



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
New York, New York

FGJ:JKB
62-6795

July 8, 1941

file 7/10

~~PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Attn: Mr. L. B. Nichols, Asst. Director

Re: ~~Bacteriological Warfare by~~ b6
~~Hitler:~~

[redacted] Informant. b7C

Dear Sir:

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE b7D

Reference is made to Mr. Nichols' telephone conversation with Mr. T. J. Donegan on Saturday, July 5, 1941, during which Mr. Nichols advised that it was the Bureau's desire to have [redacted] interviewed in connection with statements regarding the possible use of bacterial warfare by Hitler made in a book on sabotage [redacted]

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RECORDED 100-93216-X
INDEXED 11-5-7-0

Mr. Nichols further advised that [redacted] was reported [redacted]

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the statements [redacted] in the book on sabotage [redacted] indicated that [redacted]

Hitler was experimenting with the use of diseased germs such as tularaemia, which germs, it was contemplated, would be refrigerated and then thrown from airplanes on civilian population in the prosecution of Nazi wars, as reportedly set forth in the official German Army Journal of September, 1939.

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NCL BEHIND FILE

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DECLASSIFIED BY *60211 uclms/bj/pan*
ON 11-13-03

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CHI 6

Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

informant of the New York Office, developed for the purpose of supplying information regarding the activities of German refugees. [redacted]

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[redacted] To date [redacted] has not been used as an informant by the New York Office.

On July 5th and again on July 7, 1941, [redacted] was interviewed by Special Agent [redacted] of this office, in accordance with Mr. Nichols' request. [redacted] stated that [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] appears to be very much opposed to Hitler and his Nazi regime in Germany [redacted]

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[redacted] expressed every willingness to cooperate with the Bureau and was, in all respects, frank and straightforward in his statements.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] knew nothing regarding Hitler's possible plans for the use of bacteriological war; that the only information he had on the subject was derived from material which he had read [redacted]

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[redacted]

Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

[redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] According to the information received from the Bureau, [redacted]

[redacted]

At the time [redacted]

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[redacted] he was interviewed by reporters from what he believed was the "New York Journal American" [redacted]

[redacted] During the interview with these reporters the subject of bacteriological war evidently developed and [redacted] referred the reporters to material which he had read in the book entitled, "The Voice of Destruction", by Hermann Rauschning. On pages 1 and 2 of chapter 1 of this book Rauschning reports a conversation with Hitler when two other persons were present, during which Hitler mentioned bacteriological warfare and stated that he was then experimenting with this as to its practicability and so forth. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

No copy of [redacted] is being transmitted with this letter because it is believed that the Bureau is already in possession of a copy of this book and can check on the references made to it.

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[redacted]
[redacted] an article entitled, "The Bacteriological War", by O. Hartmann. This article, in full, was originally published in the "Norse Journal of Military Medicine" [redacted] this article, as contained on page 434 of the September, 1939 issue, Volume 9, of "Der Deutsche Militararzt."

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[redacted], photostatic copies were obtained of the article which appeared in "Der Deutsche Militararzt", as well as the original full-length article which appeared in the "Norse Journal of Military Medicine." These two photostats, together with an English translation of the German article, made by Special Agent [redacted] of the New York Office, are being transmitted herewith to the Bureau.

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[redacted] shortly after the above-mentioned article appeared in the "Der Deutsche Militararzt" the Nazi Ministry of Health circulated an article on tularaemia (rabbit fever) in the Reich Health Paper ("Reichsgesundheitsblatt") to all German doctors. [redacted]

[redacted] tularaemia is practically unknown in Germany and the whole of Europe, although it is much more common in the United States. It should be pointed out that tularaemia is specifically mentioned as a possibility in connection with bacteriological war in the articles

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Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

mentioned above. [redacted] Hitler might be seriously considering bacteriological war, in view of the fact that the Reich Ministry of Health was evidently informing German doctors on the subject of Tularaemia for which, [redacted] no antitoxin has been developed to date, so that the German medical profession might be fully familiar with the disease in case any emergency might develop subsequently.

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[redacted]
an article which had been offered for publication but never published, [redacted] entitled, "Is a War of Bacteria Possible?" Two copies of this article [redacted] [redacted] are being transmitted with copies of this letter to the Bureau. The article consists largely of [redacted] thoughts and comments regarding the article, "The Bacteriological War", which was summarized in "Der Deutsche Militararzt". [redacted]

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It should be pointed out that [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] did not recall having read anything additional on the subject in question.

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[redacted] knowledge of Hitler's character as obtained through report and by reputation only and from the material mentioned above [redacted]

Director

New York, New York
July 8, 1941

[redacted] Hitler would not hesitate to use bacteria in waging war if the exigencies of any war demanded its use to assure a Nazi victory. [redacted] the use of bacteria in warfare was a part of Hitler's military program which he was probably holding as an "ace in the hole". [redacted] the article on bacteriological war which appeared in "Der Deutsche Militararzt" could possibly have originated in Nazi brains and then have been presented in the German Military Journal as the product of a Norwegian. [redacted] Hartmann, the alleged author of the article, sounded more like a German than a Norwegian name.


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In case the original articles might be desired subsequently by the Bureau, it should be pointed out that the photostatic copies transmitted herewith were obtained from originals in the library of the New York Academy of Medicine, 2 East 103rd Street, New York City.

Very truly yours,


E. J. CONNELLEY,
Assistant Director.

Enclosures (5)

Special Del.

Penetrating wound of the chest, with report of
case-punch wound

60

Der bakteriologische Krieg

Der bakteriologische Krieg

42

Bericht über die Bluttransfusion zur dem
Schlachtere

36

Berichte

Bericht über die Bluttransfusion zur dem

Bericht über die Bluttransfusion zur dem

ADDRESS ALL LETTERS, ETC. TO:
THE LIBRARY,
N. Y. ACADEMY OF MEDICINE,
2 EAST 108th ST., NEW YORK CITY

*Deutsche
Omlitararz*

4
1939

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-82 BY 60262 u/s/aw/ajp/aw
977600

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-05 BY 60207 uc/um/bj/ptm
977600

THE BACTERIOLOGICAL WAR by O. Hartmann.

Norse Journal of Military Medicine (Vol.)
42, (Page) 45 and German Synopsis (page)
52 (1938) (In Norwegian)

After a reference to the importance of epidemics in former wars (there is given a) warning against underestimation of bacteriological attack, since in a war of the future every manner of attack will probably be seized upon and the further development of bacteriology could furnish better possibilities herefor than those of that time. The attack will apparently be directed chiefly against the civil population, insofar as one's own troops cannot be protected against contagion by immunization - during use at the front. Of the various possibilities for infection the direct infection of wounds by means of pus excitors, anthrax, tetanus and gas burns through infected projectiles is considered to be infeasible in practice, likewise a transmission of the causes of sexual diseases is out of question.

There are difficulties as to breeding or intensification of virulence against the use of diseases transmissible by air such as grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, smallpox and poliomyelitis. On the other hand the infections occurring by way of the stomach-intestinal-canal such as typhus, paratyphus, amoebic and bacillic dysentery and cholera are very usable, especially however dysentery as up to the present immunization against it (has been) impossible. In connection with this attention is called to the possibility of transmission by means of infected flies and other insects. Also Malta fever and Bang's Disease, which are transmitted from animal to man, can be used under (certain) conditions, likewise Weil's Disease by means of infected rats. More importance is to be attributed to tularemia however, as it is especially suitable, (having) exceptional contagiousity together with a lack of a specific therapy. A spread of malaria must also be considered, also the transmission of spotted typhus is completely possible, as the production of infected lice in great numbers has been mastered.

Infection with pestilence by means of rats seems less apparent, on the other hand the danger of dissemination of

pestilence-cultures, which can be easily produced, is in reality larger. Also virus infections are possible, the transmission of parrot fever (being) especially easy. As means of attack the airplane will apparently be used and the infection result from the throwing down or strewing of cultures (which will be) probably mixed with indifferent substances of heavier specific gravity or from infected flies which are kept immovable at 10° centigrade. The distribution by espionage practices is also alluded to. Attack is to be expected soonest against thickly populated cities.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-14-03 BY 602167 UC/MSJ/gj/Proc

977600

IS A WAR OF BACTERIA POSSIBLE

Hitler makes mysterious insinuations about new frightful weapons with which he intends to annihilate his opponents. In making these statements has he in mind the war of bacteria, is this awful possibility, to which reference is made again and again, more than a devilish Utopia, is such a war of bacteria actually thinkable and feasible?

There were times during which pestilence and cholera devastated the world. These epidemics ravaged more momentously and more cruelly, than wars with large casualty lists. Old people, women, children fell victims to them indiscriminately. By tremendous efforts and at great pains humanity has conquered these enemies. We owe it to measures of hygiene and the findings of medical research that the most dangerous epidemics today hardly constitute a threat to the civilized parts of the world.

Only a diseased brain could evolve the thought of misusing the progress of science and its heroic discoveries: not to prevent epidemics but to engender their outbreak.

Undoubtedly everyone has heard or read of the "war of bacteria" now and then, the fewest among us have been able to form any definite conception of it. Only a small minority di-

vines that the "war of bacteria" is the most horrible, the most criminal weapon that the urge to destroy on the part of man has ever conceived. No imagination suffices to visualize the reality of this threat. That this threat is to be taken seriously, that it can be carried out and that forces are now at work to convert it into actuality, we learn unequivocally from the work of Captain O. Hartmann, reported in the magazine "Der Deutsche Militärarzt" (The German Army Physician) (Year IV, Vol. 9, page 434, September 1939).

It is a shaking experience to read this work, that considers the possibilities of the use of bacteria as a weapon in warfare, in the manner of objective and sober scientific report. At first you believe that you are learning something new about a new medical treatment in combatting epidemics and only gradually do you realize, that it is not the meaning of this work to describe a new manner of healing, but a new manner of merciless annihilation.

At first the significance of epidemics in former wars is referred to. Undoubtedly the idea of the war of bacteria is traceable to a circumstance almost totally unknown, namely that the fate of a war is decided far more by the amount of disease, than by the number of wounded. That at least has been the case in all the wars fought up to the present. In the American Civil War the ratio of wounded to diseased was 1:8.7 and in the

last World War it was 1:3.8. The thought is therefore obvious, in this "total" war of the present, to augment the number of diseased on the enemy's side by means of artificial interference, to such an extent that his activity and his fitness as a combatant is decisively impaired.

Captain Hartmann warns against depreciation of the bacteriological attack, since future wars would renounce no manner of attack whatsoever and since the further development of bacteriology has created the best possibilities for this manner of attack.

The attack by means of bacteria will in all probability be directed principally against the civilian population. Application at the front would only be expedient, if their own troops had previously been protected by inoculation from contagion by the same bacteria used in the attack.

With the most minute detail the various groups of germs are discussed that may be considered for mass dissemination. Bacteria that necessitate direct contact between the carrier and the object of attack or which must be transferred directly to wound surfaces, are unsuitable for the war of bacteria, because the likelihood of infection is not great or because the technical difficulties are too great. For these reasons wound infection by means of bullets infected with pus germs, spleen gangrene, tetanus and gas gangrene, is not practicable.

Likewise the transfer of the germs of venereal diseases might not be practicable.

Great difficulties are also foreseen in the case of infectious diseases, where infection takes place via the air route through the respiratory organs. Among these are grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, small-pocks and polyomyelitis. On the one hand the technical difficulties to be overcome in the breeding of the germs of these diseases are too great, on the other hand, it will not be possible to manufacture bacteria cultures, whose virulence is strong enough, to accomplish their work of destruction surely.

Gradually it becomes clear to us, what demands bacteria must fulfill, in order to function properly in warfare: it must be possible to breed them easily in huge masses, the bacteria cultures must possess a high and durable virulence, it must be possible to transfer them readily and unnoticed and they must breed diseases, against which there is no protection and for which there are practically no remedial possibilities.

Seen from these view points, the germs through which infection is effected by way of the gastric channel, already behave in a far more military manner. Among them are typhoid, paratyphoid, cholera, amoeba-and-bacillus dysentery. The germs of dysentery are considered as particularly valuable. Why?

Protective vaccinations may be employed against the other members of this group. Dysentery, however, enjoys the privilege, that so far it has been impossible to immunize against it, besides it can easily be caught through infected flies and other insects.

In the war of bacteria diseases will rise to honor, that thus far have only been encountered rarely on the European continent. Obviously it is advantageous to the strategy of bacteria, if the diseases that are bred, have so far been little known to the population; the panic is increased, the possibilities of protection and defence dwindle. Thus Malta fever is recommended, also known as undulant fever or Brucellensis, that is somewhat prevalent in some parts of the United States, in Texas and New Mexico. It is carried through animals and the specific medical treatment has so far shown visible successes only in chronic cases. The Weil disease may be placed in the same category, which latter disease has appeared in New York so far only in three cases. It is carried through rats. In this instance treatment also is almost powerless.

Particular military significance in the war of bacteria is attributed to rabbit fever; "It is particularly adapted because of its extraordinary infectious qualities with a lack of specific therapy."

Rabbit fever has been almost unknown in Europe up to the present, while in the United States and in Japan it plays an important part. It is carried from diseased rabbits, squirrels, rats and mice by means of flies and insects to human beings and is an extremely lingering, painful and dangerous disease. Spreading it in epidemic form in densely populated residential districts would be a capital crime against humanity. "The spreading of malaria must be reckoned with," the paper continues. Malaria has already increased during and after the world war in Central Europe, because it was continually being carried in from the south-eastern fronts and because the Anophele-fly, the intermediate-carrier of malaria, has its hotbeds in Central Europe also. It would indeed be easy to accomplish an epidemic-like spreading of malaria in Europe by means of a bacteriological attack. "The infection of spotted fever is absolutely possible, because the breeding of infected lice is controlled." So the report in the magazine "Deutscher Militaerarzt" sets forth. Spotted fever, as it is well known, is only carried through lice. During the last war thousands were the victims of this terrible disease. Since lice may be counted among the greatest winners of a war, and since the fact that the civilian population is more affected in this war will lead to a far quicker failure of all hygienic precautions than in 1914-1918, it will hardly be necessary to call upon artificial help to experience the outbreak of an epidemic of spotted fever. The contemplation,

however, that the fliers of bombers in this new war, will shower millions of infected lice on the suffering countries, instead of explosives, is more horrible and more grotesque, than the visions of Dante's Inferno.

"The infection with pestilence through rats seems less likely, on the other hand the danger of dissemination of pestilence cultures, which are easily manufactured, is considerably greater." During the entire duration, of the last war, pestilence did not break out in a single spot, not even on the Asiatic fronts. If the enemies of humanity should succeed in letting loose a new epidemic of pestilence all over the earth, this would be the most atrocious crime in world history.

As far as the technical procedure in the spreading of epidemics in the war of bacteria is concerned, we learn that the plane would in all probability be the medium of attack and that infection would be brought about by throwing off and dispersing of bacteria cultures. In order to insure the "safe" landing of these devilish substances, they would be mixed with indifferent and specifically heavy substances. Still another ingenious method is mentioned. Flies become rigid at a temperature of 10° Celsius. Thus a tremendous quantity of infected flies may be placed in a plane. The "cooled" flies are thrown off like ballast and upon landing in a warmer temperature again become capable of moving - and attacking. Dissemination via

the espionage route is also referred to.

"The attack is primarily to be expected against thickly populated cities." Thus the article closes. It seems like a bad dream and if one had not seen it black on white before one's very eyes, one would consider this objective presentation of an insane and infamous plan, impossible. There is still the hope that none of the belligerent powers has put it into effect or ever will. For bacteria know no nations, no boundaries, no political phantoms. They know only one enemy: humanity, the inhabitants of our earth. In the most frightful manner this barbaric weapon should strike back at him, who dares to put it to use.

Since no madness is impossible in these wretched times, when the fate of millions is subject to the fancies and notions of a few, it is imperative that steps be taken to safeguard mankind from this extreme madness. Anyone who knowingly and notoriously becomes an accomplice in this war of bacteria, should be punished as a marauder and murderer and should not enjoy the protection of a legitimate combatant. Acquiescence in this or a similar agreement should be demanded of every nation, simultaneously with a solemn obligation, to renounce the war of bacteria in every form. The Red Cross or any other neutral organization could accept these declarations.

It is a far cry from the alleged poisoning of wells of the middle ages to the throwing off of bacteria from planes of this day and age. Civilization must be spared the disgrace, that the great deeds of her progress have led to nothing more,

than back to the road of the most sinister and inhuman
barbarism.

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

| |
|---------------------|
| Mr. Tolson..... |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm..... |
| Mr. Clegg..... |
| Mr. Glavin..... |
| Mr. Ladd..... |
| Mr. Nichols..... |
| Mr. Tracy..... |
| Mr. Rosen..... |
| Mr. Carson..... |
| Mr. Coffey..... |
| Mr. Hendon..... |
| Mr. Holloman..... |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm..... |
| Mr. Nease..... |
| Miss Gandy..... |
| Files..... |

February 3, 1942

Ed
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of January 30, 1942, containing confidential information on the possible use of bacterial warfare.

This information has been placed in the hands of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service for his confidential use.

Sincerely yours,



Administrator

Hon. John Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60262 ucl/mud/bj/ama

RECORDED

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100-93216-122
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FIVE -

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FEB 11 1942
124

RECORD ONE

65-96320-3

January 30, 1942

RECORDED

~~65-96320-3~~
100-93218-X1

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Honorable Paul V. McNutt
Administrator
Federal Security Agency
Social Security Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McNutt:

RECORDED BY SLAB
3-7-90
307009

A confidential informant, [redacted] recently advised this Bureau that [redacted] convinced that a Japanese-American war was inevitable. During an interview, [redacted] Japanese would make war on the United States within fifteen years.

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This source of information further reported that [redacted]

[redacted]

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anthrax bacilli dysentery and typhus germs as some of the methods to be employed in the bacterial warfare.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

[redacted]

the Japanese would resort to this or any other means to achieve success in the present hostilities.

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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
JAN 31 1942
F. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

8 FEB 17 1942
27-124

EX-6

100-93216-K1
~~100-93216~~
65-35320

January 30, 1942

RECORDED

LLL:OME

CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1AG/SC
ON 5/2/90
307009

Dear Sir:

A confidential informant, [redacted] recently advised this Bureau that [redacted] convinced that a Japanese-American war was inevitable. During an interview, [redacted] Japanese would make war on the United States within fifteen years.

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b7D

This source of information further reported that [redacted]

[redacted]

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anthrax bacilli dysentery and typhus germs as some of the methods to be employed in the bacterial warfare.

[redacted]

[redacted] the Japanese would resort to this or any other means to achieve success in the present hostilities.

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Very truly yours,

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
JAN 31 1942
Assistant Chief of Staff
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

John Edgar Hoover
Director

41704

41702

Handwritten signatures and initials

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
January 14, 1942

*done
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/7/90 BY SP1AGS/C

307009

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Re: JAPANESE ACTIVITIES

On December 10, 1941 [redacted]

[redacted] appeared at the Milwaukee
Field Division with the following information which may be
of interest to the Bureau.

[redacted]

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[redacted] In this interview [redacted]
forecast that Japan would make war on the United States within
fifteen years. As of possible interest to the Bureau, the
Milwaukee Sentinel clipping of December 8, 1941 is enclosed

[redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] anthrax bacilli dysentery and typhus germs
as some of the methods to be used for this bacterial warfare.

ENCLOSURE 10
*done
H*


COPY IN FILE

*let me see
let O. J. E.
ex. B. in
1/14/42
1/14/42*

RECORDED

100-93216-11
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
16 JAN
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

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Director
1-14-42

Pg. 2

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the Japanese people [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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would stop at absolutely nothing to win the war. He said that the human mind is incapable of visualizing the means to which the Japanese would resort to achieve their ends.

Very truly yours,



H. T. O'Connor
Special Agent in Charge

FMP:els
Enclosure

TDB:MJ

February 25, 1942

RECORDED

100-93216-13

Honorable Paul V. McNutt
Administrator
Federal Security Agency
Social Security Building
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Dr. Thomas Parran
Surgeon General
U. S. Public Health Service

Dear Mr. McNutt:

Thank you for your letter of February 10, 1942 and for your kind offer to furnish this Bureau verbally information relative to diseases considered important in warfare and sabotage by the Surgeon General, Dr. Thomas Parran.

I have designated [redacted] of the Technical Laboratory of this Bureau to receive this information from Dr. Parran. [redacted] will arrange to meet with Dr. Parran in Dr. Parran's office at his convenience.

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Trusting that the above arrangements will meet with your approval, I am

Sincerely yours,

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
 MAILED
 FEB 26 1942 P.M.
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED
 FEB 25 1942
 U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
 FBI
 RECEIVED ROOM 2840
 FEB 25 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 ucl/mel/jap/m

6 MAR 11 1942

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



DML:WGR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

February 17, 1942

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MEMORANDUM FOR [redacted]

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Boehm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

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In connection with the attached letter, it is suggested that it be acknowledged by you and that [redacted] or someone from the Laboratory be designated to contact the Surgeon General for the purpose of securing the confidential information referred to herein.

Very truly yours,

D. M. Ladd
D. M. Ladd

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Attachment

2 ENCL. 13
6/11/42
3

Letter to Surgeon 2/25/42

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uc/mud/bja/PSM

RECORDED
100-93216-83
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
13 FEB 28 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

C.
G-2
P
X
L.D.OME.

January 1942

Sent to Paul V. Mc Nutt.
Director of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

A confidential informant [redacted] recently advised this Bureau [redacted] that a Japanese-American war was inevitable. During an interview had with this individual by a representative of the press, on April 5, 1925, he forecast that Japanese would make war on the United States within fifteen years.

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[redacted]

[redacted] German doctors in Japan were there for the sole purpose of teaching Japanese the art of bacterial warfare and some day Germany would get its revenge over the United States through the Japanese use of that mode of warfare. [redacted] anthrax bacilli dysentery and typhus germs as some of the methods to be employed in the bacterial warfare.

[redacted]

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc - Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-8-03 BY 60267 uc/mw/gj/PAW

ENCLOSURE
100-93216-X3
~~100-93216-X2~~



THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON

Office of
THE ADMINISTRATOR

February 10, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

| | |
|----------------|---|
| Mr. Tolson | ✓ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | ✓ |
| Mr. Clegg | ✓ |
| Mr. Glavin | ✓ |
| Mr. Ladd | ✓ |
| Mr. Nichols | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen | ✓ |
| Mr. Tracy | ✓ |
| Mr. Carson | ✓ |
| Mr. Coffey | ✓ |
| Mr. Hendon | ✓ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | ✓ |
| Mr. Nease | ✓ |
| Miss Gandy | ✓ |

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I wish to acknowledge and thank you for your letter of January 30 concerning Japanese and German plans for bacterial warfare.

The whole subject is being studied by the Public Health Service and also by a special secret committee which has been appointed for that purpose. The Public Health Service is represented on this secret committee.

The matter has been discussed with the British and Canadian authorities and contact is maintained with organizations set up by them for this purpose. I request that any information which your agents may obtain concerning this subject be forwarded directly through me to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, who will be charged with presenting the information to the secret committee.

With particular reference to the three diseases mentioned in your letter, the following statements may be made:

It is almost certain that typhus cannot be established here under any conditions now existing.


Small outbreaks of dysentery could be considered as acts of sabotage, but should be controlled without much difficulty.

The possibility of producing human cases of anthrax is negligible. However, it might be built up in a few years to a higher incidence in stock animals.

Information concerning the diseases considered of real importance will be communicated verbally to you by the

ENCLOSURE
100-93216-X3

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-83 BY 60267 uel/mel/ja/ma

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
John Edgar Hoover

-2-

2/10/42

Surgeon General, if you consider such information necessary.

Very sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Paul V. McNutt". The signature is written in a cursive style with a prominent initial "P" and a long, sweeping underline.

Paul V. McNutt

Mr. John Edgar Hoover,
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Director
1-14-42

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Pg. 2

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In conclusion [redacted] stated that through his close association with the Japanese people and a study of their character and methods he was of the opinion that they would stop at absolutely nothing to win the war. He said that the human mind is incapable of visualizing the means to which the Japanese would resort to achieve their ends.

Very truly yours,

H. T. O'Connor
Special Agent in Charge

HMP:els
Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 nls/bja/ptm



IN REPLYING ADDRESS
DIRECTOR
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH

FEDERAL SECURITY
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
BETHESDA, MARYLAND

March 4, 1942.

[Redacted]
Technical Laboratory
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

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Dear [Redacted]

The Public Health Service has been informed that you have been designated by Mr. Hoover to receive from the Surgeon General, information relative to diseases considered important in warfare and sabotage.

I wish to inform you that Dr. Dyer, Director of the National Institute of Health, who is now out of the city, is interested in this matter and will confer with you upon his return. Dr. Dyer is expected to return on the sixteenth of this month.

Very truly yours,

LFB
L. F. Badger, Acting Director
National Institute of Health

*Major in contact 3/17/42
by phone
and on 3/18/42*

Bacterial Warfare

LFB:CDW

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 Nib/bja/prac

RECORDED & INDEXED
100-93216-14
100-93216-13

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
15 MAR 7 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

7 MAR 24 1942
3/18/42
124
134

EX-18

FIVE

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH
BETHESDA, MARYLAND
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/13/85 BY 60267 uq/mw/ljg/rae



PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$30



Technical Laboratory
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
San Francisco, California
March 21, 1942

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY UC/NAC/PAW 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 11/13/2028

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/7/90 BY SP1AG/SC

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Please advise what steps, if any, should be taken by
this office under the premises.

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

Very truly yours,

N. J. E. Pieper
N. J. E. PIEPER
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

307009
3/25/42
3/7/40

TBE:GG
Encl.

RECORDED

INDEXED

100-72340-1
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
18 MAR 23 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

3/7/90
307009

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 80-627-27

307009

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1 ENCL. 18

PDB:RMB

April 1, 1942

RECORDED
Special Agent in Charge
San Francisco, California

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated March 21, 1942, in the above-entitled matter, requesting advice as to what action should be taken by your Office in this matter. You are instructed to immediately conduct investigation in order to determine whether typhoid vaccine has been sold in unusually large amounts by any of the commercial pharmaceutical concerns or other organizations in the San Francisco Bay area. In addition investigation should be conducted to determine whether there has been an increase in the sales of vaccine in the vicinity of Salinas, California. Based upon the findings of the above investigations, such further investigation should be conducted as is warranted.

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[redacted] should be thoroughly interviewed concerning the basis for his statement that there has been a large increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine used by the Japanese Colony near Salinas, California.

The Bureau desires to be immediately advised as to the results of the investigation conducted by you in this matter.

With reference to the rumor concerning commercial rice which is alleged to have been poisoned in Alameda, California, you are instructed to bring this matter to the attention of the Food and Drug Administration Office in your territory for such further action as they may deem appropriate.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 7
★ APR 1 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

33 APR 15 1942

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

SP1AGSC
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RECEIVED
APR 3 1942

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RECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-93216-217

PDB:RMB

98-8332 -1

April 3, 1942

cc: "POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE, SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE"

Special Agent in Charge
Seattle, Washington

CONTAINED
3/7/90 DISPIAGSC
307009

b6 Re: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS

b7C [REDACTED]
SABOTAGE

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Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the closing report of Special Agent [REDACTED] dated March 14, 1942 at Seattle, Washington, in the above-entitled matter relating to the spreading of germs by Japanese persons.

The San Francisco Office presently has under investigation the case entitled "POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE, SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE" in which it is alleged that there has been an increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine to the Japanese Colony near Salinas, California, although this has not yet been verified. The report in this matter was originally furnished by the Military Intelligence Service. It is suggested that the Japanese may intend to use typhoid bacteria against citizen populations of this country.

In view of the possible connection between the incident as reported in Seattle and the matter under investigation in San Francisco, you are instructed to re-open the instant case for additional investigation in an effort to determine the identity of the Japanese informant in this case. If [REDACTED]

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 98-8332

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm Because of the possible effects of knowledge of this information Mr. Clegg and the rumors which might start from it, extreme discretion should be Mr. Glavin used in mentioning it to any outside persons.

- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Holloman
- Mr. McGuire
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

APR 24 '42

Very truly yours,
John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED
INDEXED
100-93216-2
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
APR 15 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EX-18

followed by [unclear]
FAC [unclear] 19-42
PDB



COPY 4-

March 20, 1942

TDB:AL

MR. TRACY

Re: The possible use of disease organisms in Sabotage

[Redacted]

[Redacted] A representative of this Bureau was invited to receive orally from [Redacted] information concerning [Redacted]

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[Redacted] of the Laboratory was designated as the Bureau's representative and he called upon [Redacted] on March 18, 1942 to receive this information. [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 98-0-1656

Respectfully,

E. P. Coffey

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED
INDEXED
Jan

100-93216-31
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
APR 22 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

APR 27 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uel/nw/bja/paw

0 Biological Warfare

RECORDED

100-93216-4
PDB:wmc

June 19, 1942

Special Agent in Charge
San Francisco, California

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

DATE 3/7/90 BY SP1 ABJ/C
307009

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
Sale of Typhoid Vaccine to Japanese

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated June 3, 1942, in the above-entitled matter requesting copies of Bureau letter to your Office dated April 1, 1942, inasmuch as a search of the files of your Office has failed to reflect any information relating to this letter.

In accordance with your request there are attached hereto copies of the Bureau's letter dated April 1, 1942.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosures

- r. Tolson _____
- r. E. A. Tamm _____
- r. Clegg _____
- r. Glavin _____
- r. Ladd _____
- r. Nichols _____
- r. Rosen _____
- r. Tracy _____
- r. Carson _____
- r. Coffey _____
- r. Hendon _____
- r. Holloman _____
- r. McGuire _____
- r. Quinn Tamm _____
- r. Nease _____
- ss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
 MAILED 11
 ☆ JUN 20 1942 P.M.
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED JUN 20 1942
 JUN 20 11 58 AM '42

S. F. ...
7/18/42
6/18/42

Oh
at

(Handwritten mark)

wmc
 11 JUN 20 1942

San Francisco, California
June 3, 1942

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
Sale of Typhoid Vaccine to Japanese

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated May 19, 1942,
Bureau file No. 100-93216, wherein reference was made to Bureau
letter dated April 1, 1942.

Please be advised that a search of the San Francisco
files fails to reflect any information concerning Bureau letter
dated April 1, 1942. It is respectfully requested that the Bureau
supply this office with copies thereof in order that this investi-
gation may be conducted.

Very truly yours,

H.J.L. PIEPER
Special Agent In Charge

HLM:MK
100-9518

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3/17/90
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172
FILE COPY

100-93216-4

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

San Francisco, California
June 3, 1942

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
Sale of Typhoid Vaccine to Japanese

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated May 19, 1942,
Bureau file No. 100-93216, wherein reference was made to Bureau
letter dated April 1, 1942.

Please be advised that a search of the San Francisco
files fails to reflect any information concerning Bureau letter
dated April 1, 1942. It is respectfully requested that the Bureau
supply this office with copies thereof in order that this investi-
gation may be conducted.

Very truly yours,

N.J.L. Pieper
N.J.L. PIEPER
Special Agent In Charge

HLM:NK
100-9518

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-7-90 BY SP1/BJD

307009

RECORDED

100-93216-4
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
15 JUN 8 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



COPY IN FILE

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100-93216

August 18, 1942

pdh;pf

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-12-03 BY 60267 uc/uuw/bja/Prad

Special Agent in Charge
San Francisco, California

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated June 19, 1942, in the above entitled matter, transmitting copies of a letter to your office dated April 1, 1942, in which you were instructed to immediately advise the Bureau as to the results of the investigation conducted by your office in this matter.

To date no information concerning this case has been forthcoming from your office as requested, and you are instructed to submit a report to the Bureau within seven days after this letter is received by your office.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

RECEIVED - CIVIL RIGHTS
AUG 18 10 45 AM '42

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 3
★ AUG 19 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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100-93216-5
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
AUG 21 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

354
72 AUG 22 1942

80639

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA**

FILE NO. **100-9518**

| | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|--|---|
| REPORT MADE AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. | DATE WHEN MADE 8/24/42 | PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 8/8,9,10,15; 8/11/42 | REPORT MADE BY [Redacted] JSS |
| TITLE POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE | | CHARACTER OF CASE INTERNAL SECURITY J | |

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

It was reported that there had been an increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine to Japanese Colony near Salinas, California. Investigation with wholesale drug houses in San Francisco, California failed to reflect any increased demand for their vaccine.

DETAILS : This report is predicated upon information obtained from [Redacted] that Japanese were buying large quantities of typhoid serums.

AT SALINAS, CALIFORNIA

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [Redacted]

[Redacted] advised that a salesman for the McKesson and Robbins, druggists supply house, had been in Salinas on 2/28/42 and had remarked that the Japanese druggists were buying large quantities of typhoid serums, and that he had received an order for 50 vials at one drug store. [Redacted] did not know the salesman's name, but that the salesman indicated that he did not want to discuss the situation, as he was interested in selling supplies and receiving a commission, rather than reporting unusual activities to the authorities.

APPROVED AND FORWARDED:

myl P. [Signature]

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

- 5 BUREAU COPIES OF THIS REPORT
- 2 ONI, San Francisco
- 1 G-2, " "
- 2 Seattle (info)
- 2 SAN FRANCISCO

100-93216-6

RECORDED & INDEXED

3 SEP 5 1942

COPY FILE

CLASSIFIED BY [Redacted] 11-13-08
DECLASSIFY ON: [Redacted] (D) 11-13-2028

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In view of the fact that such large purchases of typhoid serum would indicate either that the Japanese were preparing themselves for the evacuation from this area or that there was some contemplated contaminating of the water supply, it was believed that a check of drug supply houses should be made.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
[redacted] a check be made at the following drug supply houses for the sale of typhoid serums - McKesson and Robbins, Cutter Laboratories in Berkeley, and the Eli Lilly Company, San Francisco.

[redacted] advised that he had not personally noticed any large sale of the serum, but that he was contacted by all drug houses, as he ran the Salinas Laboratories. [redacted] a drug salesman, was in Salinas at that time, and that he would have the salesman contact the Salinas Japanese Drug Stores in an effort to locate the typhoid serum supplies and see if the Japanese were buying much of the serum.

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Accordingly, [redacted] was contacted and offered to check at each of the Japanese Drug Stores in Salinas.

[redacted] was again contacted later in the day and the following information was received from him relative to his contacting the Japanese operated drug stores.

The Edno Pharmacy, 107 Lake Street, Salinas, was contacted and there were four or five Japanese in the store discussing something in Japanese, later [redacted] were discussing what they should do about their children, in case they should be evacuated from Salinas. They were discussing the value of immunizing their children against various diseases, such as, whooping cough, diphtheria and typhoid.

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[redacted] called at the drug store in a routine manner to check up on the catalogs and dating of the stock they had with the Cutter Company. He talked with [redacted] who advised that they owned the [redacted] Salinas.

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Both of the above mentioned Japanese were interested in obtaining some Pertussis Vaccine and Tetanus Toxoid. They did not show any great interest in Typhoid Vaccine; but when it was mentioned, they indicated that they had recently purchased a large quantity of typhoid vaccine, [redacted] was unable to determine from whom it was purchased.

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[redacted] discussed frankly the problem that faced the Japanese evacuating this area, and stated that they had certain items in their two stores that they would like to turn back into the Cutter laboratories in exchange for some items which they wanted, namely;

Diphtheria Toxoid, Typhoid Vaccine and Tetanus Vaccine. [redacted] that the Cutter products were exchangeable and that the men would have to list the products to be exchanged. [redacted] then went to the other store, the [redacted] and left some catalogs, meanwhile talking with the drug clerk at that store, who advised that they had recently purchased a large quantity of typhoid vaccines, but refusing to say who from. [redacted] the vaccines were purchased to immunize Japanese families.

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[redacted] then called at the FUJI Drug Store, 23 Lake Street, where the druggist accepted some catalogs but would not discuss his stock [redacted] [redacted] was not contemplating any purchases at present as the Japanese affairs were too unsettled. [redacted] the operator of the Fuji Drug Store acted in a hostile manner, and would not engage in conversation, simply advising that he was not interested in any drugs and that he didn't wish to discuss any of them.

[redacted] was unable to obtain any accurate information as to the exact quantity of the stock of typhoid vaccine the druggists had on hand, but did determine that they were interested in immunizing their families against certain diseases.

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[redacted] was again contacted on 3/4/42 and advised that the following drug supply houses would be able to furnish information as to the amounts of vaccines sold to Japanese druggists :

Lederle Anti-Tox Laboratories, San Francisco, California(274 Brannan)
Parke-Davis Company, San Francisco, California(350 Mission)
E. R. Squib and Company, San Francisco, California(608 Folsom St.)
Eli Lilly Company, San Francisco, California(450 Mission)
Coffin and Robbins, Jobbers, San Francisco(801 Folsom)
Sharpe and Donahue, Mfr. Co., San Francisco(132 2nd St)
McKesson Langley and Michael Co., Jobbers, San Francisco(50 1st St.)
Guth Brothers, San Francisco, California(811 Flood Bldg.)

~~Confidential~~ Informant [redacted] advised the following -

[redacted] reports that there has been a large increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine used by mouth or injection in the Japanese Colony around Salinas, California. [redacted] advised, in a letter quoted in part below, that particular attention should be given paragraph 8; in that regard, suggesting that a check be made on Japanese research doctors and workers employed in state, municipal and university laboratories, as it would be possible for these people to obtain Shiga Dysentery cultures and cholera cultures.


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In this connection the following is supplied upon reliable information reveals a subversive rumor is circulating in Alameda, California, that commercial rice has been poisoned. In consequence of this rumor civilians are refusing to purchase rice.


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





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AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA (Following investigation conducted by the writer)

[redacted] C. Rodolph Guth Company, Flood Building, advised that this company deals in wholesale drugs, and sells to the general retail stores and stated that the company has only two Japanese drug stores on their books, and they are NIPPON DRUG COMPANY, Stockton, California, and the HISAWA DRUG COMPANY, in San Francisco, California.

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He further stated that this company handles typhoid serums, and have not had anything other than normal amount of orders for typhoid serum, and that he has had no orders from any Japanese drug companies for some time.

He further advised that he would notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event that at anytime there is an unusual amount of activities in connection with the sale of any drugs which would tend to show, an unusual amount of sales.

[redacted] E. R. Squib Company, 608 Folsom Street, advised this company is in the business of manufacturing drugs and selling their products to wholesale druggists and hospitals, and that there has been no unusual sales of typhoid serum to anyone to whom they have been dealing with, and advised that the following is a list of the Japanese customers that have in the past purchased drugs :

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| ICHIOKA DRUG STORE | LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA |
| OKONOGI SANITARIUM | FRESNO, CALIFORNIA |
| STANDARD DRUG COMPANY | SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA |
| FIRST & SOTO PHARMACY | LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA |
| SHOWA DRUG COMPANY | " " |
| KYOSAI DRUG COMPANY | " " |
| TENSHAW DRUG COMPANY | " " |
| RAFU SHOYU COMPANY | " " |
| ICHIOKIA CLINIC | " " |
| THE OKA COMPANY | WEST " |
| NIIPPON DRUG COMPANY | SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He further stated that none of these companies have made any unusual amount of purchasing of drugs, but stated that he would cooperate and notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event that there is an unusual amount of purchasing by anyone.

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[redacted] Lederle Anti-Tox Laboratories, 274 Bran-
nan Street, advised that this company does such a small amount of business
with any Japanese druggists, that it can be considered negligible, and has
never sold any typhoid serum to any Japanese, but deals in the serum.

They have shipped a great deal of the serum to Honolulu on U. S.
Government order. He advised that he would cooperate with the Bureau and
notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event he has, or he learns of
any unusual amount of traffic in drugs and more particularly the typhoid
serum.

[redacted] Sharp and Dohme Manufacturing Company,
132 2nd Street, advised that this company does not have any Japanese customers
in San Francisco except the Nippon Drug Company and they have not purchased
any of the typhoid serum.

He advised that this company is a manufacturer of drugs and is in the
general business of selling their products to wholesale and retail druggists.
He further stated that the company manufactures typhoid serum and have sold
some serum to the SAVERMORE DRUG COMPANY in Salinas, California, [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] in the following amounts -

| | | |
|---|----------|---------|
| 2 | vials on | 3/2/42 |
| 3 | " " | " " |
| 5 | " " | 3/15/42 |
| 4 | " " | 2/26/42 |

He stated that this is not an unusual amount of sales for this time
of the year, that he would cooperate in anyway that he could with the Bureau.

[redacted] McKesson, Langley and Michaels
Drug Company, 50 1st Street, advised that this company is in the business of
wholesale drugs, and sell their products to retail druggists. They handle

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

typhoid serum and that most of the sale is now to the United States Government.

The company sells to almost every Japanese druggist, and as far as he knows there has been no unusual amount of the serum having been sold to the Japanese. He further stated that this company has not sold any of the serum to any drug stores in Salinas, California, except the **SAVEMORE DRUG COMPANY**, and that was a very small amount of the serum. He further stated that all Japanese drug stores are now on a C.O.D. basis and do very little buying. He advised that he will cooperate in anyway he can with the Bureau, and will notify the San Francisco Field Office if there is any unusual amount of buying of drugs.

[redacted] Parke-Davis Company, 350 Mission Street, advised that this company manufactures and distributes all types of drugs to retail merchants and jobbers, among which are several Japanese druggists, most of whom are in San Francisco and in other towns throughout California. None of the stores however, have made any purchases for over a year of typhoid serum.

This company has no unusual amount of typhoid serum sales so as to suspect that anyone could be securing large quantities of the serum.

He further advised that he would be willing to cooperate with the FBI and would report anything suspicious to the San Francisco Field Office.

[redacted] Coffin, Redington Company, 301 Folsom Street, advised that this company is in the business of wholesale jobbers and purchase their supplies from the Eli Lilley Company and the Cutter Laboratories, and that in his opinion there has been no unusual amount of sales of typhoid serum, and advised that the following are the sales to **SAVEMORE DRUG COMPANY**, in Salinas, California -

| | | | | |
|---------|---|-----------------------|----|---------------|
| 2/25/42 | 2 | vials, sufficient for | 20 | immunizations |
| 3/5/42 | 1 | " | " | 10 " |
| 3/6/42 | 1 | " | " | 10 " |
| 3/9/42 | 2 | " | " | 20 " |
| 3/10/42 | 1 | " | " | 10 " |
| 3/11/42 | 5 | " | " | 50 " |

He further stated that he would cooperate in all matters with the Bureau, and would notify the San Francisco Field Office in the event that he learns of any unusual amount of sales in the drug market.

[redacted] Eli Lilley Company, 450 Mission Street, advised that this company is in the business of manufacturing drugs and distributing drugs to wholesalers, and does not sell to any retailers. [redacted] are their largest buyers of drugs and have purchased a large amount of vaccine, 407 cc of the serum; he further advised

that 2 cc are sufficient for one immunization, otherwise there has not been large purchases from any other organizations, except to Coffin Redington Company, who have purchased recently about 6 20 cc packages of typhoid serum and 5 1 cc packages of typhoid serum.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He was very cooperative and advised that he would be available to assist the Bureau at any time.

P E N D I N G

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNDEVELOPED LEAD

THE SAN FRANCISCO FIELD DIVISION
AT SALINAS, CALIFORNIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WILL interview [redacted] concerning the basis for his statement that there has been a large increase in the sale of typhoid vaccine by the Japanese Colony.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE
Bureau File #100-93216

DATE: June 19, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Nease _____

11-13-2003
CLASSIFIED BY ucjma/bj/paw 60267
DECLASSIFY ON: O 11-13-2008
DERIVATIVE

PURPOSE:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (C)

b1

BACKGROUND:

You may recall that during a Liaison contact at Camp Detrick, Maryland (The Army's Biological Warfare Research Center) by the Baltimore Office, [Redacted] suggested to the Liaison Agent that this Bureau should alert Public Health Agencies throughout the United States to the possibilities of an enemy Biological Warfare attack and that these Agencies should be furnished with information concerning the most likely BW Agents to be used by an enemy.

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The Baltimore Office was subsequently instructed to inform [Redacted] the alerting of such Agencies was not within the jurisdiction of this Bureau and that this matter had been referred to the ICIS. By memorandum dated March 31, 1950, the suggestion made by [Redacted] was furnished to [Redacted] with the observation that the alerting of such Agencies and the furnishing of BW data to them was not within the jurisdiction of this Bureau.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (C)

b1

[Redacted]

b1

EHM:mh

59 DEC 1 1950

9-7-50

RECORDED - 43

100-93216-67

SEP 22 1950

CONFIDENTIAL 26

FILE EHM

[Redacted] EHM

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b7C

Referral/Direct

D. M. Ladd

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1950

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1

](c)

[Redacted]


Referral/Direct

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D. M. Ladd


June 19, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



OBSERVATION:

Referral/Direct



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Referral/Direct

D. M. Ladd

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1950

[Empty rectangular box]

This report contains the following recommendations:

[Empty rectangular box]

ACTION:

None. The above is for your information.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11-1308
CLASSIFIED BY
L. GLASSLEY S

60267 UC/NLS/GJA/PAW

(b) 11-13-2028

January 1942

September 17, 1942

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. TAMM
MR. LADD

FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Bacterial Warfare

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (S)

b1

62-6478-45

b1

b1

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

SP138C 3/7/90 307009
Very truly yours,
Classified by SP1 GSK/ADP
Declassify on: OADR
(26-7) John Edgar Hoover
Director
233934

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

SENT FROM D O
TIME 5:50 PM
DATE 9-17-42
BY [REDACTED]

RECORDED & INDEXED

100-93216-7
B 1
5 SEP 18 1942

~~SECRET~~

57 SEP 21 1942

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Op-16-F-2/152

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OF POSTAGE, \$300.

195

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/08 BY 60267 uc/pas/lj/ra

J. Edgar Hoover, Esquire,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, D. C.

VIA COURIER SERVICE

EPC:EGK

September 17, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267/uc/and/lj/ma

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. TAMM
MR. TRACY
MR. CLEGG
MR. GLAVIN
MR. NICHOLS
MR. LADD
MR. ROSEN

Dear Sir:

It is desired that the Bureau assemble all possible information concerning the known uses and possibilities of bacteria warfare. All information concerning the use of bacteria for warfare or sabotage purposes which comes to your attention should be routed to Mr. Coffey in the laboratory who will coordinate the same. You should also advise Mr. Coffey of any contacts which you may have which might be productive of information of this sort.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAIL ROOM
SEP 21 1942
RECEIVED - ROOM 5400
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
RECEIVED - CIVIL ROOM

100-93216-8
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEP 22 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

37 SEP 26 1942

JEH: DAJ

10:50 a.m.

September 17, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-18-02 BY 60267 ucl/mud/lja/pmc

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. TAMM
MR. TRACY
MR. LADD
MR. COFFEY

Bacterial Warfare

[redacted] who was referred to me by Mr. Paul
McNutt, called at my office today to speak with me in regard to his
work under a Presidential directive with Mr. McNutt's office, which
job is to coordinate and make effective defensive and offensive
bacterial warfare. In this connection one of their problems would
be the detection of bacteria in American materials, food supplies,
water supplies, and other things which are subject to contamination.
He stated that it is definitely known the Germans have a branch of
their armed services for bacterial warfare and that they are making
large quantities of a highly virile strain of anthrax, but that to
his knowledge they have not used this form of warfare as yet against
the United States, Canada, or Great Britain.

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[redacted] indicated that to counteract this a scheme was
adopted to [redacted] of the
Federal Security Agency; that this was his official title and this
would be his front in all matters involving finances, politics,
etc. In addition, the FSA has the job of coordinating the activities
of the Public Health Service and the Food and Drug Administration.
He will be the Director of the Branch of the War Research in
Chemistry (WRAC) which initials the British and certain other
persons on the inside means the Bacterial Warfare Research Coordination.
His duties will be to administer and carry out the program outlined
and to be prepared to carry out any form of antibacterial warfare against
the enemy that may be necessary.

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b7C

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

INDEXED

100-93216-9

He stated that he was coming to me to ask the Bureau's
help on several things. He first wanted to be advised of any
cautions which might have come to us pointing to the use of
warfare of any type by the enemy. I told him that in this connection
I would have a check made of our records to see if we had up to this
time heard of any contamination by bacteria, and further
that we would get anything the British Intelligence may
have on this. I also explained to him the cooperation
which the FBI, OSI and MID were having and indicated that
the British Intelligence and the FBI were closely cooperating.
In addition I outlined to him the procedure we followed
at present in disseminating war information to the

59 OCT 13 1942

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 11:34 PM
DATE 9-24-42
BY 20

Memo for Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd & Coffey - 2 -

interested agencies of the Government. I also explained to him the various intelligence conferences, regional conferences, in Washington and in each of the 50 different field divisions of the Bureau, and other activities of the Bureau which were utilized to more effectively cooperate with the Army and the Navy as well as with the local law enforcement officers throughout the United States. In addition I explained our complete SIS setup and the duties it performed.

He asked if he might use the organization of the Bureau to distribute and gather certain information, and I told him that I thought this would be an excellent idea. He indicated that in addition to the things our SIS agents were now on the lookout for, he would appreciate it if they were also instructed to be on the lookout for any evidences of bacterial warfare in the countries of South America, Central America and the Caribbean. I told him this could be done.

[redacted] stated that he had already contacted JMI and C-2 and they were going to route him the information he desired also. In JMI a [redacted] (phonetic) and in C-2 a [redacted] have been designated to work with him. I told him that I would designate [redacted] in the FBI to be the liaison man with the BUWC. I told him that Mr. Coffey would be available at any time and that if there was anything he wanted from the FBI he should let us know about it. I also suggested that somebody who was thoroughly familiar with this subject might give a lecture to our training school on the work of this division; that I thought it would be of great benefit to our Agents and it would give them information on to whom to turn to get certain analyses and checks made for the purpose of determining whether different places were being properly examined, etc. Mr. Kerck said that the active work would be to nominate one or two of the best men from the Technical Laboratory to act as special instructors to instruct, demonstrate and make special checks. He mentioned that

Mr. Tolson they have a list of about 25 different diseases and plagues which Mr. E. A. [redacted] spread easily among people and animals which would seriously handicap the Nation's war effort, and that although they were not Mr. Glavin equipped to effectively deal with all phases, they were working on the most important problems first. He said that they were cooperating with the Canadians on this program and were trying to develop certain vaccines and other preventatives, and in addition were keeping in mind the fact that we might be able in return to direct these same bacteria back against the enemy to his detriment.

Mr. Coffey [redacted] also wants to find the public standpoint toward bacterial warfare. He stated that this was equally as important to them as the research work they are conducting and the production of any given materials. He said it was the Administration's wish that

Mr. Hendon
Mr. Kramer
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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b7C

Memorandum for Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Eads & Coffey - 3 -

this work not be attached to the Army officially so that it would not be publicly known it was being conducted, and for this reason he was attached to Mr. McNutt's agency, but that in reality [redacted] (phonetic) in the office of the Secretary of War is his superior and directs his activities. The activities of the BWAC are not to be made public until it is quite clear the United States should go the maximum in its defensive and offensive in bacterial warfare. He said that anything that is done by them now, however, would have to fit in with the work of the Army and Navy.

Thirdly, [redacted] will have a division of documentation of records, which is a description to cover public relations, publicity, and having ready for the President certain things to say should certain things happen, down to having people begin to write stories along certain lines in the Saturday Evening Post, Readers' Digest and other widely read periodicals. In charge of this division he has placed [redacted] (phonetic), who was a combat officer in the last war, a chemist, later becoming interested in advertising and publicity, and lastly being a writer. [redacted] asked me to meet him and discuss with him the public psychology angle. I told him I would be very glad to do this; that I thought this was particularly important. I said that in general I thought the public would be in favor of his organization, but that there would probably be a small group, organized very strongly, who would say this should not be done. I told him that I thought his work should be known publicly and should be known soon. [redacted] said that he had to have someone who knows Washington, who knows the country, who knows the administration, to help him shape the ball and then help to carry it. I told him that I would be glad to help him and that the best way I thought was in due time to have certain magazine articles published from the viewpoint of the outside looking in to assure the people that this program is being put into effect.

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[redacted] asked me to have my secretary let him know when Mr. Tolson was going to be in New York. I told him that I was making about two trips each month to New York, and that I would be very glad to let him know when I would be there. He said that while he might not want to talk with me while I was there, he had a feeling that there would be many instances when he felt he should talk over certain things with me, and that he would be in Washington only occasionally.

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Mr. Tracy I introduced [redacted] and instructed Mr. Coffey to give all the cooperation possible in regard to the bacterial warfare program. [redacted] explained to Mr. Coffey that [redacted] was under cover working with Mr. McNutt and was the director of the BWAC. The duties of the BWAC were explained to Mr. Coffey, and I gave him instructions to have the FBI files checked for any indication that bacterial warfare had been used by the enemy; that Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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Memo for Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd & Coffey - 4 -

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b7C

we should contact the British to see if they have any information, but that we should not give the British any idea as to what we wanted this information for, however. I told him that I also wanted arrangements made for any additional information to be routed to [redacted] and that he should arrange with Mr. Tamm and Mr. Ladd for all of this material to be routed to him so he might assemble it. I told him that generally the Bureau would not know of this operation except that instructions would be given that information of this type should be forwarded to him personally. I also told him that he was to be designated as the liaison man between the activities here and Mr. Zerok's organization, and explained to him the other cooperation the BUREAU desired from the Bureau through its field offices, conferences, training school, etc., and further stressed that there should be no bottlenecks and the program should be streamlined.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

CPB:MP

Date: October 1, 1942

To: SAC, Baltimore

RECORDED

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject:

The following quoted advertisement appeared in the September 20, 1942, edition of The Sun, Baltimore, Maryland:

" WANTED WILD RATS

Will buy any number of live uninjured wild rats for 25¢, per rat. Hunterian Bldg., Madison & Wolfe Sts., 4th floor. Deliver between 8:30 A. M. & 5 P. M.

The Bureau desires that you conduct such discreet inquiry as is necessary to determine the identity of the party or parties responsible for the insertion of this advertisement and the purpose thereof.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-12-03 BY 60267 uo/nlw/bjg/raa

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
 MAILED 3
 OCT 1 1942 P.M.
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

F 51 OCT 20 1942

Handwritten initials: fur & R, fur & W

Handwritten initials: MB

September 21, 1942

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MEMO FOR MR. GLAVIN

The following ad appeared in The Sun, Baltimore, Sunday Morning, September 20, 1942.

I am submitting this ad for your consideration because I feel there is a possibility that some persons may be planning to use these animals as disease carriers or to destroy stores of food products vital to our war effort.

Respectfully,

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-85 BY 60267 uc/nuc/gp/pan

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

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3744



100-93216-9X

6 OCT 5 1942

~~Sixty~~
~~FIVE~~

*Letter Baltimore
10-1-42
C.P.B.*

*Bacterial Warfare
See in cr.*



RECEIVED
OCT 1 1942

HMC;LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted]

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You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly. You are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned and to call to their attention the necessity of maintaining secrecy on this entire project.

Very truly yours,

RECORDED

100-93216-10

John Edgar Hoover
Director

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

OCT 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Source: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
Memo from the Director to Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd, and Coffey dated 9/17/42 P.M.
SEP 29 1942

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

37-202-6 1942

RECORDED BY 66267 ucl/mcl/gj/pax
11-13-03

Copy filed in files.

b2
b7D

HMC:LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted]

b2

b7D

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that [redacted]

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b7C

[redacted] should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly. You are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned and to call to their attention the necessity of maintaining secrecy on this entire project.

Very truly yours,

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____ Source:
- Mr. Ladd _____ Memo from the Director to
- Mr. Nichols _____ Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd and Coffey
- Mr. Rosen _____ dated 9/17/42.
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

John Edgar Hoover
Director

100-93216-11

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

OCT 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 11

SEP 29 1942 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

37 OCT 6 1942

11-13-03

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RECEIVED

SEP 30 5 20 PM '42

HMC:LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC POUCH

CONF. INFT. [redacted]

b2

b7D

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly. You are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned and to call to their attention the necessity of maintaining secrecy on this entire project.

Very truly yours,
RECORDED

100-93216-12
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

John Edgar Hoover
Director

OCT 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/vaw/ly/pam
ON 11-13-03

Source: Memo from the Dir. to Tolson, Tamm, Tracy, Ladd and Coffey

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 11

SEP 29 1942 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E.A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Kramer
- Mr. McGuire
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease

RECEIVED OCT 1 1942

RECEIVED OCT 1 1942

100-93216-12



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

September 28, 1942

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

best

CHC:LL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Reference is made to the Director's memorandum dated September 17, 1942, with regard to the Director's conversation with [redacted] relative to bacterial warfare, etc.

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Please be advised that instructions have been forwarded to all FBI attaches to be alert for any information pertaining to the use of bacterial warfare, by way of sabotage or otherwise, in order that they can transmit any such information of any kind whatsoever to the Bureau immediately. The attaches have been instructed to immediately inform other Bureau personnel, undercover and otherwise, concerning the importance of being on the alert for this type of information and immediately advising the Bureau relative thereto. They have been cautioned to treat this as strictly confidential and to be most discreet with regard to any efforts or action that they might take.

All Supervisors in the SIS Division have been instructed to be on the alert for any information of any kind whatsoever pertaining in any way to bacterial warfare and to immediately route such information to Mr. Coffey in the Laboratory.

In the latter connection, Supervisors in the SIS Division are now reviewing files with respect to some past material believed to possibly pertain in some ways to bacterial warfare and related matters. This material is being prepared to be sent to Mr. Coffey for his attention.

You will be kept advised of any additional information received in this connection.

Respectfully,

[Signature]
C. H. Carson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-05 BY 60267 us/mw/gj/ptm



50 OCT 14 1942

COPY IN FILE

311

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100-93216-13

RECORDED

18 OCT 5 1942

CARSON

FIVE

HMC:LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA CLIPPER

CONF. INFT. [] b2
b7D

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that the enemy has used or is planning to use bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies, water supplies or other articles subject to contamination, should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Info. from:
Memo from the Director
to Tolson, Tamm, Tracy,
Ladd and []
dated 9/17/42

RECORDED

100-93216 14

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 1 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 3
★ SEP 28 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uq/nue/lja/mae
ON 11-13-03

58 OCT 23 1942

Bacterial warfare

lkh

K

HMC:LKH

September 26, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CONF. INFT.

b2

b7D CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/uu/bja/proc
ON 11-13-03

You are requested to report to the Bureau immediately any indications which come to your attention pointing to the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy. Any information which you have at the present time that the enemy has used or is planning to use bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies, water supplies, or other articles subject to contamination, should be forwarded at an early date.

This request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Source:
Memo from the Director
to Tolson, Tamm, Tracy,
Ladd, and
9/17/42

RECORDED
100-93216-15
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 1 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MAI
SEP 28 1942
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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Bacterial Warfare

hat

X *K*

~~RECORDED~~


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100-93216-16

October 14, 1942

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/03 BY 60322 UC/NLS/BJA/PAM


I want to thank you for the detailed information furnished in your letter of October 10, 1942, your number 150, concerning bacterial warfare. I will indeed appreciate receiving any additional information which you may obtain from time to time concerning this subject.

Sincerely yours,

~~SECRET~~
COPIES
3/8/90
308900

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(S)



RECEIVED
OCT 15 1942

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 6
OCT 15 1942
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

11/13/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/PAM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (U) 11/13/2028

~~SECRET~~

Handwritten signature/initials

4

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ottawa, Ontario.

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | |
| Mr. Clegg | |
| Mr. Glavin | |
| Mr. Ladd | |
| Mr. Nichols | |
| Mr. Rosen | |
| Mr. Tracy | |
| Mr. Carson | |
| Mr. Coffey | |
| Mr. Hendon | |
| Mr. Kramer | |
| Mr. McGuire | |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | |
| Mr. Nease | |
| Miss Gandy | |
| Files | |

AIR MAIL & SPECIAL DELIVERY


PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

October 10, 1942.

Classified by SPLAG 50
Declassify on: OADR 3/8/90
307009

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the Bureau's letter dated September 26, 1942, requesting that I transmit to the Bureau any information that the enemy has used or is planning to use bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies, or other articles subject to contamination (X)(U)



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

11/13/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 JCH/MS/BJA/AM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 01/13/2028

one
10/14/42
GRE:gr
COPY THIS LETTER
ES

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b7C

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J. Edgar Hoover, Esq.,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U. S. Department of Justice,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
U. S.

100-93216

1942

COPY IN FILE ~~SECRET~~

McG...
10/11/42

JEL:ECR

October 9, 1942

(S) [Redacted]

b1

A reply to our memorandum dated September 21, 1942, requesting information available with reference to Japanese plans for pursuing bacterial warfare, as well as any similar plans on the part of the Germans, will be appreciated.

b1

[Redacted]

~~CLASSIFIED BY SP1AGS~~
DATE: 3/8/90
307009

(S) ORIGINAL FILED IN

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

*Form 4 - San Francisco
11-3-42
pdlb/mmh*

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/mw/ljlpaw
DECLASSIFY ON (S) 11-13-2028

RECORDED
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259

RECORDED
100-93216-17
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 12 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PBB:ER
100-93216 -18

October 26, 1942

[Redacted]
143 Roseville Avenue
Newark, New Jersey

b6

b7C

Dear [Redacted]

I have received the signed copy of your letter of October 7, 1942, addressed to [Redacted] Editorial Rooms, Jersey Journal, Jersey City, New Jersey.

Your interest in bringing this information to my attention is sincerely appreciated and you may be assured that it will be given appropriate consideration.

b6

b7D

Enclosed with this communication was a letter dated October 9, 1942, directed to [Redacted] Editorial Rooms, Jersey Journal, Jersey City, New Jersey, and it is believed that this letter, which is enclosed, was transmitted to this Bureau in error.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson _____ Enclosure
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____ cc:
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uc/mj/gj/pam

Oct 26 8 43 PM '42
RECEIVED-ROOM 5840
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U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 14
★ OCT 27 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

JH
F

[Redacted]

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C O P Y

October 7th, 1942

[Redacted]

Editorial Rooms,
Jersey Journal,
Jersey City, N. J.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-83 BY 60067 ucj/psj/bja/psu

Dear [Redacted]

Many prominent men of Washington, D. C., lecture over the radio. Some of them claim we are not winning the war and some of them claim we are losing the war.

The American Medical Association is forcing the inoculation of all kinds of serums on our soldiers and WAACS and recently it has been quoted in the daily press that there have been 28,585 cases of yellow jaundice and 62 deaths in the armed forces following the use of serums for the prevention of yellow fever and just recently a Wilkensburg army nurse, Lieut. Emma Mae Amend, died a victim of yellow jaundice, reported to have followed inoculations of anti-yellow fever serum.

Is it possible that these inoculations are part of an extended program of the Nazi conspirators? Only last January 8 drug firm officials were fired as Nazi conspirators. Have the Nazi agents gained control of Morris Fishbein and his army of medical doctors who force our soldiers, the pick of the land, to submit to these filthy inoculations or be court martialed and put in the guard-house?

Are the American people going to stand for this inside invasion by the Nazi regime?

I should like to hear the pro and con of the forced inoculation program from the readers of the Jersey Journal,

Always at your service, I am

Vigorously yours,

[Redacted Signature]

OCT 12 1942

RECORDED &

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Bacterial Warfare

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
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FWC:MW
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100-93216-11
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M.

only ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED *ON ENVELOPE*
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *11-17-03* BY *60267 uc/nw/gja/pal*

ENCLOSURE

10-9-16-18
Original returned to sender



b6
b7C

October 9, 1942.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-17-03 BY 60267uc/wal/gfm

b6
b7C



Editorial Rooms,
Jersey Journal,
Jersey City, N. J.

Dear Mr. Grunow:

On page 12 of the Jersey Journal of Wednesday,
October 7th, 1942, in the 3 column, you have a pic-
ture of Dr. T. McG. Brannock and in black, bold
type it says, "DOCTORS" - continued.

Will you kindly inform me what page of this
paper the article is continued from? I have gone
over the paper two or three times but somehow or
another I must have missed it. I should like to
get the beginning of this article. Please send it.

Always at your service, I am

Vigorously yours,



FWC:MW

COPY

b6
b7C

Original returned to 



JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 1, 1942

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

EPC:EGK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

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The Director requested that a summary of the information in the Bureau's files on Bacterial Warfare be prepared and delivered to [redacted]. I have completed that summary and it is attached hereto in the form of a blind memorandum. If the Bureau approves the contents thereof I shall telephone [redacted] and ask him in what manner he wants this delivered to him.

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As additional information is received in the Bureau and as soon as a reply is obtained to our inquiries made of [redacted] any additional information will be transmitted to [redacted].

51 OCT 24 1942 345

RECORDED

Respectfully,

[Redacted Signature]

100-93216-20
7 OCT 19 1942
10715
summary given
march
WJ

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nuc/ga/ma
ON 11-13-03

b6

b7C



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[Redacted]
Port au Prince, Haiti.
October 13, 1942

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D. C.

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated September 26, 1942, directing the writer to forward to the Bureau any and all information concerning the enemy's use or contemplated use of bacterial warfare through materials, food supplies, etc.

This matter has been discussed with other agencies of the United States Government in Haiti, who have agreed to cooperate in this matter by furnishing the writer with any information which might come to their attention, which will be immediately forwarded to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted Signature]

G.I. S.I.S. # 250

b6
b7C

Copy filed in 515 files.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/13/03 BY 60267 uc/ALS/BJA/PAM

G.I. S.I.S. # 250

[Redacted]

Outgoing retained in [redacted] files 11/20/42 em

Communication #169
55 FEB 22 1943

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RECORDED

100-93216-
B
3 OCT 19 1942
[Handwritten initials and stamps]

1480

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EPC:GWH

October 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM [redacted] (S) b1

Reference is made to my memorandum of September 18 concerning information on the use of bacteria in sabotage and warfare. I should greatly appreciate receiving these data if you can provide them. This matter is an urgent one at the present time. We should also appreciate such additional information on the subject as may subsequently come to your attention.

Bacterial Warfare

[redacted] (S)

b1

cc - Mr. Ladd

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY UC/MS/bic/pam 60267 AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 6 11-15-2020

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____


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100-93216-22
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 19 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

ORIGINAL FILED IN




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DECLASSIFY ON: (b) 11-13-2028

EPC:AF b1

October 20, 1942

Classified by SPIAG/FO
Declassify on: OADR 3/8/90

MEMORANDUM



BT
International Warfare

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
- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

RECEIVED
276
DEC 3 1942

~~SECRET~~

EX-23

~~SECRET~~



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NOTE: The original of this memorandum was furnished to
[redacted] National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

DEPT. OF JUSTICE
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 MAR 30 1 42 PM '45
 RECEIVED



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 10-21 1942

| | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Director | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tracy |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. Tolson | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Q. Tamm |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. E. A. Tamm | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Coffey |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. Clegg | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Anderson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Ladd | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bowles |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Glavin | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Buckley |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nichols | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Engert |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Rosen | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hallett |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Miss Gandy | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Keyser |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bellino | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Larmoyeux |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Carson | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Martin |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Clements | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. O'Melia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Collier | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Potter |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Cunningham | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Quinn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Deane | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Trotter |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fletcher | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Gearty | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Grill | <input type="checkbox"/> Miss Teller |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hair | <input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Mann |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Harbo | <input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Cox |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hayes | <input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Davis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hendon | <input type="checkbox"/> Miss Bullock, 6632 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hince | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Caldwell |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Hodges | <input type="checkbox"/> Miss Dawson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kimball | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Fallon |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kramer | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Miller |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. L. L. Laughlin | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Simpson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. R. H. Laughlin | <input type="checkbox"/> Mrs. Sisson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Little | <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mertz |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. McGuire | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Mumford | <input type="checkbox"/> Note and return |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Nease | <input type="checkbox"/> Please distribute |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. R. E. Smith | <input type="checkbox"/> Please handle |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Traynor | <input type="checkbox"/> Please have |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Van Landingham | <input type="checkbox"/> employee initial |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. A. E. White | <input type="checkbox"/> Please initial |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mr. | <input type="checkbox"/> Please sign |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Civil Service Desk | <input type="checkbox"/> Re-date |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chief Clerk's Off. | <input type="checkbox"/> Rewrite |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Leave Clerk | <input type="checkbox"/> Send file |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Files Section | <input type="checkbox"/> See me |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel Files | |

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-85 BY 60267 uc/nuc/gja/pw

S. J. TRACY
Rm. 7639, Br. 777

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

GC-287

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | ✓ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | ✓ |
| Mr. Clegg | ✓ |
| Mr. Glavin | ✓ |
| Mr. Ladd | ✓ |
| Mr. Nichols | ✓ |
| Mr. Rosen | ✓ |
| Mr. Tracy | ✓ |
| Mr. Carson | _____ |
| Mr. Coffey | _____ |
| Mr. Hendon | _____ |
| Mr. Kramer | _____ |
| Mr. McGuire | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Nease | _____ |
| Miss Beahm | _____ |
| Miss Gandy | _____ |

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

October 17, 1942

SJT:BT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-63 BY 60267 ush/mj/psw

RE: [redacted]
Telephone Inquiry

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b7C

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[redacted] desired to make a request of the Bureau for
some data with regard to the activities of [redacted]
[redacted] is getting this information for him.

He also wanted to advise Mr. Hoover that he, [redacted]
considers the failure to check laboratories throughout the United States
which may be capable of making bacteria is bad and the situation should
be corrected. [redacted] is taking this up through channels.

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b7C

[redacted] is also interested in dealing with the Baker Drug
Company of Broadway, New York City, which company he desires to utilize
in connection with experiments in his project. He understands some of
the employees in this company are not satisfactory to the FBI and have
not been cleared by the FBI and he inquires if a new and subsequent check
or inquiry into the company can be made.

The files will be checked to see what information if any is
in the possession of the Bureau concerning this company and Mr. Merck
will be appropriately advised.

There is transmitted herewith a memorandum covering the visit
of [redacted] on October 15 at which time he was accompanied by
[redacted]

b6

b7C

Respectfully,

[redacted signature]

b6

b7C

RECORDED

100-93216-26

B

INDEXED

OCT 26 1942

FOR DEFENSE



BUY
UNITED STATES
SAVINGS
BONDS
AND STAMPS

Director advised briefly.

EX-34

Wanted in Hartford

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

EPC:EGK

October 15, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-18-05 BY 60267 ucl/mst/gh/pan

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

[redacted] called on [redacted] this morning. [redacted] was handed the forty-page summary from the Bureau's files on the subject of bacterial warfare, also a copy of a letter from [redacted] and an abstract of a report from Honolulu concerning a recent outbreak of blackleg among cattle in Hawaii. [redacted] advised [redacted] that a new unit had been set up to handle the project entitled War Research Service and it was under the FSA. This service is to consider all items and weapons of warfare beyond the pale of the Geneva Convention, and this goes a bit farther than bacterial warfare in that it includes poisons and drugs and other biological items. [redacted] has divided the service into four divisions dealing with (1) humans, (2) animals, (3) plant life, and (4) water and food supplies. [redacted] is the head of the service with the title of Special Assistant to the Administrator of FSA. [redacted] is Director of Research for the project. [redacted] has been retained as public relations expert. Offices have been opened in the National Academy of Science Building, Executive 8100, Branch 128.

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[redacted] showed [redacted] through the Laboratory but their time was cut short before the tour could be completed. [redacted] to join him at a luncheon meeting at the Metropolitan Club.

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ENCLOSURE

RECORDED

100-93216-26

Except for [redacted] the luncheon meeting was made up entirely of Army and Navy officers representing agencies as follows:

- [redacted] all representing the United States Public Health,
- [redacted] of the United States Navy Medical Division,
- [redacted] Colonel Hortenburt, and
- [redacted] all of the Surgeon General's Office of the United States Army.

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[redacted] advised the group that the purpose of calling them together was an effort to obtain from them a list of vital cities and points in the war effort which might be seriously affected if their water supplies were contaminated and also to prepare a code of recommendations for the safeguarding of the water supplies from contamination in these vital points. This code of recommendation was to be all-inclusive, consisting of such things as investigation of the personnel having access to the water supply systems, inspection of the physical plants, a study of the operations, the methods of treating with chlorine or other preventive means, recommendations to safeguard against acts of omission and carelessness, and the prevention of sabotage. One specific instance was cited as a typical example, this involved an epidemic outbreak at Newton, Kansas, which was caused by carelessness in handling the water supply system at that point and which had a serious effect on the war effort in the area.



COPY IN FILE

Memorandum for the Director
Page Two

[redacted] then related at considerable length the background of this subject matter insofar as the Public Health Service was concerned. He indicated that a year or more ago an anti-sabotage board was created to study the problem, this board being made up of representatives of G2, ONI, FBI, OCD, Public Health, and several other Federal agencies. The board sought to build up a "Facility Security Program." [redacted] intimated that during these studies it was the impression of most of the experts on the board that the work would be undertaken by the Provost Marshal of the United States Army. However, a Presidential Directive was issued on May 19, 1942, delegating the Facility Security Program to the OCD under [redacted] hinted that the OCD had pulled a fast one. The whole program then lagged for a while while [redacted] sent a budget request up to Congress. [redacted] personally appeared before the Appropriations Committees and they knocked the whole thing out and didn't give them anything at all. [redacted] was a bit bitter because the water supply protection program, which he deemed of outstanding importance, was thus lost in the shuffle. Following Talbot's recitation, several of the officers let loose a tirade at the OCD and also at the red tape within their own organizations, the Army and the Navy. Particularly bitter were [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] intimated that the thing perhaps to do now would be to rescue the water supply protection part from the rest of the program for the reason that he felt that if all the frills were cut away and those things of vital necessity presented to Congress, that they could be made to provide the necessary funds.

[redacted] then stated that the Public Health Service had already prepared a list of between eight and nine hundred cities and other vital points with water supplies which, if injured, would be a detriment to the war effort. [redacted] stated that G2 also had a list which contains two to three hundred such cities, and it was further understood that the WPB has its own list of cities, number unknown. The Public Health Service has gone so far as to send out a questionnaire on the water supplies to these eight or nine hundred cities. At least ten pages of this questionnaire deal with the reliability and loyalty of the personnel who have access to the water systems, and it was mentioned by [redacted] that the FBI could be a big help in checking on this personnel. Many of the questionnaires have been returned to the Public Health Service by the State water supply engineers, but the Public Health has no funds to study the questionnaires or inspect the water supply systems or send out recommendations. b6 b7C

[redacted] summarized that it would be necessary to immediately begin to work the three lists into a combined list of cities and vital points and then to make up the recommended code of standards for the safety of the water supplies. [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] of the Surgeon General's Office of the Army volunteered that they had already drawn up standards which might be quite suitable and that these would be delivered to [redacted]

Respectfully,

[redacted]

b6
b7C

TEB:LVO
11/4/42

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER~~

RECORDED 100-432-16-77

EX-31

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uclms/bj/pam
ON 11-13-03

[redacted]
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear [redacted]

There is attached hereto a summary of the pertinent information in the files of this Bureau regarding the company on which you requested information in your telephone conversation with [redacted] of this Bureau on October 19, 1942.

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b7C

You are advised that our files fail to reflect that any investigation has been conducted of this company in connection with alleged subversive tendencies. However, in 1928 and 1930 some inquiry was made relative to an Anti-Trust matter, but no information was developed which would be pertinent to your inquiry.

With regard to the personnel of this company no check of our records has been made, inasmuch as we are not in possession of the names and other identifying data with regard to same.

In regard to your request of the same date to the effect that certain information be obtained from the [redacted] please be advised that this information is being secured and will be forwarded to you promptly upon receipt thereof.

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
F. B. I.
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
NOV 5 12 45 PM '42

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Sincerely yours,
John Edgar Hoover
Director

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 7
NOV 6 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NOV 6 1942

[Handwritten signature]
TEC

173

RE: [redacted]

b7D

A reliable source has advised that on March 17, 1942, [redacted] sent a letter to an individual in Brazil stating that, inasmuch as [redacted] could not mention the names of boats in its cables the following code names would be employed to represent the names of [redacted]

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[redacted]

(62-62736-1116)

It was also reported that on April 4, 1941, a check in the amount of [redacted] was drawn on the account of [redacted] bank payable to [redacted] It should be noted that [redacted] allegedly [redacted]

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Further, a source whose reliability is unknown has advised that [redacted]

[redacted]

(100-769-2231X, 36)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uq/ncg/gj/PAU

RECORDED

EX-31

100-93216-27
F B I
19 NOV 9 1942

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NOV 10 10 03 AM '42
F B I
RECEIVED SECRETARY

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E.A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd ✓
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EPC:AF

October 19, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-18-83 BY 60267 ucl/hsp/pan

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b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

Re: [redacted]
Bacterial Warfare

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[redacted] telephoned stating he had three items:

1 - He was very appreciative of the information furnished him by the Bureau the other day. He inquired whether we could ascertain from [redacted]

b6
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b7D

2 - He has conferred with [redacted] concerning the deplorable lack of control in this country over laboratories capable of producing bacteria. They both agree that it is a dangerous situation but have not yet worked out any plan or recommendation for its correction. [redacted] would like Mr. Hoover to know for his general information that they do consider this a dangerous situation and he will advise Mr. Hoover later of any steps which they may be able to work out to correct it.

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3 - [redacted] organization is planning to have [redacted]

[redacted]

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b7D

I told [redacted] I would bring these matters to Mr. Hoover's attention.

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b7D

I am writing to [redacted] for the information sought. I shall ask the Security Division to prepare a reply to Merck for the Director's signature on [redacted] situation.

RECORDED
&
INDEXED
1152

Respectfully,

100-93216-27
F B I
NOV 9 1942

[redacted signature box]

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COPY IN FILE

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY UC/NIS/BJA/PAM 60267 AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: EON (6) 1143-2028
No. W-360
October 19th, 1942

In reply to your memorandum No. 1480 of
October 13th, we wish to advise you that
information on the subject of bacteriological
warfare sent direct to Mr. Edgar Hoover, Director,
on October 16th. A copy of this letter is attached
herewith.

Bacteriological Warfare

see index

*letter to Gen. ...
11/21/42 ...*

b1

52 NOV 17 1942

ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

100-93216-38

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 23 1942
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EX-44

mrw

Habana, Cuba
November 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Re: Poliomieltis epidemic in Cuba

For the past several months, there has been raging an epidemic of Poliomieltis in Cuba and it became so great that the primary schools were closed to prevent the spread of the disease. The epidemic seems to be subsiding now after a high mark of 107 reported cases during the middle of October in all of the Island. A request was made of the writer to determine if there was any possibility of this epidemic being the result of bacterial warfare.

[redacted] a fifth year medical student at the University of Habana, [redacted] was questioned along this line. [redacted]

[redacted] scouted the idea that the epidemic might have been the result of bacterial warfare saying that too little is known of the disease to make it a suitable subject for this type of warfare. According to him, although many theories have been advanced about the transmission and treatment of the disease, it is not yet known if the disease is caused by a filterable virus. The means of transmission are not definitely known and [redacted]

[redacted] that it was a startling fact that no cases of Poliomieltis had been found in the slums of Cuba but that the victims were from middle class families where ~~there~~ the sanitary conditions were, for the most part, good.

From the above, it is apparent that, unless the Axis scientists have made some revolutionary discoveries about the disease, one possibility of the Poliomieltis epidemic being the introduction of bacterial warfare may be dismissed. There are so many other more deadly diseases which might be easily introduced that it doesn't seem logical that "Polio" would be selected for the job.

Respectfully submitted,

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[redacted]

100-93216-24

NOV 16 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uc/mw/lja/PAW

NO STIPULATIONS

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Handwritten notes on the right margin, including a vertical line and some illegible text.

EPC:AF:MJC

November 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The following statement was made by a proved German saboteur in connection with his description of the training which he received in a sabotage school in Germany:

"I might mention at this time that during the course I specifically asked a question as to whether there was any bacterial or poison warfare planned. I was told quite definitely that no plans had been made for any warfare of this type; also that we were not to approach anyone or attempt to buy anything of that kind in the United States as they were sure the United States did not intend to engage in any of that type of warfare."

Quoted from the statement of Ernst Peter Burger.

File under "Bacteria". Warfare

SENT BY 11/11/42
SPECIAL MESSENGER.
WT

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/mcl/bja/mia
ON 11-13-03

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100-93216-33
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NOV 14 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

142

WT

EPC:EGK
10/30/42

100-92216-31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EX-81 RECORDED SAC, New York

Dear Sir:

The Bureau's Laboratory is presently interested in the chemical product bearing the trade name "Ricin." This is listed in the Eimer and Amend catalog. This is a wholesale chemical house located at 633 Greenwich Street, New York City. The Bureau desires that you have an immediate inquiry made at Eimer and Amend's to determine the current price of this substance. It is also desired that you ascertain the presently available supply of the same and whether it is produced, to the knowledge of Eimer and Amend, by other chemical houses.

The inquiry is confidential and the information obtained should be telegraphed to the Bureau.

Yours truly,

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nue/bj/pml
ON 11-13-03

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

39 NOV 27 1942

INVESTIGATIONS SECTION
 MAILED 8
 NOV 2 1942 P.M.
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
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 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Handwritten initials

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JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CC-287



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

EPC:EGK

October 30, 1942

~~SECRET~~

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Kramer
- Mr. McGuire
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Beahm
- Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

RE: BACTERIA


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 hcp/PLS/BJA/PAAM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (U) 11-13-2008



(S) b1

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Bacterial Warfare

I talked to [redacted] subsequently on the telephone about this. He stated that the Chemical Warfare Service was afraid to negotiate with Eimer and Amend and buy this substance because it would probably cause a lot of curiosity and commotion and might leak out. He said that it was his plan to attempt to buy it "under cover." I pointed out to him that if the FBI went in to purchase the entire supply of the product it would probably cause as much or more curiosity than the Chemical Warfare. He agreed and stated that he had not given that angle enough consideration, and since I mentioned it he now thought it would be best to try to get some small chemical house to attempt to buy it. He stated that he would be very appreciative, however, if, through our New York office, we could find out if they had the substance in stock and how much was on hand. He stated that they were coding the word "Ricin" and would refer to it in telephone conversations and otherwise as "Product W."

The drug Ricin is listed in Eimer and Amend's catalog as chemically pure and packed in one-gram vials, selling at \$3.00 per gram. I am informed that it is the basic ingredient of castor oil. The authorities relate the following: "... A very toxic poison... usually acts after several hours causing intense diarrhea, urine suppression, jaundice pain, and other marked symptoms of acute inflammation." No figures were available in the Laboratory as to what would constitute a toxic dosage for the human, but it was noted that .000002 grams would kill a rabbit. Apparently Merck is considering its use in connection with his special project.

RECOMMENDATION: I would be inclined to recommend against the Bureau's purchasing the supply of this material for Merck. Of the other hand, I see no harm in accommodating him by having the New York office contact Eimer and Amend to determine how much they have on hand. If the Director concurs, I have attached a letter to the New York office issuing instructions.

100-93216-31


no more should be purchased



COPY IN FILE

EX-3

Respectfully,



Suggest to have by tele. 11/5/42

ENCLO. 5
JAN 1 1943
Attachments

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

EPC:MJC

100-93216-32
October 31, 1942
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October 31, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 ucp/ma/jat/mc

[Redacted]
Sanitary Engineer Director
U. S. Public Health Service
Washington, D. C.

b6

b7C

Dear [Redacted]

I am in receipt of your letter of October 16 transmitting a copy of "Facility Security Program Public Water Supply Survey Instructions; No. 158" as well as the tentative list of public water supplies considered essential to the war effort. This is a very interesting report and should serve as a valuable reference in the Bureau's files. I wish to thank you for furnishing it.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 3 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

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NOV 10 10 00 AM '42

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

CC-287

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tolson | _____ |
| Mr. E. A. Tamm | _____ |
| Mr. Clegg | _____ |
| Mr. Glavin | _____ |
| Mr. Ladd | _____ |
| Mr. Nichols | _____ |
| Mr. Rosen | _____ |
| Mr. Tracy | _____ |
| Mr. Carson | _____ |
| Mr. Coffey | _____ |
| Mr. Hendon | _____ |
| Mr. Kramer | _____ |
| Mr. McGuire | _____ |
| Mr. Harbo | _____ |
| Mr. Quinn Tamm | _____ |
| Tele. Room | _____ |
| Mr. Nease | _____ |
| Miss Beahm | _____ |
| Miss Gandy | _____ |

[Handwritten initials]

October 31, 1942

EPC:MJC

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

Re: Bacteria Research

In my memorandum of October 15, I described a luncheon given by [redacted] in which the protection of the Nation's water supply systems from bacteria was discussed. The Bureau has since received a copy of the Facility Security Program Public Water Supply Survey Instructions, No. 158" and a tentative list prepared by the Public Health Service of public water supplies that are considered essential and important to the war effort. These were submitted by [redacted] and a letter of acknowledgment has been prepared.

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0 Bacteria Research. Water supply

Respectfully,

[Redacted signature box]


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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uel/mue/bja/ma

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&
INDEXED

71

100-93216-32
B I
NOV 19 1942
FIVE



PDB:cmc

100-93216-28

Date: November 21, 1942
To: SAC, San Francisco

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60207 ucp/ml/bj/pan ✓

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: **POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE; SALE OF
TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE**

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____ Reference is made to Bureau letter dated November 3, 1942,
Mr. Clegg _____ requesting that the Bureau be advised as to the status of this case.
Mr. Glavin _____ A Reply has not been received by the Bureau.

Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____ You are instructed to afford the instant case continuous and
Mr. Rosen _____ preferred attention until all logical leads have been concluded in order
Mr. Tracy _____ that the full facts of this case may be made available to the Bureau in
Mr. Carson _____ the shortest possible time. Further delay in the investigation of this
Mr. Coffey _____ case will not be countenanced.

- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nesse _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 8
NOV 23 1942
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NOV 21 5 12 AM '42
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
44 274

100-93216-28
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
NOV 25 1942
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECORDED

700-93-16-34
EPC:AF

November 27, 1942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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b7C

[Redacted]
[Redacted]
of the Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

Dear [Redacted]

Reference is made to your recent inquiry concerning "Ricin".
For your very confidential information, the following data have been
obtained:

"Information obtained from confidential sources
reflects that [Redacted]"

[Redacted]

b7D

It is hoped this information will be useful in your project, etc.

Sincerely yours,

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 u/vna/lj/rae
ON 11-13-03

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 12
NOV 26 1942
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

58 DEC 1 1942

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NOV 25 1942

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RECEIVED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-2006 BY 60267 ucjms/bjppm

- Mr. Tolson.....
- Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
- Mr. Clegg.....
- Mr. Glavin.....
- Mr. Ladd.....
- Mr. Nichols.....
- Mr. Rosen.....
- Mr. Tracy.....
- Mr. Carson.....
- Mr. Coffey.....
- Mr. Hendon.....
- Mr. Kramer.....
- Mr. McGuire.....
- Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
- Mr. Nease.....
- Miss Gandy.....

FBI NYC 11-25-42 DB

DIRECTOR
ATTENTION TECHNICAL LABORATORY.
RE LETTER DATED NOV SECOND FORTYTWO. QUOTE ~~RICIN~~ UNQUOTE EIMER AND
AMEND CATALOG. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM NY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT
REFLECTS THAT

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FOXWORTH
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Partial original copy

*11/27/42
Letter to*

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Called Laboratory

M

RECORDED & INDEXED

100-93216-54 By

6 NOV 30 1942

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COPY IN FILE

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

CC-287



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

October 13, 1942

EPC:GWH:EGK

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

RE: Bacteria Warfare

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11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uo/mus/bj/fan
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6) 11-13-2028

[redacted] advises me that the following has been accomplished on this project since [redacted] visit to you on September 17, 1942:

1. A 40-page summarization of information on the subject appearing in the Bureau's files has been completed. [redacted] has been notified telephonically that this is ready, and he has advised that he will personally pick it up Thursday or Friday of this week. One copy of this was routed to your office, and the original is being held on [redacted] desk for [redacted]

b6
b7C

2. A 3-page summarization on the subject [redacted] A copy of this will be furnished to [redacted]

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b6

3. [redacted]

b7C
b1

4. All Bureau Division heads were advised of the Bureau's interest in this project and were instructed to route all material pertaining to bacterial warfare coming to their attention to [redacted] in the Laboratory.

5. In a telephone conversation, [redacted] indicated to [redacted] that he was desirous of having [redacted] meet with [redacted] of ONI on this subject, and that he would endeavor to have the meeting Thursday or Friday of this week. [redacted] will meet with them at their convenience.

b6
b7C

Items which [redacted] has not yet gone into but which were discussed with the Director include the possibility of giving our Agents in training certain instructions about problems of defensive bacteria warfare and the possibility of utilizing our field forces to gather special information which might be needed, such as data on vulnerable spots and the like.

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OTHERWISE

Respectfully,

S. J. Tracy

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BACTERIAL WARFARE AND SABOTAGE

I. Bacterial Warfare

The following is from Helmut Klots: The New German War:

In order to anticipate the author's point of view and in order to mark out the terrain from the first, we declare in complete consciousness of our political, military and scientific responsibility:

We affirm on the basis of years of careful studies and tests, in principle the possibility of bacteriological warfare. These studies and tests have been extended and are being extended to the purely bacteriological and to the practical and military side.

Whether this weapon, serviceable in theory, will be used in the individual case and the often changing practice of war, or whether special circumstances will cause its application to appear unsuitable or dangerous for one's own troops and own people, is essentially a question of tactics.

Bacteriological warfare in this respect differs in nothing from a great many other kinds of warfare. There are military situations in which the use of this or that weapon is to be rejected; this special rejection does not in the least mean the general rejection of the weapon, rather it results exclusively from tactical considerations. Tactical considerations cannot be generalized.

In trench warfare, when the trenches run only a few meters one from the other, one will forego the shelling of the enemy trenches with heavy artillery, in order not to endanger his own trenches; furthermore, in trench warfare one will renounce a bombardment with gas grenades, if within a short distance between one's own lines and the enemy lines, the wind is blowing in the direction of one's own troops. These precautionary measures, taken for the protection of one's own troops, by no means pronounce a death sentence against heavy artillery or gas grenades.

For, in other situations, heavy artillery and the gas grenade have shown themselves to be serviceable and suitable, often the only effective weapons. There are, at times, circumstances in war in which the application of a definite weapon is just as wrong as it is right and necessary at other times.

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We repeat and sum up: whether in a concrete case the conditions are fulfilled for the use of a definite method of warfare, for example bacteriological warfare is decided by tactics on the basis of the special circumstances of the situation, like wind direction, wind intensity, meteorological conditions, condition of the ground and terrain, proximity of one's own troops and the populace.

The answer may be unconditionally affirmative in one case, unconditionally negative in another case, and in a third case, doubtful. In no case, however, does this question touch the problem as to whether the conduct of bacteriological war is fundamentally possible. That is to say, whether it is scientifically, technically and militarily possible.

That, however, depends on us. We have to test whether bacteriological warfare belongs to the region of Utopias and false alarms, or whether it is a reality of today.

We affirm this reality of bacteriological warfare. At the time, however, we deny - again on the basis of careful studies and tests - that bacteriological warfare is able to or tends to supplant or to replace the other methods of warfare. This is true at least for the present state of science and engineering, which can alone be the standard for our judgment.

And, at least provisionally, bacteriological warfare is a chance weapon in a disproportionately higher degree than infantry fire, artillery and hand grenades, one of which the possibility of use and success depends on the fulfillment of a whole series of conditions. If these conditions are not fulfilled or not completely fulfilled, then the bacteriological weapons - if they are used anyhow - will be wasted without any effect and will bring the danger of being fatal to one's own troops and people.

Some critics of the bacteriological principle have emphasized energetically this last mentioned danger of repercussion against one's own troops and people. This emphasis was right; it was wrong, however, if the conclusion was drawn from this - that people would, because of this danger, absolutely renounce the use of bacteriological warfare.

This inference contradicts the entire contents of military history.

The question as to whether a definite weapon or method of warfare can have harmful or even deadly retroactive effects on one's own troops was and is never decisive; rather what was and is decisive is only whether the disadvantage caused to the enemy by the weapon is in the right proportion to the possibilities of these reactions. Besides, for ages it has belonged to the special tasks of war technique to weaken and reduce just these possible reactions.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Kramer
Mr. McGowan
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Things are precisely this way with bacteriological warfare. If the weapon is applied without any plan or reflection, then it can result equally destructive for friend and foe. If it, however, is used only when the geographical conditions and meteorological conditions, which are prevailing, exclude this repercussion, then only the foe is hit, and indeed struck a destructive blow. If, however, wants to be completely safe, then there can be found many measures for the protection of one's own troops and populace, since the time and type of offensive are known; the foe, however, is surprised. Here the tenet that "he who strikes first, strikes the hardest" is valid.

It is possible to imagine situations in which the danger of a repercussion of the weapon is exactly zero. For example in the case of a German bacteriological attack on England. If relatively calm weather prevails, if moreover weak wind currents blow over England from the northeast toward the southwest, then there does not exist in human judgment the slightest danger for the European continent. And even if the wind should change around after one or two days and blow from England over the Channel and North Sea toward the East, the bacteria would have lost their vitality even before they landed on the continent.

Things would be similar in a German bacteriological attack on Italy. In this case the weapon would be put into use with a calm and constant north-south wind. There exists no danger for Germany; and if the wind changed its course, even in the opposite direction, the high mountains enclosing Italy in the north, northeast and northwest would stop the flight and virulence of the bacteria.

The situation in case of a German bacteriological attack on central and southern France would not be so completely simple, but still simple enough. Here also it is possible to think of situations which exclude the danger of the rebound of the wave.

And in differently laid out cases, in which one's own troops and people are endangered by a bacteriological offensive? Here, in the rough reality of war of which we speak, it will always only be a matter of weighing carefully whether the possibility of endangering one's own nation is sufficiently justified, compared with the damage that can be expected to be inflicted on the enemy. Moreover, the military-bacteriological science does not work only on the development of the offensive powers of bacteria, but also - and none the less - on methods of defense and protection. These methods are to insure one against enemy bacteriological offensives; they are, however, also to reduce to a minimum the danger of the rebound of one's own offensive.

Fear of new and perhaps incomprehensible things is no good counselor. The problem of the conduct of a bacteriological war requires calm and objective examination. The peculiar practice of certain military and semi-military officials of concealing or denying the dangers of the weapon does not speak for balance or objectivity. It would indeed be better and as a result more useful to confess that there does not exist or scarcely exists an effective defense against bacteriological offensives of the opponent in the present state of science and scientific technique. This is, however, the case.

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Mr. McGuire

Mr. Quinn Tamm

Mr. Nease

Miss Gandy

Next we give the interpretation of a high French military and medical expert again of the fundamental question of the possibilities of bacteriological war. Dr. Romieu declared (*) under the strong impression of the publications of the English politician and writer, Wickham Steed, about the bacteriological experiments made by the German military authorities in the installations of the subway in Paris and London:

"The designation 'bacteriological warfare' appears phantastic; it, however, corresponds to reality. The 'bacteriological troops' consist of living beings, which are indeed infinitely small, but compensate for their small size through their numbers. The number is astronomical.

"The production (culture) of bacteria in great volume is in the majority of cases not difficult and only requires a small amount of time. Certain species can be produced in one single laboratory up to 100 billion specimens per thousandth of a second. Moreover their mass production requires neither complicated installations nor large factories. Their production on a large scale can be hidden without the slightest trouble, so that even the slyest examining committee is not in a position to establish anything. The production cost of the bacteria is insignificant.

"Certain bacteria groups cannot be used for military purposes. It is different with that group, which we in military speech designate as the 'armed service group.' To this group there belongs on one side the plague, and on the other side cholera, dysentery, and typhus. The plague bacillus can be cultivated without any trouble; contagion is accomplished extremely easily ('avec une extreme facilite' meaning, with extreme ease).....The legendary fear of the plague is explained by the enormous mortality rate in pestilence sicknesses; in the case of the bubonic plague on an average 80 out of 100 cases result fatal, in the case of the rarer lung plague up to 100 out of 100 cases....."

Thereby, in complete agreement with us, the French expert unequivocally and positively affirms the possibility of employing the plague bacillus for military purposes. Just as unequivocally positive is his opinion regarding dysentery. In the case of the cholera bacillus he makes certain restrictions, likewise, although in another direction, in the case of the typhus bacillus.

The problem of a use of the anthrax spore, the favorite of the German military bacteriologist, is not examined by Romieu.

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A series of negative critics of bacteriological warfare have believed to be able to dispose of the possibilities of the waging of a bacteriological war with the primitive explanation that the allegedly highly sensitive bacteria could not resist the afflictions of pressure and temperature; that the bacteria would, at the latest, be destroyed at the time of the bursting of the shell to which they were joined. This cheap objection is without weight, even if it were scientifically founded - which is by no means the case. It is not the purpose of bacteriological warfare, as it has been prepared by Germany, to "shoot" bacteria as a charge for grenades and shells. The bacteria are rather to be thrown out of airplanes in easily breakable containers (with or without parachutes), or, mixed with liquids, be rained down.

* In the newspaper "Le Petit Journal", of September 13, 1934

The widespread assertion of the alleged inability of bacteria to stand high pressure and temperature strain is moreover scientifically false. We recall that two French scholars, physicians Pidelievre and Guy, have undertaken interesting experiments, precisely in this field, and in this have arrived at completely positive results. These experiments (*) had the following as subject matter:

From three different firearms, introduced into the French army, and from an ordinary Browning pistol there was fired the (very sensitive) bacillus prodigiosus. (**) This happened in such a way, that first an ordinary shot was fired in order to sterilize the barrel. Then a cartridge was loaded, the shell of which was previously besmeared with a solution containing the bacillus prodigiosus. The shot was fired at a packet of wadding that had previously been carefully sterilized. From the wadding the bacillus prodigiosus cultures could be developed without any trouble.

A second, disproportionately important experiment followed: The striking bacteria were exposed to the considerably higher temperatures - in comparison with the barrel pressure - which arise when they strike on a steel plate. A layer of wadding was set up before the steel plate and in close contact with it, and the shot, prepared as before, was shot at this plate. The result was no less positive. That part of the wadding that had been in direct contact with the steel plate was merely examined; in this case too the bacteria had resisted the (momentary) high temperatures, without losing virulence.

That the strains, which arose through the rapid transport through the air, and which the unprotected bacteria met with, have not exercised the slightest harmful influence is self-evident.

Moreover in these experiments it was a question of the bacillus prodigiosus, a relatively sensitive spore. The resistance of the plague bacillus is essentially higher than that of this bacillus, that of the anthrax spore is even higher.

It can therefore pass for scientifically proved that even with the bacillus prodigiosus firing from a gun is possible. This method is, however, not at all intended; and the strains which may affect the bacteria, if they - sealed in light glass balls - are thrown down (or rained down), are so small, that theoretically they can scarcely be comprehended, practically, not at all.

Mr. Tolson _____

Mr. E. A. Tamm _____

Mr. Clegg _____ Already in 1924, accordingly 13 years ago now, the League of Nations
Mr. Glavin _____ saw itself induced to deal with the question of bacteriological warfare. A
Mr. Ladd _____ commission of experts was appointed, to which, besides other experts, Professor
Mr. Nichols _____ Bordet, Director of the Pasteur Institute in Brussels and holder of the Nobel
Mr. Rosen _____ Prize of 1919 (Bordet discovered the whooping cough germ), and the Italian
Mr. Tracy _____ bacteriologist, Professor Angeli, Florence, belonged.

Mr. Carson _____

Mr. Coffey _____

Mr. Hendon _____ (*) presented in the "Journal of the American Medical Association," 1931,
Mr. Kramer _____ volume 96, page 959.

Mr. McGuire _____

Mr. Quinn Tamm _____

Mr. Nease _____

Miss Gandy _____

(**) The bacillus prodigiosus, the so-called bacillus of the "bleeding host,"
is a very rarely appearing, completely harmless spore. It is used with preference
for bacteriological experiments because of these properties and because it
develops a red coloring material (hence its name).

The results of the labors of this commission were published by the League of Nations, in extract according to the importance of the question (Document of the League of Nations A 16 1924 IX.) In the second part of this document, entitled "Bacteriological warfare," it is declared that bacteria would lose power if they are too old or if they are used as an addition to the load of a shell.

The first objection regarding the harmful effects of age is refuted by science, refuted at least in regards to the anthrax spore. According to the "Annales de l'Institut Pasteur" (*) anthrax spores in a dry state can be preserved for several years without thus losing vitality. The (German) bacteriologist, Professor Robert Koch, has proved (**) that anthrax spores which have been placed in carbolic acid for 40 days have lost nothing of their capacity. And in order to climax the proof: in the "Medical Research Council" (***) it is confirmed that anthrax spores in the ground for 15 years preserve their complete vitality and virulence.

That was the first objection that was put forward in the judgment of the League of Nations. The second objection, that bacteria would lose virulence if they are used as a load for shells, has in the meantime been refuted with reference to the bacillus prodigiosus by the experiments of the two afore-named French physicians.

Moreover, this objection would not have needed any refutation, since it is not at all intended to "shoot" the bacteria.

Back to the League of Nations document from 1924: after the apparently negative, but positively demonstrable and positively demonstrated explanation, the judgment continues verbatim: "The only method that could mean a certain danger, would be to throw out of an airplane glass balls that are filled with bacteria."

And Dr. Hugo Stolzenberg in Hamburg, who was during the World War the German expert for gas warfare, has worked in this direction. In 1929 he had (and this procedure is also symptomatic) entered in the Reichs Patent Office in Berlin under number 485,574 (class 45 1 3) the following patent:

"Process for the obtaining of drop dispersion from great heights." In the patent papers Dr. Stolzenberg carefully describes his method. He comes to the result, that the objections that had been raised against the raining down of liquids from great heights, "can be considered refuted, if the drops are enclosed by a protective shell." As protective shells Stolzenberg proposes glass, celluloid, metal foils, etc.

Dr. Stolzenberg designated this patent as "designed for the control of pests." Yet a few years later he takes up the idea anew: in the "Deutsche Chemiker-Zeitung" (meaning German Chemists' Magazine) 1932, page 751-752 he speaks of the possibilities of defending a troop which is bombed, perhaps with "yellow cross" (mustard gas, etc.), according to the method of his patent number 485,574. The agricultural patent has become a military one.

(*) Paris, 1894. Cited in the book by Zinsser, "A Textbook of Bacteriology," London, 1928, Page 657.

(**) Likewise in Zinsser, page 658.

(***) London, September 19, 1931. Volume V, page 460.

Yet even before Dr. Stolzenberg, Professor Hugo Junkers, the deceased airplane manufacturer in Dessau, had invented a process, which can be used just as well for dropping virus as bacteria. This process also is represented as being destined for pest control.

Under the number 457,659 Professor Junkers registered a process "for the division and decomposition of remedies for pest control" (Reichs Patent Office, Berlin, 1928); in 1929, he had a supplementary patent follow under the number 477,164.

In what a rapid tempo the military and scientific investigation of bacteriology and the technique of bacteriological warfare have been developed is forcefully shown by two documents of the League of Nations. The first one dates from 1924; the second one, from 1932.

The first one (A 16 1924 IX) says: "The majority of the experts are of the opinion that bacteriology in its present state (1924) is not capable of destroying the total food stores and cattle resources of a country. Professor Cannon (Boston), however, does not completely share this latter opinion; he affirms the possibility that from an airplane extensive regions can become infected and the cattle resources destroyed."

The second document (Conf. D. 152, of December 13, 1932) declares with resignation: "It is not possible to prevent preparations for bacteriological warfare."

And one of the experts of the League of Nations, Bacteriology Professor Madsen (Copenhagen), sees himself forced to confirm the following: (*) "I agree completely with the views advocated by Professor Pfeiffer (Germany) in his memorandum. The possibilities which bacteriological science possesses at its present stage are, without doubt, sufficient to produce epidemics of greater or lesser extent."

In the summer of 1934, occasioned by the courageous impulse of Wickham Steed, the question of bacteriological warfare came abruptly into the foreground of public interest. The most eager attention of conscientious women and men of all countries began to concentrate on this element in the great chain of German war preparations, an element which seemed to be directly predestined for the purposes of an invasion-war.

Also the circles in Berlin around Generals Goering and von Reichenau were very deeply concerned, although in another direction and in another sense. They seriously reckoned with the danger of calamitous consequences.

(*) Cited in Victor Lefebure's book, "Scientific Disarmament" (London, 1931, page 217-218). Major Victor Lefebure was during the World War the expert of the British Army for questions of gas warfare.

Yet, after only a few days, the atmosphere cleared again: in Paris, in London and elsewhere members of the League came forward, experts and laymen, some from the scientific milieu, some from the military milieu. Members of the League without wanting to be such, but League members de facto, they declared with strange unanimity that the dangers and possibilities of bacteriological warfare were presented in an exaggerated manner; there were natural and more or less outlined boundaries over which no one could step without being punished.

This exonerating offensive, which had to cripple the impetus of action of those who were demanding clarity and enlightenment, has a good purpose; it however fought with poor arms. It miscarried because of that and had to miscarry.

This was the good purpose; one wished to prevent the threatening danger of a future panicky frame of mind among the masses of the population of the large cities. One did not wish to admit - in thoroughly correct knowledge of things - that there did not exist any effective defense against the Third Reich's plans for a bacteriological attack, at least in the present state of bacteriological science and technique.

This was, on the other hand, the poor weapon: in order to avoid the natural consequence of an admission of the relative defenselessness against the German bacteriological war plans, one tried to reduce the threatening dangers, then on the whole to attack them, and finally to turn them into ridicule. And this happened and was able to happen partially with the assistance of real and false military authorities.

Nothing could be more fatal than these tactics. They have not been able to secure calm in one's own land. And they were correctly recognized in Berlin, correctly evaluated and correctly supplemented.

Let the most naive argument, which used to be mobilized during that exonerating offensive, be anticipated. It is the childish self deception that there existed - in the age of the Third Reich - unwritten, but effective laws of ethical humanitarianism which forbids the belligerent opponent to make use of a serviceable and destructive weapon.

How foreign to reality and dangerous this Utopian dreaming is, is proved by the evidence of certain chapters of the World War. We remember now only the experiments of a former military attaché of the Central Powers in Washington, who gave himself all the trouble imaginable in the first phase of the war in order to infect the feed of the horses destined for the French and English troops in Europe. The experiment failed, of course, as really everything that the gentleman in question had undertaken up until then in his motley life. In the second place we remember the Rumanian experiment of the German war leadership in August, 1916; the German Professor Niemeyer, full of disgust and shame, reports concerning this experiment in his "Manual of the Disarmament Problem" (second volume, page 442):

"We recapitulate: The scholars, whose opinions we have collected, are of the opinion that our present knowledge of hygiene and bacteriology enables us to limit the extension of an epidemic that was artificially created on the front

and at home. In the present state of the things, they (the scholars) are of the belief that bacteriological warfare is not able to break the defenses of a country; they believe that this "double-edged method of warfare" does not signify any special danger today. Other scholars have, however, opposite views; these men obliged us to follow the development of bacteriology with the greatest interest. Moreover, Professor Bordet (Director of the Pasteur Institute in Brussels) reminds us that (in 1917) glanders cultures were found in the German Embassy in Bucharest, provided with exact directions for use for the infection of the Rumanian supply of horses."

We remember in the third place the attempt undertaken on the western front by the army of the former German Crown Prince. This experiment, the consequences of which would have become incalculable, was interrupted November 10, 1918. The armistice put an end to the hideous deed.

We admit that the bacteriological experiments of that time were undertaken with insufficient means and that they were not directly aimed at people, but only at the horses and the cattle of the enemy. Yet this restriction was (unfortunately) less the product of any moral restraint or humanitarian impulse than the accompanying phenomenon of the then still undeveloped state of bacteriological research, which was felt to be deplorable. This lack, has in the meantime, been compensated for by tireless labor.

We have already occupied ourselves with the often heard objection that bacteria are highly sensitive to the influences of weather, to pressure and to fluctuating and high temperatures. This objection is scientifically false; it is doubly false when it is a question of the anthrax spore.

This spore (it is, as we repeat, the favorite one of the German military bacteriologists) is in a dry condition extraordinarily resistant to heat, cold and sun beams; it bears without difficulty temperatures of a second's duration of 200 to 250 degrees centigrade; a pressure strain of 50 to 80 atmospheres does not affect the spore in a demonstrably hurtful manner. If the spore is fixed to the culture medium then its power of resistance is indeed smaller; it, however, still exceeds the practical requirements in many ways. (*)

No one will dare seriously to contest the special appropriateness of this anthrax spore for military purposes. And also the extraordinary dangerousness of the spore is beyond all doubt.

The anthrax spore, the virulence of which can be increased to a maximum by suitable methods of culture, works directly and indirectly; directly through respiration, indirectly through the taking in of spore infected food or liquids. Through the breathing in of a slight quantity of spores (**) there arises within a very short while and with almost absolute certainty pulmonary anthrax (rag-sorters' disease), which is almost always fatal. And through the taking in of spore infected food or liquids there arises the intestinal anthrax which is likewise mostly fatal.

(*) Compare, for example: "Medical Research Council," London 1929/31, Volume V, page 460.

(**) The weight of the anthrax spore (in a dry state) amounts to 10 to the minus 12th power grams; therefore there are 1000 trillion spores in a gram.

Remedies against anthrax and the anthrax spores? Even just a somewhat effective defense does not exist. The dangerousness of the anthrax spore, the extraordinarily high coefficient of contagion, and the lack of suitable defensive measures, all of these facts are emphasized by the legal prescriptions that have been issued in all civilized countries in case animals die of anthrax. In general such animals' bodies must be buried under police supervision in a grave that is at least three meters under surface of the earth; the body must be surrounded by a layer of unslaked lime. Then there comes packed earth. The grave must have a fence around it; for the duration of two years the spot is closed to all access.

What practical possibilities are given of using bacteria (especially the anthrax spore) as implements of war? What possibilities are being prepared in the Third Reich?

We disregard the relative improbability (not impossibility) that bacteria cultures be used as loads for shells; we concentrate rather on those three methods which are practically proved in Germany and which will find application in the next war.

(a) The method of sealing the bacteria cultures or spores in glass capsules. These glass capsules are available in two sizes of a net weight of 5 and 20 grams. These capsules are thrown out (dispersed) from airplanes. The altitude of the airplane, in this as elsewhere in the case of dropping bombs, plays a role only as regards the accuracy of aim. Experiments have shown that in normal weather conditions, in spite of the slight weight of the capsules, a sufficient accuracy of aim is obtained even from an altitude of from 5 to 6 thousand meters.

The thin glass ball flies into fragments when it hits the ground or the roof of a house, and the contents are scattered out. The air currents existing in cities - even in a calm - effect the dispersion of the bacteria or of the spores.

Only medium and larger cities come into consideration as objects for this method, occasionally troop concentrations also.

(b) The so-called "non-explosive bomb." With the non-explosive bombs a bacteria field of greater intensity is obtained in contrast with the method of the glass capsules.

This bomb consists of a solid container filled with bacteria culture, which is thrown from almost unlimited heights by means of a parachute. The parachute opens automatically at a height that may be controlled at will; in another, likewise controllable height (generally 10, 20 or 50 meters above the ground), the container opens automatically and slowly blows out the contents which are under low pressure. The bacteria which are in solution with a liquid sink to earth with slight velocity and are propagated.

As contents for the non-explosive bomb there is provided in the first place anthrax spores, in the second place plague bacilli, exactly as in the case of the glass capsule method.

As a variant of the non-explosive bomb, the so-called "Himmel cannon" must be named, the construction and method of operating of which have been thoroughly described in the author's book "The Berlin Diaries," volume II. (London, Jarrolds. 1935, page 156 ff.).

(c) The method of "drop dispersion". This method finds application not only for bacteriological war materials, but also for liquid poison substances used for military purposes.

The idea of having bacteriological and toxicological materials rain down on the enemy is the logical consequence of striving for the greatest useful effect. Through the "drop dispersion" method there are avoided all the bad effects which could arise through explosion, pressure and temperature; and this is not the least decisive factor - the so-called "dead weight" is reduced to a minimum.

In the case of the usual gas grenades (artillery shells) this dead weight (tare) amounts to approximately eight times the gas content; and even in the case of airplane bombs the dead weight is still approximately twice as high. In the case of the "drop dispersion" method, on the other hand, when no container is dropped, but the gas is rained down in the form of drops, there is only one part of dead weight for about nine part of lethal agents (poison gas or bacteria).

Formerly and today also partially, people are of the opinion that the method of raining down can only be used from relatively small heights, if the drops are not to evaporate during the time of falling or if the aiming is not to be illusory. These misgivings could be refuted by exact experiments and calculations. The technical arrangements available now permit raining down without difficulty from heights of 4000 meters and even more.

The free fall and falling velocity of liquid drops are not subjected to the normal laws of gravitation, as they exist for solid bodies. The falling velocity of drops of liquids is rather, to speak in the language of the physicists, terminal and maximal. Differently expressed: the liquid drop reaches its maximal falling velocity after a relatively short time in the fall; this maximum cannot be exceeded, not even by extended duration of the fall.

This "maximal final velocity" depends essentially on the volume of the drop, or, since indeed the spherical form of the drop may be practically assumed, on its radius; in the second place on the density of the drop and on the density of the air, on the coefficient of resistance and other factors.

A second view point requires consideration: if at any height a drop of distilled water of the weight of one gram is rained down, then this drop does not fall to earth with just any velocity, but immediately splits up in several drops, of which each one, in an extreme case, weighs 0.2 grams and possesses a maximum radius of 7 millimeters.

This drop of water with the greatest possible radius, however, by no means reaches the maximum velocity which can be reached by drops of water and which must be reached in order to diminish the danger of evaporation and to increase the accuracy of aim. The experiments set up in German laboratories have proved rather that the highest falling velocity of a drop of water is reached with a constant radius of 3.5 millimeters. With this radius, a division of the drop is excluded.

In the case of other fluids with other density conditions other radii are to be chosen. Thus in the case of lewisite, the specific gravity of which amounts to 1.12; here the favorable radius is 2.3 millimeters; thus in the case of technically pure mustard gas, the specific gravity of which is 1.19 (at a temperature of 20 degrees centigrade); here the most favorable radius is 2.1 millimeters. Thus finally in the case of the so-called "bacilli water" (bacteriological liquid), of which the specific gravity amounts to 1.1; here the most advantageous radius is 2.35 millimeters.

With the choice of these radii the maximal falling velocity of the drops is on an average 8.4 meters per second. In other words: a drop that is rained out from a height of 4000 meters reaches the earth in about 8 minutes.

The danger that these drops will be driven away by the wind exists; without doubt this danger is greater than it, likewise, is for airplane bombs. It is shown here that "drop dispersion" is not any universal weapon, but an occasional one -- exactly as this is the case for other weapons.

The German experiments have finally proved that the losses which arise during the fall due to evaporation do not have any decisive significance, but are completely held within normal limits.

It is self-evident that the raining down of liquids with a radius of 2.1 to 2.3 millimeters requires in itself considerable time. During this time the airplane changes its position greatly. In order to obtain the desirable concentration, nozzles are provided in large numbers, and the raining down is carried out under carefully calculated pressure. The intervals between the individual drops is reduced to a minimum without the drops coming into collision one with the other.

Special care is used in German constructions so that the stationary waves, which arise in the containers in the process of emptying because of the shaking of the airplane, are caught up and made harmless. The danger of the containers being exploded by these stationary waves and endangering the crew of one's own airplane can be considered overcome.

By means of this "drop dispersion method" there may be rained out, besides poison gas, especially anthrax spores. The production of these spores offers no difficulty. In from 24 to 48 hours they can be cultivated in lots of many tons; special installations are not required, and large expenditures of money are not necessary. The storing of the spores can be carried out easily and without danger; if the most elementary measures of precaution are observed, the spore does not lose its virulence even in the case of rather long storage.

There is set forth below an article entitled "Germ Warfare Wanes: Infection May Be Threat in Third World War, Southland Doctors Say," by William S. Barton. The origin of this article is not clear, but it apparently appeared as a newspaper article, probably early in 1942.

Super-germs may supplant bombers as the major weapon in any World War No. 3. But when someone whispers that Hitler already is prepared to conquer America with germ warfare, laugh up your sleeve or report the whisperer as a fifth columnist!

Local physicians and California Institute of Technology scientists who were questioned about the rumor agree that germ warfare is more a future bogey than a present menace. The threat of using deadly infectious agents, however, dates back to 1410 when the French, led by the Duke of Burgundy, attempted to recapture Calais from the English.

DREADFUL PROSPECT

Holinshed's Chronicle reported that the Duke "had gathered together serpents, scorpions, todes and other kinds of venomous things which he had closed and shut up in little barrels, that when the flesh or substance of these noisome creatures was dissolved into filthy matter, he might lay siege to Calais and cast the said barrels let out of engines into the town; which with the violence of the throw being dasht to peeces, might choke them that were within, poison the harnessed men touched therewith and with their scattered venom infect all the streets, lanes and passages of the town."

The plot was discovered and the English bribed an early fifth columnist to burn up, not only the lethal matter, but also the entire French village in which it was stored.

BETTER SANITATION

Germ warfare, authorities agree, might have worked in 1410 because of lack of the necessary sanitary knowledge required to prevent spread of epidemics. It may work in the year 2000, but the informed consensus is that in 1940 too much is known about how to halt epidemics and too little is known about how Nature starts them to make it possible for men to create great artificial plagues.

A recent attempt to get rid of Australia's millions of rabbits by infecting them with disease germs was a complete failure despite the fact that the thousands of animals used in initial tests were enclosed within a fence. Almost as soon as a rabbit was inoculated and contracted the disease, it isolated itself as far as possible by lying down in the most remote clump of weeds it could find.

BUBONIC PLAGUE

Human plague victims may lack the hermit instinct that causes a sick rabbit to avoid infecting its fellows, but our alert health officials go the rabbit one better by not only isolating contagious patients, but also saving many lives by modern medicine.

Bubonic plague and typhus are transmitted by the bites of fleas and body lice, the fleas usually having been spread about by infected rats, ground squirrels, and other rodents. It would seem a simple matter to spread bubonic plague. Cages filled with rats and dropped by small parachutes could be so arranged that they would open upon reaching city roofs or pavements. Physicians point out, however, that, for some incompletely explained reason, bubonic plague invariably is halted when it enters a modern country in which standards of cleanliness are high.

And chances for decimating an enemy population with organisms that must be taken into the mouth, such as those of cholera, typhoid, and dysentery, are little better, say bacteriologists. All outbreaks of these diseases, it is held, can be stopped wherever the populace is intelligent enough to obey orders to boil all food and water and bury all waste in the sterilizing earth.

WOULD TEST FOODS

What about food poisoning resulting from the deadly bacillus botulinus? The poison from this bacillus is so potent that enough could be carried in one automobile to kill all the 2,000,000,000 inhabitants of the world. But how could an enemy be dosed with it? In this case, also, any outbreak probably could be halted by food tests and extended boiling.

A French scientist voiced the fear that the Germans might use flies to spread food poisoning. But flies can travel only a short distance and kitchen windows can be screened.

No local authority can be found who believes the popular fiction that the Germans wilfully started the influenza epidemic that caused the deaths of 500,000 persons in this country alone in 1918. At one of the last international medical conferences it was agreed that once bacteria are released, they cannot be confined to a particular locality, and that an artificially created plague would be as dangerous to those who produced it as to their foes.

MOVE TOO FAST

In the last war, in which opposing troops occupied virtually the same positions for years at a time, there might have been some chance to infect enemy territory, they reasoned. But in this war of lightning thrusts and mass movement, troops which infected an enemy trench today would likely have to occupy it tomorrow.

Imaginative terrorists have circulated rumors that Germany is about to produce epidemics of respiratory air-borne diseases such as "flu," pneumonia, and even common colds by dropping tons of infected dust from airplanes. Even though it were possible to obtain billions upon billions of the most deadly flu virus of the type that killed 20,000,000 persons and attacked every continent and every inhabited island in the world in 1918, the attempt would be certain to fail in part. Because, according to a nationally known scientist who refuses to be quoted directly on such a "sensational" thing as germ warfare, virtually all those who were alive in 1918 are still immune to that particular breed of the 125 known strains of flu virus.

NEED SUPER-VIRUS

"To wipe out an enemy successfully with influenza," he said, "would require the propagation of a super-virus against which only the enemy had not been immunized."

Nature has done little to protect men from dive bombing planes, but she has done much to afford protection against "diving germs." For germs strewn from planes might be blown right back again by vagrant air currents. And most germs, being sensitive to light, cold, or heat, would dry and shrivel up even if they didn't become too scattered to cause infection upon dropping down into the abodes of men.

HEAT WOULD KILL

The most likely success in waging war with germs, physicians say, would result from the release of disease organisms in crowded air-raid shelters by fifth columnists. But that threat also, it is predicted, could be obviated with the aid of special masks and germ-killing ultra-violet lamps.

Suggestions that armies could be routed by bombardment with shells containing spore-forming organisms like those of tetanus, gangrene, and anthrax are branded as "fantastic." Heat and sound waves resulting from the impact of such shells would kill the organisms, two Los Angeles physicians are certain. Not only that, but all British soldiers, for example, are now immunized against not only smallpox and typhoid, but against tetanus as well. Also, a new kind of vaccination against wound lockjaw has been perfected and already has been given all United States Naval Academy midshipmen.

What about the use of malaria and yellow fever mosquitoes? It wouldn't work in places like Southern California where nights are so cool that these mosquitoes can't thrive.

Fortunately for the survival of the race, scientists cannot grow disease germs outside their laboratories as fast as they can inside.

If they could, it would be possible with a germ that reproduces itself once every 20 minutes to fill the lakes and oceans so full of deadly bacteria within a few months that there would be no room for the water. But thus far Nature has made any such attempts impossible by making the outdoors too hot, too cold, too windy, or even by sending rain at the wrong time.

MATHEMATICIANS BUSY

The mathematicians have conjured up a comforting argument. They say that successful germ warfare will be impossible as long as the first 100 persons infected fail to give the disease to more than 99 other persons. In that case, the epidemic soon would wane.

But it is the progress made in fighting diseases accompanying wars that makes the successful use of germs in the present conflict unlikely. In the Thirty Years War 8,000,000 Germans succumbed to flea-borne bubonic plague and louse-borne typhus. During his retreat from Moscow, Napoleon lost 450,000 of his 500,000 men from dysentery and pneumonia.

In the first World War 8,000,000 men were killed on the battlefield and less than 3,000,000 succumbed to disease, most of the latter deaths occurring near the close of the four-year conflict. In short, in the 18th century loss by disease was six times the battle losses. In the war of 1914-1918 the ratio was only three disease deaths to eight battle deaths. And in this war less than one disease death has occurred for over 10 deaths caused by bullets!

The following is a ~~confidential~~ report which has been evaluated as fairly reliable and is concerned with the possible experimentation by the Japanese of the use of disease-producing organisms for civilian population:

For many years bubonic plague in China has been more or less a local problem in a few semi-isolated areas. In 1940 and 1941 it showed a tendency of migrating toward the hinterland. From Fukien it spread to Chekiang and Kiangsi. In November, 1941, an outbreak occurred in Hunan.

Since the beginning of Sino-Japanese hostilities there have been reports and rumors that Japan was practicing bacteriological warfare. These reports have not been too well authenticated. However, the following circumstances connected with the outbreak at Changteh, Hunan, where 6 cases developed between November 11 and 25 and where a 7th case was reported on December 14, are sufficiently well authenticated to be worthy of notice:

1. On November 4, a single Japanese plane appeared over Changteh. It flew just over the roof tops, circled about for twenty minutes, then departed without dropping a bomb.
2. Returning residents were puzzled when they observed scattered rice grains mixed with wisps of cotton rags, most of them near the 2 main gates. Samples of these materials, on analysis, were found to be contaminated with bubonic plague bacilli.
3. Several bubonic plague cases were reported on November 11. All died within 36 hours.
4. No bubonic plague had been reported in Changteh for more than 10 generations. The nearest epidemic region is more than 500 miles distant. The victims were not transients or refugees who might have brought in the disease, but residents who had never travelled more than a few miles from Changteh. All lived near the 2 main gates.
5. The plague is usually transmitted by bites from fleas which have lived on infected rats, which soon die. No dead rats were found in Changteh on November 11th leading to the belief that the plague was directly transmitted by the infected fleas.
6. A reliable foreigner, Dr. R. Politzer, former League of Nations epidemiologist, stationed now in Changteh, who dissected 5 infected rats, stated that in his opinion Japan is experimenting with bacteriological warfare.

The evidence is thus strong that a Japanese plane dropped cotton cloth bags containing rice and plague-infected fleas, the rice presumably being to attract rats.

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The circumstances at Changteh check with previous stories, particularly with reports of the outbreaks in Chekiang province during 1940. Of interest in this connection is a report that about a year ago fishing operations in a certain section near Otaru, on the island of Hokkaido, were suspended by order of the Japanese government, due to large cultures of bubonic plague bacilli having been inadvertently dropped into the sea as a result of flood damage to the laboratories situated at the city of Otaru.

The following article appeared in the Washington Evening Star, May 18, 1942, and was written by one Stephen J. McDonough. It is entitled, "Army Medical Expert Brands Bacteria Warfare as Fantastic, Germs Difficult to Handle and Might Infect Wrong Side, Doctor Says":

The use of bacteria as a weapon of war to carry death to an enemy was described today as fantastic.

An Army Medical Corps expert, Major Leon A. Fox, declared that the dangers in using bacteria against an enemy more than offset any advantages. Most bacteria are difficult to handle and cannot survive long under adverse conditions.

No germ known could survive the immense heat generated when a shell is fired from a gun or explodes on striking an objective.

Writing in the Military Surgeon, official journal of the Association of Military Surgeons, Major Fox declared:

"That the effects of bacterial injury cannot be limited or localized to any area; modern water purification methods protect most areas against typhoid and cholera; plague is a disease that would be as dangerous for the force using the organisms as for those attacked; the danger from typhus has been grossly exaggerated and modern sanitary precautions are effective in controlling most communicable diseases.

"Any consideration of the deliberate use of disease organisms as a means of warfare will have to consider the question of how to produce a destructive epidemic in the forces of an opponent and at the same time protect one's own forces from invasion by the virulent organisms in question," he declared.

"Certainly at the present time we know of no disease-producing micro-organisms that will respect uniform or insignia."

Taking the various diseases in order, Dr. Fox pointed out that while typhoid, cholera and dysentery have been familiar scourges of both armies and civilian populations in the past, modern sanitation measures and immunization have practically wiped them out as weapons of warfare.

It might be possible to contaminate a civilian water reservoir, he added, but the effect would be purely local, and it would be almost impossible to contaminate the water or milk supply of any large army unit.

The germs of these diseases are with us all the time, and the only reason we do not have epidemics is that we are either vaccinated against them or are protected by such public health measures as pasturized milk and filtered or chlorinated water.

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ENCLOSURE

Infection of military units with these diseases "would probably prove entirely ineffective because modern water purification methods and the close supervision of the water supply will absolutely preclude the successful employment of this means of combat," Dr. Fox declared.

Smallpox is no problem in the bacterial warfare picture since every man in the armed forces not previously immunized is vaccinated on induction, just as he is immunized against typhoid fever.

Epidemics of influenza, the common cold, pneumonia and meningitis have been mentioned in "scare stories" of the dangers of bacteria in wartime, he added, but again these are germs and viruses which are always with us.

"I do not know of a bacteriologist or an epidemiologist who can tell you how to start a respiratory epidemic," he said, "unless the stage is especially set" by poor hygienic conditions, overcrowding, poor ventilation and exposure to unfavorable climatic conditions or other factors which decrease resistance.

When such conditions exist, as they do now on the Russian-German front, disease outbreaks are certain to occur and kill or incapacitate more men on both sides than bullets.

Not enough is known about the viruses of the common cold or influenza to handle them as a war weapon, Dr. Fox declared, and the tiny organism which causes epidemic meningitis is so small and delicate that it must be handled carefully under carefully controlled conditions and then must be introduced directly to the mucous membranes of the nose or throat.

Subonic plague has often been mentioned as a war pestilence, which it has often been in the past, but it is a weapon with a reverse spin since infected rats set loose on an enemy would quickly infect the army which started it in motion.

Likewise typhus, transmitted from rats to men by the body louse, would promptly bounce back on the army which used it when the first prisoner carrying the disease-infected body louse mingled with his captors.

The tough spore-forming germs such as those which cause tetanus, gas gangrene and anthrax are the greatest problem in warfare, Dr. Fox declared, "but they do not produce epidemic diseases and they are not communicable."

Tetanus germs are present in the soil in incalculable numbers, he added, but today serum is available to combat it before infection occurs.

In the case of infection with the bacillus welchii, which causes gas gangrene, new drugs and treatments have removed the dread of this disease, and even if a retiring army sowed the battlefield with these germs it would have little effect on an invading army.

Infection of wounds with anthrax is practically unknown, and human epidemic anthrax is unknown since the days of Louis Pasteur, who first investigated the disease, Dr. Fox declared.

It is of course possible, he added, to use such materials as the toxin of the bacillus botulinus, the most deadly substance known to man, one drop of which would be enough to kill an entire company within a few hours if taken in food, injected, or even dropped into the nose or throat.

However, it is difficult to make, difficult to handle, and its use against troops is almost an impossibility with the strict regulations and inspections imposed.

"Such statements as an airplane destroying an entire city with toxins is ridiculous," Dr. Fox said.

"I consider that it is highly questionable if biologic agents are suited for warfare. Certainly at the present time practically insurmountable technical difficulties prevent the use of biologic agents as effective weapons of warfare."

On November 20, 1940, a suggestion was received from a confidential informant who is a civilian engineer that the water supply of any city of fair size could be contaminated by disease-producing organisms through the installation of suitably located back pressure pumping systems which would be distributed at certain points in the city and suitably synchronized. He further suggested that these back pressure pumps would not have to be of large size and could be located in almost any house or building that had a water supply and was in a fair proximity to a large water main.

It is generally considered that, should great quantities of disease-producing germs be introduced in the above manner or otherwise placed in water used for drinking purposes, the superabundance of germs would override the water purification measures resulting in sporadic cases appearing and probably an epidemic of the disease from the organisms which were reproduced. Some of the more important and most likely germs considered are those which cause typhoid, paratyphoid, bacillary dysentery, and cholera. It would appear that the same purpose might be served by the introduction of these same types of organisms into a milk supply prior to distribution, and likewise the introduction of these germs on raw vegetables and fruits which are eaten raw.

The Bureau has been advised confidentially by an authoritative source that one of the greatest dangers in civilian sabotage by disease organisms is the disease of yellow fever. It is to be noted that there are no cases of yellow fever in this country, nor have there been for many years. The introduction of yellow fever into this country by accidental means was considered by at least one of the foremost bacteriologists several years ago. He lost his life in the disappearance of a clipper on his way into the tropics to make a study of this topic which he considered of vital importance.

Yellow fever is caused by a filterable virus and is transmitted by a species of mosquito commonly known as the yellow fever mosquito, which is a common inhabitant of this country particularly in the southern sections bordering on the Gulf.

Two other potentially dangerous diseases which, according to confidential authorities, might lend themselves to sabotage against the war effort are rinderpest, a disease of animals which has never been introduced in this country and which is confined to tropical Africa, and a plant disease which affects potatoes and is known as potato blight.

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A review of the book entitled "Sabotage" by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, which was published in September of 1942, discloses the following data:

The complete record of sabotage carried out by Chernov, supposedly of the German Intelligence Service, in Russia during 1930 to 1936 is too long to put into the book according to the authors, but includes—Killing off pedigree breed-stock and raising cattle mortality by artificially infecting cattle with various kinds of bacteria—Effecting a shortage of serum to counteract epidemics of anthrax so that, in one instance, 25,000 horses perished as a result of Chernov's sabotage—Infecting tens of thousands of pigs with erysipelas and with certain plagues by having virulent bacteria placed in medicinal sera.

In another point, the authors have asked the question: "Could such wholesale sabotage of agriculture as took place in the Soviet Union take place in the United States of America?" They then answer the question that, regardless of how fantastic it might sound, such diabolical sabotage was actually practiced by German saboteurs in 1915 in the United States of America.

Anton Dilger, a German-American medical graduate from Johns Hopkins University, was in Germany when the First World War broke out. He offered his services to the Kaiser, and was promptly detailed by Colonel Nicolai to do secret service work in the United States. Dilger returned to America with a supply of cultures of glanders and anthrax germs. Financed by von Papan, he set up a laboratory in Chevy Chase, near Washington, and started breeding germs on a large scale for infecting mules, horses, and cattle awaiting shipment to the Allies.

This man then organized a band of some twelve assistants to travel around the country, carrying Dilger's germs in small glass phials stoppered with corks through which a needle extended. This roving band jabbed their deadly needles into the livestock.

They also spread germs by placing them in fodder and drink. Thousands of soldiers, as well as horses and cattle, died as a result of Dilger's germs. At last Dilger revolted against his mission of silent death. He was murdered by German spies a few months before the end of the war.

"Could it happen here? It did happen here!"

The authors do not give their source of information on this story.

In Chapter IV, entitled "Tokyo Terrorists," the authors go into the Black Dragon Society and the efforts of Japan to obtain information in various ways. They reproduce a copy of the letter dated June 28, 1934, from the Japanese Consulate, K. Kagayama, to Mr. H. A. Van Norman, the chief

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ENCLOSURE

engineer and general manager of the Los Angeles Bureau of Water Works and Supply, which was nothing more than a polite request from the Japanese Consulate for information concerning the Los Angeles water supply, number of consumers, filtering process, etc. A copy of this letter was turned over to the FBI by Mr. Norman, who also consulted the military authorities at that time. (The reviewer has seen sometime in years past a copy of this letter in the Files of the FBI.)

Dr. Martin Gumpert, reported to be the former head of the Berlin City Dispensary, is credited with certain statements in a book on sabotage published by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In this, it is reported that Hitler was experimenting with the use of disease-producing organisms such as tularaemia which, it was contemplated, would be refrigerated and thrown from airplanes on civilian populations in the prosecution of the war. He has apparently quoted extracts from an official German army journal published in September, 1939, which discussed the possibilities of unleashing disease-laden germs upon the civilian populations in France and Great Britain. The irreconcilable statement that tularaemia, for which there is no possibility of treatment or vaccination, could be spread by dropping refrigerated flies and lice by airplane is also reported to be Dr. Gumpert's. He is further credited with stating that Hitler's secret weapon may be "horrible bacteria warfare that Hitler might not hesitate to unleash when he finds himself at bay."

Dr. Gumpert has made the statement that his information on the subject was derived from material which he has read since arriving in the United States in 1936; that he never heard the subject discussed while in Germany, nor did he know of any instances in which Hitler had actually employed bacteria in waging war or experimented with their use.

Dr. Gumpert has been in this country since 1936 and is reported to be seeking citizenship and to be practicing medicine in New York City. His last reported residence was 315 E. 63th Street and his office, 3 E. 74th Street. He has previously cooperated with the FBI.

See also "The Bacteriological War" by Von O. Hartmann, Norwegian Medical Journal "Med. 42, 45" (1938 Norwegian), also reported to have been published in "Der Deutsche Militararzt" for September, 1939. See also "Der Deutsche Militararzt", p. 434 of the September, 1939, issue, Volume 9. See also "The Voice of Destruction" by Hermann Rauschnig.

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ENCLOSURE

There is set out below an article written by Dr. Martin Gumpert entitled "Is a War of Bacteria Possible?" It is to be noted that the article consists largely of Dr. Gumpert's thoughts and comments regarding the article, "The Bacteriological War," which was summarized in "Der Deutsche Militärarzt." It is to be noted that even though Dr. Martin Gumpert was reportedly the former head of the Berlin City Dispensary, nothing is known of his ability in the field of bacteriology and public health. In the consideration of some of the statements made by Dr. Gumpert in his article, the amount of weight which should be applied is highly speculative.

IS A WAR OF BACTERIA POSSIBLE

Hitler makes mysterious insinuations about new frightful weapons with which he intends to annihilate his opponents. In making these statements has he in mind the war of bacteria, is this awful possibility, to which reference is made again and again, more than a devilish Utopia, is such a war of bacteria actually thinkable and feasible?

There were times during which pestilence and cholera devastated the world. These epidemics ravaged more momentarily and more cruelly, than wars with large casualty lists. Old people, women, children fell victims to them indiscriminately. By tremendous efforts and at great pains humanity has conquered these enemies. We owe it to measures of hygiene and the findings of medical research that the most dangerous epidemics today hardly constitute a threat to the civilized parts of the world.

Only a diseased brain could evolve the thought of misusing the progress of science and its heroic discoveries: not to prevent epidemics but to engender their outbreak.

Undoubtedly everyone has heard or read of the "war of bacteria" now and then, the fewest among us have been able to form any definite conception of it. Only a small minority divines that the "war of bacteria" is the most horrible, the most criminal weapon that the urge to destroy on the part of man has ever conceived. No imagination suffices to visualize the reality of this threat. That this threat is to be taken seriously, that it can be carried out and that forces are

now at work to convert it into actuality, we learn unequivocally from the work of Captain O. Hartmann, reported in the magazine "Der Deutsche Militaerarzt" (The German Army Physician) (Year IV, Vol. 9, page 42, September 1939).

It is a shaking experience to read this work, that considers the possibilities of the use of bacteria as a weapon in warfare, in the manner of objective and sober scientific report. At first you believe that you are learning something new about a new medical treatment in combatting epidemics and only gradually do you realize, that it is not the meaning of this work to describe a new manner of healing, but a new manner of merciless annihilation.

At first the significance of epidemics in former wars is referred to. Undoubtedly the idea of the war of bacteria is traceable to a circumstance almost totally unknown, namely that the fate of a war is decided far more by the amount of disease than by the number of wounded. That at least has been the case in all the wars fought up to the present. In the American Civil War the ratio of wounded to diseased was 1:8.7 and in the last World War it was 1:3.8. The thought is therefore obvious, in this "total" war of the present, to augment the number of diseased on the enemy's side by means of artificial interference to such an extent that his activity and his fitness as a combatant is decisively impaired.

Captain Hartmann warns against depreciation of the bacteriological attack, since future wars would renounce no manner of attack whatsoever and since the further development of bacteriology has created the best possibilities for this manner of attack.

The attack by means of bacteria will in all probability be directed principally against the civilian population. Application at the front would only be expedient, if their own troops had previously been protected by inoculation from contagion by the same bacteria used in the attack.

With the most minute detail the various groups of germs are discussed that may be considered for mass dissemination. Bacteria that necessitate direct contact between the carrier and the object of attack or which must be transferred directly to wound surfaces, are unsuitable for the war of bacteria, because the likelihood of infection is not great or because the technical difficulties are too great. For these reasons wound infection by means of bullets infected with pus germs, spleen gangrene, tetanus and gas gangrene is not practicable. Likewise, the transfer of the germs of venereal diseases might not be practicable.

Great difficulties are also foreseen in the case of infectious diseases, where infection takes place via the air route through the respiratory organs. Among these are grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, small pox, and poliomyelitis. On the one hand the technical to be overcome in the breeding of the germs of these diseases are too great; on the other hand, it will not be possible to manufacture bacteria cultures whose virulence is strong enough to accomplish their work of destruction surely.

Gradually it becomes clear to us what demands bacteria must fulfill in order to function properly in warfare: it must be possible to breed them easily in huge masses, the bacteria cultures must possess a high and durable virulence, it must be possible to transfer them readily and unnoticed, and they must breed diseases against which there is no protection and for which there are practically no remedial possibilities.

Seen from these viewpoints, the germs through which infection is effected by way of the gastric channel already behave in a far more military manner. Among them are typhoid, paratyphoid, cholera, anoba- and bacillus dysentery. The germs of dysentery are considered as particularly valuable. Why? Protective vaccinations may be employed against the other members of this group. Dysentery, however, enjoys the privilege that so far it has been impossible to immunize against it; besides, it can easily be caught through infected flies and other insects.

In the war of bacteria diseases will rise to honor, that thus far have only been encountered rarely on the European continent. Obviously it is advantageous to the strategy of bacteria, if the diseases that are bred have so far been little known to the population; the panic is increased, the possibilities of protection and defense dwindle. Thus Malta fever is recommended, also known as undulant fever or Brucellensis, that is somewhat prevalent in some parts of the United States, in Texas and New Mexico. It is carried through animals and the specific medical treatment has so far shown visible successes only in chronic cases. The Weil disease may be placed in the same category, which latter disease has appeared in New York so far only in three cases. It is carried through rats. In this instance treatment also is almost powerless.

Particular military significance in the war of bacteria is attributed to rabbit fever: "It is particularly adapted because of its extraordinary infectious qualities with a lack of specific therapy."

Rabbit fever has been almost unknown in Europe up to the present, while in the United States and in Japan it plays an important part. It is carried from diseased rabbits, squirrels, rats, and mice by means of flies and insects to human beings and is an extremely lingering, painful and dangerous disease. Spreading it in epidemic form in densely populated residential districts would be a capital crime against humanity. "The spreading of malaria must be reckoned with," the paper continues. Malaria has already increased during and after the world war in Central Europe because it was continually being carried in from the south-eastern fronts and because the Anophele-fly, the intermediate-carrier of malaria, has its hotbeds in Central Europe also. It would indeed be easy to accomplish an epidemic-like spreading of malaria in Europe by means of a bacteriological attack. "The infection of spotted fever is absolutely possible, because the breeding of infected lice is controlled." So the report in the magazine "Deutscher Militaerarzt" sets forth. Spotted fever, as it is well known, is only carried through lice. During the last war thousands were the victims of this terrible disease. Since lice may be counted among the greatest winners of a war, and since the fact that the civilian population is more affected in this war will lead to a far quicker failure of all hygienic precautions than in 1914-1918, it will hardly be necessary to call upon artificial help to experience the outbreak of an epidemic of spotted fever. The contemplation, however, that the fliers of bombers in this new war will shower millions of infected lice on the suffering countries instead of explosives is more horrible and more grotesque than the visions of Dante's Inferno.

"The infection with pestilence through rats seems less likely; on the other hand the danger of dissemination of pestilence cultures which are easily manufactured is considerably greater." During the entire duration of the last war, pestilence did not break out in a single spot, not even on the Asiatic fronts. If the enemies of humanity should succeed in letting loose a new epidemic of pestilence all over the earth, this would be the most atrocious crime in world history.

As far as the technical procedure in the spreading of epidemics in the war of bacteria is concerned, we learn that the plane would in all probability be the medium of attack and that infection would be brought about by throwing off and dispersing of bacteria cultures. In order to insure the "safe" landing of these devilish substances, they would be mixed with indifferent and specifically heavy substances. Still another ingenious method is mentioned. Flies become rigid at a temperature of 10° Celsius. Thus a tremendous quantity of infected flies may be placed in a plane. The "cooled" flies are thrown off like ballast and upon landing in a warmer temperature again become capable of moving - and attacking. Dissemination via the espionage route is also referred to.

"The attack is primarily to be expected against thickly populated cities." Thus the article closes. It seems like a bad dream and if one had not seen it black on white before one's very eyes, one would consider this objective presentation of an insane and infamous plan impossible. There is still the hope that none of the belligerent powers has put it into effect or ever will. For bacteria knows no nations, no boundaries, no political phantoms. They know only one enemy: humanity, the inhabitants of our earth. In the most frightful manner this barbaric weapon should strike back at him who dares to put it to use.

Since no madness is impossible in these wretched times, when the fate of millions is subject to the fancies and notions of a few, it is imperative that steps be taken to safeguard mankind from this extreme madness. Anyone who knowingly and notoriously becomes an accomplice in this war of bacteria should be punished as a marauder and murderer and should not enjoy the protection of a legitimate combatant. Acquiescence in this or a similar agreement should be demanded of every nation simultaneously with a solemn obligation to renounce the war of bacteria in every form. The Red Cross or any other neutral organization could accept these declarations.

It is a far cry from the alleged poisoning of wells of the middle ages to the throwing off of bacteria from planes of this day and age. Civilization must be spared the disgrace that the great deeds of her progress have led to nothing more than back to the road of the most sinister and inhuman barbarism.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/8/90 BY SP1A/SJC
307009

THE BACTERIOLOGICAL WAR by O. Hartmann.

Norse Journal of Military Medicine (Vol.) 42,
(Page) 45 and German Synopsis (page) 52 (1938)
(In Norwegian)

After a reference to the importance of epidemics in former wars (there is given a) warning against underestimation of bacteriological attack, since in a war of the future every manner of attack will probably be seized upon and the further development of bacteriology could furnish better possibilities herefor than those of that time. The attack will apparently be directed chiefly against the civil population, insofar as one's own troops cannot be protected against contagion by immunization - during use at the front. Of the various possibilities for infection the direct infection of wounds by means of pus exciters, anthrax, tetanus and gas burns through infected projectiles is considered to be infeasible in practice; likewise a transmission of the causes of sexual diseases is out of question.

There are difficulties as to breeding or intensification of virulence against the use of diseases transmissible by air such as grippe, pneumonia, meningitis, diphtheria, scarlet fever, tuberculosis, smallpox and poliomyelitis. On the other hand the infections occurring by way of the stomach-intestinal-canal such as typhus, paratyphus, amoebic and bacillic dysentery and cholera are very usable, especially however dysentery as up to the present immunisation against it (has been) impossible. In connection with this attention is called to the possibility of transmission by means of infected flies and other insects. Also Malta fever and Bang's disease, which are transmitted from animal to man, can be used under (certain) conditions, likewise Weil's Disease by means of infected rats. More importance is to be attributed to tularemia however, as it is especially suitable, (having) exceptional contagiousity together with a lack of a specific therapy. A spread of malaria must also be considered, also the transmission of spotted typhus is completely possible, as the production of infected lice in great numbers has been mastered.

Infection with pestilence by means of rats seems less apparent, on the other hand the danger of dissemination of pestilence-cultures, which can be easily produced, is in reality larger. Also virus infections are possible, the transmission of parrot fever (being) especially easy. As means of attack the airplane will apparently be used and the infection result from the throwing down or strewing of cultures (which will be) probably mixed with indifferent substances of heavier specific gravity or from infected flies which are kept immovable at 10° centigrade. The distribution by espionage practices is also alluded to. Attack is to be expected soonest against thickly populated cities.

100-93216-35
ENCLOSURE

AJT:mc

100-93216-36

December 30, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR PATCH

Conf. Inft

b2

b7D

Re:

b7D

Reference is made to the report of [redacted] dated November 18, 1942, your communication [redacted] relative to the above captioned matter.

b6

b7C

b7D

A review of this report reveals [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

b6

b7C

b7D

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

[Handwritten signature]

14-3204-B-43

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

File

Case originated at

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.


File No. 100-9518

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Report made at SAN FRANCISCO | Date 11-27-42 | Period 11-20-42 | Report made by |
|---------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|

b6
b7C

| | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| Title POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE | Character INTERNAL SECURITY (J) |
|--|------------------------------------|

SYNOPSIS:



b6
b7C
b7D

-c ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 307007
DATE 3/8/90 BY 821AESC

REFERENCES: Bureau File 100-93216.
Letter from Bureau dated September 24, 1942.
Report of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 24, 1942
at San Francisco.

b6
b7C

DETAILS: AT SALINAS, CALIF.:

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent



b6
b7C

| | |
|--|---|
| Approved & Forwarded <i>M. J. Fisher</i> SAC | Do not write in this space RECORDED INDEXED 100-93216-37 10 DEC 5 1942 <i>MP</i> |
|--|---|

COPY IN FILE
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
- 5 - Bureau
- 2 - ONI, San Francisco
- 1 - G-2, San Francisco
- 1 - Seattle, inf.
- 4 - San Francisco

[redacted] attempted to contact the original informant [redacted]
[redacted] He ascertained at that address that
[redacted] had recently [redacted]
[redacted] was not at home at the time of
the Agent's call at the latter address but [redacted]
[redacted] supplied the information that [redacted] could be reached at [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Inquiry at the [redacted] brought the information that
[redacted] was [redacted]

AT OAKLAND, CALIF.:



b6
b7C
b7D

In view of the fact that [redacted]
[redacted] have been
set out in reference report, further investigation is being discontinued upc.
authority of the Special Agent in Charge.

b6
b7C
b7D

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- CLOSED -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-19-03 BY 60267 uc/nue/bja/pmm

100-93216-38

CANCELLED

376

M.G.B.

~~373~~

WFO:EGK

November 30, 1942

THE DIRECTOR

Re: November Committee Meetings -
Radio Intelligence Committee
Joint Cryptanalysis Committee
Bacterial Warfare Committee
 Committee VIII of the Board of
 War Communications
 Interdepartment Radio Advisory
 Committee
Special Committee on Truth Serum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 udm/dlp/pan

b6

b7C

[redacted] who serves on the committees listed, reports the following activities for November, 1942:

Radio Intelligence Committee: An informal committee consisting of British Security, Federal Communications Commission, Army, Coast Guard, Navy, and FBI representatives met every Tuesday during November for routine exchange of technical information.

Joint Cryptanalysis Committee: A committee consisting of FBI, Army, and Navy representatives, serving under the Joint Intelligence Conference, held no meetings during November. This is the second successive month in which no meetings have been held by this committee. A recent conversation with [redacted] was had in which he indicated that he is going to look into the committee to see why this committee, of which he is chairman by right of rank, is not functioning. There seems to be a possibility that a reluctance on the part of the Navy exists for some unknown reason.

b6

b7C

Bacterial Warfare Committee: This is [redacted] committee to which [redacted] has been invited to attend. No meetings were held in November.

Committee VIII of the Board of War Communications: [redacted] serves on this committee and no meetings were held in November.

b6

Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee: [redacted] serves as a technical advisor.

b7C

War Meeting: One meeting was held in November. This was not attended by [redacted] inasmuch as

there was no pressing FBI business before the Board.

Special Committee on Truth Serum: Two meetings were held during November at the National Academy of Sciences. Detailed reports have been prepared. Additional meetings will be held to formulate a program. This committee was started under the National Academy of Sciences at the instigation of WIB of the Army.

- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Respectfully,

E. J. Tracy

100-93216-39

SEARCHED INDEXED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FILE

EX-117

33 DEC 28 1942 352

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-93216-39

Second Copy

KFC:EDK

November 30, 1942

THE DIRECTOR

Re: ~~November Committee Meetings -
 Radio Intelligence Committee
 Joint Cryptanalysis Committee
 Bacterial Warfare Committee
 Committee VIII of the Board of
 War Communications
 Interdepartment Radio Advisory
 Committee
 Special Committee on Truth Serum~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11-13-88 BY 60207 ucl/mll/japau

Mr. Coffey, who serves on the committees listed, reports the following activities for November, 1942:

Radio Intelligence Committee: An informal committee consisting of British Security, Federal Communications Commission, Army, Coast Guard, Navy, and FBI representatives met every Tuesday during November for routine exchange of technical information.

Joint Cryptanalysis Committee: A committee consisting of FBI, Army, and Navy representatives, serving under the Joint Intelligence Conference, held no meetings during November. This is the second successive month in which no meetings have been held by this committee. A recent conversation with Colonel Carter Clarke was had in which he indicated that he is going to look into the committee to see why this committee, of which he is chairman by right of rank, is not functioning. There seems to be a possibility that a reluctance on the part of the Navy exists for some unknown reason.

Bacterial Warfare Committee: This is George Marek's committee to which Mr. Coffey has been invited to attend. No meetings were held in November.

Mr. Committee VIII of the Board of War Communications: Mr. Coffey serves on this committee and no meetings were held in November.

Mr. Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee: Mr. Coffey serves as a technical advisor. One meeting was held in November. This was not attended by Mr. Coffey inasmuch as there was no pressing FBI business before the Board.

Mr. Special Committee on Truth Serum: Two meetings were held during November at the National Academy of Sciences. Detailed reports have been prepared. Additional meetings will be held to formulate a program. This committee work was started under the National Academy of Sciences at the instigation of NIB of the Army.

- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Respectfully,

S. J. Tracy

| | |
|-----------------------------|------|
| U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE | |
| | FILE |

EPC:AF

November 10, 1942

THE DIRECTOR

Re: October Committee Meetings -
Radio Intelligence Committee
Joint Cryptanalysis Committee
Bacterial Warfare Committee
Committee VIII of the Board of
War Communications
Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60272 chus/bj/pam

b6

b7C

[redacted] who serves on the committees listed, reports the following activities for October, 1942:

Radio Intelligence Committee: An informal committee consisting of British Security, Federal Communications Commission, Army, Coast Guard, Navy and FBI representatives met every Tuesday during October for routine exchange of technical information.

Joint Cryptanalysis Committee: A committee consisting of FBI, Army and Navy representatives, serving under the Joint Intelligence Conference, held no meetings during October. The acting chairman of the committee, Commander Wenger of the Navy, has indicated that the committee feels that a further directive from the Joint Intelligence Conference, setting forth explicitly the duties of the committee, is necessary before additional meetings are held. He states he is attempting to obtain this directive.

Bacterial Warfare Committee: This is [redacted] committee to which [redacted] has been invited. One luncheon meeting was held during October. The protection of municipal water supplies of the nation was discussed.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____ Committee VIII of the Board of War Communications [redacted] serves on this committee and no meetings were held in October.
Mr. Glavin _____

b6

b7C

Mr. Ladd _____ Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee: [redacted] serves as a technical advisor. One meeting was held in October. Routine assignments of frequencies were considered.
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____

Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECORDED

100-93216-40

Respectfully,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
S. J. Tracy

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL - 2

FILE

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-16244-108

o Routine of Warfare wd

1022

KCH:SB
~~12-30-42~~
12-1-42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

b6
b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/mw/bja/mae
ON 11-13-03

Brigadier General [redacted]
General Staff
Chief, Military Intelligence Service
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Kronart:

There are transmitted herewith for your information
and whatever consideration deemed appropriate, copies of a
communication addressed to this Bureau by [redacted]

b6
b7C

The correspondent has been advised of this reference.

Very truly yours,

RECORDED

&
INDEXED
John Edgar Hoover

100-93216-41
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEC 2 1942
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Enclosure

cc - Rear Admiral [redacted] b6
Director of Naval Intelligence b7C
War Department
Washington, D. C.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 15
★ DEC 1 1942 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

o. C. Cronart

g...

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

RECORDED

TDB:GWH
100-93216-42
Transcribed January 6, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

[Redacted]
Special Assistant to the Administrator
Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

Dear [Redacted]

In line with our previous conversation, I am transmitting to you herewith a photostatic copy of an article, the authorship and name of the publication of which are not known. The original of this article consisted of a clipping and was submitted to this Bureau anonymously.

No investigation of any kind is being undertaken on this matter by this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

- Mr. Tolson Enclosure
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

DECLASSIFIED BY *6027 ucl/mcl/ljg/pml*
ON 11-13-03

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FBI

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 13
JAN 8 1943 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE


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317
50 JAN 20 1943
2/16

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION
KEEP ENVELOPE ATTACHED

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON ENVELOPE
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-02 BY 60267 ucl/wel/bja/ptm

1 ENCL. II
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522
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RECORDED & INDEXED

100-92815-42

DEC 1 1942

FIVE Coffey

EX-231

There is a new professorship at the University of Berlin, and the new professor, Dr. Ewald Banse, teaches military science. He is the author of a book on that subject. Wishing to check up on him, a Saarbrück editor opened it the other day and read, "Inasmuch as England believes in starving an enemy and inasmuch as gas and the horrible effects of modern artillery have robbed war of all its chivalry, biology will be justified in enabling it to exterminate entire nations.

"We shall have recourse to the poisoning of drinking water with typhus germs, to the introduction and spreading of typhus by means of fleas, and to the spreading of cholera by artificially contaminated rats."

Reading on, the Saarbrück editor found Dr. Banse saying, "By landing in an enemy country, aviators can disseminate the deadly germs, and the results will be particularly favorable," while another passage, now reprinted like the foregoing in the Saarbrück *Freiheit*, asseverates, "Certainly, biological warfare is the kind appropriate for disarmed nations. When a race is driven to desperation, its only way out is to attempt the seemingly impossible and, without the smallest regard for international law, consider good all the means—yes, all—by which it may defend itself."

As was sure to happen, these paragraphs caught the attention of a French journalist, who translated them, so Dr. Banse got front-page publicity, with liberal italics, in *Le Figaro*. Then it is questioned whether universities should have professorships of military science and whether, in case they do, a more dangerous professor than Dr. Banse could be found.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-83 BY 60267 uol/ud/bj/pmc

ENCLOSURE

100-93216-42

TDB:BF
65-3304

January 9, 1943

M E M O R A N D U M

A laboratory operated by a Japanese national, supposedly for the preparation of quinine, was searched, after the necessary papers were secured, by authorities together with an expert bacteriologist.

The laboratory was found to be much better equipped than one used solely for the manufacture of quinine. Much of the material was not at all necessary for the manufacture of quinine. A considerable amount of equipment had not, at the time of the search, been removed from its original wrappings consisting of Japanese newspapers. It was the bacteriologist's belief, from an examination of the equipment in the laboratory, that it had been used, illegally and without the necessary Government permission, in the manufacture of vaccines and medicines. Although there was material present for bacteriological research, the particular equipment used for research on yellow fever virus was not found. It appears that a peculiar type of test tube is used in connection with yellow fever research, which was not found present, and it was, therefore, assumed that no work was done in the laboratory on yellow fever cultures.

The laboratory and surroundings gave no indication of recent use. In one corner, some solutions were soaking, but they had probably been there for some time, according to the report. In a back room, there was found a stock of cascarilla bark for the making of quinine.

In all, nothing was found that would indicate that yellow fever cultures had been produced, but there was every indication that the laboratory was complete enough to be used for other types of bacteriological work. However, it was made quite certain that the laboratory was not being used, at the time it was searched, for any purpose whatsoever.

The laboratory in question was located in Ecuador and the Japanese operator is named Fermin Matukuru Masura.

122-11-43
JAN 10 1943

TDB: EF

January 11, 1943

65-3304

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

[redacted]
Special Assistant to the Administrator
of the Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

Dear [redacted]

As a result of our previous conversation, I am pleased to transmit herewith confidential information received from a South American informant.

The Bureau is endeavoring to obtain additional information in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

000885

Enclosure

Source of Information:
[redacted] Ecuador

b6
b7C

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 2
JAN 12 1943 P.M.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
RECEIVED READING ROOM
JAN 11 8 28 PM '43

563

Port au Prince, Haiti.
December 11, 1942.

b6
b7C

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington D. C.



Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated November 18, 1942, relative to any information coming to the writer's attention concerning the use of bacterial warfare of any type by the enemy, and advising that "this request must be maintained in absolute confidence and any investigations emanating from information received by you should be conducted most discreetly." This letter further advised "you are instructed to discuss this matter with our other representatives in the country to which you are assigned....."

By letter of October 13, 1942, the writer advised that this matter had been discussed with the Naval Attaché and the American Minister. However, it was not indicated at that time that the Bureau was interested in the matter, and it was thought more advisable to discuss the matter with them than with any local officials under the same conditions, inasmuch as even a hint that the writer was interested would have caused rumors to fly thick and fast. Therefore, proceeding more cautiously, it was believed that the former procedure was advisable, thus putting two other individuals on guard for any information available.

Another reason for this discussion was due to the second quotation above. At this time there were no other Bureau representatives in Haiti, and the use of the words "our other representatives" was interpreted as meaning representatives of the United States Government.

If the interpretation was badly taken, the writer assures the Bureau that it was taken in good faith, and not in order to violate instructions. C.I. S.I.S.#250

Very truly yours,


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-23-83 BY [redacted]

RECEIVED
NOV 18 1942
FBI

DEC 12

50 JAN 2 1943
127

Communication #231





EPC:EGK

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

December 17, 1942

CC-287

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen ✓
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffee ✓
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Beahm _____
- Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. E. A. TAMM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-03 BY 60267 uc/nwd/bja/plu

RE: [redacted] b6
[redacted] b7C

[redacted] called at my office at three o'clock. He had intended to come over with [redacted] was tied up and could not come. [redacted] of [redacted] special project on bacterial warfare.

[redacted] stated the principal purpose of his call was to get acquainted. He expressed appreciation for the information which has already been furnished to their organization by the FBI. He stated he was anxious to see it continued and he wanted us to know that they were interested in receiving every scrap of information on the subject, no matter how trivial it might appear to be.

I told [redacted] that Mr. Hoover had reached such an agreement with [redacted] and had issued instructions that all material which we get of that nature be routed to [redacted]. I outlined to [redacted] the coverage of our agents in intelligence work.

I told [redacted] that I did think he should have a thorough understanding of the Bureau's jurisdiction responsibility and the method in which the FBI conducted investigations so that he could better evaluate the material furnished to him. I then outlined the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction in espionage and sabotage matters and pointed out to him that if the bacteria incident was one which would in any sense be suspected sabotage the FBI would immediately institute a full investigation and handle it as a sabotage matter unless, of course, it was on a military installation. I pointed out to him that for this reason [redacted] or himself need never wonder if the matter is being properly handled from the investigative standpoint. I then told him that we sometimes get crank letters and non-specific complaints which required no investigation and were retained for future reference purposes. I also pointed out to him that there would be instances where the FBI would have to protect the source of its information for the reason that the information was obtained with the express understanding that the source be maintained confidential.



55 DEC 28 1942

RECORDED
INDEXED
100-93216-45
DEC 24 1942
I tried to get him on Friday but he was tied up.

Memorandum for Mr. E. A. Tamm
Page Two

b6

b7C

[redacted] expressed full accord and understanding in all these matters. He stated that he was hopeful of meeting the Director sometime in the near future and having a personal talk with him on the matter. He indicated that one of his biggest jobs was to "build up the case for the American people" so that if it became necessary to release an argument either for or against bacterial warfare, he would be prepared to do so.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

b6

b7C

EPCoffey/af
100-93216-

December 28, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-83 BY 60267 uc/wel/bj/mna

MEMORANDUM

Following is a copy of a letter dated November 1, 1942, received from [redacted] Copies have been furnished to the War and Navy Departments.

9
b6
b7C

"I have just finished reading a condensation of the book 'Sabotage' by Michael Sayers & Albert Khan, in the October number of The Reader's Digest. From my many years of study of medical practice, and working with the microscope, I am wondering if your investigators have ever thought of the great opportunity of trying to wreck the health of our armed forces by sabotage laboratory workers? I know that many scientific medical workers are Germans.

"The recent report of Secretary Stimson, that 28,585 service men had been given jaundice, and 62 had DIED of it, resulting from the inoculation 'against' yellow fever, caused me to wonder! There is a chance for the greatest danger to health in all such inoculations, and it is impossible for the Army doctor to KNOW exactly what he is putting into the BLOOD of his victims! To begin with, it is FOOLISH to inoculate healthy men with such dangerous laboratory preparations to protect them from such a disease as yellow fever when there is no chance in one of many thousands ever getting it.

"Then they are given anti-tetanus inoculations—more stupidity! Healthy BLOOD does NOT develop lockjaw! I have had several typical tetanus wounds and have been carrying a bullet for over 40 years, but no tetanus.

"All these inoculations are foreign to the blood, and MUST be cast out, but medical fanaticism knows no limits, and so our service men are being 'vaccinated'—with God knows what, inoculated against typhoid,

Mr. Tolson tetanus, pneumonitis and yellow-fever! All these by-products of disease are
Mr. E. A. Tamm to wreck the health of any set of men!

Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin Mr. Hore-Belisha, War Minister of England, had all these inoculations abolished in the British Army, Navy and Marine Corps in 1939, so
Mr. Ladd we have read in English papers. The distressing effects of such inoculations
Mr. Nichols was the cause of such actions.

Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy All medical men cannot as honest as some think they are, as when
Mr. Carson a child dies from vaccination, they very often attribute the cause to
Mr. Coffey something else besides the 'morbid animal POISON' that they have administered.
Mr. Hendon

Mr. Kramer "The anti-typhoid is worthless! If a man drinks tainted water if he
Mr. McGuire does not, it is useless. [redacted] an Army Officer was killed by
Mr. Harbo as it went to his heart. All inoculations must go through the heart
Mr. Quinn in a general blood circulation.

Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

b6
b7C

Bacterial Warfare

INDEXED
100-93216-46
JAN 13 1943

Memorandum

"With the most careful microscopic inspection by two of our largest vaccine manufacturers, their product was contaminated with foot-and-mouth disease in 1908, and doctors were 'vaccinating' children with it!

"A very little laboratory carelessness, deliberate, or not, could cause the deaths of many thousands of soldiers! This is the most vital spot I know of to start mischief!

"It was vigorous HEALTH that protected our race down through the past ages, when 'germs' were free for everybody, otherwise there would not be a human being alive upon this earth today!

"Army doctors can, unintentionally, wreck our war effort!"

Original of this memorandum forwarded to
Special Asst to the Administrator of the Federal Security Agencies
327 Natl Academy of Sciences Bldg., 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington DC

b6

b7C

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Kramer _____
Mr. McGuire _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

RECEIVED
F B I
MICHIGAN RECORDS
JUN 10 1954
RECORDED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-83 BY 60267 oel/mue/lj/pau

100-93216

December 26, 1942

WAR:wct

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC - San Francisco

RE: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE;
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent [redacted] at San Francisco, California, August 24, 1942, in the above-entitled matter. Reference is also made to Bureau letters to your office dated September 24, 1942, November 3, 1942 and November 21, 1942.

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A check of the files of the Bureau indicates that you have not submitted a report covering the investigation requested in the undeveloped leads set out for your office in the report of Special Agent [redacted]. The files also indicate that you have failed to reply to any one of the Bureau letters to your office mentioned above.

If you have submitted a report in this matter subsequent to the report of Special Agent [redacted] or if you have replied to the Bureau letters mentioned above, I desire that you advise immediately the dates and captions of the reports or letters submitted so that they can be located in the Bureau files.

b6
b7C

If you have not submitted a subsequent report in this matter in accordance with previous Bureau instructions and if you have not furnished an explanation for your failure to do so, I desire that you immediately advise me of the reasons for your failure to act in this matter. I desire to know the name of the Agent to whom this case has been assigned, the date on which it was assigned to him and I further desire that a detailed explanation be submitted immediately of the reasons why this matter has been handled in such a haphazard and dilatory manner.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Kramer
- Mr. McGuire
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

I wish to point out to you that the matter of the possibility of bacterial warfare is a matter in which I am personally interested and any information developed by you which has any bearing upon this possibility of bacterial warfare must be closely followed by you and immediately submitted to the Bureau.

RECORDED

100-93216-47
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
99

Yours truly,
John Edgar Hoover
Director

LHP:tlc



December 21, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SIS#98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-304-243

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated September 28, 1942, directing you to submit any information in your possession relative to bacteria warfare. Your attention was called to the light report dated May 10, 1942, which deals extensively with the matter of possible preparations on the part of the Axis Powers for bacteria warfare in Brazil. You were instructed to conduct investigation of the persons and places mentioned in the said report for the purpose of ascertaining the development of operations and the present activities of the persons mentioned therein in furtherance of the alleged plan to use bacteria as an instrument of war, and to submit a report.

A review of our files reflects that to date no report has been received from you in this matter. You are, therefore, instructed to complete your investigation and to submit an immediate report.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

100-304-243
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEC 21 1942
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



- Mr Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Handon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

RECEIVED
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH
1942

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]



Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

Suite 1729 - 111 Sutter
San Francisco, Cal.
Jan. 2, 1943

66,43,42

Jul

Director
FBI

Re: POSSIBILITY OF BACTERIAL WARFARE;
SALE OF TYPHOID VACCINE TO JAPANESE

2

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated December 26, 1942, Bureau File 100-93216, wherein it was requested that the San Francisco office advise Bureau immediately whether a report had been submitted in this investigation subsequent to that of Special Agent [redacted] dated August 24, 1942. Please be advised that a closing report was submitted under date of 11/23/42 by Special Agent [redacted] under the title of the Bureau letter, making reference to the file number reflected on reference Bureau letter.

b6
b7C

In the event the Bureau is unable to locate the copies of that report, please be advised that four copies were retained in the files of the San Francisco Field office, and upon receipt of instructions to do so, the San Francisco office will forward appropriate copies thereof.

Very truly yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 uol/mu/tpa/pmc

N. J. L. PIEPER
SAG

to file
1/20 Tgd

HLMc/fb
100-9518



COPY IN FILE

54 JAN 23 1943

RECORDED & INDEXED

100-93216-49
F B I
JAN 8 1943

RECEIVED

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

Baltimore, Maryland
January 5, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-03 BY 60267 ucj/ma/g/pma

Director, FBI

RE: ADVERTISEMENT IN BALTIMORE
"SUN", SEPTEMBER 20, 1942.

Dear Sir:

100-93216-9X
C.P.B.

Reference is made to Bureau letter to the Baltimore Field Division dated October 1, 1942, requesting investigation be made as to the parties who were responsible for the insertion and reasons for the insertion in the newspaper, The Sun, Baltimore, Maryland, for September 20, 1942. ~~"WANTED WILD RATS.~~ Will buy any number of live uninjured wild rats for 25¢, per rat. Hunterian Bldg., Madison & Wolfe Sts., 4th floor. Deliver between 8:30 A. M. & 5 P. M."

You are advised that contact was made with [redacted] of The Sun, Baltimore, Maryland, who revealed that this advertisement was placed by a [redacted] Johns Hopkins Hospital, this city. It was probably placed on the 19th of September, last and ran from September 20, 1942 to September 26, 1942. The advertisement was telephoned to that paper.

b6
b7C

[redacted] Johns Hopkins Hospital, [redacted] Fourth Floor, Hunterian Building, Baltimore, Maryland advised that [redacted] was engaged in a study of rat poisons under a grant from the United States Government, and that the animals advertised for were necessary to carry on experiments in this work. She further stated that the advertisement proved fruitless.

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b7C

In view of the above information, no further investigation is being conducted by this office.

Very truly yours,

E. A. Soucy
E. A. SOUCY
Special Agent in Charge

TSD:MCR
100-8827


106
55 MAR 5 1943
MAIL

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

b6
b7C

Back of page

1/14/43



~~Federal Bureau of Investigation~~

~~United States Department of Justice~~

DRM/trb
67-380

510 Industrial Trust Building
Providence, Rhode Island

November 25, 1942

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-05 BY 6027 uc/nk/bja/pam

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Re: Special Agent
Investigative Suggestion

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I am transmitting herewith an original memorandum prepared by Special Agent in which he suggests certain contacts and investigation in connection with a possible use of bacteria in the commission of sabotage.

b6

It is suggested that the Bureau direct a letter of appreciation to Special Agent for his suggestion.

b7C

Yours truly,

Enc.

Dean R. Morley
Special Agent in Charge

100-93216-51

FILE COPY

216

FEDERAL BUREAU OF

Labor

Date 1/11

CONTAINED
307009
SPLAGJC

| | Room | | Room |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|-------|
| Mr. Tracy | 317790 7639 | Mr. Nichols | 5640 |
| Mr. Carson | 2266 | Mr. Renneberger | - |
| Mr. Clegg | 5256 | | 114-B |
| Mr. Fitch | 1262 | Mr. Rosen | 5734 |
| Mr. Gatins | 5252 | Mr. E. Tamm | 5734 |
| Mr. Ladd | 1742 | Mr. Q. Tamm | 7639 |
| Single Finger- | | | 7639 |
| print | 1420 | 6th Floor Files | |
| Mr. Little | 1645 | Personnel Files | 4513 |
| Mr. McGuire | 4238 | Chief Clerk | 5519 |
| | | Mr. | |

b6
b7C

*Very interesting -
note item 15 on last
page - if this is for possible
publication - should they
not refrain from identifying
persons not yet investigated
or charged with crime?*

ROOM 7326

b6
b7C

*Very interesting -
Note item 15 on last page - if this is for
possible publication - should they not refrain
from identifying persons not yet investigated
or charged with crime?*

/s/ E. E. Coffey
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/7/90 BY SP1AG/JC
307009

EPC:EGK

RECORDED

100-93216-52

January 19, 1943

EX-4

b
ox

8

[Redacted]

b6

Room 308

b7C

National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/7/90 BY SP1ABJ/C
307009

Dear [Redacted]

I have reviewed the very interesting summary which you sent to Mr. Coffey under cover of January 8, 1943. This should make a useful item in your files for possible future use in the manner in which you indicate it.

I would like to offer the suggestion that the names of specific individuals under investigation but not yet prosecuted not be set forth in any data released. I notice on page ten of your summary the name of one individual who is the subject of an investigation by this Bureau.

Assuring you of my continued interest in this valuable piece of work and hopeful that the future will permit us to talk it over sometime, I remain

Sincerely yours,

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

J. Edgar Hoover
F. B. I.
RECORDED-1646

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED 5
★ JAN 20 1943 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED-READING ROOM
JAN 20 11 32 AM '43

RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
F. B. I.
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
JAN 20 7 08 PM '43

54 FEB 5 1943

[Handwritten signature]



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

January 20, 1943

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Holloman _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

TDB:MJC

b6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

b7C

Re: [redacted] Bacterial Warfare Project.
A Summary.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
[redacted] was referred to you by [redacted] and met with
you b7C your office on September 17, 1942 to explain the Bacterial
Warfare Project and to request assistance in the form of information
on the subject in the Bureau's files, from our Agents in this country
and South America [redacted] and requested (S) the use of the Bureau to distribute and gather information on this
subject. b1

Subsequent to this meeting the following suggestions of yours
and [redacted] were carried out:

- A. A forty page summary of information on the project of Bacterial Warfare from the Bureau's files was placed in [redacted] hands. b6 b7C
- B. A three page summary on the subject [redacted] b1
[redacted] was furnished [redacted] (S)
- C. Information [redacted] (S) b1
was turned over to [redacted]
- D. All information on the subject received throughout the Bureau was
and is being routed to me for summarization and transmittal to
[redacted] The proposed instructional program to our Agents
discussed by you and [redacted] has received no further attention
by [redacted] as yet. (I will follow him on this). b6 b7C
- E. [redacted] request of possibly utilizing the Bureau's field
forces to collect and gather special information has not as yet
been the subject of any special request by [redacted]

3. [redacted] called on me on October 15, 1942 and
advised me that [redacted]
[redacted] had been retained as Public Relations expert. We left
here after a brief tour of the Bureau and met at luncheon with representatives

b6

b7C

56 JAN 27 1943

11-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] b0207 FAG
DECLASSIFY ON: [redacted] 11-13-2008

~~SECRET~~

Page two
Memorandum for the Director

~~SECRET~~

of the Army, Navy, Public Health, and Surgeon General's Office of the U. S. Army. The purpose of that meeting was to discuss the safeguarding of water supplies to vital cities.

4. [] has since been over and talked with me and has several times requested to see the Director.

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5. Under cover of January 8, 1943 [] sent over a ten page summary for review of an article to be presented for publication in the event it becomes necessary to explain to the people the necessity for the Bacterial Warfare Research Committee. It has been suggested to [] that the names of specific individuals under investigation by the Bureau not be set out before prosecutive action has been completed.

6. On January 14, 1943 the Bacterial Warfare Committee met in [] office. Representatives of the Surgeon General's Office, Chemical Warfare Service, Navy, U. S. Public Health Service, Office of Strategic Services, Warfare Diseases Laboratory of Canada and the Office of Scientific Research and Development were represented. [] represented the FBI. The meeting was devoted to a discussion of the use of disease germs in offensive warfare and sabotage. An outline of the progress thus far was given and several problems for practical consideration were discussed.

b6

7. All this time a number of current abstracts of reports received in the FBI on this general subject have been forwarded to []

b7C

During the period [] has also made several minor requests for information which has been furnished him. About the only one of significance concerned his desire to learn the available quantity of a little used drug ricin, from Eimer and Amend in New York, the basic substance of castor oil and is very poisonous. The information has been furnished.

Respectfully,

[]

b6

b7C

~~SECRET~~

TDB:MJC:EGK

100-93216-37

January 16, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nac/tp/PAU
ON 11-13-83

Basual warfare

Handwritten mark

[Redacted]

Special Assistant to the Administrator
of the Federal Security Agencies
327 National Academy of Sciences Building
2101 Constitution Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

b6

b7C

Dear [Redacted]

I am transmitting to you herewith a memorandum
containing highly confidential information which I believe
will be of interest to you.

An investigation of this matter is being
undertaken by Special Agents of this Bureau.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

RECORDED
& INDEXED
D149

100-93216-37
JAN 16 1943
4 12 PM '43
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
1226

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd ✓
- Mr. Nichols ✓
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Kramer
- Mr. McGuire
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

Enclosure

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ JAN 16 1943 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Source of Information:
Report from San Francisco Field Office

TDB
Handwritten signature

D2

January 15, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-19-03 BY 60269uc/nuc/bj/m

MEMORANDUM

Confidential informant advised [redacted]

b7D

Another confidential informant, [redacted]

During the investigation of this matter the Endo pharmacy, 107 Lake Street, Salinas, was contacted and at the time of the contact there were four or five Japanese in the store discussing some matter in the Japanese language. Later [redacted] advised they had been discussing [redacted]

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[redacted] showed no great interest in typhoid vaccine. [redacted] had recently purchased a large quantity of typhoid vaccine. [redacted]

[redacted] the Savemore Drug Store, 104 Market Street, Salinas, it was learned that there had been a recent purchase of a large quantity of typhoid vaccines reportedly for the purpose of immunizing families.

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b7D

Information obtained from wholesale drug firms in San Francisco revealed that not any had sold any unusually large amount of typhoid serum to Japanese drug stores as indicated by an examination of their books.

b6

b7C

b7D

[redacted] bought enough oral vaccine to immunize two to three hundred persons.

b6

b7C

b7D

ENCLOSURE

100-93216-54

JBL:ECR

January 16, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
VIA DIPLOMATIC AIR POUCH

Mr. Arthur M. Thurston
c/o American Embassy
London, England

Dear Sir:

Your attention is invited to my letter dated December 12, 1942, requesting that you endeavor to obtain the separate memorandum being prepared by [redacted] with regard to bacterial sabotage. It is desirable that this information be forwarded at the earliest practicable date.

Very truly yours,

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nw/ljz/pka
ON 11-13-03

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Bacterial Warfare

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Kramer _____
- Mr. McGuire _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
JAN 18 1943 P.M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED
100-93216-55
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JAN 19 1943
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

55 FEB 8 1943



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

TLB:GWH:MJC

January 14, 1943

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

Re: Bacterial Warfare Committee Meeting

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Coffey
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Holloman
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Harbo
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Beahm
- Miss Gandy

DECLASSIFIED BY 60207 ucl/mud/bj/pan
ON 11-13-03

The above committee met today in the office of [redacted]

Present in addition to [redacted]

for the project, were [redacted]

[redacted] of the Veterinary Corps, Surgeon
General's office. [redacted] Surgeon General's office.

[redacted] Chemical Warfare Service, [redacted]

b6

[redacted] working with [redacted]

b7C

of National Institute of Health, [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] of the Office of Strategic Services, [redacted]

[redacted] of Strategic Services, [redacted]

[redacted] Office of Scientific Research and Development. [redacted]

represented the Bureau. The theme was predominantly the offensive use of
disease producing germs on man, animals, and plants.

[redacted] of the Graduate School
of the University of Wisconsin [redacted] of the
Bacterial Warfare Project, briefly set forth the principal diseases under
consideration and each one was discussed by members of the group as to
practicability, effectiveness, and protection to our own forces and the
personnel introducing them.

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[redacted] of the Office of Strategic Services presented two
problems—one, the infection of persons in one building, such as a hotel
(possibly in Rome), and, two, the infection of poultry throughout Italy as
a means of sabotage to food supply. Concerning subject one, the use of
enteric (digestive tract) diseases was discussed, and it was generally agreed
that dysentery, cholera, and botulinus toxin could be used together in order
to confuse the clinical picture when the victims were autopsied, dysentery
and botulinus toxin being effective and the cholera's effectiveness unknown.
Under subject two, three fowl diseases were considered and fowl plague after
some argument between [redacted] was
considered most practical.

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[redacted] pointed out that considerable work was being undertaken
on plant destroyers, both in the form of germs and poisons which could be
sprayed by airplane.


RECORDED & INDEXED

N108

100-93216-56
12 FEB 5 1943
[Handwritten signatures]

55 MAR 5 1943 106

Page two
Memo for the Director



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b7D

[redacted] of the Surgeon General's Office made a startling statement that they could go into Europe in June and devastate it with yellow fever, but the fact that the occupied countries would also suffer to the same extent precluded placing the plan in operation.

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At the conclusion [redacted] to remain in order to show him a file containing all aspects of all diseases of man, animal, and plants applicable to bacterial warfare and sabotage contributed by 120 specialists. This file contains lists of disease organisms affecting plants and animals arranged in columns with pertinent information relating to the resistance of the germs, method of culturing, ease of culturing, method of dispersal, name of plant or animal affected, extent of injury to plant or animal, et cetera. [redacted] wanted to make sure the Bureau knew of the existence of this information and its accessibility to the Bureau.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be a stylized name, is written over the top left corner of the signature box.



b6
b7C

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

JRR:ELL

Savannah, Georgia
February 3, 1943

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-2003 BY 60267 UC/Ned/PAK

Director, FBI

RE: PLAN TO PLANT BOMBS CONTAINING
GERMS OR TO ENDEAVOR TO CREATE
AN EPIDEMIC SUCH AS HOOF AND MOUTH
DISEASE AMONG CATTLE AND OTHER
LIVE STOCK; SABOTAGE

Dear Sir:

This office has received a copy of a communication from
JOHN T. BISSELL, Colonel, General Staff, Assistant Executive Officer,
Military Intelligence Service, Washington, D. C., dated December 29,
1942, to directors of intelligence in all Service Commands, which is
as follows:

"1..It has been brought to the attention of this Division the
possibility in the immediate future of an attempt on the part of
the enemy to plant bombs containing germs or to endeavor to create
an epidemic, such as hoof and mouth disease, among cattle and
other livestock.


"2. It is requested that should any information concerning the
above come to the attention of the Directors of Intelligence of
the Service Commands or the A. C. of S., G-2, Western Defense
Command, that the same be transmitted by the most expeditious
means to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department."

This is furnished to the Bureau for its information and such
action as is deemed appropriate.

Very truly yours,

J. R. Ruggles
J. R. RUGGLES
Special Agent in Charge

Bacterial Warfare



31 FEB 12 1943

*11/16/43
Director's information
JRR*

24-

RECORDED & INDEXED

N/68
EX-42

100-93216-
B 1
9 FEB 6 1943
[Handwritten initials]

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY

WASHINGTON

b6

b7C

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue

January 22, 1943

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-10-03 BY 60267 ucl/wal/bjp/pau

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This will acknowledge the receipt of your confidential memoranda of January 16th and 18th, which I am very interested in having.

In regard to the memorandum of the 16th, I note that your Bureau is undertaking an investigation of the matter. I shall look forward to seeing further reports on this case. I presume that when you deem it of value your agent on the West Coast will acquaint the proper official in the Ninth Service Command with the matter. We are doing nothing from this end.

In regard to the memorandum of the 18th, I note that no investigation is being instituted by your Bureau. However, this office is bringing the substance of your report to the attention of the Surgeon General's Office of the Army and of the U. S. Public Health Service.

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

Sincerely yours,

George W. Merck, Director
War Research Service



60 MAR 15 1943

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100-93216-58
4 FEB 15 1943

Washington

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4/25/43

Date:

To:

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Franklin B. Atwood, Acting Chief
Subject: Trade Intelligence Division
Office of Exports

64-1170-90

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As of possible interest to you, the Bureau is in receipt of recent information to the effect that

This report, however, contained no criticism of

This information is being furnished to you for such distribution as deemed necessary.

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
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-13-83 BY 60267 uel/luellbj/ptau
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- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Jones _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAILED
★ DEC 20 1942 ★
P. M.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

RECORDED & INDEXED

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JAN 17 1943

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FEB 25 1943

Professor Foresaw U. S.-Jap War in 1925

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No claim to the gift of prophecy is made by Prof. Hugh L. Riordan of Marquette university, but:

On April 5, 1925, in the Milwaukee Sentinel, he wrote:

"It is probable that within a comparatively few years, possibly 15, Japan will be forced to choose between revolution and war. . . . To turn the seething unrest in Japan into a war against America would be easy, for the bitterness against America is intense."

WRITTEN BEFORE HITLER

That was written long before Hitler; long before the Sino-Japanese war; long before the Axis; long, if you please, before Japan became personified in her realistic foreign policy through a fictional character—Mr. Moto.

Again:

Professor Riordan is scheduled to speak Tuesday night before the Milwaukee Business and Professional Woman's club. One of the club officers, knowing the Riordans had spent three years in Japan, where the professor taught at the University of Tokio, asked that Mrs. Riordan wear a beautiful Japanese kimono she had brought back with her.

To that request, Professor Riordan replied:

"I know she'll be glad to wear it—if we're not at war with Japan by then!"

REFUSED NEW CONTRACT

Professor Riordan in 1921 received an appointment from the government at Tokio to teach in the university there when he was a member of the staff at the University of Wisconsin. After his term he refused to renew a proffered contract.

In his uncannily prophetic article in the Milwaukee Sentinel and other Hearst newspapers, Professor Riordan warned that Japan always had prepared for and charted her war years in advance. He wrote:

"The Japanese plan their wars a long way ahead. In 1894 they began preparations against Russia, although they didn't strike until 10 years later. They have just completed plans for sending 75,000 Japanese each year into South and Central America."

DANGER TO CANAL CITED

"If their scheme goes unchecked, they will have within 15 years over 1,000,000 of their nationals within absurdly easy striking distance of the Panama canal."

"When the immigration law agitation (American exclusion act) was at its height, a meeting of Japanese Christian ministers was held in Tokio. One of them said: 'Within a few score of years the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands and the entire West coast of America will belong to Japan.'"

The Japanese, Professor Riordan wrote in 1925, had developed a manifest destiny philosophy in which "they believe that in time they shall inherit the earth." It continued:

"The Japanese are taught from childhood that they are the greatest people on earth and that their destiny is unique. They are taught that the gods

made Japan first; that when the gods returned to heaven; they left their descendant as Emperor of Japan. The Emperor of Japan is still called the Son of Heaven."

IN DESPERATE STRAITS

What might have been said yesterday, the professor wrote in his amazing article:

"Japan is approaching a desperate situation, and with nations, as with individuals, we may expect desperate action from those in desperate straits. If the choice comes between being cut down by revolutionists and crashing into a foreign war, the militarists are likely to plunge into war, no matter what the odds may be against them."

To Americans, Professor Riordan gave the cheerful word:

"War with America would prove eventual suicide for Japan; but we need turn back only a decade to find that nations do commit suicide and cause seas of sorrow and mountains of trouble for others in their downfall."

MILW.
SENTINEL 17/8/41



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Freedom of Information / Privacy Acts

Release

SUBJECT: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE/BEFORE 1980

Xeroxed
1 copy
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Subj: *Foot Detective*
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COMMUNICATION #1243

PLACE:
KINGSTON, JAMAICA

DATE:
10/18/43

REPORTED BY:

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CONF. INFT. S. I. S. # 162

b7C /

TITLE:

~~BACTERIAL SABOTAGE~~

CHARACTER:

JAMAICA SABOTAGE - G

SYNOPSIS:

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] (S)

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7-21-2004
CLASSIFIED BY: *no/nls/isa/AMM 60367 AAS*
DECLASSIFY ON: *(S) 7-21-2029*

COMMENTS:

[Redacted]

b1

STATUS:

~~SECRET~~

REFERENCE:

NONE

Made Available to:

- () Embassy (Consulate)
- () M. A.
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Copies:

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OTHERWISE

100-93216-102

RECORDED
INDEXED

13 OCT 27 1943

EX-68

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[Redacted]

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100-93216
CH-2589
F-668

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 16, 1943

SAC Norfolk

INDEXED BY 60267 UC/NWJ/gafm
7-21-2004

Laboratory examination of cartridges containing wooden bullets which were confiscated [redacted]

b7D

Reference is made to your letter of September 29, 1943 transmitting six cartridges containing wooden bullets in a clip marked [redacted] For reference purposes the clip and cartridges have been assigned Bureau file #100-93216 Q1.

The wooden bullets contained in specimen Q1 were examined for the presence of harmful chemicals, poisons and pathogenic organisms which might cause infection if splinters from the bullets came in contact with a human body, but no such substances were found.

Cartridges Q1 are identical in over-all size with Italian 6.5 mm. military ammunition and are in an Italian military clip. The cartridge cases in specimen Q1 have apparently been used and are reloaded with the wooden bullets.

Inasmuch as the wooden bullets in question are hollow and very light, it is unlikely that they were intended for battle use. They were probably made to be used as blanks in training and the wooden bullet is necessary for the cartridge to work in automatic weapons.

Specimen Q1 was consumed during the course of the examination.

Two additional copies of this report are being submitted herewith for the local offices of OSI and G-2.

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Mumford _____
- Mr. Piper _____
- Mr. Starke _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Mr. Nease _____
- Miss Gandy _____

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
M. A. I. LA
Director
OCT 18 1943
Washington, D. C.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Colonel R. Forney

RECORDED
OCT 20 10 12 AM '43

100-93216-10
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OCT 28 1943
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

0
Confidential Warfare

6
OCT 29 1943

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

November 26, 1943

- Mr. Tolson _____
- Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
- Mr. Clegg _____
- Mr. Coffey _____
- Mr. Glavin _____
- Mr. Ladd _____
- Mr. Nichols _____
- Mr. Rosen _____
- Mr. Tracy _____
- Mr. Acers _____
- Mr. Carson _____
- Mr. Harbo _____
- Mr. Hendon _____
- Mr. Mumford _____
- Mr. Starke _____
- Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
- Tele. Room _____ b6
- Mr. Nease _____ b7C
- Miss Beahm _____

SWR:ed

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. D. M. LADD

_____ advised the writer in strictest

confidence that _____

_____ pointed out again to the writer in strictest confidence that

100-93216-104

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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267UC/mst/jg

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Back to Mr. Ladd

Memorandum for Mr. D. M. Ladd

- 2 -

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In accordance with instructions, I advised [redacted] that it would be perfectly all right for his agents to conduct an investigation of [redacted]. [redacted] stated that these agents will be instructed to conduct an extremely discreet investigation so that it will not evoke any undue interest in the laboratory. He stated that the agents he plans on sending are [redacted].

[redacted] stated that these agents will not submit reports through routine channels but will send memoranda directly to him and refer to the project by the code initials [redacted].

Respectfully,
[Signature]

[redacted]

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1/17



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

MJO:ACS
98-1639

December 9, 1943

Director, FBI

Re: [redacted] Informant

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Dear Sir:

This is to advise that [redacted] on November 10, 1943,
advised this office that [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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At the time of the interview, [redacted] was observed to enter
[redacted] volunteered the information


that [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]



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DATE 7-21-2004 BY 60267 uc/jud/gj/pan EX-54


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DEC 15 1943
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Sub

53 DEC 20 1943

COPY IN FILE

Letter to the Director
Page 2
NK-98-1639



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Inasmuch as the Bureau has been in receipt of communications from this letter is being directed to the Bureau in order to enable the Bureau to properly evaluate any subsequent communications.

Very truly yours,

S. K. McKee
S. K. McKEE,
Special Agent in Charge