Statement
of
Donald Van Duyn
Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the
House Homeland Security Committee
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing,
and Terrorism Risk Assessment
September 20, 2006
Chairman
Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, and members of the
Subcommittee, I want to thank you for this opportunity
to speak to you on the topic of Islamic radicalization
in the United States. I would like to emphasize before
I begin that the issue is not Islam itself but how
the religious ideology is used by violent extremists
to inspire and justify their actions. The FBI does
not investigate members of any religion for their
religious beliefs, but rather focuses on investigating
activities that may harm the United States.
Successes
in the war on terrorism and the arrests of many key
al Qaeda leaders have diminished the ability of the
group to attack the U.S. homeland. At the same time,
a broader Sunni extremist movement has evolved from
being run entirely by al Qaeda central to a broader
movement. This is demonstrated by the 2004 Madrid
bombings, the July 2005 bombings and attempted bombings
in London, and recent disruptions in the U.S., United
Kingdom, Canada, Bosnia, Denmark, and elsewhere.
That
said, core al Qaeda remains committed to attacking
the United States and continues to demonstrate its
ability to adapt its tactics to circumvent security
measures and reconstitute its ranks. Al Qaeda is also
attempting to broaden its appeal to English-speaking
Western Muslims by disseminating violent Islamic extremist
propaganda via media outlets and the Internet.
Although
the most dangerous instances of radicalization have
so far been overseas, the Islamic radicalization of
U.S. persons, whether foreign-born or native, is of
increasing concern. Islamic radicalization in the
United States does not appear to be endemic, but it
does exist nationwide. Key to the success of stopping
the spread of radicalization is identifying patterns
and trends in the early stages.
The
FBI defines homegrown Islamic extremists as U.S. persons
who appeared to have assimilated, but reject the cultural
values, beliefs, and environment of the United States.
They identify themselves as Muslims and on some level
become radicalized in the United States. They intend
to provide support for, or directly commit, a terrorist
attack inside the United States. The threat from homegrown
Islamic extremists is likely smaller in scale than
that posed by overseas terrorist groups such as al
Qaeda but is potentially larger in psychological impact.
Several recent cases illustrate the nature of the
issue.
Since
August 2005 the FBI, other federal agencies, and our
foreign partners have dismantled a global network
of extremists who are operating independently of any
known terrorist organization. Several individuals
affiliated with this network were arrested for providing
material support in connection with the plotting of
a terrorist attack in the United States.
The
apparent increase of cases involving homegrown Islamic
extremists may represent an increased sensitivity
of law enforcement to activities not previously regarded
as terrorism, but we cannot rule out the possibility
that the homegrown phenomenon is growing.
The
FBI has identified certain venues, such as prisons
and the Internet, that present opportunities for the
proselytizing of radical Islam.
Particularly
for Muslim converts, but also for those born into
Islam, an extremist imam can strongly influence individual
belief systems by speaking from a position of authority
on religious issues. Extremist imams have the potential
to influence vulnerable followers at various locations
of opportunity; can spot and assess individuals who
respond to their messages; and can potentially guide
them into increasingly extremist circles.
Although
the activities of radical imams are typically associated
with Salafist-Wahhabi lectures given in the mosque,
they are not limited to the mosque itself. Imams are
often active and influential in other venues such
as prisons, publishing, online forums, audio lectures,
and at Islamic conferences and institutes. These various
forums allow imams to reach new audiences and potentially
susceptible followers outside of the mosque itself.
The
propagation of radical ideas is not confined to Sunni
Islam. Iran is committed to promoting Shia Islam activism.
The
European and American experience shows that prisons
are venues where extremists have radicalized and recruited
among the inmate population. Prison radicalization
primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided
by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized
inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist
media. Ideologies that radicalized inmates appear
most often to embrace include the Salafi form of Sunni
Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known
as "prison Islam") and an extremist view
of Shia Islam similar to that of the government of
Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
Most
cases of prison radicalization appear to be carried
out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few
or no direct foreign connections, like the Sunni Islamic
extremist group in California, the Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam
Is-Saheeh, identified in July 2005. I would like to
emphasize that not all prison radicalization is Islamic
in nature. Domestic groups such as white supremacists
also recruit in prisons.
In
response to this possible threat, the FBI and the
Bureau of Prisons have been actively engaged in efforts
to detect, deter, and interdict efforts by terrorist
and extremist groups to radicalize or recruit in U.S.
prisons since February 2003. As part of these efforts,
we have identified best practices for correctional
institutions to combat the spread of radicalization.
The
Internet is also a venue for the radicalization of
young, computer-savvy Westernersboth male and
femalewho identify with an Islamic extremist
ideology. An older generation of supporters and sympathizers
of violent Islamic extremism, in the post-9/11 environment
of increased law enforcement scrutiny, have migrated
their radicalization, recruitment, and material support
activities online.
Radicalization
via the Internet is participatory, and individuals
are actively engaged in exchanging extremist propaganda
and rhetoric online which may facilitate the violent
Islamic extremist cause. These online activities further
their indoctrination, create links between extremists
located around the world, and may serve as a springboard
for future terrorist activities.
Overseas
experience can also be a significant element in facilitating
the transition from one who has a proclivity to be
radicalized and who may espouse radicalized rhetoric,
to one who is willing and ready to act on those radicalized
beliefs. Although radicalization can occur without
overseas travel, the foreign experience appears to
provide the networking that makes it possible for
interested individuals to train for and participate
in operational activity. The experience may vary from
religious or language instruction to basic paramilitary
training.
We
assess that the overseas experiences of John Walker
Lindh played a pivotal role in his involvement with
the Taliban. Once overseas, he was directed by radicalized
individuals to attend extremist universities and ultimately
training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Lindh,
after pleading guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia
to supporting the Taliban in violation of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act and carrying an explosive
during the commission of a felony, was given a 20-year
prison sentence.)
The
FBI approaches the radicalization issue on two levels:
We
are attempting to understand the dynamics of individual
and organizational radicalization to identify early
indicators as to whether individuals or groups are
demonstrating the potential for violence.
We
are engaged in extensive outreach to Muslim communities
to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism.
Thank
you for the opportunity to address this important
issue. I am happy to answer your questions.