The focal point of post-crisis financial development is Korea's continued liberalization
and restructuring processes. Notably, major creditor institutions have taken
the leading role in implementing corporate restructuring policies. It is important
to review the results of financial and corporate restructuring in a different
context than that of macro comparison.
The primary goal of financial restructuring was to engineer a well-developed
financial intermediation for sustainable economic growth. Reform in the financial
sector was mainly conducted to dispose of bad loans that hindered efficient
financial intermediation and hurt market confidence. Specifically, the post-crisis
financial development can be summed up as deregulation and liberalization, globalization,
strengthened prudential regulation and banking supervision, and the pruning
of non-viable institutions.
Until the financial crisis, customers as well as shareholders of financial institutions
did not exactly know how much trouble they were in, and international standards
were not applied to determine ailing banks. Nowadays, many transparent standards
have been established. Some of the solutions are to induce banks or non-bank
institutions to engage in M&As; or to increase their capital adequacy.
The recent trends of universalism of financial boundaries, such as the integration
of the security business, banking business, and insurance business, and the
lack of prudential regulation, were some of the crucial causes of the 1997 financial
crisis.
Full-scale liberalization at the time was not limited to the banking business,
but totally opened the entry barriers. The market was open, but prudential regulation
and banking supervision provisions were not well prepared. Due to the lack of
sufficient supervision, banks experienced moral hazards and borrowed short-term
money from international creditor banks (loans with a maturity of 3 to 6 months),
and subsequently made long-term loans to Korean firms. For example, Korea First
Bank borrowed money from Citibank (maturity of 6 months) and lent the money
to conglomerates as a 10-year project loan. Here was a clear example of a typical
maturity mismatch.
Korea's unique banking governance specifies the upper limit of shares acquirable
for ownership of a bank at 4 percent of the total shares, but no limits for
foreign investors. Financial boundaries can be divided into three types: traditional
banking business, securities business, and insurance business. But even still,
there are many hybrid bank functions like the deposits taking by non-bank institutions.
Finally, in the past, the Bank of Korea (central bank) was in charge of banking
supervision. But now the FSC (Financial Supervisory Commission), an independent
organization separate from the Ministry of Finance and from the central bank,
has taken over the task.
Chronology of the Korean Financial Restructuring
The First Round of Financial Restructuring
The first round financial restructuring focused on easing the capital crunch
in the corporate sector and restoring the functional system in response to the
economic crisis. Upon facing the danger of systemic collapse, the Korean government
had to mobilize a large amount of public funds to first stabilize and then to
rehabilitate the system. Instead of concealing the problems, the government
realistically recognized the losses of loans extended to the corporate sector
with assistance from the IMF, World Bank and international accounting firms.
In April 1998, the Korean government established the financial restructuring
plan with the aim to stabilize the financial system and to increase the soundness
and efficiency of the financial institutions. One of the main pillars of financial
restructuring was to support viable financial institutions by cleaning up their
bad loans and carrying out recapitalization. Another goal was to exit non-viable
financial institutions from the market as promptly as possible. Delays in cleaning
up only contributed to jittery market trends. Resolving insolvent financial
institutions was the main target of restructuring during this period.
Under the restructuring framework, internationally recognized accounting firms
were commissioned to perform diagnostic reviews on financial institutions to
evaluate their viability. Based on the reviews, non-viable financial institutions
were liquidated and viable ones were provided with support to undergo a prompt
normalization process. Consequently, the government shut down five commercial
banks, whose assets were subsequently transferred to other healthy ones via
presumption and acquisition. After the initial stage of the reform, financial
institutions made self-rescue efforts to regain their soundness and strengthen
their businesses. They sought to merge with other banks, attracted foreign capital,
downsized manpower, and issued new stock to increase their equity capital.
For normalizing the system, the government's aggregate fiscal support has been
around 109.6 trillion won (US$87 billion). Approved by the Korean National Assembly
in 1998, most of these funds came through bond issuances by two entities: the
Korea Asset Management Corporation, or KAMCO (which is the U.S. equivalent of
the Resolution Trust Corporation or RTC) and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation
(KDIC).
Of the first fiscal support package of 64 trillion won (US$50 billion), 20.5
trillion won (US$16 billion) was expended by KAMCO to purchase non-performing
loans, and 43.5 trillion won (US$34.5 billion) by KDIC for recapitalizing and
paying off guaranteed deposits. KAMCO recycled 18.4 trillion won (US$14.7 billion)
of its assets in the years 1999 and 2000 combined. Aside from that, other resources,
as much as 27 trillion won (US$20.7 billion), were procured and used by issuing
government bonds and selling state-owned property shares. Owing to some legal
constraints, however, these additional funds were used mostly for recapitalizing
such public entities as specialized banks, including the Korea Development Bank
and the nationalized Seoul Bank and Korea First Bank.
Korea's progress has been quite dramatic in view of the changes made with the
financial institutions. With the injection of public funds, a substantial amount
of bank assets have now been managed by nationalized banks. While the worst
performing five banks were liquidated, the government demonstrated its commitment
to opening the market to foreigners through the sale of Korea First Bank to
the American company, Newbridge Capital in 1999.
Throughout the entire restructuring process, the principle underlying the government's
support has been the pledge of self-rescue efforts by the financial institutions.
This pledge bound financial institutions to make their utmost efforts on loss
sharing and downsizing, the implementation of which has been closely monitored
by the Financial Supervisory Commission.
The banks' cost saving efforts can be affirmed by the industry-wide 35.6 percent
reduction in the number of employees during a single year after the crisis,
and the closure of 1,200 branch offices. As a result, bank assets per employee
have sharply increased by almost 50 percent over the past three years. Banks'
profitability has not returned to a normal level and their cost-saving efforts
helped them normalize their operations, in addition to the continuing write-offs
for non-performing loans and recapitalization. Operating profits before provisioning
have sharply increased. The average BIS (Bank for International Settlements)-set
capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector went up to 10 percent in two years.
There was a substantial increase in foreign investment in the healthy commercial
banks. For the non-bank financial institutions, restructuring has also been
making substantial progress at the initiative of their large shareholders and
the government's urging for rehabilitation. Thus far, many insolvent institutions
have been closed or acquired by healthier ones.
The Financial Supervisory Commission gave similar treatment to the restructuring
of non-bank financial institutions. Insolvent merchant banks were closed and
incorporated into a bridge merchant bank. Self-rehabilitation measures were
implemented under the initiative of major shareholders with the Financial Supervisory
Commission closely monitoring the progress. The institutions whose self-rehabilitation
measures proved inadequate were subject to either corrective actions or closure.
As of March 2002, 470 non-bank financial institutions had their licenses revoked
or were suspended.
By October 1998, the government focused on "hardware" restructuring, such as
the disposal of bad loans and recapitalization. Since October 1998, it moved
its focus to improving the so-called "software" elements, such as corporate
governance and credit risk management.
In retrospect, Korea's successful financial restructuring was due to the financial
authorities' decisive action of taking over the fragile banking system, making
bailout payments and incurring a huge fiscal cost up-front.
The Second Round of Financial Restructuring
Korea's financial system was hit hard once again in 1999 following the collapse
of the Daewoo business group, one of the top chaebols. Fund flows had been seriously
skewed, as the liquidity within the capital markets dried up and a significant
amount of cash was withdrawn from the investment trust companies. Such fund
flows in turn imperiled corporations that had come to depend on the issuance
of debentures.
Notwithstanding, private market participants were not capable of resolving these
problems, which made the funding of additional public money inevitable. FLC
criterion had been strict on banks' bad assets, resulting in the need for more
infusion of public money. In order to raise 40 trillion won (US$32 billion)
of additional funds, the Korean government obtained approval from the National
Assembly in December 2000, when the second round of financial sector restructuring
was launched.
These funds were used to: 1) recapitalize ailing banks to improve their BIS
ratios; 2) shore up capital of Seoul Guaranty Corporation to honor guarantees
for Daewoo Group and non-Daewoo workout companies; and 3) inject capital to
meet any shortfall for the additional sales of non-performing loans.
On the basis of the first round of financial restructuring, the second round
was launched in September 2000. The goals behind the second round included establishing
a government assisted bank holding company and improving international competitiveness.
In fact, it is noteworthy that in the second round, the government not only
cleaned up banks' balance sheets but also accomplished bank consolidation. Potentially
undercapitalized banks (Chohung Bank, Hanvit Bank, KEB, Seoul Bank, etc.) presented
their rehabilitation plans to the government authorities. These plans were scrutinized
by the Bank Management Evaluation Committee. The banks deemed to be viable (KEB,
Chohung Bank) were allowed to implement their own normalization plans. Other
severely undercapitalized banks (Hanvit Bank, Peace Bank, Kwangju Bank, Kyungnam
Bank) were recapitalized with public funds and were put under the control of
a financial holding company as subsidiaries. In addition, Kookmin Bank and Housing
and Commercial Bank, were merged. Follow up mergers are expected among the other
remaining commercial banks, which will bring about a new landscape in the banking
business sector.
 |
Structure of Banking Industry
Financial institutions in Korea may be divided into three categories by function:
the central bank, or the Bank of Korea; banking institutions including both
commercial and specialized; and non-bank financial institutions including the
non-bank deposit-taking institutions, insurance, securities companies and others.
The foundations of the modern financial system in Korea were laid in the early
1950s, when the central and commercial banking systems were realigned under
the new institutional bases of the Bank of Korea Act and the General Banking
Act.
Commercial banks mean the financial institutions established pursuant to the
General Banking Act, which focuses on the deposit-taking, lending and the payment
settlement businesses. Traditionally, commercial banks have played a key role
in Korea's financial system. In 1998, for instance, commercial and specialized
banks channeled 60.1 percent of all funds used by individual sectors and 28.3
percent of all funding sources for the corporate sector, respectively. Commercial
banks include nationwide commercial banks, regional banks, and foreign bank
branches.
Specialized banks were established mostly during the 1960s under individual
acts to supplement commercial banks in areas where they could not supply enough
funds due to limitations in funding, profitability, and expertise. They were
also created to support special sectors that were given priority in Korea's
series of economic development plans. With subsequent changes in the financial
environment, however, specialized banks expanded their scope of business into
commercial banking areas although their share of fund allocations to the relevant
sectors was still relatively high. In raising funds, specialized banks depended
mainly on public funds and on the issuance of debentures, although they had
to compete with commercial banks for deposits. There are five specialized banks:
the Korea Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, the Industrial
Bank of Korea, the Credit and Banking Sectors of the National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation, and the Credit and Banking Sectors of the National Federation of
Fisheries Cooperatives in operation.
Most non-bank financial institutions were introduced during the 1970s in order
to diversify financing sources, to promote the development of the money market,
and to attract funds into the organized market. From the early 1980s, several
commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions were added as part of a
series of broad measures to spur financial liberalization and internationalization.
This coincided with a shift from a government-orientated stance on economic
policy towards a market-orientated stance.
Financial Supervision and Deposit Insurance
Financial Supervision
The growing convergence of financial services and the blurring distinction between
financial sectors created a growing need for a single regulator to oversee the
full range of financial businesses in order to enhance cooperation between financial
supervisors and to eliminate supervisory gray areas. Industry-specific supervisory
organizations, each with its own approach and administration, hindered efficient
regulatory cooperation and the establishment of consistent supervisory policies.
This recognition emphasized the need for a single, consolidated supervisory
body to conduct proper supervision and regulation of the financial industry.
The road to an integrated supervisory system began with the launching of the
Presidential Committee on Financial Reform in early 1997. After a detailed review
of the financial sector, the Committee recommended a sweeping series of reforms
for the Bank of Korea and for the nation's financial supervisory structure as
a whole. At the Committee's recommendation, the government drew up a plan to
consolidate under one roof the four existing financial supervisory authorities:
the Office of Bank Supervision (OBS), the Securities Supervisory Board (SSB),
the Insurance Supervisory Board (ISB), and the Non-bank Supervisory Authority
(NSA). Draft bills for the financial sector, including the Act on the Establishment
of Financial Supervisory Organizations, were submitted in August 1997 and passed
by the National Assembly in December 1997.
On April 1, 1998, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established
as the nation's supreme and integrated financial supervisor. More importantly,
as the FSC has driven initiatives to reform financial institutions and business
groups (i.e. chaebols) as agreed upon by international organizations including
the IMF and the Korean government, it has overseen and facilitated financial
and corporate sector restructuring, thereby building a fundamentally sounder
infrastructure for the national economy.
In addition, the Securities & Exchange Commission, which had formerly regulated
the securities market in Korea, was dissolved and the Securities & Futures Commission
(SFC) was established within the FSC to oversee the securities and futures markets.
The Insurance Supervisory Commission, which had formerly regulated the insurance
market, was also dissolved.
On January 1, 1999, the four supervisory bodies, the OBS, SSB, ISB and NSA,
were consolidated into a single body, the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS),
which carries out its duties under the supervision of the FSC. The result was
a fully integrated financial regulatory and supervisory system that serves to
secure the transparency and international standing of Korea's financial institutions.
Deposit Insurance System
Prior to June 1996, Korea lacked an explicit deposit system for banks. Instead,
there existed an implicit, or unofficial, government guarantee on bank deposits.
As for financial institutions other than banks, each sector had its own method
of depositor protection, usually in the form of a fund.
Taking into consideration the grave repercussions that can result from the bankruptcy
of a bank, the government took on the role of implicitly protecting depositors
in case of any bank failure. The protection of non-bank financial institutions
existed according to each sector and, in the event of a failure or insolvency,
the government intervened to resolve the problem and protect depositors.
The Depositor Protection Act was enacted in December 1995 and the Korea Deposit
Insurance Corporation was established in June 1996 to protect depositors in
banks and to maintain public confidence in the financial system. The KDIC embarked
upon the task of deposit insurance for banks in January 1997, while the separate
funds for each respective non-bank financial institution remained in place.
The Depositor Protection Act was revised in April 1998 to unify the formerly
separate deposit insurance agencies under the KDIC. Thus, deposits to be protected
now included not only those of banks, but also deposits held in securities companies,
insurance companies, merchant banking corporations (MBC), mutual savings & finance
companies (MSFC), and credit unions.
The partial deposit insurance system, which covers deposits up to 50 million
won (US$40,000) at the maximum, replaced the blanket insurance system at the
beginning of 2001. Now, deposits are guaranteed only up to 50 million won (US$40,000).
The insurance premium for any bank is fixed at 0.1 percent of guaranteed bank's
deposit. The insurance premium for securities firms and insurance companies
is 0.2 percent, and that for credit unions and mutual savings and financing
companies is 0.3 percent. The government originally planned to introduce a differentiated
premium system based on the financial health of guaranteed institutions at the
beginning of 2001 in accordance with the implementation of a partial deposit
insurance system but delayed the new measure indefinitely due to its possible
impact on financial institutions.
Resolution of Failed Banks
Past experience shows that there are four options for dealing with a large troubled
bank: (1) it can be merged with another large Korean bank (merger); (2) it can
continue to go forward on its own in the hope that improved management practices
and external capital injections will enable it to attain a satisfactory condition
(stand-alone with government assistance); (3) it can be turned into a sound
bank possibly given some form of purchase option (P&A;); or (4) it can be sold
to an investor group or foreign bank that will recapitalize it in connection
with a transaction whereby the government provides satisfactory asset protection
(sell-off to foreign investors). The second option of stand-alone was initially
ruled out because it would not be accompanied by necessary self-rescuing efforts,
including the substantial reduction of staff and branches. The other three options
were actually used for dealing with failing banks.
The FSC gave warnings and prompt corrective actions to the 12 banks that did
not meet the BIS capital ratio of 8 percent by February 28, 1998. The FSC demanded
submission of improvement plans to meet the BIS capital ratio of 8 percent by
April 30, 1998. The improvement plans were examined by the Bank Management Evaluation
Committee which consisted of outside experts. Based on the Committee's assessment,
the FSC classified them into two categories: "disapproved" and "conditionally
approved." Five banks whose rehabilitation plans were rejected by the FSC were
"disapproved," and seven banks were "conditionally approved" and ordered to
fulfill the corrective actions imposed by the FSC.
Purchase & Assumption Transactions
The five banks with a low possibility for improvement were ordered to be closed
down. They were liquidated through purchases and assumptions (P&A;) in June 1998
and their assets were transferred to acquiring banks selected on the basis of
financial soundness (BIS ratio of 10 percent or higher), long-term business
strategies, and comparative advantages.
The P&A; transaction structure of the five banks is illustrated in the graph.
Sound financial institutions took over the performing assets and liabilities
of the insolvent financial institutions, and KAMCO purchased the NPLs by the
government's administrative action. KDIC insured the liability in excess of
the asset amount. Before signing the P&A; agreement, the FSC selected five banks
to take over the assets and liabilities of five insolvent banks considering
their financial performance and comparative advantage. The plans were scheduled
in cooperation with the five banks. Because of the time limit, the plan was
decided only on the resolution of the board of directors.
With the resolution of the board of directors, P&A; agreements were signed between
the purchasing banks and the five insolvent banks. In order to prevent the insolvency
of the five banks taking over the assets, the NPLs were transferred to KAMCO.
KDIC insured the liability in excess of the asset amount. The NPLs that the
purchasing banks were not responsible for were repurchased by KAMCO and the
losses were insured by KDIC.
Following the contract transfer decision, a Steering Committee, comprising of
the members from the KDIC, related banks, accounting firms, and the FSC laid
down the criteria for the due diligence performed by the accounting firm. Taking
the due diligence into consideration, the KDIC made a 5.78 trillion won (US$4.6
billion) contribution to the five merged banks in September 1998. There was
also a put back option if additional losses on assets were to occur during a
certain time frame following the merger. Furthermore, to account for the lowered
BIS capital adequacy ratios arising from the assumption of the exit-ordered
banks' assets, and to raise the BIS ratio to levels at the end of June prior
to the mergers, the KDIC made equity participation totaling 1.19 trillion won
(US$0.9 billion) in December 1998.
The close-outs of the five insolvent banks in June 1998 was a landmark in the
financial industry's history. The liquidation of the insolvent banks contributed
to preventing moral hazards for the bank management and establishing the principle
of self responsibility. It also resolved financial stringency and contributed
to the recovery of international credibility. Inducing a voluntary merger of
financial institutions, these exits made the foundations for corporate restructuring.
However, there were conflicts of interests between the signing parties. A number
of conflicts extended to legal confrontations.
Government-Assisted Mergers
The seven viable banks dubbed "conditionally approved" by the FSC were the Commercial
Bank of Korea, Hanil Bank, Korea Exchange Bank, Chohung Bank, Peace Bank, Chungbuk
Bank, and Kangwon Bank. They took corrective actions imposed by the FSC to further
improve their capital adequacy ratios.
In September 1998, the Commercial Bank of Korea and Hanil Bank were ordered
to reduce their capital stock according to the prompt corrective action put
forward by the FSC, sought rehabilitation through merger and were recognized
as failing financial institutions. The order gave birth in early 1999 to the
largest commercial bank: Hanvit Bank. In addition, Cho Hung Bank, Kangwon Bank,
and Hyundai Merchant Banking Corporation announced the merger by the end of
March 1999. Chungbuk Bank was also ordered to merge with the aforementioned
three financially institutions at the beginning of February 1999. These transactions
were financial supported by the government to enhance the merged banks' capital
adequacy ratios up to 10 percent. The KDIC made a capital investment of 1.63
trillion won (US$1.3 billion).
Among the banks that made the 8 percent BIS capital ratio by the end of 1997,
Kookmin and Credit Bank, and Hana and Boram Bank respectively signed voluntary
merger agreements and were officially merged by January of 1999. In order to
prevent the new financial institutions established by merger from becoming super-sized
insolvent banks, the support from the government in ways of purchasing NPLs
or recapitalization was inevitable. For instance, Hana Bank's merger with Boram
bank was met with a capital investment of 329 billion won (US$2.53 billion)
by the KDIC to be used to prevent the deterioration of the merged bank's capital
adequacy level.
Sell-off to Foreign Investors
Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, which showed problems with their financial
structure even before the currency crisis, decided to reduce their capital in
January 1998. The government decided to sell-off Korea First Bank and Seoul
Bank to foreign investors after injecting public funds.
In December 1998, Korea First Bank and Newbridge Capital signed a memorandum
of understanding. After a long debate, the contract investment was signed in
September 1999. As of January 2000, Newbridge Capital took over Korea First
Bank and established a new board of directors.
The sell-off to foreign investors had to be designed in a way to minimize side
effects. Two alternatives were under consideration. First, the government could
insure the value of the securities, or carrying costs of the NPLs. Second, seniority
could be given to funds financing workout corporations. The first method of
using the put-back option was selected for Korea First Bank.
| (Table 1) |
| Changes in the Financial Sector |
| (1) Market opening |
Financial markets |
Stock market access |
Jan. 92 |
5% to 15% |
| Dec. 97 |
55% |
| Mar. 98 |
100% |
| Bond market access |
Jul. 94 |
Partially allowed |
| Dec. 97 |
Free entry |
| Money market access |
Feb. 98 |
Partially allowed |
| May 98 |
Almost free access |
| (2) Free entry |
Financial business |
- Freedom to open branch offices and induct capital |
| - Free establishment of financial firms |
| - Freer movement of capital, labor, and software |
| - Strict checking on track records outside Korea: prudential
soundness |
| (3) International rules, standard,
and practices |
|
| (Table 2) |
| Financial Institution Restructuring |
| (Nov. 1997 ~ Oct. 2002, unit: %, number) |
Financial
Sector |
Number of
Institutions
(a) |
Restructuring |
Number of Institutions (00.7) |
| Cancellation |
M&A; |
Break up & disposal |
Sub-total |
(b/a) |
| Bank |
33 |
5 |
9 |
N/A |
14 |
42.4 |
20 |
| Non-bank |
2,068 |
121 |
150 |
361 |
632 |
30.6 |
1,498 |
| Merchant bank |
30 |
18 |
6 |
4 |
28 |
93.3 |
3 |
| Securities |
36 |
5 |
3 |
1 |
9 |
25.0 |
44 |
| Insurance |
50 |
7 |
6 |
2 |
15 |
30.0 |
46 |
| Investment trust |
30 |
6 |
1 |
N/A |
7 |
23.3 |
31 |
| Mutual savings |
231 |
74 |
27 |
26 |
127 |
55.0 |
116 |
| Credit Unions |
1,666 |
2 |
105 |
328 |
435 |
26.1 |
1,240 |
| Lease |
25 |
9 |
2 |
N/A |
11 |
44.0 |
18 |
| Total |
2,101 |
126 |
159 |
361 |
646 |
30.7 |
1,518 |
|
| Source: Public Fund Oversight Committee |
| (Table 3) |
| Major Changes in Financial System and Practices |
| Financial Supervision System
Advanced |
- Financial Supervisory Commission established (Apr. 1998),
Financial Supervisory Service combined (Jan. 1999)
- Monetary policy system decentralized (Ministry of Finance
and Economy
- Financial Supervisory Commission, Bank of Korea etc.)
- Laws about structural improvement of financial industry enacted
(Sept. 1998)
- International standards introduced for asset soundness classification
(FLC) (Dec. 1999)
- Timely readjustment management system improved (June 1998)
|
| Financial Institution Transparency Improved |
- Compulsory outsider director system introduced (Jan. 2000)
- Accounting of financial institution and disclosure system
strengthened
- Autonomy of bank management established
- Credit decision by the independent loan committee
- Even in the banks in which the government is a major shareholder,
outside intervention should not be allowed |
| Ordinary Times Restructuring System Built |
- Full amount deposit guarantee system converted to partial
amount guarantee system (starting Jan. 2001)
- In case of financial institution bankruptcy, depositors are
guaranteed up to 50 million won per person.
- Bond current value appraisal system introduced
- Corporate restructuring, pre-packaged bankruptcy, market friendly
corporate restructuring means introduced
- Workout system based on voluntary agreement of financial institutions
implemented
- Role of autonomy regulatory agency improved
|
| Financial Market Infra Improved |
- Improved development plan for medium and long-term bond market
- Financial instrument diversified (mutual fund, asset backed
securities, REITs etc.)
- Derivative product market activated- Korea Futures Exchange
established (Apr. 1999)
- Electronic finance and Internet banking infrastructure improved
|
|
| (Table 4) |
| Financial Institutions in Korea |
| (As of September 2002) |
|
Financial Institutions |
Number |
| Banks |
Commercial Banks |
Nationwide Banks
Regional Banks
Foreign Banks Branches |
9
6
41 |
| Specialized Banks |
5 |
| Non-Bank Deposit-taking Institutions |
Mutual Savings and Finance Companies
Merchant Banking Corporations
Credit Unions |
149
3
1,242 |
| Insurance Companies |
Non-life Insurance Companies |
Property and Liability Insurance Companies
Reinsurance Companies
Guarantee Insurance Company |
18
4
1 |
| Life Insurance Companies |
22 |
| Securities-related Institutions |
Securities Companies
Investment Trust Management Companies
Asset Management Companies
Investment Advisory Companies
Securities Finance Company
Futures Companies |
61
31
61
130
1
14 |
| Others |
Credit-specialized Companies
Money Brokerage Companies |
53
2 |
| Special Purpose Vehicles |
Special Purpose Companies
Mortgage-Backed Securities Company |
175
1 |
|
| Source: Bank of Korea [Monetary Bulletin], Various Issues |
