Surge = Training Op for Iraqis

Ongoing “surge” operations in Baghdad are doubling as training opportunities for Iraqi soldiers, airmen and government officials. U.S. strategy entails turning over responsibility for security in Iraq to native entities as soon as they’re ready; the demands of the surge have forced Iraqis to be readier, sooner.

Iraqi army battalions “disintegrated last year when we tried to move them around,” says Major General William Caldwell, spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq, referring to several Iraqi units that refused to deploy to trouble spots from their home bases in the north or south of the country. Many of the Iraqi soldiers involved cited a lack of preparation. “Now we have them ready to move,” Caldwell stresses. “By the middle of March, we should have three Iraqi brigades in Baghdad.”

Iraqi forces in the contested city now number more than 20,000, and Iraqi officers have taken the lead in many Baghdad missions. The tiny Iraqi air force is stepping up operations, as well, flying troop transport missions for deploying units using three U.S.-donated Lockheed Martin C-130E Hercules airlifters in addition to conducting Baghdad surveillance with CH-2000 reconnaissance planes.

“There’s been an increase in Iraqi air force operations in recent weeks,” says Brigadier General Stephen Hoog, chief U.S. trainer for the Iraqi air service. “They did their first medevac mission about seven days ago – they’re setting up channel missions to take wounded northern Iraqi troops back home. And the CH-2000s are going on one or two missions every day checking out checkpoints.” All that’s missing from operations is Iraq’s sizeable force of helicopters, which are awaiting the installation of the defensive gear they need for Baghdad missions. “By the middle of summer, we’ll see much greater participation of their helicopters.”

The surge hinges on significant diplomatic efforts by Iraqi politicians aiming to cut off the flow of weapons and insurgents into Baghdad and to keep the city’s militias peaceful. “The U.S. government got the Iraqi Prime Minister [Nouri Al Maliki] to make it clear to the militias that there’s no room for militias, and that those that ignored that warning were going to be dealt with,” reports Ambassador Daniel Speckhard, deputy chief of the U.S. mission. As a result, many of them dissolved or have ended their activity or moved out of Baghdad.” Speckhard adds that Al Maliki recently took his first official trip to western Iraq to meet with tribal leaders who are key to intercepting weapons coming in from Syria.

--David Axe, cross-posted at War Is Boring

Afghan Sit-Rep

On another front, DT obtained a copy of an after action review of operations in Afghanistan from former 24th Infantry Division commander in Operation Desert Storm and now International Affairs professor at West Point, Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who traveled to Afghanistan in mid-February.

During his visit, McCaffrey met with a wide range of military leaders, intelligence officials, diplomats and local Afghans to get a read on how things are going over there. This is something McCaffrey is exceedingly good at. His OIF post-op was outstanding and lacked the politically-charged rhetoric of many other assessments – then and now.

Overall, he’s optimistic that the U.S and NATO can “without question, achieve our US national objective of a functioning law-based state -- with a performing, non-drug economy -- which rejects sanctuary for terrorism. This is the cross-over year. The execution of our plan in the coming 24 months will decide the outcome in the country.”

But “rhetoric and political will cannot achieve our goals. Afghanistan needs strong US inter-agency and Congressional support to provide the dollars, equipment, combat soldiers, ANA and ANP mentors, and vigorous NATO and Afghan leadership to pull this mission from the fire.”

McCaffrey is calling for a $500 billion investment over the next 10 years to build the Afghan army and police force into “capable, dominant” institutions.

The Afghan economy is booming at 12% growth rate a year. $14 billion has been spent on aid since 2001. Six TV channels and a hundred free/uncensored publications are available to the people. Literacy is increasing rapidly. The ring road is now 2/3 complete. The 40,000 soldiers of the ANA are growing rapidly in numbers and capability. There are 45,000 NATO and US troops in-country. There is a functioning democracy with an elected Parliament ---and a serious, dedicated Afghan President in office.

Afghanistan can be a strategic victory in the struggle against terrorism. We are now on the right path.

There’s also good information on Pakistan’s role in the festering conflict, a NATO force hamstrung by constrained rules of engagement, the success of U.S. airpower and an innovative option for creating more “tier one” special operators…

…in my view, the Pakistanis are NOT actively supporting the Taliban -- nor do they have a strategic purpose to de-stabilize Afghanistan…

…the Pakistanis need better US support for COIN operations in South and North Waziristan. We need to sort out a set of strategic tools to help them do better. They immediately require the $395 million they have requested for their Frontier Corps. It will be a disaster for our strategic purpose if we push them to premature military action which destroys them as a unifying and stabilizing force in the region…

…as a general statement, however, the NATO forces are too weak on the ground, lack essential supporting elements (helicopters, engineers, logistics, intelligence), have severely restrictive rules-of-engagement, and may lack the national political will to fight when required. It is possible that the Taliban will try to knock one or more of these NATO nations out of the war. A major blow to the Italians, the Canadians, the Dutch, the Spanish, or the Germans might shatter their weak domestic political support…

…we need to take a revolutionary look at the methods of creating these “Tier One” forces. It will require a separately funded recruiting program similar to WWII OSS programs to identify college graduates, with superb athletic skills, who will volunteer for a 24 month training program (to include total immersion language training in Arabic or Dari) -- followed by a four year employment tour…

(Gouge: NC)

-- Christian

Changing of the Guard

Last Friday, 16 March, 2007 saw Admiral William "Fox" Fallon take over command of CENTCOM from General John Abizaid at a change of command ceremony held at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Fla.

These sorts of changes of command happen all the time in the military, at every level in the chain of command. What is special about this one, however, is that a Navy admiral is taking the helm over a traditionally Army or Marine-focused unified regional command.

What is really unique about this is that it is evidence that the Navy, long considered an outsider in the Joint arena, has finally "made it" - has finally "changed" (transformed?) enough from a platform-centric, open-ocean war-at-sea protect-the-sea-lanes-of-communication entity to one that is integrated with the other combat services to provide a broad spectrum of battlespace operations. This is a good thing, and Carl von Clausewitz is smiling, wherever he is.

U.S. Army photo by Spc. Patrick A Ziegler (RELEASED)

--Pinch Paisley, crossposted with more at the Instapinch

On Target

DT got a weekly Air Force update sent to us on the coalition air war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sitrep included some pretty interesting strikes from the US arsenal including a B-1B Lancer hit a Strike Eagle gun run and some British Harrier fly-bys in Afghanistan, as well as some Falcon and Warthog CAS in Iraq.

So for some fun weekend reading, take a look...

AFGHANISTAN: A B-1B Lancer dropped guided bomb unit-38s and GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions on enemy personnel and a building near Garmsir, in support of Operation Achilles. The on-scene JTAC and ground forces observed direct hits.

F-15E Strike Eagles provided close-air support near Garmsir, firing cannon rounds on enemy forces in the open, dropping GBU-12s and GBU-38s on buildings known to contain enemy forces and on buildings where insurgents hid after initial air strikes.

A Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet dropped a GBU-12 on an enemy mortar position and another on a cave entrance where an enemy mortar spotter was located near Now Zad. A JTAC confirmed good hits on both targets.

Other Navy F/A-18s provided a show of force over a compound for coalition forces receiving mortar fire near Sangin. A JTAC reported the show of force was successful as enemy fire had ceased. The F/A-18s also provided overwatch for a coalition convoy and reconnaissance for a roadway in the same area.

Royal Air Force GR-7 Harriers provided a show of force for a coalition convoy attacked by multiple rocket propelled grenades at the gate of a forward operating base near Garmsir. The GR-7 pilots reported individuals observing the patrol from inside a compound.

Other GR-7s released enhanced Paveway II munitions, 540-pound bombs and a rocket on enemy individuals in the open and in buildings near Garmsir. The weapons directly hit the targets, according to a JTAC.

In total, 57 close-air-support missions were flown in support of Afghan and International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, troops, reconstruction activities and route patrols.

IRAQ: Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons provided reconnaissance of suspicious individuals and provided a show of force over a large group of people near Balad. A JTAC reported the show of force was successful.

Other Air Force F-16s provided reconnaissance of a house in which anti-Iraqi insurgents involved in a previous engagement were hiding. The F-16 pilots watched the house until the arrival of coalition forces.

A-10 Thunderbolt IIs performed armed reconnaissance in support of counter-improvised explosive device mission near Iskandariyah.

In total, coalition aircraft flew 46 close-air-support missions for OIF.

Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft and C-17 Globemaster IIIs flew about 165 airlift sorties in-theater, delivering nearly 500 tons of cargo and transporting around 2,770 passengers.

Coalition C-130 crews from Canada, Japan and South Korea flew in support of OIF or OEF.

On March 6, U.S., RAF and French tankers flew 39 sorties and off-loaded more than 2.6 million pounds of fuel which is the equivalent of 65 full Air Force fuel trucks.

(Gouge: NC )

-- Christian

Why-Read-When-You-Can-Watch-Type News

Baghdad Push Just the Start

"News that an Iraqi Army brigade and 2,000 American troops have begun an operation in [Baghdad's] Sunni dominated neighborhood of Azamiyah has kicked off speculation the Baghdad Security Operation is now underway in full force," serial embedder Bill Roggio notes. "But the fact is the operation to stabilize the capital and the surrounding provinces is only in its infancy. Today's positioning of forces Azamiyah is but one more opening move on the chessboard."

From what I understand, Gen. David Petraeus, the new American commander in Iraq, only now just got to Iraq. So it doesn't seem like the moment for the be-all-, end-all push the papers are trumpeting.

Iraq Re-arms

Despite flat oil exports and a struggling economy, Iraq has embarked on a comprehensive program to re-arm its embattled security forces. That's focus of my latest feature for World Politics Watch:

The country is buying American patrol planes, Italian naval vessels, Russian helicopters and armored vehicles co-produced by American and British firms. The new equipment is utilitarian stuff -- optimized for patrols in and over Iraq's teeming cities and on its smuggler-infested waters rather than for attacks on external foes -- and reflects the complete inward focus of Iraq's military. But the purchases do little to solve the forces' nearly complete lack of logistics capability.

Iraq has spent around a billion dollars on new weapons in the past year, but all the new planes, vehicles and patrol boats do nothing to address Iraqi forces' fundamental flaws, including their nearly total lack of logistics ability, as I explained in a story for National Defense Magazine a few months back:

After three years of training by coalition advisors, Iraqi forces in southern Iraq are capable of planning and commanding operations. But their logistics systems remain deeply flawed, and the Iraqis rely on British and U.S. forces for supplies and spares support for all but the most basic functions.

Plus, it doesn't matter how well armed Iraqi forces are if they can't deploy within their own country, a problem I addressed last year for The Washington Times:

The 700-strong Kurdish Iraqi army battalion, originally from the northern city of Sulaimaniyah, deployed to Balad recently to bolster a single Shi'ite battalion mustered from local residents. ... The large Sunni minority living around Balad has protested the Kurdish unit's presence, said U.S. Army Lt. Col. David Coffey, a member of an ad hoc military transition team that is helping train the Kurdish battalion. He said the residents have resisted the presence of the Kurdish battalion with such force that commanders are afraid to let the soldiers leave their base, which is adjacent to a U.S. compound outside the city.

But then, Arab militaries have a bad habit of buying impressive-looking weapons that they're incapable of using to advantage. Saudi Arabia's latest spending spree, for example, includes new Apache attack choppers, Typhoon fighters and the latest Abrams tanks. But that country remains incapable of defending itself, according to the Federation of American Scientists.

-- David Axe, cross-posted at War is Boring (with video!) and Ares

Breaking: Double the Troops in "Surge" (Updated)

President Bush and his new military chiefs have been saying for nearly a month that they would "surge" an additional 21,500 troops to Iraq, in a last, grand push to quell the violence in Baghdad and in Anbar Province. But a new study by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office says the real troop increase could be as high as 48,000 -- more than double the number the President initially said.

That's because the combat units that President Bush wants to send into hostile areas need to be backed up by support troops, "including personnel to staff headquarters, serve as military police, and provide communications, contracting, engineering, intelligence, medical, and other services," the CBO notes.

Over the past few years , DoD’s practice has been to deploy a total of about 9,500 personnel per combat brigade to the Iraq theater, including about 4,000 combat troops and about 5,500 supporting troops.

DoD has not yet indicated which support units will be deployed along with the added combat forces, or how many additional troops will be involved. Army and DoD officials have indicated that it will be both possible and desirable to deploy fewer additional support units than historical practice would indicate. CBO expects that, even if the additional brigades required fewer support units than historical practice suggests, those units would still represent a significant additional number of military personnel.

To reflect some of the uncertainty about the number of support troops, CBO developed its estimates on the basis of two alternative assumptions. In one scenario, CBO assumed that additional support troops would be deployed in the same proportion to combat troops that currently exists in Iraq. That approach would require about 28,000 support troops in addition to the 20,000 combat troops—a total of 48,000. CBO also presents an alternative scenario that would include a smaller number of support personnel—about 3,000 per combat brigade—totaling about 15,000 support personnel and bringing the total additional forces to about 35,000.

According to the study, the costs for the "surge" would also be dramatically different than the President has said. The White House estimated a troop escalation would require about $5.6 billion in additional funding for the rest of fiscal year 2007. Of that, about $3.2 billion was supposed to go to the Army and Marines for their escalated activity.

But that figure appears to have been grossly underestimated. The CBO now believes "that costs would range from $9 billion to $13 billion for a four-month deployment and from $20 billion to $27 billion for a 12-month deployment." There's a more detailed analysis of the numbers on pages 3 and 4 of the study, which was sent to House Budget Chairman John Spratt today.

UPDATE 1:43 PM: Here's Spratt's reaction, in a statement just released:

“An average of 170,000 military personnel has been maintained in the Iraq theater of operations, and this high deployment level has taken a toll. Last year, CBO reported that the Department of Defense had reduced the amount of ‘dwell’ time for many troops from two years to one year in order to sustain troop levels. ‘Dwell’ time is the time troops spend in training at bases in the United States while living with their families. CBO questioned whether such a high pace of operations was sustainable over the long term. The President’s proposal will increase this level to above 200,000 troops, and to reach this level, the Pentagon will probably have to relax ‘dwell’ time standards even more.

“CBO’s report concludes that the cost of the President’s plan to ‘surge’ troops will be higher than previously indicated, both in dollar terms and in the burdens it places on our military.”

UPDATE 2:06 PM: As they say on the Internet, "WTF?" Gen. George Casey, the nominee for Army chief of staff, "told a Senate panel Thursday that improving security in Baghdad would take fewer than half as many extra troops as President Bush has chosen to commit," the AP is reporting.

Asked by Sen. John Warner, R-Va., why he had not requested the full five extra brigades that Bush is sending, Casey said, "I did not want to bring one more American soldier into Iraq than was necessary to accomplish the mission."

With many in Congress opposing or skeptical of Bush's troop buildup, Casey did not say he opposed the president's decision. He said the full complement of five brigades would give U.S. commanders in Iraq additional, useful flexibility.

"In my mind, the other three brigades should be called forward after an assessment has been made on the ground" about whether they are needed to ensure success in Baghdad, Casey said. later.

Now, Casey has long been skeptical of a troop increase. "It's a tough nut, whether or not bringing in more troops, more US troops will have a significant long term impact on the violence," he said back in October. And just the other day, Casey was arguing that any additional boots on the ground could be removed by the summer. So this feels like we're seeing the edges of an internal squabble between the White House and the Army brass. Or maybe between general and general.

UPDATE 02/02/07 6:36 PM: The White House is denying the CBO report.

(Big ups: JA)

Merc Chopper Shot Down (Updated)

The tens of thousands of foreign mercenaries fighting alongside coalition soldiers in Iraq aren't just tooling around in up-armored SUVs sporting submachine guns. These guys have got helicopters too that they use to escort convoys -- and one of them has just been shot down over Baghdad, according to the Associated Press:

Five civilians died in the Baghdad crash of a helicopter owned by the private security company Blackwater USA, according to a U.S. military official. The helicopter was shot down Tuesday over a predominantly Sunni neighborhood, a senior Iraqi defense official said. The crash came three days after a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter crashed northeast of Baghdad, killing all 12 soldiers aboard.

Blackwater should have seen this coming. Unlike U.S. military helicopters, which are armored and equipped with countermeasures to defeat shoulder-fired missiles, Blackwater's McDonnell Douglas MD-369FF Loaches are essentially defenseless, unless you count the two mercs hanging out the cabin doors with their rifles.

Note that Blackwater's choppers -- which fly from the same Green Zone helipad used by the U.S. Army and Marines -- are just civil versions of the Hughes OH-6 Cayuse that the Army began phasing out after the Vietnam War due to their vulnerability. U.S. Special Forces fly updated H-6s, but only at night, when it's safer. It's not clear what time of the day the Blackwater bird was shot down, but I've witnessed these choppers buzzing around in broad daylight.

It's too early to tell what this shoot-down means for Blackwater and for merc ops in Iraq. But one thing's for sure: with the military struggling to scare up another 20,000 troops for its so-called "surge," the demand for private soldiers isn't going away.

UPDATE 1/24/07: Four of the dead Blackwater men were apparently killed execution-style, perhaps after surviving the chopper crash, while the fifth was a member of a second chopper crew also at the site of the crash. All this according to the Associated Press:

In Washington, a U.S. defense official said four of the five killed were shot in the back of the head but did not know whether they were still alive when they were shot. The U.S. official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the record. ...

Another American official in Baghdad, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said three Blackwater helicopters were involved. One had landed for an unknown reason and one of the Blackwater employees was shot at that point, he said. That helicopter apparently was able to take off but a second one then crashed in the same area, he added without explaining the involvement of the third helicopter.

The New York Times, citing unnamed American officials, reported that the helicopter's four-man crew was killed along with a gunner on a second Blackwater helicopter.

--David Axe, crossposted at War Is Boring

UPDATE 01/24/07 11:01 AM: Who do ya trust?

Doug Brooks, president of the International Peace Operations Association, an industry group that includes security contractors, said the type of helicopter downed, known as a "little bird," is among the safest modes of transportation in war zones.

"Their crews are the best -- they really know their stuff," he said in an e-mail. "They are very good at avoiding fire, flying low and fast -- and the tiny helicopters are very hard to hit."

Doug is a nice guy. But I'll put my money on Axe as the more objective observer.

UPDATE 01/24/07 11:07 AM: Robert Young Pelton has details on the incident -- and recent footage of Blackwater choppers in action.

Behind the Ethiopian Blitz

Today marks the launch of two blogs from two Defense Tech's most awesomest contributors. Site regulars Sharon Weinberger and David Axe have debuted Ares, a spinoff of Defense Technology International. Meanwhile, the Axe-man has begun his own blog, called War Is Boring. Expect frequent cross-posting. The launch post for both is Axe's analysis of Ethiopia's mechanized blitz through Somalia:

Ethiopia's tiny air force, which just four years ago was in danger of implosion, spearheaded last month's assault into southern Somalia to drive out Islamic Courts and their militia forces. Beginning on December 24, Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter-bombers hit strategic targets and even struck ground troops while at least 3,000 Ethiopian soldiers – 8,000 according to the United Nations – supported by T-55 tanks, Mil Mi-24/35 Hind gunship helicopters and artillery darted more than 150 miles to surround Mogadishu in just seven days. By the first week of January, Islamic forces had fled to the southern tip of Somalia and a jungle enclave and were being tracked by U.S. aerial drones flying out of Djibouti. On Jan. 8, the last Islamic holdouts came under assault by U.S. and Ethiopian forces, signaling the imminent end of large-scale Islamic military resistance.

This is only the latest victory for a storied air service. The Ethiopian air force, then backed by Russia, defeated the powerful Ukrainian-supported Eritrean air force during the two nations' 1998-2000 border conflict. But the service suffered in post-war political crackdowns. Two senior officers, Major Daniel Beyene and Captain Teshome Tenkolu, were abducted by government security forces and reportedly held for years on suspicion of disloyalty. Beyene died last year, apparently assassinated, while Tenkolu and more than a dozen other pilots and technicians defected several years ago, Tenkolu while at the controls of an Aero L-39 jet trainer. Meanwhile, Ethiopia's MiG-21 Fishbed and MiG-23 Flogger fighters were becoming obsolescent.

But an improved Ethiopian political climate and a concerted effort to re-equip the air force and its sister services preceded the Somali fighting. Between 1998 and 2004, Ethiopia received around 16 Flankers plus a handful of Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot attack planes from Russia as well as several dozen Hinds and other helicopters. The army, for its part, bought around 100 pristine T-55 tanks from Bulgaria in addition to Russian- and U.S.-built self-propelled howitzers; these would arm the invasion force and likely inflict the majority of Islamic casualties. But it was Ethiopia's new fighter jets that elicited hysterical comments from Islamic Courts leaders in the days before the Ethiopian invasion. "I hope God will help us shoot down their planes," Sheik Mohamoud Ibrahim Suley told the Associated Press in December.

The Sukhois are the backbone of operations in Somalia and are the only jet types mentioned in press reports from the fighting. Jeffrey Gettleman of The New York Times claimed a jet even strafed the Mogadishu airport on Dec. 25. Hinds, too, have featured prominently in journalists' dispatches. One Hind was reportedly shot down on Dec. 25. Professor Abdiweli Ali from Niagara University, who claims to have contacts with pro-Ethiopian Somali commanders, told Pajama Media that the Islamic Courts were armed with Russian should-fired surface-to-air missiles but had failed to hit the mostly high-flying Ethiopian aircraft. It's not clear what brought down the Hind.

The effectiveness of the Ethiopian air campaign came as a surprise to at least one observer. "There's nothing significant to bomb ... that would really affect the Islamic Courts," Professor Terrence Lyons from George Mason University said at a Dec. 15 Council on Foreign Relations event. Lyons perhaps neglected the disproportionate effects of combined air-ground operations, as demonstrated by U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan in 2001. The Ethiopian air force apparently worked in close coordination with ground forces. If doctrine applied during the 1998-2000 border war is still current, the majority of Ethiopian air strikes within sight of friendly ground forces in Somalia were guided by ground-based forward air controllers. (During international mediation of damage claims following the war with Eritrea, the Ethiopian government insisted that of hundreds of attack sorties launched by its air force, only 20 were executed without ground controllers.)

In Somalia, Flankers hit airports, roads, ammo dumps, Islamic militia camps and convoys – disrupting transport, communications and emergency re-supply – while T-55s sporting external fuel tanks crawled south ahead of self-propelled howitzers. Hinds flew top cover and even dropped 250-kilogram gravity bombs. Mil Mi-17 medevac choppers evacuated wounded troops. Helicopters kept pace with the ground advance by way of forward operating bases.

These heavy forces faced just a few thousand Islamic troops boasting nothing heavier than "technicals" – pickup trucks hauling heavy machine guns. There were reports of Eritrean forces aiding the Islamists and even swapping artillery barrages with the invaders; if true, this resistance hardly slowed the Ethiopian advance. The Ethiopian government claims 1,000 Islamist fighters killed while declining to cite its own, surely lighter, losses.

What role the United States has played in Ethiopia's initial success is unclear. For years, the Pentagon has reported only around $200 million annually in military aid to Ethiopia, mostly in the form of technical assistance for aircraft. This assistance might be related to the 1995 U.S. donation of four used Lockheed Martin C-130B Hercules transports.

Training support is another matter. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. soldiers headquartered in Djibouti have instructed Ethiopian troops in infantry tactics. "This goes from troop-leading procedures to react to contact, break contact, reconnaissance, patrolling, vehicle searches and so on," Army 1st Lt. Christopher Anderson told a military journalist in April.

"They love it and eat it up," Sgt. Ryan Castro said in the same article. "A part of this class is short-range marksmanship. The Ethiopian army shoots maybe ten rounds a year. Here, they went through 400 to 500 rounds in a week."

This murky relationship is getting clearer. On Jan. 8, CBS news reported attacks by a U.S. Air Force Boeing AC-130 Spectre gunship on Islamic forces in southern Somalia. CBS also mentioned supporting operations by unspecified U.S. aerial drones, most likely General Atomics RQ-1 Predators based alongside the Spectres in Djibouti. Meanwhile, the U.S.S. Eisenhower aircraft carrier and her battlegroup departed their station in the Arabian Sea and headed towards the Somali coast, apparently to support further operations against "terrorist" forces in Somalia.

What happens next in Somalia is anyone's guess. In weeks of furious fighting, Ethiopian forces proved effective at conducting fast-moving, conventional air-ground operations leveraging one of the world's most advanced fighter jets. Whether the same forces will succeed or even attempt to provide post-conflict security remains to be seen.

--David Axe, crossposted at War Is Boring and Ares

Washington Post Meets Soldiers' Justice

Twelve days ago, Peter Singer broke the story here, that private military contractors were going to be subject to the same laws as soldiers. Since then, big media outlets from the Boston Globe to the Financial Times have picked up on Singer's scoop. Today, it's the Washington Post's turn. The paper puts the story on the front page.

"Right now, you have two different standards for people doing the same job," said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), who pushed the provision. "This will bring uniformity to the commander's ability to control the behavior of people representing our country."

Graham, an Air Force Reserve lawyer, said the change will help morale in the field. "If the troops see someone getting away with something that hurts the overall mission, that is a morale buster," he said.

Under military law, known as the Uniform Code of Military Justice, commanders have wide latitude in deciding who should be prosecuted. Crimes include many that have parallels in civilian courts -- murder and rape, for instance -- as well as many that don't, such as disobeying an order, fraternization and adultery.

Legal experts say that latitude is one reason why attempting to hold civilians to the same standards as U.S. troops could be a messy process. It is also likely to raise constitutional challenges: Civilians prosecuted in military court don't receive a grand jury hearing and are ultimately tried by members of the military, rather than by a jury of their peers...

To try to solve the problem, Rep. David E. Price (D-N.C.) introduced legislation last week that he said would strengthen MEJA [the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which supposedly expand federal prosecutors' authority to foreign battlefields], an option he considers superior to using military law. "Military law is not appropriate for civilians," Price said. "The constitutional questions just confuse the issue."

The New York Times also gives our lil' site a shout-out over the scoop, in the "What's Online" column.

Bush Authorized Anti-Iran Raids

I was a little skeptical, when some blog-buddies started worrying that the President had "declare[d] 'secret war' against Syria and Iran" in his speech this week. But events may be proving them right, after all.

"A recent series of American raids against Iranians in Iraq was authorized under an order that President Bush decided to issue several months ago to undertake a broad military offensive against Iranian operatives in the country, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the New York Times

“There has been a decision to go after these networks,” Ms. Rice said...

Ms. Rice said Mr. Bush had acted “after a period of time in which we saw increasing activity” among Iranians in Iraq, “and increasing lethality in what they were producing.” She was referring to what American military officials say is evidence that many of the most sophisticated improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.’s, being used against American troops were made in Iran.

"Surge": Some Good News (Updated Again)

I just spent a couple of minutes on a White House conference call on the troop increase. There wasn't a ton of new information, unsurprisingly. But there was one, teeny-tiny encouraging tidbit: at least some U.S. soldiers are going to be redeployed from their massive bases, and spend 24/7 in Baghdad itself.

The city will be divided into 9 sections. Each will get a brigade of 2500 Iraq troops. And joined to that brigade will be an American combat battalion of 650 men. These people will live, full-time, "in the neighborhoods themselves," White House chief flack Tony Snow says. Unlike before, when U.S. troops would often take a 'hood -- and then head right back to their bases.

This is all in keeping with traditional counterinsurgency tactics. And moves like this met with some success in Tal Afar and Baquba, previously.

Those were smaller cities, however. Baghdad is a city of six million. An extra 5,000 U.S. troops there full-time is nice. Is it really enough?

UPDATE 4:41 PM: "President Bush tonight is expected to announce plans to increase the permanent size of U.S. ground forces by as many as 90,000 uniformed personnel," Inside Defense is reporting.

UPDATE 4:53 PM: Here's the AP's bullet-point breakdown of the President's plan.

Total # of new troops: 21,500.

UPDATE 6:28 PM: OK, this is potentially interesting, too. "The rules of engagement governing where troops could and couldn't go were severely restricted by politics in Baghdad during previous operations," says a White House fact sheet. "Prime Minister Maliki has made clear that this is going to change. The extremists will no longer have safe havens in Baghdad where U.S. and Iraqi troops cannot enter."

Also, this set of National Security Council slides -- especially #7, on the changed "key assumptions" about Iraq -- is, for this White House, almost jaw-dropping realistic and head-headed.

UPDATE 7:23 PM: Check out MountainRunner, too.

UPDATE 8:37: Below the jump, advance text of the speech.

________________________________________________________________

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY January 10, 2007

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE NATION

As Prepared for Delivery

Good evening. Tonight in Iraq, the Armed Forces of the United States are engaged in a struggle that will determine the direction of the global war on terror – and our safety here at home. The new strategy I outline tonight will change America’s course in Iraq, and help us succeed in the fight against terror.

When I addressed you just over a year ago, nearly 12 million Iraqis had cast their ballots for a unified and democratic nation. The elections of 2005 were a stunning achievement. We thought that these elections would bring the Iraqis together – and that as we trained Iraqi security forces, we could accomplish our mission with fewer American troops.

But in 2006, the opposite happened. The violence in Iraq – particularly in Baghdad – overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made. Al Qaeda terrorists and Sunni insurgents recognized the mortal danger that Iraq’s elections posed for their cause. And they responded with outrageous acts of murder aimed at innocent Iraqis. They blew up one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam – the Golden Mosque of Samarra – in a calculated effort to provoke Iraq’s Shia population to retaliate. Their strategy worked. Radical Shia elements, some supported by Iran, formed death squads. And the result was a vicious cycle of sectarian violence that continues today.

The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people – and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me.

It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq. So my national security team, military commanders, and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted Members of Congress from both parties, allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefited from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group – a bipartisan panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.

The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq.

The most urgent priority for success in Iraq is security, especially in Baghdad. Eighty percent of Iraq’s sectarian violence occurs within 30 miles of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis. Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people. And their government has put forward an aggressive plan to do it.

Our past efforts to secure Baghdad failed for two principal reasons: There were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. And there were too many restrictions on the troops we did have. Our military commanders reviewed the new Iraqi plan to ensure that it addressed these mistakes. They report that it does. They also report that this plan can work.

Let me explain the main elements of this effort: The Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad’s nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to this effort – along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations – conducting patrols, setting up checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents.

This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence – and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I have committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them – five brigades – will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.

Many listening tonight will ask why this effort will succeed when previous operations to secure Baghdad did not. Here are the differences: In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighborhoods of terrorists and insurgents – but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we will have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared. In earlier operations, political and sectarian interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into neighborhoods that are home to those fueling the sectarian violence. This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter these neighborhoods – and Prime Minister Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated.

I have made it clear to the Prime Minister and Iraq’s other leaders that America’s commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people – and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this. Here is what he told his people just last week: “The Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.”

This new strategy will not yield an immediate end to suicide bombings, assassinations, or IED attacks. Our enemies in Iraq will make every effort to ensure that our television screens are filled with images of death and suffering. Yet over time, we can expect to see Iraqi troops chasing down murderers, fewer brazen acts of terror, and growing trust and cooperation from Baghdad’s residents. When this happens, daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq’s Sunni and Shia want to live together in peace – and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible.

A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.

To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country’s economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend 10 billion dollars of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation’s political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws – and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq’s constitution.

America will change our approach to help the Iraqi government as it works to meet these benchmarks. In keeping with the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, we will increase the embedding of American advisers in Iraqi Army units – and partner a Coalition brigade with every Iraqi Army division. We will help the Iraqis build a larger and better-equipped Army – and we will accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, which remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq. We will give our commanders and civilians greater flexibility to spend funds for economic assistance. We will double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self reliance. And Secretary Rice will soon appoint a reconstruction coordinator in Baghdad to ensure better results for economic assistance being spent in Iraq.

As we make these changes, we will continue to pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda is still active in Iraq. Its home base is Anbar Province. Al Qaeda has helped make Anbar the most violent area of Iraq outside the capital. A captured al Qaeda document describes the terrorists’ plan to infiltrate and seize control of the province. This would bring al Qaeda closer to its goals of taking down Iraq’s democracy, building a radical Islamic empire, and launching new attacks on the United States at home and abroad.

Our military forces in Anbar are killing and capturing al Qaeda leaders – and protecting the local population. Recently, local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on al Qaeda. As a result, our commanders believe we have an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists. So I have given orders to increase American forces in Anbar Province by 4,000 troops. These troops will work with Iraqi and tribal forces to step up the pressure on the terrorists. America’s men and women in uniform took away al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan – and we will not allow them to re-establish it in Iraq.

Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity – and stabilizing the region in the face of the extremist challenge. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.

We are also taking other steps to bolster the security of Iraq and protect American interests in the Middle East. I recently ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group to the region. We will expand intelligence sharing – and deploy Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies. We will work with the governments of Turkey and Iraq to help them resolve problems along their border. And we will work with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region.

We will use America’s full diplomatic resources to rally support for Iraq from nations throughout the Middle East. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf States need to understand that an American defeat in Iraq would create a new sanctuary for extremists – and a strategic threat to their survival. These nations have a stake in a successful Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors – and they must step up their support for Iraq’s unity government. We endorse the Iraqi government’s call to finalize an International Compact that will bring new economic assistance in exchange for greater economic reform. And on Friday, Secretary Rice will leave for the region – to build support for Iraq, and continue the urgent diplomacy required to help bring peace to the Middle East.

The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have declared their intention to destroy our way of life. In the long run, the most realistic way to protect the American people is to provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful ideology of the enemy – by advancing liberty across a troubled region. It is in the interests of the United States to stand with the brave men and women who are risking their lives to claim their freedom – and help them as they work to raise up just and hopeful societies across the Middle East.

From Afghanistan to Lebanon to the Palestinian Territories, millions of ordinary people are sick of the violence, and want a future of peace and opportunity for their children. And they are looking at Iraq. They want to know: Will America withdraw and yield the future of that country to the extremists – or will we stand with the Iraqis who have made the choice for freedom?

The changes I have outlined tonight are aimed at ensuring the survival of a young democracy that is fighting for its life in a part of the world of enormous importance to American security. Let me be clear: The terrorists and insurgents in Iraq are without conscience, and they will make the year ahead bloody and violent. Even if our new strategy works exactly as planned, deadly acts of violence will continue – and we must expect more Iraqi and American casualties. The question is whether our new strategy will bring us closer to success. I believe that it will.

Victory will not look like the ones our fathers and grandfathers achieved. There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship. But victory in Iraq will bring something new in the Arab world – a functioning democracy that polices its territory, upholds the rule of law, respects fundamental human liberties, and answers to its people. A democratic Iraq will not be perfect. But it will be a country that fights terrorists instead of harboring them – and it will help bring a future of peace and security for our children and grandchildren.

Our new approach comes after consultations with Congress about the different courses we could take in Iraq. Many are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States – and therefore, our policy should focus on protecting Iraq’s borders and hunting down al Qaeda. Their solution is to scale back America’s efforts in Baghdad – or announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces. We carefully considered these proposals. And we concluded that to step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear that country apart, and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale. Such a scenario would result in our troops being forced to stay in Iraq even longer, and confront an enemy that is even more lethal. If we increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.

In the days ahead, my national security team will fully brief Congress on our new strategy. If Members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable people have different views, and they will voice their criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to scrutiny. And all involved have a responsibility to explain how the path they propose would be more likely to succeed.

Acting on the good advice of Senator Joe Lieberman and other key members of Congress, we will form a new, bipartisan working group that will help us come together across party lines to win the war on terror. This group will meet regularly with me and my Administration, and it will help strengthen our relationship with Congress. We can begin by working together to increase the size of the active Army and Marine Corps, so that America has the Armed Forces we need for the 21st century. We also need to examine ways to mobilize talented American civilians to deploy overseas – where they can help build democratic institutions in communities and nations recovering from war and tyranny.

In these dangerous times, the United States is blessed to have extraordinary and selfless men and women willing to step forward and defend us. These young Americans understand that our cause in Iraq is noble and necessary – and that the advance of freedom is the calling of our time. They serve far from their families, who make the quiet sacrifices of lonely holidays and empty chairs at the dinner table. They have watched their comrades give their lives to ensure our liberty. We mourn the loss of every fallen American – and we owe it to them to build a future worthy of their sacrifice.

Fellow citizens: The year ahead will demand more patience, sacrifice, and resolve. It can be tempting to think that America can put aside the burdens of freedom. Yet times of testing reveal the character of a Nation. And throughout our history, Americans have always defied the pessimists and seen our faith in freedom redeemed. Now America is engaged in a new struggle that will set the course for a new century. We can and we will prevail.

We go forward with trust that the Author of Liberty will guide us through these trying hours. Thank you and good night.

# # #

"Surge": What's the Use?

Obviously, the giant news of the day is Bush's plan for more troops in Iraq. And I have to say, I'm having trouble getting my arms around the story. Because I can't find anyone -- anyone -- that thinks this "surge," this "escalation," is a good idea. That believes it will truly deliver a significant impact.

I know a lot of you guys who hang out here at Defense Tech are committed supporters of the President. Who think he's done a solid job, given extremely difficult circumstances. So let's hear from you: Will adding 20,000 troops really make much of a difference in Iraq? How?

Don't get me wrong. For more than three years, I've had soldiers complaining to me about the lack of boots on the ground. About how winnable this war might be with more troops. But these guys didn't want a 10 or 15 percent increase in manpower, like the President will call for tonight. They wanted several divisions to join 'em. Enough troops to completely blanket the country -- or at least to pull off the classic counterinsurgency move of clearing out neighborhoods of guerrillas, and holding the areas for the good guys.

As Fred Kaplan notes, incoming Iraq commander Gen. David Petraeus and his co-authors "discussed this strategy at great length" when they put together the Army's new counterinsurgency field manual.

One point they made is that it requires a lot of manpower — at minimum, 20 combat troops for every 1,000 people in the area's population. Baghdad has about 6 million people; so clearing, holding, and building it will require about 120,000 combat troops.

Right now, the United States has about 70,000 combat troops in all of Iraq (another 60,000 or so are support troops or headquarters personnel). Even an extra 20,000 would leave the force well short of the minimum required — and that's with every soldier and Marine in Iraq moved to Baghdad. Iraqi security forces would have to make up the deficit.

In the short term, then, say for a year or so, enough troops might be concentrated in Baghdad if troops now deployed in Iraq have their tours of duty extended, troops due for redeployment to Iraq are mobilized several months ahead of schedule, nearly all these troops are transferred to Baghdad, and enough Iraqi troops can be mobilized to make up the remaining slack.

Meanwhile, how will Petraeus be able to keep Baghdad's insurgents from simply slipping out of town and wreaking havoc elsewhere? This is what happened in Fallujah when U.S. troops tried to destroy the insurgents' stronghold in that city. (emphasis mine)

It doesn't even seem like the surge's intellectual authors even back the plan. Gen Jack Keane, who helped push the idea to the White House, called for 32,000 troops -- 50% more than what the President is supposed to ask for. John McCain, Congress' most visible backer for more troops, is squirming, too. On the Today show last week, the Senator was asked if 20,000 more soldiers would be enough. His answer: "I’m not sure... To make it of short duration and small size would be the worst of all options to exercise, in my opinion."

UPDATE 1:55 PM: "The thousands of troops that President Bush is expected to order to Iraq will join the fight largely without the protection of the latest armored vehicles that withstand bomb blasts far better than Humvees," says the Baltimore Sun.

Vehicles such as the Cougar and the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle have proven ability to save lives, but production started late and relatively small numbers are in use in Iraq, mostly because of money shortages.

UPDATE 2:20 PM: Good analysis in this video from Paul Rieckhoff and Lt. Gen. Rick Francona. "This is not like a Haily Mary pass on the part of the President," Paul says. "This is like calling a draw play when you're down big in the 4th quarter."

UPDATE 2:33 PM: The surge option "has deep blind spots that destroy my confidence in [its] proposed solutio[n] as anything except a recipe for accelerated defeat," says former Bush-backer Joe Katzman. He's got a long, detailed list of the escalation effort's unanswered questions. A few:

* If capturing terrorists in Iraq continues to result in "catch and release" due to a poorly-functioning and often intimidated Iraqi judicial system, what do you expect to accomplish with more troops? A higher flow-through rate?

* What are the fundamental attitudes on the ground of Sunni and Shi'ite leaders? Are the Sunnis really prepared to deal, or are they still maniacally focused on their loss of dominance in Iraq?

* If you stupidly continue to let Moqtada "death squads" al-Sadr live, what lasting good do 50,000 troops do when you propose to deploy them for a while in Baghdad? US troops have whittled down his forces before - how do the long-term results look now? What happens after US troops leave, if al-Sadr is still breathing?

UPDATE 3:50 PM:Matt Yglesias has a pair of talking point memos on the surge that are almost indescribably vacuous. Click on over for a laugh. Or a cry.

There is one substantive point in these memos, however: that two-thirds of the "new" Iraqi troops in Baghdad will be Kurdish pesh merga. That could actually be the move that brings warring Shi'a and Sunni factions together: both groups absolutely, completely hate the pesh's guts.

(Big ups: Umansky)

Contractors Squirm Under Soldiers' Justice?

The Boston Globe and Defense News have picked up on Peter Singer's scoop -- that military contractors are now going to be subject to soldiers' justice.

Neither the Globe nor Defense News could find any big defense contractor to comment on the five-word change to the law, spearheaded by Senator Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican and former JAG. But they've caught the legal and private military interest groups squirming.

Stan Soloway, president of the Professional Services Council, an organization that represents government contractors, tells Defense News that "one result [of the rule change] may be that contractors now can be punished for actions not ordinarily prosecutable under U.S. law."

The UCMJ’s "behavioral requirements are very different and potentially in conflict with contract law and criminal law," Soloway said...

Civilian contractors now might be punished for disrespecting an officer, disregarding an order or committing adultery — actions that are not prosecutable under U.S. law, Soloway said.

"If a general or colonel directs a contractor or government civilian to do something that is outside terms of contract, under U.S. procurement law, the contractor does not do it without authority from the contracting officer," Soloway said. But under the UCMJ, "that might be failure to follow an order."

"I think there should have been some kind of hearing before Congress passed this measure," Eugene R. Fidell, president of the National Institute of Military Justice, tells the Globe.

"Ultimately, if this power is used, it will create a substantial issue that would likely reach the Supreme Court, and it will put us at odds with contemporary international standards."

Fidell said that US courts have a history of throwing out convictions of civilians who were tried in military courts, including the 1957 case of a wife who killed her husband on a military base.

"There was a period of decades that you could have crimes by US persons overseas that could never be punished," he said.

Hopefully, that will start to change.

Our New Man in Iraq (Updated Again)

UPDATE 4:04 PM: More changes at the top: Army chief of staff Peter Schoomaker is out. Iraq commander Gen. General George Casey is in. (Big ups: Dan)

So there's a new general slated to take over Iraq: Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, the well-regarded, media-savvy chief of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. While he was there, he "helped oversee the drafting of the military’s comprehensive new manual on counterinsurgency," the Times notes.

Petraeus was tapped over several more senior generals. He's "arguably the Army general whose star is rising most rapidly on the basis of his performance in Iraq," Tom Barnett noted in a March profile for Esquire. The general "led the 101st Airborne Division in northern and central Iraq during the first difficult postwar year and then assumed leadership of the coalition effort to rebuild Iraq's security forces... [he] worked the sheikhs well enough but let a horrifically efficient insurgency build on his watch."

On his blog, Barnett calls Petraeus "a solid choice" for Iraq commander.

Petraeus doesn't shy from the nation-building role and since building Iraq from the army outward is the most feasible pathway of success, putting him in charge makes a lot of sense; he's got the most experience and has done the most thinking and revamping of doctrine on the more general topic of counter-insurgency. Plus, Dave's just a really good guy.

Juan Cole, no friend of the Bush Administration, likes the pick, too.

I'm stricken with a case of the "what ifs" and "if onlys"! What if Gates had been at the Pentagon in 2003 and Petraeus had been in charge of the US military in Iraq and Crocker had been there instead of Paul Bremer? These are competent professionals who know what they are doing. Gates is clear-sighted enough to tell Congress that the US is not winning in Iraq, unlike his smooth-talking, arrogant and flighty predecessor. Petraeus is among the real experts on counter-insurgency, and did a fine job of making friends and mending fences when he was in charge of Mosul.

The Post's William Arkin, on the other hand, isn't so sure. "Though Petraeus may be an intellectual and promotional wizard, I have a hard time seeing any true success and product from his early work in or on Iraq."

And Ralph Peters adds, "He's the greatest peacekeeping general in the world. But I just don't know if he can win a war."

Regaining control of Baghdad - after we threw it away - will require the defiant use of force. Negotiations won't do it. Cultural awareness isn't going to turn this situation around (we need to stop pandering to our enemies and defeat them, thanks)

As Newsweek noted a few years back, "nobody seems neutral."

His fans believe he's a new-style officer for a new type of warfare, where battles can be won with superior technology and firepower, but true victories can be secured only by good peacemaking and politics. They say he proved himself—and his methods—in the aftermath of the war last year. (It's widely accepted that no force worked harder to win Iraqi hearts and minds than the 101st Air Assault Division led by Petraeus.) These boosters include many in the White House. "People's body language shifts" when they talk about Petraeus there, says one official. Yet critics regard Petraeus as one of a type they call "perfumed princes," a derisive term for officers who have advanced from one staff job to another, essentially working as efficient courtiers to the four-stars. They say he won a short-term peace in Mosul at the expense of allowing insurgents to organize themselves mostly unmolested. They rankle at Petraeus's penchant for self-promotion and PR.

UPDATE 01/06/06 6:08 PM: "Believe the hype," says Spencer Ackerman. Then he warns...

Petraeus is in a horrible dilemma. He has no plausible way of refusing this assignment. Yet Iraq is beyond repair. Bush is using Petraeus -- the only symbol of wisdom and, indeed, success that the military has left -- as a human shield. He has no problem putting Petraeus through the agony of Iraq if it means a more "dramatic" move on Wednesday. If there's any irony here, it's that the arrival of Petraeus in Baghdad will make it harder for anyone to argue that the war was lost on the home front, since now it's in the hands of the wisest general in the U.S. Army.

After the jump, there are some more illustrative snippets from that Esquire piece on Petraeus...

With his Princeton Ph.D. in international relations, Petraeus is the closest thing the Army has to its own Lawrence of Arabia, a comparison he does little to discourage, as he seems to identify with the British colonel's experiences in the region during the First World War and the enduring wisdom of his advice to those military officers caught in similarly trying circumstances (Lawrence's legendary book, Seven Pillars of Wisdom), which Petraeus appears to know by heart...

One of the first challenges Petraeus faced while occupying much of northern and central Iraq—including the huge Al Anbar province—with the 101st Airborne in the spring of 2003 was the small matter of there being no government there whatsoever. Sudden, unanticipated problem, usually not the preserve of generals: How to get the local government to continue paying its workers. The acting governor of Al Anbar pointed Petraeus in the direction of a central bank manager, who, it just so happened, had set aside a substantial sum of Iraqi currency for just such a post-invasion occasion. Problem was, this banker felt he had no authority in a post-Saddam environment, because his entire career he hadn't sneezed without first asking permission from Baghdad. So he said to Petraeus, "You have the authority." Petraeus thought about that and said, "You're right, I do!"...

Petraeus also has his own version of Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which in his case number thirteen. It's a simple PowerPoint package of thirteen slides of lessons learned in the war. Number one is, Lawrence had it right. By this he means: It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them. Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh would readily recognize Petraeus's other pillars as eternal truths: Armies of liberation have half-lives. Money is ammunition. Intelligence is the key. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier. Success depends on local leaders.

That last one seems to be the most important to Petraeus. So when the Iraqi leaders of Mosul came to him as commander of the 101st Airborne in the first months of the postwar occupation asking for his help in getting the city's university back up and running, Petraeus didn't hesitate. He had helicopter assault troops available, so Petraeus told them, "Hey, you won the lottery. You're going to rebuild Mosul University." The place had been completely looted and was a shambles, but a month or so later, a Big Ten–sized university was holding classes in Mosul, finishing out the school year a little late, with American helo pilots filling in as college administrators.

That follows with the main lesson General Petraeus has learned from Iraq: "Everyone does nation building."

Soldiers' Justice; Readers React (Updated)

If you haven't had a chance yet, go check out the comments to Peter Singer's story on the private military contractors who will now have to face soldiers' justice. A few samples:

My CO had a very interesting way of making sure the civilian contractors in his area to behave. Before he came the civilian contractors were acting like thugs. My CO in the civilian world is a cop. So he got his friends to pull up personal data on the civilian contractors.

He had a meeting with them and basically told them if they keep on acting the way they did he will make sure their personal information makes it's way to the insurgents and he will personally hand them over to members of the Iraqi police that he is fairly certain are members of the insurgency.

Funny thing was after that meeting the civilian contractors stopped being thugs to the Iraqis.
Posted by: Billy at January 4, 2007 03:21 PM

Good. Exposure to the UCMJ means additional risk, which means more money. I need a raise.

Being subject to the UCMJ will make us immune from Iraqi law under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), just like soldiers.

Also, the US government will not turn us over to the International Criminal court (ICC) to be tried for war crimes; real, imagined, or concocted.

I lived under UCMJ for 22 years. A few more will not make any difference.
Posted by: Thorn... at January 4, 2007 01:39 PM

The British Investigation into the "Elvis" video event released its report before Christmas concluding that all the footage in the video came from legitimate operations. Strange you mention the case to support your argument but don't mention the (previous) resolution. Raised major red flags with me about the enitire article.
Posted by: Michael Stora at January 4, 2007 02:48 PM

I am on my 3rd tour, I have seen a contractor shoot a civilian in the head because he protested when the contractor grabbed his daughters breasts. There was nothing that anyone could do about it when re radioed it in we were told to lethim go. This isjust one of dozens of stories and one that I saw myself.
Posted by: WKean at January 4, 2007 01:49 PM

Kevin Drum, ROFASIX, Hilzoy, MountainRunner, the Columbia Journalism Review, and my man Blackfive all have interesting takes, too. Give 'em a read.

UPDATE 01/05/06 6:15 PM: P.W. Singer "refute[s] a few of the most insane/stupid posts" responding to his story.

UPDATE 01/05/06 11:30 AM: Pat Dollard sends as an interesting take on the rule changes from one military officer. Check it out after the jump.

1. There are a few Articles [in the UCMJ] that apply [to reporters]…

Article 82 - SOLICITATION (this would apply to the guy who pimped the soldier to challenge Rumsfeld about the vehicle armor); Article 88 – Contempt; Articles 89 - Disrespect, Article 107 - MAKING A FALSE OFFICIAL STATEMENT (I would like to pay some people back); Article 117 – provoking speeches or gestures, Article 132 - FRAUDS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES…

2. For contractors (we are actually referring ONLY to security contractors like BlackWater, Triple Canopy)… This amendment to the already existing law will help area/unit commanders control their actions and their movement. Since they are mercenaries, and many prior military, every single article applies to them…

3. You can see how this tool will effect BOTH "contractors" and media personnel. The way I see it is this:

A- [Applied to reporters, it is] a tool for the government to allow/use the military to control media content and output. This could be a VERY controversial issue.

B- [Applied to contractors,] it allows for unit and area commanders to CONTROL the conduct and accountability of civilians/contractors/reporters that are operating in their Area of Operation. As a military commander, who personally, and intimately dealt with both agencies outlined above, I feel that this is the greatest merit of the "amendment" to the law.

4. What is missing is an appendix, that deals with the specific application of all the articles of the UCMJ as it applies to contractors, reporters, etc. It already exists, but there are a few grey areas that immediately pop out. Realize there are many, but here are few to get your mouth wet: Is there a specific authority that can adjudicate the law? Right now, as a Captain, I can punish/adjudicate the law to all those who the law applies to. My authority, as well as at the battalion level - uses Non- Judicial Punishment to adjudicate the law. We take away rank, money, assign "extra duties", and restrict or "ground" them. So, it would make sense to me that all of these cases will be referred to a higher authority in order to adjudicate the law by Court Martial. All the money, rank, etc applies, but there is imprisonment factors and felony/criminal charges that carry the same implications as in the "real world".

There is no "double-jeopardy". We cannot charge, and punish you against the UCMJ, and then punish you for the same offense in the civilian court system. So, I cannot use MEJA and the UCMJ together, it has to be one or the other.

These laws need to be explained to everyone that it applies to. And in my opinion, there needs to be some sort of signature/contract that binds them to these laws.

5. While I like the whole concept, it leaves too much to interpretation and needs to be strictly defined, so that when it comes time to hold the "target audience" accountable for their actions - there can be no way they can get out of it. We can do MUCH better, and I am surprised that no one has taken the initiative on this.

Since the DOJ, MEJA, and all the other bullshit cannot take care of this issue on their own, they will continue the trend of piling this responsibility upon the shoulders of the US service members. Since we are already carrying the State Department on our backs, in addition to battling a raging insurgency, and rebuilding a nation - I guess we can make room for the DOJ. I guess it really makes sense. Do you really think they will send Department of Justice personnel to Iraq to help enforce MEJA and all applicable laws? As it applies to most of our public officials, they are not willing to shoulder the same burden and make the same sacrifices as the American, and now Iraqi, service members. But, like I said, this would be a much appreciated tool for military commanders to control their battle-space. So, all bitching aside, I like it. And it makes me want to go back even more.

Guns-for-Hire Accused of Gitmo Abuse

WaPo: "New allegations of detainee abuse at Guantanamo Bay released by the FBI on Tuesday put private contractors at the center of interrogation operations, raising questions once again about where they fit in the military's chain of command."

Contractors have traditionally not been subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the body of laws that governs the behavior of soldiers. Other laws apply to contractors, but many remain untested.

"You have two different types of people operating under different sets of rules," said Scott L. Silliman, executive director of the center on law, ethics and national security at Duke University.

The Law Catches Up To Private Militaries, Embeds

Since the start of the Iraq war, tens of thousands of heavily-armed military contractors have been roaming the country -- without any law, or any court to control them. That may be about to change, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow P.W. Singer notes in a Defense Tech exclusive. Five words, slipped into a Pentagon budget bill, could make all the difference. With them, "contractors 'get out of jail free' cards may have been torn to shreds," he writes. They're now subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the same set of laws that governs soldiers. But here's the catch: embedded reporters are now under those regulations, too.

Over the last few years, tales of private military contractors run amuck in Iraq -- from the CACI interrogators at Abu Ghraib to the Aegis company's Elvis-themed internet "trophy video" —- have continually popped up in the headlines. Unfortunately, when it came to actually doing something about these episodes of Outsourcing Gone Wild, Hollywood took more action than Washington. The TV series Law and Order punished fictional contractor crimes, while our courts ignored the actual ones. Leonardo Dicaprio acted in a movie featuring the private military industry, while our government enacted no actual policy on it. But those carefree days of military contractors romping across the hills and dales of the Iraqi countryside, without legal status or accountability, may be over. The Congress has struck back.

Amidst all the add-ins, pork spending, and excitement of the budget process, it has now come out that a tiny clause was slipped into the Pentagon's fiscal year 2007 budget legislation. The one sentence section (number 552 of a total 3510 sections) states that "Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by striking `war' and inserting `declared war or a contingency operation'." The measure passed without much notice or any debate. And then, as they might sing on School House Rock, that bill became a law (P.L.109-364).

The addition of five little words to a massive US legal code that fills entire shelves at law libraries wouldn't normally matter for much. But with this change, contractors' 'get out of jail free' card may have been torn to shreds. Previously, contractors would only fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, better known as the court martial system, if Congress declared war. This is something that has not happened in over 65 years and out of sorts with the most likely operations in the 21st century. The result is that whenever our military officers came across episodes of suspected contractor crimes in missions like Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan, they had no tools to resolve them. As long as Congress had not formally declared war, civilians -- even those working for the US armed forces, carrying out military missions in a conflict zone -- fell outside their jurisdiction. The military's relationship with the contractor was, well, merely contractual. At most, the local officer in charge could request to the employing firm that the individual be demoted or fired. If he thought a felony occurred, the officer might be able to report them on to civilian authorities.

Getting tattled on to the boss is certainly fine for some incidents. But, clearly, it's not how one deals with suspected crimes. And it's nowhere near the proper response to the amazing, awful stories that have made the headlines (the most recent being the contractors who sprung a former Iraqi government minister, imprisoned on corruption charges, from a Green Zone jail).

And for every story that has been deemed newsworthy, there are dozens that never see the spotlight. One US army officer recently told me of an incident he witnessed, where a contractor shot a young Iraqi who got too close to his vehicle while in line at the Green Zone entrance. The boy was waiting there to apply for a job. Not merely a tragedy, but one more nail in the coffin for any US effort at winning hearts and minds.

But when such incidents happen, officers like him have had no recourse other than to file reports that are supposed to be sent on either to the local government or the US Department of Justice, neither of which had traditionally done much. The local government is often failed or too weak to act - the very reason we are still in Iraq. And our Department of Justice has treated contractor crimes in a more Shakespearean than Hollywood way, as in Much Ado About Nothing. Last month, DOJ reported to Congress that it has sat on over 20 investigations of suspected contractor crimes without action in the last year.

The problem is not merely one of a lack of political will on the part of the Administration to deal with such crimes. Contractors have also fallen through a gap in the law. The roles and numbers of military contractors are far greater than in the past, but the legal system hasn't caught up. Even in situations when US civilian law could potentially have been applied to contractor crimes (through the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act), it wasn't. Underlying the previous laws like MEJA was the assumption that civilian prosecutors back in the US would be able to make determinations of what is proper and improper behavior in conflicts, go gather evidence, carry out depositions in the middle of warzones, and then be willing and able to prosecute them to juries back home. The reality is that no US Attorney likes to waste limited budgets on such messy, complex cases 9,000 miles outside their district, even if they were fortunate enough to have the evidence at hand. The only time MEJA has been successfully applied was against the wife of a soldier, who stabbed him during a domestic dispute at a US base in Turkey. Not one contractor of the entire military industry in Iraq has been charged with any crime over the last 3 and a half years, let alone prosecuted or punished. Given the raw numbers of contractors, let alone the incidents we know about, it boggles the mind.

The situation perhaps hit its low-point this fall, when the Under Secretary of the Army testified to Congress that the Army had never authorized Halliburton or any of its subcontractors (essentially the entire industry) to carry weapons or guard convoys. He even denied the US had firms handling these jobs. Never mind the thousands of newspaper, magazine, and TV news stories about the industry. Never mind Google's 1,350,000 web mentions. Never mind the official report from U.S. Central Command that there were over 100,000 contractors in Iraq carrying out these and other military roles. In a sense, the Bush Administration was using a cop-out that all but the worst Hollywood script writers avoid. Just like the end of the TV series Dallas, Congress was somehow supposed to accept that the private military industry in Iraq and all that had happened with it was somehow 'just a dream.'

But Congress didn't bite, it now seems. With the addition of just five words in the law, contractors now can fall under the purview of the military justice system. This means that if contractors violate the rules of engagement in a warzone or commit crimes during a contingency operation like Iraq, they can now be court-martialed (as in, Corporate Warriors, meet A Few Good Men). On face value, this appears to be a step forward for realistic accountability. Military contractor conduct can now be checked by the military investigation and court system, which unlike civilian courts, is actually ready and able both to understand the peculiarities of life and work in a warzone and kick into action when things go wrong.

The amazing thing is that the change in the legal code is so succinct and easy to miss (one sentence in a 439-page bill, sandwiched between a discussion on timely notice of deployments and a section ordering that the next of kin of medal of honor winners get flags) that it has so far gone completely unnoticed in the few weeks since it became the law of the land. Not only has the media not yet reported on it. Neither have military officers or even the lobbyists paid by the military industry to stay on top of these things.

So what happens next? In all likelihood, many firms, who have so far thrived in the unregulated marketplace, will now lobby hard to try to strike down the change. We will perhaps even soon enjoy the sight of CEOs of military firms, preening about their loss of rights and how the new definition of warzone will keep them from rescuing kittens caught in trees.

But, ironically, the contractual nature of the military industry serves as an effective mechanism to prevent loss of rights. The legal change only applies to the section in the existing law dealing with those civilians "serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field," i.e. only those contractors on operations in conflict zones like Iraq or Afghanistan. It would apply not to the broader public in the US, not to local civilians, and not even to military contractors working in places where civilian law is stood up. Indeed, it even wouldn't apply to our foes, upholding recent rulings on the scope of military law and the detainees at Gitmo.

In many ways, the new law is the 21st century business version of the rights contract: If a private individual wants to travel to a warzone and do military jobs for profit, on behalf of the US government, then that individual agrees to fall under the same codes of law and consequence that American soldiers, in the same zones, doing the same sorts of jobs, have to live and work by. If a contractor doesn't agree to these regulations, that's fine, don't contract. Unlike soldiers, they are still civilians with no obligation to serve. The new regulation also seems to pass the fairness test. That is, a lance corporal or a specialist earns less than $20,000 a year for service in Iraq, while a contractor can earn upwards of $100,000-200,000 a year (tax free) for doing the same job and can quit whenever they want. It doesn't seem that unreasonable then to expect the contractor to abide by the same laws as their military counterpart while in the combat theatre. Given that the vast majority of private military employees are upstanding men and women -- and mostly former soldiers, to boot -- living under the new system will not mean much change at all. All it does is now give military investigators a way finally to stop the bad apples from filling the headlines and getting away free.

The change in the law is long overdue. But in being so brief, it needs clarity on exactly how it will be realized. For example, how will it be applied to ongoing contracts and operations? Given that the firm executives and their lobbyists back in DC have completely dropped the ball, someone ought to tell the contractors in Iraq that they can now be court martialed.

Likewise, the scope of the new law could made more clear; it could be either too limited or too wide, depending on the interpretation. While it is apparent that any military contractor working directly or indirectly for the US military falls under the change, it is unclear whether those doing similar jobs for other US government agencies in the same warzone would fall under it as well (recalling that the contractors at Abu Ghraib were technically employed by the US Department of Interior, sublet out to DOD).

On the opposite side, what about civilians who have agreed to be embedded, but not contracted? The Iraq war is the first that journalists could formally embed in units, so there is not much experience with its legal side in contingency operations. The lack of any legal precedent, combined with the new law, could mean that an overly aggressive
interpretation might now also include journalists who have embedded.

Given that journalists are not armed, not contracted (so not paid directly or indirectly from public monies) and most important, not there to serve the mission objectives, this would probably be too extensive an interpretation. It would also likely mean less embeds. But given the current lack of satisfaction with the embed program in the media, any effect here may be a tempest in a tea pot. As of Fall 2006, there were only nine embedded reporters in all of Iraq. Of the nine, four were from military media (three from Stars and Stripes, one from Armed Forces Network), two not even with US units (one Polish radio reporter with Polish troops, one Italian reporter with Italian troops), and one was an American writing a book. Moreover, we should remember that embeds already make a rights tradeoff when they agree to the military's reporting rules. That is, they have already given up some of their 1st Amendment protections (something at the heart of their professional ethic) in exchange for access, so agreeing to potentially fall under UCMJ when deployed may not be a deal breaker.

The ultimate point is that the change gives the military and the civilians courts a new tool to use in better managing and overseeing contractors, but leaves it to the Pentagon and DOJ to decide when and where to use it. Given their recent track record on legal issues in the context of Iraq and the war on terror, many won't be that reassured.

Congress is to be applauded for finally taking action to reign in the industry and aid military officers in their duties, but the job is not done. While there may be an inclination to let such questions of scope and implementation be figured out through test cases in the courts, our elected public representatives should request DoD to answer the questions above in a report to Congress. Moreover, while the change may help close one accountability loophole, in no way should it be read as a panacea for the rest of the private military industry's ills. The new Congress still has much to deal with when it comes to the still unregulated industry, including getting enough eyes and ears to actually oversee and manage our contracts effectively, create reporting structures, and forcing the Pentagon to develop better fiscal controls and market sanctions, to actually save money than spend it out.

A change of a few words in a legislative bill certainly isn't the stuff of a blockbuster movie. So don't expect to see Angelina Jolie starring in "Paragraph (10) of Section 802(a)" in a theatre near you anytime soon. But the legal changes in it are a sign that Congress is finally catching up to Hollywood on the private military industry. And that is the stuff of good governance.

-- P.W. Singer is Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at The Brookings Institution. He is the author of Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press) and the upcoming book Wired for War (Houghton Mifflin).

Saddam Dead; Footage Everywhere (Updated)

As I'm sure you all know by now, Saddam Hussein has been hanged to death -- executed for his role in the slaughter of 148 in the Shi'ite town of Dujail.

Iraqis, according to the Times, "spent much of the day crowding around television sets to watch mesmerizing replays of a videotape that showed the 69-year-old Mr. Hussein being led to the gallows at dawn by five masked executioners, and having a noose fashioned from a thick rope of yellow hemp lowered around his neck."

But, as Xeni notes in an excellent round-up of the execution coverage, "explicit images of Hussein's corpse and 'unedited' cellphone video of the hanging (which includes the moment of death) have already shown up online," on Google Video.

The video is grotesque. But "I think there's a public interest in making this available for adults who choose to see it, non-passively," Xeni tells Defense Tech. I agree.

UPDATE 9:26 PM: Defense Tech pal Michael Hastings has himself a scoop, interviewing Ali Al Massedy, who "was 3 feet away from Saddam Hussein when he died. The 38 year old, normally Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's official videographer, was the man responsible for filming the late dictator's execution at dawn on Saturday."

UPDATE 10:24 PM: Eric Umansky has "the most telling part of the execution." Let's just say Moqtada Al-Sadr is psyched.

UPDATE 12/31/06 11:49 AM: "We are seeing 21st century psychological operations," says TPM Cafe. "It can be concluded there were elements within America's government and/or military, working in concert with Iraq's current scarecrow power-holders, who wanted as many people as possible in the world to see Saddam hang." I'm not sure I buy this. And I can't get with screeching tone. But it's an interesting notion, nonetheless.

UPDATE 12/31/06 11:56 AM: Juan Cole gets into the execution's religious dynamics.

The tribunal also had a unique sense of timing when choosing the day for Saddam's hanging. It was a slap in the face to Sunni Arabs. This weekend marks Eid al-Adha, the Holy Day of Sacrifice, on which Muslims commemorate the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice his son for God. Shiites celebrate it Sunday. Sunnis celebrate it Saturday –- and Iraqi law forbids executing the condemned on a major holiday. Hanging Saddam on Saturday was perceived by Sunni Arabs as the act of a Shiite government that had accepted the Shiite ritual calendar.

The timing also allowed Saddam, in his farewell address to Iraq, to pose as a “sacrifice” for his nation, an explicit reference to Eid al-Adha. The tribunal had given the old secular nationalist the chance to use religious language to play on the sympathies of the whole Iraqi public.

The political ineptitude of the tribunal, from start to finish, was astonishing. The United States and its Iraqi allies basically gave Saddam a platform on which to make himself a martyr to Iraqi unity and independence -- even if by unity and independence Saddam was really appealing to Sunnis' nostalgia for their days of hegemony.

(Big ups: Josh)

Behind the Green Zone Jail Break

In a war filled with too-strange-for-fiction stories, this may be the strangest yet. Was Iraq's former electricity minister, jailed on corruption charges, really "sprung from a Green Zone prison this weekend by U.S. security contractors?" If so, how did they pull it off? And what does it say about the rapidly-expanding, ridiculously-lucrative, morally-ambiguous field of private militaries?

Robert Young Pelton, author of the recently-published Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror, tells Defense Tech that his "guess (if the story is true) is that they simply presented their DoD and other credentials and said [the contractors] were there to accompany him to some mythical destination. Once out of prison it is very easy to leave the Green Zone and then take a taxi to Jordan, Syria, Kuwait or Kurdistan."

He also figures that "there was no gunplay or violence involved... [A]nother likely scenario would be to simply bribe the jailer (by paying a family member) and then the jailer making up some cock and bull story."

Brookings Institution Senior Fellow P.W. Singer -- who wrote Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, which has become the ur-text on this new wave of mercenaries -- is less interested in the particulars of the break-out. It's the long-term trend that bothers him: guns-for-hire running around war zones, with almost zero accountability, undermining the U.S. war effort again and again. He tells Defense Tech:

So the Great Private Military Escape joins the lengthy list vying to be made into a bad Hollywood movie (sorry, Blood Diamonds). My other favorites include the Triple Canopy lawsuit which alleges that a company supervisor told his employees that he had "never shot anyone with my handgun before" and then fired his handgun through the windshield of a parked taxi, killing the driver; the Aegis "trophy video," in which employees posted footage on the web of shooting at Iraqi cars on the web, set to Elvis music; the Donald Vance case, in which a US contractor was held 97 days without charges in a US military prison; the various Blackwater episodes, ranging from the 4 guys sent to Fallujah without maps, intell, or proper equipment, to the plane crash in Afghanistan, in which the plane lacked basic safety equipment and didn’t even follow basic flight safety procedures, flying by guesswork into a box canyon, killing 3 civilians and 3 US Army; and of course don’t forget the wonderfully named Custer Battles charging for all sorts of fraud at Baghdad airport, such as a bomb-sniffing dog that in the words of a US Army colonel turned out to be "a guy with his pet."

At what point do we accept that this whole situation has gone well beyond the original idea of privatization and start to rein it in? Then again, the Army Under Secretary testified to Congress 2 months back that the Army had never authorized Halliburton or its subcontractors to carry weapons or guard convoys, denying we even had firms handling these jobs. So, I guess its like the end of Dallas, where the whole private military industry in Iraq (estimated by Centcom to be 100,000) was "just a dream."

Phil Carter, just back from a year-long Army deployment in Iraq, notes that the 100,000 contractors (mostly logistics guys, not trigger-pullers) "very nearly doubles the size of the U.S. force in country. However, there has never been an open, public, meaningful debate over the wisdom of using so many contractors in so many battlefield roles. Instead, it has happened over time as the slow result of small policy decisions made by myriad actors. I think this will be one of the major policy questions which emerges from the Iraq war once it is over."

Leaving a Soldier Behind? (Updated)

Did the United States just abandon an abducted soldier by removing road blocks around Sadr city at the command of Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki? That's what Andrew Sullivan and Josh Marshall have been asking.

Today's Washington Post has details:

The move lifted a near siege that had stood at least since last Wednesday. U.S. military police imposed the blockade after the kidnapping of an American soldier of Iraqi descent. The soldier's Iraqi in-laws said they believed he had been abducted by the Mahdi Army as he visited his wife at her home in the Karrada area of Baghdad, where U.S. military checkpoints were also removed as a result of Maliki's action.[...]

U.S. soldiers in Humvees had used concertina wire and sandbags to close off all bridges and other routes into Sadr City, home to 2.5 million Shiites, from the rest of Baghdad. The U.S. troops, backed by Iraqi soldiers, admitted vehicles only one at a time after searches. The blockade caused hours-long backups, and Sadr City's largely working-class residents complained that the cost of food and fuel was soaring. [...]

(U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Jonathan)Withington said the lifting of the blockade "does not stop our search for the soldier. We're dead serious about getting him back, and that won't stop because of these checkpoints." He said at least seven U.S. troops had been injured in the search for the missing American.

Is it really as simple that political pressure from Shiite militias caused the order, or might this be part of some back room deal to release the soldier where the ransom paid is the political humiliation of the U.S.?

Share your thoughts in the comments.

Update: The Army has identified the kidnapped soldier as 41-year-old reservist Ahmed Qusai al-Taayie. Three carloads of armed men kidnapped him while he was visiting his wife and her family on October 23. (Washington Post)

- Ryan Singel

Big Ups: JZ, Photo: patteia

The 'Bravest Guy in al-Anbar Province'

I don't usually post these sorts of things. But there's an e-mail making the rounds, from a marine in Fallujah, that's too good not to share. From bank-robbing insurgents to Oprah-watching locals to the "Bravest Guy in al-Anbar Province," this marine has vidvidly, succinctly captured life during wartime -- and made it all funny, to boot. Go read, now.

(Big ups: GH)

Subject: A Marine's Eye-View of Fallujah (Unclassified)

A Marine's Eye-View of Fallujah

All: I haven't written very much from Iraq. There's really not much to write about. More exactly, there's not much I can write about because practically everything I do, read or hear is classified military information or is depressing to the point that I'd rather just forget about it, never mind write about it. The gaps in between all of that are filled with the pure tedium of daily life in an armed camp. So it's a bit of a struggle to think of anything to put into a letter that's worth reading. Worse, this place just consumes you. I work 18-20-hour days, every day. The quest to draw a clear picture of what the insurgents are up to never ends. Problems and frictions crop up faster than solutions. Every challenge demands a response. It's like this every day. Before I know it, I can't see straight, because it's 0400 and I've been at work for twenty hours straight, somehow missing dinner again in the process. And once again I haven't written to anyone. It starts all over again four hours later. It's not really like Ground Hog Day, it's more like a level from Dante's Inferno.

Rather than attempting to sum up the last seven months, I figured I'd just hit the record setting highlights of 2006 in Iraq. These are among the events and experiences I'll remember best.

Worst Case of Déjà Vu - I thought I was familiar with the feeling of déjà vu until I arrived back here in Fallujah in February. The moment I stepped off of the helicopter, just as dawn broke, and saw the camp just as I had left it ten months before - that was déjà vu. Kind of unnerving. It was as if I had never left. Same work area, same busted desk, same chair, same computer, same room, same creaky rack, same . . . everything. Same everything for the next year. It was like entering a parallel universe. Home wasn't 10,000 miles away, it was a different lifetime.

Most Surreal Moment - Watching Marines arrive at my detention facility and unload a truck load of flex-cuffed midgets. 26 to be exact. I had put the word out earlier in the day to the Marines in Fallujah that we were looking for Bad Guy X, who was described as a midget. Little did I know that Fallujah was home to a small community of midgets, who banded together for support since they were considered as social outcasts. The Marines were anxious to get back to the midget colony to bring in the rest of the midget suspects, but I called off the search, figuring Bad Guy X was long gone on his short legs after seeing his companions rounded up by the giant infidels.

Most Profound Man in Iraq - an unidentified farmer in a fairly remote area who, after being asked by Reconnaissance Marines (searching for Syrians) if he had seen any foreign fighters in the area replied "Yes, you."

Worst City in al-Anbar Province - Ramadi, hands down. The provincial capital of 400,000 people. Killed over 1,000 insurgents in there since we arrived in February. Every day is a nasty gun battle. They blast us with giant bombs in the road, snipers, mortars and small arms. We blast them with tanks, attack helicopters, artillery, our snipers (much better than theirs), and every weapon that an infantryman can carry. Every day. Incredibly, I rarely see Ramadi in the news. We have as many attacks out here in the west as Baghdad. Yet, Baghdad has 7 million people, we have just 1.2 million. Per capita, al-Anbar province is the most violent place in Iraq by several orders of magnitude. I suppose it was no accident that the Marines were assigned this area in 2003.

Bravest Guy in al-Anbar Province - Any Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician (EOD Tech). How'd you like a job that required you to defuse bombs in a hole in the middle of the road that very likely are booby-trapped or connected by wire to a bad guy who's just waiting for you to get close to the bomb before he clicks the detonator? Every day. Sanitation workers in New York City get paid more than these guys. Talk about courage and commitment.

Second Bravest Guy in al-Anbar Province - It's a 20,000 way tie among all the Marines and Soldiers who venture out on the highways and through the towns of al-Anbar every day, not knowing if it will be their last - and for a couple of them, it will be.

Best Piece of U.S. Gear - new, bullet-proof flak jackets. O.K., they weigh 40 lbs and aren't exactly comfortable in 120 degree heat, but they've saved countless lives out here.

Best Piece of Bad Guy Gear - Armor Piercing ammunition that goes right through the new flak jackets and the Marines inside them.

Worst E-Mail Message - "The Walking Blood Bank is Activated. We need blood type A+ stat." I always head down to the surgical unit as soon as I get these messages, but I never give blood - there's always about 80 Marines in line, night or day.

Biggest Surprise - Iraqi Police. All local guys. I never figured that we'd get a police force established in the cities in al-Anbar. I estimated that insurgents would kill the first few, scaring off the rest. Well, insurgents did kill the first few, but the cops kept on coming. The insurgents continue to target the police, killing them in their homes and on the streets, but the cops won't give up. Absolutely incredible tenacity. The insurgents know that the police are far better at finding them than we are. - and they are finding them. Now, if we could just get them out of the habit of beating prisoners to a pulp . . .

Greatest Vindication - Stocking up on outrageous quantities of Diet Coke from the chow hall in spite of the derision from my men on such hoarding, then having a 122mm rocket blast apart the giant shipping container that held all of the soda for the chow hall. Yep, you can't buy experience.

Biggest Mystery - How some people can gain weight out here. I'm down to 165 lbs. Who has time to eat?

Second Biggest Mystery - if there's no atheists in foxholes, then why aren't there more people at Mass every Sunday?

Favorite Iraqi TV Show - Oprah. I have no idea. They all have satellite TV.

Coolest Insurgent Act - Stealing almost $7 million from the main bank in Ramadi in broad daylight, then, upon exiting, waving to the Marines in the combat outpost right next to the bank, who had no clue of what was going on. The Marines waved back. Too cool.

Most Memorable Scene - In the middle of the night, on a dusty airfield, watching the better part of a battalion of Marines packed up and ready to go home after six months in al-Anbar, the relief etched in their young faces even in the moonlight. Then watching these same Marines exchange glances with a similar number of grunts loaded down with gear file past - their replacements. Nothing was said. Nothing needed to be said.

Highest Unit Re-enlistment Rate - Any outfit that has been in Iraq recently. All the danger, all the hardship, all the time away from home, all the horror, all the frustrations with the fight here - all are outweighed by the desire for young men to be part of a 'Band of Brothers' who will die for one another. They found what they were looking for when they enlisted out of high school. Man for man, they now have more combat experience than any Marines in the history of our Corps.

Most Surprising Thing I Don't Miss - Beer. Perhaps being half-stunned by lack of sleep makes up for it.

Worst Smell - Porta-johns in 120 degree heat - and that's 120 degrees outside of the porta-john.

Highest Temperature - I don't know exactly, but it was in the porta-johns. Needed to re-hydrate after each trip to the loo.

Biggest Hassle - High-ranking visitors. More disruptive to work than a rocket attack. VIPs demand briefs and "battlefield" tours (we take them to quiet sections of Fallujah, which is plenty scary for them). Our briefs and commentary seem to have no affect on their preconceived notions of what's going on in Iraq. Their trips allow them to say that they've been to Fallujah, which gives them an unfortunate degree of credibility in perpetuating their fantasies about the insurgency here.

Biggest Outrage - Practically anything said by talking heads on TV about the war in Iraq, not that I get to watch much TV. Their thoughts are consistently both grossly simplistic and politically slanted. Biggest offender - Bill O'Reilly - what a buffoon.

Best Intel Work - Finding Jill Carroll's kidnappers - all of them. I was mighty proud of my guys that day. I figured we'd all get the Christian Science Monitor for free after this, but none have showed up yet. Talk about ingratitude.

Saddest Moment - Having the battalion commander from 1st Battalion, 1st Marines hand me the dog tags of one of my Marines who had just been killed while on a mission with his unit. Hit by a 60mm mortar. Cpl Bachar was a great Marine. I felt crushed for a long time afterward. His picture now hangs at the entrance to the Intelligence Section. We'll carry it home with us when we leave in February.

Biggest Ass-Chewing - 10 July immediately following a visit by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Zobai. The Deputy Prime Minister brought along an American security contractor (read mercenary), who told my Commanding General that he was there to act as a mediator between us and the Bad Guys. I immediately told him what I thought of him and his asinine ideas in terms that made clear my disgust and which, unfortunately, are unrepeatable here. I thought my boss was going to have a heart attack. Fortunately, the translator couldn't figure out the best Arabic words to convey my meaning for the Deputy Prime Minister. Later, the boss had no difficulty in convening his meaning to me in English regarding my Irish temper, even though he agreed with me. At least the guy from the State Department thought it was hilarious. We never saw the mercenary again.

Best Chuck Norris Moment - 13 May. Bad Guys arrived at the government center in the small town of Kubaysah to kidnap the town mayor, since they have a problem with any form of government that does not include regular beheadings and women wearing burqahs. There were seven of them. As they brought the mayor out to put him in a pick-up truck to take him off to be beheaded (on video, as usual), one of the bad Guys put down his machinegun so that he could tie the mayor's hands. The mayor took the opportunity to pick up the machinegun and drill five of the Bad Guys. The other two ran away. One of the dead Bad Guys was on our top twenty wanted list. Like they say, you can't fight City Hall.

Worst Sound - That crack-boom off in the distance that means an IED or mine just went off. You just wonder who got it, hoping that it was a near miss rather than a direct hit. Hear it every day.

Second Worst Sound - Our artillery firing without warning. The howitzers are pretty close to where I work. Believe me, outgoing sounds a lot like incoming when our guns are firing right over our heads. They'd about knock the fillings out of your teeth.

Only Thing Better in Iraq Than in the U.S. - Sunsets. Spectacular. It's from all the dust in the air.

Proudest Moment - It's a tie every day, watching my Marines produce phenomenal intelligence products that go pretty far in teasing apart Bad Guy operations in al-Anbar. Every night Marines and Soldiers are kicking in doors and grabbing Bad Guys based on intelligence developed by my guys. We rarely lose a Marine during these raids, they are so well-informed of the objective. A bunch of kids right out of high school shouldn't be able to work so well, but they do.

Happiest Moment - Well, it wasn't in Iraq. There are no truly happy moments here. It was back in California when I was able to hold my family again while home on leave during July.

Most Common Thought - Home. Always thinking of home, of Kathleen and the kids. Wondering how everyone else is getting along. Regretting that I don't write more. Yep, always thinking of home.

I hope you all are doing well. If you want to do something for me, kiss a cop, flush a toilet, and drink a beer. I'll try to write again before too long - I promise.

Semper Fi,

Damascus Embassy Attacked (Updated)

I don't usually like to air my guesswork here. But does anybody else think there's something a little fishy about this, in a country where the government is in such complete control?

Four attackers armed with grenades and machine guns tried to storm the American embassy in Damascus today, but security forces repelled the assault, killing three of the gunmen and injuring the fourth, Syria’s official Arabic news agency said...

The Syrian Interior Minister, Bassam Abdel-Majeed, said that a “terrorist operation” aimed at the embassy had failed, and that preliminary investigations indicated that the attackers used two stolen cars, according to the Syrian news agency. He said that the attackers gained access to the vicinity of the embassy by way of a busy public street.

It appeared that one of the cars, primed with explosives, was parked at the embassy gate with the aim of detonating it and blowing the gate open, according to the agency.

“I saw two men in plain clothes and armed with grenades and automatic weapons,” a Syrian political commentator who was in the area, Ayman Abdel-Nour, told Reuters. “They ran toward the compound shouting religious slogans while firing their automatic rifles.”

[According to Bloomberg, "Syrian Interior Minister Bassam Abdel Majid said one suspected assailant had been captured. He said the vehicles used in the attack were stolen."]

The motive of the attack was not immediately clear. But public sentiment in Damascus has been anti-American lately, because of the turmoil in Iraq and because of tensions during the recent war between Israel and the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon, when the Bush administration called for President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to order Hezbollah to halt its attacks on Israel.

The State Department’s latest “Country Reports on Terrorism,” issued in April, says that Syria provides political and material support to Hezbollah and to some Palestinian terrorist organizations, and that Damascus, the Syrian capital, is a haven for leaders of these groups.

UPDATE 12:24 PM: Time is calling it a "bold challenge to the rule of President Bashar Assad... the Syrian regime's own long war with Islamic extremists is heating up again."

UPDATE 3:41 PM: Quoting "well informed Syrian sources," the Counterterrorism Blog says that "the [Assad] regime 'allowed' the operation to happen, 'knew' it would happen, and let the security guards on the ground sacrifice themselves in the line of diplomatic duty."

UPDATE 4:08 PM: Good stuff from Stratfor.

A covered pickup truck loaded with poorly constructed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remained intact Sept. 12 after the smoke cleared from a gunbattle between Syrian security forces and at least four attackers outside the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, Syria... At first glance, the incident appears to have been a jihadist attack against the embassy, though if that is the case the perpetrators quite obviously failed to adequately plan and execute the operation.

Not only were the IEDs poorly constructed -- meaning they probably lacked sufficient power to even breach the embassy compound's perimeter wall, let alone damage the interior of the compound -- the attacking force also was completely inadequate for hitting a hard target such as the embassy. The compound is surrounded by Syrian security forces, and guarded on the inside by U.S. Marines. Although small details suggest the embassy was the target, it is hard to believe such an attack would have been so botched...

Due to the tension between Washington and Damascus, the degree of Syrian surveillance around the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is equal to that which was in place outside the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during the Cold War. In addition to the approximately 30 Syrian guards posted around the embassy on any given day, the compound is under constant and heavy surveillance by Syrian intelligence and security forces. This surveillance begins several blocks out, and all locals in the vicinity are watched by the Syrians as possible U.S. intelligence sources. Anyone acting suspiciously near the embassy immediately attracts the attention of Syrian security forces.

The high level of security in the district, and in Damascus in general, might have prevented the militants from conducting adequate pre-operational surveillance, which would go a long way toward explaining the poor planning and execution of the attack. It would also explain the rapid Syrian response.

Knock on Wood

The forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs has a piece from Ohio State professor John Mueller that I'm almost afraid to link to.

Here's the hook: Mueller says "almost no terrorists exist in the United States and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad."

Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -- reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

OK, OK: Here's the link.

Looks like the American public isn't so sure:

As the five-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks approaches, nearly three-fourths of those responding to a CNN poll said they believe Osama bin Laden is planning another significant attack against the United States.

Seventy-four percent of the 1,033 adult Americans polled said they believe an attack is being planned, according to the poll conducted by Opinion Research Corporation on behalf of CNN.

However, many don't think much of bin Laden's chances:

In results released Wednesday, 44 percent said they believe he will not succeed. The other 30 percent said the attack would be successful.

UPDATE: I'd recommend making sure you get the address for Foreign Affairs right. It's www.foreignaffairs.org, NOT .com. Let's just say the .com link is not safe for work.

-- Dan Dupont

More Lebanon Lessons Learned

Today Janes takes look at the Israeli Defense Force's war "post-mortem". It calls the invasion "an indecisive operation, which was conducted ad hoc rather than based on a comprehensive plan, and which revealed a series of flaws within the Israel Defence Force". These include:

* The reserve army, the IDF's main ground force, was exposed in the campaign as an insufficiently trained and equipped force. Years of negligence, due to budgetary constraints, brought highly motivated but sometimes poorly equipped units into Lebanon. "We have been warning for years on the deterioration of the reserve army, through its lack of training," claimed Gen Halutz. There's a consensus among senior IDF officers that the reserves will have to undergo a significant upgrade effort.

* The anti-tank threat emerged as the most serious challenge to the IDF. Operating Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), Hizbullah successfully destroyed 14 Israeli Merkava Mk 2, 3 and 4 main battle tanks. In response, the Israeli MoD has ordered Rafael Armament Development Authority to accelerate preparations for production of its Trophy active protection system (APS) for future IDF procurement. Israel Military Industries has also been asked to complete development of its APS, dubbed Iron Fist, for IDF evaluation.

* Military intelligence provided information about Hizbullah capabilities, both in artillery rockets and in ATGMs. However, it was not able to provide the IDF with accurate intelligence on the whereabouts of Hizbullah's political and military leadership, which the IDF wished to target. Also, field commanders claimed, information on Hizbullah's ground alignment of tunnels and bunkers in southern Lebanon was insufficient.

(Reuters has more on the Reserve's lack of preparation: "'The government didn't take seriously the lives of our troops,' said Zvi Marek, a reserve infantry soldier at [a recent] demonstration.")

Janes, like other prominent publications, predicts a resumption of hostilities:

With Israel fearing that the recent conflict with Hizbullah will not be the last and could also mark the prelude for a future confrontation with Iran, calls are growing for a quick rehabilitation of the IDF to prepare it for what could be the "next round".

That next round could come soon if the U.N. fails to cobble together a worthwhile peacekeeping force, as AFP reports: "Despite intense negotiations since the truce came into effect on August 14 and warnings that it could unravel if more peacekeepers fail to deploy quickly, few European countries have made firm commitments."

Meanwhile, on its second front, Israel is stepping up Gaza incursions as it continues to search for kidnapped soldiers.

--David Axe

Lebanon War Lessons Learned

Predicting an imminent resumption of fighting with Hezbollah, the Israeli military is quickly studying the results of round one, Aviation Week reports:

While the [Israeli Air Force] contends it did its mission, others are putting some of the blame for the offensive's mixed results on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, the first air force officer to serve in that post. Critics contend that his expectations for the IAF were too high. As a result, along with continued fighting against Hamas in Gaza and the looming roles-and-missions battle between the services, there are strong signals the Israeli defense establishment is headed for a shake-up. Additionally, a heated debate over future defense spending priorities is expected in the coming months.

Meanwhile, The Nation is calling for a renewed look at Israel's justification for the invasion:

We were saturated with the message that Hezbollah is a shadowy terrorist organization that has spent years showering northern Israel with rockets -- and that Israel had both the right and the duty to protect itself from such attacks once and for all. Thus was history instantaneously rewritten to Israel's own specifications.

In fact, from the moment that Israel ended its last military occupation of Lebanon in 2000 until the explosion of the current war on July 12, UN observers report that there was not a single casualty as a result of a confirmed rocket attack by Hezbollah on civilian targets in northern Israel.

Results on the political front are less ambiguous: Israelis are hopping mad, according to The New York Times:

Israel is politically roiled by public dissatisfaction with the monthlong Lebanon war. The public has been surprised by the inconclusive outcome of the campaign, frightened by unintended consequences like the surging popularity of Hezbollah, and angry that Israel's vaunted military has been shown to be less than all-powerful.

Perhaps the most comprehensive "lessons-learned" report can be found here, courtesy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (warning: PDF!).

--David Axe

My Country for a Source

The administration is attacking Seymour Hersh's latest New Yorker article, which claims, among other things, that Israel sought a green light from Washington prior to taking military action against Hezbollah.

The administration's sharply worded denial -- as seen in this response to the Los Angeles Times -- attacks Hersh's credibility and his use of anonymous sources:

"The piece abounds in fictions," White House Press Secretary Tony Snow said in an e-mailed response to a request for comment. He also assailed reporter Seymour M. Hersh's use of unnamed sources, saying it was "hard to imagine that the story would meet any major news organization's standards for sourcing and verification."

In fact, the New Yorker article does have a more than its healthy share of anonymous sources, such as "former diplomat," "consultant," and the ever-in-demand "expert in Middle East Affairs" (which these days, could be just about anyone in Washington). In some cases, these sources are providing subjective information, describing people's thoughts and motivations. In other words, all things hard to verify. For example:

According to a Middle East expert with knowledge of the current thinking of both the Israeli and the U.S. governments, Israel had devised a plan for attacking Hezbollah—and shared it with Bush Administration officials—well before the July 12th kidnappings. "It's not that the Israelis had a trap that Hezbollah walked into," he said, "but there was a strong feeling in the White House that sooner or later the Israelis were going to do it."

What qualifies someone as having "knowledge of current thinking" of two different governments? How much expertise does it take to be an expert?

This extensive use of anonymous sources should always raise questions with readers. But how fair is the administration's response? Background interviews are a mainstay of government agencies these days. The Pentagon, in particular, regularly sets up interviews that are on background (thus attributable only to "a senior defense official" or otherwise negotiated title). Worse, readers have no way of knowing whether such interviews are such officially sanctioned "background interviews" – or whether they really represent senior officials going around protocol to speak anonymously to trusted reporters.

Ultimately, the readers are left to determine the credibility they attribute to a journalist's anonymous sources. In this respect, Hersh is one step ahead of the administration. Readers are likely to give the anonymous sources of Hersh--who has a solid track record reporting on issues such as Abu Ghraib—the benefit of the doubt.

-- Sharon Weinberger

The Iran Connection

Even as a ceasefire takes effect today between Israel and Hezbollah, both sides in this war are still fighting on a second front for public opinion. I’ll look tomorrow at the back and forth over the latest Seymour Hersh New Yorker article, which says that Israel planned the war—and informed Washington—before its soldiers were kidnapped by Hezbollah.

But let’s look at the Iran connection. At least some U.S. intelligence officials are apparently backing Israel’s claim that Iran not only supplied funding and weapons to Hezbollah, but also sent advisors to Lebanon. As Aviation Week & Space Technology reports this week:

The Iranian government has a cadre of "hundreds" of technical advisers in Lebanon that trained, and continue to support, Hezbollah forces in the use of sophisticated anti-ship and anti-tank missiles and unmanned aircraft. No evidence has yet emerged, however, that the Iranians are actually operating any weaponry in the fighting, say U.S. officials.

"It's not just a matter of turning weapons over to Hezbollah," a U.S. intelligence official says. "They also have to provide the training [for such advanced weapons]." Other munitions possessed by Iran (particularly those bought from Russia) have not been used in the Lebanon/Israel conflict, because the provenance would be obvious and, in some cases, "the Iranians don't want to be associated with that," he says. Nonetheless, "there is evidence that Iranians are in the country training Hezbollah." They remain in Lebanon, but until late last week appeared to have avoided direct participation in combat.

That situation may have changed, however, with the discovery of papers on the bodies of soldiers killed in Southern Lebanon on Aug. 9 that identified them as members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards. "There's a possibility they could have been operating systems, but they weren't necessarily fighting. It could have been a case of being at the wrong place at the wrong time," the intelligence official said.

"Despite a couple of reports that the Iranians were at the controls of rocket launchers in the early part of the conflict, that's not our conclusion," the U.S. intelligence official says. "The group was originally in the hundreds. We haven't seen any large numbers leave." The Iranian government denies that they have advisers or trainers in Lebanon. The U.S. State Dept. says the Iranians provide arms and funding, but won't answer questions about advisers. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sources put the number of advisers at about 100.
U.S. ANALYSTS WON'T confirm that the Hezbollah UAV shot down in the Mediterranean by Israeli fighters last week was operated by Iranians or even Iranian-trained insurgents. But, obtaining the aircraft and learning how to launch and program its flight "would have taken outside help," the intelligence official says. Hezbollah's first recorded incursion into Israeli airspace with a UAV occurred in late 2004.

International aerospace industry officials, without being specific, say that countries other than Iran are also working with various insurgent groups in the region, including Hezbollah. They point out Russian anti-aircraft missile sales to Syria and the Mar. 3 visit of a Hamas delegation to Moscow. U.S. intelligence analysts say Syria is supplying some arms to Hezbollah, but not at the level of Iran, nor does it appear to have training cadres in Lebanon. They contend that while Chinese weaponry is being used, it was either transferred in the 1990s or came from illegal sales through intermediaries. The U.S. recently announced a two-year trade sanction against arms trader Rosoboronexport for selling the TOR-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) air defense missile system to Iran. That move may backfire since Russian support is critical to U.N. approval of any U.S.-orchestrated cease-fire agreement in Lebanon.

Similarly, the Washington Post today quotes sources saying Hezbollah’s strength relies in large part on Iranian funding. The article doesn’t claim that Iran has advisors actually present in Lebanon:

The fighters' Islamic faith and intense indoctrination reduced their fear of death, he noted, giving them an advantage in close-quarters combat and in braving airstrikes to move munitions from post to post. Hezbollah leaders also enhanced fighters' willingness to risk death by establishing the Martyr's Institute, with an office in Tehran, that guarantees living stipends and education fees for the families of fighters who die on the front.

The Hezbollah arsenal, which also included thousands of missiles and rockets to be fired against northern Israel's towns and villages, was paid for with a war chest kept full by relentless fundraising among Shiites around the world and, in particular, by funds provided by Iran, said the intelligence specialist. The amount of Iranian funds reaching Hezbollah was estimated at $25 million a month, but some reports suggested it increased sharply, perhaps doubled, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took over as president in Tehran last year, the specialist said.

Both articles quote unnamed specialists and intelligence officials, which doesn’t mean they’re not accurate. But as with the Hersh article, they raise questions about how the press copes with information that can’t be easily verified.

-- Sharon Weinberger

Is Ricks Nuts?

Alert reader Harry Toor points us to some crazy comments from Post reporter Thomas Ricks while a guest on CNN's "Reliable Sources":

[Transcript] And joining us now here Washington Anne Compton who covers the White House for ABC News, and Thomas Ricks, Pentagon reporter for "The Washington Post" and author of the new book "Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq."

Tom Ricks, you've covered a number of military conflicts, including Iraq, as I just mentioned. Is civilian casualties increasingly going to be a major media issue? In conflicts where you don't have two standing armies shooting at each other?

THOMAS RICKS, REPORTER, "THE WASHINGTON POST": I think it will be. But I think civilian casualties are also part of the battlefield play for both sides here. One of the things that is going on, according to some U.S. military analysts, is that Israel purposely has left pockets of Hezbollah rockets in Lebanon, because as long as they're being rocketed, they can continue to have a sort of moral equivalency in their operations in Lebanon.

KURTZ: Hold on, you're suggesting that Israel has deliberately allowed Hezbollah to retain some of it's fire power, essentially for PR purposes, because having Israeli civilians killed helps them in the public relations war here?

RICKS: Yes, that's what military analysts have told me.

KURTZ: That's an extraordinary testament to the notion that having people on your own side killed actually works to your benefit in that nobody wants to see your own citizens killed but it works to your benefit in terms of the battle of perceptions here.

RICKS: Exactly. It helps you with the moral high ground problem, because you know your operations in Lebanon are going to be killing civilians as well.

What do you guys think? Is Ricks on to something? Or is he just nuts?

--David Axe

Bombs over Beirut (and beyond)

Both Israel and Hezbollah have intensified their campaigns in the past two days; Israel's air strikes have expanded to include suburbs of Beirut, more highways, and Lebanon’s northern border, while Hezbollah launched over 200 rockets into Israel on Thursday (its largest barrage so far in a single day). Hezbollah, on Friday, also succeeded in hitting a field in central Israel outside the city of Hadera, by far the southern-most point hit so far.

The biggest development since my last update is Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah's appearance in a taped television statement. He told the Israelis:

"If you strike Beirut, the Islamic resistance will strike Tel Aviv and it is able to do so…[if] at any time you decide to stop your campaigns on our cities, suburbs, civilians, and infrastructure, we won’t strike with rockets any settlement or Israeli city."

In response, a senior Israeli military source said "If Tel Aviv is attacked, Lebanese national infrastructure will be destroyed."

Israeli ground forces are moving northwards slowly; this, combined with Nasrallah's words, could mean either of two things, as Stratfor notes:

"...from where we sit, the operation looks to be going slowly. That could be because Israel is moving cautiously to reduce Hezbollah positions with minimal casualties to Israeli forces. Alternatively, it could be because Hezbollah is putting up stiff resistance. It is hard to tell from a distance, but Nasrallah's statement seemed to concede what logic would indicate, which is that Hezbollah is fighting hard but is unlikely to win in the south."

An internal dispute has also arisen in Israel over how far, exactly, to push the ground invasion. Defense Minister Amir Peretz told Israeli forces to prepare for a push all the way to the Litani River; he believes that will be sufficient to negate the short-range rocket threat from Hezbollah. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, on the other hand, believes—-rightly, by many accounts—-that taking so much land will not negate the threat from longer range rockets. His position is somewhat at odds with that of his military; according to UPI, "Senior Israeli officers believe they succeeded in curbing with [sic] Hezbollah's long- and medium-range rockets."

The unusual public split between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense may represent political jockeying between the parties the two men represent. The historically hawkish Olmert may be trying to cement Kadima’s standing as Israel’s centrist party, while Peretz seems to be trying to shake the Labor party's image as traditionally dovish, along with his own image as militarily inexperienced.

Either way, Peretz's plan would require the approval of the Israeli cabinet, which it is unlikely to gain if the Prime Minister does not get onboard. The Israeli Cabinet has so far only approved the occupation of a buffer zone four miles deep.

Counterterrorismblog points out a NY Sun report that says:

"[t]he Israel Defense Forces also says it has not been able to seal the border between Syria and Lebanon, making it possible to ferry men, small rockets, and other material to Hezbollah through the back roads and smuggling routes in the Bekaa Valley,"

This despite numerous air strikes, which appear to have closed one of the main aid pipelines into Beirut and one of the last accessible border crossings in the north, near the city of Al Qaa (Map here). Aid workers may be able to take side roads, but they will inevitably be slower to arrive where they are needed.

Finally, diplomats at the UN seem to be inching closer to a resolution; Israel has some time to achieve its objectives. They will have to move quickly, though, while rockets continue to fly.

-- Eric Hundman

Shift in strategy: Israel invades, War widens

Yesterday Israel sent thousands of ground troops into Lebanon, in a move widely assumed to be aimed at two goals: clearing southern Lebanon of the Hezbollah threat to prepare for the insertion of a potential international force, and destroying Hezbollah’s long-range missile capabilities. Israeli officials estimate they need ten days to two weeks to achieve these goals; they are hoping that political pressure will not force them to stop sooner. Even a week may be optimistic given how much the time scale has lengthened in the past few days. In light of the Israeli timetable, Condoleeza Rice's statement yesterday could charitably be described as unrealistic:

"I still believe that if we really put our minds to it and work that this week [a ceasefire and lasting settlement are] entirely possible. Certainly, we're talking about days, not weeks, before we are able to get a cease-fire."

Broadly, the war has two fronts: the border area below the Litani River, and the Bekaa Valley in the northeast. The Israeli navy also continues to launch artillery at Tyre, on the western coast, but no actual fighting seems to have taken place there yet. Bill Roggio over at Counterterrorismblog posted a great reference map here.

Israel’s daring raid in the city of Baalbek (in the Bekaa Valley) generated the most buzz today. The IDF claims to have captured five middling Hezbollah officials from their base inside a hospital; Hezbollah claims the building was just a hospital and the five Israel captured were civilians. All Israeli troops involved in the mission got home safely, but the reason for the raid is still unclear. Stratfor notes:

"During the night, Israeli commandos raided Baalbek, the main city in the Bekaa Valley. The purpose of the mission is obscure: Some reports claim it was to snatch someone from a hospital there, but it is hard to imagine that a raid of the reported magnitude and lasting long enough for major publicity about it to flow could have been for that purpose."

Elsewhere in the Bekaa Valley, Israeli forces have been conducting air raids where the highway from Damascus crosses the border. They aim to cut off supply shipments to Hezbollah, and one Lebanese paper reports that craters and debris have "effectively closed" the highway. Some reports claim that a few shipments are still getting through, however. U.S. media sources are strangely silent about the highway’s condition; its destruction could have been an indication that Israel has no intention to attack Syria.

Everyone seems sure of Israeli strategy in southern Lebanon. Stratfor puts it most succinctly: "[The Israelis] are clearly planning to take southern Lebanon and destroy all Hezbollah infrastructure there." Tactically, the LA Times reports that the IDF is working north from the border and south from the river simultaneously, clearing out Hezbollah forces along the way. This theory is supported in the NY Times, which reports that the entire river is controlled by Israel (one way or another) and that ground forces have penetrated a few miles north of the border. The Washington Post, citing the same source, goes further and says "Israel now controls most of the zone below the Litani River, either with ground forces or through air missions." This is probably exaggeration, since Israel only began full-scale operations yesterday.

The number of troops involved in ground operations is very unclear. Estimates range from 5,000 to 18,000 on the Israeli side, though the true number is probably closest to 10,000, spread between six brigades. The number is expected to climb; it could even triple. Hezbollah is thought to have between 2,000 and 3,000 fighters, of whom 250-300 have been killed so far.

Israel has committed to clearing Hezbollah out of southern Lebanon, but big question marks remain about Hezbollah strongholds south of Beirut and especially in the Bekaa Valley. Stratfor speculates:

"…it remains clear to us that unless the Israelis go deep on the ground into the Bekaa -- not with commando raids, but with a major force -- they will not identify and destroy the rockets that are the strategic threat to Israel. The Israelis frequently open ground operations with air mobile attacks designed to keep their opponents off-balance, knock out defensive positions and disrupt logistics. The Bekaa action may have been part of that. However, at this point, we are not seeing the armored thrust that would follow this up. Still, it must come soon or not at all. The diplomatic window for operations is closing, and the Israelis will need to be wrapping things up next week. That does not leave a great deal of time to occupy, locate, destroy and withdraw, which is the Israelis' announced strategy, and which we believe to be what they want to do. Israel is now on track with our earlier expectations, and we would therefore anticipate some commitment of forces for a ground attack soon."

Now that Israel has committed ground troops, it is much more likely to achieve its objective in southern Lebanon; Olmert claims they already have:

"If the military campaign would have ended today, today we could already say with certainty the face of the Middle East has changed."

Success elsewhere in Lebanon is more uncertain. In a few days, we'll probably know more about how the conflict will have changed Hezbollah.

-- Eric Hundman

UPDATE: Stratfor released more information on the Baalbek raid, with a heavy dose of speculation. The report is behind a subscription barrier, but for now you can access it by searching Google News for "Lebanon: Israel's Strategic Raid on Baalbek."

Afghan Embed, All Wrapped Up

Army-infantryman-turned-blogger Bill Roggio just got back from a month-long embed with coalition forces in Afghanistan, where he reported on everything from Kabul's four traffic lights to the "Talibanization of western Pakistan." Check out his posts and pics from Afghanistan here.

Iraqi Troops, Muderers?

News reports fingering Iraqi soldiers in the 2004 shooting deaths of two California National Guardsmen have again raised the perennial issues: How reliable are Iraqi forces? And when can U.S. and British militaries fully turn over security in Iraq to native troops?

The answers, it seems, are "not very" and "not soon" -- with qualifiers.

"Restoring Iraq to military self-sufficiency will require at least a decade," says John Pike, a military expert at the think tank Globalsecurity.org. "For that reason alone, Iraq will remain an American protectorate well into the next decade ... [and] I would not expect to see a significant drawdown [of U.S. troops] prior to 2007."

Read my full report at Military.com. Check out an Iraqi forces photo gallery at Flickr. And see my graphic novel WAR FIX for real-life scenes from Iraq's dangerous streets.

-- David Axe

Carter and the Killer

For the past few months, one of life's exquisitely painful pleasures has been reading my buddy Captain Phil Carter's e-mails home from Iraq -- and not being able to say a thing about 'em.

Since he got to the sandbox, Phil has been sending regular, sometimes-heartbreaking, sometimes-hilarious reports about his unit's attempts to train the local police in the Baqubah region -- and restore the rule of law, in the process. But despite my regular begging, Phil has been reluctant to share his progress with the wider world without Army permission. Now, luckily, the Wall Street Journal's Greg Jaffe has paid Phil & Co. a visit, so y'all can read about the amazing work Phil is doing.

Capt. Phillip Carter visits the filthy, overcrowded prison here at least twice a week to meet with the warden and police officers who oversee the facility. Each time he stops by, the warmest greeting he receives comes from a burly 46-year-old convicted murderer.

Hamid Abboud was found guilty in 1998 of killing a man in a fight and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was released and granted amnesty in 2002. Under Iraqi law, he should now be free. But he was mysteriously re-arrested in 2004 on the old charges and remains incarcerated, ordered to serve out the rest of his sentence.

Capt. Carter, a 30-year-old military police soldier who is a lawyer in civilian life, could demand Mr. Abboud's release and the Iraqis would likely comply. But he doesn't. Instead he prods judges and prosecutors in this province an hour's drive from Baghdad to uphold Iraqi law and set Mr. Abboud free on their own.

"I have faith because of your work," Mr. Abboud told Capt. Carter in late May, when the temperature had risen above 100 degrees and the stench in the prison, crammed to four times its legal capacity, was almost unbearable. "My fate is in your hands."

Why a U.S. Army captain took on the case of a convicted murderer speaks volumes about how the American strategy has changed in Iraq in the past six months, as the U.S. tries to turn control back to the Iraqis. It also shows how painful and halting progress in Iraq can be.

Capt. Carter hopes to use the case to make a larger point: that the Iraqi judicial system, dominated by personal and sectarian grudges, needs to follow its own rules. "It appeared like the perfect test case, because it would show that the result should be dictated by Iraqi law and not by the whim of any individual," he says...

Mr. Abboud was among those granted amnesty in 2002 when Saddam Hussein, just before the U.S. invasion, freed tens of thousands of prisoners in Iraq.

Following the fall of Mr. Hussein in 2003, the U.S. decided to honor the amnesty. The decision was made largely out of necessity: It would have been too hard to round up all the prisoners, and then figure out who had been imprisoned legitimately and who had been incarcerated for political reasons, say U.S. officials familiar with the decision. The Iraqi government has let the amnesty stand. So under Iraqi law, prisoners released in 2002 should be free today.

Capt. Carter figured that if he could persuade judges in Baqubah to follow their own rules and release a guilty man, maybe they would be more likely to respect the law in other cases, where the inmates appeared to be innocent. "If we can solve this case according to the law, we can solve all the cases in the jail," he says.

The Tech That Took Out Zarqawi

Ten years ago, taking out Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi with F-16s would have been an impossible task. Air strikes were planned days or even weeks in advance. Pilots weren't trained to change missions mid-stream. Sensors and weapons weren't accurate and flexible enough to spot and hit fleeting targets.

But during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Air Force pioneered the prosecution of what it calls Time Sensitive Targets, or TSTs. Since then, the Navy and Marine Corps have gotten in on the game too, and these days, over Iraq, it's typical for jets to launch with only the vaguest idea of what's out there. New sensors and weapons, high-tech surveillance drones and better training have resulted in a minor revolution of which the Zarqawi attack is just one result.

The Air Force has been mum on the subject, but it's entirely possible that the F-16 drivers who eliminated Zarqawi were just flying a routine patrol before orders came to hit the safehouse. In stark contrast to the rigid preplanned sorties that were typical during the 1991 Gulf War, these days over Iraq, fighters from the Air Force and its sister services launch in two-jet sections carrying sensor pods and laser- and satellite-guided bombs. They have no specific targets in mind. Orbiting over their assigned areas, they scan the ground below with sensor pods and helmet-mounted sights, use datalinks to pass around video imagery and the GPS coordinates of potential targets and coordinate with ground-based forward air controllers to hit insurgents who appear in crowded cities or crawl onto highway medians to plant improvised explosive devices. Hitting a safehouse is relatively easy by comparison.

Sensor pods are perhaps the most visible technology in the military's efforts to take on TSTs. Pods contain day and night cameras, GPS for employing satellite-guided bombs and laser designators and trackers for laser-guided bombs. The cigar-shaped pods are slung under jets' wings or fuselages.

Lt. Col. David Wilbur, commander of Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 332, which returned from Iraq in February, says that the new Litening AT pod enables Marine fighter crews to switch easily between looking for insurgents and attacking them, even in bad weather. Litening AT made its combat debut on Marine Corps jets during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and since have become standard equipment.

"There's no reason to take off without one," says Lt. Col. Wilbert Thomas, commander of Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 224, which served in Iraq between January and August 2005.

The Air Force is buying a number of different pod designs for nearly all of its combat aircraft types. In recent years, F-16s, F-15Es, A-10s, B-52s and B-1Bs have been fitted with pods.

The newest sensor pods include datalinks tied to a laptop computer-based terminals called Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receivers, or ROVER. The system allow crews to beam pod imagery to troops and commanders on the ground, letting them see what the crews see and facilitating close coordination between U.S. personnel on the ground and personnel in the air. A datalink called Link 16 performs a complementary role. Link 16-equipped jets can transmit a graphical target schematic based on and including GPS coordinates to other jets and to ground stations.

Air Force 77th Fighter Squadron commander Lt. Col. Donavan Godier says that Link-16 means a "large jump forward". "In the past we needed a lot of [voice] comms." Godier says that, in a combat scenario, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft like the RC-135 Rivet Joint and E-8C J-STARS can "feed targets to us via datalink". "We can refine that data or pick up new threats. We can populate the network ... [and] pass data to link-equipped fighters."

Navy Lt. Comm. Trenton Lennard used Link 16 in conjunction with the new Joint Helmet-Mounted Cueing System, or JHMCS, a visor that allows pilots to direct their radars, targeting pods and weapons just by looking at a target. "With that helmet, on the [Link 16 terminal], a pilot can look down, designate a target and put it out to everybody. ... It gets target pods, sensors and eyeballs on to the same piece of dirt."

With pods, datalinks and JHMCS, if one pilot or sensor operator sees a target, so can every other friendly force in the area. A target need enter only one person's situational awareness to enter everyone's. That makes it hard to hide and allows commanders ands controllers to assign the best shooter to a given target, cutting the time between spotting the target and attacking it.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), blanketing Iraq in cameras and radars around the clock, only reinforce what is already a robust network of sensors and shooters. The Air Force flies 20 small Predator drones and a handful of larger Global Hawks on continuous orbits that cover almost every corner of the country. The service calls this "persistent" surveillance. Navy Capt. Steve Wright, a UAV manager for the Chief of Naval Operations, says that UAVs help the military maintain a "common operational picture" -- in other words, a universal, constantly-updated picture of the battlefield, with which it can quickly assign on-station pilots to hit new targets.

While most attacks are carried out by high-performance manned aircraft, Predators themselves have been armed to give commanders more options. It was an early armed Predator that killed U.S.S. Cole bombing suspect Abu Ali in 2002. A new version of the versatile UAV will carry more ordnance.

Despite the depth and breadth of the military's sensor/shooter network, single human beings who don't want to be found represent a daunting targeting challenge. The system is in place to quickly kill high-value targets such as Zarqawi, but it depends on someone on the ground pointing out the target's location to begin with, accurately and in a timely manner. This is where previous decapitation strikes failed. An air raid in Fallujah in June 2004 narrowly missed Zarqawi. Notorious Ba'ath Party leader Ali Hassan Al Majeed, aka "Chemical" Ali, had already left his safehouse in Samawah when it was hit in March 2003. Several attacks on suspected safehouses in Baghdad failed to kill Saddam Hussein in the early months of the war. Indeed, the opening shot of the U.S. invasion was a bomb dropped on Dora Farms, one of Saddam's country retreats, on March 20, 2003. The strike was launched based on reports that the Iraqi leader was at the site, when in fact he hadn't visited in months.

Despite the sophistication of U.S. warplanes, sensors and ordnance, all results of billions of dollars of investment -- and despite great progress in prosecuting TSTs -- most decapitation strikes have been undermined by tardy or faulty intelligence at the ground level. The Zarqawi killing represents the first time in more than four years that intelligence has allowed the technology of surgical strikes to fulfill its potential.

-- David Axe, cross-posted to Tech Central Station

Zarqawi Zapped (Updated Yet Again)

By now, you've heard the good news: Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has been killed by U.S. forces. (Here is the video of the F-16 strikes that knocked him off. And here is footage from the aftermath.) Below are a few links, to provide a little context:

* Gen. George W. Casey, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, said that "tips and intelligence... from Iraqi senior leaders from [Zarqawi's] network led forces" to him. (The printed version of Casey's statement reads a little differently.)

* John Robb looks at Zarqawi's tenure as a "violence capitalist." (Here is a list of the big attacks claimed by his followers.)

* The Counterterrorism Blog highlights the role of Task Force 145, the combination of SEAL and Delta Force units, in Zarqawi's take-down. (William Arkin has a bit more.)

* Juan Cole looks at the split between Zarqawi and "the main arm of the guerrilla resistance."

* Chris Allbritton, striking an uncharacteristically hopeful tone, says, Zarqawi's elimination "indicates that bringing the Sunnis into the government seems to [have] worked." (More here.)

* CNN wonders if Zarqawi's recent video helped nail him.

* Dexter Filkins says "it could possibly set off a bloody struggle within the organization to succeed [Zarqawi], [although] the insurgency and sectarian war he helped ignite in Iraq will carry on without him."

* Smash asks if Abu Abdulrahman al-Iraqi is taking Zarqawi's place. (Thanks to Smash for the pic, too.)

* Foreign Policy offers up its "profile of a killer."

* Winds: Is Zarqawi Iraq's "Jeb Stuart"?

* Barnett: "Zarqawi's elevation to 'master terrorist' was useful to our purposes."

* Blogging Baghdad: "Maliki's big chance."

* Stratfor: "Al-Zarqawi was attacked by two F-16s, each of which dropped a 500-pound bomb, not by a Hellfire missile launched from a Predator drone. Predators are dual intelligence gathering/assassination tools. Pairs of F-16s are more likely to be used when there is pre-existing intelligence that results in a tasking. U.S. forces selected their weapon very carefully to be low on fragmentation or fire to maximize the chances of the quick recovery of an easily identifiable corpse. Al-Zarqawi was not found, he was sold out. A political deal was made, and the Sunnis have delivered on their end."

* Kaplan: "If there's any legitimacy to the new Iraqi government, now's the time it might take traction."

* Ackerman: "Zarqawi's death may in fact be a bad thing."

* Zarqawi's brother-in-law arrested live, on TV.

G.I. Journos' Killer War Doc

A little more than two years ago, filmmaker Deborah Scranton got an offer to embed with the New Hampshire National Guard as they headed to Iraq. She turned it down. Instead, Scranton gave cameras to ten soldiers -- and let them shoot the movie. The result, The War Tapes, premiered this weekend in New York, at the Tribeca Film Festival. It's not only the best documentary to date about the conflict in Iraq. But it just might change the face of journalism in the process.

Most movies about Iraq, so far, have been pretty thin, with little insight into the guys fighting this war, and minimal combat footage. That's largely because the filmmakers didn't have the acess -- or the patience -- to get to the war's meatiest material.

Scranton leapfrogged that problem by letting the soldiers become her cameramen. Shooting over a thousand hours, in the field and back at home, they took the time to cpature their unit's unguarded moments, both literal and metaphorical. The laugh-out-loud moments come almost as often as the IED attacks: the ode to guarding septic trucks; the Tarantino-esque debate over whether a severed limb "resembles hamburger, ground up but uncooked.. [or] like a raw pot roast"; the scorpion-spider cage match; the verge-of-breakup moments with girlfriends; the young Iraqi, who stepped into an American convoy a moment too soon.

The War Tapes benefits from a strong dose of luck. Scranton could've cast a thousand GIs, and not gotten three soldiers as sharp, as articulate, and as funny as Stephen Pink, Zack Bazzi, and Mike Moriarty, the movie's main characters. And she couldn't have known how much action these guys would see -- Al-Anbar province in 2004 saw some of the most ferocious fighting of the counterinsurgency.

But an even larger helping of editorial prowess makes The War Tapes a success. Condensing a thousand hours into two hours is tough. Condensing into two hours with a narrative and emotional arc this strong is damn-near-impossible.

In recent years, there's been a ridiculously cantankerous debate over the benefits of professional journalists versus citizen-reporters. The pros are seen as biased and clueless; the amateurs as, well, amateurish, without the seasoned eye to pick the truly telling moments from the torrent of experience. Take the blogs from frontline troops, for example. The views are a refreshing alternative to what you read in the mainstream press; their anecdotes vital. But getting to that good stuff, sorting out the proverbial wheat from blogosphere chaff, takes forever. Most readers, I've found, just give up.

Documentaries like The War Tapes -- and Grizzly Man, and, to a lesser extent, Capturing the Friedmans -- have found the happy medium between the old- and new-school approaches to news. The citizen-journos collect the facts. The pros craft a story from 'em. The result may not be what the news-gathers expected -- Zack Bazzi was surprised how much of his political views wound up in The War Tapes' final cut. But, in this case at least, it's satisfying and truthful and raw. And it's the kind of journalism we ought to have. With some luck, it may be the kind we get, moving ahead.

Iraqi Police = Shi'ite Militia?

Defense Tech pal Chris Allbritton has a brutal story out of Iraq, on the "growing evidence" that "massacres... are being tolerated and even abetted by Iraq's Shi'ite-dominated police forces, overseen by Iraq's Interior Minister, Bayan Jabr." This is exactly the kind of thing Stephen Biddle warned us about.

On his watch, sectarian militias have swelled the ranks of the police units and, Sunnis charge, used their positions to carry out revenge killings against Sunnis. While allowing an Iranian-trained militia to take over the ministry, critics say, Jabr has authorized the targeted assassination of Sunni men and stymied investigations into Interior-run death squads...

So black is the reputation of the National Police, that after the Feb. 22 bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra, many Sunnis said the perpetrators were Interior Ministry troops who were looking for a pretext to start a civil war. Their fears were further fueled in the bloody two days after the attack, when Iraq became a sectarian slaughterhouse. Instead of protecting citizens from each other, National Police units stood by as Shi'ite rioters — and rival militiamen from Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army — stormed Sunni mosques and swarmed over Sunni neighborhoods, according to numerous reports, including some confirmed by U.S. Gen. George Casey, commander of American forces in Iraq...

[Former National Security Advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority David] Gompert notes, "I remember saying, 'If there is going to be a civil war, it's going to be fought between Sunni insurgents and Shi'ite militias." And as long as Jabr is running the Interior Ministry and its police forces, there is little doubt which of the two in such a conflict will have the law — and American training — on its side.

No Press in Samarra Assault?

Maybe this means something. Maybe it doesn't. But it's interesting to note that Operation Swarmer, the biggest air assault raid in Iraq since '03 -- and certainly the one with the most Iraqi participation -- doesn't have any only has a single embedded reporters along for the ride. (Big ops in the past, like October's Iron Fist, usually have several.)

The Pentagon said there were no reporters embedded with U.S. troops, and it released video and a series of photos of preparations for the assault. The images showed Soldiers receiving a preflight briefing from a UH-60 Blackhawk crew chief, Soldiers and aircraft positioned on an airstrip, and helicopters taking off over a dusty landscape.

UPDATE 2:08 PM: I'm told CNN's Nic Robertson did wind up with an embed, the only one.

UPDATE: 2:10 PM: "According to a colleague of mine from TIME who traveled up [to Smarra] today on a U.S. embassy-sponsored trip, there are no insurgents, no fighting and 17 of the 41 prisoners taken have already been released after just one day," says Chris Allbritton. "The 'number of weapons caches' equals six, which isn’t unusual when you travel around Iraq. They’re literally everywhere. "

(Big ups: Duncan)

Iraq Rebuild More Cash than Marshall Plan?

Adam Rogers is right: "IEEE Spectrum this month has an awesome, awesome article on why we can’t get the electricity on in Iraq."

He pulls out some of the story's juicier tidibits. Stuff like:

* Shortage of power nationwide: 4000 megawatts.

* Amount of power you could generate from the natural gas that gets “flamed off” -- vented and burned — from working oil wells instead of captured: 4000 megawatts.

* Kind of fuel the Iraqis have easy access to: crude oil.

* Kind of fuel the persnickety GE dual-fuel combustion turbines we bought use: diesel or natural gas.

* Cost of bringing high quality diesel, by truck, from the nearest source (Turkey): $85 a barrel.

* Amount of diesel all the fancy new combustion turbines in the country would use if they were up and running, which they aren’t: one tanker-truckful every 45 minutes.

But to me, that most amazing statistic in this numbers-rich article is that "the final [reconstruction] tally might be as high as $100 billion."

As of fall 2005, the United States had spent or committed more than US $20 billion to the effort, other countries had pledged $13.6 billion, and Iraq itself had contributed about $24 billion, including seized assets of Saddam Hussein.... For comparison, in the first two years of their reconstruction after being devastated in wars, Germany, Japan, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan together received a total of $25.6 billion, in 2003 dollars, according to the United States Institute of Peace, a congressionally created organization devoted to conflict resolution. The first European Recovery Program, known as the Marshall Plan, which rebuilt much of Western Europe after World War II, spent the equivalent of about $90 billion in today's dollars between 1948 and 1951.

Insurgents Using Chem Weapons - On Themselves?

This has to be the most bizarre twist in the WMD saga yet. Insurgents in Iraq could very well have chemical weapons. And they may be using them - on themselves.

The story starts over a year ago with a Marine blogger in Iraq. On June 2nd 2004 "The Green Side" - we’ll get back to the signficance of this source later - describes suicidal attacks by insurgents in Fallujah: “We could not understand why they kept coming but they did.” The reason, it turned out, was drugs: “…these ‘holy warriors’ are taking drugs to get high before attacks. It true, as we pushed into the town in April many Marines came across drug paraphernalia (mostly heroin). Recently, we have gotten evidence of them using another drug BZ that makes them high and very aggressive.”

BZ is not your typical substance of abuse. It’s a hallucinogenic chemical weapon. This weird concept originated in the 1950’s when “better living through chemistry” was a slogan to live by and warfare without blood was the goal. As the Washington Star noted in 1965:

New chemical weapons that win by creating confusion rather than death and destruction have proved so successful that they have been quietly added to the Army's arsenal. The latest and best, a gas called BZ by the Army, put a number of soldier guinea pigs out of action during field tests at a Utah Army base last November, and did it without harming a man.”

BZ or "Agent Buzz" is the military name for 3-quinuclidinyl benzillate, an extremely powerful hallucinogen. After experimenting with a whole stash of mind-altering substances including cocaine, heroin and LSD, the Pentagon selected BZ for weaponizing. Its major advantages are that it can easily delivered in an aerosol cloud, and it is very safe. With many substances, the effective dose can be dangerously close to the amount needed to kill - ask any anesthetist. With BZ, the tiny effective dose (maybe two milligrams) is around one-thousandth the lethal dose. It is also odorless and invisible, and there is currently no means of detecting it.

Agent Buzz was tested between 1959 to 1975 on some twenty-eight hundred US soldiers at several locations. It proved extremely effective as an incapacitant. The physical effects are increased heart rates, pupil dilation, blurred vision, dry skin and mouth, increased temperature, and flushing of skin – as a med school mnemonic has it “blind as a bat, dry as a bone, hot as Hades, red as a beet.”

But the psychological effects are more important than the physical ones, as the subject is also rendered “mad as a hatter.”

It also produces uncontrollable aggression, Wouter Basson, the man behind South Africa’s chemical and biological warfare program, notes. His version of BZ, in fact, was modified with CB (Carboxy-Methoxy-Benzoxytropane) specifically to reduce this effect.

The Serb army manual on their BZ munitions implies a violent reaction: “it can be expected that such individuals or groups will subsequently, under the effects of [this chemical agent], inflict great damage and losses on their own forces.”

Over a hundred thousand pounds of BZ were produced by the US. However, it fell out of favor because its effects were considered to be too unpredictable. Destruction of the BZ stockpile commenced in 1988 and was reportedly completed in Pine Bluff in 1990.

Could any be in Iraq? In 1995, the British reported that Iraq had produced Agent 15, similar or identical to BZ, and possessed ‘large stocks’ of it. A later CIA report discounts this and concludes that "Iraq never went beyond research with Agent 15—a hallucinogenic chemical similar to BZ—or any other psychochemical.” The British do not agree and as of the last updated in 2004, the MoD maintains its claim. This would appear to be the most likely source of any insurgent supplies.

I did not initially take the report from The Green Side too seriously. Posted in the form of letters home from a Marine to his Dad, it looked like just keeping in touch with the folks at home and recording a piece of personal history, not an intel report. But the blog turns out to be the work of Lt Col Dave Bellon (right), not just another Marine but intelligence officer for the First Regimental Combat Team. The blog can no longer be easily accessed as it has now disappeared behind a USMC security screen.

Given Lt Col Bellon’s access to inside information, his rather specific claim about BZ becomes more serious. Other US sources do not mention BZ by name but do describe drug use by insurgents.

The account of the November 2004's "Fall of Fallujah" by Bing West in the Marine Corps Gazette mentions “crazies” rushing out in suicidal attacks as well as others “sustained by drugs.”

Elsewhere, Dan Senor, a Senior Advisor from the CPA stated: “Our delegation has been told by Fallujan leaders that many of the individuals involved with the violence are on some - are on various drugs. It is part of what they're using to keep them up to engage in this violence at all hours

Other drugs were clearly involved as well, and Lt Col Bellon’s information about BZ may simply be wrong. But it’s quite possible than coalition troops are facing a number of aggressive, paranoid insurgents, unable to tell friend from foe and unable to realize that there was anything wrong with them, beyond control and hallucinating their worst fears.

Could the guerillas be taking BZ -- sometimes called “the ultimate bad trip” – willingly? This seems unlikely: blurred vision, paranoia and hallucinations are not assets in a firefight. But the British Navy traditionally issued a half-pint ration of rum before action and there were always plenty of takers. In Iraq, cynical leaders might dole out BZ to unwitting cannon-fodder. A homicidally aggressive fighter, even an impaired one, is more useful than one who won’t fight against insane odds. This may remind some people of the fabled assassin cult, but don’t believe everything you read in Dan Brown.

Back during the first Gulf War, some in the tinfoil-hat crowd tried to argue that the US used BZ on Iraqis. Wouter Basson even claims to have found traces of BZ in the urine of supposed victims. As with the other alleged BZ attacks mentioned above there is no independent confirmation of this. And reading the incredible story of Basson’s involvement in the whole area of chemical and biological weapons – mind-boggling only begins to describe it – you can assess his credibility yourself. Anyone making such claims will need solid evidence.

But just in case: if anyone offers you any performance-enhancing substances with the words “Dude, this is weapons grade…” – just say no.

(Speaking of Weapons Grade, my publishers would like me to mention my book of the same title which provides an insight into military high-tech from directed-energy weapons to nanotechnology and how it will change both warfare and civilian life.)

-- David Hambling

Ward to Wingers: Get Lost

The tone is probably a little different from the one I'd take. But I couldn't agree with Military.com editor and (F-14 flyer) Ward Carroll's sentiments more.

As a veteran I'm put off by the rhetoric (and the media's coverage of it) from the far ends of the political spectrum surrounding so-called “support” for the troops. On balance the dialectic is white noise, not to mention by in large disingenuous. The extreme conservative doesn't have the warfighter's best interest in mind any more than the radical liberal does. Sean Hannity is a poseur and Cindy Sheehan is an opportunist. Neither of them knows what its like to serve. (And, by the way, having service members email you does not count as service.)

The draw of service is an intangible, for the most part. You can't read it in a book or see it on a DVD and get it. It lives under lofty tenets like Duty and Honor but it comes down to climbing into the Humvees day after day because the rest of their squad is. Their mission isn't spreading Freedom; their mission is to keep traffic flowing along the airport road. They'll do it, not because the vice president gave them a pep talk from half a planet away, but because the captain told them to and he's a decent leader, even if he doesn't know a thing about hip hop. And they'll do it because a few weeks back a couple of their buddies died when an IED went off next to their vehicle and there's no way they're going to let those insurgent bastards get away with it.

From the safety and quiet of my stateside home I have the luxury of wondering what happened to the moral high ground. I'm dying to know where all the neo-cons went. What happened to Douglas Feith and the spring darlings of 2003 who graced the cover of Vanity Fair and gave whacky press conferences? Goodness gracious, where did they go? And who gave Janeane Garofalo a microphone? Does the majority of the new left not see what a cartoon they are -- like a middle schoolers conception of a Woodstock reunion or a feature length Tommy Hilfiger commercial?

Limelight for Pentagon Withdrawal Plan

A week ago, this blog picked up on something the big media had all-but-ignored: a Pentagon plan to draw the number of U.S. troops down to about 92,000 by the end of next year.

"I would think that the fact that the DOD announced we were lowering the number of troops in Iraq for 2006 would be huge news, but no one seems to care," the site's author, Pierce Wetter, e-mailed me.

That was before Rep. John Murtha's call to bring the troops home. Now, suddenly, withdrawal plans are all the rage. Especially ones "drafted by Gen. John Abizaid and Gen. George Casey, the two top U.S. commanders of the war," as NBC notes.

If Iraqi elections are successful in December and a new parliament seated by January, withdrawal could begin almost immediately. Military officials say it would be an incremental or phased withdrawal — beginning slowly at first, with one or two battalions — up to 2,000 troops at a time.

Entire battalions of soldiers and Marines, now scheduled for duty in Iraq next year, would also be told they don't have to go. Some American troops would be placed on temporary standby in neighboring Kuwait — ready to respond, if needed, to any major outbreaks of violence in Iraq.

THERE'S MORE: In the comments, Murdoc says the 92K number doesn't include Marines... And "Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, addressing the renewed debate over American troops in Iraq, said today that any paring down of the forces there would depend on military and security conditions, and that current troop levels must be maintained at least until the December elections in Iraq," according to the Times.

AND MORE: John Robb, as usual, has smart things to say about this. Particularly, about the natural consequence(s) of the isolation of US decision makers from the external reference environment. Instead of making connections, we severed them," he writes.

This isolation... drove: Bad decision making. The willingness to accept flawed intelligence on Iraq's WMD capabilities. The failure to stop the looting after the invasion. The decision to disband the Iraqi military. The failure to send enough troops.

Ad hoc planning and strategy development. The lack of a plan to win the peace in the Iraq. The plethora of different military plans since then: build Sunni militias (Fallujah), stability for elections and a political solutions, aggressive counter-insurgent sweeps, clear-and-hold (oil-spots), etc.

Inside the "Baghdad Bomb Squad"

After months of preparation, and three weeks in a warzone, my entire trip to Iraq has been boiled down to 29 hours. But that day-and-a-smidge shift with “Team Mayhem,” a U.S. Army bomb squad, winds up being pretty damn action-packed.

Booby traps, smoking mortars, rooftop gunfire, suspected truck bombs, roadside explosives, and an idiosyncratic little robot named “Rainman” all figure prominently in the story, which appears in this month’s Wired magazine. Mostly, though, the article is about the battle of wits that’s being fought between high-tech U.S. military squads and low-tech insurgent bombers. Improvised explosives have become the deadliest threat to soldiers and civilians alike in Iraq. So the winner of this fight largely determines the fate of the counterinsurgency.

But getting a clear picture of this tangle has been tough; military bomb squads, or "explosive ordnance disposal" units, are ordinarily shrouded in secrecy, operating in shadows. This is one of the first times they’ve allowed a reporter in for an extended stay.

So click here for a look inside “The Baghdad Bomb Squad.” Once you’re done, you can take a look at 140 pictures I shot during my time in Iraq. And here are some reports on American troops’ morale, and my online diaries from Iraq. Enjoy…

THERE'S MORE: Capt. Greg Hirschey, the commanding officer of the 717th Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Company (which inlcludes Team Mayhem), just dropped me a line. Two of his sergeants, he said, "were hit with an IED yesterday with injuries to their security element. I just walked into the shop from an incident and received word that our Air Force augmentation team was hit with an IED just minutes ago... It is hectic right now once again. Seems like it never stops. Here is a photo of my shot from this morn."

The Carter Chronicles

It was some time in January of '03, only a few days after Defense Tech went live, that I first got an e-mail from Phil Carter. He dug the site, and I sure liked his blog, Intel Dump. In the two and a half years since, we've become pals. We've shared beers on both coasts. Pigged out at Kosher and Cuban joints. Even split a hotel room, once. More important, maybe, the former Army captain has been a grounding influence on me as I've picked my way through military issues, providing level-headed responses to my not-infrequent hysteria.

So I got a lump in my throat when Phil called me one night, to tell me he was back in the Army, and headed for Iraq.

This week, Phil -- a frequent Slate contributor -- has a week-long diary on his return to uniformed life. It's a must-read.

My dad volunteered to throw a backyard going-away party to gather all my friends and family in one place to send me off. The party started in a fairly jubilant mood, given the occasion; my family doesn't do a lot of big get-togethers, so this was special despite its cause. But as the night went on and people started to leave, and I had to start saying goodbye, the night became much tougher. I had resolved not to drink much because I wanted to remember everyone and everything about my last night in Los Angeles with everyone. But when it came time to hug my grandmother for the last time, I suddenly wished I had finished the case of Sam Adams I had brought. After my family departed, leaving only my close friends, the conversation finally veered to my subject of my deployment itself. I tried to explain as much as I could, but found myself saying "I don't know" more than any other phrase.

By the time the day came to report, I had numbed to the thought of my deployment. My checklist of tasks was complete: I had moved out, closed out my legal practice, hugged my dog, packed my bags, and said my goodbyes. Eventually, the time came to leave. My parents drove me to the airport so I could catch the 4:30 p.m. Southwest flight from Los Angeles to Nashville. We hugged at the curbside briefly, and that was it. I walked into the airport, went through security without a hassle, and sat down at Gate 13 with my bags to wait for the flight. I spent an hour hand-writing my will on the legal pad I had brought with me to write letters home, and then spent the next hour listening to my iPod, trying to relax while waiting for my flight. It would be a while before I saw Los Angeles again.

Lights, Camera, Bombing

John Robb is, as usual, a must-read today. Here's his take on the series of bombings in Baghdad.

The entire event was staged for the benefit for the western reporters who have become virtual prisoners of their hotel rooms in Baghdad (since they couldn't go to the war, the guerrillas brought the war to them). The incident was in clear view of the AP's mounted video camera (which recorded the entire event) -- footage that will be endlessly replayed in newsrooms across the globe...

The effect desired from this highly orchestrated event...as to radically magnify the menace, uncertainty, and mistrust (all of which are aspects of moral conflict) of those in the media. It was also intended to bring those same feelings, by extension, to the public the reporters represent. As an example of tactical innovation by Iraq's open source insurgency, it was brilliant (unfortunately for us). It will set the expectations of the media -- re: this conflict -- for months.

THERE'S MORE: "The more I think about this place and yesterday’s attack on the Palestine/Sheraton compound, the more I feel that it’s time to leave here — and that I’m a coward for thinking that," confesses Defense Tech hero Chris Allbritton, who's spent years reporting from Iraq. "I don’t want to desert this story. I don’t want to let my friends down. I don’t want to leave my staff, who have bravely stuck by us and who can’t leave like I can. But I also don’t want to die for this story."

Metric System

On Oct. 1, his first full day on the job, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace issued an 11-page guidance document to his subordinates. As my colleague Jason Sherman reports, Pace asked a few pointed questions about the administration's war on terror:

“We are now four years into this campaign and should ask ourselves if the changes we have made to date are achieving the necessary effects,” Pace writes. “What additional changes are needed? Is the level of effort reflected in the level of return? How do we measure our progress?”

Sound familiar?

It should. William Arkin, in his Washington Post blog, noted this week that the Pentagon has issued a solicitation asking for "contracted advisory and assistance services" to develop "a system of metrics to accurately assess U.S. progress in the War on Terrorism, identify critical issues hindering progress and develop, and track action plans to resolve the issues identified."

This, Arkin writes, evokes an infamous Donald Rumsfeld memo issued almost a year ago, in which the defense secretary asked direct questions about whether the United States was succeeding in the war on terror -- and called for "metrics" to help find out.

The president, of course, made things sound pretty good yesterday. He must have different metrics.

-- Posted by Dan Dupont

Book Learnin'

Late in 2004, my Inside the Pentagon colleague Elaine Grossman wrote a story about books. Books on Iraq, counterinurgency, military and Middle Eastern history and the like -- all recommended by U.S. officers and other experts for those preparing to operate in Iraq.

The suggestions may also prove useful holiday reading for others seeking greater understanding of what may sometimes seem a confounding and intractable situation in Iraq, involving complex military, political, economic, cultural and historical dimensions.

The story has legs, as they say. It got a lot of attention at the time from a lot of people, but no one, perhaps, took it quite as seriously as Jamie Hailer.

As detailed in this story, Hailer read the list and decided that the many out-of-print and hard-to-find books it contained could, and should, be found and sold. So he started his own company "to ensure that the great military history books of yesterday remain available for the students and scholars of today."

Hailer's first choice for a book to reprint was David Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare" -- because Elaine's story quoted a retired CIA officer who said readers should "run -- not walk -- to the Pentagon library and get in line" for the book, which he called "a primer for how to win in Iraq."

And, predictably, the book is sold out on Hailer's site -- but available here.

THERE'S MORE: The National Defense University maintains a list of military reading lists here.

-- Posted by Dan Dupont

Bedlam Follows Basra Intrigue

Of all the insane stories that have come out of the war in Iraq, this might just be the craziest.

"Two unknown gunmen in full Arabic dress began firing on civilians in central Basra, wounding several, including a traffic police officer," CNN reports. "The two gunmen fled the scene but were captured and taken in for questioning, admitting they were British Marines carrying out a 'special security task.'"

"Iraqi security officials... accused the two Britons they detained of... trying to plant explosives," the Washington Post notes.

Members of the Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to the rebellious Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, then "converged on the police station holding the British men, apparently hoping to seize them in order to free... three colleagues in British custody," the New York Times says. "[They] begun attacking the station with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, and... British troops soon responded to defend it...

"British armored vehicles... fired on the station, headquarters of the major crimes unit in central Basra, and [broke] through its outer wall. Troops then stormed in and freed the two [Marines]."

The pair were "sprung only hours after British forces had encircled the building but were forced to flee by a violent mob hurling stones and Molotov cocktails," the Times of London reports. "Two Iraqi civilians were reportedly killed in the riots, during which two UK Warrior armoured vehicles were set alight."

According to the AP, "150 Iraqi prisoners [also] fled as British commandos stormed inside and rescued their comrades."

THERE'S MORE: The BBC says the marines were actually being held in a militia safehouse. It's one of a number of discrepancies in the news accounts of this confusing story. There are sure to be more.

Juan Cole has put together a timeline of the events, and a possible explanation.

Army Doc: "Bring Us Home"

Captain Daniel Green is an battlefield surgeon, treating soldiers and Iraqi civilians around Baghdad's Green Zone. He has seen more casualties -- and interacted with more Iraqis -- than the vast majority of GIs over there. And that has given the captain a different perspective on this war. He isn't happy with how it's being run. In an e-mail to friends and family back home, Green says that it's time for U.S. forces to get out of Iraq.

I don't rightly know what your US news is saying, but here are a few of my own observations... The US Army is putting forth its main effort to train Iraqi soldiers... It will realistically take years before their Army and police are sufficient to protect the people and resist internal corruption. The reports that the commands are making to the higher-ups are biased and sugar-coated. The corruption is underplayed and the achievements/milestones exaggerated. The results however, may convince Congress and that a successful pull-out is close.

At this point I'd appreciate [it]. I've done my part. I've personally come to the law-of-diminishing-returns. The remaining process will be slow and arduous. Increasing financial expenditures and man-hours are going to be needed to sustain any significant growth.

It's similar to building a house. From the initial ground-breaking to foundation and framing, things seem to go remarkably fast, giving the home owners an unrealistic sense of impending move-in. Then the minor details like outlets, appliances, trim work, and cabinetry begin and little progress is noted after long periods. The tenants-to-be get anxious. The same is taking place here. The American public will not be able to consciously measure our productivity even with the best of media reporting.

Besides, I think the military is the wrong force at this point. We deal effectively with the combat training, but this corruption is a new species. We need Americans more attune to the nuisances of internal governmental fraud...people more like our own lawmakers. Soldiers need to focus on combat, not mafia arbitration.

I witnessed a company commander a few months ago try to expose and bring to justice the perpetrators of an intricately weaved plot of electricity theft. The King-Pin of the scheme was none other than the chairman of the city council. That went over well...

If it moves shoot it. If it doesn't move, shoot it anyway, and leave the rest to the State Department. Bring us home.

THERE'S MORE: As Jon reminds us in the comments, Michael Yon has been doing great fronline blogging from Mosul.

M-4s? Not so Fast...

The Times has an interesting story on American relcutance to give Iraqi army units the machine guns and armored Humvees they want.

Simply put, Iraq remains too fragile for any planner to know what shape the country will be in six months or a year from now - whether it will reach compromises and hold together or split apart in a civil war.

And that presents a conundrum for American military planners. With those questions up in the air, they have to fear that any heavy arms distributed now could end up aimed at American forces or feeding a growing civil conflict. And the longer Iraq's army has to wait for sophisticated weapons, the longer American forces are likely to be needed in Iraq as a bulwark against chaos.

Baghdad Battle, First Hand

Pick up the paper today, and you'll read reports of "fierce gun battles [that] erupted between about 40 insurgents and the police... in western Baghdad."

Here's what those battles looked like, from a soldier who was there. He was kind enough to copy me on an e-mail he wrote home immediately after the fighting.

I just strolled back in to the safety net of my surroundings and have been dragged through chaos the past couple of hours. My brain is still spinning and I am not sure where to even start.

We received a request to conduct a post-blast investigation of a VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device) that detonated near the base camp. The initial report indicated that the target was an Iraqi Police (IP) car. We responded to the incident site and found the smoldering remains of a couple of vehicles in the middle of the road. It appeared at first glance that the only fatalities resulted from the suicide bomber in the car and perhaps the occupants of the IP car. As we walked from our vehicles to the incident site, we heard another car bomb detonating near an IP station approximately 2 kilometers away.

We soon received a request to respond. We quickly finished up with the first incident site, but not before we found additional casualties – persons in the near vicinity. While we prepared for movement to the second site, we heard on the radio that the second site was now getting hit – people were driving past the IP station, and firing RPG's [rocket propelled grenades] at IP's in their vehicles. We conducted movement to the IP station and when we arrived, the scene was full of chaos.

IP's were frantically running down the streets helping injured persons. IP vehicles were speeding up and down the streets looking for the culprits. Vehicles were burning. Gun fire erupted in the background and we just pulled our vehicles into a formation to provide a good tactical posture and prepared to unleash a heavy volley of steel. After everything settled down, we continued to do our work. We found an IED nearby that was meant to add to the attack.

I don't usually write home and talk about the details of specific incidents because I feel compelled to keep the chaos out of the homes of family and friends. But today felt different. I don't know why I had the need or desire to talk about today's events -- other than the fact that perhaps it was time to vent some fumes. All of my soldiers deal with the reality of what we face everyday in different ways. Some have made pacts to not write home and possibly worry family. Perhaps I am wrong in doing so, but I thought I would provide some insight to what you might not see on the news tonight. You will not be able to smell the burnt remains of the suicide bombers or the IP's. You probably won't see the charred remains of persons in the vehicles. And you won't be able to see the full effects of a carefully placed VBIED with a follow-up attack with RPG's and small arms fire.

While writing, I decided to comb through my pictures and add one. But I'll adhere to my promise to not send anything too graphic. Perhaps, if you catch the news, you might just see that suicide bombers once again rocked Baghdad.

U.S. Ships Attacked

"A rocket was fired early today at two American naval ships docked in southern Jordan, killing a Jordanian soldier and marking the first attack on American military ships in the region in five years," the Times reports.

A rocket was fired at the same time from apparently the same area at an airport in a neighboring Israeli port, hitting a stretch of road and wounding a taxi driver, news agencies reported, citing Israeli officials and witnesses. A third projectile was fired at a Jordanian hospital around the southern port of Aqaba but did no damage.

No one claimed immediate responsibility for the simultaneous attacks, which displayed audacity in their use of military-style weapons and techniques. In October 2000, two suicide bombers detonated a launch loaded with explosives next to the American destroyer Cole as it was refueling in a port in Yemen. That attack, which killed 17 people and wounded 39 others, was attributed to Al Qaeda.

The attack today on the American vessels, the dock landing ship Ashland and the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge, took place around 8:44 a.m. and missed two naval ships at dock in Aqaba, said Capt. Ryan Fitzgerald of the United States Air Force, a spokesman for the American military command in the Middle East. The tocket flew over the ships and landed on a warehouse at the pier, he said.

THERE'S MORE: Suspects have been arrested. And the Iraqi Prime Minister is accusing Jordan of allowing Saddam;s family "to finance an insurgent campaign to destabilize Iraq."

Mag: Tehran's Iraq Moves "Rival Those of U.S."

The Times had a titilating piece ten days back about Iran supplying some of the Iraqi insurgency's roadside bombs. Today, Time magazine carries the story about seven football fields further, documenting a wide-scale effort by Tehran to make its presence felt through Iraq.

A TIME investigation, based on documents smuggled out of Iran and dozens of interviews with U.S., British and Iraqi intelligence officials, as well as an Iranian agent, armed dissidents and Iraqi militia and political allies, reveals an Iranian plan for gaining influence in Iraq that began before the U.S. invaded. In their scope and ambition, Iran's activities rival those of the U.S. and its allies, especially in the south.

Read it all.

THERE'S MORE: "The American commander of Multinational Corps Iraq, Army Lt. Gen. John Vines, speaking to reporters from Baghdad June 21, played down the notion of outside [read: Iranian] expertise coming into the country," Defense News observes.

“They are certainly getting some outside advice, but there is some technical expertise that was resident in the Iraqi Army, probably from their explosive ordnance personnel.” He said it is not so much technical sophistication that’s a problem; the lethality of the IEDs comes from a combination of bombs. “The tactical expertise to do that, that capability exists here in the country,” he said.

Big Blast Aftermath

Eric has all the best links. Read deep.

Awful Day

Even though I've been home for five days, my fiancee is still shaken, and frankly a little angry, about my time in Iraq. Her nerves weren't exactly calmed this morning. She woke me up to tell me that a freelance writer, from New York no less, was killed in Basra.

Steven Vincent, author of "In the Red Zone," wrote an op-ed in Sunday's New York Times that lit into British authorities for allowing the local police to be inflitrated by Shi'ite extremists.

An Iraqi police lieutenant, who for obvious reasons asked to remain anonymous, confirmed to me the widespread rumors that a few police officers are perpetrating many of the hundreds of assassinations - mostly of former Baath Party members - that take place in Basra each month. He told me that there is even a sort of "death car": a white Toyota Mark II that glides through the city streets, carrying off-duty police officers in the pay of extremist religious groups to their next assignment.

Yesterday, Vincent was kidnapped "by masked gunman in a pick-up truck as they left a moneychanger's shop... The gunmen may have been in a police vehicle." Vincent's body was found this morning.

Before I left for Iraq, a pair of Marines warned me -- and the crew of young troops they were training -- not to trust the Iraqi army or police forces, under any circumstances. Treat them as hostiles. Too many of them were insurgent agents, only pretending to be on the government's side.

The advice kept going through my head this morning, as I read about Vincent's death, and the ambush of six marine snipers, near Haditha. "The attack is eerily similar to one in nearby Ramadi more than a year ago," MSNBC notes. "In both cases, it's feared the Marines were betrayed by insurgents who had infiltrated the Iraqi military."

When I was in Iraq, I saw the increasing number of patrols by local police and army units as a good thing. Now, in hindsight, I'm not so sure.

London Attacked

"London was struck by a series of at least six separate and apparently coordinated explosions in its subways and buses during the morning rush hour this morning," the Times is reporting.

CNN adds:

The blasts caused chaos and panic across the city, with bloodied survivors emerging from stations and receiving treatment on sidewalks. The mobile phone network was overloaded, and many struggled to even let others know that they were safe.

In the first report of casualties, City of London police told CNN there had been two fatalities at Aldgate east station. At least 90 people are reported to have been injured.

Blair said: "It is reasonably clear there have been a series of terrorist attacks in London." There have been casualties, he said "both people that have died and people seriously injured."

"It's particularly barbaric that this has happened" on a day that people are meeting to deal with world problems at the G8 in Scotland.

THERE'S MORE: As of 12:53pm eastern time, the death toll has risen to 33, according to the Washington Post. The BBC has first-hand reports from victims and from its correspondents.

For the best analysis of the unfolding events in London, however, be sure to check the Counterterrorism Blog. It's got the savviest, most up-to-date analysis I've seen so far. Be sure to check Global Guerillas, as well, to learn why the Tube was targeted.

Iraqi Navy Rises

Getting the Iraqi army ready to fight has been a pretty thankless task for American troops. Maybe they'll have better luck with the Iraq's navy.

"The United States is planning to hand responsibility for securing two major oil platforms back to Iraqi forces by year’s end," Defense Daily reports.

But before the nascent Iraqi navy can handle the job of protecting the facilities, he added, it will need new equipment and additional training... Vice Adm. David Nichols, the commander of the 5th Fleet and head of Naval Forces Central Command, told reporters in a videoconference yesterday...

An April 2004 suicide boat attack on the Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya oil platforms off the coast of Iraq claimed the lives of two U.S. sailors and one Coast Guardsman and caused the loss of hundreds thousands of barrels of oil production... Following the attack, the U.S. military took over responsibility for guarding the terminals from Iraqi forces...

The security handover on the oil terminals, Nichols said, is "probably going to occur late this year, assuming the conditions are right."

According to Nichols, the training and equipping of the Iraqi navy has been a "relatively good news story." The U.K. Royal Navy has taken the lead in training Iraqi patrol boat crews and integrating the vessels into coalition maritime security operations.

Training a new Iraqi navy, Nichols acknowledged, is a far less daunting task than standing up a new Iraqi army and police, an effort being led by Army Lt. Gen. David Petraeus. The Iraqi navy has only about 800 personnel, and about a half dozen patrol boats, along with smaller craft vessels used in inland waterways.

"Given the size of the Iraqi navy, it’s a relatively easier and more straightforward issue than Dave Petraeus has with the significantly larger Iraqi army force," Nichols said.

The Iraqis are building some additional patrol boats, and while Nichols said their navy does not have any "grandiose plans" for acquisition [buying new ships], it could use some logistics support ships to provide refueling and maintenance services for some of these smaller boats.

Nichols said there had been no additional attacks on Iraq’s sea oil terminals since the April 2004 incident, but added: "We know through intelligence that the terrorists have notional plans, desire, to attack targets in the maritime environment, including key oil infrastructure."

Torture, Broken Down

So much of what passes for online journalism -- this site included -- is really just old-fashioned newspaper or magazine reporting, ported from the page to the screen. And the few lame attempts by the mainstream press to break out of those formats usually leave readers panting for the old stand-bys.

Slate's "interactive primer on American interrogation," however, is different. By breaking a large, messy, complex issue into digestible online bites, Phil Carter and friends succeed in educating readers on the torture debate better than any TV show or magazine article or blog post I've seen so far.

Every major player in the American interrogation scandals is profiled. All the legal justifications for torture are called out. Each of the big techniques for getting a suspect to talk is outlined. But despite the motherlode of information, Slate's feature isn't in the slightest bit overwhelming.

If you've largely tuned out the torture issue since those awful Abu Ghraib pictures surfaced last year, it's time to click here.

SOLDIERS' STORIES, COLLECTED

On a bad-ass scale of one to ten, flying a Black Hawk over Iraq rates about a twelve to me. Which is what Chief Warrant Officer Gordon Cimoli did for ten months back in 2003. So I'm figuring that Iraq: Providing Hope, the new book from Cimoli and 50 other soldiers who've been stationed in Iraq, is packed with good stories. (His online diaries sure are.)

TIKRIT, CLOSE UP

Assaulting islands on the Tigris River, defusing roadside bombs, collecting guerillas' weapons caches -- it's all in a couple week's work for one Army unit, stationed in Tikrit. Random Probabilities has the first-hand account, plus a slew of pics. (via Winds of Change)

IRAQ'S NEW WAR PLAN

The situation in Iraq seems to settled considerably in recent months, with the January elections there being credited for the calm. But a new U.S. military battle plan probably had something to do with it, too. Especially since "prior to a February revision... the secret blueprint lacked detailed mileposts for achieving security in the war-torn nation," according to Inside Defense.

The top U.S. officer in Iraq, Army Gen. George Casey, issued his first campaign plan in August 2004, just one month after becoming commander of Multinational Forces Iraq, or “MNF-I,” according to Air Force Col. Robert Potter, the general’s spokesman in Baghdad.

Officials privy to the document say it contained an array of lofty objectives, like bringing stability to the nation and transitioning security responsibilities to newly trained Iraqi forces. But it offered unit commanders virtually no guidance on how to implement the goals and laid out no time lines, officials say.

“You had a classified campaign plan,” said one retired officer who has worked in Iraq. “It was dense. It was strategically broad. It almost didn’t mean a thing...”

Casey’s earlier plan depicted multinational security operations in Iraq along a military concept for “lines of operation,” in which activities are segmented into discrete baskets like civil affairs, counterinsurgency operations, logistics, economic reconstruction and the like, according to defense officials.

“None of these things are connected,” one source recalls an officer at Casey’s headquarters acknowledging. “They didn’t understand the enemy and didn’t frame it the right way” in Casey’s first plan, said this former officer. “It was many things but it was not a counterinsurgency plan.”

The new edition “adds milestones and what we call cradle-to-grave processes,” Janke said. It offers “the big picture view” and tells unit commanders, “Now we’re going to give you direction,” he said...

Many in Casey’s headquarters were resistant to embracing the new tack, defense officials tell ITP... Casey’s deputy chief of staff for strategy, plans and assessment -- was advocating a major change that would make Iraq operations more unified around the counterinsurgency effort. The Army-dominated bureaucracy at Casey’s headquarters was pushing back, this official said.

“It was a big shift for people to say, ‘OK, now we’re in an insurgency,’” said an Army officer interviewed last month.

Heading into the first weeks of February, there still was “not a consensus inside MNF-I headquarters about the idea of what priorities MNF-I should pursue,” a former military officer said...

“It’s dawning on [senior leaders] what they’re dealing with now” is a full-blown counterinsurgency campaign to which all other objectives in Iraq must be linked, the official said.

The military blueprint that Casey’s August plan replaced -- a January 2004 document issued by Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then the top general in Iraq -- offered even less insight on how the U.S.-led counterinsurgency effort was to succeed, defense officials say...

By spring of last year, “the Sanchez campaign plan was thrown out” and officers in Iraq were being told “there was none,” recalls one officer who recently returned from the region.

Over the ensuing 12 months, as casualties have mounted, the focus in Iraq has largely shifted from broad security and reconstruction tasks to fighting a war against the insurgency, according to officials in the region. Casey’s challenge now is to apply the resources -- both funds and troops -- in the right places to fulfill U.S. military objectives, defense sources say.

PENTAGON ADMITS IRAQI TROOP LACK

During the 2004 election, the President and his team talked endlessly about the countless battalions of Iraqi troops that were helping out the coalition in its counterinsurgency fight. On May 15 of last year, for example, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told Wolf Blitzer that "we now have 200,000 Iraqi security forces that are out there providing security in their country, and frankly, being killed themselves."

But the Pentagon's supplemental budget bill, released yesterday, shows just how hollow those words were. In fact, the Defense Department now admits in a $5.7 billion request to train local troops, there are hardly any Iraqi forces that are able to put up a fight.

The Iraqi Interim and Transitional Governments, with Coalition assistance, have fielded over 90 battalions in order to provide security within Iraq during a period of an intense counterinsurgency campaign that was designed to suppress the development of democracy. All but one of these 90 battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed, and have very limited mobility and sustainment capabilities. These limitations, coupled with a more resilient insurgency than anticipated when the Iraqi Security Forces were initially designed, have led the Prime Minister of Iraq to request forces that can participate in the "hard end" of the counterinsurgency, and to do so quickly. (Emphasis mine. And yeah, I caught the little Bushism, too.)

SOMETHING BEAUTIFUL

As most regular readers know, I've been extremely skeptical about American involvement in Iraq. The White House's justification for going to war always seemed shaky to me; its execution, nearly as wobbly.

But the sight of so many Iraqis risking their lives to vote yesterday, that was beyond inspirational. And I have to give the President and his team credit here. They had the collective stones to stick with these elections -- even when seizures of violence made the plan look like fantasy. And they had foresight to predict the electrifying power of the ballot in Iraq -- no matter how confused, how rushed, or how scary the election may have been.

In Iraqis, the White House saw a group who couldn't wait to grab control of their lives, after so many years without leverage at all. The President's people were right. And, as a result, something beautiful happened on Sunday.

Here's how one friend, who's been helping the Iraqis set up these elections, described yesterday's events:

Today was a day for voters and electoral workers, and both groups exceeded expectations. Throughout the day, we worked the phones to get updates from friends and associates across Iraq. The phrasing of one seemed to have been echoed by many: “we heard explosions and gunfire, but we were together and were not afraid.” A quintessential example of what happened here today is relayed in an anecdote from Quadisiyah, a district of Baghdad at the end of the peninsula. Voters lined up outside a polling station and then scattered when an insurgent appeared down the street with an RPG and fired. The grenade missed its target, and an hour later the voters regrouped, in greater numbers, to finish the job.

Nearly forty died across Iraq today in the violence that had been promised. Nine suicide bombers also visited polling stations. Insurgents chased down voters exiting polling stations and hit them with grenades. And there were mortars. They waited an hour or so until after the polling stations opened here before hitting in force. And then there was silence, and in that silence, a people beset by hardship went about the business of self-expression. The honor of the fallen was upheld by the undeterred.

A couple weeks ago, a bright young friend of mine asked me “who is this Ben Franklin guy?” I asked what made him wonder and he said, still staring at his internet screen, “because he said that people who think there is a choice between security and liberty deserve neither—I think that’s pretty cool, would there be any problem with my printing this out and hanging it on the wall?” No problem at all, Mohammed, print away.

MARINE HELO DOWN; 31 DEAD

This is awful, just awful. Let's hope these numbers are off.

A U.S. Marine helicopter transporting troops crashed Wednesday in the desert of western Iraq, killing 31 people, American military officials said. It was the deadliest crash of a U.S. military helicopter in Iraq.

A Pentagon source said the helicopter was a CH-53 Sea Stallion, which is normally configured to carry 37 passengers, but can take up to 55. There was no immediate word on how many people were on board or what caused the crash.

The military officials did not specify the nationalities of those on board or say how many were soldiers.

It was the biggest loss of life in a helicopter crash in Iraq -- and could be the deadliest single incident for American forces since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003.

THERE'S MORE: Back in August, a Sea Stallion crashed in Okinawa; thankfully, no one was killed. But that same month, two Marines died when their CH-53 copter went down over Iraq's Al-Anbar province. In 2002, two more lost their lives when the newer, Super Stallion version of the aircraft broke down in Afghanistan.

SUPER, JUST SUPER

For all four of you who still believe everything is going along swimmingly in Iraq, here's a sample of today's headlines:

- Rumsfeld Seeks Broad Review of Iraq Policy
- Some Iraq Areas Unsafe for Vote, U.S. General Says
- Temporary Troop Increase for Army May Become Permanent
- After Leveling City, U.S. Tries to Build Trust
- 9 GIs Die in Iraq

MOSUL: MORE THAN TRAGEDY

The awful events yesterday in Mosul meant more than just tragedy for 14 American soldiers' families and friends. The attack on Forward Operating Base Marez is a harbinger of even worse things to come in Iraq, Tom Ricks argues in a must-read story in today's Washington Post:

The major difference between the latest attack and the earlier incidents is that it was an attack on a U.S. base, rather than on troops in transit in vulnerable aircraft. That difference appears to reflect both the persistence of the insurgency and its growing sophistication, as experts noted that it seemed to be based on precise intelligence. Most disturbingly, some officers who have served in Iraq worried that the Mosul attack could mark the beginning of a period of even more intense violence preceding the Iraqi elections scheduled for Jan. 30.

"On the strategic level, we were expecting an horrendous month leading up to the Iraqi elections, and that has begun," retired Army Col. Michael E. Hess said.

Jeffrey White, a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst of Middle Eastern military affairs, said he is especially worried that the insurgents' next move will be an actual penetration by fighters into a base. "The real danger here is that they will mount a sophisticated effort to penetrate or assault one of our camps or bases with a ground element," he said...

The attack also indicates that the insurgency is growing more sophisticated with the passage of time. One of the basic principles of waging a counterinsurgency is that it requires patience. "Twenty-one months" -- the length of the occupation so far -- "is not a long time to tame the tribal warfare expected there," said retired Marine Lt. Col. Rick Raftery, an intelligence specialist who operated in northern Iraq in 1991. "My guess is that this will take 10 years."

Another principle, less noted but painfully clear yesterday, is that insurgents also tend to sharpen their tactics as time goes by. Over the past 20 months, enemy fighters have learned a lot about how the U.S. military operates and where its vulnerabilities lie.

"The longer you are anywhere, the more difficult it becomes," said Hess, who served in northern Iraq in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1996. "They have changed their tactics a lot in the year-plus."

THERE'S MORE: "Worried about recent artillery attacks on American mess halls in Iraq, the U.S. military was just days away from completing a reinforced dining area at the camp where a rocket attack killed more than 20 people in a tent the bunker was meant to replace."

AND MORE: The Mosul blast now appears to have been the work of a suicide bomber. And that's even worse news than a rocket attack. Because it means that insurgents are slipping into American bases, the Times explains.

The announcement on Wednesday of the likely cause of the Mosul attack produced a new source of concern by leaving a crucial question unanswered: How was the attacker able to infiltrate a heavily guarded military base in one of the most hostile regions of Iraq?

It also raised the possibility that one of the most commonly discussed fears of American soldiers stationed at forward operating bases in Iraq had come true - that an Iraqi or other foreign worker had been able through special access, knowledge and privileges to sabotage the troops he was supposed to be serving.

Other heavily guarded compounds have been infiltrated, including the main American governmental zone in Baghdad, where suicide bombers killed five people in October. But the attack on Tuesday far exceeded the size and devastation of any previous strike on American troops within a secured compound.

"I've been expecting it," said Wayne Downing , a retired four-star Army general who headed the inquiry into the bombing at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996. "They're trying to get in. We have a terrible problem. We have all this indigenous labor. We don't wash our dishes, cook our own food. When you bring indigenous laborers into camps, you immediately have a security problem."

INSIDE FALLUJAH'S INSURGENCY

IED factories, packed with radios and plastic explosives. Martyr training manuals. Illicitly-used mosques, pinpointed on a map.

That's all part of an eye-popping PowerPoint presentation, obtained by Military.com, "Telling the Story of Fallujah to the Word." Allegedly created by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the Multi-National Corps - Iraq, the slide show is meant to catalog just how venomous insurgent forces in Fallujah had become.

Sixty percent of Fallujah's mosques had fighting positions within them, according to "Telling." That's a violation of the laws of war. 203 weapons caches were found dotted around the city. 653 IEDs were discovered – as well as 11 factories for building the bombs.

The presentation also shows ledgers, supposedly tracking foreign fighter in the city, evidence of torture chambers, and a rundown of the weapons confiscated by American and Iraqi government troops. Grisly stuff, especially for a holiday weekend. But well worth the 3MB download.

THERE'S MORE: The bosses here have turned that PowerPoint beast into good ol' HTML. So now there's no excuse the check it out.

AND MORE: A review of Palestinian militants' stockpiles and production facilities, produced by a former Israeli Army soldier, is here.

ARMY'S INSURGENT MANUAL AUTHOR SPEAKS

Last week, Defense Tech took a look at the Army's new field manual for Counterinsurgency Operations – and how that guide seemed, at first blush, to be at odds with the assault on Fallujah.

The story kicked up a nice little dust-up over on the new Defense Tech forum. One of the people who weighed in: Lt. Col. Jan Horvath, with the Army's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate. He's the man who led the team that put together the counterinsurgency manual, "FM-I 3-07.22."

Lt. Col. Horvath and I have traded e-mails a few times this week. I've parsed the conversation into a Q & A. In it, he's sometimes critical of U.S. operations in Iraq -- the Fallujah strike should have emphasized "operational secrecy and surprise," for example. But he finds a lot of good in how American troops are handling this ongoing guerilla war.

DEFENSE TECH: Who put together this manual? And what is it supposed to be used for? Is it some kind of academic exercise, or does it really guide troops on the ground?

JAN HORVATH: The FM-I is a collaborative product developed primarily by the U.S. Army but in collaboration with the USMC [U.S. Marine Corps], the [Army's] Special Warfare Center and the British Army.

The FM-I is NOT academic. It applies lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures to articulate what we learned in Vietnam, El Salvador, Afghanistan and Iraq and what others learned in Colombia, and Northern Ireland. It is descriptive and not prescriptive. The FM-I recognizes each environment (and for that matter each day) is unique.

I believe we all recognize doctrine has rarely ever been an American strength. However, the FM-I is just a good, first-draft for the field manual we are now writing.

Did we miss anything? Of course, we only had five months to research and write it. What are we adding? An operational and theater strategic focus and guidelines, near state-of-the-art intelligence analysis, [and] principles for training indigenous security forces. Tactically, [we missed] the "swarm" attack, urban operations (going through walls rather than down the street); logistics, Intel[ligence] analysis, and the media and communications. After all, if counterinsurgency is a war of ideas, we better win the formulation and communication of those ideas.

The Army refers to me as the author of FM-I 3-07.22 -- I am not. I am the leader of an informal, distributed, team that put the material together and then shaped it into a coherent (and what we regard as a useful) product.

DT: But the manual is already being challenged, in some ways, by events in the field, right? For example, FM-I suggests commanders should "concentrate on elimination of the insurgents, not on terrain objectives" and "get counterinsurgency forces out of garrisons, cities, and towns." Doesn't the Fallujah attack run counter to these suggestions?

JH: No, I do not believe the Fallujah attack runs counter to these recommendations. Why not? An imperative is to eliminate insurgent sanctuaries. Fallujah is the primary sanctuary from which most insurgent political direction emanated. The armed supporters of that specific counter-state had to be broken and eliminated. The political and ideological apparatus will be eliminated in Fallujah over the next 6 months.

Our military's role is to secure the populace from insurgent violence and intimidation, therefore, influence. In securing the people, we must separate them from the insurgents. We do this by patrolling everywhere, talking with the people, and earning a modicum of trust. After all, we don't want anything from them... except information. Our very presence (on-the-spot) should disrupt the insurgents' influence and movements.

We learned from an earlier misstep when we attacked the insurgents too soon in Samarra. Yes, we won. However, we left the area and did not remain to secure the local populace AND the police. The insurgents came back, attacked the police and intimidated their way back into authority. The next attack had to wait until the militia and police we were training were trained and capable of effectively defending the people and area, initially with our assistance, after our successful attack. Then, soldiers and militia attacked in the middle of the night together, and surprise and disruption reigned. We still own the people of Samarra, and the city is no longer a sanctuary.

DT: So what do you see as the big issues ahead as the U.S. fights the Iraq insurgency?

JH: Operationally, there are two issues. We must eliminate all sanctuaries, and we must permanently sever the lines-of-communication and supply from Syria through Ar-Ramadi to Baghdad -- darn near done. We did not do this in Vietnam.

Second, we must effectively eliminate all enemy insurgents that will prevent or interfere with the Iraqi Govt establishing a strong presence in Fallujah that provides security for the residents while separating them permanently from the insurgents -- critical, and we are successfully creating those conditions.

Tactically, we haven't used firepower to flatten Fallujah as we applied in Hue, Vietnam to destroy the VC [Viet Cong] battalions during Tet in 1968. We have used distributed, networked systems (drones and long-range surveillance, and eyeballs to ID where the enemy is followed by precision FA [field artillery] and tanks, LAVs [light armored vehicles], BFVs [Bradley Fighting Vehicles] and sniper and rifle fires to kill them.

We should move along a city block by moving inside buildings and through walls more. However, more residents might have become injured. We must still find the two leaders of the Fallujah Muj[hadeen] -- an Imam and a Sheikh -- regardless of where they have fled in Iraq or Iran, and assist them in their rapid transition to Paradise.

We [also] missed on the operational secrecy and surprise, but we will continue to tactically surprise. [FM-I counsels U.S. commanders to "emphasize secrecy and surprise" during their attacks. But the build-up to Fallujah was long and noisy -- ed.]

Yes, we must still root out the counter-state infrastructure in Fallujah using population resource control. [That's a] mechanism to collect social and economic intelligence... The Nazi's Gestapo and the Eastern European communists were the best at this. Without becoming tainted or infected by their methods and attitudes, we have picked up some of their systems and processes.

We rarely have an opportunity to plan and execute such operations -- this is exactly one of those opportunities. [It'll take] 6-12 months [for this to work].

Otherwise, I appreciate our military leaders' application of the principles and common sense. They are smart enough to have teams following the soldiers to provide food and blankets, medical care, and basic services as well as turning power and water on in areas we have secured.

We won't convince everybody overnight we mean them well, but we can provide a stark contrast -- deeds, not words. Fortunately, people will always demonstrate their intentions for us. What we must demonstrate very quickly is the Iraqi Government is legitimate, and we are not the same though our goals and objectives are complementary. Then perhaps, the Iraqi people can show us whether they have the capacity for freedom, or not.

After all, freedom is never free.

MORE FROM FALLUJAH

- The Washington Post hops in a M109 Paladin self-propelled howitzer, stationed just outside of Fallujah.

- The Chicago Tribune rolls with a Bradley fighting vehicle crew, on the lookout for snipers.

- The New York Times gets pinned down, with 150 marines, by a lone Iraqi sharpshooter.

- "Some artillery guns fired white phosphorous rounds that create a screen of fire that cannot be extinguished with water," the San Francisco Chronicle finds. "Insurgents reported being attacked with a substance that melted their skin, a reaction consistent with white phosphorous burns." (via Boing Boing)

FALLUJAH PUSH: BY THE BOOK?

Maybe this means something. I'm more than willing to believe it doesn't. But I found it a little odd that the U.S. military's push into Fallujah seems to be almost 180 degrees opposed to the tactics and techniques laid out in the Army's new Counterinsurgency Operations field manual.

In Fallujah, if the news reports are to be believed, U.S. armed forces are engaged in a classic, house-to-house battle, to remove Fallujah as a guerilla base of operations. Overwhelming firepower, and manpower, have been brought to bear – gunships and artillery, more than ten thousand soldiers and marines. For months, everyone has known the attack was coming.

Now look at what the manual – unearthed by Inside the Pentagon and Secrecy News – suggests for counterinsurgent "Offensive Operations":

• Concentrate on elimination of the insurgents, not on terrain objectives…

• Get counterinsurgency forces out of garrisons, cities, and towns; off the roads and trails into the environment of the insurgents…

• Avoid establishment of semipermanent patrol bases laden with artillery and supplies that tend to tie down the force. (Pay special attention to prevent mobile units from becoming fixed.)

• Emphasize secrecy and surprise…

• Judicious application of the minimum destruction concept in view of the overriding requirements to minimize alienating the population. (For example, bringing artillery or air power to bear on a village from which sniper fire was received may neutralize insurgent action but will alienate the civilian population as a result of casualties among noncombatants.)

Doesn't sound quite the same, does it?

Now, of course, no battle is fought exactly "by the book." And the field manual's section on "Clear and Hold" operations – aimed at dislodging guerillas from an area they control – does feel a bit more like the Fallujah push. There are calls for "military forces clearly superior to the insurgent force," "emergency legislation to provide a legal basis for population and resource control measures," and "psychological preparation of the population of adjacent areas." That's reminiscent of the build-up of U.S. troops, the recent declaration of a state of emergency by Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Alawi's, and of the long, slow ratcheting up of pressure on Fallujah.

But that section also warns that "no area or its population that has been subjected to the intensive organizational efforts of a subversive insurgent organization can be won back until… the insurgent hard-core organization and its support structure has been neutralized or eliminated." And given the U.S. Army's admission that insurgent leaders like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi likely slipped out of Fallujah before the attack, that seems like a goal that will remain outstanding.

THERE'S MORE: "I'm sure the commanders know the manual," says Winds of Change's Joe Katzman. "I suspect that political constraints made a number of its prescriptions moot, or that the commanders decided to treat it as a conventional urban warfare pitched battle. It happens, and I'm reluctant to second guess people on the ground who have all the facts, but it's good to know what's in that manual."

LIGHT RESISTANCE, BAD NEWS?

Already ten soldiers have lost their lives during the fighting in Fallujah. But, according to the L.A. Times, "U.S. military leaders said that overall, resistance was lighter than expected and the advance was proceeding more quickly than anticipated."

And that may be the bad news. As I mentioned yesterday, a relatively easy fight -- and this is all relative here -- would probably mean that the hardest of the hard-core insurgents are skipped out of town before the G.I.s came barreling in.

An American general admitted as much yesterday, the New York Times reports.

Insurgent leaders in Falluja probably fled before the American-led offensive and may be coordinating attacks in Iraq that have left scores dead over the past few days, according to American military officials here... "I personally believe some of the senior leaders probably have fled," Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Metz, commander of the multinational forces in Iraq, said in a video conference with reporters on Tuesday. "I would hope not, but I've got to assume that those kinds of leaders understand the combat power we can bring."

Insurgent attacks continued to exact a heavy toll across Iraq on Tuesday. Two American soldiers died in a mortar attack in Mosul, where government authority appears to be ebbing. Gunmen assassinated a senior government official in Samarra. Guerrillas fired mortars at police stations in downtown Baghdad while hundreds of fighters massed in the center of the provincial capital of Ramadi, just 30 miles west of Falluja.

A suspected car bombing outside an Iraqi National Guard base in Kirkuk killed three people and wounded two others, Reuters reported. The attacks on Tuesday followed several others over the weekend, both in Baghdad and the Sunni triangle.

The American military said on Tuesday that six people had been killed in the car bomb attack Monday night outside Yarmouk Hospital in Baghdad. Five were Iraqi policemen, and the sixth was a civilian, the military said. In the two church bombings the same night, one Iraqi was killed and several wounded, and one of the bombers was disguised as an Iraqi policeman, according to a report put out by a Western security contractor.

This spate of what appear to be coordinated attacks, as well as the dispersal of top insurgent leaders, suggests that the Falluja offensive alone will not crush an insurgency that has been gathering strength. And it raises the prospect that insurgents will try to regroup and infiltrate Falluja after the fighting is over, as they have done in Samarra.

FALLUJAH: PLEASE, NO CAKEWALKS

As you'd expect, the reports from the first day of fighting in Fallujah have been confusing and contradictory. The New York Times describes an hours-long fight for "one house" by a group of 150 marines, while in another part of town, American units had pushed as far as 800 yards into the city. The Washington Post blandly states that "troops encountered some resistance in the first hours of the battle."

We all want as many of our troops as possible to come home from this fight safe. But I, for one, am hoping U.S. soldiers and marines don't have too easy of a time in Fallujah. And before you press "send" on that hate mail, let me explain why.

The goal of the Fallujah attack is to wipe out an insurgent stronghold. But that aim will only be met if the insurgents actually stick around and fight. That's not a standard tactic in the guerilla playbook, however. Insurgents traditionally avoid those kind of direct confrontations, opting for the hit-and-run or the terror attack instead. Just look at what happened recently in the Iraqi town of Samarra: American forces easily "take" from the rebels in October; by November, the place is back to being a terror hotspot.

If Fallujah varies from this norm, the fighting there could be brutal. American technological advantages in communications and battlefield awareness tend to crumble in urban canyons. But at least it could prove decisive.

Now, there are some signs that the hard-core, religiously-inspired insurgents have decided to stick around. The Post caught up with a dozen rebel fighters before the shooting started, and the paper found "a new generation of the jihad diaspora, arriving in Fallujah from all over the Arab world: five Saudis, three Tunisians, a Yemeni. Only three were Iraqis." These Associated Press pictures seem to tell a story of seasoned insurgents.

But John Robb, at the always-insightful Global Guerillas blog, isn't so sure. "Some insurgents will stay for the fight (as payment for the support provided and/or due to a strong affection for the city's people)," he writes. But "most of the people and equipment we want to kill or capture is already gone. The US/Iraqi government telegraphed their desire to retake the city months ago. Further, many other locations are available" for the guerillas to operate in.

Robb instead predicts a battle "against local boys, organized by neighborhood, mosque, family, or tribe…people that are fighting for their homes."

Let's hope he's wrong.

THERE'S MORE: "U.S. and Iraqi forces have faced less resistance than expected and suffered minimal casualties, a commander [told CNN] Tuesday, as the troops continue their second day of assaults on militant-controlled Falluja."

WHO ARE IRAQ'S 36TH?

So the assault on Fallujah is underway, with the taking of the town's hospital, "a refuge for insurgents and a center of propaganda against allied forces," according to the Times.

Joining in the attack were "two companies from the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion." It's a group that's mentioned constantly in war reports from Iraq -- most recently, in last month's (very temporary) taking of Samarra.

So who are these guys? Defense Tech recently spoke with an Army officer, present at the 36th's creation, to get the scoop.

"The 36th was originally known as the 'political battalion,'" he said. That's because it was formed from the militias of five major political groups in Iraq: Iyad Alwai's Iraq National Accord (INA), Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress (INC), the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which backs Ayatollah Ali Sistani, and the two main Kurdish groups, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). About 110 soldiers were originally culled from each group.

Because of the group's diverse roots, it's supposed to be the "most reliable" of the Iraqi forces. But, in reality, only a segment of the 36th has really been trustworthy – the Kurdish fighters known as pesh merga. In an early operation, the U.S. Army officer recalls, about 60 of SCIRI's soldiers fled; so did 30-40 each from the INA and INC. But between the two Kurdish groups, only 11 dropped out, total.

Further battles have, hopefully, hardened the 36th's resolve. But they likely haven't eased the resentment that Iraqi Arabs feel towards the Kurds, and their participation in the unit. "I will send my brothers north to kill the Kurds," a Fallujah insurgent told the Washington Post (via Iraq'd), after the April assault on the city, to which the 36th contributed.

"The 36th was supposed to grow and become the center of the [Iraqi] national armed forces, not beholden to the warlord leaders," the U.S. Army officer notes. But with these warlords jockeying for position in advance on the January elections – and with Arab-Kurd tension still running high – the 36th remains a fractured group, still loyal to their chieftains. "We're coming to depend on them," the American officer says, "And they're not beholden to the central government."

THERE'S MORE: Back to Iraq's Chris Allbritton reminds us that the 36th's "Kurdish members also have a reputation for brutality, and [for] shooting anyone in the field of fire. The Kurds don't mind killing a few civilian Arabs -- it's payback time."

EXPLOSIVE PROBLEMS

NBC now says that the 380 tons of missing Iraqi explosives might have vanished before the U.S. invasion. If true, it's a small comfort -- the bottom line is, the insurgents there now have the stuff, to go along with their giant bankroll, swelling manpower, and seemingly-impermeable command structure.

Besides, the NBC story -- now being pushed by conservative commentators -- doesn't quite hold together, Josh Marshall believes.

On Monday, the Pentagon gave mixed signals about what the first troops on the scene found. Or rather, an official whom the AP describes as closely involved in the Iraq survey work says the explosives were there, while Pentagon spokesman Larry Di Rita says they weren't.

Di Rita's claim that the explosives were already gone was picked up this evening by NBC news which reported that one of its news crews embedded with the 101st Airborne visited the facility on April 10th and found no weapons...

[But] military and non-proliferation analysts say that a detachment of soldiers not specifically trained in weapons inspections work and certainly an NBC news crew simply wouldn't be in a position to make such a determination. We're not talking about a storage unit with a few boxes in it, but a massive weapons complex made up of almost a hundred buildings and bunkers.

Former weapons inspector David Albright was asked about this on CNN Monday evening and he said, "I would want to check it out. I mean it's a big site. These bunkers are big and it could get lost in that complex and it may be that they just didn't go to the right places and didn't see it."

THERE'S MORE: "There wasn't a search," says the NBC news producer with the 101st when it stopped at the weapons dump. "The mission that the brigade had was to get to Baghdad. That was more of a pit stop there for us. And, you know, the searching, I mean certainly some of the soldiers head off on their own, looked through the bunkers just to look at the vast amount of ordnance lying around. But as far as we could tell, there was no move to secure the weapons, nothing to keep looters away. But there was – at that point the roads were shut off. So it would have been very difficult, I believe, for the looters to get there."

IRAQ EXPLOSIVES CACHE LOOTED

The New York Times is reporting that " nearly 380 tons of powerful conventional explosives - used to demolish buildings, produce missile warheads and detonate nuclear weapons - are missing from one of Iraq's most sensitive former military installations."

The huge facility, called Al Qaqaa, was supposed to be under American military control but is now a no-man's land, still picked over by looters as recently as Sunday. United Nations weapons inspectors had monitored the explosives for many years, but White House and Pentagon officials acknowledge that the explosives vanished after the American invasion last year...

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publicly warned about the danger of these explosives before the war, and after the invasion it specifically told United States officials about the need to keep the explosives secured, European diplomats said in interviews last week. Administration officials say they cannot explain why the explosives were not safeguarded, beyond the fact that the occupation force was overwhelmed by the amount of munitions they found throughout the country.

Josh Marshall has more, including this heartwarming tidbit:

The Defense Department has been trying to keep this secret for some time. The DOD even went so far as to order the Iraqis not to inform the IAEA that the materials had gone missing. Informing the IAEA, of course, would lead to it becoming public knowledge in the United States.

The Times notes that "the bomb that brought down Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 used less than a pound of the material of the type stolen from Al Qaqaa." Now, the insurgents have something like 700,000 times that amount at their disposal, to go along with their ocean of cash, and increasingly sophisticated tactics like these. Bad. Very, very bad. Andrew Sullivan hits in on the head:

In terrorist-ridden Iraq, the possibility of serious weaponry falling into the hands of the enemy and being deployed against American troops and conceivably American citizens is unforgivable. The whole point of the invasion was to prevent this kind of transfer from taking place. Yet, thanks to this administration, it may have precipitated it.

THERE'S MORE: Juan Cole points out that this is one of several "missing deadly weapons" scandals to break in Iraq. In the middle of the month, we heard about the nuclear equipment buildings that simply disappeared from the world's satellite screens. And in the summer of 2003, we learned that radioactive materials -- good for a dirty bomb -- had vanished from Iraq's al-Tuwaitha facility.

GEAR LACK ALMOST STOPPED IRAQ OPS

"The top U.S. commander in Iraq complained to the Pentagon last winter that his supply situation was so poor that it threatened Army troops' ability to fight," the Washington Post's Tom Ricks reports.

The lack of key spare parts for gear vital to combat operations, such as tanks and helicopters, was causing problems so severe, Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez wrote in a letter to top Army officials, that "I cannot continue to support sustained combat operations with rates this low."

Senior Army officials said that most of Sanchez's concerns have been addressed in recent months but that they continue to keep a close eye on the problems he identified. The situation is "substantially better" now, said Gary Motsek, deputy director of operations for the Army Materiel Command.

Sanchez, who was the senior commander on the ground in Iraq from the summer of 2003 until the summer of 2004, said in his letter that Army units in Iraq were "struggling just to maintain... relatively low readiness rates" on key combat systems, such as M-1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, anti-mortar radars and Black Hawk helicopters.

He also said units were waiting an average of 40 days for critical spare parts, which he noted was almost three times the Army's average. In some Army supply depots in Iraq, 40 percent of critical parts were at "zero balance," meaning they were absent from depot shelves.

THERE'S MORE: As we all know by now, the U.S. miliary is running short on personnel for Iraq, too -- so short, they've decided to deploy their "OPFOR," or opposing force, used to test other units' mettle. That's the equivalent of "eating your seed corn," Phil Carter says.

This unit is responsible for training other units and raising their level of expertise and combat readiness. The 11th ACR is being replaced by a National Guard unit. That's like replacing the Dodgers with a high school baseball team. Sure, they can both play baseball and wear the uniform — but one is a whole lot more proficient and experienced at its job. The OPFOR has a reputation as a tough enemy, and that's a good thing because it forces units training at the NTC [Army National Training Center] to become better themselves. By replacing this unit with National Guard troops, the Army has hurt its ability to produce good units for Iraq in the future. Suffice to say, National Guard and active units that go through Fort Irwin aren't going to get the same tough experience they would have with the [11th ACR] as OPFOR — and that means they'll be less ready for combat when they get to Iraq. This is a desperation measure, and I think the Army will come to regret it.

COUNTERINSURGENCY FROM ABOVE

Can you fight an urban insurgency -- from the air?

"In Fallujah and other Iraqi cities not controlled by American forces, the military is turning increasingly to air power to target suspected insurgent hideouts," the AP reports.

"The counterinsurgency led by U.S. forces has been fought mainly on the ground against a resilient enemy. But air power is taking a more prominent role" -- because, in cities like Fallujah, there aren't any American ground troops in place to fight the guerillas.

Air Force F-15 and F-16 fighter jets, as well as Navy F/A-18s flying off the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy in the Persian Gulf, have been used in the recent attacks, Pentagon officials said.

Air Force AC-130 gunships, with side-firing 105mm artillery guns, also have seen action lately.

On Monday, U.S. planes attacked a suspected militant hideout in Fallujah, the center of operations and support for a group led by Jordanian-born terror suspect Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It was at least the fifth airstrike in Fallujah in the past week...

Loren Thompson, a defense analyst at the Arlington, Va.-based Lexington Institute think tank, said Monday the Americans seem to believe that airstrikes in Fallujah will wear down the insurgents and buy time for U.S.-trained Iraqi security forces to prepare for a ground assault in the weeks ahead.

"But you have to wonder whether we're radicalizing the Iraqi civilian population" in the meantime amid claims - substantiated or not - that airstrikes are killing innocent people, Thompson said. (via Juan Cole)

YOU'RE IN THE ARMY - HOW?

How can soldiers who've left the Army be yanked back into service? Slate explains.

INSURGENTS GETTING SMARTER, TOUGHER, POST SAYS

Yesterday's attacks in Iraq weren't the stumbling, almost-suicidal strikes of some earlier guerillas. "Well-equipped and highly coordinated, the insurgents demonstrated a new level of strength and tactical skill that alarmed the {U.S] soldiers facing them," the Washington Post reports.

The insurgents fought in large, coordinated squads, set complex ambushes and occupied downtown buildings from which they apparently planned a long fight, U.S. military commanders said. Striking first along two key avenues bracketing the city, the insurgents intended to isolate and overrun the local Coalition Provisional Authority compound and other downtown government buildings, the commanders said.

Several U.S. commanders suggested the insurgents had learned the tactics in recent weeks from skilled guerrilla commanders from outside the city, perhaps led by foreign fighters who came to Iraq to fight the occupation.

BAGHDAD BLOGGER: TODAY'S VIOLENCE BAD OMEN

"It's beginning," warns Back-to-Iraq blogger Chris Allbritton, currently in Baghdad, stringing for Time. "Today's violence was a warmup and word from four sources, including from within the resistance itself, is that today was the beginning of the real jihad in Iraq. CENTCOM is apparently very worried about the next few days."

For the next seven days, we, meaning western reporters, have been instructed not to leave our hotels or venture out. Anyone is a target from car bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, etc. They've cut the main power lines to the north, meaning much of the north is now in the dark we hear. Tonight, word is that the rebels might attempt a similar strike on the power lines from the West, which would cut off Baghdad. Today, Mosul, Fallujah, Baqouba and Ramadi were hit in a coordinated wave of attacks from rebels. Tomorrow, the word is that it's coming to Baghdad.

TORTURE SCANDAL CONTINUES TO RISE

The "few bad apples" defense is dead.

- U.S. News: "The top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, issued a classified order last November directing military guards to hide a prisoner, later dubbed 'Triple X' by soldiers, from Red Cross inspectors and keep his name off official rosters."

- The Washington Post: "In January 2002, for example, Rumsfeld approved the use of dogs to intimidate prisoners... Then, in April 2003, Rumsfeld approved the use in Guantanamo of at least five other high-pressure techniques also listed on the Oct. 9 Abu Ghraib memo, none of which was among the Army's standard interrogation methods."

- The Telegraph: "New evidence that the physical abuse of detainees in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay was authorised at the top of the Bush administration will emerge in Washington this week... Four confidential Red Cross documents implicating senior Pentagon civilians in the Abu Ghraib scandal have been passed to an American television network, which is preparing to make them public shortly."

- The Times: "Beginning in November, a small unit of interrogators at Abu Ghraib prison began reporting allegations of prisoner abuse... The disclosure...raises new questions about whether senior officers in Iraq were alerted about serious abuses at the prison before January. Top military officials have said they only learned about abuses then, after a soldier came forward with photographs of the abuse."

THERE'S MORE: "It is going to get much worse," writes liberal hawk Christopher Hitchens, who appears to be coming back to his senses after a long bout of Bushphilia. "The graphic videos and photographs that have so far been shown only to Congress are, I have been persuaded by someone who has seen them, not likely to remain secret for very long. And, if you wonder why formerly gung-ho rightist congressmen like James Inhofe ('I'm outraged more by the outrage') have gone so quiet, it is because they have seen the stuff and you have not. There will probably be a slight difficulty about showing these scenes in prime time, but they will emerge, never fear. We may have to start using blunt words like murder and rape to describe what we see."

NEWSWEEK: CHALABI GAVE IRAN INVASION PLANS

It gets worse...

Newsweek is now reporting that Chalabi's group "is suspected of leaking confidential information about U.S. war plans for Iraq to the government of Iran before last year’s invasion."

Meanwhile, "federal investigators have begun administering polygraph examinations to civilian employees at the Pentagon to determine who may have disclosed highly classified intelligence to Ahmad Chalabi," the Times notes.

THERE'S MORE: "The idea that the entire Iraq war may have been an Iranian plot, with the Iranians using Chalabi to feed false information about Iraq's weapons programs to the US," says Juan Cole, "is impossible. Chalabi and the other Iraqi expatriates certainly gamed the Bush administration. But it is not credible to me that Iranian intelligence actively sought a US invasion of Iraq."

In 2002, the US occupied Afghanistan, to Iran's east. The hardliners in Iran did not like this development. They certainly would not have wanted US troops in Iraq to their West, as well. That they would manufacture fairy tales about Iraqi weapons to lure the US to Baghdad is inconceivable. And the hardliners are in charge of Iranian intelligence.

The hardline clerics objected strenuously in summer, 2002, when the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, then based in Tehran, openly admitted to having conducted negotiations with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's office about an alliance against Saddam. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim received great heat for this alliance. Then when Abdul Majid Khoei went to Iran in winter, 2002-2003, he spoke to conservative clerics about the need to ally pragmatically with the US against Saddam, and it caused an uproar. His talk was at one point actually cut off by the tumult and he had to leave the hall.

That the Iranians reluctantly accepted that the US was determined to go to war against Iraq is obvious. But that they connived at it is ridiculous.

SADR WALKS

Since early April, U.S. commanders in Iraq have been vowing to "kill or capture" the renegade cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Now, they appear to be backing off of that promise.

The Times is reporting that American forces and Sadr's guerillas have struck a deal to end the fighting in the holy cities of Najaf and Kufa.

The agreement, hammered out between Mr. Sadr and Iraqi leaders and approved by the Americans, calls for [Sadr's] Mahdi Army, whose fighters have held the city since April 5, to put away their guns and go home, and for the American forces to pull most of their forces out of the city. Under the agreement, the Americans can maintain a handful of posts inside the city and may still run patrols through the city center...

In a major concession to Mr. Sadr, the Americans and Iraqi officials promised to suspend the arrest warrant issued against him for his suspected involvement in the murder of a rival cleric in April 2003...

In a news conference today, the Americans and the Iraqis said Mr. Sadr's fate was open to negotiation. Some Shiite leaders said plans were in the works to offer Mr. Sadr or people around him positions in the new government, scheduled to take over when the Americans transfer sovereignty here on June 30. (emphasis mine)

BAGHDAD BLOGGER'S CAR BOMB PIC

Back to Iraq's Chris Allbritton has only been in Baghdad for a few days. And he's already in the thick of it.

He e-mails friends to say:

"Nasty car bomb today at about 8:15 a.m. Maybe 100 m from my hotel. I’m fine, but I was in the Internet café and every wall and window shook. People poured out of hotels. Too much to do now, but I’m fine. Speculation that the car, a blue VW, was carrying wired artillery or mortar shells, based on shrapnel in the street and complete absence of the car. (All that was left of it was the hood which landed about 100 m away, and the engine block, which landed near the hotel.) A window in my kitchen was broken.

The bomb went off right in front of the al-Karma hotel, which makes the black jokes obvious. 5 people injured. Two critically, including a boy 10-11 years old.

Later, Chris sent on a slew of pictures from the scene. Here's one.

THERE'S MORE: Chris' heart-breaking full report is now up.

IRAQ: SANCHEZ OUT, MILITIAS IN?

Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, who's leading U.S. military forces on the ground in Iraq, is going to be replaced.

"Sanchez has been besieged lately by questions about his oversight of detainee operations in Iraq, especially his role in the scandal over the abuse of Iraqi detainees by U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad," the Washington Post notes. "But administration officials said the move to install a new four-star commander has been under consideration for months, well before the mistreatment of detainees became major news. "

The Army's second-in-command, Gen. George Casey, is the main contender for Sanchez' job. But whoever the new American leader is, it's clear that he won't have control over all the forces keeping order in Iraq. The New York Times reports that with "the sharp deterioration of the security situation in recent months, American officials appear to have resigned themselves to working with [private and tribal] militias in Falluja, Baghdad and elsewhere even as American soldiers die fighting them in street battles in Karbala and Najaf."

THERE'S MORE: "An Army summary of deaths and mistreatment involving prisoners in American custody in Iraq and Afghanistan shows a widespread pattern of abuse involving more military units than previously known," according to the Times.

CHALABI RAIDS...

...Chris Allbritton has the skinny, straight from Baghdad.

By many accounts, Chalabi seemingly single-handedly convinced many in the American government and the major media that Saddam had banned weapons, and that the U.S. should invade the country, in order to take 'em out. But now that America's former best Iraqi buddy has been charged with spying for Iran, the Bush administration is saying, "Ahmad Who?"

THERE'S MORE: Are you one of the trolls who thinks the sadists at Abu Ghraib were just "having a good time?" Maybe the latest photos from the prison -- featuring soldiers actively beating their captives -- will change your mind. Maybe the accounts of interrogators raping Iraqi boys will sway you. But probably not.

IRAQ GOVERNING COUCIL CHIEF KILLED

AP: "The head of the Iraqi Governing Council was killed in a suicide car bombing near a checkpoint outside the coalition headquarters in central Baghdad on Monday, dealing a blow to U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq ahead of a handover of sovereignty on June 30."

THERE'S MORE: Remember that deal to turn Falluja over to Saddam's former generals? Turns out they were really the part of the insurgent force attacking U.S. troops in the first place, according to the Los Angeles Times.

"Today, Fallouja is for all intents and purposes a rebel town, complete with banners proclaiming a great victory and insurgents integrated into the new Fallouja Brigade — the protective force set up with U.S. assistance to keep the peace," the paper says (via Slate).

"In Fallouja these days, there is little talk of the central U.S. demands — disarming the insurgents, finding the people who killed and mutilated the four U.S. contractors and hunting down foreign jihadists. There were no foreign fighters, proclaims [Brigade chief Mohammed] Latif. And if they were here, they must have escaped, he has said."

DOGS OF WAR SUIT UP

Following up on a Defense Tech item from a couple of weeks back, the Associated Press takes a look at military dogs in Iraq getting bulletproof vests.

The U.S. Army has some 30 dogs in Iraq, guarding bases and checking cars for explosives. [Army kennel master Staff Sgt. Jarrod] Zaleski says the dogs have uncovered car bombs and have such sensitive noses that one was able to smell an ammunition clip in a woman's pocketbook.

With violence escalating, the Army shipped vests for all of its dogs to Iraq about two weeks ago. War dogs in Afghanistan already have the vests. Soldiers have worn vests since the start of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Zaleski said no dogs have been killed in Iraq although several have suffered injuries to their paws while walking through debris or shattered glass.

On some missions the dogs are now equipped with padded boots to protect their paws from getting cut up.

"Someone just needs to come up with a helmet for dogs and we'd be good," quipped Zaleski.

HERSH: RUMMY APPROVED INTERROGATION PLAN

"The roots of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal lie not in the criminal inclinations of a few Army reservists," reports Sy Hersh in tomorrow's New Yorker, "but in a decision, approved last year by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to expand a highly secret operation, which had been focussed on the hunt for Al Qaeda, to the interrogation of prisoners in Iraq. Rumsfeld's decision embittered the American intelligence community, damaged the effectiveness of élite combat units, and hurt America’s prospects in the war on terror."

According to interviews with several past and present American intelligence officials, the Pentagon’s operation, known inside the intelligence community by several code words, including Copper Green, encouraged physical coercion and sexual humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in an effort to generate more intelligence about the growing insurgency in Iraq. A senior C.I.A. official, in confirming the details of this account last week, said that the operation stemmed from Rumsfeld’s long-standing desire to wrest control of America’s clandestine and paramilitary operations from the C.I.A.

Rumsfeld, during appearances last week before Congress to testify about Abu Ghraib, was precluded by law from explicitly mentioning highly secret matters in an unclassified session. But he conveyed the message that he was telling the public all that he knew about the story. He said, “Any suggestion that there is not a full, deep awareness of what has happened, and the damage it has done, I think, would be a misunderstanding.” The senior C.I.A. official, asked about Rumsfeld’s testimony and that of Stephen Cambone, his Under-Secretary for Intelligence, said, "Some people think you can bullshit anyone."

THERE'S MORE: A Newsweek report comes to similar conclusions. "The Bush administration created a bold legal framework to justify this system of interrogation," according the magazine. "What started as a carefully thought-out, if aggressive, policy of interrogation in a covert war—designed mainly for use by a handful of CIA professionals—evolved into ever-more ungoverned tactics that ended up in the hands of untrained MPs in a big, hot war. Originally, Geneva Conventions protections were stripped only from Qaeda and Taliban prisoners. But later Rumsfeld himself, impressed by the success of techniques used against Qaeda suspects at Guantanamo Bay, seemingly set in motion a process that led to their use in Iraq."

AND MORE: "It's pure, unadulterated fantasy," a Pentagon spokesperson says of Hersh's report. "We don't discuss covert programs, but nothing in any covert program would have led anyone to sanction activity like what was seen on those videos."

To which Phil Carter responds, "This isn't exactly an unequivocal denial. For one thing, it leaves open the possibility that the Pentagon might have sanctioned what was depicted in the many photographs now in the public domain."

Josh Marshall adds, "Rumsfeld spokesman Larry Di Rita's widely-quoted statement -- 'Assertions apparently being made in the latest New Yorker article on Abu Ghraib and the abuse of Iraqi detainees are outlandish, conspiratorial, and filled with error and anonymous conjecture.' -- isn't a denial, it's splutter -- a classic non-denial denial."

"HUGE COMMAND FAILURES" BEHIND ABU GHRAIB

The former commander of the scandal-tainted 372nd MP Company is warning us not to blame Abu Ghraib on a handful of depraved soldiers.

"These actions were the result of huge command failures," he says in a Washington Post op-ed today.

The senior person charged thus far is Ivan L. Frederick, a staff sergeant. In an MP company, a person of his rank is normally placed in charge of a squad of 11 soldiers. I refuse to believe that no leader above Frederick was aware of or complicit in the abuses that were apparently widespread throughout the prison. While certain officers were relieved of their commands and other leaders were given letters of reprimand, the failure of unit leaders, from company to brigade, is stunning.

The 372nd has approximately 150 soldiers and is divided into five platoons, four of which consist of MPs. The company commander is directly responsible for all actions taken by his soldiers, or those that they fail to take. The 372nd's commander and the relevant platoon leader either knew or should have known of the actions of their subordinates, as should have their noncommissioned officers. All these leaders failed in their most basic responsibilities of supervising their soldiers in the performance of their duties. (via Phil Carter)

THERE'S MORE: Speaking of command failures, top Pentagon officials still can't agree on who was running the show at Abu Ghraib. At a Senate hearing yesterday, Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba and under secretary of defense for intelligence Stephen Cambone, "contradicted each other about who was in charge," according to Slate.

Taguba said that the top commander in Iraq—against Army doctrine—gave military intel people final control. The Pentagon official, undersecretary for intelligence Stephen Cambone, said the order put military intel in charge of the prison "facility," not the guards.

Taguba and senators noted that the abuses came in the fall after the then-commander of Guantanamo Bay visited Abu Ghraib and suggested "special operating procedures" to "Gitmo-ize" the prison and help guards "set the conditions" for interrogations. That general, Geoffrey Miller, is now head of the Iraqi prison system and his trip was recommended by Cambone."

AND MORE: "The abuse and humiliation actually took place at 3 prisons in the Baghdad area," a senior military intelligence NCO tells Soldiers for the Truth. "This was not done by accident, it was a planned, systematic way to break down the prisoners will to resist any interrogation, degrade them and then blackmail them into working for US Intelligence."

AND MORE: "I was instructed by persons in higher rank to stand there and hold this leash and look at the camera," says Pfc. Lynndie England, the woman who's become infamous worldwide for her grinning portraits of abuse.

RED CROSS: IRAQ ABUSE S.O.P.

Think the abuses at Abu Ghraib were just the work of a few guards turned to the dark side? Wrong.

A Red Cross report, leaked yesterday, says that the "methods of physical and psychological coercion used by the interrogators appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and extract information.

"Several military intelligence officers confirmed to [the Red Cross] that it was part of the military intelligence process to hold a person deprived of his liberty naked in a completely dark and empty cell for a prolonged period [,] to use inhumane and degrading treatment, including physical and psychological coercion, against persons deprived of their liberty to secure their cooperation." (via TPM)

NOW BUSH IS UNHAPPY WITH RUMMY?

Let me get this straight:

after more than 750 of our soldiers have been killed in a war that was supposed to be a cakewalk;

after the fighting in Iraq has dragged on for an extra year -- with no end in sight;

after invading a country -- without a plan for the occupation;

after turning marines and soldiers into cops and occupiers -- without giving them the equipment they need to do the job safely;

after relying on half-trained reservists and mercenaries to guard prisoners of war -- only to have hearts grow black and the lowest form of sadism and torture emerge;

now -- only now -- is President Bush reprimanding Defense Secretary Rumsfeld?

THERE'S MORE: New photos from the Abu Ghraib torture chambers have emerged. They are not for the faint of heart. And we should expect to see more, Sy Hersh says (via TPM).

AND MORE: Wanna job softening up Iraqi prisoners for interrogation? Maybe with a little moonlighting in torture? Then CACI, the private military contractor whose employees are at the center of the Abu Ghraib scandal, is looking for you:

Interrogator/Intel Analyst Team Lead Asst. Baghdad, Iraq... Assists the interrogation support program team lead to increase the effectiveness of dealing with Detainees, Persons of Interest, and Prisoners of War (POWs) that are in the custody of US/Coalition Forces in the CJTF 7 AOR, in terms of screening, interrogation, and debriefing of persons of intelligence value. Under minimal supervision, will assist the team lead in managing a multifaceted interrogation support cell consisting of database entry/intelligence research clerks, screeners, tactical/strategic interrogators, and intelligence analyst.

(via Boing Boing)

HINTS OF IRAQ ABUSE IN DECEMBER

I should have seen this coming. In December, in a report for the Chicago Tribune, I noted how member of the 800th Military Police brigade -- the same unit now implicated in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal -- were using electricity-spewing taser guns on its prisoners. Why? Because Saddam's thugs employed similar tactics to enforce their will.

"The previous regime used batons to beat the populace, and electrical torture devices on dissidents. Thus judicious use and control of the riot baton and introduction of the TASER has intimidated the former members of the regime, and saved soldiers and civilians lives," reads a personal report, circulating through the Defense Department, from recently retired Lt. Col. Wesley "Bo" Barbour, now a contract employee for the Army's Training and Doctrine Command...

The taser's value as a particularly ferocious behavior-modification tool became clear at a prisoner-of-war camp holding "high-value detainees currently depicted in the 'deck of cards'" -- the list of the 55 most wanted leaders of Saddam Hussein's government.

Members of the 800th Military Police Brigade had to use lethal force several times to quell prisoner uprisings, the report says. But such rebellions reportedly came to an end after a military police officer demonstrated the taser's power--more than 50,000 volts of electricity, enough to cause muscles to fail after a shock of a few seconds.

"Holy shit! That was the expression" when the prisoners saw the taser demonstration, said Sergeant Major Charles Slider, with the Military Police School based out of Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri. He was part of Barbour's team in Iraq. "They moved away, they got it in line. It was a significant event for them."

Now, we know that this wasn't the only time American guards used electricity -- or the threat of it, at least -- to enforce their will on prisoners.

"One Iraqi man," the L.A. Times notes, "had a slur written on his skin in English. Another was directed by Americans to stand on a box with his head covered and wires attached to his hands. He was informed that if he fell off the box, he would be electrocuted."

THERE'S MORE: TalkLeft says that "there have been hints, reports, investigation and hearings into abuse of Iraqi POW's all along." Back in May of '03, the blog passed along word of possible abuse by British soldiers.

AND MORE: The L.A. Times publishes excerpts from a secret Army report detailing "systemic" abuse at Abu Ghraib.

Maybe now that the report's segments are online, Defene Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will actually bother to read it.

"Appearing on three Sunday talk shows," the New York Times notes, "General Myers insisted that the instances of mistreatment were not widespread and were the actions of 'just a handful' of soldiers who had unfairly tainted all American forces in Iraq. But when pressed, he acknowledged that he had not yet read a classified, 53-page Army report completed in February by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba...

"A spokesman for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said that the secretary had not been briefed on General Taguba's report either."

TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB

By now, you've all heard the reports and seen the awful pictures of American and British guards horribly abusing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Saddam's former torture chamber.

Phil Carter looks at the roles of private contractors and CIA operatives in the scandal.

Chris Allrbitton said that by stripping the prisoners, and making them perform homosexual acts, the American guards "must have had at least an instinctual knowledge of how awful their abuse would be. They picked a perfect storm of taboos and humiliation — and documented it! — that would enrage the Arab world."

But in Monday's New Yorker, Seymour Hersh, goes further, with the most potentially damning story of all.

As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush, insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military as a whole. [An internal Army] report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels. The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day management of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.

GUNS OF FALLUJA DETAILED

The New York Times details which weapons coalition forces are using in their bombardment of Falluja. The idea, it would appear, is to "pacify" the city as much as possible before handing counter-insurgency duties over to Iraqi troops.

In the past 48 hours, Air Force F-15E and F-16 warplanes, and carrier-based F-14 and F-18 fighter-bombers, have dropped about three dozen 500-pound laser-guided bombs in three different sections of Falluja, Air Force officials said, destroying more than 10 buildings and 2 sniper nests identified by troops as sources of attacking fire, and other targets.

By day, AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters have hovered over the city, launching Hellfire missiles at guerrillas who fire on the Marines. By night, lumbering AC-130 gunships have pounded trucks and cars ferrying fighters with the distinctive thump-thump of 105-millimeter howitzers. British Tornado ground-attack planes are also flying missions over Falluja, and remotely piloted Predator reconnaissance aircraft prowl the skies.

MARINES TO WITHDRAW FROM FALLUJA

"A new Iraqi security force made up of former Iraqi soldiers and commanders will replace the American troops now in Falluja and assume responsibility for the city's security," the New York Times reports.

The new force, known as the Falluja Protection Army, will include as many as 1,000 Iraqi soldiers led by a former general from the army of Saddam Hussein, American military officials said. A Marine commander, Col. Brennan Byrne, said the force will be a subordinate command of the American military...

Marines in Falluja and encircling the city were briefed today on the agreement to form a new Iraqi military division. The plan is supposed to take effect beginning on Friday. Some Marine units were already beginning to pack up today in preparation for the withdrawal, news services reported.

The new Iraqi force represents an about-face for the American authorities, who disbanded the Iraqi army following the fall of Mr. Hussein.

Quick question -- three, actually:

1) Have Iraqi forces shown any ability whatsoever to put down insurgent forces? These former Saddam-ites will probably be more ruthless than their predecessors. But will they be any more effective?

2) Why have AC-130 gunships pound the hell out of the city one day, only to abandon it the next?

3) Is the pullback of U.S. troops from an area already known as the "Iraqi Alamo" going to be seen as a sensible, mutually beneficial settlement, or as a complete and total victory for anti-American forces?

Chris Allbritton has much more on the withdrawal's many meanings.

THERE'S MORE: Why use the big gunships right before pulling out? "It was to provide incentive to come to agreement, and to root out easy targets before a deal was struck," says Defense Tech reader TM. The insurgents most assuredly were using the 'cease-fire' time to dig in for the next assault... Bringing in the AC-130’s was a low (military) liability, but highly effective means of bearing a lot of pressure on insurgents without exposing US GI’s."

ARMORED POOCHES ON IRAQ PATROL

G.I.s in Iraq may not be able to get armor for their Humvees. Their dogs, on the other hand, are well protected.

U.S. forces are using K-9s, like the one in this New York Times photo to the left, for crowd control and other duties. To keep Cujo and his furry friends safe from dog-hating insurgents, the pooches have been outfitted with new body armor -- kevlar vests that are "manufactured to the same standards" as the ones people wear, according to the Marines.

The armor, weighing seven pounds, protects against small arms fire and stab wounds. And it costs about a thousand bucks a pop -- chump change, the Corps argues in one of their official "news" stories.

"We get attached to the dogs because they're our partners, and we don't want to lose them," Marine dog handler Cpl. Daniel Hillery said.

"If you estimate the cost of raising, feeding and training a dog, it adds up to somewhere around $60,000. Replacing a dog ends up being a lot more expensive and time consuming," Hillery went on to explain.

Along with the financial benefits, the new K-9 body armor is giving the Marines behind the dogs more confidence to accomplish their missions no matter what task is assigned to the unit.

"I think that it makes us feel more confident with the dogs because we know that they're going to be protected, and we feel like we can do more with them," Hillery explained.

THERE'S MORE: Iraqis will likely find the armored doggies "doubly insulting," Defense Tech pal KK believes. "The Koran says they are filthy animals. They are not kept as pets," he notes.

BIG STRIKES, MAJOR CONSEQUENCES

The shift to a gunship-and-howitzer kind of fight in Iraq is good for American forces militarily. The U.S. has the bigger guns. And, unlike house-to-house, small-arms combat, G.I.s are kept somewhat out of harm's way. That's why yesterday's casualty figures seem particularly lopsided -- only a single American soldier dead, compared to dozens and dozens of insurgents.

But politically, this shift could be bad news. The coalition assault earlier this month in Falluja has become a rallying cry for those Iraqis disenchanted with the American occupation. This new round of strikes has the potential to be much, much more bloody.

Traditionally, the terrorist mentality has been the provoke the most draconian response from the government possible. That forces the local public to take sides -- often against those who rule. (It's one of many reasons why Palestinian militants have thrived under the Sharon government in Israel.)

American forces can wipe out the Sunni insurgents in Falluja. They can decimate the Sadrists in Najaf. But an all-out strike could, in the end, lose the entire country.

ARMOR LACK LEADS TO HEAVY ATTACKS

Raining hell on Falluja is a tactic bursting with political danger. So why do it? The answer, according to Newhouse's David Wood, is because thin-skinned American Humvees can't handle an up-close fight.

"A shortage of armored combat vehicles in Iraq is pressing U.S. forces into a cruel dilemma: either advance stealthily on foot, or hold up at a city's outskirts and use artillery, mortars and airstrikes," Wood writes.

"Using bombs and AC-130s is a strategic defeat," given the political repercussions, said Kenneth Brower, a weapons designer and consultant to the U.S. and Israeli military. "But we've had to use them."

In contrast, Israel has developed special armored vehicles for urban combat in Gaza and the West Bank, senior Israeli officers said, enabling them to drive up close to the enemy and use pinpoint weapons. Soldiers ride into Palestinian neighborhoods in tanks with turrets replaced by armored boxes with bulletproof glass, which allow the vehicle commanders to see 360 degrees without exposing themselves to fire.

American tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, like the Bradley, have notoriously restricted vision when hatches are closed. In city streets, they must operate with crewmen exposed in open hatches or be flanked by walking infantrymen to protect against side attack.

"We have a whole spectrum of vehicles that enable you to see where you are going and who shoots at you, without being hit," said a senior Israeli officer who recently commanded a brigade in Gaza.

"This enables you to advance inside the city and to get closer" to the enemy, said the officer, who spoke on condition that he not be identified by name. "As far as I can recall we have never used indirect fire in 3 1/2 years in the West Bank and Gaza."

ALL-OUT WAR RETURNS TO IRAQ

It's all-out war. Again.

Almost a year to the day after President Bush delcared an end to major combat operations in Iraq, American soldiers and marines unleashed ferocious assaults in Fallujah and outside of Najaf. 64 militiamen loyal to the renegade cleric Moqtada al-Sadr were killed in the holy city, according to the AP. The death toll for Fallujah is not yet known.

In that city's Jolan quarter, a U.S. AC-130, "a powerful gunship that can unleash a deluge of ordnance, joined 105mm howitzers in opening up on insurgent targets in the neighborhood. Gunfire and explosions reverberated for nearly two hours, and an eerie orange glow shone over the area while showers of sparks descended like fireworks," the AP reports.

"U.S. aircraft dropped white leaflets over Fallujah before nightfall, calling on insurgents to give up. 'Surrender, you are surrounded,' the leaflets said. 'If you are a terrorist, beware, because your last day was yesterday. In order to spare your life end your actions and surrender to coalition forces now. We are coming to arrest you.'"

In recent days, American forces had largely held their fire in Fallujah (where an extremely tenuous cease-fire with Sunni rebels was in place) and in Najaf (which the U.S. was hesistant to attack, because it is the equivalent of the Vatican to Iraq's Shi'ite majority).

With the twin lulls ended, Slate's Fred Kaplan notes, "no longer [can] U.S. officials speak of conducting mere 'security and stabilization operations' — the Marines' declared mission last month when they took over [Fallujah] from the Army's 82nd airborne division. SASO (the military's acronym for such operations) is essentially police work with heavy armaments in a war, or postwar, zone. It is not an accurate term for invading a city of half a million people or strafing it with gunship fire."

IRAQ INSURGENCY TAKES TO THE SEAS

For the first time in the Iraqi occupation, insurgents have struck at sea.

"Three boats launched an apparently coordinated suicide strike Saturday on Iraqi oil installations in the Persian Gulf, killing three American troops," the Los Angeles Times reports.

Three other U.S. troops were wounded when their craft approached one of the attacking boats and the vessel exploded, flipping the coalition craft and throwing the crew into the water, a statement from the U.S. 5th Fleet said...

The boat attacks recalled the assault on the U.S. destroyer Cole in Yemen four years ago, when an explosives-laden boat rammed the ship, killing 17 U.S. sailors. The CIA has concluded that Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist network planned and executed that operation.

REPORT: SADR SURRENDERS

The radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who's militia has clashed so violently with Coalition forces, has accepted a deal to surrender, Juan Cole says, passing on an arabic newspaper report.

"It would provide for the senior ayatollahs to issue a ruling or fatwa dissolving the Army of the Mahdi, Muqtada's militia. Muqtada [would] surrender to the grand ayatollahs and agree to have [top religious leaders] negotiate for him with the Americans," Cole writes. "Muqtada would accept the outcome of those negotiations without condition. Iran would offer him temporary asylum, until June 30 and the formation of a sovereign Iraqi government, at which time he could report to Najaf for his trial. In return, the US would withdraw its forces from the environs of Najaf."

The New York Times reports that a group of Iranian diplomats has been doing the negotiating. And that their work is not done yet. Stay tuned.

SADR MILITIA BACKING DOWN?

WaPo: "A week after seizing control of Najaf, Iraq's holiest city, members of a militia loyal to radical Shiite Muslim cleric Moqtada Sadr relinquished their hold on police stations and government buildings Monday as hundreds of U.S. soldiers mobilized in preparation for an assault on the city.

"The withdrawal of Sadr's forces, the continuation of a cease-fire in the violence-wracked city of Fallujah and the release of seven kidnapped Chinese civilians amounted to the most positive developments for U.S. occupation forces since a two-front war with Shiite militiamen and Sunni Muslim insurgents erupted a week ago."

Meanwhile, the New York Times reports, leading Shi'ite clerics -- including representatives of Grand Ayatollah Sistani -- are now meeting with Sadr in Najaf, to try to defuse his standoff with American troops. But Juan Cole is pessimistic about the talks.

I think it most unlikely that the terms of the negotiations reported above will be acceptable to the United states. Coalition spokesmen continued to talk about capturing or killing Muqtada. The tough talk may be intended to put pressure on him to surrender, but if so it is a miscalculation. Muqtada is a millenarian who thinks the world is about to end, and for the foreigners to discuss killing him might well drive him to seek the advent of the apocalypse through a call for more violence.

MILITARY QUESTIONING POLITICAL MOVES IN IRAQ

Decapitating a double-headed insurgency in Iraq is the easy part. It's what comes next – the political process – that's hard, current and former military officers are saying.

"With less than three months before the American-led occupation force hands sovereignty to an Iraqi civilian government, the process for a political transition remains unclear," the New York Times notes. "There are no firm plans yet for who the leaders will be on the transfer date of June 30."

"We can beat these guys, and we're proving our resolve," one officer tells the paper. "But unless the political side keeps up, we'll have to do it again after July 1 and maybe in September and again next year and again and again."

A recently retired, 30-year-plus Marine Corps veteran – one who saw action in Iraq, Vietnam, Somalia, and elsewhere – tells Defense Tech a similar story.

He's confident that, in Iraq, "the jihadists don't own the battlefield, we do."

But he's mystified about what comes after the fight.

What is the end state? That was never made clear to me during the war and I'm not sure now. For example, during the first Gulf War we all understood that our end state was to liberate Kuwait...

I cannot tell you what it is supposed to look like in this case, and yes, I don't think we can expect any help from our NATO or UN "partners" either for the same reason. You're not the only one who is confused. There [are] a lot of us.

CEASE-FIRE: GOOD SIGN OR BAD?

"American troops withheld their firepower on Sunday outside three Iraqi cities where insurgents have seized control, allowing Iraqi intermediaries time to seek negotiated solutions to the most serious challenge yet to the year-old occupation," the Times reports.

U.S. military officials said they decided to pause for the Shi'ite festival of Arbaeen. And, according to the Times, they warned that the resistance in Falluja, Najaf, and Karbala "would be crushed if the insurgents maneuvered for long."

But The Agonist notes that "you do not negotiate a cease-fire from a position of strength if you are the occupying power."

Steve Gilliard agrees, noting that the Marines' tactics in Falluja don't bode well for their operations there.

One exmple, the use of the AC-130. That plane is never used in offensive operations. It can kill a football field's worth of soldiers. No one can move forward when Spectre is above, unless they want to die. It is usually used when US forces are pinned down. Then, it can wipe an attacking enemy out. The fact that it was used in Fallujah indicates that their attack stalled out. Then, they had to call in more AF fighters, which means they were in serious trouble. Marines hate calling in the Air Force because they have a habit of killing Marines.

Then, of course, they bought up a third battalion. A full regiment of troops still stuck in that one mile area of Fallujah.

In no war game you could play, in no Lessons Learned, do you bring up another unit if your attack is going well. You do that when your other units are getting hammered.

Not so, says Defense Tech reader RB. Although 18 Marines have died in a week's worth of fighting in Falluja, "citing Marine casualties as a flat number is misleading in the extreme."

The real issue is a) ratio of Marine to enemy casualties, b) casualties as a percent of engaged Marines and c) effective control of the city vs. damage to infrastructure & civilian casualties.

From what reports are available, the Marines are doing an unprecedented job in all 3 of these categories... Apart from the missiles that took down the wall around a mosque early on, this operation seems to be highly effective without the use of major force options. The house to house fighting is in fact a sign of our strength – we can do this with a minimum of collateral damage.

THERE'S MORE: Defense Tech reader MS thinks Steve Gilliard's all wrong about the AC-130 gunship's symbolism.

"This is far, far, far from your daddy's orbiting bullet hose of yesteryear," MS writes. "Steve's statement may have had some accuracy back in the day of the original(s) going to the DC3 with 7.62 miniguns, up through the shortlived -119 version, and even the original -130 variant.

"Current models, however, while useful in a perimeter defense, are also very, very useful in plinking individual targets with limited collateral (damage)."

URBAN WAR PREDICTIONS COMING TRUE

A year ago, before U.S. troops entered Baghdad, military observers (including this one) were predicting a drawn-out, bloody mess. Urban war zones, they warned, would blunt America's technology edge -- radios don't work so well in concrete canyons, and unmanned spy planes can't see inside buildings. More importantly, perhaps, Iraqi fighters could easily pop in and out of a city -- and a civilian population -- they knew a thousand times better than any G.I.

But then: nothing. Saddam's forces vanished. American soldiers were left to deal with a nasty pirhana of an insurgency. But it was nothing like the street-to-street combat so many had forecasted.

Until now, it seems. 12 Marines were killed yesterday fighting Sunni insurgents -- likely former Saddamists -- in "nonstop, house-to- house, roof-to-roof fighting" in Ramadi, near Baghdad. Another group, from the Marines' 2nd battalion, 1st regiment, fought "block-to-block" in Fallujah, according to the AP. In a half-dozen other cities across Iraq, Shi'ite forces aligned with the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are battling with U.S. and allied troops. Sadr now appears to be in control of Najaf, a city of 500,000 that's one of the most holy in the Shi'ite faith.

It's clear from reports like this that Sadr's militia wouldn't pose a hint of a threat to allied troops -- if this was open combat, traditional war. But it's not.

The Command Post has ongoing updates. And Phil Carter's blog is a must-read in these times.

GUNS-FOR-HIRE REPELLED NAJAF ATTACK

"An attack by hundreds of Iraqi militia members on the U.S. government's headquarters in Najaf on Sunday was repulsed not by the U.S. military," the Washington Post reports, "but by eight commandos from a private security firm.

"Before U.S. reinforcements could arrive, the firm, Blackwater Security Consulting, sent in its own helicopters amid an intense firefight to resupply its commandos with ammunition and to ferry out a wounded Marine, sources said."

This is the second time in a week Blackwater has been in the news.

"The four men brutally slain Wednesday in Fallujah were also Blackwater employees and were operating in the Sunni triangle area under more hazardous conditions -- unarmored cars with no apparent backup -- than the U.S. military or the CIA permit."

THERE'S MORE: According to the AP, radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has left his mosque in the city of Kufa -- where his militants have pretty much replaced allied and Iraqi authorities. Those forces appear to have taken over the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, Juan Cole says. That's bad news, because the shrine is one of the holiest places in all of Shi'ite Islam -- equivalent, if I understand right, to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.

There is some good news, however. According to the Washington Post, Baghdad's Sadr City slum -- named after Muqtada's father -- appears to have been re-taken by U.S. troops.

SHI'ITE UPRISING MARKS DANGEROUS IRAQ PHASE

Sunday wasn't just another in a long series of tragic days in Iraq. When Shi'ite militias loyal to the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr launched a series of coordinated attacks yesterday, it marked the beginning of what could be the most dangerous phase yet of the allied occupation.

"The difference here is the type of violence and who's fighting," Josh Marshall explains.

Almost all the paramilitary violence -- the shootings and ambushes and roadside explosions -- have come from the Sunni minority concentrated in the center of the country.

Violence from the Sunni areas has never been difficult to understand. They lost out on privileges and status when Saddam was overthrown. And the future looked even more bleak, because the eventual handover of authority to a democratically elected government all but insured the domination of the Shia majority which the Sunnis had been lording it over for decades if not centuries.

In other words, time was never on the side of the Sunni rejectionists. From the start their interests were in destabilizing and delegitimizing the occupation.

Time, however, was very much on the side of the Shia. From a cynical viewpoint, why not let their American and Sunni enemies bloody each other into exhaustion in the central Iraq and sit back and wait on the day -- not too distant, certainly -- when they would inherit the new Iraqi state?

A central question has always been, when would the Shia come off the sidelines? ... Now, they seem to have come off the sidelines with a vengeance.

Juan Cole says that by closing down Sadr's newspaper, and going after one of his top capos, the Coalition Provisional Authority baited the cleric into this fight. But why?

THERE'S MORE: The counter-attack against Sadr has begun, Cole and Chris Allbritton report. He's locked himself inside a mosque, David Koresh-style. Will U.S. forces do him the favor of turning him into a martyr?

Meanwhile, 2,500 Marines have encircled Falluja, to retaliate for last week's heinous attacks there.

IMPROVED MISSILES IN IRAQI HANDS?

"The Pentagon is investigating whether new, more deadly versions of Russian missiles may be in the hands of Iraqi insurgents, possibly enabling them to shoot down U.S. Army helicopters and threaten other aircraft," the Boston Globe reports.

U.S. military officials thought they were well prepared for the variety of shoulder-fired missiles utilized by Saddam Hussein's forces, mainly missiles manufactured in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For years American intelligence officials gathered technical information on a variety of portable Russian missiles - including the SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, and SA-18 - in order to develop countermeasures, such as electronic jamming equipment and decoy flares.

But missile components and other weapon systems uncovered by US forces in Iraq have fueled suspicions that insurgents may have obtained more advanced weapons, not previously known to US intelligence, that can confuse helicopters' electronic defenses or overcome attempts to send them off course, the officials said.

Nine helicopters have been lost to enemy missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms fire - costing the lives of 32 soldiers - since the US-led invasion last March. Several airplanes flying into Baghdad International Airport have also been hit by missiles, but managed to land safely.

IRAQ PREDICTIONS REVISTED

"A year ago tonight, President Bush took the nation to war in Iraq with a grand vision for change in the Middle East and beyond," the Washington Post notes. "The invasion and occupation of Iraq, [the Bush] administration predicted, would come at little financial cost and would materially improve the lives of Iraqis. Americans would be greeted as liberators, Bush officials predicted, and the toppling of Saddam Hussein would spread peace and democracy throughout the Middle East.

"Things have not worked out that way, for the most part."

There is evidence that the economic lives of Iraqis are improving, thanks to an infusion of U.S. and foreign capital. But the administration badly underestimated the financial cost of the occupation and seriously overstated the ease of pacifying Iraq and the warmth of the reception Iraqis would give the U.S. invaders. And while peace and democracy may yet spread through the region, some early signs are that the U.S. action has had the opposite effect...

On April 23, 2003, Andrew S. Natsios, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, laid out in a televised interview the costs to U.S. taxpayers of rebuilding Iraq. "The American part of this will be $1.7 billion," he said. "We have no plans for any further-on funding for this..."

...The administration has already sought more than $150 billion for the Iraq effort.

In its predictions a year ago, the Bush administration similarly underestimated the resistance the United States would face in Iraq. "I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators," Vice President Cheney said in a March 16 interview.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz derided a general's claim that pacifying Iraq would take several hundred thousand U.S. troops. And Rumsfeld, in February 2003, predicted that the war "could last six days, six weeks. I doubt six months..."

Considerable economic activity has resumed in Baghdad and other major cities, while living standards are better than at any time since the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the country's oil revenue is gradually climbing. "What's impressive -- and maybe more credit goes to Iraqis than to us -- is that economic activity has picked up. Clearly, there's money out there. People are going to jobs and working," said Henri Barkey, former State Department expert on Iraq and now chairman of Lehigh University's International Relations Department.

[An] ABC News poll confirms this. Fifty-six percent of Iraqis said things are better than before the war, and 71 percent expect that their lives will be even better next year.

THERE'S MORE: Are Iraqis better off now than they were a year ago? The Christian Science Monitor offers a detailed scorecard.

GUNS-FOR-HIRE TO GUARD AMERICAN HQ IN IRAQ

The Washington Post is reporting that "the U.S.-led authority in Iraq plans to spend as much as $100 million over 14 months to hire private security forces to protect the Green Zone, the four-square-mile area in Baghdad that houses most U.S. government employees and some of the private contractors working there."

The Green Zone is now guarded primarily by U.S. military forces, but the Coalition Provisional Authority wants to turn much of that work over to contractors to free more U.S. forces to confront a violent insurgency. The companies would employ former military personnel and be responsible for safeguarding the area for the first year after political authority is transferred to an interim Iraqi government on June 30.

U.S. FORCES SLIM DOWN FOR NEXT IRAQ PHASE

The U.S. military isn't just swapping soldiers in Iraq, the Associated Press reports. It's slimming down, too.

The Army's 4th Infantry Division, which currently occupies a swath of Iraq north of Baghdad, will require 19 of the Navy's massive "roll-on, roll-off" or Ro-Ro ships to carry away its vast collection of tanks...

By contrast, the Army's 1st Infantry Division, which will replace the Tikrit-based 4th Infantry in the coming weeks, is arriving in Kuwait on just five Ro-Ro ships...

Military officials have said the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq will take on a less-intrusive hue when the massive rotation of U.S. troops now underway sends 110,000 fresh troops into neighboring Iraq to replace the 130,000 being sent home.

Instead of patrolling Iraq in Bradley armored vehicles and 70-ton Abrams tanks - brought in for the land invasion in March - incoming soldiers and Marines will rely more on armored Humvees and other lighter, more maneuverable vehicles. Hence the need for fewer trips by Navy ships like the hulking gray U.S.N.S. Pomeroy, which was being loaded Monday with Humvees from the Army's V Corps, which is in the process of returning to Germany.

The troop rotation also signals the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom 2, when most U.S. troops will be shifted from the current tight-knit occupation that uses dozens of bases inside Baghdad and other cities, to large camps lying on the outskirts of Iraqi cities. Several bases have already closed.

ARMY SAYS NO TO AD-HOC ARMOR

Last week, we talked about how U.S. soldiers are adding jury-rigged armor to their Humvees, to toughen the vehicles up against RPGs and roadside explosives. Now, the Army is telling its troops to cut it out -- or be very, very careful, at least.

“What we want to avoid is having soldiers adding ad-hoc armor to their vehicles and giving themselves a false sense of security,” Maj. Gen. N. Ross Thompson III, commanding general for the Army’s Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, says in a statement.

An Army press release warns of the "potential consequences" of ad-hoc armor: "more required maintenance as the additional weight will likely mean early structure and mechanical failures, and reduction in the amount of cargo the vehicle can safely carry... Drivers will need more time to brake due to the increased weight; and the added material could possibly change the vehicle’s center of gravity, increasing the risk of vehicle rollover."

Sensible guidelines? Or bureaucratic clamp-down?

U.S. PLANS PAK OFFENSIVE

"The Bush administration," reports the Chicago Tribune, "is preparing a U.S. military offensive that would reach inside Pakistan with the goal of destroying Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network."

U.S. Central Command is assembling a team of military intelligence officers that would be posted in Pakistan ahead of the operation, according to sources familiar with details of the plan and internal military communications. The sources spoke on the condition they not be identified.

As now envisioned, the offensive would involve Special Operations forces, Army Rangers and Army ground troops, sources said. A Navy aircraft carrier would be deployed in the Arabian Sea.

Referred to in internal Pentagon messages as the "spring offensive," the operation would be driven by certain undisclosed events in Pakistan and across the region, sources said. A source familiar with details of the plan said this is "not like a contingency plan for North Korea, something that sits on a shelf. This planning is like planning for Iraq. They want this plan to be executable, now."

JANE'S: U.S. MULLING HIZBULLAH STRIKES

Could the U.S. be planning covert attacks against terrorists in Lebanon? Jane's Intelligence Digest thinks so.

US secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld is considering plans to expand the global war on terrorism with multi-pronged attacks against suspected militant bases in countries such as Lebanon and Somalia...

Sending US troops into lawless Somalia would not be new, nor is it likely to cause serious diplomatic waves. Covert US forces have periodically infiltrated the country over the past two years in order to conduct surveillance and even snatch [Al Qaeda] suspects...

However, sending US special forces into Lebanon - and in particular an area like the Bekaa Valley (which is virtually Syrian territory) and where the bulk of Damascus' military forces in Lebanon are deployed - would be an entirely different matter. Deployment of US forces in the area would almost certainly involve a confrontation with Syrian troops.

That may well prove to be the objective, since the Bush administration is currently stepping up pressure on the Damascus regime in a bid to force it to cut off all support for radical Palestinian groups which have been targeting Israel during the three-year-old intifada. Washington also wants Syria to abandon its weapons of mass destruction and to withdraw all its forces from Lebanon, a virtual satellite since Syria moved in with tacit US support in 1990 as part of a strategy to end Lebanon's civil war.

The US administration has long considered Damascus as a prime candidate for 'regime-change' (along with Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and possibly even Saudi Arabia). Syria, once a powerhouse of Arab radicalism that could not be ignored, has been seriously weakened, both militarily and politically. Washington may feel that the time is coming to oust Bashir Al-Assad and the ruling generals. Targeting Syria via Lebanon, the only concrete political influence Damascus has to show following decades of radical diplomacy, could prove to be a means to that end...

Moreover, since the 11 September 2001 attacks, Washington has been keen to prove that Hizbullah has a global reach, and is thus a legitimate target for its war on terrorism. Thus far, US intelligence services have been unable to produce compelling evidence supporting this claim. So instead of launching military strikes, the Bush administration has sought to weaken Hizbullah by putting pressure on Iran, the movement's ideological mentor, and on Syria, which has used the Shia militants as what amounts to a proxy force against Israel over the last 20 years...

Washington's own focus on Hizbullah has intensified amid claims that the movement has links with Al-Qaeda (even though Hizbullah is staunchly Shia, while Al-Qaeda's religious ideology stems from the puritanical Wahhabite sect of Sunni Islam). Whether there is any actual operational alliance between Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda remains highly questionable.

COPTER SHOOTERS WISING UP

"A classified Army study of the downings of military helicopters in Iraq found that guerrillas have used increasingly sophisticated tactics and weapons — including at least one advanced missile — to attack American aircraft," the New York Times reports.

The insurgents have proved adept at using both rocket-propelled grenades, which are point-and-shoot weapons, and heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, which require greater maintenance and skill, said Army officials familiar with the study.

No type of helicopter is more vulnerable or more protected against the problem, the review found. But the team recommended specific changes to help pilots better evade ground fire, Army officials said. Senior officers declined to elaborate, but changes in the past have included flying more missions at night with lights off to avoid detection...

One troubling finding, Army officials said, is that on at least one occasion the insurgents used a SA-16 shoulder-fired missile, which has a guidance system that is harder to thwart than the SA-7 missiles and rocket-propelled grenades that insurgents have used in other attacks.

A PROFESSOR GOES TO WAR

Peter Maass has an incredible you-are-there article about the perils of counterinsurgency in tomorrow's New York Times Magazine. Go read it. Now.

IRAQ ARMS-HUNTERS YANKED

"The Bush administration has quietly withdrawn from Iraq a 400-member military team whose job was to scour the country for military equipment," the New York Times reports.

The step was described by some military officials as a sign that the administration might have lowered its sights and no longer expected to uncover the caches of chemical and biological weapons that the White House cited as a principal reason for going to war last March.

A separate military team that specializes in disposing of chemical and biological weapons remains part of the 1,400-member Iraq Survey Group, which has been searching Iraq for more that seven months at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. But that team is "still waiting for something to dispose of," said a survey group member.

Some of the government officials said the most important evidence from the weapons hunt might be contained in a vast collection of seized Iraqi documents being stored in a secret military warehouse in Qatar. Only a small fraction have been translated.

GREAT G.I. BLOG

A bunch of American soldiers serving in Iraq have their own blogs. But most of them read like press releases from the Coalition Provisional Authority, or like the Free Republic's foam-at-the-mouth rants.

Then there's Jason Van Steenwyk. Often nasty, usually hilarious, this Army officer writes long, unvarnished posts about G.I. life. Check out his latest tale, on "Dead Haji Storage," here.

SMART BOMBS, DUMB TARGETS

Our bombs were plenty smart. But our targeting during Gulf War II was dumb. Of the 50 "decapitation strikes" American forces launched during the conflict, none took out their intended marks in the Iraqi leadership.

Slate's Fred Kaplan has the details.

The capture of Saddam Hussein dramatically illustrates an ancient, but often forgotten, principle of warfare: It's easy to kill people but very hard to kill a person.

Saddam's nabbing took thousands of Army and special-ops forces, interrogating hundreds of loyalists, tracking dozens of leads, and, in the end, one soldier spotting an out-of-place thread of fabric on what turned out to be a secret cover, then lifting the lid to find the Butcher of Baghdad himself hiding in the bottom of a hole.

It was the work of armed troops on the ground, close-up, ultimately at arm's length. It could not have been accomplished by pilots dropping smart bombs from two miles high in the sky.

SADDAM CAUGHT

At the bottom of a man-sized hole underneath a farmhouse near Tikrit, American troops found and captured a scraggly, bearded Saddam Hussein Saturday night. And the soldiers, from the 4th Infantry Division and from special forces units, did it without firing a shot, according to the New York Times. Great news.

Watch the video of the press conference announcing Saddam's apprehension -- and outlining the operation which caught him -- here. Live coverage from the BBC is here. And check out The Command Post for links to dozens and dozens of capture-related stories.

THERE'S MORE: "If I drink water I will have to go to the bathroom and how can I use the bathroom when my people are in bondage?"

That was Saddam Hussein's reaction when he was offered a glass of water by his American captors, according to Time. The magazine's website claims to have exclusive details of the former dictator's first interrogation. Time also claims that American troops took from Saddam's hideout the minutes of a meeting of Iraq insurgent leaders.

Titillating stuff. But, like all first accounts, take this one with a big salt spoonful.

"TERRORISM VS. TERRORISM"

Iraq may not be another Vietnam. But some in the Pentagon think it could be America's West Bank, Seymour Hersh reports in this week's New Yorker.

The U.S. military has quietly asked Israeli counter-terror commandos -- the guys behind the "targeted killings" of Hamas heavweights during the current intifada -- to work with, and become models for, American Special Forces units in Iraq.

One official tells Hersh, "The only way we can win is to go unconventional. We’re going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We’ve got to scare the Iraqis into submission.”

WILL AGGRO TACTICS IN IRAQ WORK?

The American counter-insurgency in Iraq is reaching new heights, the New York Times reports.

In Saddam's hometown, Tikrit, "commanders called in AC-130 gunships, A-10 attack planes and Apache helicopter gunships, as well as Air Force F-16 and F-15E fighter-bombers with 500-pound bombs, the military said, in the largest bombardment in the area since President Bush declared the end of major combat on May 1."

Meanwhile, U.S. forces called in air strikes "against targets in central Baghdad for the first time since the Spring," Channel News Asia notes.

Major General Charles Swannack, who leads the 82nd Airborne, says the stepped-up offensive "demonstrates our resolve, and we are not going to fight this one with one hand tied behind our backs."

But the Salt Lake City Tribune notes that "a top-secret CIA assessment from Iraq, widely reported last week, has warned that such aggressive counterinsurgency tactics by the army could incite more Iraqis to fight the Americans."

With their gruesome acts, terrorist-type insurgent groups (think Hamas, or Peru's Sendero Luminoso) traditionally try to provoke the government into ever-more repressive responses. The more heavy-handed the government is, the theory goes, the more the populace is radicalized, and the more ripe for revolution the area becomes.

Does that mean, then, the the U.S. offensive is playing into the bad guys' hands? Do American military commanders have any other choice?

THERE'S MORE: On the other end of the tactical spectrum, "the decision to pull the U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division out of the 'Sunni Triangle' city of Ramadi — and to turn local security over to Iraqi officers — might be the most significant step since the U.S.-led occupation began six and a half months ago," Slate's Fred Kaplan says. "If the Ramadi experiment succeeds, it could serve as the road map to a responsible exit strategy. If it fails, it will dramatize the depths of our predicament, the utter lack of good options, the tenacity of the — dare we say it? — quagmire that bogs us down."

AND MORE: "The U.S. Air Force used some of the largest weapons in its inventory to attack targets in central Iraq," according to the Associated Press.

"A pair of 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs were dropped late Tuesday near Baqouba, 30 miles northeast of Baghdad, on 'camps suspected to have been used for bomb-making,' said Maj. Gordon Tate, a spokesman for the 4th Infantry Division."

SUN TZU: IRAQI INSURGENT?

Iraqi guerillas are taking page out of Sun Tzu's 2,500 year-old playbook, says a 30-year CIA veteran in today's New York Times.

JAMMING PLANES GROUNDED

The U.S. Navy has grounded nearly 40 percent of its Prowler electronic attack jets because of wear on the wings' center sections, KOMO-TV in Seattle reports.

The Navy's announcement Friday that it was pulling 24 more of the EA-6B jets from service follows a September announcement pulling 19 jets for the same reason.

The aging jets, primarily based at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island in Oak Harbor, are used to jam radar and communications. The Prowler played an important role in the past two wars, helping protect U.S. and coalition planes from surface-to-air missiles.

(via Periscope)

DEPRESSING SCORECARD FOR IRAQ

The always-intriguing Defense and the National Interest website has a downright-depressing scorecard on how the U.S. military is doing in Iraq. Let's hope this is off-base (though I'm worried it's not):

Have the Iraq "insurgents" gained, for now at least, a superior position?

- Based on public sources, apparently the Coalition still does not know the nature of the opposition: leaders, goals, ideology, numbers, etc.

- Insurgent attacks demonstrate the operational resources to strike at will in central Iraq, and on occasion anywhere in Iraq.

- The increasing frequency of attacks against Coalition forces and its "collaborators" indicates growing resources for the insurgents, with attack rates of 25 - 30 per day.

- The increased sophistication of attacks demonstrates the insurgents growing experience and the Darwinian nature of guerilla warfare, culling the slow learners from insurgent forces. Note the improvised and camouflaged missile launcher which attacked the Rashid Hotel, one of the best guarded sites in Iraq. Built by the insurgents, it fired two different types of missiles — one designed for use by helicopters. Probably the next attack will be designed better and executed more successfully.

We can only guess, probably poorly, at the insurgents' ultimate goals. Still, they have accomplished important objectives.

- Stripping the Coalition's support by UN and non-governmental organizations, such as the Red Cross.

- Limiting the Coalition's ability to recruit other nations, such as Turkey and India, who could provide diplomatic support and military forces.

Perhaps most important, they have gained the initiative. Coalition operations appear almost totally reactive.

The result:

Coalition forces appear to have lost the vital connection between strategy and tactics. Clear and feasible goals drive strategy, which drives tactics. Also, Coalition leaders much have clear and popular goals to maintain domestic support for the War. Feasible strategy and tactics maintain domestic confidence in Coalition leadership. With popular support success in long and painful conflicts becomes possible.

What are the Coalition's goals and strategy? If these are in fact uncertain, as they were in the Viet Nam war, development of successful tactics becomes difficult. Maintaining domestic support and confidence becomes problematic.

Fortunately, the public in Coalition nations does not seem to know the odds against us. In modern times, insurgents' successes far outnumber the few successes of western nations. Also, the western wins come at a large cost in resources and lives — guerillas, defenders, and civilians. Note the US experience in the Philippines (1899 - 1902, with "pacification" continuing until 1932) and the British in Malaya (1948 - 1961).

TANK DESTRUCTION A "MYSTERY"

The M-1A1 tank was supposed to be just about invincible. But last week, one was damaged by a makeshift bomb. And in late August, a "mystery projectile" burst through the tank's side armor, StrategyPage notes.

"Whatever it was, it just barely missed the tanks gunner (it went through the back of his seat and grazed part of his flak jacket) and put a pencil size hole nearly 50mm deep into the four inch thick armor on the other side of the tank," the website says.

"No known RPG (rocket-propelled grenade, one of the preferred anti-tank weapons) would do that kind of damage."

THERE'S MORE: Army Times has additional details on the M1 puzzle.

Last week's M1 attack "blew the turret completely off," the Times also notes. "Two soldiers were killed when the device — a 155mm round packed with 50 pounds of C4 explosive — detonated near the tank on patrol about 45 miles north of Baghdad."

AND MORE: StrategyPage now says that "the 'Mystery Projectile'... was probably a Russian RPG-7V or similar type."

COPTER DOWN; 16 G.I.'S DEAD

The worst week so far in the Iraq war has gotten much, much worse.

"A U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook transport helicopter packed with soldiers headed for a short-term break was hit with a missile and crashed in a field west of Baghdad on Sunday morning, killing 16 soldiers and wounding 20 others," the Washington Post reports. It's the single deadliest attack of American forces since the start of Gulf War II.

The shoulder-fired missile streaked through a clear blue sky and struck the dual-rotor helicopter in its rear around 9 a.m. as it was ferrying soldiers from bases in western Iraq to Baghdad's international airport...

The force of the impact destroyed the 10-ton Chinook, scattering twisted and charred bits of fuselage over a wide area. Everyone on board was killed or injured, many of them severely, military officials said...

The missile strike provided an example of the increasing sophistication and lethality of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq. Resistance fighters who began their effort to evict American troops by indiscriminately firing guns and rocket-propelled grenades at supply convoys now are targeting well-fortified bases with mortars, firing volleys of rockets inside the seat of the U.S. occupation authority, concealing roadside bombs and launching antiaircraft missiles.

Iraqi "Guerrillas are known to have fired missiles at American planes two or three times a week, and ground fire at helicopters even more often," the Times notes. "Only defensive tactics and devices had enabled aircraft to avoid disaster until Sunday."

Fewer than a third of the 5,000 shoulder-fired missiles in Saddam's stockpile have been accounted for.

These weapons are a constant threat to American helicopters. "But there appears to be no ready means to avoid flying," the Times says.

In a country the size of California, where more than 150,000 American and allied troops are operating, routine daily missions must go on, and every method of moving people and things around Iraq is dangerous.

Armored convoys can carry tons of equipment, supplies and ammunition, but they are under growing attack from homemade roadside bombs. They require escorts and are limited in how quickly they can deliver essential troops and matériel.

So commanders must also rely on scores of Army helicopters, from Black Hawks to the giant, twin-rotor Chinooks, and a fleet of Air Force cargo planes to ferry ammunition, equipment and personnel on hundreds of flights a day across Iraq.

"There's no way to stop using large cargo aircraft," said Walter P. Lang, a former chief Middle East analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency. "There's just so much stuff."

THERE'S MORE: The New York Times Magazine has the most detailed examination yet of why the Iraq afterwar has gone so wrong. It's a must read.

IRAQI TERROR KINGPIN FOUND?

One of the things that has made the guerilla attacks in Iraq so damn scary is that the people behind them has been a mystery. There's no Osama, no Arafat to blame for the carnage.

Now, CNN claims to have found a mastermind: General Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, the northern regional commander in Saddam's military.

"Al-Duri, the 'King of Clubs' in the U.S. military's 'most wanted' deck of cards, is the highest-ranking member of the Saddam Hussein regime still at large, except for Saddam himself," CNN notes.

The network says "Pentagon officials" -- relying on confessions by freshly-captured members of the Ansar Al-Islam terror group -- have fingered Al-Duri as the kingpin.

It's a big breakthrough, if true. But, as with all "first reports," take this one with a grain of salt...

THERE'S MORE: "Senior American officials" now say there's evidence that Saddam may be behind the insurgency.

Of course, this "role by Mr. Hussein could not be corroborated, and one senior official cautioned that recent intelligence reports contained conflicting assessments," according to the Times.

Hmm... Front page claims, backed by hazy intelligence... This all sounds so familiar, somehow...

AND MORE: "Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said on Friday that he saw no signs that Saddam Hussein was active in coordinating attacks on American forces in Iraq," Reuters reports.

"I don't know where he is or what he's doing, but we really don't have the evidence to put together a claim that he is pulling all the strings among these remnants in Baghdad and other parts of the country that are causing us the difficulty," Mr. Powell said on the ABC News program "Nightline," according to a transcript.

He also cast doubt on reports that one of Mr. Hussein's deputies, Izzat Ibrahim, was behind the attacks, saying, "I see no evidence to support that."

RASHID ATTACK DETAILS EMERGE

Details are emerging from the weekend's deadly attack on the al-Rashid hotel in Baghdad that injured 16 people and barely missed Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz:

The missiles were launched from an improvised multirocket platform, a homemade version of the Katyusha system used by Russia, military officials said. The Irish Republican Army has used similar systems.

The launcher was hidden in a blue trailer made to resemble a mobile electricity generator, a ubiquitous item in Baghdad, where electrical service is unreliable. In the quiet of early Sunday morning, a white passenger vehicle towed the trailer down a major street that runs between the hotel and a large park. It was then unhitched at a cloverleaf that had been closed by the Americans for security reasons. The car pulled away. Soon after, at 6:08 a.m., 8 to 10 missiles thudded into the hotel, about 450 yards away, officials said.

The casualties could have been higher; 11 missiles failed to fire because of electrical or mechanical malfunctions. In addition, the wheel base of the trailer had been booby-trapped with explosives, which American soldiers deactivated.

Altogether, the launcher held 40 missile pods, said Brig. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, commander of the First Armored Division, whose responsibility is the security of Baghdad. General Dempsey spoke Sunday evening at a news conference held in a building in a compound near the Rashid Hotel.

Half the missiles were 68-millimeter, which have a range of two to three miles; the other half were 85-millimeter, with a three- to four-mile range, he said. The smaller ones were French-made, and designed for use by helicopters. The others were Russian. The French rockets, officers said, were quite new, and were probably purchased after the arms embargo was in place. They were in pristine condition,'' said one military officer who inspected the rocket tubes and assembly.

Mr. Hussein had weapons of that type, but General Dempsey said he did not know if the missiles used the hotel attack came from Mr. Hussein's arsenal.

General Dempsey described the device as clever, but not sophisticated.'' He called it a science project in a garage with a welder and a battery and a handful of wires.''

That such an unsophisticated device could be used against one of the most fortified and well-guarded sites in Baghdad raised questions about the military's ability to secure any major site in Baghdad. The compound is surrounded by high concrete walls, but the missiles were fired over them...

A New York Times reporter traveling with Mr. Wolfowitz was a few rooms from where one of the rockets hit. Looking across the street, he saw the trailer from which the rockets had been fired, and saw one projectile coming at the hotel, trailing sparks.

The Times also reports that bombings at five police stations and the Baghdad office of the Red Cross have killed 34 people and wounded 224 more.

"It puts us back into combat operations," Lt. Col. Eric Nantz, a battalion commander with the 82nd Airborne Division's 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, tells the Washington Post. "It's not where we want to be. It's not where the Iraqi people want us to be."

NEW SPY GEAR FOR IRAQ

The Pentagon is rushing new gear out of its labs and into Iraq, in an attempt to thwart guerilla attacks, the New York Times reports in a maddeningly-vague story today.

New Defense Department spending "would include $38.3 million for tethered blimps equipped with digital cameras to spy on guerrillas' movements, more than $30 million for electronic jammers to disrupt their remote-controlled bombs, and $70 million to develop and buy what the letter called other 'rapid-reaction/new solution' technologies.

"Some devices would help detect roadside bombs and booby traps that have been killing American-led occupation forces, (Darpa chief Anthony) Tether said. These countermeasures use a variety of approaches including lasers, acoustic sensors and electromagnetic technologies, he said. He said the devices would be shipped in the next three to four months or sooner, after accelerated, last-minute development and testing."

THERE'S MORE: New Scientist has details on the technologies -- including a laser system to home in on snipers by finding "the tiny particles caught in the ballistic shockwave generated by a shot."

UNGUARDED ARMS FUELING IRAQ ATTACKS

Virtually every guerilla attack in Iraq is being "carried out with explosives and matériel taken from Saddam Hussein's former weapons dumps, which are much larger than previously estimated and remain, for the most part, unguarded by American troops," the New York Times reports.

The problem of uncounted and unguarded weapons sites is considerably greater than has previously been stated, a senior allied official said.

The American military now says that Iraq's army had nearly one million tons of weapons and ammunition, which is half again as much as the 650,000 tons that Gen. John P. Abizaid, the senior American commander in the Persian Gulf region, estimated only two weeks ago...

A private American company, Raytheon, has been awarded a contract to destroy the weapons, but it will not begin work until December, one official said.

TROOPS IN IRAQ: BODY ARMOR LACK

"Thousands of U.S. troops invaded Iraq in March without the new body armor that can stop rifle bullets, and thousands more still lack the lifesaving protection," according to the Daily News.

"I can't answer for the record why we started this war with protective vests that were in short supply," Army Gen. John Abizaid, chief of the U.S. Central Command, told Congress last week.

Abizaid asked for quick approval of President Bush's request for $87 billion in new funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, which would include $300 million for body armor and $177 million to upgrade Humvees with chassis armor.

U.S. GEAR IN IRAQ WEARING DOWN

It's not just the troops that are getting worn down by an extended tour of duty in Iraq, ABC News reports. The equipment is, too.

Keeping vehicles running is as important as keeping the troops fed. The longer the U.S. military is there, the harder it gets. For example: The Army says helicopter blades and engines are rapidly being "eaten by the sand."

The heat and terrain are shredding tires on Humvees. Some $236 million has been spent to replace them since the war began in March, instead of the $80 million normally needed.

Bradley fighting vehicles are in the worst shape. The Army can't replace worn track on the Bradleys fast enough. Stockpiles have now been depleted, and won't be re-supplied for months...

The heavily armored Bradleys now are needed to escort military convoys, dramatically increasing the amount of use.

Bradleys normally log about 800 miles a year. In Iraq, some have logged 1,200 miles per month.

"I don't think we quite saw the magnitude of having to secure all the convoys with Bradleys," Gen. Paul Kern, commanding general of the U.S. Army Material Command, told a small group of reporters recently.

BATTERY LACK ALMOST PULLED PLUG ON IRAQ WAR

Major combat missions during Gulf War II almost ground to a halt -- because of a shortage of batteries.

The BA 5590 non-rechargeable battery is the military’s most widely used portable power source, juicing up all kinds of communications gear. They power items like the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) radios, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) alarms.

"We literally [came] within days of running out of these batteries," Navy Capt. Clark Driscoll, with the Defense Contract Management Agency, tells National Defense magazine.

The shortage was a "near-term disaster," he adds. Only a quick war kept the military from running out of batteries completely.

The Marines alone were using 3,028 of the BA 5590s per day. They eventually had to ask over 30 countries for enough batteries to last the war.

TOP BRASS BLASTS U.S.' IRAQ EFFORT

High-level criticism of the White House's afterwar effort continues to mount. Maybe it'd be possible to blow off any one of the critiques from former Army Secretary Thomas White, former Navy Secretary James Webb, the current Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Congressional Budget Office. But taken together -- it's hard to imagine a more damning assessment of the path President Bush is pursuing in Iraq.

U.S. TRICKED BY IRAQI DISINFO?

The hunt for Saddam's WMD is going so badly that U.S. officials are starting to wonder whether they've been tricked by Iraqi double-agents, according to the Los Angeles Times.

Former Iraqi operatives have confirmed since the war that Hussein's regime sent "double agents" disguised as defectors to the West to plant fabricated intelligence. In other cases, Baghdad apparently tricked legitimate defectors into funneling phony tips about weapons production and storage sites.

"They were shown bits of information and led to believe there was an active weapons program, only to be turned loose to make their way to Western intelligence sources," said the senior intelligence official. "Then, because they believe it, they pass polygraph tests ... and the planted information becomes true to the West, even if it was all made up to deceive us..."

One U.S. intelligence official said analysts may have been too eager to find evidence to support the White House's claims. As a result, he said, defectors "were just telling us what we wanted to hear."

Hussein's motives for such a deliberate disinformation scheme may have been to bluff his enemies abroad, from Washington to Tehran, by sending false signals of his military might. Experts also say the dictator's defiance of the West, and its fear of his purported weapons of mass destruction, boosted his prestige at home and was a critical part of his power base in the Arab world...

The current focus on Iraqi defectors reflects a new skepticism within the Iraq Survey Group, the 1,400-member team responsible for finding any illicit arms. In interviews, several current and former members expressed growing disappointment over the inconclusive results of the search so far.

"We were prisoners of our own beliefs," said a senior U.S. weapons expert who recently returned from a stint with the survey group. "We said Saddam Hussein was a master of denial and deception. Then when we couldn't find anything, we said that proved it, instead of questioning our own assumptions."

U.S. SOLDIERS USING IRAQI GUNS

G.I.s in Iraq have a new weapon of choice: Iraqi AK-47s.

"The soldiers (of the 4th Infantry Dvision) based around Baqouba (Iraq) are from an armor battalion, which means they have tanks, Humvees and armored personnel carriers. But they are short on rifles," the Associated Press reports.

A four-man tank crew is issued two M4 assault rifles and four 9mm pistols, relying mostly on the tank's firepower for protection.

But now they are engaged in guerrilla warfare, patrolling narrow roads and goat trails where tanks are less effective. Troops often find themselves dismounting to patrol in smaller vehicles, making rifles essential.

"We just do not have enough rifles to equip all of our soldiers. So in certain circumstances we allow soldiers to have an AK-47. They have to demonstrate some proficiency with the weapon ... demonstrate an ability to use it," said Lt. Col. Mark Young, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Infantry Division.

It's great that our soldiers have been able to adapt themselves to the situaiton they've found themselves in. But there couldn't be a clearer example of how poorly their Pentagon bosses prepared for the Iraqi afterwar.

THERE'S MORE: "I don't think it's fair to call the use of the AK by dismounted mechanized forces in Iraq poor planning by the Pentagon. Armor crews have always been under-gunned in the US military," writes Defense Tech pal Wyatt Earp. "The Army needs to do what the Marines do, which is give everyone an M-16 (rifle) as well as supply more M-203s (grenade lanuchers) to the units and start handing out MP-5s (submachine guns) and more Combat Shotguns."

AND MORE: "The surprising -- shocking? -- part of this article is that highly trained tankers are being dismounted to patrol on foot and in humvees. What better testimony to the US Army's need for constabulary-type units, maybe modeled on the US Constabulary formed in 1946 to police the occupation of Germany," replies one member of the JO Forum.

AND MORE: "It's not just the rifles," Phil Carter adds. "Let's think of all the things that a regular civilian police force would have -- hand-held radios, shotguns, flexcuffs, handcuffs, batons, shields, etc. Then let's compare that to what an armor battalion has -- less than one M16 per soldier. These units are having to buy tons and tons of equipment to become more like cops."

AND MORE: Maybe it's just a coincidence, but the Army has just announced that it's speeding up the development of a potential replacement of its assault weapons.

U.S. ADMITS NAPALM USE

"American pilots dropped the controversial incendiary agent napalm on Iraqi troops during the advance on Baghdad," according to the Independent. "The attacks caused massive fireballs that obliterated several Iraqi positions."

The Pentagon denied using napalm at the time, but Marine pilots and their commanders have confirmed that they used an upgraded version of the weapon against dug-in positions...

A 1980 UN convention banned the use against civilian targets of napalm, a terrifying mixture of jet fuel and polystyrene that sticks to skin as it burns. The US, which did not sign the treaty, is one of the few countries that makes use of the weapon. It was employed notoriously against both civilian and military targets in the Vietnam war.

The upgraded weapon, which uses kerosene rather than petrol, was used in March and April, when dozens of napalm bombs were dropped near bridges over the Saddam Canal and the Tigris river, south of Baghdad.

U.S. ORDERS BAGHDAD MOBILES OFF

Last week, mobile phones mysteriously began working in Baghdad, giving the war-ravaged city a needed boost to its shattered communications infrastructure. Now, the BBC reports, U.S. authorities in Iraq have ordered the Bahraini firm Batelco to stop running the service.

"The authorities were concerned that a renegade service provider could upset its own plans to put Iraqi mobile licences up for tender next week," according to the Beeb.

"Since Batelco had not applied for a licence of its own, the Coalition Provisional Authority has asked the firm to shut down its roaming facility. The firm said it had already spent $5m (£3.1m) on infrastructure in Baghdad."

(via Techdirt)

UDAY AND QUSAY DEAD

Saddam Hussein's sadistic, demonic spawn, Uday and Qusay, have been killed in Mosul. According to CNN, U.S. Special Operations team Task Force 20 -- backed-up by 200 members of the 101st Airborne's 2nd Brigade, armor, and air power -- killed the pair and two others after a six-hour firefight. A walk-in tipster betrayed the pair's location.

The two were widely considered the most brutal in a brutal Baathist regime. Qusay was in charge of Iraq's intelligence services. Uday organized the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam, "headed the country's Olympic Committee and was reported to have tortured athletes who did not compete as well as he hoped," the Washington Post notes.

THERE'S MORE: "Humvee-mounted TOW missiles likely struck the fatal blows that killed Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay," according to CNN.

GUNS-FOR-HIRE TO POLICE IRAQ?

The U.S. may turn to a private security force to guard as many as 2,000 key sites in Iraq, the New York Times reports.

The idea, currently being floated "at the highest levels of the Pentagon," is to re-hire former Iraqi soldiers, and to retrain them to guard the National Museum and other locations.

"Our sense is that the military has too much on their plate right now, and that these are issues that need to be addressed, and the way to do that is through the private sector," Anne Tiedemann, an executive at the security firm Kroll Inc., told the Times.

Guns-for-hire are becoming an increasingly attractive option for U.S. policy-makers. They're being used currently to spot drug-growers and rebels in Colombia. And, as discussed a few weeks ago, they're being considered for peace-keeping duties in the Congo.

THERE'S MORE: Peter Singer -- author of the recently-published Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry -- calls the privatized police idea "another checker player's move in a game of chess."

"Now we have a situation where the new Iraqi army, new Iraqi police force and now new Iraqi paramilitary force will all be assembled by the private market," he tells Defense Tech.

That's in addition to all of the other functions contractors are filling in Iraq. By some estimates, the ratio of private employees to U.S. soldiers operating in the Persian Gulf area is one-to-ten.

The lurch towards an outsourced police force, Singer notes, is an indicator of "how little planning the administration gave to the post-conflict stage ('don't know what to do, just give it to someone else to do')."

He adds, "How can you think that creating a new, private, paramilitary force (hired and fired by outsiders) will not cause problems with the other forces and not undermine the authority of the public Iraqi administration we are supposed to be setting up?"

STRYKERS MAY HEAD TO IRAQ

General John Abizaid, the new chief of U.S. Central Command, raised a ruckus yesterday when he acknowledged that American troops were facing a "classical guerrilla-type" war in Iraq.

But lost in the fuss over Abizaid's comments was an interesting bit of news: the Army may soon be sending its controversial, high-tech Stryker light armored vehicle brigade to help combat the Iraqi insurgents.

Light, mobile, and packed with the latest communications gear, the eight wheel drive Strykers would seem to be a perfect fit for the intermittent, free-flowing fighting going on in Iraq.

But the vehicles -- the first new armor to be introduced into the Army since the Abrams tank in the 1980's -- have had a rocky recent past. During the Millennium Challenge 2002 war game, for example, soldiers complained that the Stryker was susceptible to flat tires, couldn't hit targets on the run, and would get unbearably hot inside -- 120 degrees and higher.

And that was during testing in California. Imagine how toasty the Strykers will get in the heat of the Mesopotamian desert.

THERE'S MORE: Two National Guard brigades may also be called up to Iraqi duty. And Phil Carter isn't too happy about it.

America's National Guard has already been stretched thin by consecutive homeland security deployments since Sept. 11, known as Operation Noble Eagle. In the California Army National Guard, nearly every combat arms unit has already deployed once. The units which have deployed have returned in deplorable condition, with most soldiers opting to leave the Guard. There are a number of National Guard units which have been left alone for homeland security, and these are the likely units to deploy to Iraq. However, even that is a finite supply. If America is to stay in Iraq for the long haul, this solution won't work.

GUN FAILURES LEAD TO PRIVATE JESSICA'S CAPTURE

Why were Iraqi fighters able to ambush Private Jessica Lynch and the 507th Maintennance Company? Because the Americans' weapons didn't work, according to a new report.

"The report indicates that soldiers had difficulty firing both their personal weapons (the M16A2 rifle) and their crew-served weapons (the M2 .50 caliber machine gun) at the enemy," Phil Carter notes. "It appears from this report and others that the culprit was poor weapons training and maintenance."

He continues, "Support units work hard in peacetime to keep our equipment running, often to the neglect of their own field training. The result is that they do not meet the standard for basic soldiering and warfighting skills."

"Our Army needs to embrace the warrior ethos in all units -- not just the combat arms -- and it needs to ensure that every unit can fight its way out of an ambush like this one."

Soldiers for the Truth has a Gulf War II after-action report on which small arms worked, and which ones didn't.

TOUGH TALKING FOR MARINES IN IRAQ

Don't tell the members of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force about information overload. They already know all about it.

During Gulf War II, members of the force often had to use a helmet headset, four radios and two laptops at once to communicate with their comrades and commanders -- all while crammed into light armored vehicles crawling across the Mesopotamian desert.

An analysis of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force's experience in central Iraq has yielded a number of important lessons about what gadgets worked and what high-tech equipment flopped in Gulf War II.

The primary finding, according to the field report by Marine Corps Systems Command: "Marines were overwhelmed with the high number of varied communications equipment they were expected to use."

During the war, U.S. chieftains and military analysts talked with wide-eyed wonder about how quick and how perfectly seamless communications between U.S. troops had become. In a matter of minutes, they crowed, a tip about Saddam Hussein's location became an assault on a Baghdad restaurant.

Now, it seems, that flawless network is at least equal parts Rube Goldberg and Henry Ford.

"They had a communication system for every eventuality, and for every issue," said Patrick Garrett, an analyst with the defense think tank Globalsecurity.org. "But they really didn't integrate them all together."

My Wired News story has more on the Marine's communications woes.

THERE'S MORE: This story is unfair, one Defense Tech reader complains. The military identified these gaps long ago, and has been steadily working to fix them. The Joint Tactical Radio System ("JTRS"), when it's finally ready, promises to solve most of these shortcomings.

All true. But, in many cases, the Marines' inability to talk had nothing to do with technology. It was a matter of logistics. Marine units often received radios that were incompatible with one another. If all of 1 MEF had been outfitted with a common set of radios, their problems in this area would have been largely solved.

LIGHTS OUT DOOMED APACHE ATTACK

March 23rd's failed Apache helicopter attack on Republican Guard forces was perhaps the lowest point of the American effort in Gulf War II. How did the out-gunned Iraqis manage to turn such a strike back?

By turning off the lights.

Lt. Gen William Wallace, commander of the U.S. Army's V Corps, told the Associated Press that the Iraqis "orchestrated a localized power outage to serve as a signal of the coming Apache attack." They also used cell phones to warn troops that the Americans were approaching.

Wallace got into trouble with superiors for his comments during the war that the enemy in a Iraq was "a bit different than the one we war-gamed against." He defended those comments Wednesday:

"The enemy that we fought" in numerous cities in southern Iraq in the opening days of the ground offensive "was much more aggressive than what we expected him to be, at least what I expected him to be." He mentioned the cities of Najaf, Hillah, Samawah, Karbala and Nasiriyah.

The Iraqis were "willing to attack out of those towns toward our formations, when my expectation was that they would be defending those towns and not be as aggressive," he added. Wallace also noted that foreigners who fought alongside Iraqi paramilitaries were "fanatical if not suicidal."

"So all of those things led to that comment," he said.

According to the Associated Press, the Pentagon has replaced Wallace as V Corps commander.

3,000 POSSIBLE WMD SITES IN IRAQ

If there are any banned weapons still in Iraq -- and that's a big if -- finding them isn't going to be easy. Scattered throughout the country are 3,000 sites where weapons of mass destruction might be, Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. forces in the Gulf, said. And American troops are only checking 10-15 of those locations per day.

Before the war, some analysts predicted that Hans Blix-style inspections would have to resume once the conflict ended. Those forecasts are now looking increasingly prescient.

But these examinations could once again be a prologue to battle. President Bush yesterday said "there are chemical weapons in Syria," shipped from Iraq.

When asked if that meant the U.S. would be invading Syria next, he replied, "First things first. We're here in Iraq now."

TIKRIT CENTER FALLS

The center of Tikrit -- Saddam's Hussein's hometown, and final shard of his broken regime -- has been captured by U.S. Marines.

Several thousand troops, accompanied by more than 300 armored vehicles were "spared the last burst of resistance they expected," according to the New York Times.

After being pounded by AH-1 Cobra helicopters and F/A-18 Hornet warplanes, the Washington Post reports, most of the town's defenders fled before the American ground forces arrived.

BIG GUNS, NOT HIGH TECH, BEHIND BAGHDAD COLLAPSE

The technologies behind U.S. troops' victories in the open expanses of the Mesopotamian deserts aren't what's triggering the fall of Saddam's rule in the alleys and shadows of Baghdad.

GPS-guided bombs, advanced radios and spy drones all become less reliable as sand gives way to concrete and steel. Instead, the American military has leaned on the cunning of its junior officers and the overwhelming firepower of its heavy armor in its battle for the Iraqi capital.

This is proving to be a powerful combination for U.S. forces, as recent events have shown. But it's most definitely a shift from the war's first phase.

Jim Lewis, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said, "Urban combat means training becomes important, and technology becomes secondary."

My Wired News story has more.

SADDAM'S HOLD ON BAGHDAD OVER, U.S. SAYS

"Saddam Hussein's rule over (Baghdad) has ended, U.S. commanders declared Wednesday, and jubilant crowds swarmed into the streets here, dancing, looting, cheering U.S. convoys and defacing images of the Iraqi leader," the Associated Press reports.

"The capital city is now one of those areas that has been added to the list of where the regime does not have control," said Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks at U.S. Central Command in Qatar.

The locus of battle immediately shifted to Saddam's hometown of Tikrit, where coalition aircraft have been bombing Republican Guard divisions in advance of a ground assault.

"CHEMICAL ALI" DEAD; SADDAM PALACE TAKEN

"American forces took control of a major presidential palace on the banks of the Tigris River in Baghdad early this morning in the biggest thrust into the city so far," according to the New York Times. "As many as 70 tanks and 60 Bradley fighting vehicles rolled down the wide streets as A-10 Warthog planes and pilotless drones flew in the skies unchallenged."

In the southern city of Basra, "Ali Hassan al-Majid, dubbed 'Chemical Ali' by opponents of the Iraqi regime for ordering a 1988 poison gas attack that killed thousands of Kurds, has been found dead," the Associated Press reports.

TROOPS TAKE OVER BAGHDAD AIRPORT

"U.S. ground forces have swept into Baghdad's international airport under cover of darkness, securing it with tanks and other armored units. They encountered almost no opposition from Iraqi forces," ABC News reports.

FAULTY TECH NOT TO BLAME FOR "FRIENDLY FIRE"?

Misfiring technology has been blamed for many of the "friendly fire" deaths in Gulf War II. But New Scientist says that the armed services' lack of coordination is the real culprit in these accidents.

BRIT BRIDGE-BUILDERS GO BACK IN TIME

In the midst of this high-tech war, British soldiers are building bridges with a technique that originated in the Roman empire. StrategyPage has the details.

BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD BEGINS

U.S. ground forces have started their push towards the Iraqi capital, entering the so-called "red zone" -- the area within range of Baghdad's artillery, FROG rockets, and al Samoud surface-to-surface missiles.

"Columns of M1 Abrams tanks and armored vehicles from 1st Marine Division...headed into the outer defenses of the Republican Guard's Baghdad Division around the city of Kut, about 100 miles southeast of the capital," the Washington Post reports. "To the west...units from 7th Cavalry Regiment of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division were engaged in a 'knock-down, drag-out' battle with elements of the Republican Guard's Medina Division."

F/A-18 Hornets and other warplanes from the 3rd Marine Air Wing also struck Iraqi T-72 tanks in reinforced shelters as part of the effort, the paper noted.

American troops are gaining a crucial advantage, the New York Times says, because the push is coming during the darkest period of the month, allowing American troops to use their night-vision goggles.

To help mount the attack, airstrips have been built in the desert for C-130 supply planes. And the Iraqi air base at Tallil has been taken over. The base is being used to refuel the Air Force's A-10 attack planes.

THERE'S MORE: The U.S. military says that Iraq's Baghdad Division has been "destroyed."

U.S. MILITARY BANS REPORTERS' SATELLITE PHONES

U.S. Central Command has told reporters embedded with military units in Iraq to shut off their Thuraya satellite phones, Reuters says. The phones could be used to zero in on where troops are -- they're equipped with GPS, and have a location-finding system that's accurate to 100 meters. Phones from Thuraya's military-backed rival, Iridium, aren't as precise.

(via /.)

AFTER-SCHOOL BEERS BECAME BATTLE PLAN FOR IRAQ

The U.S. military's battle plan for Iraq began as "a what-if session over beers among a handful of Army majors nearly 17 months ago," the National Journal reports in a must-read article.

They were all students at the Army's School for Advanced Military Studies, known colloquially as SAMS, at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., where the Army's most promising planners take a graduate course in strategic campaigns. The young majors brainstormed about a march on Baghdad to dispose of Saddam Hussein. In its earliest versions, the plan envisioned a 125-day campaign by a U.S. force nearly twice the size of that now in Iraq.

Maj. Kevin Marcus, a SAMS graduate now attached to V Corps headquarters, helped develop the plan from a back-of-an-envelope exercise into a PowerPoint presentation that within days of being finished ended up on the desk of the president of the United States. Though any military campaign plan of the size of Iraqi Freedom has many midwivesóand for this one, they include Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld himself, who prodded planners to think outside the boxóMarcus saw it develop from infancy to fruition.

From the very beginning, he says, the need to synchronize a rapid, combined-arms campaign to seize the initiative with "shock and awe"óroughly the modern-day equivalent of armored blitzkrieg warfareóleapt out at planners determined to limit the opportunity for Iraqi forces to employ chemical weapons, wreak environmental havoc, or organize a coordinated defense. In bullfighter parlance, they wanted to go for a quick kill before the bull learned the trick of the cape...

Changes to Marcus' plan may have undermined its effectiveness, however.

Right up until the launch of the war, the plan kept changing... Just days before the war began, U.S. commanders had also seriously considered changing the battle plan to allow for a strategic pause at the key southern crossroads city of An Nasiriya. Such a pause would give U.S. forces time to accept the expected surrender of the 11th Division of the regular Iraqi army that defends that city, and give Republican Guard forces near Baghdad an opportunity to capitulate as well. The plan was dropped at the last minute...

By far the most dramatic and disruptive change to the battle plan, however, was Rumsfeld's decision last November to slash Central Command's request for forces. This single decision essentially cut the size of the anticipated assault force in half in the final stages of planning, and it had a ripple effect on Central Command and Army planning that continues to color operations to this day.

Notably, the Pentagon scrapped the Time Phased Force Deployment Data, or "TipFid," by which regional commanders would identify forces needed for a specific campaign, and the individual armed services would manage their deployments by order of priority. The result has meant that even as Central Command chief Gen. Tommy Franks was launching the war, forces identified for the fight continued to pour off ships in Kuwait, and not necessarily in the order of first priority.

BUNKER BUSTERS ON BAGHDAD

For the first time in Gulf War II, the U.S. Air Force has hit downtown Baghdad with "bunker busting" bombs. A B-2 stealth bomber dropped two of the 4,700-pound, satellite-guided GBU-28 munitions on a major communications tower on the east bank of Tigris River, according to Ha'Aretz.

The bunker-busters were parts of massive coalition bombing effort last night. Combat aircraft dropped bombs "just about as fast as we can load them," Capt. Thomas Parker, aboard the USS Kitty Hawk in the Persian Gulf, told the paper.

NORTHERN FRONT AIRLIFT BEGINS; IRAQI TANK COLUMN ENDS

"The U.S. military Thursday began airlifting troops, tanks and equipment for the U.S. Army's 1st Infantry Division into northern Iraq after about 1,000 paratroopers secured a key airfield in the country's Kurdish-controlled zone," according to CNN.

The U.S. military had originally hoped to send some 60,000 U.S. troops -- including the 4th Infantry Division -- into northern Iraq from Turkey, giving them an option to launch a pincer movement on Baghdad. But the Turkish government rejected the plan.

The airlift begins to give the U.S. the option of that second front. But it won't be ready for another week or so, Reuters reports.

In southern Iraq, British forces destroyed a column of 14 Iraqi T-55 tanks leaving Basra this morning in a "short, sharp engagement," according to the New York Times.

MINES DELAY AID

It's one of the trickiest, most dangerous jobs in a battlezone -- clearing mines from coastal waters. And right now, it's keeping food and medicine from flowing through the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr.

UPI reports that over the last 96 hours, coalition mine-hunters have been trying to map a safe channel through the waters to Umm Qasr. But they're finding a lot of "possible mine contacts" -- objects that may or may not be mines. So they're having to go through the nerve-wracking process of placing mine disposal charges next to these "contacts" and exploding them.

For the moment, there's no high-tech way to do this. Divers have to place the charges by hand -- although sometimes they'll get an assist from a dolphin. The Navy is working on drones that could handle the job; but they're not going to be ready for this war.

THERE'S MORE: There have been major problems distributing aid by land, as well. "Tens of thousands of prepared meals and ration kits of rice, oil, sugar and cereals destined for farms just north of the Iraqi border, had instead been hijacked soon after leaving Kuwait," the BBC reports.

AND MORE: The British aid ship Sir Galahad has finally landed in Umm Qasr with its cargo of humanitarian supplies.

REPUBLICAN GUARD HEADING TOWARDS MARINES

"A large contingent of Iraq's elite Republican Guard headed south in a 1,000-vehicle convoy Wednesday toward U.S. Marines in central Iraq ó an area that already has seen the heaviest fighting of the war," reports the Associated Press.

THERE'S MORE: The BBC is saying that "coalition warplanes are attacking a huge convoy of (Iraqi) tanks and armoured personnel carriers which are heading south-east from Basra towards the al-Faw peninsula.

AND MORE: Sandstorms continue to keep the 3rd Infantry's Apache helicopters on the ground, according to CNN. But the weather has eased up enough for fixed-wing airplanes to make close air support strikes, if needed.

NET-WAR DREAMS MATERIALIZING IN IRAQ

For years, military strategists' idea of nirvana has been "network-centric warfare" - the notion that infantrymen, pilots, drones, and generals will all share just about everything they see and hear over a new Internet for combat.

In Iraq, U.S. forces have come closer than they've ever been to reaching this goal. And it's not an entirely positive development.

Check out my Tech Central Station story for the benefits, and perils, of war on "Internet time."