UTILIZING THE

MARK II TWO MAN SPACECRAFT

Classification changed to U
By authority of E.O. 11652 - 6/1/72
Date 2/14/79 - Lally Hoss

Space Task Group
Langley Field, Virginia

August 14, 1961

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT - TITLE UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
	SUMMARY	
1.0	INTRODUCTION	1
2.0	MISSION OBJECTIVES	2
2.1	Long Duration Flights	2
2.1.1	Manned	2
2.1.2	Animal	2
2.2	Radiation Studies	2
2.3	Controlled Land Landings	2
2.3.1	Dispersion Control	3
2.3.2	Landing Impact	3
2.4	Rendezvous	3
2.5	Training	4
2.6	Backup for Apollo	4
2.7	Program Philosophy	4
3.0	SPACECRAFT	6
3.1	Basic Spacecraft	6
3.1.1	Basic Spacecraft Weights	6
3.1.2	Adaptability for Advanced Missions	6
3.2	Effect of Mission Duration	6
3.2.1	Life Systems	7
3.2.2	Attitude Control System	7
3.2.3	Electrical Power Supply System	7
3.2.4	Spacecraft Weights for Longer Missions	8
3.3	Rendezvous Missions	8
3.3.1	Mission Concept	8
3.3.2	Special Equipment	11
3.3.3	Spacecraft Weights	11
3.4	Touchdown Control	11
3.4.1	Maneuvering Requirements and Capability	12
3.4.2	Special Equipment	12
3.4.3	Weights	12
3.4.4	Land Impact Attenuation	12
4.0	BOOSTER	14
4.1	Introduction	14
4.2	Description	14
4.2.1	Stage I	14
4.2.2	Stage II	16

[redacted]

4.3	Special Modifications	17
4.3.1	Performance Modifications	17
4.3.2	Modifications for Reliability	17
4.3.3	Abort Sensing System	18
4.4	Reliability	18
4.5	Performance	18
4.5.1	Circular Orbit Capability	18
4.5.2	Elliptical Orbit Capability	18
5.0	TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN	19
5.1	Spacecraft	19
5.2	Booster	19
5.3	Flight Test Plan	19
5.3.1	Qualification and Radiation Test (Flight Test No. 1)	19
5.3.2	Eighteen Orbit Test (Flight Test No. 2)	20
5.3.3	Long Duration Tests (Flight Tests Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 8)	20
5.3.4	Rendezvous Tests (Flight Tests Nos. 5, 7, 9, and 10)	20
5.4	Master Schedule	21
6.0	MANAGEMENT PLAN	22
6.1	Project Concepts	22
6.2	Assignment of Responsibilities	23
7.0	RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS	25
7.1	Manpower Assignments	25
7.2	Project Support	25
7.3	Project Office	25
7.4	Summary	26
8.0	COST SCHEDULE	27
9.0	CONCLUSIONS	28
	Appendix - Program Potential - Deep Space	29
	Tables	
	Figures	

[redacted]

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Basic Spacecraft Weight Derivation - 2 Man 18 Orbit

Table 3.2 Special Rendezvous Equipment

Table 3.3 Equipment Currently in Production that is Suitable for Rendezvous Missions

Table 3.4 Rendezvous Spacecraft Weight Derivation

Table 4.1 Booster Reliability Summary

Table 5.1 Flight Test Plan

Appendix

Table A-2.1 Equipment Added for Deep Space Navigation

Table A-2.2 Deep Space Mission Weight Derivation

Table A-7.1 Flight Test Plan - Accelerated Program

[redacted]

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.1 Interior Arrangement

Fig. 3.2 Estimated Weight Statement (18 Orbit)

Fig. 3.3 Life Support System

Fig. 3.4 Weight Required for Addition of Second Crewman - Δ Weight vs. Time

Fig. 3.5 Attitude Control System - Δ Weight vs. Time

Fig. 3.6 Electrical Power Supply System - Δ Weight vs. Time

Fig. 3.7 Basic Mission Spacecraft - Effective Launch Weight vs. Time

Fig. 3.8 Rendezvous Δ V Requirements

Fig. 3.9 Rendezvous Minimum ΔV Requirements - Variable Azimuth

Fig. 3.10 Events Required to Complete a Rendezvous Mission when Spacecraft Launch Occurs within the Limits of the Launch Window

Fig. 3.11 Velocity Available for Rendezvous

Fig. 3.12 Interior Arrangement - Rendezvous in Orbit

Fig. 3.13 Rendezvous Spacecraft - Effective Launch Weight vs. Time

Fig. 3.14 Reentry Maneuvering Envelope

Fig. 3.15 Effect of L/D on Maneuvering Envelope

Fig. 4.1 Modified Titan II

Fig. 4.2 Duplicated Guidance and Control System (MISSING)

Fig. 4.3 Circular Orbit Capability of the Modified Titan II

Fig. 4.4 Elliptical Orbit Capability of the Modified Titan II for 90 N.M. Perigee

Fig. 4.5 Excess Velocity Available for Different Insertion Altitudes Using Modified Titan II

Fig. 4.6 Anticipated Lifetime as a Function of Apogee Altitude

Fig. 5.1 Test Plan

Fig. 5.2 MK II Mercury Spacecraft - Two Man Version Development Test Plan

Fig. 5.3 Modified Titan II Booster Development Test Plan

Fig. 5.4 Master Schedule

Fig. 6.1 Project Organization

Fig. 8.1 Cost Schedule

Appendix

Fig. A-1.1 Total Velocity Available for Deep Space Probe After Effecting Rendezvous with Spacecraft at 100 N. M.

Fig. A-2.1 Deep Space Probe Spacecraft - Effective Launch Weight vs. Time

Fig. A-3.1 Deep Space Missions

Fig. A-3.2 Apogee Altitude Obtainable After Effecting Rendezvous with Spacecraft at 100 N. M.

Fig. A-5.1 Master Schedule - Deep Space Mission

Fig. A-7.1 Master Schedule - Accelerated Program

Fig. A-7.2 Cost Schedule - Accelerated Program (MISSING)

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SUMMARY

A plan is presented for a program of manned space flight during the period from 1963 to 1965. It would include flights of several days' duration and the development of rendezvous techniques. Some radiation study and long duration animal flights also would be performed. In all, the program would consist of ten flights. A two man version of the Mercury spacecraft would be used in conjunction with a modified Titan II booster. The Atlas-Agena B combination would be used to place the Agena B into orbit as the target vehicle in the rendezvous experiments. This use of existing or modified versions of existing hardware minimizes the necessity for new hardware development. It is proposed that a Project Office be established to manage both the present Mercury project and the program presented here. A statement of the manpower required is presented to demonstrate how this management function would be performed. It is believed that this program would produce valuable and needed information and that it would complement other programs now underway or contemplated while not interfering with their prosecution. It is estimated that it will cost about three hundred and fifty million dollars.

In an appendix, a further plan is presented which would exploit the experience gained in long duration flights and rendezvous experiments. Under this plan the program would be extended to gain experience with rendezvousing with liquid hydrogen fueled vehicles. It is then proposed that an excursion to the vicinity of the moon be made by mid 1964. (Some of the less rewarding early shots would be eliminated to meet the proposed schedule for this plan.) Only nine flights would be involved with the last four utilizing the Centaur as the rendezvous target injected into orbit by the Titan II booster. This program is estimated to cost about three hundred and sixty million dollars.

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SPACE AGENCY BARS GEMINI MOON TRIP

HOUSTON, Tex., Oct. 13 (UPI)—The space agency has ruled against a proposal to send two astronauts around the moon aboard a Gemini capsule, an official said Wednesday.

Dr. George Mueller, chief of the man-in-space program, said the Gemini project of ten earth-orbit flights probably would be finished by early 1967, when emphasis would shift to the larger three-seat Apollo spaceships that are to take astronauts to the moon.

The nation's first manned lunar landing is expected in late 1968 or 1969.

The lunar mission with a Gemini capsule was suggested in a study by the Martin Company and McDonnell Aircraft Company, two top contractors on the $1.35 billion Gemini program, as an interim step leading toward a manned lunar landing.

Dr. Mueller said Wednesday the cramped Gemini craft conceivably could be modified for lunar trips. But, he said, "I see no need for" such a voyage.

The first manned trip in an Apollo is expected in late 1966 at the earliest.

→ MCL/Carel

Cross file

See List Below

SEP 30 1965

MC/Capt. Freitag

Circumlunar Gemini Flights

I am forwarding the attached correspondence to you at Mr. Webb's request. It is for the information and use of you and your staff as a guide as this indicates NASA's position on possible circumlunar Gemini flights.

Original signed by
Robert F. Freitag

Robert F. Freitag
Director
MSF Field Center Development

Enclosure:
Copy of ltr from Congressman
Teague to Mr. Webb dtd 8/18/65
and copy of ltr from Mr. Webb
to Congressman Teague dtd 9/10/65

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MSC: AA/Gilruth
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUITE 2317-2325 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 18, 1965

Mr. James E. Webb
Administrator
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

Much discussion is now taking place on the possibility of a circumlunar flight using a Gemini system prior to the Apollo lunar landing.

We would appreciate your point of view as to this as a possible program. Further, if additional funds were available, would you feel that a Gemini circumlunar flight should be accomplished or such funds used in the Apollo program?

Your comment will be of assistance to the continuing review of our National Space Program by the Oversight Subcommittee.

Sincerely yours,

OLIN E. TEAGUE
Chairman
Subcommittee on
NASA Oversight

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

September 10, 1965

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

Honorable Olin E. Teague
Chairman, Subcommittee on NASA Oversight
Committee on Science and Astronautics
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

With reference to your request for my views on the possibility of a circumlunar flight, using a Gemini system, prior to the Apollo lunar landing, you will note that the enclosed statement, which was submitted to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on August 23, indicates that in the process of accomplishing the lunar exploration mission with Apollo, our program will give us experienced crews, operating know-how, and the ground and space equipment to undertake quite a number of other scientific and technological developments. The point is also made that our on-going and approved missions will require, for the next several years, the peak performance of the scientific, engineering, industrial and facilities complex that we have been expanding since 1961.

As indicated to the Senate Committee, we are not ready to recommend major new projects on the order of Gemini or Apollo. Our main objective now is to see that our basic current responsibilities are met effectively. I also feel that the Apollo system now being developed can meet our requirements for knowledge and capability better than the adoption of other courses of action.

The insertion in our program of a circumlunar flight, using the Gemini system, would require major resources. We are now proceeding with many complex developmental, test, and operational efforts with too thin a margin of resources. Therefore, if additional funds were available, I believe it would be in the national interest to use these in the Apollo program.

As you will remember, I testified in 1961 that the USSR would most likely have the capability and therefore accomplish ahead of us each major milestone in space up to the lunar landing and exploration with manned vehicles. We have clearly stated over the past few years that they will do a lunar fly-by with men before we can accomplish this with the Apollo system. However, there is certainly no assurance that we could do this in advance of them with a modified Gemini system. Further, our main reliance for operating

lunar distances and developing a thorough-going capability that can achieve preeminence in space, and hold it, is the large Saturn V/Apollo system. The fact that this has been under contract for several years; that full duration test runs have been made on each stage of the Saturn V booster; that we now have an eight-day Gemini flight behind us and will shortly have information from a 14-day flight; and the fact that the Apollo ground test equipment has largely been fabricated and the flight line equipment will shortly be constructed and delivered means that we have a growing competence that we and the world can see is considerably beyond anything the Russians have shown us, including Proton One. Therefore, I do not believe a decision not to make the substantial investment that would be required by a modified Gemini lunar fly-by will change the posture which our program has had for a number of years.

Sincerely yours,

Original signed by
James E. Webb

James E. Webb
Administrator

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MGS/Mr. Eldon W. Hall

DATE: April 3, 1964

FROM : MGS/John L. Hammersmith

SUBJECT: Advanced Gemini, Circumlunar Mission

The attached material represents the current status of my attempts to block out some aspects of the launch vehicle and spacecraft systems which are pertinent to the subject mission.

A spacecraft weight requirement is presented and defended, characteristics of a number of stages are tabulated, the pad situation at AMR is summarized, and several candidate vehicle and stage combinations are briefly analyzed. With respect to the latter, weight and performance data are not of uniform quality since some vehicles and stages are in use, or the data was derived from detailed studies, while other data are my own "rough cuts". I hope that I have been sufficiently conservative, however, to forestall radical variations in the event that more serious study of any of these is undertaken.

These rough notes illustrate many of the considerations and engineering problems involved. Financial matters have not been treated. Scheduling played a part only to the extent of aiming at the 1967-1970 time period with minimum disturbance to Gemini and Apollo programs. No conclusions or recommendations are made since the intent has been to work up some raw material for discussion and possible deeper study.

John L. Hammersmith

John L. Hammersmith

Unclassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GEMINI L SPACECRAFT

Reference: McDonnell Direct Flight Apollo Study, Report 9182, Volume II, Fall 1962

The "Lunar Gemini II" spacecraft was selected from the referenced document as a basis for deriving a reasonable spacecraft weight to be used in performance calculations. This configuration seemed closest to the present Gemini 14-day spacecraft which would likely serve as a design starting point. This hypothetical spacecraft was dubbed "Gemini L". The derivation went as follows:

1. The reference document listed Lunar Gemini II and Gemini 14-day system weights side-by-side.

2. The paraglider landing system weight was subtracted from the 14-day set and the parachute weight of Lunar G. II substituted.

3. The lighter structure for L.G. II was not allowed; the 14-day structural weight was substituted.

4. The gross growth of the 14-day total from that in the document to December 1963 was applied to the resulting L.G. II total. (This growth was approximately 6.8%)

5. Since the Lunar Gemini system utilized a service module and Gemini L would not, the December 1963 adapter weight was added.

6. For the same reason an enlarged propellant capacity OAMS system, based on December 1963 figures, was also added.

The "Gemini L" so obtained weighed 8867 lbs. In the absence of design studies, a round figure of 9,000 lbs. was adopted as reasonable and conservative for rough calculation. The 1,000 ft/sec ΔV capability in the OAMS system could be used for injection ΔV, midcourse corrections, maneuver in the lunar vicinity, or some of the weight could be traded for retro and/or abort rockets. It may be expected that experiment and communication weights will tend to be heavier than allowed.

One of the principal developmental problems associated with the circumlunar Gemini spacecraft will concern the heating problems on the after body on re-entering the earth's atmosphere. Present Gemini shingles are barely adequate for present Gemini missions; much improved shingles would have to be developed, or a decision made to use an ablating surface instead (as with Apollo).

No account has been taken of the possible requirement of a launch escape tower, or of any other abort mode or mechanism. It was presumed that a 72 hour (one way) "free return" trajectory was adequate; and it must be recognized that, in the absence of a service module, no substantial modification of the trajectory is possible after translunar injection. The ΔV required for injection from low earth orbit onto the 72 hour trajectory is approximately 10,300 ft/sec.

WEIGHT

GEMINI 14 Day vs. GEMINI L

	Gemini 14 Day	Gemini L
Command & Reentry Module	4361	5680
Basic Structure	1333	1409
Heat Shield	324	718
Crew System	985	1120
Communications + Instruments	295	742
Experiments	-	90
(Little difference in remainder)		
Adapter	2134	3187
Structure	425	425
Equipment	1130	1302
OAMS (wet)	368	460
OAMS, Useable Propellant (No Retro)	211	1000*
Total S/C Injected	6495	8867

*Provides approximately 1000 ft/sec ΔV.

LAUNCH VEHICLES

It is apparent that there is little choice in launch vehicles. Furthermore, the development of upper stages, or rendezvous stages, is likely.

Qualification of hardware for manned flight will be a complicating factor. In the following mission plans an attempt was made to stay close to existing developments, proposing minimum modifications.

Short of Saturn V, the only hope for a single launch, direct flight requires development of a hydrogen third stage for the Saturn IB.

The present GLV cannot launch a 9,000 lb. spacecraft. The following plans which utilize it presume its performance can fairly readily be improved a sufficient amount by augmenting the first stage with relatively small, strap-on, solid motors. There is little basis at this time for believing that NASA, or the AF, will buy into the major GLV improvement program proposed by Martin Company and Aerojet General.

CANDIDATE SPACE PROPULSION STAGES

Stage	Burnout Weight	Propellant Capacity Oxidizer & Fuel	Specific Impulse	ΔV with 9,000 lb. S/C	Gross Weight with Spacecraft
Transtage Titan III	4,400	22,900 15,450 & 7,450	314	10,100	36,300
GLV Stage 2	5,700	60,300 38,500 & 21,800	310	16,526	75,000
GLV Stage 2	5,700	26,586 (off-loaded) 16,975 & 9,611	310	10,300	41,286
S-V + IU	7,500	28,200 23,500 & 4,700	430	13,788	44,700
S-V + IU	7,500	18,237 (off-loaded) 15,197 & 3,040	430	10,300	34,737
S-V	5,500	16,026 (off-loaded) 13,355 & 2,671	430	10,300	30,526
Centaur	4,000+	14,368 (off-loaded) 11,973 & 2,395	430	10,300	27,368
Agena D	1,500	13,077 9,409 & 3,668	290	7,547	23,577
Agena enlarged	2,300	22,783 16,392 & 6,391	290	10,300	34,083
2 Agena's (parallel)	3,200	26,154 18,818 & 7,239	290	10,688	38,354

AMR Pads

Pad No.	Vehicle	Responsible Agency	Remarks
11	Atlas	AF	
12	Atlas-Agena	AF	NASA use exclusively
13	Atlas-Agena	AF	Joint NASA-AF use
14	Atlas-Agena (Gemini)	NASA	
15	Titan II	AF	Martin study for
16	Titan II	AF	LeRC estimates 13 months to convert to Titan-Centaur-Surveyor
19	Gemini LV	NASA	
20	Titan III Core	AF	Five vehicles only, then ITL will handle
34	Saturn IB	NASA	
37A		NASA	No launches programmed, under study
37B	Saturn I/IB	NASA	
36A, B	Centaur	NASA	Single blockhouse
39	Saturn V	NASA	Two pads
40, 41	Titan III	AF	ITL Complex

ADVANCED GEMINI, CIRCUMLUNAR MISSION

Some Vehicle Combinations

Mode	Launch Vehicles	Rendezvous Stages
EOR	Saturn IB GLV	Two Agena's (parallel) Gemini L
EOR	Titan III GLV	Centaur (single burn) Gemini L
EOR	Saturn I (2½ stages) GLV	Centaur (2 burns) Gemini L
EOR (tanking)	Titan III Titan III	Oxidizer Tanker Transtage + Gemini L
Direct	Saturn IB (3 stages)	Gemini L

MISSION: Advanced Gemini, Circumlunar

MODE: Earth Orbit Rendezvous, Spacecraft Coupled to Space Propulsion Stage

LAUNCH VEHICLES:

1. Saturn IB (Payload: 33,000 to 35,000)
2. Thrust Augmented GLV (Payload 9,000+)

RENDEZVOUS STAGES: (LV Payloads)

1. Two Agena's in parallel

Dry weight	3,200
Docking adapter and thrusters	2,500
Mainstage propellants	26,154
OAMS propellant	800
Adapter to LV and shroud	2,000
Gross payload to orbit	34,654

2. Manned Gemini L Spacecraft

Gross weight in orbit	9,000

DEVELOPMENT AND AVAILABILITY:

1. Technical difficulty in mating Agena's to the IB.
2. There may be a problem getting IB's.
3. Gemini uprating required for parabolic re-entry.
4. Requires NASA sponsored development to increase GLV capability.

ATTRACTIVE FEATURES:

1. Natural follow-on to Gemini in exploiting orbiting operations.
2. Use of "standard" strap-on solids is cheap, minimum difficulty, way to obtain modest performance gain from GLV.
3. Except for solids, all elements are part of NASA program, and, for the most part, of Gemini.
4. Pad availability should not be a problem.

UNDESIRABLE FEATURES:

1. Marginal capability to accomplish the mission.

2. Possible interference with Apollo.

3. Does not advance techniques of orbiting operations beyond Gemini.

4. Other than achieving circumlunar flight prior to Apollo, contributes little to the advancement of space flight that is not already programmed.

MISSION: Advaned Gemini, Circumlunar

MODE: Earth Orbit Rendezvous, Spacecraft Coupled to Space Propulsion Stage

LAUNCH VEHICLE:

1. Titan III (Payload capability to low orbit: 25,000+)
2. Thrust augmented GLV (Payload 9,000+)

RENDEZVOUS STAGES: (LV Payloads)

1. Centaur (No burn prior to translunar injection)

Dry weight	4,000
Docking adapter and thrusters	2,500
Mainstage propellants	17,100
OAMS propellant	800
Gross in low orbit	24,400

2. Manned Gemini L Spacecraft

Gross weight in orbit	9,000

TRANSLUNAR INJECTION STAGE AND SPACECRAFT:

Centaur	23,600
Spacecraft	9,000
Gross weight	32,600
Total ΔV and ΔV required	10,300

DEVELOPMENT AND AVAILABILITY:

1. Titan III scheduled to be operational in mid 1966.
2. Spacecraft production begins near time when present Gemini SC production ends.
3. Gemini uprating required for parabolic re-entry.
4. Minimum modification to Centaur.
5. Requires NASA sponsored development to increase GLV capability.

ATTRACTIVE FEATURES:

1. Natural follow-on to Gemini in exploiting orbiting operations.
2. Use of "standard" strap-on solids is cheap, minimum difficulty, way to obtain modest performance gain from GLV.
3. Essential elements are part of the national space and missile program, and therefore, "proven".
4. Gemini pad will become available at right time, and Titan III complex should be able to absorb this program.
5. No serious development problems.
6. Does not appear limited by LV payload capabilities.
7. Centaur burn not required prior to translunar injection.

UNDESIRABLE FEATURES:

1. Titan III launch vehicle is AF and pad modification would be required to handle Centaur payload.
2. Does not advance techniques of orbiting operations beyond Gemini.
3. Other than achieving circumlunar flight prior to Apollo, contributes little to the advancement of space flight that is not already programmed.

MISSION: Advanced Gemini, Circumlunar

MODE: Earth Orbit Rendezvous, Spacecraft Coupled to Space Propulsion Stage

LAUNCH VEHICLE:

1. Saturn I plus partial use of space stage (Required gross to low orbit: 24,400)
2. Thrust augmented GLV (Payload 9,000+)

RENDEZVOUS STAGES: (LV Payloads)

1. Centaur (burned once to complete launch)

Dry weight	4,000
Docking adapter and thrusters	2,500
Mainstage propellants	17,100
OAMS propellant	800
Gross in low orbit	24,400

2. Manned Gemini L Spacecraft

Gross weight in orbit	9,000

TRANSLUNAR INJECTION STAGE AND SPACECRAFT:

Centaur	23,600
Spacecraft	9,000
Gross weight	32,600
Total ΔV and ΔV required	10,300

DEVELOPMENT AND AVAILABILITY:

1. Technical difficulty mating Centaur to Saturn I.
2. Saturn I "pipeline" has not been filling for vehicles beyond SA-10 for some time.
3. Gemini uprating required for parabolic re-entry.
4. The last Saturn I is scheduled for mid '65. If this were to follow the Gemini program, ending in mid '67, Saturn I production capability will be non-existent without special, and expensive, attention.

DEVELOPMENT AND AVAILABILITY: (Cont'd)

5. Requires NASA sponsored development to increase GLV capability.

ATTRACTIVE FEATURES:

1. Natural follow-on to Gemini in exploiting orbiting operations.
2. Use of "standard" strap-on solids is cheap, minimum difficulty, way to obtain modest performance gain from the GLV.
3. Essential elements are directly derived from NASA programs.

UNDESIRABLE FEATURES:

1. Does not advance techniques of orbiting operations beyond Gemini.
2. Probably the only reasonable way to solve the "phasing" problem between ending Saturn I production in '65 and starting flights for this program in '67 would be to interfere with the present Gemini program.
3. Other than achieving circumlunar flight prior to Apollo, contributes little to the advancement of space flight that is not already programmed.

MISSION: Advanced Gemini, Circumlunar

MODE: Earth Orbit Rendezvous, Transfer Oxidizer from Tanker to Space Propulsion Stage

LAUNCH VEHICLES:

Two Titan III Launch Vehicles
Payload capability to low orbit:
25,000+ per vehicle

RENDEZVOUS STAGES (LV PAYLOADS):

1. Oxidizer Tanker

Dry weight (incl. Thrusters):	3,800
Oxidizer	16,000
400 ft/sec OAMS propellant	1,000
Tanker gross weight	20,800

2. Manned Gemini L spacecraft with Titan III transtage attached (no oxidizer)

Gemini L (propellants in)	9,000
Transtage (wet)	4,400
Transtage fuel	7,450
Gross weight	20,850

TRANSLUNAR INJECTION PROPULSION STAGE & SPACECRAFT

Rendezvous Stage #2	20,850
Oxidizer transferred (Transtage is fully loaded)	15,450
Gross weight	36,300
Total ΔV (Transtage & Gemini L) (less any used for rendezvous maneuvers)	11,100
ΔV Required for Injection	10,300

DEVELOPMENT & AVAILABILITY:

1. Titan III scheduled to be operational in mid-1966.
2. Tanker is new.
3. Gemini uprating required for parabolic re-entry.
4. Fuel transfer in orbit is new and will require development flights as well as development of transfer equipment.

ATTRACTIVE FEATURES:

1. Natural follow-on to Gemini in exploiting and further developing orbiting operations.
2. Minimum pad availability problems because the dual pad system is designed for high firing rates with little possibility of saturation in near future.
3. Minimum, operational, dual launch problems because identical launch vehicles are used from a single, pad complex.
4. Minimum NASA development problems with propulsion stages since these will all be "man-rated" under the Titan III program.
5. Does not appear limited by LV payload capability.
6. Profits from use of "work horse" standard LV's in contrast to expensive, tailored LV's not used in other programs.

UNDESIRABLE FEATURES:

1. Possible conflict with MOL program.
2. Launch system is AF and not NASA.

MISSION: Advanced Gemini, Circumlunar

MODE: Single Launch, Direct Flight

LAUNCH VEHICLE:

Three Stage Saturn IB, high energy third stage

Payload capability to lunar injection conditions: More than 10,000 lbs. with almost any type of hydrogen third stage ever proposed for use on this vehicle, including Centaur, S-V, S-VI, MMM, High-Energy SM

CIRCUMLUNAR SPACECRAFT:

Gemini L

DEVELOPMENT & AVAILABILITY:

1. Two-stage Saturn IB will be man-rated and operational.
2. High energy third stage is new.
3. Gemini uprating required for parabolic re-entry.
4. Pad 37A usage is under study and could be available.

ATTRACTIVE FEATURES:

1. Straightforward operational method to achieve mission.
2. Pad availability probably not a problem.
3. Not limited by launch vehicle payload capability.
4. Profits from NASA developed launch vehicle.

UNDESIRABLE FEATURES:

1. Requires development of a man-rated high energy stage.
2. Possible conflict with Apollo.
3. Escape tower will be required.