/* Written 6:24 pm Feb 24, 1993 by greenleft in peg:greenleft.news */
/* ---------- "Green Left #89, February 24, 1993" ---------- */
Army moves: beginning of the end of Suharto
By Max Lane
Long-simmering tensions between President Suharto and the
Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) high command have been brought
into the open.
On February 16, the military seemingly laid down the gauntlet to
the president a spokesperson at ABRI headquarters in Jakarta
announced that the armed forces faction in the Indonesian super-
parliament - the People's Deliberative Assembly (MPR) - would
nominate the retiring commander in chief of ABRI, General Try
Sutrisno, for the position of vice-president.
Reliable sources in Jakarta have told Green Left Weekly that
Suharto's preferred candidate was the current vice-president and
Suharto crony, Sudharmono.
ABRI and Suharto have been increasingly at loggerheads as Suharto
has shifted his power base from the army to big business
conglomerates, including his own family businesses. Military
figures have been eased out of the cabinet, the bureaucracy and
the business world.
Reaction to ABRI's announcement indicates the line-up of forces
within the ruling elite. The home affairs minister, (retired)
General Rudini, the defence minister, Murdani, and the new
commander in chief of ABRI, General Edi Sudrajat, have all
announced their support for Try.
This line-up, implying a fairly solid front among the ABRI high
command, has caused other forces to begin to fall in behind the
proposed nomination. The Indonesian Democrat Party (PDI) and the
Muslim United Development Party (PPP) announced they would
support Try, although the PPP was obviously reluctant.
The outgoing vice-president, Sudharmono, had to suffer the
indignity of a well-publicised visit by General Try. Sudharmono
emotionally wished Try well, but also indicated that this time
there should perhaps be more than one vice-presidential
candidate.
Sudharmono and Wahono, the head of the government party, Golkar,
were reportedly furious that ABRI had not consulted them. After
initially avoiding comment, Wahono finally came out with an
expression of indirect support for Try by saying that Golkar's
candidate was the same as PPP's. This is despite the fact that a
powerful team of Golkar parliamentarians had already been formed
to lobby for
Sudharmono.
It is clear that major pressure is being put on Golkar by ABRI,
which controls a majority of Golkar branches in the provinces.
Pro-army civilian members of Golkar have also been making public
statements in favour of Try.
Meanwhile, figures closer to Suharto, such as the powerful
cabinet secretary, Moerdiono, stated that the president was angry
that ABRI had announced its candidate without his agreement. The
politics and security minister, Admiral Sudomo, said it would be
sad for Try if Suharto rejected him.
Options
If Suharto wishes to defeat ABRI's nomination of Try, he has two
choices. First, he can attempt to force ABRI to back down so that
when the MPR meets, Try is no longer a candidate. Second, he can
- perhaps - get Golkar or the Regional Representatives Fraction
(appointed by Suharto to ``represent'' the provinces) to nominate
another candidate or perhaps two candidates and attempt to win a
vote.
In either case, a major breach between Suharto and ABRI will be
exposed to the public. A back-down by ABRI would be humiliating
in the extreme and would certainly fuel anger in the officer
corps. A contest between a Golkar candidate and an ABRI candidate
would be very destructive to the civilian-military alliance that
the status quo is based upon. It would also be a very risky
tactic, for ABRI has a major presence inside Golkar. There would
be no guarantee of the Golkar vote holding.
It is also unclear what pressure Suharto would be able to exert
upon ABRI or the MPR membership in a situation of open defiance
by the ABRI fraction. Through his cousin-in-law, Major General
Wismoyo, and his son-in-law, Lt Col Prabowo, Suharto has access
to the rapid deployment forces and paratroop commandos. However,
it would be a major step to deploy these troops against the
minister for defence and commander in chief of the armed forces -
although Suharto did exactly that 27 years ago, when he first
came to power.
Suharto might also use the threat to resign. It is likely that
the unity in ABRI is based only on agreement to make Try vice-
president in preparation for a later move against Suharto or even
as preparation for the next presidential election in 1998. It is
doubtful that ABRI would be ready to agree to Try, not respected
for his political abilities, becoming president now.
Against this, it is unlikely that Suharto's family, who rely
on his personal protection in the matter of their fantastically
expanding business enterprises, would be happy with this option.
And, of course, ABRI might be more solid than observers think and
simply call Suharto's bluff.
The president may be forced to surrender to the fait accompli. In
this case, it is expected that he will make a bid to have Wismoyo
appointed commander of the army, a position is now vacant. If
Suharto accepts Try's nomination, one measure of how much power
he has lost will be his ability to get Wismoyo appointed.
A failure to achieve this would signal the virtual end of the
Suharto period. Power would shift, in the short term, to the
``coup plotters'': Defence Minister Benny Murdani, Try Sutrisno,
Edi Sudrajat and possibly General Rudini.
In the meantime, the humiliations have begun with two instances
of his brother, Probosutejo Suharto, being invited to major
regional Golkar events but then not allowed to speak.
Changed policies?
Democracy movement figures have indicated to journalists their
scepticism about political reform should Try become vice-
president and Suharto be slowly pushed out of power. According to
the outspoken director of the Institute for Human Rights, Haji
Princen, Try should not be nominated for vice-president until he
has given an accounting of the 1984 massacre of urban poor Muslim
protesters in the Jakarta port area, when Try was in command of
the Jakarta military district.
Other pro-democracy figures have called on the military, if it is
genuinely interested in reform, to force Suharto to defend his
recent policies, especially those resulting in the massive
centralisation of wealth in his family's hands.
Benny Murdani, Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudrajat are all identified
as hardline military figures, especially on such issues as East
Timor and the management of social unrest - although, in recent
times, Edi Sudrajat has made several speeches echoing the calls
of lower level officers for more freedom of speech in society and
less political control.
The conflict between ABRI and Suharto is indeed likely to bring
to the fore the contradictions between the upper and lower levels
of the officer corps and also between the leadership of ABRI and
the large number of retired generals.
Both the lower professional levels of the army and the
retired generals wish to see the army reduce its role in
governmental affairs. The professional officers want to be able
to concentrate on military affairs, and the retired generals want
to move to the centre of politics themselves.