

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

DANES, ORIENTALISM AND THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE NORDIC PERIPHERY

By

JONAS KAUFFELDT

A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of History
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded:
Summer Semester, 2006

Copyright © 2006
Jonas Kauffeldt
All Rights Reserved

The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of Jonas Kauffeldt defended on 26 May 2006.

Peter P. Garretson
Professor Directing Dissertation

Scott C. Flanagan
Outside Committee Member

Bawa S. Singh
Committee Member

Nathan Stoltzfus
Committee Member

Michael Creswell
Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

To my parents and brother
Their love and support was crucial to the successful completion of this project

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A research project in the academic field of history is by definition dependent on archival materials, be they public or private. The information gleaned from such sources serves as the foundation upon which historians construct arguments and build frameworks of analysis. In this regard, the following study of Danes and their perspectives on the Middle East does not deviate from that tried and tested norm. Countless hours were spent sifting through boxes and folders of private letters, government documents, and other pertinent papers. And while much of the material gathered over those many months is not included in the present, completed work, the bulk of the collected information will constitute the basis for other, future projects.

The majority of research in primary sources that appears on these pages was conducted in Copenhagen, the Danish capital. *Rigsarkivet* (The State Archives) and *Det Kongelige Bibliotek* (The Royal Library) yielded a wealth of information, and the staffs at both locations, which incidently are situated right next to each other, were helpful and knowledgeable about the collections. The successful completion of this project is, in part, due to their cooperation and assistance.

Special thanks also go to Nette Holmboe Bang and her husband, Thorkild, of Værløse, Denmark, who most graciously invited me to their home and granted me access to her late father's personal papers. It was a great experience to handle and consider those documents and one that I will not soon forget. Similarly, Søren Nysom, in his capacity as an executive at Kampsax International A/S, was very forthcoming in allowing me to study the available company records and relevant papers relating to the Danish role in building railways in Turkey and Iran during the interwar period (1920s-1930s). The days spent at the former company headquarters in Hvidovre served to greatly enhance my understanding of the construction projects as symbols of the Danish role in the Middle East.

Lastly, the members of the supervisory committee deserve my gratitude for their patience through the delays and extensions. In particular, I feel indebted to my major professor, Dr. Peter P. Garretson, for his guidance in helping me to complete the writing process. Without his encouragement and advice, I am sure that the project would still be languishing in its initial stages.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Maps	vi
Abbreviations, Translations, and Transliteration	vii
Abstract	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
1. DANES IN UNIFORM: THE MILITARY CAREERS OF SØREN A. ARENDRUP AND P. DANIEL BRUUN	12
2. THE HØYERS AND THE DANISH CHURCH MISSION IN ARABIA	45
3. VIKINGS IN THE SAND: THE TRAVELS OF BARCLAY RAUNKIÆR AND KNUD HOLMBOE	89
4. AID WORKER TO A DEVASTATED PEOPLE: KAREN JEPPE AND THE ARMENIANS	123
5. DANISH ENGINEERS AND TURKO-IRANIAN DEVELOPMENT 1927-1938	157
EPILOGUE	188
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	197
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	227

LIST OF MAPS

1.	Northwestern Algeria	15
2.	Eritrea and North-central Ethiopia	20
3.	Battlefield of Gundet, 1875	31
4.	Southwestern Arabia, 1900	50
5.	Upper and Lower Yemen	54
6-7.	Holmboe's route across North Africa	97
8.	North-central Arabia, showing pilgrim routes, tribal regions and place names	100
9.	Lebanon and Syria under the French Mandate, 1930	130
10.	Routes of the Danish-built railways in northern and southern Turkey	160
11.	Route of the Trans-Iranian Railway	172

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DDA	De Danske Armeniervenner (The Danish Friends of Armenia)
DKA	Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien (Danish Church Mission in Arabia)
KDGS	Det Kongelige Danske Geografiske Selskab (The Royal Danish Geographical Society)
MJP	<i>Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten</i> (The Morning Paper Jutland Post)

TRANSLATIONS

All translations of Danish primary sources into English are solely attributable to the author. He alone is responsible for the accuracy of the excerpts that appear in text.

TRANSLITERATION

The English rendering of Persian, Arabic, and other foreign language terms follows the form most commonly accepted in the field.

ABSTRACT

In 1978, Edward W. Said (1935-2003), Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, published his now famous book, *Orientalism*. Intended as an indictment of the dichotomization of East and West – the willful categorization of the Orient as distinct and necessarily stunted in comparison to the Occident – Said argued that the perception, rooted in the murky centuries of medieval Europe, crystallized into a potent and pervasive discourse that once manufactured, combined establishment knowledge with political and economic power in the 19th century. Imperialism and direct occupation of the Middle East reinforced the belief in its regional subservience and weakness and forged a virtual ideology of Western superiority and entitlement.

Yet how did societies and individuals at the margins of European and Western power fit into the framework put forth by Said? Was he correct to assert that the Orientalist discourse was all encompassing and colored every observer and scholar who studied the region? Or was it possible for individuals, both from within the states that dominated the Middle East and even more readily those native to the lesser powers that did not, to assert an independent basis for judgment and interpretation?

This dissertation explores a range of experiences that Danes, citizens of a small and relatively weak European state, garnered in their encounters with the Middle East. Their views and understandings of events, as well as their perspectives on “the Other,” served to influence the shaping of knowledge in Denmark about the East. Further, as their country was unentangled in the web of strategic and imperial intrigue that dominated the affairs of the larger powers, Danes were able to position themselves before the local populations as individuals untainted by affiliations that might present a danger of undue influence. Ever conscious of this advantage, they worked diligently to cultivate that perception and harness it as an advantage wherever possible.

In short, a revelation and consideration of Danish perspectives adds to the diversity of sources encompassed by the study of Orientalism.

INTRODUCTION

At six o'clock the prison barge weighed anchor. Leaving behind the sanctuary of Derna harbor, the vessel steamed out to face the turbulent summer waters of the Mediterranean Sea, and set a course for Benghazi, the capital of Italian-occupied Cyrenaica. The strong waves rolled the ship violently on that June evening in 1930, promising the crew and their human cargo a most unpleasant passage. Stowed away below deck, and confined to simple bunks encased in iron bars, the prisoners were compelled to endure nature's punishments along with those imposed by their captors. An overwhelming stench of sweat and vomit dominated the poorly ventilated cell, and the soiled mattresses upon which they had to lay were infested with vermin. With their hands shackled to the iron bars, they had no means to fend off the attacks of the pests, and as the ship tossed and turned the metal constraints gnawed at their flesh. In this nightmarish setting, the small group of imprisoned men and boys, ranging in age from seventy to just thirteen, attempted to keep up their spirits and draw strength from their faith, but the harsh conditions, the scowls of the Eritrean guards, and the notoriety of Italian injustice made optimism fleeting.

The captives could well imagine what awaited them in Benghazi. They would undergo a brief trial, receive a term of years in prison, perhaps be transferred to a labor camp, or even be sentenced to die. After all, executions were common under Italian rule. Yet several of the prisoners had committed no other offense than being related to the Sanusi family, members of which led the anti-Italian resistance. And another of the men, the only non-Arab in the group, but very much a Muslim, had been falsely arrested as a foreign spy. That particular man stood out from the rest despite being dressed in traditional, native clothes, because he was taller than the others and was fair-haired. His piercing blue eyes, which observed with admiration the moral courage of the other prisoners, also indicated that he was someone out of place, someone immersed in an environment alien to his origins.¹

The man was in fact a Dane and a journalist by the name of Knud Holmboe. But how had a Scandinavian of a privileged, upper middle class background become embroiled in an insurgency campaign in faraway North Africa and hence incarcerated by fellow Europeans? The answer, no, the explanation, of how such a seemingly unlikely circumstance could come to pass is intriguing, much as is the story of other Danes who traveled to the Middle East, lived among the people, studied their cultures, and conveyed their experiences and impressions to their countrymen. Holmboe and his compatriots would come to serve their fellow citizens as an invaluable resource of information and perspectives on the region and its multitude of diverse societies. However, the quality and veracity of the learning they dispensed was rather nuanced, reflecting a diversity within the Danish population. From adventurous travelers to respected scholars, they were, in what they observed and the manner in which they recorded data, conditioned by "the preconceived notions and unconscious ideas imparted to [them by their] own social milieu and individual background[s]."² Their very identity, as people of a particular class, education, and ideological conviction, became an invariable factor in shaping understandings of Middle Eastern affairs and societies.

A need to consider the role of individualism in creating particular scholarship and perspectives was supplemented and reinforced by the recognition that national origin was, and continues to be, a source of influence. Danes and others from countries or regions (the Netherlands, Poland, Scandinavia as a whole, etc.) that lacked significant political and economic power were

people whose nations never came to dominate, much less rule, lands in the Middle East. Falling outside the power relationship inherent in the occupier-occupied dynamic, they lacked the compulsion to necessarily justify or legitimize the superiority of their countries in the region. That ability to distance themselves, at least symbolically, from those in power afforded them an opportunity, though not one seized by all, to be more objective and evenhanded in their assessment of the local people and societies. As participants in the Orientalist discourse, these representatives of smaller states constituted a part of the body of Westerners asserting the power and authority to represent the Other, but they were not inherently perpetuating the structures of dominance or the endorsement of same.³ Their contributions instead added nuance, depth, and even challenges to the field, widening the base of knowledge and interpretations available to their audience. Orientalism was in fact enriched by such an inclusion of perspectives from the periphery, serving to partially lift the fog that otherwise obscured a clearer, more honest understanding of the East and its cultures.

The body of learning that sought to explain the Orient to the West constituted by its very nature an artificial, manufactured vision, a discourse that distorted rather than clarified. Edward W. Said (1935-2003), arguably “the most widely known Palestinian intellectual in the West,” famously analyzed the phenomenon in his 1978 book, *Orientalism*, wherein he defined the field as “a system of ideological fictions” fostering in essence “a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”).”⁴ Tracing the core of the problem to the limitations inherent in one culture seeking to portray another, he stressed the need to evaluate Western scholarship and other works on the East in context of the layers of subjectivity attached to the published and stated assessments.⁵ “All representation is misrepresentation of one sort or another,” Said declared in a 1996 interview, “but I argue in *Orientalism* that the interests at work in the representation of the Orient by the West were those of imperial control and were the prerogatives of power.”⁶ The intersection of material and political superiority with the self-proclaimed authority to classify and evaluate the identity of others served by the 19th century to create a field of perspectives reflecting the reality and supposed inevitability of the dominance of the West over the rest of the world.

Leading imperial powers like Britain and France, which are the main focus of Said’s analysis, as well as Russia, came to translate their ascendancy into physical and intellectual possession of the Middle East. From the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699) to Napoleon’s brief seizure of Egypt (1798-1802), Europe’s growing military strength transformed the once feared Ottoman Empire from threat to exotic curiosity. Western dominance, asserted by the continent’s Christian and Caucasian states, was increasingly contrasted with the stagnation of the Orient, a condition attributed to core weaknesses deemed intrinsic to Eastern culture. And as superiority led to prolonged occupation and eventual partition of the Middle East, the logic and justification was partly found in the conviction that the indigenous populations were hopelessly incapable of governing themselves. The very ability to even define and express their own identity was stripped from them, appropriated by each occupying power and manipulated to serve set needs regardless of their basis in reality. “Orientalism emerged,” writes one scholar, “as a coherent discourse, a system of Western knowledge about the Orient that was pervasive, powerful and durable, despite having little to do with what actually went on in the part of the world designated by Westerners as the Orient.”⁷ The fictionalized East became, in effect, the intellectual by-product of colonial occupation, emblematic of “the nexus between knowledge and power,” as Said termed it, and increasingly distorting objective reality that grew into an almost insur-

mountable, institutional code of learning.⁸ The resultant “myth-system” of Orientalism, establishing itself as the gatekeeper to proper knowledge about “the Orient,” constituted the Western lens or ideological prism through which the East was seen and understood.⁹ The distant, exotic region, shrouded in mystery, could seemingly only be comprehended in context of the West, being “reconstructed, reassembled, crafted, in short, *born* out of the Orientalists’ efforts.”¹⁰ Hence, in the Orientalist worldview, there is no Orient without the established vision.

Said’s indictment of Orientalism, which he classified as a form of Western anti-Semitism with an Arab-Muslim focus, stirred the academic community to variously criticize and endorse his argument.¹¹ Regarded by many as one of the most significant English-language works on social and cultural studies published in the last decades of the twentieth century, *Orientalism* constituted an activist book, an impassioned call to apply a new consciousness to past and current scholarship.¹² One reviewer even adjudged Said to having sparked a form of intellectual “insurgency” against Orientalist scholarship, and he is widely credited with convincing academics of the need to reconsider Western literature as rich repositories of imagery about the East and to study more intently the effects and legacies of colonialism.¹³ But many who celebrated Said’s contentions as timely and valid, also found him a bit of a zealot and too quick to dismiss the nuance of findings and analyses that existed within the volumes of the targeted scholarship. The Frenchman Maxime Rodinson, author of *La fascination de l’Islam*, which was published only two years after Said’s work, found that *Orientalism* contained many valuable ideas and worthy appeals to academics, but he, too, considered that Said’s “militant stand” had led him “repeatedly to make excessive statements.”¹⁴ The latter’s main focus on only the large empires, argued Rodinson, led him to neglect the role of non-colonial-based scholars from smaller states, and hence to generalize dangerously. The Frenchman further found Said’s failure to deal with Orientalism broadly as it applies across the entire East, and instead limit his focus to only the Arab Orient, “*his* Orient,” reflected “his nationalistic tendencies” and thereby tainted the quality of his analysis.¹⁵ However, such robust criticism failed to dissuade Rodinson from ultimately endorsing Said’s core arguments:

There are still Orientalists who are imprisoned, many quite contentedly, in their own small cells of Orientalism. The concept of Orientalism itself sprang from pragmatic necessities that forced themselves on European scholars devoted to the study of other cultures. This situation was reinforced by European dominance over other societies, and the result was a greatly distorted vision of things.¹⁶

Rodinson, like many others, agreed that new thinking was needed, but he believed that Said could have advocated the position more effectively. The British scholar Ziauddin Sardar, who published a book on Orientalism in 1999, largely echoed Rodinson’s assessments, noting Said’s contributions to the study of Western fiction and endorsing his findings that fictional representation was used to justify control and exploitation.¹⁷ Yet Sardar was also very critical, suggesting that Said borrowed heavily from other scholars, such as Marshall Hodgson, and even bordered on being an Orientalist himself, as reflected, asserted the Briton, in his discussion of Islam.¹⁸

More vehement was the criticism leveled against Said by those scholars who failed to see any merit in his assault on the field. Having fired the first shot in his insurgent campaign to unsettle the traditional Orientalists, and having denounced one of its pillars, Bernard Lewis (b. 1916), as a propagandist, Said could have expected nothing less than the forceful response that followed.¹⁹ In a running, increasingly bitter, squabble with Lewis that spanned the early eighties and culminated with a public debate at the 1986 Middle East Studies Association (MESA) conference in

Boston, Said held firm to his core argument, but also worked to further develop his overall critique of Orientalism.²⁰ In 1993, he published *Culture and Imperialism*, a book that was both a sequel to *Orientalism* and an effort to emphasize the intersection and cross-pollination of cultures.²¹ Committed to promote “contrapuntal reading,” to consider Western novels in context of their time and the voices included and excluded in the text, Said sought to read critically in order to explore the imperial realities embedded in the works.²² He reasserted the argument that the images created in the West to represent the East, be they in novels, plays, histories, paintings, etc., revealed more about those who created them than “the Orient” itself. The works of Orientalism were, in effect, like a convex mirror, reflecting more accurately the Occident than the Orient.²³

The roots of manufactured understandings of the East can be traced to the dawn of Western intellectual experience and interaction with the region. Beginning with ancient Greece and its ties with Persia and Egypt, positive and constructive relations fostered through diplomacy and trade were often trumped by the images developed during times of conflict and rivalry. Over the subsequent centuries the Western sense of the East evolved, labeling the region as a realm of the exotic, the violent, and the irrational. At once alluring and depraved, it assumed a schizophrenic identity, both attracting and repelling the Western audience. The nuanced categorization was further complicated by the rise of Islam, a religion that emerged out of the East and very quickly came to constitute an ideological and political challenge to Christianity and the West. But while Europe survived and deflected the advances of Muslim armies into the continent, the impact of the experience resonated long after the danger dissipated. In their drive to understand the forces fueling and sustaining Islam, scholars and observers in Europe were motivated both by intellectual curiosity as well as a desire to vilify and condemn. Muhammad, Muslims, and Islam needed to be classified and analyzed as a collective distortion of legitimate faith and relegated to a status as nothing more than a parasite of the Judeo-Christian tradition.²⁴ If Jesus was the son of God and the representation of love, fellowship, and peace, then Muhammad was the face of the opposite, an imposter leading an un-religion symbolized by hate, oppression, and violence.

The intrusion of ideology and conviction into the pursuit of learning, perhaps an unavoidable development, served to cloud the evidence considered and the conclusions reached. Rather than cultivate a sense of shared identity by focusing on common, cross-cultural characteristics, Orientalism sought to emphasize that which separated the West from other regions and identify those distinctions as essential and profound. Through classification and categorization it was possible to “prove” the superiority of one cultural tradition over another, applying the learning and findings of new sciences to the framework developed over centuries, retaining, “as an undislodged current in its discourse, a reconstructed religious impulse, a naturalized supernaturalism.”²⁵ Said identified the shared monotheistic history of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as a resource for Orientalism, fueling and intensifying the drive to assert a separation of identities. “The idea of the West,” he suggested, “comes largely from opposition to the Islamic and Arab world.”²⁶

But the inclusion of all European countries in the Western bloc obscures the range of relationships that existed between individual states and the Islamic Middle East. Levels of power and proximity to the region influenced such ties, serving to either moderate or aggravate the perceptions enshrined in the original visions of a fundamental religious divide. The role of Western Christianity as an obstacle to constructive contact and interaction could be, and was, neutralized by decisions to downplay the perceived chasm and instead trumpet other qualities as determinative in framing relations. Small countries, such as Denmark, that could exploit geography and

relative political weakness, established for their citizens the opportunity to assert a role as non-threatening actors in the Middle East. Understood as representatives of states that were both distant and disinterested, dealings with such individuals avoided entanglements with the main Western powers and the inherent complications and dangers therein.²⁷ Danes were to exploit those conditions in a range of ways, serving in an array of capacities across the region and contributing a unique, if neglected, perspective on Middle Eastern affairs.

From Outsiders to Insiders

The early history of Denmark and the development of foreign perceptions of Danes parallel the initial Western understandings of Islam and Arabs. Forged in times of conflict, the views were necessarily intense, uncompromising, and reflective of the sense of mortal danger represented by the Viking raiders of Scandinavia and the Muslim armies pressing into southern Europe. Each threatening Christian Europe in a distinct manner, the two peoples shared a role as the Other, occupying a vivid image as mortal enemies of the Church. The soldiers of Islam, storming across the Straits of Gibraltar early in the eighth century, were the vanguard of an ideological rival to Christianity, while the Norse warriors, whose raids began in the latter stages of the same century, were seen as instruments of a heathen past poised to be restored. But the elements of an alliance of convenience between Muslim and Viking forces never blossomed into reality as the Scandinavians, known in Arabic as *al-Madjus* (the heathens), also conducted raids, beginning in the ninth century, on the emirates in occupied Spain.²⁸ Relations were therefore strained and, even when otherwise, limited to fledgling diplomatic and commercial ties. One account providing clear evidence of such contact is that of the Arab merchant At-Tartuschi, who in the tenth century visited the major trading port of Hedeby located in the very southern reaches of the Jutland Peninsula.²⁹

Yet what the West lacked in commercial vibrancy between the two societies, the East provided in abundance. Viking traders, beginning in the ninth century, sailed deep into Eurasia, up the main rivers cutting through the landmass, reaching all the way to the Black and Caspian Seas. Transporting items that were eagerly sought after in Eastern markets, such as honey, walrus ivory, furs, amber, and especially slaves, the Vikings conducted a lucrative trade with merchants from both the Byzantine Empire and the Abbasid Caliphate.³⁰ At Bulgar, the main commercial center on the Volga River, the diverse trading communities exchanged their wares and, at least the most astute and studious among them, cultivated the opportunities to observe and learn about other peoples and cultures. One famed witness to this vibrant, cosmopolitan environment was Ahmad ibn Fadlan, a tenth century Arab envoy from the Abbasid court at Baghdad, who recorded his detailed findings in a book published soon after his return.³¹ Providing fascinating revelations of how a cultured and learned Arab Muslim viewed the hearty traders from so far afield, the account also reflects a distinct tone of cultural superiority and abhorrence at the perceived lack of sophistication shown by the Norse travelers. “They are the dirtiest creatures of God,” he wrote condemningly, constituting nothing more than “asses who have gone astray.”³² In his mind, they were a people devoid of civilization, lacking a basic sense of cleanliness, wallowing in immoral behavior, and practicing a false religion. Such harsh assessments were tempered by Ibn Fadlan’s view that the Viking also constituted a manner of noble savage, describing each of them as physically impressive and harboring a martial ethos. But beyond their bodily attributes and cultural limitations, the Scandinavian presence at the doorstep to the caliphate, the reputed center of the world, also indicated that they were an enterprising and ambitious people.

Through their contact with the Eastern empires, the Vikings developed an economic and commercial sophistication that they had been lacking, adopting an Arab-inspired system of weights and measures and becoming increasingly reliant on Arab silver, the bulk of which made its way to Scandinavia in the form of coins and would for much of the Viking Age play a central role in the regional economy.³³

The spread of Christianity into the far reaches of northern Europe fundamentally altered its societies and aligned Danes and their Scandinavian brethren with the rest of the continent. No longer condemned as heathen outsiders preying on the institutions of order and civilization, they had been converted, brought into the fold, and placed alongside the other defenders of the proper faith. That new identity was expressed most symbolically in the late eleventh century heroic tale of *Chanson de Roland* (Song of Roland), in which one of the hero's companions was Ogier le Danois.³⁴ Depicted as a faithful comrade in the epic struggle against Islam and its spread across Europe, the Dane represented the ever-broadening fellowship under the banner of Christianity and the widespread determination to assure its perseverance through violence. The spirit of the Crusades reinforced that commitment and Danes also participated in the struggles to recapture Jerusalem from Muslim rule, though the main focus of Danish kings was on Christian expansion in the Baltics rather than the Middle East. Yet the perceived threat posed by Islam remained a poignant concern in Denmark even if its intensity was far less immediate than elsewhere in Europe. The very first book printed in the country related the events of an Ottoman siege of Rhodes and, appearing just three decades after the fall of Constantinople (1453), it revealed clearly how that latter, momentous event had reverberated across the continent and fueled fears of a renewed Muslim expansion.³⁵

But as knowledge about the region and its societies grew, the basis on which assessments were made about the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim Middle East gradually changed across Europe. Danes made a significant contribution to this transformation beginning in the sixteenth century when the artist Melchior Lorck (1527-1583), a native of Flensburg, traveled to the court of Sultan Süleyman as part of a diplomatic delegation from the Habsburg Empire.³⁶ Over a period of nearly four years (1555-59), he lived and worked in Istanbul, gaining significant insight into Ottoman life and society. And by the time Lorck returned to Europe, he had compiled a collection, unique for the age, of drawings that would form the basis for a later book on the sultan and his empire.³⁷ However, Lorck's efforts to meticulously reproduce all physical aspects of Ottoman society, including two famed portraits of the sultan himself, did not translate into sympathy for the empire or its ruler. In a letter to the Danish monarch, King Frederik II, he expressed satisfaction at having left behind the borders of the Ottoman realm and lamented the fate of Christians within the empire.³⁸

Lorck's sense of displeasure with the Orient and Islam based on direct experience was echoed by Adam Olearius (1603-71) who traveled to Persia in the seventeenth century, serving as an official on an expedition dispatched to explore the possibilities of reestablishing a land-based trade route from northern Europe to the East. His observations, providing the first in-depth, Western assessment of the Safavid Empire, constituted a serious attempt to compile a detailed, encyclopedic account of life in Persia. In the eighteenth century, two additional expeditions, one led by Frederik L. Norden (1708-42) and the other eventually by Carsten Niebuhr (1733-1815), produced similar, seemingly comprehensive works about the region.³⁹ Reflective of the transition to scientific Orientalism, the published accounts were rich in illustrations and attempts to classify and explain what the authors witnessed and experienced. Liberated to some degree from the ideological constraints of the past, the new age allowed a measure of rehabilitation for the

East, an acceptance that its inhabitants were not necessarily lacking of positive qualities.⁴⁰ Niebuhr's writings provided evidence of this new thinking, as he celebrated the Bedouin "spirit of liberty [that] renders them incapable of servitude" and fueled an inherent aversion for despotism.⁴¹ His recognition of the perceived nobility of simple Bedouins, much as Ibn Fadlan identified primal qualities in the Vikings, indicated the emergence of a foundation, however tenuous, on which to build a framework for dialogue and greater understanding. But it also revealed the transition that Danes had undergone, from outsiders and the observed to insiders and the observers.

Five Aspects of the Danish Experience

The range of perspectives that Danes can and have provided on the Middle East is both rich and insightful. Having interacted with the region for centuries, be it culturally, commercially or politically, yet never in capacities as occupiers or colonial masters, Danes have retained an identity in the area as relatively benign and non-threatening actors. From the late nineteenth century through much of the twentieth, when the dominance of Western powers peaked in the Middle East, Danes became more involved in a range of capacities across the region. From mercenaries to missionaries, from builders to explorers, they carved out niches for themselves, benefiting both from their European identity but also from its limitations. Their nationality as Danes opened doors and created opportunities that were otherwise scarce for citizens of more powerful and influential countries. The relative weakness of Denmark became an advantage that they could manipulate to better maneuver between the wary, local populations and the ever-present and encroaching major Western powers.

Denmark's lack of an imperial presence or even efforts to forcefully assert its interests in the Middle East elevated its citizens to seemingly ideal candidates for military service with regional armies. Men such as Søren A. Arendrup (1834-75), an artillery officer in the Danish armed forces, possessed the expertise in modern arms sought by Middle Eastern rulers desperate to protect their realms from Western pressures and expansion. By 1870, the most affluent and determined of these prospective employers was Khedive Ismail of Egypt, and Arendrup soon joined the ranks of his army, serving as a staff officer and technical adviser in the efforts to professionalize and modernize the Egyptian Army. In the East, Arendrup also realized his coveted ambition of being a frontline commander, though the dream soon dissipated, as the Dane met his end on the battlefield. The lure of adventure and fighting experience similarly enticed P. Daniel Bruun (1856-1931) to pursue a military career in the Middle East. However, unlike his compatriot, Bruun served to promote the expansion of imperial Europe, fighting with the French Foreign Legion in Algeria. Regardless, their joint experiences revealed aspects of the bitter struggles that resulted from clashing, rivaling interests and the complex realities of growing Western influence in the Middle East.⁴²

But conflict was hardly the only consequence of an intensifying European involvement in the region. The quest to win converts to the Cross prompted many Western missionaries to assume the challenge of working among the local Muslim populations. Oluf Høyer (1859-1930) and his wife Maria (1858-1939) were two such devoted Christians who founded the *Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien* (Danish Church Mission in Arabia) in 1904. Intent on carving out a specifically Danish role on the peninsula, the Høyers envisioned that their fledgling beginnings in Aden were the seedlings of a mission that would flourish for many decades. Those ambitions soon dampened as the difficulties of winning converts became apparent and the hardships of life in Yemen

took their toll on the couple. Yet the Danish missionaries did contribute significantly to the improvement of the daily lives of the local people by successfully providing education, dispensing medical care, and establishing vocational training programs.⁴³

The drive to tame and mold the regional populations was matched by a desire by some Western adventurers to push ever further afield and accurately explore, map, or simply experience the rugged and sometimes forbidding expanse of the Middle East. The Danes Barclay Raunkiær (1889-1915) and Knud Holmboe (1902-31) were two such men, who ventured into the deserts of the region to satisfy both their curiosity and their ambitions. Raunkiær, an aspiring scholar, seized the opportunity in 1911 to head the Royal Danish Geographical Society's expedition to Eastern Arabia, an area whose exploration Danes hoped to make their exclusive preserve. However, the young Dane's journey was a bittersweet experience, and though he successfully completed the venture, the memories of hardship, fear, and poor health colored his assessments of the region and its people. In contrast, Holmboe, who traveled across North Africa by car in 1930, came to embrace the Middle East as a new home, both learning to speak Arabic and converting to Islam. His experiences in Italian-occupied Libya, where he witnessed atrocities and oppression, turned him against the Western presence and influence in the Middle East, something about which he wrote with passion and conviction.⁴⁴

Condemnation of imperial excesses was similarly a central concern of Karen Jeppe (1876-1935), who worked her entire adult life to alleviate the suffering of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and post-World War I Syria. Driven by her religious convictions to assist the helpless and victimized, Jeppe also became an advocate for the preservation of Armenian cultural identity and a proponent that all aid work should be dispensed without parallel attempts to convert the unfortunates or rob them of their heritage. In her capacity as a League of Nations commissioner (1921-27) in charge of the rehabilitation and resettlement of Armenian refugees in Syria, Jeppe worked tirelessly to develop an operation that promoted those same ideals and attempted to restore the vibrancy she deemed inherent in the Armenian people. Overseeing a refugee recovery program, medical and food services, vocational training, and conventional schooling, she strove to recreate the building blocks of a society and heal the wounds inflicted by conflict. But the most ambitious project in the multi-pronged effort, a planned settlement of Armenians in newly established agricultural villages across the countryside in northeastern Syria, was successful only for some years as the Armenians eventually favored other vocations than farming.⁴⁵

A Danish role in fueling transition and development in the Middle East became in the twentieth century a significant factor in solidifying a favorable reputation for the country. Determined to participate in the modernization and even Westernization of the region, Danish companies sought to establish themselves on the international stage and compete for lucrative and prestigious contracts. In the 1920s and 1930s, a consortium headed by the company Kampsax managed to secure responsibility for two such projects, constructing major railways in Turkey and Iran. The latter states, both headed by strong nationalist leaders wary of entanglements with the main European powers, turned to Denmark because they knew that the technical expertise needed would be dispensed as part of a simple business transaction rather than a first step in an association working to subvert their independence. Danish business leaders worked to cultivate that perception of impartiality, using their country's size, distance from the region, and relative weakness as a springboard to winning further contracts and forging commercial relationships.⁴⁶

Denmark's ties to the Middle East evolved further in the decades after the Second World War, building on the foundations laid over the centuries. Media coverage and scholarship on the region increased and ever growing numbers of Danes traveled to the area on business or as

diplomatic representatives. Perceptions of the Middle East, while influenced by regional conflicts and the rapid expansion of its petroleum industry, became seemingly more sophisticated and concerned with the nuance of interpretation. But the image of Denmark as a country that remained outside the orbit of Orientalism and never needed to understand the Middle East as subservient to the West, is now questioned by the recent publication (September 2005) of the infamous cartoons satirizing the Prophet Muhammad. Those drawings, printed in the country's largest daily, *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*, revived some of the age-old, venomous stereotypes about the man who serves as a role model for all Muslims. Alleging that Muhammad was at his core a false prophet and an agent of violence and oppression, the cartoons reflected insensitivity as well as an inability to distinguish between Muslims, an inability to discern that "they" are as diverse as "us" and that an indictment of Islam in its entirety is erroneous. Danes must therefore challenge the vestiges of Orientalism in their midst and work to recover their well-deserved reputation for tolerance, objectivity, and diplomacy.

-
- ¹ Knud Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder!* (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1931), 236-241.
- ² Maxime Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, trans. Roger Veinus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 113.
- ³ Izabela Kalinowska, *Between East and West* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004), 10; Birgitte von Folsach, *I Halvmånens Skær* (Copenhagen: Davids Samling, 1996), 21; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 19.
- ⁴ Valerie Kennedy, *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 4; Gauri Viswanathan, ed., *Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2001), 444; Said, *Orientalism*, 43, 321.
- ⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 272-73; Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 189.
- ⁶ Viswanathan, ed., *Power, Politics, and Culture*, 237.
- ⁷ Lockman, *Contending Visions*, 188.
- ⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 27-28, 67, 121; Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 10.
- ⁹ Kennedy, *Edward Said*, 10; Peter Mancuse, "Said's Orientalism: A Vital Contribution Today," *Antipode* 36, no. 5 (2004): 814.
- ¹⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 87.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 27-28.
- ¹² Lockman, *Contending Visions*, 183, 190.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 205-11. Gyan Prakash, "Orientalism Now," *History and Theory* 34, no. 3 (1995): 199.
- ¹⁴ Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, 130-31, n. 2.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 117.
- ¹⁷ Ziauddin Sardar, *Orientalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 67-69.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 66-67, 74-76.
- ¹⁹ Said, *Orientalism*, 316. Lewis was incensed by the Saidian argument, branding it "science fiction history" and the new definition of Orientalism as a "kind of intellectual pollution". See Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 101, 114.
- ²⁰ Lockman, *Contending Visions*, 190-92.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 207-08; Viswanathan, ed., *Power, Politics, and Culture*, 183-84.
- ²² Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 66-67; Kennedy, *Edward Said*, 107-08.
- ²³ Kabbani, *Europe's Myth of Orient*, 85.
- ²⁴ Asaf Hussain, et al, eds. *Orientalism, Islam, and Islamists* (Brattleboro, Ver.: Amana Books, 1984), 25; Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, 11.
- ²⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 121.
- ²⁶ Viswanathan, ed., *Power, Politics, and Culture*, 388.
- ²⁷ The idea for framing the argument in this manner stems from a conversation with Dr. Houman Sadri, professor of political science at the University of Central Florida, Orlando.
- ²⁸ Kjeld von Folsach, et al., eds., *Den Arabiske Rejse* (Århus: Forhistorisk Museum Moesgaard, 1996), 9-12.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 15; Else Roesdahl, *Vikingerne Verden*, 5th edition (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1994), 136, 175.
- ³⁰ Ingolf Boisen, *Danmark og Iran gennem tiderne* (Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1965), 39; Kjeld von Folsach, *Den Arabiske Rejse*, 16.
- ³¹ Richard N. Frye, *Ibn Fadlan's Journey to Russia* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005), ix.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 64.
- ³³ Kjeld von Folsach, *Den Arabiske Rejse*, 14-16; Boisen, *Danmark og Iran gennem tiderne*, 39-41.
- ³⁴ Kjeld von Folsach, *Den Arabiske Rejse*, 27-28.
- ³⁵ Ingolf Boisen, *Tyrkiet og Danmark gennem tiderne* (Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1962), 15.
- ³⁶ Erik Fischer, *Melchior Lorck i Tyrkiet* (Copenhagen: Statens Museum for Kunst, 1990), 2-3.
- ³⁷ Kjeld von Folsach, *Den Arabiske Rejse*, 31, 40-41; Birgitte von Folsach, *I Halvmånens Skær*, 10-11.
- ³⁸ Melchior Lorck to Frederik II, 1 January 1563, *Melchior Lorck i Tyrkiet*, 19-29, 36-37.
- ³⁹ Svend Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon* 13 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1982), 375-77, 547-49; Birgitte von Folsach, *I Halvmånens Skær*, 20.
- ⁴⁰ Geert Jan van Gelder and Ed de Moor, *Eastward Bound* (Amsterdam; Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994), 79; Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, 45, 48-49.

⁴¹ Carsten Niebuhr, *Travels through Arabia and other Countries in the East*, vol. 2, trans. Robert Heron (Edinburgh: R. Morrison and Son, 1792), 18-19.

⁴² Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*, 1: 274-75, 603.

⁴³ Erik W. Nielsen, *På Pionermission i Arabien* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Missionselskab, 1948), 20, 26-27; *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 4 (1906): 52-53.

⁴⁴ Knud Holmboe, *Desert Encounter* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), v-viii; Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*, 17: 63-64.

⁴⁵ Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*, 7: 340-41.

⁴⁶ Einar Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det* (Copenhagen: Julius Gjellerups Forlag, 1941), 143-91.

CHAPTER ONE

DANES IN UNIFORM: THE MILITARY CAREERS OF SØREN A. ARENDRUP AND P. DANIEL BRUUN

The Western way of war was by the close of the nineteenth century the dominant tool for states and rulers to project power and protect their borders from foreign incursions. A Europe ascendant, brimming with confidence and martial strength, charted a path of proper development that mandated a rejection of local traditions and an embrace of imported, allegedly superior, models of military organization. In the face of incontrovertible technological advancements within the arms industry and the progression of tactical innovations, traditional means of warfare were no longer adequate to meet the challenges of a modern world of aggressive expansionism and empire-building. Non-Western realms and leaders that possessed the means necessary to reform their militaries, procured new weapons and hired foreign advisers to train their armed forces, while those who lacked the needed resources were forced to accept the dismal prospect of defeat and occupation.

In North Africa this dynamic was unfolding in glaringly contrasting terms during the decades of the latter half of the nineteenth century, as Egypt moved rapidly to assert and protect its independence through an ambitious modernization program, and Algeria, an area gradually slipping under French control, struggled to retain zones of self-rule deep in its interior. The military became in both contexts the focal point and engine of change as fundamental socio-economic reform was required to support a modern army, but in Egypt that effort was directed by the state itself while in Algeria it was imposed by a foreign power.¹ A restructuring of the economy and an emphasis on sedentarization became key elements in this transition as plantation agriculture was instituted broadly and urbanization was expanded. Such innovations were intended to allow the central government to increase its tax base through a cash crop economy and to deepen and consolidate its control of the countryside.

Westerners assumed a significant role in shaping this North African transformation. France had invaded Algeria beginning in the 1830s and was forcibly instituting profound societal changes in the country. The French Foreign Legion saw its headquarters established on a site in the interior that its troops helped convert from wilderness to an urban center, symbolizing the unit's role not only as an instrument of conquest but also one of colonization. In fact, during the decade immediately following the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the Legion served more as an engineering and construction corps than as a military unit.² The Egyptian armed forces, in part under the direction of Western officers, executed a similar function as expeditions were dispatched into the Sudan and beyond to explore and extend control over areas claimed by Egypt. In both instances, Danish officers took part in the efforts to transform the Orient, opting to serve the regimes that were engaged in imperial expansion. Søren A. Arendrup (1834-75), a colonel in the Egyptian army, and P. Daniel Bruun (1856-1931), a recruit in the French Foreign Legion, were career military men who found themselves attracted by the prospects of Eastern adventure in foreign service and the opportunities to confront the Other on the field of battle.³ Rather than languish in the ranks of a domestic military that promised little of either, these two men embraced the chance to further their experiences overseas where events would put each of them at the forefront of the regional conflicts.

Two Men Who would be Warriors

In the years following Denmark's defeat in the 1864 war with Prussia, use of the military faded as a viable option in resolving disputes with neighboring states. The Danish government and public were compelled to recognize that advancements in modern armaments had made their small, flat country almost indefensible against a larger and determined enemy. For the country's armed forces this new reality meant that opportunities for distinguished service and rates of career advancement would suffer even for experienced and decorated officers. Men like Arendrup, who emerged during the 1860s as a leading expert on the manufacture of field guns and fortification artillery, became disgruntled with these conditions and with the resultant stagnation within the establishment military.⁴ Even as Arendrup thrived in the rather independent position as a control officer at the famed foundry at Finspång in southeastern Sweden, he, too, lamented the lack of vision and drive that dominated the Danish artillery service.⁵ However, his sense of national duty kept serious thoughts of joining a foreign army quite remote until personal tragedy and health conditions forced him to develop another outlook. His wife's death from tuberculosis in 1868 and the fear that he, too, might be afflicted, led him to leave Denmark for Egypt where he hoped the warm and dry climate would improve his disposition. Over the next few years, Arendrup continued to require periodic stays in Egypt, but he retained his rank within the Danish Army and did not officially leave his influential position at Finspång until 1870, about seven years after first assuming that post.⁶ The Dane was clearly reluctant to cut his ties to Denmark and its armed forces, and even as he accepted a role as a civilian, technical adviser to the Egyptian general staff, he remained hopeful that events might unfold in such a manner that he could one day return home. Not until November 1874, less than a year before his death, did he resign his commission in the Danish military, and he revealed an enduring attachment to the broader Scandinavian region when he, in his capacity as an adviser, counseled the Egyptians to buy cannons from Sweden.⁷

But Arendrup's ties to his native soil also weakened as he gradually and inevitably proceeded to establish a new life in Egypt. He took a new wife, marrying in 1873 an Englishwoman named Edith Mary Courtauld (b. 1846); he assumed a new career with the Egyptian army; and he rose to a position of prominence within the general staff, serving as an adjutant to Khedive Ismail (r. 1863-1879) and as a tutor and instructor to Hassan, one of the khedive's sons.⁸ Conditions in Cairo seemingly suited the Dane, as his status blossomed and his health was soothed by the climate and perhaps occasional visits to the Helwan Baths, a spring located just outside the capital and renowned for its medicinal waters and dry air.⁹ Rather than fade away into early retirement, Arendrup was invigorated by the challenges and possibilities that lay ahead, and his strength of character seemed to assure success:

Here as wherever else he appeared, he became a focal point of attention. His open, winning, confident, and noble manner joined with his considerable talent, his conscientiousness and diligence made him a complete personality who was exceptionally suited to serve in the public sector overseas.¹⁰

Such accolades were probably excessive, but Arendrup's years in Sweden had revealed that he was a skilled and knowledgeable officer whose abilities were much needed in Egypt where the fervent drive to create a modern army demanded sound guidance.

The role Bruun would fill in the French Foreign Legion was far different from that of his compatriot in Egypt, because he was merely a junior officer when he joined the storied unit as a lowly infantryman. Having only just been commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1879, Bruun

was hardly an experienced officer when he sought and was granted permission to leave the Danish Army for a year, beginning in October 1881, to answer the French call for foreign recruits.¹¹ Attracted by the promise of gaining combat experience that he was almost guaranteed to never attain by remaining in Denmark, he seized, as he would write decades later, the opportunity with youthful exuberance:

In the year 1881 I was a second lieutenant and the blood in my veins flowed much more vigorously than today. I harbored the courage and drive to put the art of war into practice. From Algeria one heard of the bitter struggles between French military units and the indigenous Arab tribes along the border with Morocco, where Bu-Amemaa [sic] had raised the banner of revolt. The French commanders were hard-pressed to suppress this insurrection to the south, where the wells are extremely scarce and the heat of the sun limits vegetation to a few valleys.¹²

In terms saturated with romanticism and Orientalist mythology, Bruun presented the Algerian wilderness and service in the Legion as the ideal setting for heroic action and for determining the true measure of a man.¹³ But while the harsh conditions and alien culture perhaps justified that assertion to a degree, the fierce native defense of independence and drive to resist a predatory imperial power should have resonated with every Dane as a very proximate and familiar outlook. Rather than focus on the exotic and foreign, a glaring basis for common cause was the struggle of small nations to guard their territory against encroachment. After all, Denmark had been Europe's first victim of an emerging German nationalism, and its citizens should easily have identified with the plight of the Algerian tribes fighting another European aggressor, one fed by French nationalism. However, Bruun neglected this parallel, and even as he acknowledged that France was seizing land from its rightful occupants, he endorsed and of course even participated in the conquest, because he saw the French much as they saw themselves, as a civilizing presence.¹⁴

Bruun, too, came to see the legionnaires as performing a noble role in the French endeavor. He noted that many a foreign soldier-laborer had served selflessly to prepare the way for colonists and an orderly sedentary life.¹⁵ The city of Sidi-bel-Abbès, located about fifty-five miles south of Oran, was a symbol of that contribution, growing from a Legion encampment in the 1830s into a large town with many thousands of residents only a half century later.¹⁶ Legionnaires had built not only a permanent military base but also a town with all the necessary elements of civilian infrastructure, including schools, municipal offices, parks and churches. In that urban landscape a diverse and vibrant population emerged with settlers from Spain and the Mediterranean islands, local Jews, Arabs, and Berbers, and both active and retired legionnaires.¹⁷ Over time, the flow of foreign colonists and soldiers, including Bruun, who reached the town in November 1881, served to meet the French design of imposing its will and control on the region.

Building and Rebuilding Societies

The penetration of European capital, culture, and influence into North Africa was pervasive but varied during the nineteenth century. In Egypt, the process was embraced by the ruling class in a fervent bid to match the advancements achieved in the West and to forge a strong foundation for empire. Though nominally a province within the Ottoman Empire, Egypt had for decades been moving toward autonomy and had even challenged Istanbul directly for dominance over the Eastern Mediterranean region. However, by 1863, when Ismail assumed the throne, Egypt had long since seen its northern ambitions blunted by the Great Powers, but the novice ruler was de-



Map 1. Northwestern Algeria. Reproduced from Patricia M. E. Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, prejudice and race in colonial Algeria* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995), insert.

terminated to carve out an empire in the south. He instituted an aggressive expansionist policy that was aimed at deepening and broadening Egyptian control of the Sudan and pushing expeditions ever farther into the continent.¹⁸ Touted as a drive to civilize and develop the southern lands, including aims to foster economic modernization and the eradication of slavery, the Cairo-directed effort was praised by many contemporary observers, one even asserting that “[to Ismail] the credit is due of making a deliberate and persistent attempt to engraft Western civilization, usages, institutions, and arts on to the old Mohammedan [sic] stock.”¹⁹

But to somehow suggest that the Egyptian effort was philanthropic in nature misportrays the unfolding events. For decades Egypt had looked to exploit the southern territories as a resource to fuel military and economic change in the north. Repeated attempts to locate and develop mineral deposits and to monopolize regional trade were calculated elements in a grand scheme to create an East African commercial zone in which the flow of goods would be channeled to the Egyptian-controlled harbors on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.²⁰ Dominance of the interior, combined with the recovery of the port cities of Massawa and Suakin (both in 1865) and the acquisition of Zeyla (1875), would help to realize that coveted aim and seemingly serve to demonstrate that Egypt was genuinely committed to regional development.²¹ However, many who witnessed the realities of Egyptian rule doubted that any such benefits would emerge. The stated pledge to end slavery and the slave trade was questioned, because even though the khedive had appointed dedicated European officers to direct the campaign and to underscore the veracity of Egypt’s commitment, an eradication of human bondage would severely damage the regional economies, the very sources of revenue that the empire hoped to harness.²² Reports also surfaced that some liberated slaves were forcibly drafted into the Egyptian Army and that, as late as the summer of 1873, the Egyptian authorities were allowing slave markets to continue in towns claimed by the government and garrisoned by its troops.²³ Some slaves were even carried aboard Egyptian ships and dispatched from the coast at Massawa, a port that between 1800-1875 averaged an annual export of 1,750 souls.²⁴ It seemed the khedive’s commitment to end slavery was at best a statement of intent rather than a reality.

Egypt’s role in fostering stability and prosperity in the region was equally muddled. The policy of encroachment that for years had guided Cairo’s actions in the south had served to devastate the areas along the ill-defined borderlands between the Sudan and Ethiopia.²⁵ By the reign of Ismail, explorers and travelers, such as Samuel W. Baker and E. A. de Cosson, who passed through Egyptian-controlled territories, described the frontier zones as depopulated and unsafe, and De Cosson even accused the Egyptians of constituting a predatory presence, with their unruly troops disrupting rather than promoting trade.²⁶ In regions like Hamasen, directly inland from Massawa, and once described as “the plain of the thousand villages,” society and economic activity was undermined by the violence and the seemingly unceasing Egyptian push for regional dominance.²⁷ The frontier lands had effectively deteriorated into a preserve for outlaws, raiders, and armed groups who positioned themselves between Egypt and Ethiopia and helped create a zone of instability that would lead to a direct clash between the two realms.²⁸

In response to such a prospective conflict and the ongoing drive for empire, Khedive Ismail had since his ascension to power instituted an extensive and ambitious program to reform Egypt. Through loans and increased taxes sufficient funds were generated to see the country’s infrastructure improve further in Ismail’s sixteen-year reign than had been evident during the prior century.²⁹ More than eight thousand miles of canals were dug, increasing the land available for cultivation by almost 1.4 million acres and vastly elevating annual export revenues.³⁰ Additional investments in railway expansion, paved streets, and developing the port of Alexandria into one

of the best in the Mediterranean all served to modernize Egypt and bolster its chances of accumulating the level of wealth and strength craved by its ruler.³¹ Yet the pace and extent of change, termed by one historian as “Ismail’s galloping Westernism,” came at a devastating price as heavy taxation befell the peasantry and the negotiated loans with foreign lenders burdened the country with high fees and interest payments.³² By 1870, as much as one third of Egypt’s national revenue was committed to servicing debt and the country was caught in an ever worsening and insidious cycle of expenses outpacing revenues.³³ Many observers placed the blame for Egypt’s dire economic conditions squarely at the feet of Khedive Ismail, whom they characterized as a reckless spendthrift.³⁴ However, a fairer assessment is perhaps that the ruler refused to lower his expectations for himself and his empire even as fiscal realities were making clear the limits of Egypt’s capacity to sustain such ambitions.

One institution, the military, gradually emerged to be seen as the pivotal instrument capable of allowing the country to defy such constraints and to escape the onslaught of impending calamities. From the very inception of his rule, Ismail was intent on freeing Egypt from the confines imposed on the country two decades earlier following clashes with the Ottomans. In exchange for increased annual tribute flowing to Istanbul, the Egyptians secured rights to expand their military forces and thereby develop an arm of the state that could protect its interests and eventually assert a semblance of independence.³⁵ Foreign advisers, such as Arendrup, were identified as essential in achieving these aims, and initially under French and later United States officers, the modernization of the armed forces proceeded in haste. The number of men under arms was more than tripled and large sums were committed to procure modern weapons, such as Remington breech-loader rifles and hundreds of Krupp cannons, the latter of which were shipped secretly to Egypt to hide the rearmament effort from the Ottomans.³⁶ A modest attempt to build a domestic arms industry was also initiated and Arendrup, who for years had been a persistent advocate of countries having independent, weapon’s manufacturing capabilities, must have endorsed such efforts. “State industry,” he argued, “on an appropriate scale [is] the only and best option” to provide a dependable supply of ammunition and arms.³⁷ The Dane, as an artillery officer, would also have found much satisfaction in the fact that the artillery wing of the Egyptian Army was considered its elite. He saw that very technical and cutting-edge service as requiring the utmost training and experience, and must have considered its steady professionalization as a notable contributor to assuring Ismail of the permanence his rule.³⁸ It was, indeed, with defense in mind that the khedive first sought assistance from overseas to bolster Egyptian security.³⁹ In particular, Americans were selected to oversee the process because most were veterans of the recently concluded Civil War between the States and were natives of a country without interests in the Middle East.⁴⁰ This attraction to the United States was in part reciprocated by the Americans, who tended to admire the person of Ismail Pasha.⁴¹ It seems that despite his obvious faults, the khedive’s unwavering drive and ambition inspired confidence, and the Americans may well have identified with the ruler’s struggle to free a province from the clutches of an empire which was impeding that region’s promise. It is unclear if Arendrup or other European officers in Egyptian service shared such sentiments, but they were undoubtedly in agreement with one American, William M. Dye (1831-99), who described the majority of foreigners not as mercenaries but as “men of established reputation, who went abroad as educators anxious to assist in the great work of civilizing the natives of the classic land of the Nile.”⁴² The elevation of society as a whole became in fact an integral part of the drive to professionalize the armed forces, as a vigorous literacy program was instituted among the ranks and foreign officers were assigned to oversee public works.⁴³ Even Arendrup played an active role

in this endeavor, for a time serving in a supervisory capacity on a major construction project of a base and barracks complex in the desert between Cairo and Ismailia.⁴⁴ In no uncertain terms, a process of reshaping Egypt had been revived with the army in a vanguard role, adopting the trappings of a Western fighting force and straining to achieve the competency to perform as such.

The role of the French Foreign Legion in Algeria was similarly one of initiative and leadership. Serving as the point of the French spear thrusting deep into the interior, the Legion conquered, colonized, and reshaped the lands occupied. However, the legionnaires were far different from their Egyptian counterparts who were of the people, and the Legion, as a unit consisting mostly of foreign veterans, was an elite force with an almost tribal sense of identity.⁴⁵ Bruun observed that such feelings of superiority tended to isolate the unit and raise the levels of hostility in the local Arab population to such an extent that legionnaires were ordered not to frequent neighborhood cafés in Sidi-bel-Abbès to avoid quarreling and confrontations.⁴⁶ Yet most legionnaires, including Bruun, defied such prohibitions and frequented the Arab shantytown in pursuit of prostitutes and other entertainment, because, as he put it, “the picturesque chaos” of the *Village Nègre* provided a welcome contrast to the regimented and difficult life of a soldier.⁴⁷ In terms his audience would both want and expect, and, in a fashion characteristic of Orientalist accounts, Bruun described that part of town as opposite to the European sector, a place where dirt and infestation flourished, and where local inhabitants fit recognizable typologies, such as the proud, defiant Arab on horseback and the young, dark-eyed women who hid an alluring, mysterious beauty and even flirtatious nature beneath their veils.⁴⁸ And despite admitting that one rarely, if ever, saw young Arab women, Bruun freely offered the following insight about such female residents of the Algerian plateau and Sahara:

The Arab women are usually small, have a skin white as milk and eyes that are large, dark, sensitive, bleary, and have long lashes. In addition, they have lovely coral-red lips, long, curly hair and pearly-white teeth. Also, their faces are tattooed with blue stars on their foreheads, cheeks, and chins.⁴⁹

He further lamented that these young creatures, who lived in a world beyond Western contact, aged very rapidly under the burdens of life and abuse inflicted on them by their husbands.⁵⁰ In his mind, such mistreatment was attributable to the fanaticism, intolerance, and near anarchy that pervaded Arab society and had led to its corruption. But rather than assert that such debilitating forces were inherent to that community, Bruun acknowledged Europe’s intellectual and cultural debt to the Arab/Muslim world, and that the latter had degenerated into something which it was not originally.⁵¹ Similarly, the Dane saw Islam as diverse and as having aspects that could serve the views of both the fanatic and the average believer, but also, and more importantly, the philosopher-thinker. Just as the broader society had been corrupted, so, too, the Islam Bruun observed in North Africa seemed to him medieval and fractured with its countless brotherhoods, lodges or *zawaya*, and tomb-shrines to departed saints.⁵² It was, in short, a society in need of redemption, in need of a restoration to civilization through the exposure to and guidance from a Western power such as France.

But as Bruun became a member of the French armed forces and traveled to the Legion’s headquarters at Sidi-bel-Abbès, he gradually questioned whether the armed forces represented or even possessed the desired qualities to instill such reform. Despite the Legion’s overt contribution to the physical transformation of Algeria through conquest and construction, Bruun disclosed aspects of Legion life that tarnished the myth of the unit by revealing that the legionnaires often had to work secretly in the town during their off-duty hours to supplement their meager wages; that corruption lowered the quality of the men’s rations; and that life in the bar-


racks was dreary.⁵³ He even offered an initial and damning assessment of his fellow recruits when he remarked that the scene in the mess hall was akin to that of dogs being fed. And while conceding that such an occasion did not make for a particularly pleasant spectacle in Denmark's armed forces either, he found it far worse in the Legion.⁵⁴ "A worse band of every imaginable kind of scoundrels, thieves, and swindlers," Bruun fumed, "is probably not found elsewhere," and the Dane committed himself to separate and raise his behavior above that displayed by his future comrades.⁵⁵ To him it seemed abundantly clear that from among those men, few, if any, would ever serve to impart elements of civilization to the local population.

However, over time, and by his own admission, Bruun retreated from his original, trenchant criticism of the legionnaires as his experiences on the battlefield changed forever his assessment of those men.⁵⁶ The Dane's collective view of the Legion was similarly rehabilitated through the years and he became an apologist for even the harshest punishments meted out to the troops by its commanders. In an account about a Swiss friend and comrade who was critical of such treatment and worked actively to limit its use, Bruun came to the defense of the Legion by noting that the men had joined the unit voluntarily and that the employment of techniques like *la crapaudine* (from the French word for toad), in which significant pain was inflicted on offenders by placing them on their stomachs and tying their hands and feet together behind their backs, was far more lenient than lengthy prison terms or, of course, the use of executions.⁵⁷ In a sense, the more time Bruun put between himself and his months of active service in the Legion, the more accepting he became of its role and practices in the conquest and pacification of the North African interior.

The Rapid March To Conflict

By 1875, increasing pressures were mounting on Khedive Ismail to resolve the spiraling crisis of Egypt's debt and fleeting prospects for imperial bliss. Faced with an ever-dwindling number of options, he turned to the Egyptian Army and the foreign officers of the General Staff in the hopes that they might deliver jointly a decisive victory on the battlefield that could strengthen Egypt's position in relation to its creditors and the great European powers.⁵⁸ Such a symbolic rather than practical success, as the expansion southwards had yet failed to enrich Egypt and would likely not do so for years, seemed capable of restoring international confidence in the effectiveness of the reform program and boosting the legitimacy of Egyptian claims to the lands of the Nile basin.⁵⁹ A victory would also serve as the culmination of the gradual but steady effort to seize and fortify points along the edge of Ethiopian-held territory (e.g., Bogos province, Ailet district, Zeyla port) to serve as staging areas for raids and to severely restrict, tax or even entirely blockade the flow inland of firearms and ammunition.⁶⁰ However, the projected scope of such an offensive remained unclear, as the required goal of winning an impressive victory would demand more than merely a punitive expedition, and instead need to secure a shift of the border southwards to the Mareb River, assert control of the entire territory of Mareb Mellash (Eritrea), and perhaps even manage to unseat Yohannes IV (r. 1872-89), the recently crowned Ethiopian emperor.⁶¹

But whatever the machinations of Egyptian strategy, Cairo felt compelled to manufacture a justification for war by alleging that forces from Ethiopia provoked the conflict. Reports traced to Egypt began appearing in the international press during the late summer of 1875, accusing the Ethiopians of massing troops in the borderlands and of sending raiding parties into Egyptian-occupied areas and committing atrocities.⁶² One account, initially published anonymously, but later attributed to W. M. Dye, insisted even years later that the Egyptians acted only to enforce



Map 2. Eritrea and North-central Ethiopia, 1875. Reproduced from Haggai Erlich, "Alula, 'the Son of Qubi': A 'King's Man' in Ethiopia 1875-1897," *Journal of African History* 15, no. 2 (1974): 263.

regional peace and were forced to respond to:

the incessant raids made by the nomadic and warlike Abyssinians upon the peaceful and timid Egyptian *fellahs* dwelling in convenient proximity to these uncomfortable neighbors.⁶³

The American further described the lands beyond Egyptian rule as ravaged by anarchy and fanaticism and ruled by a “savage warrior” whose predatory nature was aptly symbolized by the emblem of the lion.⁶⁴ Yet, however accurate that assessment, which correctly identified armies as a serious burden on civilian life in nineteenth-century Ethiopia, the khedive and his regional representatives, such as the Swiss adventurer Munzinger Pasha (1832-75) and the Armenian official Arakel Bey (1832-75), were in fact more to blame for the impending conflict because they supported and promoted a policy of creeping expansionism aimed at dislodging territories from Ethiopian control.⁶⁵ Supremely confident in the strength of their own position, these men were also convinced that Ethiopia was hopelessly weakened and divided, and utterly at the mercy of a modern, invading army. The success of the British expeditionary force in 1868 had underscored what trained soldiers with breech-loading rifles could achieve in Ethiopia, and with Western advisers like Munzinger, who was described just a few years earlier as “a commander who knows Abyssinia better than the Abyssinians,” the Egyptian Army seemed poised for victory.⁶⁶

The High Command in Cairo responded quickly to the alleged aggression by dispatching reinforcements to Massawa and setting in motion an elaborate plan of attack. A flotilla under the command of a Scotsman, McKillop Pasha, landed two battalions at the Red Sea port in August, more than doubling the size of the regional garrison.⁶⁷ Those troops were intended to provide the manpower for a series of incursions into Ethiopian territory, each departing from a point on the coast. Plans had also been afoot since early in the year to coordinate such a series of attacks with a drive eastwards from the Equatorial provinces. Charles Gordon (1833-85) and Charles Chaillé-Long (1842-1917), the khedive’s English and American representatives in the interior, were the plan’s main proponents, and Chaillé-Long, who was one of the most experienced officers in Egyptian service, was touted to take command of the main expedition to assert control along the border region with Ethiopia.⁶⁸ However, within weeks of the Egyptian mobilization, the American was instead ordered to join an invasion force headed for the Somali coast where his actions would eventually embroil Egypt in a dispute with Britain over the occupation of Kismayu, a port belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar.⁶⁹ Yet Chaillé-Long’s troublesome command would pale in comparison with that of his replacement, Colonel Søren Arendrup, as head of the main Egyptian invasion force.

The circumstances that saw the Dane take charge of thousands of Egyptian troops were a testament to the personal politics of Khedive Ismail’s Egypt. Over the years of his service in North Africa, Arendrup had steadily established a reputation as an honorable and competent officer whose “high moral and intellectual character had won the esteem of the European community.”⁷⁰ An important figure such as General Charles P. Stone (1824-87), the American Chief-of-Staff of the Egyptian Army, reportedly found Arendrup to be both an “educated and highly gifted officer,” and their mutual friendship helped secure the Dane a permanent post on the General Staff.⁷¹ Crucially, Arendrup also rose to a position within the khedive’s inner circle, allowing he and his wife to forge personal contacts with those individuals in whose hands real power rested. In an apparent reflection of such influence, Ismail interceded on his Danish deputy’s behalf and ordered that he replace Chaillé-Long as expedition commander, and Foreign Minister Nubar Pasha Boghos (b. 1825), an uncle to Arakil Bey, was persuaded by Edith Courtauld-Arendrup to support her husband’s appointment.⁷² Such a manipulation of the de-

cision-making process and disregard for the professionalization of the military, the very effort Arendrup was hired to promote, seemingly revealed the extent to which he craved an opportunity to command troops in the field and to experience the fierceness of combat. However, it was also evidence that the need to reform the military establishment persisted and that the leadership culture within the armed forces, popularly known as the pasha system, retained a debilitating influence. And Arendrup's fellow officers, such as Dye and William W. Loring (1818-86), who recognized this ongoing, pressing need, judged his selection as flawed because he lacked crucial battlefield experience and knowledge of the contested ground.⁷³

Bruun, like his compatriot, had no sense of the realities of mortal conflict, but as a young, Legion recruit he was given the opportunity to acquire invaluable experience before ever being considered for a position of command. Having completed his preliminary training in Sidi-bel-Abbès, he departed in January 1882 for Ain-ben-Khelil, a base camp near the troubled border region between Morocco and Algeria.⁷⁴ Over a ten-day period, Bruun and his fellow legionnaires made their ascent into the Saharan Atlas mountains, part of the way traveling by rail, but also getting an opportunity en route to perform the Legion's other main task in North Africa, namely that of doing public works. In the area of Méchéria, only about 50 km to the northeast of Ain-ben-Khelil, the men began a road construction project, managing to build five km in just two days.⁷⁵ And such physical exertion was probably favored by the soldiers at that time of year, because, as Bruun noted, the highland plateau was bitterly cold with snow covering the ground and the water in their canteens freezing overnight.⁷⁶ The conditions, in his view, did not much improve once they reached their destination on the frontier and were billeted in the isolated camp:

The snow lies like a white carpet covering the plain. It has soaked our tents and made our stay here quite unpleasant. Our animals shake from the cold much as do we both night and day.... We continue to await the order to move out, but the weather has as yet refused to allow it.⁷⁷

In fact, within only days of having arrived on the border, Bruun remarked that though he loved the life he had chosen, he too came to believe that completing a five-year contract as an infantryman would forever damage his health. He also expressed resentment over the Legion's failure to protect the soldiers from the exorbitant prices demanded by Arab merchants who frequented the camp to sell basic items such as coffee, tobacco, and even bread. Bruun cited that a simple loaf priced at 35 centimes in Sidi-bel-Abbès, sold for between four to five francs (1 franc = 100 centimes) in Ain-ben-Khelil, a mark-up that could not begin to be covered by the increase in pay the legionnaires received while on campaign.⁷⁸ In his mind, such exploitation was unreasonable, especially for men who were about to risk their lives in fighting on the border where the Legion was embroiled in a bitter struggle with Bu-Amama, a local shaykh and holy man, or sidi, who had initiated a revolt the year before and was directing raids deep into French-held territory and driving-off settlers.⁷⁹ Bruun identified the rebels as "insurgents" and saw their leader as an Abd al-Qadir-figure continuing the fight begun decades earlier against French territorial claims, and the clash across ill-defined lines of control made the conflict reminiscent of the almost contemporary Egypto-Ethiopian war.⁸⁰ And as in the latter crisis, where Egyptian forces crossed into enemy lands to crush the opposition, the young Dane became an advocate of an aggressive French policy to seize remote oases and bases, such as the Figuig settlement, that offered sanctuary to Bu-Amama's forces. Located nominally within Moroccan-claimed territory, about 135 km southwest of Ain-ben-Khelil, the oasis complex was seen as a lightning rod for resistance and a place with a sinister core hidden behind its picturesque setting:

It is often an appealing sight [Figuig] that meets the eyes of the onlooker before he realizes that from this labyrinth [of mosques and houses], which conveys such a peaceful and solemn impression, thousands of Arabs have come and will continue to come spreading the teachings of Islam, instilling hatred and preaching on-going struggle against the non-believers. Figuig's mosques represent a greater danger to the French than do the town's fortified walls.⁸¹

A robust and determined campaign, so the argument followed, was clearly needed to root-out such fanaticism and install a French-directed, civilizing effort in its place.

But to achieve such lofty goals, they needed to embrace innovation and a new tactical approach to meet the challenges posed by the regional resistance and to neutralize its advantages. The man tasked with achieving these aims was François de Négrier (d. 1913), a French colonel “who enjoyed the well-deserved reputation of being one of the army's most brilliant [men].”⁸² Assuming command of the Legion in July 1881, following a serious setback for the unit in which over seventy men were killed and debilitating tactical weaknesses were exposed, the Frenchman looked to revolutionize the Legion's capabilities and thereby regain the initiative on the battlefield.⁸³ The seemingly simple innovation needed was to increase the mobility and range of the European infantryman and, as had been done by the British in Afghanistan and South Africa, accomplish that objective by providing the men with mounts.⁸⁴ However, what was created was not cavalry but rather “mounted infantry,” where every two soldiers were assigned a mule that could carry their most needed supplies and allow each man to ride the animal in turn. Specifically hardy Arab mules were chosen for this task due to a number of advantages they possessed over horses, such as being easier to ride, serving ideally as pack animals, and requiring less care, such as food. The mules even learned to drink from the canteens carried by the legionnaires, allowing for even greater flexibility of movement as the need to follow set routes to established wells could at times be neglected.⁸⁵ These specialized units, known as *compagnies franches* or literally free-floating companies, were thereby enabled to operate as a strike-force from a network of Legion bases or main columns on the march. As described by one historian and, in terms clear to modern readers, the mounted infantry became like squadrons of attack planes flying from island airfields and aircraft carriers, able to react to sudden attacks, to quickly dart out across the open spaces in pursuit of the enemy and deny the rebels their greatest advantage, namely the ability to outmaneuver and outrun the French forces.⁸⁶ Through rigorous training and an initial selection of only the most fit and experienced men, essentially forging an elite within the elite, Négrier managed to mold together a body of soldiers who could match the skill and endurance of the indigenous resistance, achieving speeds of six km an hour and covering as much as one hundred and fifty km over two days and three hundred km over six days.⁸⁷ “What we accomplished in regard to long marches, day in and day out, and with occasional firefights, was quite remarkable,” concluded Bruun. “We especially struggled with thirst,” he continued, “but we endured – in large part thanks to Négrier.” With those words, Bruun helped to convey what the Frenchman came to mean to the legionnaires, a resolute commander they affectionately dubbed *le marabout* in tribute both to his proximity to the troops, but also to his almost spiritual role in leading “his tribe” of fighters against an equally committed enemy.⁸⁸

Once Bruun reached Ain-ben-Khelil in early February it was the ranks of Négrier's nascent force to which he was assigned, promising the Dane that he would be at the forefront of the fighting. In fact, the very first *compagnie franche*, which had only been formed in December 1881 and consisted of but a hundred men, had just returned to the camp after a most successful baptism of fire.⁸⁹ The elite unit had formed part of a foray over the border into the Chott Tigrî (*chott* means dry lakebed) to raid the camp of one Si Slimane, a deputy of Bu-Amama.⁹⁰ During

the fighting, the mounted infantry had performed as intended, working in tandem with the French cavalry as well as providing it with vital cover from Arab counterattacks. As described three years later in a detailed analysis of these special troops, Bruun asserted that they were “indispensable” for the cavalry and that elements of the mounted infantry should always accompany the advance column and lead all attacks on fortified positions.⁹¹ It was simply recognized that the ability to quickly bring to bear the concentrated firepower of the mobile infantry could consistently be decisive much as it was on the inaugural raid. And much to the delight of every participant in the attack, a large herd of animals, including 4,000 sheep, had been seized and was subsequently sold at auction for 45,000 francs, a portion of which was divided among the men.⁹² It seems the Legion had accepted that in order to be victorious, they needed, in addition to reorganizing their forces, to become more like the local resistance and adopt some of their methods of fighting, including the use of raids that in French hands became little more than acts of pillaging and piracy on the high sandy seas.

Yet Bruun embraced the use of such tactics and, within two weeks of reaching Ain-ben-Khelil, he was preparing to join another similar cross-border attack. On that occasion, the objective was to reenter the Chott Tigri and drive the encamped peoples toward a wall of mountains through which only a few narrow passes would permit a minority of them and their animals to escape. In addition, the French plan called for the capture of vital wells that, if successful, would deny the resistance an important base of operations and, moving out on February 25th and crossing the border the following day, the French forces would remain on Moroccan-claimed territory for more than a week in pursuit of the enemy.⁹³ The initial phase of the campaign saw the *compagnie franche* advance with the light cavalry and jointly launch a surprise attack on the Arabs assembled in the lakebed. Forced to suddenly react to this unanticipated incursion, the camp inhabitants beat a hasty and disorganized retreat, abandoning both their tents and flocks of animals. Elements of the French forces raced to cutoff the attempted Arab escape while other forces, protected by mounted infantry positioned to defeat repeated counterattacks, began to round up the thousands of animals milling around the encampments and to pillage and burn the abandoned tents.⁹⁴ Bruun noted that valuable items such as jewelry, weapons, camel-hair carpets, and sacks of dates were taken by the troops and that an estimated 600 camels and about 14,000 goats and sheep were captured. The latter animals were later sold for a sum of 60,000 francs, securing each legionnaire a payment of eighty francs, and the Dane did not hesitate to describe the assembled train of booty in glorious terms as it was marched back to meet up with the advancing main French column:

It was indeed a picturesque scene that unfolded before the columns of infantry as they reached the said wells around dusk, about 20 km distant from where we had conducted our *razzia*, and a triumph train in Rome’s heyday can hardly have presented more a joyous sight than our arrival when we marched into the camp.⁹⁵

However, despite the heady atmosphere of victory, the French squandered an even greater success, as the Arabs managed to assure that a far larger number of animals, Bruun suggested as many as 80 percent, eluded capture. And even as the campaign continued over the subsequent days, the French became wary of chasing the Arabs and their herds ever deeper into Moroccan territory with which they were largely unfamiliar.⁹⁶ Experience had taught the veteran Legion officers and soldiers that such tactics were favored by the local fighters, and the French resolved to suspend the pursuit and not allow the enemy to choose the site of their next clash of arms. Instead, a withdrawal to Ain-bel-Khelil followed and a return to the dreary garrison life ensued. It seemed the Legion had decided to limit its offensive operations for a time and rest its troops de-

spite the swirl of rumors that a drive to Figuiq was imminent. Bruun regretted such hesitancy, but he also seemed enlivened by his experiences on the campaign. Even as he revisited in letters home the issue of exploitative Arab merchants who priced simple staples as if they were pure luxuries, he also remarked that he was quite satisfied in the camp:

[I] find myself – considering the conditions under which we live – to be here on very favorable terms and am probably a source of envy for others...⁹⁷

Factors explaining such a positive outlook were that he was in good health, he was free to socialize with the Arabs who frequented the base and able to pursue his interest in their culture, and the French officers treated him well.⁹⁸ Bruun was even selected by Colonel Négrier to fill a staff position as an assistant surveyor, in large part due to his near-fluency in French and his abilities as an illustrator, the latter apparently having impressed the Frenchman.⁹⁹ The Dane eagerly accepted the posting, even as it removed him from strictly combat-related duties, since he assumed opportunities for advancement would be heightened by performing tasks usually handled by officers. As he saw it, much satisfaction could also be derived from such work as it would assist the French in exploring the countryside and enhance the capabilities of their fighting forces by enabling them to conduct operations further afield.¹⁰⁰ Much as had been the case with the American officers in Egypt during the preceding decade, who had traveled widely across East Africa and staked the khedive's claims to entire regions through surveys and map-making, so, too, Bruun was to assist the French in not only taking physical possession of the land but also to do so intellectually by committing the territory to maps made and owned by the empire.

Small Expeditions in Enemy Territory

The drive to assert proprietary rights to land that lay far from the imperial seat of power required an ability to enforce and defend such claims. Invariably, that responsibility befell the armed forces of such regimes, and the khedive's army was no exception in that regard:

Little wars with barbarous nations which retreat before you into a country without roads are expensive as well as tedious affairs, and yet they are almost an inevitable consequence of the Egyptian dream of equatorial annexation.¹⁰¹

Having worked painstakingly to establish his empire as one somehow deserving of such expansion at the expense of other African rulers, Khedive Ismail was by the fall of 1875 determined to direct a series of attacks on Ethiopian-held territory. Even the prospect of needing to advance across rugged ground and to contest land intimately familiar to the enemy failed to dissuade the Egyptians from pressing ahead with their plans to dispatch contingents that were moderate in size and only loosely coordinated. Recent successes in Darfur, where a force of only 1,600 Egyptians had just the year before defeated opposing units ten-fold their superior in number, served to confirm and reinforce the conviction that African tribal armies posed but a minimal challenge.¹⁰² Modern arms, training, and leadership were deemed sufficient to guarantee victory and, commenting on Arendrup's departure from Egypt at the head of a 3,400-man expeditionary force, one observer had captured the local mood by noting "there is little doubt as to the result."¹⁰³ Focused on the ability to bring massive firepower to bear in the form of concentrated volleys from massed riflemen and devastating barrages from cannon and rocket batteries, the Egyptians believed they had the means to deliver a decisive blow against any level of resistance.

But in the highlands of Marab-Mellash and Tigray, any invader would be hard-pressed to assert his advantages over those of tough, experienced fighters defending their native soil. In Emperor Yohannes IV and his loyal deputy, Alula, who were both Tigrayans, the Egyptians faced veteran commanders with a vast army at their disposal. An estimated sixty thousand men were being mobilized in late 1875 to meet the perceived threat on Ethiopia's borders, and within its ranks the army counted some of the realm's best marksmen and most skilled mountain fighters.¹⁰⁴ The majority was still armed with only traditional weapons such as swords and spears, but many in the northeastern regions had during the prior decade been able to acquire significant quantities of firearms through their proximity to the Red Sea coast. Such access, as well as moderate assistance from British and French sources, had allowed Yohannes, "a deeply religious and uncompromising patriot," to organize a well-armed, reliable core within his army and around which elements of modern tactics could be applied.¹⁰⁵ Much beyond the common, but limiting, characterizations of traditional armies as marked mainly by physical prowess and unbounded courage, the emperor's "army of Tigray," as one historian has termed it, was a force capable of tactical sophistication and movement as well as planned battlefield deployment.¹⁰⁶ And even as the massed attack remained the decisive instrument in the Ethiopian arsenal, the tactical use of mobility and feigned retreat served to lure an enemy contingent to advance and position it in the optimal location for delivering such an enveloping, final assault. The very topography of the northern highlands, "where almost every hill is a natural fortress," became an ally to those who knew best how to use its features, and a fearsome opponent to those who passed through the countryside without sufficient forces and only limited intelligence.¹⁰⁷

In early October 1875, Colonel Arendrup departed from Massawa at the head of a small force of Egyptian troops and a motley staff of officers. Entrusted with command of the most important of the simultaneous incursions into Ethiopian territory and, granted tactical discretion directly from the khedive himself, the Dane occupied a position of great responsibility and momentous importance for Egypt.¹⁰⁸ Assigned to assist Arendrup in the endeavor was a group of men whose varied qualities provided their commander with a wealth of insight and divergent guidance. Included within the staff were not only Egyptian officers of numerous ethnic backgrounds, but it also consisted of an American major, James A. Dennison (b. 1846), and two Europeans, one a Swiss major and the other an Austro-Hungarian nobleman named Count Wilhelm Zichy.¹⁰⁹ Most prominent within this group were the Armenian Arakel Bey, a rising star within the Egyptian political elite, and his policy ally, Count Zichy, whose joint confidence in the weakness of Ethiopian power made them strong advocates of an aggressive and incautious advance through enemy territory. Dye would later speculate that these two men had an undue level of influence over Arendrup and that "the courteous, warm-hearted and gentlemanly commander of the Egyptian forces, being inexperienced in war, was too readily persuaded to adopt audacious measures to which he may have been personally averse."¹¹⁰ However, the Dane knew his two aides had experience in the region, Arakel Bey having been appointed governor of Massawa in 1873 and Zichy having soldiered there since earlier in the year, so a reliance on their advice would seem warranted even if the Armenian had remarked rather improbably, just months prior to the hostilities, that the entire area of Ethiopia could be conquered using only a few thousand troops with modern arms.¹¹¹

But regardless of the degree of optimism contained in the estimate, the projected need was seemingly satisfied by Arendrup's expeditionary force of 2,500 men, twelve Krupp cannons and six rocket stands.¹¹² The adequacy of Egyptian strength was further assumed from the ease with which the advance proceeded and the apparent flight of Ethiopian units that had recently ap-

peared in Hamasen.¹¹³ Reflecting on his progress in a letter to a Swedish friend, Arendrup wrote from Godofelassie at the close of October that very little resistance had been encountered en route and that the greatest challenges as yet faced by the Egyptians had been poor roads and difficulties finding sufficient draft animals. He noted the strenuous climb into the highlands had been eased after reaching Asmara on the 16th and he expressed a genuine satisfaction with the climate and physical landscape that existed so many thousands of feet above sea level.¹¹⁴ Their dealings with the local people were also a source of contentment for Arendrup, because he saw the Egyptian presence and behavior in the area as a stark contrast to that of other forces:

The population is happy to have us nearby because it has never been used to anything other than a radical exploitation by their government and its soldiers. In contrast, we paid properly for everything they could spare which did not amount to much other than cattle and sheep.¹¹⁵

The Dane was clearly convinced that Egyptian rule would mean a liberation from the scourge of the predatory armies of Ethiopia which descended on settled areas like locusts and stripped villagers of food and supplies. Yet the promise of inclusion within the khedive's empire was hardly a guarantee of societal bliss. The state of affairs in the border region, which for years had been bitterly contested ground, was almost bound to remain unchanged no matter the level of success of the Egyptian offensive. And as the month of November unfolded the prospects for securing significant victories tended to fade rapidly with Egypt's various incursions sputtering and failing. One of the planned expeditions had in mid-October successfully advanced 1,200 troops from the port of Zeila to the town of Harrar, about 250 km inland, but had since not moved deeper into Ethiopia.¹¹⁶ A similar situation unfolded with the Chaillé-Long and McKillop Pasha expedition that managed to send a force far up the Juba River, but otherwise accomplished little and was eventually forced to withdraw in humiliation.¹¹⁷ Far worse outcomes befell two additional incursions, one led by Munzinger Pasha from the port of Tajura, and the other originating in Mettemmah on the Blue Nile. Those expeditions were intended to converge on Ankobar, capital of Shoa province, with the aim of securing an alliance with a Yohannes rival, however, both were soundly defeated by mid-November.¹¹⁸ So as Arendrup sat writing his letter in Godofelassie on the very last day of October, reflecting on his position as commander of the fifth and largest Egyptian expedition, he was seemingly unaware of events elsewhere and what loomed ahead, but he did express a sense that the enemy was mobilizing rapidly and that the situation would soon intensify. However, having brushed aside token resistance just days earlier at Addi Magunta, a small village upon which a night assault was made in a failed bid to secure prisoners, Arendrup remained confident in the superiority of Egyptian armament and organization.¹¹⁹

The Dane's successful occupation of the village of Guinda early in the campaign had similarly fostered a sense of strength and self-reliance. Lying only about 50 km from the coast, the small hamlet represented a direct challenge to khedival rule, as it had been fortified just a year earlier by Ethiopian forces under the command of the Scotsman John Kirkham (d. 1876), a former British soldier serving as a military advisor to Emperor Yohannes.¹²⁰ Under orders from the Ethiopian monarch, Kirkham had raised the Union Jack over the settlement in an attempt to create a buffer zone between the territories claimed by the king and Egypt, and from that outpost the Scotsman had secured an element of diplomatic protection through the French consul, Gustav de Sarzac (b. 1832), resident in the nearby port of Massawa.¹²¹ In fact, dealings with France had helped to provide Yohannes with much needed guns and ammunition, and even as Arendrup's forces were en route to Guinda, Consul de Sarzac was actually encamped in the village recruiting over one hundred porters for a trek to the king's capital at Adua with a small shipment of

rifles.¹²² The Dane, perhaps hoping to intercept this cargo, requested to call on de Sarzac, but the Frenchman chose to avoid any such meeting and instead pressed on with his journey. The Ethiopian garrison had also by then abandoned the village, so when Arendrup reached Guinda at the head of his troops he easily occupied the village and unceremoniously but symbolically pulled down the British flag and replaced it with the Ottoman banner.¹²³ In a curious, almost surreal event, a Dane representing one African ruler was eliminating the seat of power of a Briton who served another regional monarch.

The Guinda experience cannot have helped but to reassure Arendrup that the resources at his disposal were putting Yohannes on the defensive and creating opportunities for a rapid Egyptian advance. Hoping to capitalize on this perceived momentum, he dispatched, on 19 October, a letter to the Ethiopian king explaining Egyptian intentions to only pacify and stabilize the border region and calling on the monarch to cooperate.¹²⁴ Consul de Sarzac was in Adua when Yohannes received Arendrup's message more than ten days later, and it was clear the king was less impressed by Egyptian assurances than by their overt actions.¹²⁵ Over the intervening period Arendrup's armed men had been steadily pressing ever deeper into Mareb-Mellash, with the Danish commander gradually thinning his ranks by deploying forces at selected points to guard the expedition's lines of communications. Seven of Arendrup's twenty-four companies were stationed at Kaya-Khor and Sagaheit to secure the route forward to Godofelassie, but two Englishmen, the brothers Houghton, following the same route as the Egyptians, encountered elements of the expedition also at Asmara and further forward encamped at Deboroa.¹²⁶ After being detained by the Egyptians, the Houghtons were brought to Arendrup's main camp at Godofelassie in late October where the Dane told them he regretted having to keep them under guard.¹²⁷ However, a natural concern about spies made such a detention apt, and, as he had written to his friend in Sweden, Arendrup was anticipating danger ahead. The Dane sensed that a clash was imminent but was surely blind to the magnitude of the enemy force he would face. Hence, as the Egyptians pressed on to Addi Huala and the forward units under Count Zichy descended into the Valley of Gundet (Gudda-Guddi), Yohannes was rapidly mobilizing his vast army and proclaiming a holy war to repel the Muslim invaders.¹²⁸ The extent of Arendrup's advance, having moved the Dane more than 150 km from Massawa, also raised considerable concerns with the General Staff in Cairo.¹²⁹ One American officer, William Dye, would a few years later condemn the Danish officer for his handling of command and offer trenchant criticism of his fellow officer's judgment:

Ignorant of the country and of the character of the people with whom he had to deal, and despising his savage adversary too much, the unfortunate Arendrup divided his forces and neglected the most ordinary precautions.¹³⁰

Such an assessment was partially accurate, as Arendrup certainly lacked familiarity with the Ethiopian countryside. But Dye's comments were also unfair because the lines of communications needed to be protected and the deep advance was probably more motivated by overconfidence than a feeling of intense racism. Further, an order to withdraw was never issued from Cairo even though Major Dennison, who was dispatched directly from the capital to advise Arendrup, could have delivered such a message.¹³¹ The High Command, it seems, equally failed to foresee the level of danger that loomed across the Mareb River.

The notion that serious calamities existed along the border regions was similarly overlooked by the French leadership in Algeria during the spring of 1882. Evidence gleaned from the successes of the *compagnies franches* served to reinforce the conviction that French superiority had

been achieved on the battlefield. As Bruun prepared to reenter the Chott Tigri in his new capacity as an illustrator and surveyor, the expedition he was joining was provided with a protection force of only three hundred men, mostly foot soldiers rather than mounted infantry.¹³² Even after an Arab spy, who had infiltrated Ain-ben-Khelil, was captured and summarily executed did the commanders fail to strengthen the armed escort.¹³³ Bruun would later note the Arab skill in entering French camps undetected by mingling with the native cavalymen and camel drivers, suggesting that French plans might often be compromised, but in April 1882 he, too, remained confident about the safety of the survey team and even expressed a desire to encounter Arabs across the border.¹³⁴ Such optimism was further supported by reports that Bu-Amama's forces were on the defensive and that French troops had recently managed to capture his tent and one of his wives.¹³⁵ For Bruun and his comrades, the foray into Chott Tigri seemingly promised adventure rather than an intense brush with death.

Departing Ain-ben-Khelil on April 19th, the expedition was essentially an intelligence-gathering endeavor aimed at familiarizing the French military with the countryside and mapping the location of strategic sites. Bruun served as staff secretary and was assigned to make illustrations and surveys of the main topographical features. Each day the Dane rode off accompanied by an Arab assistant to explore and collect data that each evening was transferred to maps being prepared in the camp. Not limiting himself to making measurements and scale drawings, Bruun also gathered specimens of plants and flowers, and he was quite taken not only with his pioneering role in the region, but also by the physical aspects of the countryside. Describing the land in terms his audience could only have imagined, he conveyed striking scenes of rock formations protruding like fish fins through the sandy seas, hillocks that in the setting sun projected long shadows across the area, and towering mountain ranges that ringed the "wonderfully appealing carpet of nature" unfolding before him.¹³⁶ Even as he lamented the harsh conditions that had to be endured, such as dust storms and drastically shifting temperatures between night and day, Bruun was simply awed by the scale and magnificence of a natural environment so foreign from his own experiences.¹³⁷

But the Dane was far less impressed by the people who populated the landscape. Bruun characterized the camp Arabs as having a "born indolence" and related that he had to beat his native assistant for attempting to steal a few personal items from his tent.¹³⁸ More profoundly, commenting on their very essence as individuals, he found that Arabs were emotionally underdeveloped. Bruun argued they lacked sensibilities like pity, mercy, and sympathy, qualities which they considered signs of weakness rather than humanity. Even children, he assured his readers, were marked by such a debilitating absence of feelings and, having personally captured a young boy on a raid of opportunity while in the Chott Tigri, the Dane assessed the child in the starkest terms:

I do not doubt for a moment that my kindness would not have prevented him from trying to kill me if he had found an opportunity to do so. Mercy, sympathy, and all such emotions are seen by Arabs as cowardice, and it must surely have seemed unbelievable to him that I did not immediately cut him down as he would have done to me if the situation had been reversed and he stood in my place.¹³⁹

Bruun expanded further on this theme of deficiencies by describing the surreal experience of looking into the eyes of local Arabs:

[T]his strange, melancholy stare that all Arabs have and in which one attempts without success to discern whether they are content or distressed. I have so often seen this look – this complete surrender to fate – which is always the same regardless of whether the Arab is heading into battle with the prospect of se-


curing loot or he is facing the barrel of a rifle moments before being shot as a spy.¹⁴⁰

The Dane was telling his audience in no uncertain terms that Arabs, at least those encountered in the southern reaches of Algeria, were a people fundamentally distinct from the average European, a people hardened but also stunted by the environment in which they lived. Struggling to survive in a region of scarcity the Arabs had been toughened to accept violence as an integral part of life, Bruun concluded, but they had also become flawed in the process.¹⁴¹ However, if the local population was somehow desensitized to the use of force, it seemed that further violence, this time brought by invading French columns, was not the best method to address Arab needs. Raids and attacks, such as one conducted by the selfsame survey expedition in April 1882, served only to fuel the local drive for retaliation and vengeance. Further, by seizing not only animals but also a few prisoners, small French raiding parties like the one in which Bruun participated, were provoking a response that they were often ill-equipped to handle.¹⁴² Over the few days following the attack, the Dane would become very aware of this reality as the hunters had become the hunted and Arab forces shadowed the expedition waiting to strike. He even reported that infiltrators of the French column made off with arms and ammunition, underscoring the scarcity of men to properly guard the formation much less defend it effectively against a large, determined enemy force.¹⁴³

Ambush and Defeat

Dawn on 14 November 1875 saw Arendrup's forces firmly entrenched on the heights of Addi Huala, overlooking the Gundet Valley below. Ever since their arrival at this defensible position more than a week earlier, the Egyptians, comprising eleven companies, had worked to fortify their camp and made efforts to familiarize themselves with the surrounding countryside.¹⁴⁴ For days the advance unit, numbering six companies under Count Zichy, had operated down in the valley which, seen from Addi Huala, looked like a giant natural arena, overgrown with lush vegetation and ringed by forested mountains.¹⁴⁵ Arendrup had never ordered the count to descend the roughly 600 meters to the valley floor, but once his adventurous subordinate had done so, the Dane felt no need to recall the advance unit as he deemed it strong enough to defend its position. His sense of confidence was further strengthened on the 14th when villagers in Gundet reportedly requested Egyptian protection.¹⁴⁶ Such a call for aid would have confirmed Arendrup's sense of his mission as one of liberation and freeing the local population from exploitation by local warlords. A small contingent of Egyptian troops was soon dispatched to oust the forward elements of the Ethiopian Army, and, with that aim completed, yet another, though minor, victory was added to the string of small successes credited to Arendrup. And triumph, as is customary, generated few questions and little doubt about the expedition at a time when such reevaluation was most needed. With his forces separated by several kilometers and only linked by lines of communications that could be cut instantly, Arendrup's command was horribly vulnerable to attack.

But in the evening of the 14th, with intelligence reports reaching the Dane's headquarters suggesting that Yohannes was preparing an imminent assault on the Egyptians, Arendrup opted to take preemptive action.¹⁴⁷ Indications of rifle fire across the Mareb River also raised optimistic speculation that fissures known to exist within the regionally-diverse Ethiopian Army had led to outright conflict within the emperor's camp.¹⁴⁸ Such instability, if promptly exploited, could enable Arendrup to secure a decisive victory and open the road to Adua, only 55 km away. The prospect of seizing the Ethiopian capital, unseating or even killing Yohannes, and effectively delivering the entire northeastern part of the country into Egyptian hands must have seemed an ir-



Map 3. Battlefield at Gundet. Reproduced from Georges Douin, *L'Empire Africain*, vol. 3, part 3 of *Historie du règne du khedive Ismail* (Cairo: Institut Français, 1941), 776-77, plate 15.

resistible opportunity. As he departed from Addi Huala at the head of four companies, intent on joining his forces with those of Count Zichy, Arendrup planned to strike across the Mareb on the 16th with about 800 men and sack the enemy camp.¹⁴⁹ However, what was waiting for Arendrup on the other side of the river was no longer just on the other side. During the 14th, on the very day when the Egyptians were seemingly ousting the Ethiopians from their side of the river, other forces under the command of Alula, the emperor's trusted deputy, had used the fighting around the village as a diversion, crossed the waterway over to the Egyptian side, and maneuvered undetected to outflank Arendrup's men.¹⁵⁰ Shielded from view by the considerable vegetation in the valley, which was about 4.5 km across, the large body of Ethiopian soldiers had eluded Zichy's scouts and positioned themselves to await the moment to strike. A further element in the deception was to concentrate Egyptian attention on the Ethiopian side of the Mareb where, as described by Major Dennison, hundreds of camp fires could be seen burning conspicuously on the night of the fifteenth.¹⁵¹ Yohannes was beckoning the Egyptians to dash across the river and take the fight to him even as he was, under the cover of darkness, ordering thousands, perhaps as many as 12,000, to join Alula's men on the other side.¹⁵²

On the morning of the 16th the unsuspecting Egyptians in the valley departed from their camp hoping to quickly forge the river and secure an anticipated victory. Leaving two companies in place to guard the rear, Arendrup advanced with the remaining eight, posting Count Zichy at the fore of the column.¹⁵³ In support of this ambitious move, the Dane had ordered that the bulk of the men at Addi Huala, five of the remaining seven companies, should similarly advance during the day's early hours to follow-up the attack. At about eight o'clock, Zichy's forward elements first encountered Ethiopian units, but the resistance was light and the Egyptians pushed onwards down to the banks of the Mareb.¹⁵⁴ Here a much larger Ethiopian force enveloped the count's men and wiped out his command. Arendrup made a desperate attempt to reinforce the advance guard, however, the Dane was quickly forced to retreat and rapidly attempted to form a defensive perimeter with his remaining companies. Yet having entangled his forces in a hopelessly indefensible position with the rugged ground and thick vegetation denying the Egyptians clear fields of fire and instead providing the onrushing Ethiopians with cover until the very moment when they set upon their enemies, Arendrup and his men faced as futile a fight as that of their comrades on the river. Sweeping across the Egyptian positions like a "living hurricane," the Ethiopians cut down the defenders among whom Arendrup was one of the first to fall, struck by a bullet to either the head or chest.¹⁵⁵ His death at the very outset of the engagement spared him, as it was described by one commentator, the ordeal of witnessing the utter destruction of his forces and shielded him from the indignity of realizing the full magnitude of the disaster that befell his command.¹⁵⁶

The Ethiopian effort to eradicate the Egyptian presence in Gundet was not limited to the eight unfortunate infantry companies initially engaged. Arendrup's lightly-guarded camp in the valley was quickly overrun and most of its defenders killed, denying the remnants of both the Dane's forces and the men descending from Addi Huala a refuge where they might make a defensible stand. The five companies marching down from the heights were, in fact, attacked at their most vulnerable time, spread out along a narrow mountain trail and utterly prevented from organizing any measure of effective resistance. Trapped, much like Arendrup's men, in a carefully set ambush, they were overwhelmed by thousands of Ethiopian soldiers who hacked, slashed and stabbed their way through the Egyptian line, most favoring swords and spears as more effective weapons in the confines of the densely forested mountainside.¹⁵⁷ Arakel Bey, the young Armenian who had been so confident of success, was one of the victims of this latter engagement,

though he reportedly died by his own hand rather than allow the Ethiopians to take his life.¹⁵⁸ He was perhaps also fearful of being captured alive, because the enemy had a reputation for mutilating its prisoners, especially the non-Christian captives.¹⁵⁹ Dye would later comment that “the massacre over, mutilation held frightful sway, and the frenzied barbarians reveled in blood,” suggesting in no uncertain terms that the Ethiopians were a savage people who derived satisfaction from torturing their victims.¹⁶⁰ Yet, however ghastly the practice, its use served an effective tactical purpose by terrorizing the Egyptian soldiers, something to which Major Dennison could well attest as reports of the defeat streamed back to the camp at Addi Huala during the 16th and 17th, causing morale to plummet and making anything but a wholesale retreat impossible.¹⁶¹ The expedition that had begun with such promise and apparent success, was reduced to a frightened group of men scrambling back to the coast in search of safety, uprooting most of the garrisons stationed along the original route of advance.

Bruun, the young legionnaire, would easily have understood such a sense of fear when he too, just a few years later, found himself surrounded by thousands of enemy fighters intent on cutting short his life. The small French survey expedition, to which he was attached, had rather unnecessarily raised its profile in the Chott Tigri through aggressive action and, by 26 April 1882, attracted to its position hostile forces far their superior in number.¹⁶² Bruun estimated that as many as 7-8,000 men, including 2,000 on mounts, were concentrated around the French on that day, but more recent studies place the enemy strength at less than half that figure.¹⁶³ However, regardless of the exact number, the expedition’s mere 300 men faced a daunting task if it were to successfully escape the encirclement. In an almost futile attempt to elude its fate, the expedition set off in search of a defensible position from which the men might fend off their pursuers until a relief column could be summoned. But much as happened at Gundet seven years earlier, the attacking forces exploited the vulnerability of a Western-trained contingent on the march and managed to split the already small expedition into three even smaller, weaker units.¹⁶⁴ Within minutes of the initial assault, Arab warriors overwhelmed the 25-man rearguard, eventually killing all but two in a bitter hand-to-hand struggle.¹⁶⁵ Other attackers targeted the soft, central part of the column, managing to scatter the pack animals carrying the vital supplies of water and ammunition. And as the formation fought desperately to retain its shape and repulse repeated charges, the commander ordered his men to steadily make their way to a hill about 5 km away where he hoped to establish a stable perimeter.¹⁶⁶

Once the fighting erupted, Bruun joined the desperate efforts to relieve the besieged men at the rear of the column. However, with their demise, the Dane and his immediate comrades effectively became the replacement rearguard.¹⁶⁷ Pressed from all sides and disoriented by both the smoke and noise of the battlefield, he and the dwindling number of men around him struggled to hold the Arab tribesmen at bay. Bruun was convinced their deteriorating position would have been overrun if the enemy had not suddenly eased the intensity of their attacks. Gradually lured away from the fighting by the prospects of looting the Frenchmen’s supplies and recovering the animals lost just days earlier, the Arabs allowed, mercifully if unintendedly so, the fledgling remnants of the revamped rearguard to escape certain death.¹⁶⁸ Having succeeded in dislodging the prized flocks, including over 250 camels and mules, from the column, the attackers had achieved a desired degree of victory rather than press ahead for an annihilation of the French that would have been far more costly. The French were not about to squander this opportunity and, with Bruun commanding one of the flanks of the reorganized column, the retreating men reached the coveted hill.¹⁶⁹ Yet, short of water and needing to secure treatment for the wounded, they could not remain in that position. Pressing on after a brief rest, and harassed by elements of the

pursuing Arab horsemen, the column managed, since the outset of the battle, to move a distance of 75 km over a twenty-hour period, seven of which were spent also fighting.¹⁷⁰

But the tempered victory of a successful retreat could not mask the cost paid in casualties and the experiences seared into the memories of the survivors. Fifty-one men, including both the expedition's top-ranked officer and the commander of the mounted infantry contingent, were killed and over thirty wounded, a casualty rate amounting to about 27 percent of the column's strength.¹⁷¹ In comparison with the fate of Arendrup and the Egyptians at Gundet, where the figure exceeded 50 percent, Bruun and his fellow legionnaires had fared far better. However, parallels were discernible as regarded perceptions of the enemy on the battlefield. Much as the American officers had stressed the brutality of the Ethiopian soldiers, so, too, Bruun described Arab cruelty in terms that served to dehumanize the opposing fighters. "The greedy and barbarian enemy," he raged, tortured the captured soldiers in full view, but just beyond rifle range, of their comrades.¹⁷² "Still today," Bruun wrote decades later, "their screams of pain ring in my ears and I still hear their cries [for help] as they were tormented to death."¹⁷³ Unable to do anything to end the suffering of the victims, the survivors had to simply endure the horrific sounds and scenes, but, as the Dane related, unlike those men who had eventually died that day and been freed from their torture, his memories of those events had been an ongoing, if much milder, degree of the same. And in an effort to make his readers fully appreciate what he had witnessed, he related in some detail his impressions of the dead when he toured the battlefield just two days later:

It was a horrible sight. At the foot of...the hill lay a pile of terribly mutilated and naked corpses. The Arabs had stripped the dead of everything, cut their throats, and burned off their faces to ultimately make their cut-up bodies unrecognizable.¹⁷⁴

Actions such as these, it was implied, could hardly be those of a civilized people. Worse yet, Bruun noted that even women participated in perpetrating these crimes, dispelling quite clearly the notion that there were innocents within the Arab Bedouin communities of southern Algeria.¹⁷⁵ Brute force and summary justice were implicitly the tools France needed to employ in conquering and governing the region. As the legionnaires, led personally by Négrier, reached the battlefield to collect their dead, they captured fifteen "marauders," as Bruun defined them, who were scavenging the area and became the immediate targets of French vengeance.¹⁷⁶ The men were briefly interrogated by an Arabic-speaking officer and nobleman, who reputedly had made a covert visit to Mecca and thereby claimed certain insights about the local population. After the prisoners divulged that Bu-Amama was the one responsible for the attack, they were all executed.¹⁷⁷ It seemed civilization, directed by European elites, was well on the march in that part of the world!

The Geopolitical and the Personal

News of the disaster at Gundet was a prelude to an even greater disaster for Cairo. In a desperate effort to deflect blame away from the regime and retain some level of domestic and international confidence in the khedive's rule, the Egyptian government published belatedly an official account of the Arendrup campaign. Consisting mostly of wishful thinking and outright fantasy, the report alleged at length that the Ethiopians were the aggressors and that Egypt had been forced into an unwanted conflict.¹⁷⁸ The Egyptians further claimed that fully 15,000 enemy fighters had died at Gundet, felled in droves before the gallant and courageous Egyptian infantry

who fought tenaciously until their ammunition was expended and then threw themselves at the attacking hordes in a final, glorious bayonet charge.¹⁷⁹ Rather than a humiliating setback, the clash in the valley was actually described as a testament to the fighting spirit of the khedive's army since the 770 men Egypt acknowledged having lost in the battle had killed twenty times their own number. At the very best, the official account explained, Ethiopia had secured only a grueling, Pyrrhic victory. However, eyewitness evidence emerging somewhat later revealed that the Egyptian claims were grossly inflated. Ethiopian veterans interviewed years after the battle did agree that the Egyptians fought bravely, but reports from the French mission led by Consul De Sarzac found that Ethiopian fatalities only ran into the hundreds and, having toured the battlefield just about a week later, the consul could with authority attest to the carnage inflicted on the Egyptian forces.¹⁸⁰ De Sarzac even found Arendrup's body among the hundreds of corpses scattered across the valley and also rescued one survivor, Count Zichy, who had remained alive despite being horribly wounded.¹⁸¹ In the Frenchman's mind there could be no doubt that the Ethiopian victory at Gundet was decisive.

The revelation of the scope and manner of the Egyptian defeat served to demand a reevaluation of Arendrup and his leadership. Comments critical of the Dane gradually appeared in interviews, memoirs, and other accounts published in the aftermath of the events at Gundet. Branded as "improvident," "reckless", and utterly unfit for such a command, blame for the debacle was placed squarely on Arendrup's shoulders.¹⁸² In particular, some American officers on the General Staff suggested that the failure to entrench the expedition's men in a fortified position doomed the Egyptians to defeat. Yet, only months later, a much larger Egyptian invasion force met a similar fate at the battle of Gura despite having chosen, in part based on American advice, the ground on which to face the Ethiopians in battle.¹⁸³ Even if Arendrup, Zichy, and Arakel Bey, it seems, had remained within the camp at Addi Huala, they would have been overwhelmed by Yohannes' forces, though perhaps have denied the Ethiopians as easy a victory. And it was undoubtedly the very nature, rather than the fact, of the triumph that made it so significant. Hundreds of Remington rifles and numerous Krupp cannons were captured, providing Yohannes with a much needed infusion of modern armament, and, according to the Scotsman Kirkham, the ease of victory served to almost inoculate the Ethiopian fighters against a fear of Egyptian firepower.¹⁸⁴ Flush with confidence and a sense of purpose, the army of Yohannes repeated and multiplied its success against the Egyptians at Gura in March 1876, handing the khedive a combined loss for the two failed expeditions of about £3 million.¹⁸⁵ Neither the Egyptian Army nor the economy was able to sustain such setbacks, and within the year the khedive's dreams of an African empire were forever crushed by fiscal and geopolitical realities.

Arendrup's central and undesired role in initiating the overt demise of Khedival Egypt should have ensured that the criticisms directed against him would dominate the historical record. Yet Western sources do temper their unflattering assessments by also depicting the Dane as a heroic and tragic figure. Most such accounts agree that Arendrup was well-liked and respected as a leading adviser within the Egyptian General Staff. One contemporary report described him as "one of the most valued officers in the Khedive's service," while another held that he was "very popular" and "a man of great capacity" whose "fine soldierly figure and pleasant face will be greatly missed at many a house in Cairo."¹⁸⁶

Such a reputation suggested Arendrup had little reason to risk his life in order to advance his career in Egyptian service, but feeling attracted to the idea of becoming a battle-tested officer and, provided the opportunity to realize this dream via the confidence the regime had in him, the Dane chose a path that would ultimately end his life in a brutal fashion. The exact details of

Arendrup's demise are rather unclear, but if the published renditions of his final moments are to be believed, then the last stand was a heroic event. In terms that made the inglorious seem most glorious, the Dane was described as fighting valiantly with revolver and sword in hand, fearlessly facing the enemy until the bitter end.¹⁸⁷ Danish accounts, in particular, framed Arendrup's death in such terms, one even asserting that he "reaped the soldier's reward, heroic death and an aura of heroism."¹⁸⁸ A bizarre claim about the fate of his body also crept into some of the Danish reports, alleging that the corpse was carefully buried at a point beside the main road running past Gundet, and that every Ethiopian knew of this grave.¹⁸⁹ As if to reject the notion that Arendrup's life had ended as an obscure footnote to history, the stories served to cultivate a myth of Danish heroism that supposedly had transcended the divisions established on the battlefield.

In the aftermath of the ambush in the Chott Tigri, Bruun came to reject likened efforts by the Legion to manufacture a glorified memory of the desert clash. A battle of far lesser significance than Gundet, the defeat still wounded French pride and during May and June expeditions were repeatedly dispatched to pursue and punish the enemy. Measured success was achieved by these raids as Bedouin encampments were sacked and herds of animals were captured, but Bruun also felt a growing sense of frustration about the ineffectiveness of such tactics as the Arabs kept eluding capture, in effect using their property as a decoy to make good their escape.¹⁹⁰ The emergence of such a pattern served to undermine unit morale, and Bruun increasingly came to question the purposes of their collective sacrifices:

So this is why I sometimes am a little discouraged by the progression of the war. It is far from satisfying to begin each operation knowing full well that after days of strenuous efforts nothing more will be achieved than to see those one sought to capture disappear over the horizon.¹⁹¹

The young Dane was even further discouraged by the insistence of French military officials to propagandize the ongoing war and the nature of the fighting. He dismissed as largely inaccurate the stories channeled into European newspapers, and he condemned privately the claims made by a French general that the April ambush had been the occasion for one of the "finest achievements" by the Legion.¹⁹² On a strictly personal level, Bruun was satisfied with having been tested under fire and having overcome the sense of fear that gripped him as men fell by his side, but despite being toughened by the experience, his memories of the events of that horrible day were framed in a far different light than that expressed by the general.¹⁹³ In Bruun's view, the headlong retreat made to save their very lives was hardly the foundation for a tale of Legionary heroism and, in blunt terms, he declared "we unfortunately did not in any way fight like heroes."¹⁹⁴ The standard French assertion that the Legion never abandoned any of its troops was similarly described by the Dane as an outright lie, because he reported that men were routinely threatened with being left behind in the wilderness without arms or supplies if they failed to keep pace with the marching columns. While conceding that such iron discipline kept the number of men abandoned at a bare minimum, he saw the policy as a stain on the Legion and complained that he had personally been scared by witnessing defenseless comrades left to fend for themselves.¹⁹⁵

But if Bruun's assessment of the Legion was steadily deteriorating, the Legion's appreciation for the Dane's service was growing. Ever short of qualified, French-speaking noncommissioned officers, the Legion was eager to promote men to fill those rather isolated posts between the French officers and the foreign soldiers.¹⁹⁶ Bruun's performance at Chott Tigri, which was highly praised by the surviving officers of the ill-fated expedition, had revealed the Dane's ability to handle such a position of command, and the Legion felt confident that he merited promo-

tion, first to corporal and later to sergeant.¹⁹⁷ However, the Dane was reluctant to accept such advancements in rank, because he was only on a one-year sabbatical from the Danish military and he was not confident that if he left the national service he could obtain an officer rank within the Legion in a timely fashion. By mid-June, Bruun was also determined to end his stay in Algeria, writing to Lieutenant-General Waldemar R. Raasløff (d. 1883), a Danish veteran of the Legion and a former defense minister, that “I am ever more decided to leave here at any price....”¹⁹⁸ He hoped the general, who had been like a mentor to him, could help in ending his one-year commitment early, because he was growing increasingly unsatisfied with the deteriorating conditions within the Legion. Citing poor medical care, worsening discipline marked by more frequent desertion attempts, and tighter restrictions on access to food items to supplement their diets, Bruun described a seemingly intolerable life in the camp at Ain-ben-Khelil.¹⁹⁹ And following his hospitalization after he had been ordered to participate in drills despite suffering from jaundice, the Dane had had enough.²⁰⁰ In late August he headed north to Sidi-bel-Abbès and later onwards to the coast from which he set course back to Denmark, leaving behind him a life that had been both rich in experiences but also harsh in the realities it exposed.²⁰¹

Intersecting Lives

Søren Arendrup and P. Daniel Bruun were men who shared a passion but not a common fate. Separated in age by twenty-two years, the two Danish officers never had occasion to meet as fellow professionals or to discuss their overseas experiences, because Arendrup’s untimely death at Gundet occurred a few years before Bruun even completed his training as an officer. Yet, while the younger man must have heard of his compatriot’s demise, he was not dissuaded from following a similar course in the pursuit of military adventure on foreign soil. The same attraction that drew Arendrup away from Denmark, though the latter was also motivated by health concerns and profound personal tragedy, also lured Bruun to depart, as they both sought to exercise their training in its highest form, namely on the battlefield. On that stage, these men assumed a role as tamers of the Orient, as agents who projected civilization, as they understood it, to societies deemed to need redemption. However, as soldiers their instruments for achieving such aims were decidedly uncivilized, and the Danes would come to realize that fact in each his own way. Within a year of his arrival in Algeria, Bruun had satisfied his quest to experience the brutal reality of combat, and Arendrup, who ironically was never hired by the Egyptian High Command to serve as a frontline officer, was killed filling just such a role which he coveted but was inexperienced to perform. In short, the realization of their personal goals was fatal for one man and bittersweet for the other.

On his return to Denmark, Bruun resumed his military career, but also moved to establish himself as an author. Having experienced what few other Danes could even imagine, Bruun’s literary career flourished and he wrote many books over the subsequent years dealing with his own life, military history, and regional studies. He returned to North Africa on several occasions, never again as a soldier, but as a traveler and researcher in which capacity he spent about a month in Tunisia during 1893, collecting items of ethnographical interest for the National Museum in Copenhagen.²⁰² But in his capacity as a writer, Bruun also came to explore the events of Arendrup’s life and included in his book on European activities in Africa an entire chapter on his countryman’s career in Egyptian service. Through his contacts with the Arendrup family, he gained access to papers and accounts that better explained what transpired on the doomed expedition through Mareb-Mallash, and he concluded, to the family’s satisfaction, that Colonel

Arendrup suffered defeat mainly because he relied too much on his perceived strengths against a vastly larger enemy force fighting on ground ideal to their tactics.²⁰³ In Bruun's view, Arendrup was not an incompetent commander who blundered into an ambush, but rather an honorable officer who dutifully followed orders and shared the common affliction of many Western-trained soldiers, namely an excessive confidence in the superiority of modern arms and organization.²⁰⁴ Such an assessment of his countryman, that the tamer had himself been fatally tamed, undoubtedly reflected an inherent sympathy Bruun felt for anyone whose final moments had come on a distant battlefield and whose experiences of terror were like those the former legionnaire himself remembered vividly.

But however tragic and unfortunate their fates and conduct, armed action was a minor if not almost negligible role for Danes in the Middle East. Persuasion and argument rather than force and conflict constituted the mode of conduct more in tune with the Danish national character, and missionaries, those individuals endowed with the will and convictions to profoundly transform and salvage the Orient, were tasked to do so one convert at a time.

-
- ¹ David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 12, 79.
- ² John Laffin, *The French Foreign Legion* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1974), 72.
- ³ Christian Schiöppffe's Collection [hereafter CSC], *Danske som Officerer i fremmed Krigstjeneste, 1815-1965*, "Søren Arendrup," H. No. 89. Danish State Archives; Svend Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*, 3rd ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1979-84): 1, 274-75, 603.
- ⁴ "Oberst Søren A. Arendrup," *Illustreret Tidende* 845 (5 December 1875): 102.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, 100, 102.
- ⁶ "Adulf Arendrup," *Ny Illustreret Tidning* 12 (15 January 1876): 17.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, 18; Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk*, 1: 275.
- ⁸ "Oberst Arendrup og den ulykkelige Kamp ved Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC. A four-page account of the Battle of Gundet written in March 1922. The author is probably either Christian Schiöppffe or Daniel Bruun.
- ⁹ Mohammed Rifaat Bey, *The Awakening of Modern Egypt* (London: Longmans, 1947), 167.
- ¹⁰ "Oberst Arendrup og den ulykkelige Kamp ved Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹¹ Commander of the 18th Battalion to Bruun, Helsingør, 29 September 1881, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7c. P. Daniel Bruun's Archive [hereafter DB]. Danish State Archives.
- ¹² Daniel Bruun, "General Négrier og Fremmedlegionen," *Nationaltidende*, 26 August 1913, copy in DB.
- ¹³ Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 116.
- ¹⁴ Daniel Bruun, *Algier og Sahara: Billeder fra Nomade- og Krigerlivet* (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1893), 36, 56-58; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books 1979), 169-72.
- ¹⁵ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 19.
- ¹⁶ Roy C. Anderson, *Devils, Not Men: The History of the French Foreign Legion* (London: Robert Hale, 1987), 37-38; Douglas Porch, *The French Foreign Legion* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 118-19.
- ¹⁷ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 23-26; Laffin, *The French Foreign Legion*, 71; Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 118-19.
- ¹⁸ Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, "The Egyptian Empire," in *Modern Egypt*, vol. 2 of *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, ed. M. W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 210-11; Augustus B. Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia* (London: Methuen, 1901), 26.
- ¹⁹ "Egypt of Today," *New York Times*, 4 April 1875; Ghada H. Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa under Egyptian Rule 1865-1885* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), xiv-xv.
- ²⁰ William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, *The Blue and the Gray on the Nile* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 173-77; Daly, *Modern Egypt*, 206-07; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, vii.
- ²¹ William M. Dye, *Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia* (New York: Atkin and Prout, 1880), 127; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, viii.
- ²² Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 81; Ibrahim, "The Egyptian Empire," 211. One report, first published in the *Times of India* and later reprinted in the *Times* (London), suggested the Muslim view of slavery did not lend itself to support abolition. See "Egyptian designs on Berbera," *Times* (London), 5 August 1874.
- ²³ "Egypt," *Times* (London), 16 September 1874; E. A. de Cosson, "To the Editor of the *Times*," *Times* (London), 14 November 1876.
- ²⁴ Richard Parkhurst, *The Social History of Ethiopia* (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1992), 244-45; De Cosson, "To the Editors of the *Times*".
- ²⁵ A. E. Robinson, "The Egyptian-Abyssinian War of 1874-1876," *Journal of the African Society* 26, no. 103 (April 1927): 266; Ibrahim, "The Egyptian Empire," 209.
- ²⁶ Samuel W. Baker, *Exploration of the Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia* (Hartford: O. D. Case, 1868), 159; E. A. de Cosson, *The Cradle of the Blue Nile* (London: John Murray, 1877), 2: 316.
- ²⁷ Richard Parkhurst, "The Effects of War in Ethiopian History," *Ethiopia Observer* 7, no. 2 (1963): 151, 153; Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, 28.
- ²⁸ Mordecai Abir, "The Origins of the Ethiopian-Egyptian Border Problem in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of African History* 8, no. 3 (1967): 460; Haggai Erlich, "Alula, 'The Son of Qubi': A King's Man in Ethiopia 1875-1897," *Journal of African History* 15, no. 2 (1974): 267.
- ²⁹ George Annesley, *The Rise of Modern Egypt* (Durham: Pentland Press, 1994), 157.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 155; Alexander McEwen, "Note," *Nineteenth Century* 3 (1878): 424.
- ³¹ McEwen, "Note," 423; Rifaat Bey, *The Awakening of Modern Egypt*, 113; "Egypt," *Times* (London), 26 October 1875.

- ³² Ehud R. Toledano, *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth Century Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 26; F. Robert Hunter, "Egypt under the successors of Muhammad Ali," in *Modern Egypt*, vol. 2 of *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, ed. M. W. Daly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 189.
- ³³ F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives 1805-1879* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984), 39. Just five years later, in 1875, fully £6.5 million of Egypt's £10.8 million in total revenues was committed to debt service. See "Egypt," *Times* (London), 15 November 1875.
- ³⁴ S. Rappaport, *History of Egypt* (London: Grolier Society, 1904), 184, 189-192; Edward Dickey, "Egypt and the Khedive," *Nineteenth Century* 2 (1877): 855-56.
- ³⁵ Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the Sand* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 48; Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 67-68.
- ³⁶ Charles P. Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 5, no. 17 (1884): 173, 176; "Turkey and Egypt," *Times* (London), 16 June 1874; Ralston, *Importing the European Army*, 100.
- ³⁷ Søren A. Arendrup, "Om de nyeste forbedringer ved støbejerns kanonernes tilvirkning og de derved for deres holdbarhed opnaede resultater," *Tidsskrift for Krigsvæsen* 3 (1867): 46.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 47; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 59.
- ³⁹ Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 155.
- ⁴⁰ Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," 167.
- ⁴¹ Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 51-52.
- ⁴² Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 1.
- ⁴³ Stone, "Military Affairs in Egypt," 171, 174; Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 86-87.
- ⁴⁴ "Adulf Arendrup," *Ny Illustrerad Tidning*, 18.
- ⁴⁵ Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 197, 200-01.
- ⁴⁶ Bruun to Lieutenant General W. R. Raasløff, Sidi-bel-Abbès, 30 December 1881, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 4. DB.
- ⁴⁷ Bruun to his parents, Sidi-bel-Abbès, 30 December 1881, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 4. DB; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 18; Laffin, *The French Foreign Legion*, 38-39; Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 119.
- ⁴⁸ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 23-26.
- ⁴⁹ Bruun to his parents, Sidi-bel-Abbès, 30 December 1881, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 4. DB; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 89.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 140.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, 141-45.
- ⁵³ Bruun to his parents, Sidi-bel-Abbès, 11 December 1881, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 4. DB; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 39; Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 119, 188.
- ⁵⁴ Bruun to his parents, Sidi-bel-Abbès, 11 December 1881, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 4. DB.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁶ Introduction to collected letters, 1923, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 1. DB. Bruun stressed that the negative assessments of the Legion reflected his initial impressions and were included to show how his judgment evolved over the span of his service in the storied unit.
- ⁵⁷ Bruun, "Schweizeren Gorski: En soldatertype fra Algier," *Tilskueren* 8 (1891): 591-605; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 349-53; Laffin, *The French Foreign Legion*, 27.
- ⁵⁸ Zewde Gabre-Sellassie, *Yohannes IV of Ethiopia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 55-59.
- ⁵⁹ Sven Ruberson, *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1978), 310, 313; Leo Reinisch, "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Geographical Journal* 9, no. 3 (1897): 317.
- ⁶⁰ Pierre Crabités, *Americans in the Egyptian Army* (London: George Routledge, 1938), 187-88; Richard Parkhurst, "Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century," *Ethiopia Observer* 7, no. 1 (1963): 90; "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 25 May 1877; Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, 23; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 124.
- ⁶¹ Haggai Erlich, *Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Scramble for Africa* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1982), 10; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 168-70.
- ⁶² "Egypt – A Threatened Abyssinian Invasion," *New York Times*, 13 August 1875; "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 26 August 1875.
- ⁶³ William M. Dye, "The Egyptian Campaign in Abyssinia," *Living Age* 134 (1877): 278.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 286-87.

- ⁶⁵ Richard Hill, *Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan* (London: Frank Cass, 1967), 58-59, 282; Richard A. Caulk, "Armies as Predators," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 3 (1978): 463-65, 475; Pankhurst, "The Effects of War," 143; Erlich, *Ethiopia and Eritrea*, 10; Ruberson, *The Survival*, 315; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 142, 146.
- ⁶⁶ *New York Times*, 31 August 1872; "Egypt," *Times* (London), 26 October 1875; Christopher Spring,
- ⁶⁷ "The Egyptian Invasion," *New York Times*, 26 August 1875; "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 26 August 1875; Ruberson, *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence*, 315.
- ⁶⁸ Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 173-76; Hill, *Biographical Dictionary*, 98-99, 138-40.
- ⁶⁹ "Egypt," *New York Times*, 3 December 1875; "Egypt and England," *New York Times*, 17 December 1875; "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 20 December 1875; Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 178-79.
- ⁷⁰ "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 13 December 1875; "Oberst Arendrup," *Dagbladet*, 16 February 1876.
- ⁷¹ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 131; Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 180; Hill, *Biographical Dictionary*, 346-47; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 153.
- ⁷² Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 176, 180; Grabe-Selassie, *Yohannes IV*, 287.
- ⁷³ William W. Loring, *A Confederate Soldier in Egypt* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1884), 301; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 150; Hill, *Biographical Dictionary*, 217.
- ⁷⁴ Daniel Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara: Beredent Fodfolk paa Razzia," *Fra Alle Lande* (1883): 39; Bruun, diary notes, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 5. DB; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 179-80.
- ⁷⁵ Bruun to Lt. General W. R. Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 10 February 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 6. DB.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 179.
- ⁷⁷ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 18 February 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 6. DB.
- ⁷⁸ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 13 February 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 6. DB.
- ⁷⁹ Tony Geraghty, *March or Die* (New York: Facts on File, 1987), 93; Anderson, *Devils, Not Men*, 48; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 157-62. An illustration included in Bruun's book depicted a reported massacre of Spanish settlers by Bu-Amama's raiders. With particularly inflammatory images, such as the murder of small children and half-naked women, readers were enabled to visualize the brutality of the rebels even as the author did not specifically describe such acts. Bruun, however, did relate that five hundred civilians were killed, but the graphic nature of their deaths was left largely to the artistic representation of the event.
- ⁸⁰ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 151-55, 268; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 39.
- ⁸¹ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 261, 270-77; Bruun, "Franskændene i Figuiq: 'Vestens store Oase'," undetermined newspaper, 14 July 1884, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 8b. DB.
- ⁸² Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 316.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*; Geraghty, *March or Die*, 93; Anderson, *Devils, Not Men*, 48.
- ⁸⁴ Bruun, "Marchpræstationer særlig af beredent fodfolk under kampagnen i Syd-Algier 1881-82," *Militært Tidsskrift* 14 (1885): 71-72; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 181.
- ⁸⁵ Bruun, "Marchpræstationer," 98; Geraghty, *March or Die*, 93.
- ⁸⁶ Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 317.
- ⁸⁷ Bruun, "Marchpræstationer," 77, 102; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 199, 231; Anderson, *Devils, Not Men*, 48.
- ⁸⁸ Bruun, "General Négrier," *Nationaltidende*, undated; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 216.
- ⁸⁹ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 13 February 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 6. DB.
- ⁹⁰ Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 317; Geraghty, *March or Die*, 93.
- ⁹¹ Bruun, "Marchpræstationer," 96-100.
- ⁹² Bruun to Lt. General W. R. Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 10 February 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 6. DB; Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 13 February 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 6. DB; Geraghty, *March or Die*, 93.
- ⁹³ Bruun, diary notes, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 7. DB; Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 12 March 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 7. DB.
- ⁹⁴ Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 99-100; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 205-06.
- ⁹⁵ Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 102; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 206-08.
- ⁹⁶ Bruun, diary notes, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 7. DB; Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 12 March 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 7. DB; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 221.
- ⁹⁷ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 28 March 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 8. DB.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁹ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 18-19 March, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 6. DB.

-
- ¹⁰⁰ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 18 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB.
- ¹⁰¹ "Great Britain and Egypt," *Times* (London), 6 December 1875.
- ¹⁰² "Egypt," *Times* (London), 16 September 1874; Richard Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan 1820-1881* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 121.
- ¹⁰³ "Egypt," *Times* (London), 26 October 1875; Dye, "The Egyptian Campaign," 278.
- ¹⁰⁴ Pankhurst, *A Social History*, 152, 284-85; Pankhurst, "The Ethiopian Army," 126; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 163.
- ¹⁰⁵ Pankhurst, "Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century," 90; Robinson, "The Egyptian-Abyssinian War," 268; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 162.
- ¹⁰⁶ Richard A. Caulk, "Firearms and Princely Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of African History* 13, no. 4 (1972): 618; Spring, *African Arms and Armour*, 95; Pankhurst, *A Social History*, 157.
- ¹⁰⁷ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 114.
- ¹⁰⁸ Gabre-Sellassie, *Yohannes IV*, 59.
- ¹⁰⁹ Hill, *Biographical Dictionary*, 112, 389; Loring, *A Confederate Soldier*, 301; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 131-32.
- ¹¹⁰ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 132, 137.
- ¹¹¹ Sven Rubenson, "Ethiopia and the Horn," in *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 5, ed. John E. Flint (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 95; Robinson, "The Egyptian-Abyssinian War," 268; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 146.
- ¹¹² Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 135; Loring, *A Confederate Soldier*, 301.
- ¹¹³ "Egypt: The Egyptian Army enters Abyssinia," *New York Times*, 31 October 1875; "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 1 November 1875; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 133; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 146.
- ¹¹⁴ Søren A. Arendrup to friend (unidentified), 31 October 1875, H. No. 89. CSC; "Oberst Arendrup og den ulykkelige kamp ved Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC; Daniel Bruun, *Afrika: Dets opdagelse, erobring, og kolonisation* (Copenhagen: Nordiske Forlag, 1901), 1: 13-14; Rubenson, *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence*, 319.
- ¹¹⁵ Arendrup to friend, 31 October 1875, H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹¹⁶ Rubenson, *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence*, 317; Rubenson, "Ethiopia and the Horn," 95.
- ¹¹⁷ Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 178-79; Rubenson, *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence*, 315-17; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 82.
- ¹¹⁸ William Houghton, "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 14 November 1876; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 182-83; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 150-51; "Munzinger Pasha and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 1 January 1876.
- ¹¹⁹ Arendrup to friend, 31 October 1875, H. No. 89. CSC; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 135.
- ¹²⁰ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 126-27; Robinson, "The Egyptian-Abyssinian War," 268; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 148.
- ¹²¹ *Ibid.*; Gabre-Sellassie, *Yohannes IV*, 290; Crabités, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*, 188.
- ¹²² "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 25 October 1876; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 134; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 147, 152.
- ¹²³ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 128; Robinson, "The Egyptian-Abyssinian War," 270.
- ¹²⁴ Crabités, *Americans in the Egyptian Army*, 189; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 132.
- ¹²⁵ "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 25 October 1876.
- ¹²⁶ House of Commons, "Correspondence relative to the Arrest of Messrs. Houghton and Barlow at Massawah, and the Return of the Abyssinian Envoy from Egypt" *British Sessional Papers* 88 (1877), 333-34; "Report of Major Dennison – Affair at Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 135-36.
- ¹²⁷ House of Commons, "Correspondence relative to the Arrest," 333-34.
- ¹²⁸ "Egypt and Abyssinia," *Times* (London), 25 October 1876; Loring, *A Confederate Soldier*, 302-03.
- ¹²⁹ Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 181-82.
- ¹³⁰ Dye, "The Egyptian Campaign," 278.
- ¹³¹ Hesseltine, *The Blue and the Gray*, 182.
- ¹³² Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 280-81; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 323.
- ¹³³ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 9 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 8. DB.
- ¹³⁴ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 9 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 339.
- ¹³⁵ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 9 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB.
- ¹³⁶ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 214-15, 292; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 335-36.
- ¹³⁷ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 13 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB.
- ¹³⁸ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 17 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB.

- ¹³⁹ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 291; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 334.
- ¹⁴⁰ Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 337.
- ¹⁴¹ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 267.
- ¹⁴² Ibid., 290; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 333. The raid occurred on 24 April 1882 when an opportunity arose to seize enemy herds and household items. In the successful assault the French captured around 2,500 sheep, 60 donkeys, and a handful of Arab prisoners.
- ¹⁴³ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 295.
- ¹⁴⁴ "Report of Major Dennison – Affair of Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 137.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ibid.; Gerald H. Portal, *My Mission to Abyssinia* (New York: Negro University Press, 1969), 96-98; Frederic Villiers, "Negus Negusti and the Abyssinians," *Century* 44, no. 3 (1892): 447.
- ¹⁴⁶ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 137.
- ¹⁴⁷ "Report of Major Dennison – Affair of Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹⁴⁸ "Oberst Arendrup og den ulykkelige Kamp ved Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹⁴⁹ "Report of Major Dennison – Affair of Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹⁵⁰ Haggai Erlich, *Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Scramble for Africa: A Political Biography of Ras Alula 1875-1897* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1982), 11.
- ¹⁵¹ "Report of Major Dennison – Affair of Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹⁵² "Egypt and Abyssinia," *New York Times*, 7 November 1876; Erlich, *Ethiopia and Eritrea*, 11.
- ¹⁵³ "Report of Major Dennison – Affair of Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 138-39.
- ¹⁵⁴ "Oberst S. A. Arendrups Død," *Vort Værn* 3, no. 4 (1911), copy in CSC; Bruun, *Afrika*, 1: 19.
- ¹⁵⁵ "Egypt and Abyssinia," *New York Times*, 7 November 1876; "Oberst Arendrup," *Dagbladet*, 16 December 1875; Caulk, "Firearms and Princely Power," 619; Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, 24; Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 162.
- ¹⁵⁶ "Oberst Arendrup og den ulykkelige Kamp ved Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹⁵⁷ "Report of Major Dennison – Affair of Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC; Wylde, *Modern Abyssinia*, 24; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 139.
- ¹⁵⁸ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 140.
- ¹⁵⁹ Pankhurst, *A Social History*, 156-57; Portal, *My Mission*, 100.
- ¹⁶⁰ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 139.
- ¹⁶¹ "Report of Major Dennison – Affair of Gundet," H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹⁶² Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 300.
- ¹⁶³ Ibid., 303; Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 27 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB; Geraghty, *March or Die*, 94; Anderson, *Devils, Not Men*, 49; Laffin, *The French Foreign Legion*, 73.
- ¹⁶⁴ Laffin, *The French Foreign Legion*, 73.
- ¹⁶⁵ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 301, 303; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 426-27.
- ¹⁶⁶ Ibid.; Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 3 May 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB; Bruun, "Kampen ved Temaïd-ben-Salem," *Dagbladet*, 10 June 1882, copy in DB; Bruun, "General Négrier," *Nationaltidende*, 26 August 1913.
- ¹⁶⁷ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 303.
- ¹⁶⁸ Ibid.; Bruun, "Kampen ved Temaïd-ben-Salem," *Dagbladet*, 10 June 1882; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 431.
- ¹⁶⁹ Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 434.
- ¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 431; Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 311-12; Laffin, *The French Foreign Legion*, 73.
- ¹⁷¹ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 27 April 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB; Anderson, *Devils, Not Men*, 49; Geraghty, *March or Die*, 93-94.
- ¹⁷² Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 306, 308; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 430, 432.
- ¹⁷³ Bruun, "General Négrier," *Nationaltidende*, 26 August 1913.
- ¹⁷⁴ Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 438.
- ¹⁷⁵ Bruun, *Algier og Sahara*, 317.
- ¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 316; Bruun, "General Négrier," *Nationaltidende*, 26 August 1913; Bruun, "Feltliv i Sahara," 439.
- ¹⁷⁷ Ibid.; Bruun, diary notes, April-May 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB; Bruun, "Kampen ved Temaïd-ben-Salem," *Dagbladet*, 10 June 1882.
- ¹⁷⁸ Vice Consul N. D. Comanos to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, Cairo, 18 February 1876, Document No. 233, *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1876), 600-01.
- ¹⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁸⁰ "Egypt and Abyssinia," *New York Times*, 7 November 1876; Villiers, "Negus Negusti," 447.

-
- ¹⁸¹ “Egypt and Abyssinia,” *New York Times*, 7 November 1876; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 147-48.
- ¹⁸² Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 150; Loring, *A Confederate Soldier*, 303; “Egypt and Abyssinia,” *Times* (London), 20 December 1875; “Egypt and Abyssinia,” *Times*, 12 October 1876; “Egypt and Abyssinia,” *Times* (London), 11 November 1876.
- ¹⁸³ Talhami, *Suakin and Massawa*, 160.
- ¹⁸⁴ Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 183.
- ¹⁸⁵ Ibrahim, “The Egyptian Empire,” 213.
- ¹⁸⁶ “Great Britain and Egypt,” *Times* (London), 6 December 1875; “Egypt and Abyssinia,” *Times* (London), 13 December 1875; “Oberst Arendrup,” *Dagbladet*, 16 December 1875.
- ¹⁸⁷ B. R. Nielsen, “Han faldt, fjernt fra sit land,” *Aalborg Stiftstidende*, undated, H. No. 89, copy in CSC; Dye, *Moslem Egypt*, 140; Hill, *A Biographical Dictionary*, 60.
- ¹⁸⁸ “Soranerren, som faldt i Abessinien,” *Soraner-Bladet* 20, no. 12, undated, H. No. 89, copy in CSC; Nielsen, “Han faldt, fjernt fra sit land,” *Aalborg Stiftstidende*; “Oberst Søren Adolph Arendrup,” *Illustreret Tidende*, 102.
- ¹⁸⁹ “Oberst Arendrup og den ulykkelige Kamp ved Gundet,” H. No. 89. CSC.
- ¹⁹⁰ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, undated, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 11. DB; Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khalil, 1 June 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 12. DB.
- ¹⁹¹ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 1 June 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 12. DB.
- ¹⁹² *Ibid.*; Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 20 May 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB.
- ¹⁹³ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁹⁵ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 1 June 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 12. DB. Years later, Bruun would identify Colonel Négrier as the architect of this harsh policy that condemned men to certain death. However, by 1913, and on the occasion of writing an article to praise the Frenchman’s contributions to the Legion, Bruun characterized the practice rather as an effective motivational tool than as a basis for criticism against the storied unit. See Bruun, “General Négrier,” *Nationaltidende*, 26 August 1913.
- ¹⁹⁶ Porch, *The French Foreign Legion*, 194.
- ¹⁹⁷ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 3 May 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB; Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 20 May 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 9. DB; Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 1 June 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 12. DB; Bruun, diary notes, August-September 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 13. DB.
- ¹⁹⁸ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 15 June 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 12. DB. The general had served with the French military during the early 1840s and had participated in the conquest of Algeria. Throughout Bruun’s service with the Legion he kept in contact with Raasløff, and it seems clear that the general may well have had a role in recommending North Africa as a destination for Danish officers seeking military experience overseas.
- ¹⁹⁹ Bruun to Raasløff, Ain-ben-Khelil, 13 August 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 12. DB.
- ²⁰⁰ Bruun to his parents, Ain-ben-Khelil, 21 August 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 12. DB.
- ²⁰¹ Bruun, diary notes, August-September 1882, bundle 29, section 2b, no. 7a, folder 13. DB.
- ²⁰² National Museum to Daniel Bruun, Copenhagen, 7 August 1893, bundle 36, section 2b, folder 18. DB; Daniel Bruun, *Huleboerne i Syd Tunis* (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1893), i.
- ²⁰³ Henrik Christian Arendrup to Daniel Bruun, Copenhagen, 6 April 1899. DB; H. C. Arendrup to Daniel Bruun, Copenhagen, 29 October 1899. DB.
- ²⁰⁴ Bruun, *Afrika*, 14.

CHAPTER TWO

THE HØYERS AND THE DANISH CHURCH MISSION IN ARABIA

On the Arabian Peninsula, in the south and southwest, lies a region that is among the most spectacular in the world. Bounded by mountains and three seas, the Arabian, the Red, and the Rub al-Khali, the lands of the Yemen and Hadramawt have constituted a geographical unit for centuries.¹ Yet physical happenstance has not, until recently, translated into a similar sense of unity among the people who populate the area. Distinguished, if not divided, by sectarian affiliation, tribal identity, and socio-economic development, the people defied classification as a single population. Instead they were marked by a diversity that culminated during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the region split between two foreign empires and a vast range of major and minor local rulers.

In Upper Yemen, the Zaydi Shias struggled with the Ottoman Empire to carve out an independent imamate in the impoverished region and to reestablish their historic rule over much of Yemen. In contrast, Lower Yemen, split between the British and the Ottomans, was largely a Sunni-dominated area that was economically more stable than the highlands and generally hostile to any return of Shia rule. And in the Hadramawt, also majority Sunni, the population was largely oriented toward seagoing commerce and enjoyed strong ties with native rulers in British India. But the point where regional diversity was most apparent was in Aden, the port city in the southwestern corner of Yemen. Here the British established a strategic strongpoint and a pillar of their empire's security, and created a vibrant city whose rapidly expanding economy attracted laborers from the interior while at the same time securing an identity as a cosmopolitan center oriented more towards the wider world than domestic societies.² Aden became, in essence, a colonial outpost that was intended to serve a very specific and narrow imperial purpose, but simultaneously evolved into a conduit, an open door, to the interior.

One man who recognized this special position of Aden, its status as a protected point of entry for Western ideas and influence into Arabia, was the Danish missionary Oluf Høyer, who, along with his wife, Maria, settled in the port city in 1904. They jointly became a part of the international evangelical movement to spread Christianity globally and to specifically challenge the faith of Islam at its point of origin. In that sense, the Høyers shared the dominant Orientalist view that Islam was a polar opposite, an antithesis, of Christianity and a factor in undermining civilization.³ But they also were adamant that Danes, in particular, had a responsibility to forge ahead into Arabia due to Denmark's legacy on the peninsula. The eighteenth century Danish expedition, of which Carsten Niebuhr was the sole survivor, had explored the Yemen and, in Oluf's mind, lifted the veil of Arabia for Europe. Now, almost one hundred and fifty years later, it was time for Danish missionaries, he argued, to pick up where their Christian countrymen explorers had left off, and press on to Sana'a, Mecca, and beyond.⁴

The Making of a Missionary

In 1900, Danish-sponsored proselytizing in the Middle East was marginal and in its infancy. The *Østerlandsmissionen* [Eastern Lands Mission] was poised to begin its activities east of Damascus, and prospects for other Christianization efforts seemed limited. But in the person of Oluf Høyer (1859-1930), who had settled in Hebron, Palestine a year earlier, Danes had someone determined to blaze a trail for Danish missioning in the region.⁵ He firmly believed that great

things could be achieved through hard work and dedication, yet Høyer hardly fit the traditional image of a fervent, pioneering missionary. In fact, he came late to Christianity, not committing himself to the faith until almost aged thirty in 1888, and, prior to becoming a minister, Høyer had aspired to a military career before actually settling on a future in Danish law enforcement. For fifteen years (1881-96), Høyer served as a policeman in København (Copenhagen), rising to the rank of detective. But as the years passed, he became increasingly focused on pursuing an alternative path.⁶

A clear manifestation of Høyer's shifting priorities was his decision in 1895, only a year before he resigned, to form a small fellowship with like-minded police officers. Known as the *Politifunktionærernes Broderkreds* (The Brotherhood of Police Civil Servants), and consisting of only ten founding members, its creation was a momentous step, as the tiny group of devotees would become the core of the mission's future support network.⁷ The manner of its beginnings also reflected Høyer's drive, as it was he who recruited the first members, he who planted the first seeds, rather than the brotherhood coming to him and selecting him as their overseas representative. He was, in simple terms, the indispensable ingredient of the nascent effort and, under his capable guidance, the fellowship managed to raise sufficient funds to finance his eventual journey to the Middle East and his establishment of residence in Lebanon for the purposes of language studies and to familiarize him with the region. Over the next two years, from early 1897 to 1899, during which time he was joined by his wife, Maria (1858-1939), and daughter, Ellen (b. 1888), he became accustomed both physically and mentally to the environment in which he would be active, and finally chose Hebron (*Khalil ar-Rahman*) as the site for the couple's permanent mission.⁸

Høyer was drawn to the ancient city both by its name and its status as a focal point of the three Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Derived from the Hebrew word meaning "community" and implying a union with God, he argued that the name symbolized the police brotherhood and its aims. Høyer even suggested years later that the "Hebron" label could be retained by the mission after they abandoned the city in favor of Aden, because the name illustrated the bond which existed between them and God.⁹ But the Dane was also attracted to Hebron due to the numerous Western missions ensconced in the city. The ground had been well-prepared and the local population was accustomed to, and even embracing of, the missionaries. Oluf found the people easy to engage in conversation and noted that they often spoke of God.¹⁰ More curiously, he suggested, in 1902, that many in Hebron would like to replace Ottoman rule with that of a Christian power, and that even Muslims and Jews favored the arrival of more Christian missions in the city, though he conceded that was really attributable to the material gains these communities hoped the presence of more Europeans would generate.¹¹

Høyer's past as a detective also came to stand him in good stead. He was experienced at evaluating people, a skill that helped him determine which individuals he could engage in dialogue and pursue as converts without stirring up trouble or causing some incident.¹² His familiarity with law enforcement and sense of comfort in that environment also led him to frequent the local jail where he discussed religion with those unfortunates who were incarcerated.¹³ In a literal sense, he missioned to a captive audience. Yet, whatever Høyer's exploits within the Ottoman penal system, he further caught public attention as an activist among the Jews of Hebron. The reverend James E. Hanauer (1850-1938) of the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews, reported in the society's journal that Høyer was doing valuable work in the city and that his discussions with the Ashkenazim community were "a very hopeful sign, as hitherto, the German-speaking Jews of Hebron have been extremely unapproachable and

bigoted.”¹⁴ It is unclear if Høyer shared this negative assessment of the local Jews, because he would later claim several rabbis, people who were obviously most unlikely to convert, as his friends.¹⁵ But what is certain is that Høyer’s style of missioning was unconventional and broke new ground. Other missionaries were even so impressed with Høyer’s contributions to the international Christianization effort, citing him as energetic and scholarly, that they in 1900 sent letters to Denmark supporting his effort to be ordained as a minister.¹⁶

But in Denmark Høyer was deemed unprepared for such an advancement, and the couple was compelled to return home for an extended time. Between September 1900 and April 1901, he intensified his efforts to win ordination and worked with the brotherhood to broaden support for his activities in Palestine. One of the elements of that campaign was to reorganize the brotherhood into a formal mission, *Missionær Oluf Høyer og Hustrus Missionsvirksomhed i Judea* (The Missionary Oluf Høyer and Wife’s Mission in Judea), and to begin publishing a mission journal titled *Fra Hebron* (From Hebron).¹⁷ Høyer would later express an uneasiness about his name figuring so prominently in the mission’s title, suggesting instead that the mission belonged to God rather than to himself and his wife.¹⁸ However, the decision to use his name demonstrated clearly that he continued to be indispensable to the future of the mission.

A Mission by the Tomb of Abraham

In May 1901, with his sense of purpose reinforced, Høyer returned to the Middle East. Though he had yet to be ordained, he felt buoyed by a widening base of domestic interest in his work and by his wife having secured a pledge of additional support from the organization of *Kvindelige Missions Arbejdere* (KMA or Female Missionary Workers).¹⁹ And while temporarily living in Lebanon and preparing to once again move to Hebron, Oluf expressed a feeling of being drawn back to the city of Abraham. However, once arrived, he was disillusioned to see the residents living “poorer and even more immoral lives than earlier.”²⁰ It seemed a greater challenge faced the Høyers than they had anticipated, and Oluf would later remark that Palestine was “a land where one learns to be patient and learns to wait.”²¹ His wife also tempered her initial optimism by noting that success would require undiluted self-sacrifice.²²

The harsh reality of facing non-Christian populations strongly committed to their own faiths did present the Høyers with a daunting, though not unique, task. Most missionaries in the Middle East were active in such an environment, and Hebron, as a city holy to both Muslims and Jews, was certainly no exception. Indeed, Oluf found the local devotees of Islam were often rather zealous and that their passions intensified during Ramadan, a fact that he attributed to the daily fasting and readings from the Quran.²³ He even argued that most Muslims were quite stupid, as they limited their intellectual horizons to the Quran and tended to believe their fate was predetermined.²⁴ Such opinions suggest that Oluf was rather confrontational, but he stressed that he only challenged Muslims when necessary, as when he debated an *alim* (a learned man of Islam) at a gathering in a Jewish-owned shop and denied the man’s assertion that the Bible was corrupted.²⁵ It seems Oluf was particularly hostile to that type of view, which he perceived as narrow-minded and as a barrier built specifically to block religious dialogue. And based on that very same rationale, Oluf concluded that the local Jews were more mature intellectually than the Muslims because they listened to his arguments, considered the points made, and then resumed the debate.²⁶ He even cited one Jewish friend, whom he characterized as “Christian at heart,” as evidence that he and his message were making headway.²⁷

Yet despite his favorable assessment of the Jewish community, Oluf’s dealings with it also

frustrated him. Some rabbis intervened to block his efforts to tutor young Jews in English by denouncing social contact with Christians as “unclean,” and threatening to cutoff anyone who engaged in such interaction from access to *halukah*, the individual “share” of overseas, charitable funds made available to support Jews devoted to full-time study and prayer.²⁸ Oluf naturally lamented that action and considered it proof that “not one of [the students] is free,” as they claimed, nor “independent of others or their opinions,” and argued that they were captives of financial dependence from which only an acceptance of Jesus could release them.²⁹ Yet it slowly became clear to the Høyers that the hold of tradition over the people, be they Jew or Muslim, could not be broken through religious activism alone.

An emphasis on social reform evolved for the Høyers into an aspect of the mission that they deemed pivotal to its success. They saw the family, the basic building block of society, as terribly corrupted by prevailing traditions in the East that promoted a very unbalanced relationship between the husband and wife. In blunt terms, Oluf characterized the status of local Muslim women as little better than prostitutes, and observed that the trellis-covered windows, behind which women lived confined to the harem, reminded him of the wooden booths where such working girls displayed their wares in Copenhagen.³⁰ His wife echoed those sentiments when she described Eastern marriage as a damnation that had elevated the man’s domination of the woman to peak heights while denegrating the qualities of women.³¹ And it was precisely the liberation of women from such societal constraints, which Maria described metaphorically as an unveiling of their faces and hearts, that the Høyer’s found was necessary to create healthy, stable families and prepare the ground for conversions to Christianity.³² Maria even argued that Christian women were duty-bound to assist their “sisters,” their fellow descendants from Abraham, and make it clear to them that all women shared a common cause, that of asserting their equality with men before God.³³ Such ambition, nothing short of revolutionary, was perhaps premature in a land still plagued by poverty, bouts of disease, and underdevelopment, but it indicated that the Høyers were committed to pursuing their ideals and “proud,” as Oluf put it, “at the thought of being part of the effort to break down the worst of all obstacles to the triumphal march of the Gospels across the world.”³⁴

But as the months progressed, the Høyers became uncertain about remaining permanently in Hebron. The presence of several established missions in the city, once perceived as a benefit, threatened to marginalize the Danish effort. By 1902, the American, British and German missions numbered about forty Westerners, including children, and Oluf estimated that each commanded greater resources than he to initiate new activities and expand existing ones.³⁵ The only viable option was to find a place where the couple could found a pioneer mission and avoid competing with other Christians. Gradually, Høyer also became convinced that missioning targeted only indirectly at Muslims, such as the effort to convert Jews and Eastern Christians, was misguided and ineffective. Instead, he was intrigued by the possibility of penetrating down to the edge of the Negev (*al-Naqab*) near Bar Sheba and working among the Bedouin. In early 1902, he visited the area, met with a local shaykh and concluded that the nomads were a people fundamentally different from the sedentary population, suggesting they would be more receptive to his message.³⁶ And later in the year, continuing his search, Høyer traveled to Damascus and found there “a completely Oriental society” that seemed receptive and open, but was in need of a mission to cleanse it of “spiritual ailments.”³⁷

Yet neither Syria nor the Palestinian desert offered the Høyers the exact conditions they coveted. Rather, Oluf expressed to the mission committee a desire to head south “down into Arabia, among whose people a mission had hardly ever been active.”³⁸ That desire soon


strengthened and blossomed into a heartfelt conviction after the Høyers read an article by the famed U.S. missionary, Samuel M. Zwemer (1867-1952), which called on Christians to assume the responsibility for spreading the Gospels to the Hadramawt.³⁹ Oluf understood the call as a sign from God and was overjoyed that his belief that Danes had a role to play in the conversion of Muslims had been confirmed. It even seemed to him that he and Maria would be following in the footsteps of the Apostles who also set out from Palestine to spread Christianity to new and unfamiliar areas.⁴⁰

Mukalla, the New Frontier

The dawn of a new year brought the promise of a new horizon and the prospect of achieving goals yet unrealized. As Oluf stood on the deck of the English steamer *Arabistan* and considered the Arabian coastline along the Red Sea, he felt confident that his destiny lay within the great expanse of the interior.⁴¹ He also appreciated the importance of his recent ordination, held in a ceremony at the German Lutheran Church of Jerusalem only weeks before his departure.⁴² That achievement had won him the status and recognition he needed to garner greater support in Denmark and, perhaps, to facilitate the securing of settlement rights in the new lands. And this latter concern was naturally pivotal, as a rejection by the British of the petition for a permanent presence in the Hadramawt would effectively dash Høyer's ambitions. In fact, the British controlled the foreign policy of, and foreign access to, the territory through a series of treaties concluded with the Qu'ayti Sultanate during the 1880s, and had since 1888 administered the area as a protectorate.⁴³ But as Høyer sailed toward the port of Aden to collect papers granting him permission to stay temporarily in the Hadramawt, he was sure that the British would not impede his efforts, and even speculated naïvely that since the English queen, Alexandra, was Danish, the authorities would acquiesce to Danish plans for a mission.⁴⁴ He simply felt beckoned by the Hadramawt and was convinced that Mukalla, the area's main port and link with the rest of the world, was an "open door" through which his entry was assured.⁴⁵

Once arrived in Aden, Høyer spent several weeks in the British-controlled town before securing passage to Mukalla aboard an Arab dhow. He chose to rely on traditional, native transport after becoming convinced that the local operator of the steamer to Mukalla was hostile to conveying a missionary into the area. It is unclear whether the British authorities had a hand in complicating Høyer's passage, however the difficulties resulted in the irony that a crew of devout Muslims brought to the Hadramawt a man intent on unseating the dominance of Islam. The week-long trip also served to reinforce Høyer's determination to mission as he observed the crew and passengers at their daily prayers and commented that he was eager to redirect their sincere faith and zeal toward Christianity.⁴⁶ Further, while underway, Høyer witnessed something that would forever color his efforts in Arabia. It seems a design on the ship's sail caught his attention, describing it as depicting a cross towering over a tumbled crescent moon. The boat's captain, who bought the sail in Egypt, of course dismissed the design as mere decoration, but Høyer attached to it a great deal of symbolic significance. He saw it as an unequivocal confirmation of his role as an instrument of God, and would later adopt an artistic rendition of the event as the new cover of the mission's journal. "The Lord is onboard," Høyer explained, "from the realm of light, He brings a message to the lands in darkness, brings light, peace and the essence of life despite the all the resistant waves."⁴⁷

Høyer's considerable optimism remained strong after sailing into Mukalla harbor in late March 1903. He found the modest town, which numbered only about 7,500 residents at the



Map 4. Southwestern Arabia, 1900. Reproduced from Paul Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 2.

turn of the century, full of promise and capable of meeting his expectations.⁴⁸ “Even though I have only been here for a day and a night...,” he wrote just hours later, “...it seems as if I am home in spirit here...”⁴⁹ And it is not surprising that Høyer felt so comfortable, because he was very well-received in the town. He was invited to stay in the sultan’s residence, a building he described as a fairytale palace, in places seven stories high, and interlaced by a labyrinth of halls and stairwells.⁵⁰ In those regal surroundings he took all his meals and engaged in spirited conversations about religion with the sultan’s relatives and retainers. The Qu’aytis, who had controlled Mukalla since 1881, also granted Høyer access to the sultan’s horses to ease his travels and provided him with a tour of the royal gardens, which he noted were full of plants native to India.⁵¹

But Høyer never met his gracious host, the Sultan Awad bin Umar al-Qu’ayti, who lived in distant India. In fact, the roots of Qu’ayti power could be traced to the lands of the Central Deccan where Arab mercenaries from the Hadramawt joined the army of the Nizam of Hyderabad, among others, beginning in the early 19th century.⁵² Those who became officers, known as *jemadars*, accumulated considerable wealth and influence through the revenues from estates they held as compensation for service. And over time, the power they wielded fueled ambitions of establishing sultanates in their native Hadramawt, where their Indian-based advantage in military organization and armaments would allow them to become dominant. The Qu’ayti Sultanate, founded in 1858, emerged as the leading manifestation of this Arabo-Indian fusion, and Mukalla, the eventual capital, developed into a pseudo-Indian port city where Hindustani was commonly spoken and Parsi merchants were prominent.⁵³ Høyer observed this South Asian influence firsthand through his dealings with several Catholic and Muslim Indians attached to the royal household, via his interaction with Indian soldiers and workmen living in the city, and by way of conversations with members of the sultan’s family, one of whom was a Hyderabad-born nephew capable of speaking only limited Arabic!⁵⁴

The diversity and cosmopolitan feel of Mukalla, as well as the general atmosphere in the city, fascinated the Dane. On a tour of the harbor, he was captivated by the singing, clapping of hands, and stomping of feet that accompanied the work done by Arabs on the docks and onboard the ships. Høyer found the rhythm and song “animated everyone present” and declared the entire scene was a sheer enjoyment to behold.⁵⁵ Rather less uplifting, but certainly capable of amusing those who read Høyer’s correspondence, was his description of the delivery of mail in Mukalla. As one would assume, the palace was always the first destination of any arriving mail to the city, but once the sultan’s letters had been sorted from the collected post, the remainder was simply dumped in a pile outside the main gate of the residence, where the populace could then rummage through the mound of papers to find that which was addressed to them.⁵⁶ Such an account, reflecting mild autocracy and a hint of disorder, would perhaps have unsettled Høyer’s audience slightly, but he had far more disturbing observations to reveal as well. Just as he had in Hebron, Høyer visited a city jail, yet in Mukalla he saw that young boys, aged between 8-12, were held as hostages to assure the loyalty of their fathers who were tribal leaders. He did report that they were well-treated and were only held for a short time, as every few months the tribes replaced the captives with other boys, but the practice of incarcerating children suggested to Danish readers that the Qu’aytis lacked legitimacy and certainly compassion.⁵⁷ Høyer even asserted that the Arabs had no words for “righteousness” or “justice,” an absence that served, in part, to explain the existence of, and ongoing adherence to, callous traditions.⁵⁸ Whatever else might be needed in the Hadramawt, it seemed clear to anyone exposed to such accounts, that the region was in desperate need of Western-based, Christian influence.

The local population seemed to Høyer both deficient in social and moral qualities, and rather devoid of proper guidance. In his mind, these shortcomings could be squarely attributed to Islam and its hold on society, an opinion he openly expressed to local notables. On a visit to Shihr, a neighboring coastal city also under Qu'ayti rule, Høyer told the governor, Sultan Isa, that Islam had done nothing to improve the lives of local people over the centuries. He asserted that it was strictly an exterior religion that failed to transform that which was essential, namely the hearts of its adherents. "It matters not," he stressed, "whether [the people] perform their daily prayers, nor that they pray more often, as long as the religion permits murder, theft and sensuality, and yes, even promotes these things...."⁵⁹ Islam, in essence, was an impediment to civilization because it failed to emphasize personal accountability and profound moral commitment. Høyer, in particular, deemed the *sayyid*-class, those families who demanded and received respect and recognition as descendants of local saints, as responsible for perpetuating this lack of spiritual authenticity through their nature and behavior, as well as for sustaining Islam and maintaining its dominance over the people.⁶⁰ They were, he suggested, although knowledgeable about Islam, otherwise quite ignorant, on par intellectually only with young Danish school children, and generally impoverished and dependent on public handouts.⁶¹ Such a class of people he found utterly unworthy of reverence and rather considered them guilty of promoting a religion that was fraudulent and characterized by ritual and ceremony, but woefully lacking in substance. And on the occasion of having observed a Friday procession accompanying a Mukalla *sayyid* to the main mosque, the Dane emphasized this very point by concluding that "the parade was a true expression of what Muhammadanism [sic] is as a religion."⁶² The carnival atmosphere and cacophony of noise produced by the train of humanity snaking through the streets, including dancing swordsmen, beating drums, fluttering banners, and the thunder and smoke from muskets being fired into the air, all illustrated a reliance on distraction and promotion of symbolism rather than simple piety. Høyer even went so far as to condemn this perceived flaw in a conversation with one of the Qu'ayti sultan's sons, telling the young man that his subjects were lax in performing their religious duties not because they were lazy but rather because "they are tired of your religion and do not feel at peace in it."⁶³

One would have expected the Qu'aytis to react angrily to Høyer's blunt comments and overt assault on Islam; instead, he was treated with tolerance and grace. In Shihr, the governor invited him to return to the town if his plans to settle in Mukalla unraveled, and in the capital the sultan's older son, Ralib, pledged to assist Høyer in finding a house, something which was relatively scarce in the congested city. It seems the Muslim elite was entirely confident in the strength of their faith and in no way saw the Danish pastor as a threat to their society. Quite to the contrary, they assumed they might derive some benefit from his presence, as evidenced by the sultan's *wazir* (prime minister) requesting that Høyer serve as a tutor for his 12-year-old son.⁶⁴ Høyer, however, interpreted such gestures of courtesy and friendship as constituting a preparedness on the part of the Muslim leaders, and the wider Hadramid society, to consider accepting Christianity. His already soaring optimism was strengthened and, as he readied to return to Hebron in late May 1903, the only obstacle remaining was winning British approval of his mission.

Over the subsequent four months, Høyer made preparations to pursue the Hadramawt option without any serious consideration that such plans could be undermined. He actively recruited Arab Christians from the Levant to join his mission and, when he again headed toward South Arabia, he was accompanied by a young Syrian named Masjid Abud.⁶⁵ The Dane speculated that such Arab help could be very beneficial, as it would show the locals that Arabs also were

Christians and could further serve as a model for the lifestyle they should pursue. However, Høyer's hope of leading a troop of Arab missionaries and being instrumental in altering the social fabric of the Hadramawt was soon dashed when the British authorities in Aden refused to grant him permission to settle permanently in Mukalla or anywhere else. They asserted that the presence of a missionary, essentially under Qu'ayti protection, might fuel opposition to the sultanate and thereby damage British interests. Instead, Høyer was allowed to return only briefly and collect his possessions, but once he reached Mukalla again he stayed in the port for over a month, in defiance of British wishes, and actively worked to persuade the sultanate to independently endorse his mission despite their treaty obligations to follow British policy.⁶⁶


Høyer's attempt to challenge the British Empire failed. When he reappeared in Mukalla, the sultanate had cooled to his presence and it declined to provide him with lodgings at the palace as it had done earlier or to assist him in finding a permanent residence. Instead, Høyer stayed in the home of Edward Saldanha, an Indian electrician in Qu'ayti service, who he had befriended on his prior visit.⁶⁷ And despite seeing his ambitions hopelessly blocked by powers beyond his control and influence, Høyer resolved to offer whatever resistance he could muster and continued to mission even as the month of Ramadan began while he was in the city. In the very house where he was living, he found ample opportunity to deliver his message, as Saldanha rented rooms to a group of Muslim soldiers from India, one of whom, named Fadl Ali, was an ethnic African and artillery gunner from Hyderabad. Høyer distributed New Testaments in Hindustani to the men, and within a short time, Fadl Ali declared that he would no longer fast and had decided to convert.⁶⁸ That stunning development was greeted cautiously by Høyer who insisted that the baptism be postponed to better gauge the African's sincerity. But after he again traveled to Aden to once more petition the British to endorse his mission, he never returned to Mukalla, and he later learned that only a few days after his departure, Fadl Ali was arrested, jailed, and forced to revert to Islam and marry the daughter of a *sayyid*.⁶⁹

Høyer's Hadramawt adventure had come to an end with the close of 1903. Disappointed and frustrated, he forced himself to accept a different future from what he had hoped, and looked to build a mission that could, at least in the short term, operate within the confines of British-controlled Yemen. He still harbored hopes of making his way to the interior and escaping the restrictions of imperial rule. And he would never forget what a setback British policy had inflicted on his mission.⁷⁰ But in the meantime, while waiting for the right opportunity to emerge, he resigned himself to limit his horizons to the suburbs of Aden.

Building a Future near a Crater

On the south coast of Arabia the British Empire built a great port city full of life and economic activity. Graced with a natural harbor formed by two rocky peninsular arms jutting into the sea and sheltering a large bay, this city was perhaps destined for development and prosperity under the guidance of an imperial power. And once the British seized the port in 1839, after years of strained negotiations with the Sultan of Lahj, the area grew from a modest hamlet of about 1,000 people into an international city of over 40,000 by the twentieth century.⁷¹ That city was, of course, Aden, the seat of British administration over the Western and Eastern Protectorates in South Arabia, and a leading outpost of British-ruled India.

Through immigration, investment, and strategic importance, Aden became a center of diversity, opportunity, and colonial power. Thousands of Indians settled in the city either as civil servants and soldiers or as private businessmen and employees of Parsi merchant houses. Much as



Map 5. Upper and Lower Yemen. Reproduced from G. Wyman Bury, *Arabia Infelix* (London: Garnet Publishing, 1998), insert, 20-21

in Mukalla, Høyer noted this Indian role in area commerce and also observed that the local, spoken Arabic was filled with English and Hindustani words.⁷² The connection to India was further evident in the system of regional administration installed by the British, who secured treaties with an array of petty states or *dawlahs* in the interior and secured their cooperation with British interests in exchange for arms and an annual stipend.⁷³ Such ties to the hinterland were important because Aden depended on those areas for supplies of food and water, and Arabs flocked to the port city as seasonal laborers in the coaling industry, on building projects, and in general commerce.⁷⁴ Shantytowns sprang up around Ma'alla and on the hills above Steamer Point, both areas west of Crater, as the old city was known, and by 1900, Aden was colored by “the squalid bloom of new economic forces.”⁷⁵ Høyer would have agreed with that assessment of the city, noting that unsanitary conditions were prevalent in Aden despite British efforts to educate the people about cleanliness, poverty was widespread due to an abundance of labor that depressed wages, and disease plagued the population, in large part fuelled by the aforementioned factors.⁷⁶ In graphic terms, he described the suffering souls as “emaciated, tattered, and having at times their bodies and limbs covered with large sores.”⁷⁷

But British-driven development also brought about social improvements such as publicly-funded schooling and health services that helped to better the lives of local residents, especially those who settled in the city permanently. In fact, so many people were attracted to Aden that during the 1870s the British grew increasingly concerned about the security threat posed by large numbers of Arabs living within the walls of the peninsula. To remedy this population imbalance, the British bought the inland area of Shaykh Uthman from the Sultan of Lahj in the early 1880s to serve as an alternative settlement point for “native” workers.⁷⁸ And it was precisely in this new district, effectively a working-class suburb of the port city, that Høyer established himself upon his return from Mukalla.

Forging a Partnership

When Høyer first arrived in Aden, en route to the Hadramawt, he was invited to take-up temporary lodgings with a Scottish mission that had been active in the area for almost two decades. Founded in 1885 by Ion Keith-Falconer, a wealthy nobleman and Orientalist scholar, the mission was one of the first on the Arabian Peninsula.⁷⁹ Yet the pioneering effort almost failed to survive infancy as it sustained a debilitating blow when its visionary leader died of malaria after just a single year. It seemed the mission was destined for oblivion until the United Free Church of Scotland agreed to administer the Arabian effort, which the nobleman’s family continued to fund. Over the following years, the mission invested quite heavily in the city, building the Ion Keith-Falconer Memorial Presbyterian Church at Steamer Point and establishing a significant presence in Shaykh Uthman. A large compound housing a hospital, pharmacy, storage facilities, meeting hall, and other buildings was constructed in the suburb, and, since 1892, when a doctor named John Cameron Young assumed the mantle of leadership, the mission’s main focus had been to provide medical services.⁸⁰

The Danish pastor befriended the Scottish doctor, and during the early months of 1904 they jointly hammered out a three-year agreement to combine their missionary efforts through a mutually accepted division of labor.⁸¹ Unlike in Hebron, where Høyer thought his work would be hindered by competition from other missions, the partnership with the Ion Keith-Falconer Mission in Aden constituted a sound foundation upon which to build and provided support that was vital for the fledgling mission. The Scots ceded responsibility for educational matters to the

Danes, made available a villa rent-free for Høyer and his family, and granted him access to facilities within the mission compound so he could establish a vocational training school. In return, Høyer had only to accept that the medical and proselytizing missions would remain under the sole responsibility of the Scots. This arrangement was fully acceptable to Høyer, because his deepest desire was still to move beyond Aden, and he was principally concerned with forging a base from which his mission could flourish. He enthusiastically trumpeted the agreement with the Scots as limiting the prospective financial strains on the Danish mission and even touted the future role in education as a means to train Arab evangelists who would become vital in any effort to penetrate Arabia.⁸²

Høyer vigorously seized the opportunity to develop the mission's role in education. In rather frank terms, he pointed out to the Committee and his supporters in Denmark that the Scots had made only limited and unorganized attempts at establishing a school, noting that their enrollment of students had declined from about twenty in 1903 to no more than six a year later.⁸³ He vowed to correct that situation and make education a priority despite his own inexperience with teaching and the considerable challenges posed by native students. They, in his mind, were easily distracted and lacked discipline, but "...one came to love them, even though it [was] dirty, un-schooled, half-naked and half-wild Arab children..." that constituted the student body.⁸⁴ The vocational school, which would be run by Høyer's Arab assistant, Masjid – a carpenter by training – was also a source for optimism. It was anticipated that such instruction would help to improve standards of craftsmanship in the area and be another service, alongside medical care and formal schooling, that could provide the missions with access to Muslim homes and individuals. Høyer was further convinced, even though the Danish mission was the junior partner, that it harbored the qualities and motivation, largely personified by Høyer himself, to forge a presence where a British mission could not. Tensions between the Ottoman and British empires had already derailed an attempt by the Keith-Falconer Mission to establish itself in the Red Sea port of Hudaydah, and Høyer believed that the Scots had since become too focused on their medical duties and serving the Christian community in Aden at the expense of ignoring all areas beyond the confines of the city, even those within the protectorates.⁸⁵

Lahj and a New Hope

The spirit of initiative that Høyer generated in Aden was soon rewarded with an invitation to provide professional services for a local ruler in the interior. The Sultan of Lahj, Ahmad Fadl, was one of Britain's most important allies in the Western Protectorate, and when he approached the Danish mission, newly renamed *Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien* (DKA or Danish Church Mission in Arabia), to perform carpentry work on his palace, Høyer leapt at the opportunity.⁸⁶ He immediately sent Masjid to live in Lahj, about 25 km north of Aden, and touted the hiring as a symbolic "open door" to the area, since one of their main tasks would be to produce wooden doors!⁸⁷ And in his Arab assistant, who was the son of an evangelist in the Galilee and a ten-year resident of the German-run Syrian orphanage in Jerusalem, Høyer saw a level-headed person who could contribute a great deal to the mission.⁸⁸ Reason for optimism was heightened further by the warm reception that the young carpenter received in the town, as he was housed in the sultan's palace, slept in a hall alongside the sultan's sons, took his evening meals with the ruler's family, and was provided with a horse from the royal stables.⁸⁹ Much as Høyer experienced in Mukalla, Masjid was treated as a member of the household and shown the respect and tolerance due a guest even as he actively engaged in sometimes heated debates about religion

with his hosts. Yet again, the Danish mission had encountered an environment that shattered the popular misconception that all Muslims fanatically opposed dialogue and the exchange of ideas. In fact, Høyer came to see Ahmad Fadl as “quick minded” and “sensible,” and praised the English-speaking sultan as progressive and a model of new Arab leadership that was open to Westernization and an orderly society.⁹⁰ The Dane expressed optimism about this perceived change and was eager to partake in the growing enthusiasm and confidence that surrounded the deepening ties between the British and the sultanate. By 1904, plans were afoot to connect the town with Aden by rail, and the sultan had begun work in Lahj on the construction of a rest area for Europeans.⁹¹ With such developments underway it seemed self-evident that the time was right to be the first to establish a missionary presence in the town.

In Lahj, Høyer saw the possibility of realizing his ever-pressing, but romanticized ambition to forge an independent mission in a new area. En route to the town, which numbered no more than 10,000 inhabitants, the pastor was struck by the improved climactic conditions, a clearly practical benefit, that prevailed just inland from Aden. The temperature was cooler, the air fresher, and the countryside dotted with fields and greenery. Passing through a forest of hawthorn shrubs and trees as evening approached, Høyer was captivated by the sight of encamped, dark-skinned Arabs huddled around campfires and preparing for the night. In terms that were inextricably Orientalist, he remarked that the Western, imagined perceptions of the East, the “known exoticisms,” were confirmed through what he witnessed and experienced.⁹² The state of affairs was as it was related in popular literature and tales, and he noted how much of his childhood and adolescent reading was now “shifted from the realm of fantasy to that of reality.”⁹³ Yet in almost the same breath, only moments after having reaffirmed the understanding that the East was utterly alien, Høyer told his readers that as he awoke the following day he felt the prevailing atmosphere was akin to a Danish summer morning.⁹⁴ An element of comfortable familiarity had been inserted into the foreign setting, helping to partly defuse the exotic tinge of the place described. That effect was furthered once Lahj was reached, because Oluf was soon joined by Maria in the city, and she was enabled to penetrate one of the most enduring mysteries that have clouded the Western perception of the East, namely the harem.

The inner sanctum of the Eastern, Muslim household constituted an integral part of the imagined, Orientalist explanation of society in the region. Precisely because the harem was an intimately private institution which only a tiny minority of Westerners ever experienced, it lent itself to rumor, myth, and fantasy. Men, in particular, who traveled in the Middle East, ventured to describe what was hidden from view with purported authority and thereby further entrenched the misconceptions that dominated popular literature and opinion. Images of women, exploited and virtually imprisoned, guarded by slaves, and seeking liberation with the aid of Western men, became commonplace and served to symbolize the very dynamic that existed between the Orient and the West.⁹⁵ Hence, when Western women, such as Maria Høyer, gained access to local homes, an opportunity emerged to alter the prevailing distortion and present an alternative, though not necessarily more appealing, perspective. In fact, the pastor’s wife, having been invited to live in the sultan’s palace and having interacted with the female family members, did describe the private realm as a leisurely setting that included as many as one hundred African slaves and displayed the ruler’s considerable trove of treasures.⁹⁶ And in very Orientalist terms, she noted that the entire scene “looked like a fairy tale.”⁹⁷ But she also tempered the romance conveyed by asserting that the harem lacked the qualities of a true home. She argued that the native institution was a poor foundation for societal development, because local men preferred their harems stocked with submissive and uneducated women rather than focusing on forging

true families.⁹⁸ More profoundly, Maria held that the Arabic language lacked words to express the concept of home, so Muslim Arabs were essentially homeless both as a matter of fact and spiritually.⁹⁹

The deep conviction that local society was fundamentally flawed echoed the sentiments already expressed by the Høyers in Hebron. Even the warm and open reception they received from the sultan's family and, the indication that the locals were decent people, failed to alter their view that social transformation was imperative. In no uncertain terms, Maria expressed her dissatisfaction with the condition of the population and declared that:

If one speaks with such a person [a native Muslim], one will soon sense that their inner state and mentality is like the sand, dry, barren, and ever shifting with the wind. They live and breathe in the midst of dust and dirt as if that were their proper element.¹⁰⁰

But she was also certain that their "dried-out hearts" were capable of new growth, just as the desert bloomed under proper care and the right influence, and as Oluf put it:

The Sultan's harem is open for Maria, and it is such places that we must penetrate. We could almost always engage the men in conversation whenever we met them, but it is equally important, if not more so, to enter the homes and reach the women and get the children under our influence....¹⁰¹

It seemed he fervently believed that the work of his wife and other women would become a critical part of the Danish mission, both because it was a promising initiative and due to the absence of women serving with their Scottish partner. The use of female missionaries could help to carve out a niche for the Danes and perhaps raise their profile in the international Christianization campaign.

The Høyers were similarly confident that the recruitment of Christian Arabs to the mission's ranks would significantly aid their work. There was certainly nothing new about using natives, be they born Christians or recent converts, but, as Oluf had experienced in the Hadramawt, many Arabs did not believe that such Christians existed, and it was hoped that contact between them and the local Muslim population would serve to build bridges of understanding.¹⁰² The hiring of Masjid, and his stationing to Lahj, was meant to begin to redress this need, and ever since Oluf first arrived in South Arabia, he had actively sought to bring more Syrian and Palestinian Arab Christians to the area. This effort generated considerable response, as the Høyer message seemed to resonate in the Levant: between 1903-06, the couple secured commitments from several people, including a Lebanese doctor who had experience in the missionary field; a Palestinian shopkeeper whom Oluf found was an upstanding person of good character; and a husband and wife from Hebron.¹⁰³ However, none of these individuals ever actually joined the Høyers in Yemen, despite Oluf's pressing need for assistance and his explanation that the school demanded so much of his time that he had little energy to focus on expanding activities beyond Shaykh Uthman.¹⁰⁴ Instead, Masjid's presence in Lahj became an ever more important part of the mission, and it was a real blow to Høyer's ambitions when a rift developed between Masjid and one of the doctors belonging to the Scottish mission. It seemed a serious disagreement occurred while Oluf was away in Lebanon and by the time he returned, Masjid had opted to end his association with the Danes.¹⁰⁵ Høyer was distressed over this development, because not only was he losing a valuable colleague but he feared that the incident would undermine him and the entire mission partnership in the eyes of the Lahj leadership. As he wrote to the committee:

An Arab considers only the outcome of an event, he does not investigate how it came about. If one has in-

sulted him or his friend, then one becomes his enemy even if the insult was, in part, brought on by himself. In his eyes, that does not diminish the offense. Yes, it's quite so!¹⁰⁶

Høyer suggested that the Scotsman's feud with Masjid, a friend of the Sultan of Lahj, had risked raising the ire of the local ruler, but events unfolded differently as he defied the Dane's characterization of Arabs by not allowing the dispute to also poison their friendship. When Høyer again visited Lahj he was received as before and still allowed to discuss Christianity openly with the sultan's family. On that occasion, Høyer also saw Masjid for the final time, as the young Arab prepared to leave for Ethiopia, and the pastor was forced to accept as permanent and irreversible the loss of his valued assistant.

Disappointment was soon followed by another reversal, as Høyer's efforts to establish a presence in the highland town of Dhala were undermined by British policies. Located about 100 km north of Aden, near the recently negotiated Anglo-Ottoman border, Dhala was coveted by Høyer as a stepping stone to penetrating Turkish-controlled areas and eventually reaching Sana'a.¹⁰⁷ Ever since the setback in Mukalla, the Dane had been wary of continuing to mission under British rule and was convinced that diminishing his affiliation with the empire would improve his access and even his personal security. "If we only befriend the various sultans," he argued, "then we'll be safer than if we were guarded by an English regiment."¹⁰⁸ Høyer was, in essence, hoping to negotiate terms specific to the Danish mission, much as he had attempted with the rulers of Mukalla and Lahj, that emphasized its independence of the British. Rather than follow the will of the empire, the mission should "take advantage of the fact that 'we are Danes' and try to obtain for the mission and the missionaries more freedoms and better conditions."¹⁰⁹ In fact, Høyer was so adamant and confident in his own assessments that when he set out for Dhala in early 1906, he deliberately neglected to get British approval for the journey in order to avoid being assigned an armed escort.¹¹⁰

Yet apparently the British were not to be avoided under all circumstances, because Høyer and his party, including a guide, a servant and a vocational student, stopped at a different British Army camp each evening of their four-day trek to Dhala. It seemed the pastor was eager to mission to the Muslim troops stationed at these encampments where he felt his efforts were both fruitful and well-received.¹¹¹ However, if Høyer's intent was to distance himself and the mission from Britain, then socializing with its occupation troops and selecting Dhala as a future settlement site were rather odd choices. Though blessed with a far better climate than Aden and proximate to Ottoman-occupied Yemen, Dhala had for a few years been a significant garrison town and a target for British economic development plans. Efforts had been afoot to connect the town by rail with the coast and to build an army sanatorium in the area, projecting it to become a forward outpost of the ambitious British intent to extend the prosperity and progress of Aden to the interior.¹¹² By contemplating a mission presence in Dhala, in the midst of a fervent British effort to expand their influence, Høyer was not going to escape Aden but rather establish himself in a smaller version of the same.

But in 1906, the same year that Høyer first visited Dhala, a change of government in Britain led to a curtailment of these development plans and to a gradual but complete withdrawal from the town over the following year.¹¹³ That decision should seem to have suited the Dane splendidly, because he believed that "the more the Englishmen's influence spreads further and further afield, the more land is denied to the mission."¹¹⁴ Yet, paradoxically, Høyer would later point out that he was more opposed to the manner than the fact of British rule. He argued that the pull-out from the Dhala region would leave the area "as it had been for millennia, untouched by civilization and progress," and even reported that the local people were disappointed by the shift in

policy because they had become accustomed to the economic benefits derived from the British presence.¹¹⁵ In short, Høyer prized the advantages British power could provide in the areas of development and political stability, but resented the imperial penchant to control, manipulate, and restrict. He patently condemned the British decision to include a restriction in their policy of disengagement from the interior, similar to the one governing foreign access to the Hadramawt, that prohibited people like himself from settling beyond the Aden colony.¹¹⁶ Yet the British were clearly not going to allow what they saw as a potentially disruptive and destabilizing influence, cause unrest in an area that they had specifically abandoned to reduce the possibility of tensions. Høyer, of course, disputed such assertions and was bitterly disappointed by the unfolding developments, because during his brief stay in Dhala he found both the physical and social climate favorable for a permanent mission. He related that he encountered “not a trace of fanaticism” in the town and that he was never harmed while moving about the streets despite the fact that everyone knew he was a missionary.¹¹⁷ That experience tended to confirm his assertion of a unique status attributable to being a citizen of a small, unassuming country, and he contrasted his freedom of movement with that of the 1,000-strong British garrison in Dhala, where the Indian Muslim troops were restricted to the fort and the officers never ventured outside unescorted.¹¹⁸ However, in fairness, one must concede that foreign soldiers, enforcing a foreign occupation, would agitate the local population more, and have a greater need for protection, than a sole Scandinavian missionary whose message would probably never resonate with the people. Yet, Høyer chose to see it otherwise and derived positives from his experiences that reinforced his conviction that a Danish mission was destined for success.

Conferring in Cairo

Only weeks after visiting Dhala, and before learning that the Danes would be cut off from the town, Høyer left for Egypt to attend the First Missionary Conference on Behalf of the Mohammedan [sic] World. Convened to assess the state of missionary activities in Muslim areas, the conference assembled over sixty representatives from twenty-nine missions, among which Høyer assumed the Danish one was probably the smallest.¹¹⁹ Yet he was excited to report that their tiny mission was not ignored and that delegates approached him to stress that accomplishments were expected of them, one even urging the Danes to push on to the Red Sea port of Hudaydah.¹²⁰ Those signs of moral support elevated Høyer’s spirits and strengthened his conviction that the mission’s future lay beyond the Aden colony. In a letter written only days after the conference ended, he petitioned the mission committee to allow him to explore the possibility of establishing a mission station at Hudaydah, and argued that the landmass lying between Makalla, Sana’a, and the Red Sea port constituted the Danish mission’s triangle of operations.¹²¹ Such ambition, stoked in part by the atmosphere at the conference, was also attributable to improved funding from Denmark. Between 1904 and 1908 the mission budget jumped some 30 percent, from about 6,700 crowns to almost 9,000, and the day beckoned when financial shortages would no longer be a constant concern.¹²² In fact, by 1908, Høyer felt so confident about the future that he developed an extensive plan of action that envisioned a network of mission stations, each staffed by a Danish missionary couple and Arab assistants, and each assigned an annual operating budget of 5-6,000 crowns. And as a prized objective, he stressed the importance of reaching Sana’a and establishing there “a mountain station.”¹²³ Of course, little of this was ever realized, but in the spring of 1906, in the Cairo conference hall, seeds of optimism were planted to grow confidence and vision.

One voice that helped to inspire such self-assurance and creativity belonged to Høyer's mission partner, the Scotsman Dr. John Young. As one of the few delegates to deliver a paper at the conference, the good doctor spoke on the broad topic of "Islam in Arabia" and argued that missionary progress was being made across the peninsula.¹²⁴ He also briefly mentioned the Keith-Falconer Mission's affiliation with the Danes, though if Høyer had been the sensitive type, he might have taken offense to Young erroneously terming their mission the National Church of Denmark!¹²⁵ After all, the Danish missionaries were members of the state's *Folkekirke* (People's Church), but their mission was an entirely private organization that received no government assistance. However, mistakes aside, the Scotsman's appreciation of the Danish mission was apparent from his emphasis on the importance of education, especially for girls, and the fact that through the Dano-Scottish partnership it was the Scandinavians who had been delegated the responsibility to address that need and teach the local children.¹²⁶

A Mission to Educate

The Danish mission in Yemen achieved its most lasting effect in the sphere of education. From its inception in 1904, with a modest enrollment of only 5-6 children, the Danish school struggled to build a reliable and expanding student body, but gradually the institution overcame such difficulties and managed to remain in Aden as a provider of education until well after the Second World War.¹²⁷ One factor in the sustainability of this Danish effort was the sound groundwork laid by Oluf Høyer in the first decade of the mission's existence. He became a firm believer in having the school follow the standard Anglo-Indian curriculum, and years later, during Høyer's last visit to Aden in 1928, he commented on those early days by writing that he quickly recognized the pressing need that existed in the city for English-language education offered to Arabs in order to train them for employment with the local government.¹²⁸ Høyer saw it as an opportunity to carve out a niche in the rather balkanized education environment in Aden, where the religious communities ran their own schools alongside the government schools. By choosing to teach the officially sanctioned course material, it was hoped the school could help to elevate the Arab community and thereby forge a special connection with that segment of the population.¹²⁹ And despite the fact that Høyer was a novice in the teaching vocation, he soon concluded that "providing education is one of the most important tasks for this mission," because establishing contact and trust with the people was vital if further dialogue and access was desired.¹³⁰ In fact, the Dane hoped his fledgling institution could eventually become a high school or college with a prestige sufficient to attract students from across the region and a capacity to supply native missionaries.¹³¹

But many challenges had to be overcome before such visions of accomplishment and influence could be realized. At the outset, the Danes had to first learn to endure Aden's climate and the physical conditions prevalent in the port city, and Høyer stressed to the mission committee that any assistants they might consider hiring in Denmark, needed to be resolute in their convictions, because they would have to toil in a difficult and unfamiliar environment.¹³² The pastor could attest to that by way of personal experience, as between 1904 and 1905 he witnessed the ravages, of what he termed "bubonic plague," rage through the area from Aden to Lahj. According to his estimation, as many as 1,400 people, sometimes dying at a rate of more than twenty a day, passed away in Shaykh Uthman alone during the first three months of 1905.¹³³ That meant about 20 percent of the Aden suburb's residents died during the epidemic and the Høyers were fortunate to not also fall victim to the menacing illness, though Oluf suf-

fered from several other ailments during those initial first years. A typhus-like illness, bouts of fever, and a repeated recurrence of malaria tested Høyer's resolve and prompted the committee to contemplate whether to abandon the mission entirely.¹³⁴ Yet he recovered each time and remained determined to stay, even though it was agreed that he and Maria, who arrived in late 1904, should leave Aden every year during the warmest months. And despite feeling genuinely guilty about not sharing the annual seasonal burdens with the other residents, Oluf knew that he and his wife needed time to recover and restore their strength in a better climate, be it in Lebanon or the Eritrean highlands. He simply found that the summer in Shaykh Uthman was insufferable with its searing heat, daily sand storms, and sleepless nights. In no uncertain terms, he declared that "it is hardly possible to imagine a more unpleasant place to spend the summer."¹³⁵

The hardships of life in the Aden colony aside, the Høyers were committed to making momentous contributions in the field of education. The couple wanted to play a pioneering role by establishing a school for girls and by missioning directly to local women. Ever since their days in Hebron, the Høyers had clamored for social reform in Muslim-dominated societies, and they saw education and conversion as essential elements in fostering such change. Through their contact and interaction with the female population it was hoped that Christianity and Western ideals would penetrate the native homes and gradually bring entire families to join the first congregation.¹³⁶ Maria even confronted Muslim women with whom she met weekly and called on them to accept Jesus and to pray for their husbands.¹³⁷ She wanted these women to take an active role in liberating themselves from the oppression and discrimination of Islam that she and her husband saw as endemic to the religion. They asserted that gender injustice went to the very core of the faith, with Maria tracing the mistreatment to the Prophet Muhammad himself and Oluf attributing much of the blame to the weak institution of Muslim marriage which allowed polygamy and easy divorce.¹³⁸ Oluf even touted the Christian wedding ceremony and resultant union as a powerful symbol and an instructive model for Muslims, serving to illustrate how a genuine marriage should function. Better than any sermon, he believed that performing such weddings in Yemen would help to foster sound families and curtail the spread of polygamy as had been achieved by other missions active in Egypt and the Levant.¹³⁹

But the addition of female missionaries would be critical if the Høyers were to achieve these ambitious aims. The couple firmly believed that women could perform more tasks than men in the Aden Colony environment, and over the next few years they were happy to see the arrival of three Danish women, including the couple's teenage daughter, Ellen, to bolster the mission. Their presence helped to expand the capacity to reach more local women and girls, and especially Ellen's contribution was significant because she spoke Arabic, perhaps better than her parents, and had studied English while attending a boarding school in Scotland.¹⁴⁰ The positive effects of these developments were not lost on the Høyers, and by mid-1907 Oluf could report that the mission was offering regular night classes and holding weekly meetings, one of which had included eighteen local women.¹⁴¹

The mission's efforts and contributions were also apparent in the more traditional sphere of providing education for boys and young men. Modern schooling promised to elevate the population, and despite initial, determined opposition from leading Muslims who objected to the teaching of Biblical passages by the mission, Oluf balanced such controversial material with contemporary, secular-based education that generated less friction.¹⁴² Using new books from presses in Madras and Beirut, and teaching classes in both English and Arabic, the mission school offered its students a sound foundation upon which to build and to succeed within the co-

lonial and modernizing society.¹⁴³ Religious teaching was confined to only half an hour out of the five-hour school day, and though the spread of Christianity was the very purpose of the mission, a subtle, indirect approach was warranted if students were even to be enrolled and retained for any length of time. The cultivation of a school atmosphere that was Christian in spirit rather than fact would instead become the immediate and achievable aim, linking such a created and wholesome environment with the mission's other goal of fostering a social reform of local society. Høyer was adamant that violence, something which he considered endemic to Arab life, should be banned as a means of instilling discipline at the school, contrasting the educational setting with the world that existed beyond its walls.¹⁴⁴ In his mind, Muslim Arabs were an ill-tempered people whose behavior and limited morality made them poor examples for the next generation. "[I]f there is one thing that is wanting among Muslims, and certainly always among those of Arabia," he observed, "then it's mutual affection."¹⁴⁵ The school forum would serve to counter-balance the negative influence that parents and other adults had on the children, and emphasize that love, that very Christian quality, rather than violence and feuding, was inherent and natural in society.

The effort to reshape and convert the mission's students was moderately successful even as the number of boys attending classes declined. In 1906, Høyer felt compelled to dismiss several boys from the school because he sensed they lacked discipline and academic commitment. Instead, he focused his hopes and attentions on a small group he affectionately referred to as "his boys," which included several Arabs and an Ethiopian youth named Josef Manageru.¹⁴⁶ The Dane speculated optimistically and rather prematurely that these boys could become invaluable helpers to the mission and be a force for Christianity in Yemen. Manageru, in particular, was viewed in this light, because not only was he already a Christian, having been raised in an English orphanage in Khartoum, but Høyer was also impressed with the youth's drive to educate and improve himself. "I have not before met anyone out here," the pastor wrote, "who thirsts as much for learning as he," and by 1907, Manageru had been hired as an assistant to teach the youngest boys.¹⁴⁷ That decision reflected a great deal of confidence in the Ethiopian, but also revealed the difficulty the mission faced in finding Christians to staff the school. The local conditions were generally taxing on new arrivals to the area, and Høyer gradually resolved himself to finding the needed teachers from among the regional population, even if that meant employing Muslims. In a statement that conveyed both a calculated realism about the challenges facing the mission and also an acceptance that certain virtues transcended religious affiliation, the Dane mused that he "would rather hire a Muslim, provided he is a decent person, than someone who is a Christian in name only."¹⁴⁸ It seemed that Høyer was perhaps inching toward the realization that the coveted social reform he desired for Muslim and Eastern society could be achieved in tandem with certain locals rather than necessarily in a struggle with the entire population.

Yet, regardless of the immediate developments, conversion (i.e. re-education) and the spread of Christianity still remained the focal point of the mission. And when Høyer finally did hire a Muslim teacher, it was a person who was already poised to abandon Islam. The man in question was Salih Hassan bin Turki, a native of Lahj, whom Høyer judged to have considerable promise. "In him we have a man who can meet his brothers in open struggle," argued the pastor, "and is better suited to do so than we are."¹⁴⁹ He firmly believed that a local Arab, properly prepared and guided, could accomplish more as a missionary than a Westerner, and he harbored great hopes that his first convert would be as dedicated and committed as Shaykh Salim Hrammeri, a prized convert and co-worker of Dr. Young. "[He is] the pearl of all [the native helpers]," raved the Dane about the shaykh, because not only was he a former *alim* who had turned his back on

Islam, but he was also a gifted evangelist who could, from a position of formerly recognized authority, point out the shortcomings of the religion to his Muslim audience.¹⁵⁰ Høyer even declared that his appreciation for the shaykh was ever growing, as they interacted daily and were collaborating on a short biblical history intended for local use. In such a man, and men like him, Høyer was sure the future of Arab Christianity was in capable hands, and with the developments of 1907, that assumption seemed warranted.

That same year the Dano-Scottish mission won six people to the faith. In a ceremony held before the English-speaking congregation at the Keith-Falconer Memorial Church at Steamer Point, and performed by Dr. Young, three adults and three children were baptized.¹⁵¹ Høyer expressed misgivings about whether the converts were fully ready to take that step, but he also endorsed the sentiment that baptisms should be exercised sooner rather than later as they served to overtly separate former Muslims from the *umma*. More importantly, the small group constituted the first, rough stones of the future Arab Church in Aden. But the modest success represented by these conversions was achieved at a high price. A student boycott of the mission school followed and the Sultan of Lahj, whom Høyer had correctly described as a progressive, was alienated by what he saw as an outright assault on Islam.¹⁵² In the sultan's view, since Aden had once belonged to the sultanate, he remained the protector of Muslims within the city, and pressure was applied as well as money spent to entice the converts to revert to the fold. Within half a year, four had returned to Islam, leaving only Salih Hassan and his adopted son as the meager remnants of a damaging policy. The controversy had threatened to undermine the efforts to attract students to the mission school and also earned Høyer the condemning label of *al-murawwi* or the seducer, a commonplace reference to those who sought to spiritually mislead Muslims.¹⁵³

Høyer's public image was presented in a far better light when he received an invitation to join a commission on education reform in the Aden colony. The Bombay-based, British inspector of education met personally with the Dane and requested that he submit a report on recommended reforms, and appointed him as one of only five people named to the panel, which was chaired by a British major and included a Muslim, a Parsi, and Dr. Young.¹⁵⁴ Høyer's inclusion in the commission served as a recognition of his efforts, though limited, in promoting local education, and reflected his overall endorsement of the proposed reforms envisioned by the British. Those prospective changes entailed modernizing the curriculum, tightening standards and assuring student proficiency in their native languages by not allowing that English be taught in Arab and Indian schools until after the fourth grade.¹⁵⁵ In exchange for adopting these reforms, schools would be eligible for British funding, an incentive few could afford to ignore. Even Høyer, who was leery of too close an affiliation with the colonial authorities, embraced this infusion of much needed financial assistance and the gradual professionalization of education, but he strongly opposed the insistence that schools be classified as either native or English and the requirement that Quranic studies be taught to all Muslim students. In his view, students could learn Arabic and English simultaneously, because most had already attended Quranic schools before enrolling in government-funded institutions, and he considered the mandatory instruction in Islam as evidence that the British authorities were far from neutral on the issue of religion in the colony.¹⁵⁶ Once again, the Dane's misgivings about the empire's policies were confirmed and he refused, as the only dissenting member of the commission, to endorse the reforms dealing with the teaching of the Quran. He would later claim that even the commission chairman agreed, in private, with his position, but that such a view could not be expressed officially.

Yet Høyer's misgivings about instruction in the holy Quran failed to harmonize with opinions he held both before and subsequent to the commission vote. He noted that Muslims, though

putting a great deal of faith in the Quran, knew very little about its content, and that remedying this vacuum was a priority, because the scriptures constituted an arsenal of arguments against Islam itself.¹⁵⁷ Rather than burying its laws and declarations, the book should be actively sold and distributed by the mission, because Høyer was convinced that the more people who read the Quran the more would reject it.¹⁵⁸ The mission should, in other words, educate the public! However, the British policy that the educating should be done by teachers selected by the Muslim leadership clashed with the Dane's hopes and aspirations. But he still recognized that Aden provided a British-guaranteed safe haven for missionaries, their activities, and their converts. And his assessment of the empire was further conflicted when his only daughter married a British officer, Major H. F. Jacob, who had been the Political Agent stationed at Dhala between 1904-07, precisely during the time when the DKA was blocked from settling in the town.¹⁵⁹ It seemed an agent of the very policy that Høyer abhorred, a colonial policy that neglected to support the spread of Christianity, was becoming a part of his family. No longer was Høyer only reliant on British funds and resident in an imperial sanctuary, he was now also emotionally-attached, in a sense, to those who promoted their policy.

In 1909, education matters were further complicated when several teachers left the mission school and student enrollment plummeted. The promising student-teacher, Josef Manageru, opted to return home to Ethiopia, and Dr. Young, who had been asked to take charge of the school while the Høyers were absent from Aden on their annual vacation, clashed with Salih Hassan, the recent convert.¹⁶⁰ The dispute stemmed from the Scotsman's view that the Arab teacher was lacking in commitment, and over his practice of excusing Muslim students from classes on Islamic holidays. Salih Hassan, in turn, was incensed by the criticism and threatened to revert to Islam if Dr. Young did not cease harassing him. Once Høyer returned to Aden in November, he took decisive steps to settle the conflict by firing the Arab, because the school was in a shambles. Most of the promising students had been lost to the Catholic competitor, leaving only three boys enrolled, and the DKA school had effectively been closed down. But Salih Hassan was not alone to blame for the misfortune. Dr. Young admitted that he had lost his temper and hit some of the students, and Høyer expressed concerns that the Scotsman had perhaps accentuated the crisis by his poor treatment of the native co-workers.¹⁶¹ In fact, the Keith-Falconer Mission had only just lost one of their own Arab assistants, a man from Mesopotamia who had experience working with U.S. missionaries along the Persian Gulf, because of a falling out with Dr. Young.¹⁶² It seemed that Høyer's extended absence from his local duties had dealt the mission a serious setback.

Høyer was also sympathetic to the plight of Salih Hassan. Though he felt compelled to fire the Arab teacher, he also acknowledged that the mission had failed him. "He never received the Christian instruction that was his due," Høyer declared, "and we never were for him what we should have been. May God give us the strength to better protect the lambs He entrusts to us in the future."¹⁶³ This amounted to a heartfelt recognition that the DKA's very purpose, that of creating a stable Christian environment where converts could feel confident and secure, had been rather undermined. The mission perhaps needed to rediscover its sense of focus and commitment by establishing itself in a new environment.

Escape from the Suburbs

By the late months of 1909, Høyer was seriously considering moving the mission permanently from Shaykh Uthman to the center of Aden's old city, Crater. He had received an offer from the

Keith-Falconer Mission to assume the administrative duties of the British and Foreign Bible Society's book depot, which the Scots had been running for years in the heart of the city. The position included a yearly stipend of £45 and promised to grant Høyer a direct missionary role in a district which he saw as woefully neglected.¹⁶⁴ He had also been approached on several occasions by Jews in Crater, requesting that the DKA open a school for their children. The Jewish community, which Høyer estimated numbered about 3,000, lacked its own school and was unhappy sending its children to the government institution that was staffed by Muslim teachers.¹⁶⁵ Instead, they now turned to a Scandinavian pastor for relief, and their proposal, if accepted, would resurrect the Dane's original focus on Jews during his days in Hebron. And even though Høyer had left the Levant specifically to work among Muslims, he relished the educational opportunity offered by the Jews, because after years in the Shaykh Uthman suburb he had tired of the irregular student body produced by the seasonal and lower class population of the area.¹⁶⁶

The initial, heady period of the relocation suggested that the decision to move had been momentous. Student enrollment jumped to more than thirty by June 1910, and Høyer managed to rent a three-story building that could accommodate all the mission's needs (e.g. school, living quarters, carpentry shop, book depot) in one location.¹⁶⁷ The DKA also secured pledges from the British authorities that they would contribute hundreds of rupees to support the Danish educational efforts. And the mission's overall finances were quite sound by the middle of 1910, having covered expenses of over fourteen thousand rupees during the prior twelve-month period and commanding assets and inventory estimated at about three thousand rupees.¹⁶⁸ These developments seemed to indicate that a brighter future awaited the DKA and that the nature of difficulties and obstacles that had plagued the mission in the past would be overcome.

But optimism soon faded as challenges emerged from both anticipated and unexpected parties. In particular, the Muslim teachers at the government school saw the Danish institution as an unwanted competitor and started a campaign to persuade parents not to enroll their children in classes at the foreign school. They also attempted to use government regulations to undermine the mission school by stressing that schools receiving support from the authorities could not accept students from other such institutions without official sanction. Høyer responded forcefully to this opposition and insisted with the British that the exhibited hostility was a clear indication that he could never expect to secure such written consent. He further emphasized the need for non-Muslim schools as long as the government institution continued to require the teaching of the Quran.¹⁶⁹ These arguments won the day and, in a testament to his determination and powers of persuasion, the Dane managed to secure for his school the dual designation as an English-Arabic institution, allowing it to accept students at any grade level and from any source without fear of violating rules that could threaten access to government support.¹⁷⁰

Høyer's drive to establish a mission school with as much independence of action as possible was blurred by its heavy reliance on students from one community. While building a teaching staff with a very cosmopolitan flare, including a Syrian Muslim Arab, a local Jew, and an Indian Christian, the classes were dominated by Jewish pupils to such an extent that school closings were scheduled to accommodate the main Jewish holidays. However, this dependence did not temper Høyer's efforts to plant Christian and progressive seeds in the minds and souls of the youths at the school. He was determined to use education to transform Jewish society and to change the prevailing perception of Jesus.¹⁷¹ In fact, in his view, Judaism was little different from Islam, and he fervently believed that the Yemeni Jewish population, which he saw as subdued and weak, could only be revived through conversion.¹⁷² And in strikingly confrontational terms, Høyer told one Jew that his people were without land and salvation precisely because they

had failed to accept Jesus, and he likened the Torah to a four-walled house lacking a roof.¹⁷³ Such sentiments naturally spurred a reaction, and leading men within the Jewish community moved to hinder the mission's activities. One wealthy Jew even bought a plot of land with the intent of building a Jewish-run school on the site. And beginning in 1911, long before the school was even finished, the consequences of this rival institution were clear as Jewish boys gradually stopped attending DKA classes.¹⁷⁴

Høyer's response to this emerging crisis was both measured as well as rather reckless. He immediately set about replacing the lost students with Muslim Arab boys in order to prevent a loss of government funding which was, in part, based on levels of enrollment. And the Dane also acknowledged that the Jewish flight from the school constituted a defeat for the mission, because a certain affection had developed for the long-term students even if they were, as he put it, "Jew boys."¹⁷⁵ However, rather than take steps to avert the continued exodus of students, Høyer chose to fire the Jewish teacher and to intensify the Christian atmosphere at the school by instituting mandatory morning and afternoon devotions for everyone. This, of course, only worsened the situation and, as the last Jews abandoned the school, he resolved to return the mission's focus to the Muslim community which he realized had been somewhat alienated by the Danish emphasis on the local Jews. Yet Høyer did not harbor any animosity toward the Jewish community for so effectively resisting the mission's designs. Instead, he attributed the setback to a few determined and influential conservatives, and claimed that even the chief rabbi of Aden had told him that he did not condone the way in which pressure had been applied on the mission.¹⁷⁶ And once the Jewish school was finished in 1913, Høyer happily attended the grand opening ceremony and described the building as one of the most impressive structures in the city. In his mind, the DKA's presence had spurred the Jewish community into action and therefore took credit for improving local education even if it was not Christian-based education alone; the Dane even said as much to the main Jewish benefactor behind the school project, a man he referred to as the "millionaire Jew."¹⁷⁷ On that same occasion, the pastor was also approached about again accepting Jewish students at the mission school, but he declined as he had done before and would continue to do in the future, because he had gained a healthy respect for the kind of trouble the Jews might pose to the DKA. However, Høyer did very much lament having to exclude that segment of the population since "[a]s regards abilities and intellectual gifts," he stressed, "the Jews rank far higher than the Arabs and Muslims...."¹⁷⁸

The challenges encountered in the field of education continued as the mission pressed ahead to entrench and expand schooling for girls. Oluf Høyer reiterated to the Commission the importance of this focus and noted that the mission had a greater need for a female teacher than a nurse, and Maria, his wife, was adamant that providing learning and training to the female population would help to free its members from the constraints of traditional society that shackled them to a life without equality or opportunity.¹⁷⁹ In particular, she lamented the frequency of divorce that left women scarred and discarded and often poorly equipped to fend for themselves. "The manner," she later wrote, "in which a woman, very often before she even turns twenty, has been passed from one man to another is so upsetting that one can hardly speak of it."¹⁸⁰ It seemed to her as if the male-dominated society was predatory and treated women as nothing more than a resource that could be tossed aside once its vitality and usefulness had been expended.¹⁸¹ Yet Maria did not explicitly condemn the Muslim men for this conduct, because she conceded that they possessed many qualities as individuals, and she admired their zealous commitment to their faith. She rather blamed a corruption of their simple nobility for having led them astray:

They live according to their traditions and reject development, which their religion in fact forbids. But it must be noted with deep regret that their conscience ignores all the sin and injustice they commit against the young girls and adult women.¹⁸²

The sheer weight of Islam and centuries of cultural patterns had, it was argued, relegated women to virtual servitude, and perhaps only education, be it religious or secular, could hope to rehabilitate the population. And though Oluf reported that local Muslims felt European women had won far too many freedoms and were much too influential, the mission school overcame lingering opposition and could by March 1911 take satisfaction in an enrollment of seventeen female students.¹⁸³ The pastor's wife also extended her activism beyond the school by visiting women in their homes and even, in one instance, monitored the welfare of a woman who had been beaten by her husband, and threatened to report him to the authorities if his behavior did not improve.¹⁸⁴ These efforts were further expanded and bolstered in 1912 when three women joined the mission, two of whom were Danes and each conversant in Arabic after more than a year of language studies in North Africa. Their arrival fueled the Høyers' optimism about what might be accomplished among the local female populace, but Oluf also continued to urgently call on the Committee to recruit a young Danish man to help him shoulder the burden of administering the mission's many tasks and realizing its ongoing ambitions.¹⁸⁵

The mission's role in education was also evident in its efforts to disseminate reading materials and provide high-standard vocational training. Through the Bible depot and the establishment of a public reading room, Høyer and his staff interacted with a range of people from Aden's diverse population, and created a forum for discussion. Both Jews and Muslims came to participate in these talks and to read from the New Testament, and by 1911, Høyer was eager to extend the reading room's opening hours well into the evening to allow even more people to attend.¹⁸⁶ He felt much enthused by these developments, and as a proponent of dialogue, he was convinced that this incremental approach of individual discussions was more effective than an immediate reliance on public preaching or sermons.¹⁸⁷ This sense of optimism was in sharp contrast to how his wife had evaluated the situation less than a year earlier when she lamented that the mission was encountering significant difficulties in settling inside "Satan's territory," as she termed the Old City neighborhood where they were active. "It is for the time being costly, both in terms of money and energy," Maria declared in July 1910, "to live among a population that only thinks of material gains. Their whole thinking and conduct reveals that they are children of darkness."¹⁸⁸ Such comments suggested contempt for the environment inside the city that was dominated by non-Christian faiths, but over the following months the mission forged links with members of Crater's communities and established itself as a part of the fabric of the urban center. The pastor remarked how men from the Persian Gulf, the Hadramawt, the Red Sea, East Africa and even Zanzibar frequented the reading room and were engaged in conversation.¹⁸⁹ And between January 1910 and March 1911, sales at the Bible depot reflected this diverse, if modest, interest in the mission, as several hundred tracts and excerpts of scripture were sold in Amharic, Arabic, Hebrew, Gujarati, Urdu, and English.¹⁹⁰ Oluf saw in this commercial activity a civilizing influence, as transactions were based on fixed prices rather than ones negotiated through incessant haggling, and the book depot also sold educational material such as maps, textbooks, dictionaries, English classics, and books in Arabic.¹⁹¹ However, he also expressed misgivings about the consequences of the DKA's activities, because through its contact with the populace the mission was inherently raising questions of doubt about faith and fostering disagreement about the proper answers. In a gesture of genuine reflection, the Dane noted that some of the people with whom he had come into close contact had abandoned their religions yet not turned to Christianity in-

stead. He wondered if perhaps the doubts raised were in fact making people less religious rather than convincing them to convert.¹⁹²

A mission activity raising far fewer issues of spirituality, but harboring equally lofty goals of broader social improvement, was the operation of a carpentry shop in Crater. Intent on raising the quality of workmanship in the city and instituting professionalism, Høyer believed the establishment of a Danish-run workshop offering vocational training would elevate local standards. It was also hoped that graduates of the program would serve as self-supporting missionaries, who could travel to the interior, provide a valuable, material service to the communities, and work to spread the New Testament to the people.¹⁹³ The British authorities, who of course did not favor such an effort to Christianize the countryside, did however support economic development through better education and training, and beginning in 1910, they pledged funds to support the DKA's carpentry workshop.¹⁹⁴ In yet another instance, Høyer had entangled the Danish mission with the local colonial government, even though he still clamored for the opportunity to establish himself in an area beyond the empire's control.

The Hudaydah Venture

Since the dawn of Høyer's labors in Yemen, he had coveted the possibility of forming an independent mission in Arab-controlled territory. This desire was not dampened by the DKA's success in building a sound foundation for the future in Crater. Even the return to Aden of his daughter and influential son-in-law, who had been stationed in India for two years (1908-10), did not deter the pastor. He was still concerned about appearing too closely affiliated with the colonial authorities, and the Høyers made a most deliberate point to not participate in any British social events.¹⁹⁵ It seems every connection beyond what was critically necessary, namely as pertained to funding, should be avoided. However, this determination to distance the mission from the British would become ever harder even as the goal of a new mission outpost in new lands appeared ever closer to fulfillment.

As early as 1905, the Red Sea port of Hudaydah had peaked Høyer's interest as a possible site for a pioneer station. The Ottoman-controlled town was connected by telegraph and a main road to the highland city of Sana'a, which the Dane envisioned as a future mission center, and, as the immediate area's chief harbor and communications link with the wider world, it served as the ideal location of the DKA's initial drive into Turkish Arabia. Less beneficial for the Danes was Hudaydah's role as a key Ottoman military installation, with its port serving as the main entry point for soldiers and supplies needed to sustain imperial rule. Høyer's colleague, Dr. Young, had earlier visited the town and described it as full of disgruntled servicemen, many of whom had seen their tours of duty extended by years and had since felt abandoned by the empire.¹⁹⁶ However, in a twist of historical irony, the Franco-Egyptian-built, and later British-owned, Suez Canal had actually enabled the Ottomans to strengthen their ties to Hudaydah and to expand and better secure their presence in Southwestern Arabia since the 1870s.¹⁹⁷ Over the subsequent decades the canal would continue to bolster the empire in its hard-fought struggles for dominance in the region, even as the British grew increasingly concerned about the Ottoman position north of the Western Protectorate, and thousands of Ottoman soldiers died in a conflict few of them embraced. Høyer witnessed this very process at work, this flow of humanity being swept away to the slaughter, while vacationing in Lebanon in June 1905, as he saw masses of Ottoman troops languishing in Beirut and waiting, he assumed, on the government to collect the necessary funds to pay the tolls for passage through the canal.¹⁹⁸ The scene solicited a forceful reaction from the

Dane:

What a damnation is this war and what countless lies are concocted to justify it...How good it is to belong to a realm whose borders are not decided by diplomats and statesmen.¹⁹⁹

He condemned the notion of empire and the seemingly incessant appetite they had to consume lives and resources in the pursuit of policy objectives. Even the pastor's host, the British Empire, was a target for his criticism, as he attacked the British for helping to repatriate Ottoman deserters who fled to Aden. En route to Lebanon only days earlier, he had traveled along with more than a hundred such escapees from military service, as they sailed through the Red Sea toward Suez. They were all Palestinian Arabs, mostly from Jerusalem and Hebron, and Høyer's familiarity with those towns helped him foster a dialogue with his fellow passengers. The Dane, who sympathized with the men's plight, told them it was rumored that they would all be severely punished and placed in convict units upon their arrival in Anatolia. This news prompted most of the Arabs to jump ship as it sailed up the canal! However, Høyer's compassion for the men was clouded by his uncertainty about the veracity of their ordeal, because "a love of truth is not an Arab's strong suit..."²⁰⁰ It seemed the pastor's rejection of physical empire had yet to dislodge the accompanying mentality that painted the regional peoples in broad, general strokes and apportioned certain traits to everyone.

In addition to its position as a place of military importance, Hudaydah could also be likened to a miniature Aden by its cosmopolitan and commercial character. By 1900, about one hundred European merchants, mostly Greeks, and many hundreds of British subjects from India, dominated a growing import-export sector that saw Indian foodstuffs, U.S. and British yarns and cotton goods, and Russian petroleum arrive in the port in exchange for skins, hides, and coffee.²⁰¹ Høyer, who first arrived in the town in late-April 1907, had been asked by a German company based in Aden to perform the wedding of one of these merchants, a man who was the firm's representative in Hudaydah and also served as U.S. consul.²⁰² During his brief stay, the pastor also noted that many of the Greek families "lived more or less like heathens," as the community had no permanent priest and many of the children were unbaptized and without access to education.²⁰³ He saw in their plight an opportunity for the mission to gain a foothold in the town by starting a school for them that might soon also attract Arab children. The prospect of settling in Hudaydah was further enhanced when the British consul, on behalf of the other consuls and European merchants, invited Høyer to periodically revisit the town to hold church services. "There is for us an open door to Hudaydah and from there one into Yemen" he wrote optimistically, convinced that with consular protections the Ottomans would not block his ambitions.²⁰⁴

Confidence in the mission's possible future on the Red Sea intensified after revolution and the promise of reform swept across the Ottoman Empire in 1908. The Young Turk movement's seizure of power raised the prospect of greater freedoms being enacted and gave foreign missionaries the hope that they might soon increase their activities within the imperial borders. Høyer too greeted this change of government with enthusiasm even as he voiced skepticism about the scope and pace of reform, noting that political freedom did not necessarily include religious freedom, and asserting that "Mohammedan [sic] intractableness and religious fanaticism... will not disappear swiftly or in a single gust of reform."²⁰⁵ However, he also cautioned against the popular and prevailing Western image of the Ottoman Empire as a uniquely criminal, exploitative, and duplicitous entity.²⁰⁶ After all, an inherent aspect of empire, including the forms it had taken in European history (Roman, Spanish, British, etc.), was domination by one people

over others and the exercise of a certain degree of cruelty. The Dane suggested that foreign observers and missionaries like himself needed to be fair in their assessments and not simply perpetuate the myths that had been constructed about the Ottomans over the centuries.²⁰⁷ In that spirit, he offered a passionate defense of the conditions within the empire:

[T]he truth is...that there is probably not any non-Christian country offering more bodily protection and freedom of movement than what exists in the Turkish realm. It is almost impossible to find an example of even one of the many hundreds of missionaries who have lived and still live under the Turks that had ever been harassed or even mistreated...²⁰⁸

And to further drive home his point with the Danish audience, he alleged that certain neighborhoods in Copenhagen's inner city were perhaps more dangerous places to mission than the far reaches of the Ottoman Empire. These assertions appeared compelling and even more so after Høyer reported that a U.S. missionary, a man named Camp, who was unaffiliated with any mission, had in the spring of 1908 settled with his wife and child in Hudaydah.²⁰⁹ The Dane had befriended the American in Jerusalem years earlier and had encouraged him to join the Christian effort in South Arabia. And through their correspondence, Høyer learned that Camp had pressed on into the Yemeni highlands in 1909, to the town of Manakhah about 75 km from the Red Sea, from where he now called on his Danish friend and other missionaries to join him.²¹⁰ It seemed the Young Turk revolution had helped to open up the interior and would allow the DKA to move ever closer to realizing its coveted goal.

But only months later the rosy prospects for expanded missionary activity were shattered by Camp's murder. The missionary community, which included six Westerners and three Arabs by 1910, was reduced to none through flight from the area and outright expulsions by the authorities.²¹¹ In the face of U.S. demands for 5,000 Turkish pounds as compensation for Camp's death, and allegations that one of the female missionaries had made provocative public statements, the Ottomans were eager to reduce the presence of Christian activists who had become a source of instability.²¹² These developments should have shaken Høyer's confidence in Ottoman liberalization, but even as other missionaries were leaving Ottoman Yemen, he was laying plans to "win new territory" and possibly buy building plots in Hudaydah and even Sana'a.²¹³ The Dane was simply determined not to waver from the opportunities he had envisioned since his first foray into Ottoman-ruled territory. And in late March 1911, he returned to the Red Sea port, proudly proclaimed himself as the only missionary in the area, and set about renting a house with a storefront.²¹⁴ Within just the following few weeks in the town, he opened a school, organized a reading room, established a book depot, and started a carpentry shop staffed by one of the mission's craftsmen from Aden. Høyer believed, despite the prior setbacks, that the conditions were right for seizing the moment to put down firm roots in the area. He sensed that the Young Turks were working hard under difficult circumstances to develop the region, and he expressed admiration for their energy and initiative in that regard.²¹⁵ In particular, the Dane cited the recent arrival of more than thirty European engineers, an advance party for a French construction syndicate hired to build a railway and a port, as evidence that the new regime was committed to modernization and progress.²¹⁶ They were, in other words, seemingly moving toward the type of societal reform that the Høyers tirelessly advocated for the entire region.

The shortened distance to the Hijaz, further up the Red Sea coast, and the general proximity of autonomous Arab territory, also attracted the pastor to Ottoman Yemen. Høyer advocated that missionaries should get ever closer to the holy cities of Islam in order to send Muslims the message that "danger is looming for Islam."²¹⁷ For years he had argued that Islam, "this religion

which largely bears the blame for conditions being so poor in [Arabia] as well as all other places where it still holds sway,” was sustained by the inviolable nature of its bastion in the Hijaz.²¹⁸ In his mind, the religion would remain a mortal opponent of Christianity and an obstacle to civilization, progress, and improved societies as long as other faiths were barred from its spiritual center. Such rituals as the annual *hajj* or pilgrimage, he stressed, brought 60-80,000 people to the Hijaz and served to invigorate Islam by projecting a false image of dominance and grandeur. “It is without question in Mecca,” Høyer declared, “that the Muhammedans [sic] derive some of that strength which makes them Christendom’s toughest opponents.”²¹⁹ In fact, the Prophet’s birthplace was a keen target of the Dane’s ambitions as well as his scorn. He speculated optimistically that Jeddah, the main Hijazi port, might become the site of a mission station from which Mecca could eventually be reached. Such an achievement would put pressure on the holy city that in his eyes was to Christianity what Carthage was to Rome; an archenemy with whom they were locked in a fundamental contest for the souls of millions.²²⁰ Mincing no words, he described Meccan society as marked by materialism, self-interest, and corruption:

...this city, that even in enlightened Muhammedans’ [sic] eyes is the most unpleasant in the world; where immorality and abomination are enthroned, and where the inhabitants know no other way of life than legal and illegal plundering of pilgrims.²²¹

What awaited missionaries in the Hijaz was a daunting task and, in 1911, the DKA was yet to marshal the resources to take on such a challenge. Instead, the initial focus needed to be concentrated further south in Ottoman Yemen where Arab forces were actively moving to assert their independence. In the highlands, Zaydi Shia forces under the leadership of Imam Yahya had for years fiercely contested Ottoman rule. Høyer speculated that the DKA could perhaps in the future secure an outpost in those liberated lands. And once he landed at Hudaydah in 1911, that possibility seemingly beckoned as a local leader from Ma’rib, an ancient city about 100 km east of Sana’a, invited the Dane to visit the town which since 1909 had been under the control of forces loyal to the Imam.²²² Høyer was intrigued by the offer but also hesitant about placing the mission in the middle of the Ottoman-Zaydi conflict. He possessed a comprehensive understanding of the complexities and diverse forces involved in the regional struggle, as reflected in an article he wrote for the mission journal about the political conditions in South Arabia, and he expressed confidence that the Ottomans could overcome the insurrections.²²³ Moreover, the pastor believed that the Young Turks were better suited to implement needed reforms rather than the local Arabs, whom he described as divided and prone to feuding.²²⁴ Høyer was, in short, not categorically against empire, but rather intellectually flexible enough to give it tacit support when he perceived that such an endorsement would benefit the mission and his coveted aims.

The DKA’s success in establishing a mission outpost in Hudaydah was largely attributable to the assistance and protection it received from the British. Høyer was embraced as a friend by the empire’s vice-consul at the port, and the Englishman pledged to support the Danish venture.²²⁵ In Denmark, the committee petitioned the Danish Foreign Ministry to contact the British government through diplomatic channels and ask that the vice-consul’s personal assistance be expanded to include official protection for the Danes.²²⁶ Within only five days of the initial request, the foreign ministry instructed Denmark’s ambassador in Britain to make the necessary inquiries, which was done immediately.²²⁷ It seemed the Danish state was eager to ensure that every one of its citizens was safe even when they were far removed from their native soil. These efforts were soon rewarded when the British agreed just weeks later to provide the Danish mission workers with full official protection.²²⁸ The British were responding not only to the Scandina-

vian petition but also to reports from their vice-consul in Hudaydah that growing pressure was being applied on the missionaries and that the local authorities were subjecting them to “annoyances and indignities.”²²⁹

Beginning in the month of June, a controversy was brewing over Høyer’s distribution of books and pamphlets that the Ottomans alleged were disparaging of the Quran and likely to incite the Arab population. Since opening the depot in April, the pastor had steadily stocked the shelves with books from presses in Beirut and Cairo and with texts he personally had transported from Aden and easily cleared through customs.²³⁰ In contrast to the printed materials, he lamented that lumber for the carpentry business was far more cumbersome to import, requiring the mission to secure an array of signatures and stamps on the customs documents as well as pay high duties that had recently been raised to help finance local development projects.²³¹ The Dane therefore asserted that other factors, namely extortion and bribery, were afoot rather than the official claim that steps were being taken only to prevent Høyer from fostering unrest. He was adamant that neither authentic nor falsified Qurans had ever been sold and that none of the books in the inventory were provocative. Citing titles such as *The Sources of Islam*, *The Holy Spirit in the Quran*, *What Transpired before Muhammed’s Flight from Mecca*, and *Evidence of the Crucifixion of Christ*, Høyer conceded that the materials represented a challenge to Islam, but:

...they are written in a calm and somber tone, and rather highlight historical facts. They are not provocative and do as a whole employ an entirely different terminology than the infamous language the Muhammedans [sic] usually use in their counter-writings against us.²³²

He seemed rather unfazed by the notion that such books would still offend Orthodox Islam, believing that he could continue to mingle openly and safely with the townspeople, who received the mission well, based on its reputation in Aden.²³³ And despite Høyer’s best intentions to comply with Ottoman law, and having provided local officials with copies of books for thorough examination of content, he was still confronted by the local police chief and a detective who came to the bookshop and declared the enterprise as illegal once he refused to pay *bakschish*.²³⁴ A policeman was even posted outside the store to scare away customers. And in an effort to apply ever more pressure, the police chief accused Høyer of scheming to supply arms to the local population after a rifle, which had been accepted for repair in the carpenter’s workshop, was discovered on mission premises. However, the pastor was confident in the strength of his position, because most of the books came from Beirut where they had been cleared by Ottoman censors, and the British vice-consul intervened to keep the depot open and get the guard removed. Høyer also strengthened the mission’s ties to the British by emphasizing his position as a representative of the British and Foreign Bible Society and placing Husayn, the carpenter, in symbolic charge of the Hudaydah station, because he was both a Muslim and a British subject from Aden.²³⁵

But the support of an empire did not prevent the mission from facing ongoing Ottoman opposition nor protect it from geopolitical developments. Having been unsuccessful in their bid to extort money from the DKA or close down its activities, the local Ottomans opted to use the Hudaydah customs office to cut off the mission’s supply of books by delaying and stalling the inspection process. By late October 1911, Høyer reported that about six hundred Bibles and Biblical excerpts, variously printed in Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, and Turkish, were languishing in the clutches of the local bureaucracy.²³⁶ Not until a further one hundred days had passed were the books and pamphlets finally released to the mission after diplomatic pressures had been brought to bear on Istanbul. The whole ordeal left Høyer rather wary of the Ottomans, and he rejected a suggestion by the British vice-consul to press the authorities for £100 in compensation,

as such a move would only keep the conflict festering.²³⁷ In the meantime, a more serious situation had unfolded months earlier with the outbreak of the Italo-Ottoman War. That conflict, focused on driving the Ottomans out of their last North African foothold of Tripolitania, was far removed from Hudaydah and Aden, but tensions rose in both towns and made missionary activities far tougher. Høyer reported that “a terrible hatred of all Europeans” arose in the Ottoman port, and in Aden, the pastor found that Muslims with whom he had earlier spoken in a calm manner were now quite agitated.²³⁸ A leading Aden Muslim, and someone Høyer claimed as a friend, even urged the Dane to speak out against the Italians and advocate peace. There is no indication that he ever heeded that call, because even though he sympathized with the Ottoman position on the war and was critical of the predatory nature of the European powers, he also expressed admiration for Italian colonialism and its accomplishments, some of which he had witnessed on visits to Eritrea.²³⁹ Clearly, Høyer was of two minds, because even as he opposed the Western pursuit of empires, he also saw that the continued chipping away at the Ottoman realm had symbolic importance. Commenting on conditions in Hudaydah, he observed that:

[O]ne came away with the understanding that the power and authority of the Turks is much curtailed and that Islam is in retreat. And it is the latter that the educated Muhammedans [sic] are more and more coming to recognize here in Aden and I assume everywhere else. But rather than humble them, as [the decline] should, and leave them baffled as to the reasons why, it makes them bitter and fanatical. Yet there surely are a few men who know how to read and interpret the signs of the time even if they must still wait to voice it.²⁴⁰

Ottoman defeats and reverses, Høyer concluded, would in the short-term complicate the lives of missionaries, but gradually, over time, intelligent Muslims would come to accept the inevitable and come to embrace reform and Christianity.

The Dane’s sense of drive and optimism, and his supreme confidence in ultimate success, sustained the mission’s effort to retain and expand the Hudaydah station. Even during the war (1911-1912) when the Italian Navy blockaded the harbor and cut off Høyer’s access to the town, and the mission’s activities were actually suspended as his assistant, Husayn, took ill and had to return to Aden, the pastor remained adamant that the port station should not be abandoned permanently.²⁴¹ He pressed ahead with plans to return and was delighted to receive an anonymous pledge of \$100 a year to pay for a mission doctor at Hudaydah.²⁴² Such support would help to assure success and constituted a reward for Høyer’s determination. Within only a month of the end of hostilities, the Dane was back in the town and reported that conditions for the mission were much improved. It seemed the arrival of a new crop of Ottoman officials had eased the importation of printed materials and, in negotiations with the new *mutessarif* (civil administrator), Høyer secured an agreement to supply Arab textbooks to the local government school.²⁴³ However, the passing of official opposition was replaced by private obstruction as the mission’s landlord demanded a tripling of their monthly rent from one to three pounds sterling.²⁴⁴ This setback temporarily disrupted DKA activities by forcing it to move into a warehouse until new accommodations could be found. The pace of local economic reform, so promising before the war, had also been literally derailed by the conflict, as the French engineers originally hired to build railways and improve ports had left Ottoman Arabia for good. An English observer, contemporary with Høyer, reported in 1913 that only five miles of railway had been completed and that about 8,000 tons of building equipment for the project was simply deteriorating in open-air storage.²⁴⁵

But the stalling of societal reform did not dissuade the Høyers from pursuing their goal of bringing momentous change to Hudaydah. In early 1913, Maria Høyer made her first trip to the

town, having been dispatched by her husband to find a replacement rental property for mission use.²⁴⁶ During her visit she was well-received by the Ottomans, even meeting with the wife of the *mutessarif*. However, she found the town in desperate need of spiritual uplift, describing its population as being held captive in an Ottoman-guarded prison.²⁴⁷ Her husband was less dramatic in assessing the situation, but he too was adamant that action was needed, and he called for the recruitment of a male missionary, preferably a doctor, to help entrench the mission in Hudaydah.²⁴⁸ In that spirit, though falling short of his stated aspirations, Oluf Høyer hired an Egyptian Christian and former Coptic priest, named Stefanus Maqar, as the new administrator of the book depot in the Red Sea port.²⁴⁹ It was hoped that his familiarity with the area and his decades of experience as a traveling bookseller for the British and Foreign Bible Society would stand the mission in good stead. And within only a few months, two female missionaries, one Danish and one English, joined Maqar in Hudaydah to bolster the permanent staff and open a clinic, as well as cultivate links with the local women and children by way of home visits, a technique which had proved quite successful in Aden. Through this strengthening of their presence in the town, the Høyers and the committee hoped to again pressure the Ottomans to accept that the Danes were under British protection, and to also dissuade other Western powers from joining the effort to provide the local population with social services.²⁵⁰ In particular, the Høyers were concerned that France was making inroads into Hudaydah, as the French consul had opened a branch of the *Alliance Française* and intended to establish a boys' school as well.²⁵¹ The challenge represented by such developments, along with Ottoman obstructionism and Muslim fanaticism, as Oluf Høyer termed it, made clear that difficulties lay ahead. However, with three mission representatives attached to the station and steady sales recorded at the book depot, the Høyers were confident that a solid foundation had been built in Hudaydah.

The Fleeting Dream of Permanency

The outbreak of the First World War shattered the accomplishments of the mission on the Red Sea coast and severely hobbled its activities in Aden. Høyer's staff was banned by the British from returning to Hudaydah in September 1914, and Maqar was instructed to close down the station and book depot before he returned to Egypt.²⁵² And within six months of this setback, the remaining Danes, including the Høyers, were also evacuated from Aden, leaving only a few local workers to oversee the mission school. "I hardly need to mention," lamented Høyer, "that the evangelical work has never before suffered such a reversal as it is experiencing now during this war...."²⁵³ Not only was access and security compromised, but the Muslim population was unlikely to be impressed by notions of Christian peace and love as an unprecedented slaughter unfolded across Europe. Once again, the Western empires were seen to undermine the work of the missionaries, and Oluf vented his frustration by coming to the defense of Ottoman grievances in the war. "[T]he maintenance of the capitulations was an injustice," the Dane railed, "and one of the excesses committed against Turkey by the Great Powers; as long as they existed this land could not aspire to autonomy and independence."²⁵⁴ Yet whatever the criticism, however heartfelt, it could not alter the fact that the DKA was to be cut off from South Arabia for years and that the mission's position would be weakened, perhaps irrevocably, by its absence.

One consequence of the evacuation that troubled the Høyers most acutely was the loss of a plot of land upon which the mission could build its own facilities. For years, Oluf had lauded the advantages of ownership rather than renting, citing stability and permanence as its main benefits. By 1913, he was actively calling on the Committee to establish a building fund to achieve that

aim, and within just months he had set his sights on a large plot valued at 3,000 rupees.²⁵⁵ The Dane speculated that the property would be ideal for a girls' school, as it was located in a quiet, residential area. More importantly, after having reviewed local education regulations, Høyer realized that the mission could secure the land for free if they committed themselves to establishing a girls' school and agreed to register it as an Aided Primary School under the supervision of the British.²⁵⁶ The cash-strapped Danes could not refuse such an arrangement, because the money saved for the purchase price could immediately be allocated to the building fund and speed the achievement of greater independence. As Høyer stressed, without their own buildings "we are in the pockets of our landlords and can never feel secure."²⁵⁷ However, the eagerness and determination to begin construction was not matched by adequate funding. By July 1914, only a little more than a third of the estimated 24,000 crowns needed for the mission compound had been collected, and the project was destined to be postponed indefinitely.²⁵⁸ The British authorities were not enthused by this delay and, despite the Danish role in promoting female education and having an enrollment of twenty-five girls, all of them Muslim, during the 1913-1914 school year, the mission was pressured to begin construction or face losing the property.²⁵⁹

But the Danes were of course unable to comply with the British demand and the land was subsequently repossessed. This action must have come as quite a shock to the Høyers, because over the few years immediately prior to the First World War the mission had developed a beneficial relationship with the Aden authorities. British money flowed into the school in the form of an annual 800-rupee subsidy that constituted a slightly larger part of the yearly budget than what the mission itself committed to the endeavor.²⁶⁰ The funds were initially tied to levels of enrollment, but the British soon accepted fluctuating student levels in recognition of the difficult environment and conditions faced by the mission. And in 1913, the authorities opted to make the subsidy permanent, allowing the Danes to better budget for the expenses involved with running the school.²⁶¹ Such support reflected an appreciation of the type and quality of education provided by Høyer and his staff, an education that emphasized the standard Anglo-Indian curriculum and prepared students for recruitment into the colonial civil service.²⁶² In response to this official attitude, the pastor too eased his earlier hesitancy as regarded a broader affiliation and social interaction with the British. He agreed to hire an English soldier to teach the children gymnastics and accepted an invitation from the United Recreation Club to have the school participate in a local six-team football tournament in which he was particularly proud of how the mission's team performed against that of the 1st Middlesex Regiment.²⁶³ By 1914, the DKA had simply become an integral part of the education landscape in Aden, boasting an enrollment of over sixty pupils, providing night classes for women, and conducting home visits to dozens of families, including even the house of a leading Wahhabi.²⁶⁴

The success evident in the mission's push to educate and inform was matched by the steady growth in sales recorded at the book depot. Høyer trumpeted the positive influence that the distribution of reading materials had effected on the local society. In contrast to just a few years earlier, when only books in Arabic and about Islam were available, by 1914 Aden enjoyed a much greater diversity in literature and had seen the addition of a number of booksellers.²⁶⁵ The level of intellect present in the local population had also been raised, the Dane asserted, in part due to the unrivaled range and volume of schoolbooks available for purchase at the depot.²⁶⁶ He suggested that the mission had positioned itself at the forefront of the effort to implant profound spiritual and intellectual change to match the physical and technological innovation that was prevalent across Aden. However, the pastor acknowledged that external, material change was far more easily accepted by the locals than internal, values-based change, and he felt Muslims

needed to be separated not only from Islam but from religion in general before they could be enticed to rediscover faith in the form of Christianity.²⁶⁷

Yet the First World War disrupted Høyer's ambitions to foster fundamental societal change. In early 1915 army units of the Ottoman Empire crossed the border that only a decade earlier had been negotiated to mark the spheres of influence in South Arabia. The forces quickly advanced through the British protectorate and easily swept aside a small detachment dispatched to reinforce the town of Lahj.²⁶⁸ Høyer reported that in February the Ottomans were only some forty kilometers from Aden, but that he felt quite secure in the city after having moved to Steamer Point, an area least exposed to a potential Ottoman attack.²⁶⁹ Late the following month he left for Denmark, leaving behind his wife, daughter, and son-in-law, but harboring every intent of returning after the summer.²⁷⁰ However, during his absence the Ottomans briefly occupied the Aden suburb of Shaykh Uthman and dispatched patrols onto the peninsula that reached as far as Ma'alla.²⁷¹ And even though the incursion was repulsed, refugees flooded into the city, health conditions deteriorated, and inflation drove up the price of food and other necessities. Aden no longer seemed a safe and stable work environment, convincing the Høyers to abandon the city and turn over the daily operation of the school to their native staff.

An Extended Absence

The war years were a time of struggle and new opportunities for the mission. Through correspondence with Ibrahim Sujjan, the teacher directing the school in Aden and a man Høyer termed a ray of light in the darkness of troubled times, the Dane learned that work continued despite economic problems and major difficulties in collecting tuition payments.²⁷² It was hoped that the ongoing British subsidy to the school could provide the resources necessary for Sujjan to retain a core group of students around which a revived education mission could be built once the Scandinavians returned to assume the reins of leadership.²⁷³ In the months and years before that happened, the DKA would work to prepare a sound foundation for the restoration of its activities based on its improved finances in Denmark, as the number of journal subscribers surpassed 1,500 in 1916 and the building fund rose to over 15,000 crowns the following year.²⁷⁴ Pastor Høyer too used the time on native soil to plan for the mission's return, but he also strove to rally wider public support for its efforts in South Arabia. Through speaking engagements and articles, he informed his listeners and readers about the important work in which the DKA was engaged. But more importantly, Høyer's words, particularly those that appeared in articles in the mission journal, sought to dispel some of the most serious and enduring distortions about Islam and the Prophet Muhammed. He stressed that Muslims believed in Jesus and the virgin birth, and that Islam emerged out of the Judeo-Christian tradition of monotheism.²⁷⁵ As to Muhammed, the Dane rejected the charge that the Meccan was a deceiver or a liar, and instead presented him as a man who genuinely believed in his own message and possessed universal qualities such as humility and generosity.²⁷⁶ Of course, as a fervent Christian, Høyer could never accept the validity of Muhammed's claims to be the final messenger of God. But rather than brand him the Anti-Christ, he attributed the Meccan's failings to the corrupting influence of power that exposed the frailties of his humanity and mangled his original message.²⁷⁷ Much as Høyer had written more than a decade earlier, he saw the early Muhammed as a virtuous figure whose conduct could serve as a model for Christians, but contrasted that with the later period in Medina when the prophet occupied a position of strength and supremacy.²⁷⁸ As Høyer put it: "In the face of adversity [Muhammed] could flourish, but success ruined him."²⁷⁹

But feeling almost relegated to an academic role within the DKA, the Dane was eager to find another avenue to continue his work. In late 1916 such an opportunity arose when he was approached to serve as part of an international effort to mission to, and provide humanitarian services for, prisoners of war. Initially assigned to work among Muslims in Russian captivity, he was promptly redirected to Germany to help replace U.S. personnel whose status as neutrals had ended once America entered the war. Over the next two-year period (1917-1919), Høyer found himself again working among prisoners much as he had done in Hebron and Mukalla. However, in Germany the scale of the effort dwarfed anything the Dane had ever formerly experienced, as he traveled across the country visiting as many as twenty-nine camps with a combined population of about half a million.²⁸⁰ Among the internees he encountered were Muslims from India and North Africa, and he even met repeatedly with a group of Yemeni laborers working in Hamburg.²⁸¹ This latter group came from an area close to Aden, and together they and Høyer reminisced about South Arabia and agreed that a return was something each of them coveted.

The end of the war saw the DKA restored to Aden under a different leadership than when it left four years earlier. Neither Oluf nor Maria Høyer returned to their former home as concerns about their ages and health kept the couple away from the region, and their role as heads of the mission in South Arabia was assumed by Carl Johannes Rasmussen, a man twenty-five years their junior, who had spent most of the war years in Egypt.²⁸² Their absence was felt acutely by those who knew them well, such as Marie Henriksen, the Danish woman whom the Høyers sent to Hudaydah years earlier. She praised Oluf Høyer's leadership of the South Arabian mission and favored his return, health permitting, to manage the bookstore.²⁸³ However, the pastor remained in Denmark, becoming a DKA Committee secretary and working to broaden and deepen support for the Danish effort. His passion for the mission, despite his absence from Aden, and for Denmark's unique role in the region, continued undiminished.

We Danes are classified as small, but it is precisely the small nations that can mission. We can enter places that large states only reach with difficulty.

It is a Danish scientific expedition that has explored the part of Arabia where we have our range of mission. Where Danish men have given their lives after having exerted some of the finest work ever done by explorers, there Danish men and women now conduct their mission. Where the tasks of science end, those of the mission begin.

We need men who will sacrifice everything for Arabia; but in particular the Muhammedan [sic] world must be won over by way of tears, love, and prayer.²⁸⁴

Høyer still believed the Danes could carve out a significant role for their mission, and he called on the Committee to restore the Hudaydah station as well as attempt a penetration of the Hijaz through the port of Jeddah.²⁸⁵ Such plans reflected the pastor's bold style and sense of initiative, but not everyone was enthused by his proposals for handling mission affairs. The new director of the Aden station, Rasmussen, grew steadily wary of Høyer and, in 1924 when talk surfaced that the veteran missionary might return to South Arabia, he fervently opposed any such notion based on an array of factors. He cited the expense of renting additional lodgings for Høyer, questioned his ability to cope with the language and climate after a ten-year absence, and suggested that he had previously endangered the mission by embroiling himself in local political matters.²⁸⁶ A lingering tension between the two men would continue for another two years until Rasmussen was dismissed from the mission, removing a significant impediment to reuniting Høyer with the site of his decades-long work and focus.

The Final Visit

On the occasion of the upcoming twenty-fifth anniversary of his first visit to South Arabia, Oluf Høyer decided to return to Aden in late 1927. Despite an absence spanning more than a dozen years, the pastor felt invigorated by once again being in the city and partaking directly in missionary activities. By the time of his arrival, the DKA was firmly reestablished in the community, operating a medical clinic that treated thousands annually and providing education for more than fifty boys and girls.²⁸⁷ Høyer took up his duties in the latter field, assuming responsibility for overseeing the mission school, an institution that had contributed to breaking down “the resistance of Muhammedanism [sic]” and was serving as the best tool to influence young minds in the city.²⁸⁸ In Høyer’s view, its significance could not be overestimated:

We have over the bygone years had more than 400 of Aden’s boys in our school, and no one can doubt that has influenced the spread of the Gospels even if the fruits of that effort are only visible to us, who are immersed in the work.²⁸⁹

However, while working as an administrator and teacher, the Dane grew increasingly disillusioned about “the spiritual atmosphere at the school.”²⁹⁰ He assessed that two of the three teachers were quite incompetent and were making no effort to improve their abilities. To remedy this serious shortcoming, Høyer called for increased funding for the school, which he estimated needed between six and seven thousand rupees annually, suggested the purchase of soon to be abandoned army barracks for use as school buildings, and advocated the hiring of a Scandinavian or European man to serve as a permanent administrator.²⁹¹

But the lack of financial stability within the DKA, an impediment that had existed since the mission’s inception, prevented the immediate implementation of such plans of expansion and reform. Shortages also compelled Høyer to turn down a most attractive offer made to the mission by a British priest in Aden. It seemed one of the two English churches in the city was to be closed, and the Danes were invited to take over the building for free in exchange for a commitment to maintain it.²⁹² Touring the site in mid-February 1928, Høyer described the building as “the most beautiful church imaginable”, but within two months he was compelled to turn down the mission’s opportunity to operate its own house of worship.²⁹³ The reality of limited funds simply forced the DKA to prioritize, and the pastor recognized that the mission’s core purpose and goals should not be compromised by the expenses of establishing a building maintenance fund and the obligation to always have an ordained minister posted to Aden.²⁹⁴ A short time after this setback, Høyer too was confronted by limitations of his own as his aging body, battered through the years by bouts of illness, was weakened further by a severe case of dysentery which forced him to abandon the region permanently.

The Høyers in Arabia: An Assessment

Over many years Oluf and Maria Høyer labored to reestablish and revive Christianity in South Arabia. In the face of countless obstacles they persevered with their task, determined to overcome the challenges and driven by courage and faith. Both firmly believed that Denmark had a special role to fill in the international missionary movement, suggesting that Danes, and all Scandinavian Christians for that matter, possessed certain qualities that were suited to meet the conditions of the Middle East.²⁹⁵ The pastor’s wife expanded further on that view, arguing that the Danish national character, symbolized by the flag emblazoned with the Cross, was inextricably

linked to Christianity and its propagation.²⁹⁶ She even called for the revival of the Viking spirit of adventure and fearlessness, despite its legacy of terrorizing Christians, in a bid to enlist it in the peaceful missionary campaign.²⁹⁷ In her mind, such a source of motivation could fuel the spiritual conquest of Muslim lands and assure that the Danish flag was firmly planted on foreign soil.

There can be little argument that the Høyers, as was the case with the vast majority of Christian missionaries who ventured into the Middle East, were well-intentioned and motivated by a genuine dedication to God. Illness, political pressures, social opposition, and fluctuating financial support did not significantly dampen their commitment to bring Christianity to the people. Convinced that people were stunted and underdeveloped without an embrace of Christianity, they saw Islam in the classic Orientalist light, as adversarial, debilitating, and false. Yet their determined rejection of the religion did not translate into an abandonment of its adherents, because the missionaries had come to save the Muslims, to lead them from the darkness to the light and convert the distant Other to fellow Christians. Their fervor for the cause, however, failed to generate much success in terms of Muslims brought to the Cross. Over a twenty-year period (1904-1923), the DKA only managed to baptize seven people, of which most soon reverted to Islam.²⁹⁸ By any standards such numbers reflected utter failure and an unacceptable return on funds and effort expended on the endeavor. However, the scarcity of converts was hardly the only basis upon which to evaluate the Danish mission's contributions to life in South Arabia. Through its pioneering efforts in education, such as opening the first regional school for girls, and by providing reading materials and medical care for the wider population, the mission helped to improve the lives of the people. Immaterial of the possibly misguided drive to change people's religion, the Danish missionaries relieved and cured ailments, expanded intellectual horizons, and assured youths the promise of a better future. Those contributions and achievements could never be denied no matter the shortcomings that were otherwise evident.

Sacrifice and determination marked the spirit of the Høyers' missionary activism, sustaining their will to perform tasks to benefit others. Spurred on by difficulties that tested and reinforced their spiritual commitment, they devoted their lives to evangelism, including years of work on distant shores. The "mystical Orient" and the challenges posed by Islam drew them forth, despite the adversity that would abound, and those same forces also lured other Danes to the region. Intent on exposing the elements of Eastern society that were hidden from plain view, self-styled adventurers and explorers joined their compatriot missionaries as a source of insight and perspectives on a cultural sphere that to many seemed so utterly foreign.

-
- ¹ Paul Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1, 11-12.
- ² Tim Mackintosh-Smith, *Yemen: The Unknown Arabia* (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2000), 143.
- ³ Victor Kiernan, *The Lords of Human Kind*, 2nd ed. (London: Serif, 1995), 144; Maxime Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, trans. Roger Veinus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 66; Ziauddin Sardar, *Orientalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 50.
- ⁴ Oluf Høyer, "Fra Syd-Arabien," *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 4 (1905): 104-06.
- ⁵ Erik W. Nielsen, *På Pionermission i Arabien* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Missionsselskab, 1948), 20, 26-27; *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 4 (1906): 52-53.
- ⁶ *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 4 (1906): 52-53.
- ⁷ *Årsberetning fra Politifunktionærernes Broderkreds for 1898*, Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien [DKA or the Danish Church Mission in Arabia] Archive, bundle 1; *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 1 (1901): 1; Nielsen, *På Pionermission*, 21.
- ⁸ *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 4 (1906): 52-53; Maria Høyer, *Abrahams Døtre*, vol. 1 (Copenhagen: Bethestas Boghandel, 1909), 4, 7.
- ⁹ Oluf Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 2 (1904): 23. For years the name would continue to figure prominently as the Høyers, after their final return from Yemen to Denmark, named their home "Villa Hebron", and, in 1947, the ongoing mission in Aden christened their main residence "Hebron".
- ¹⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 3 (1902): 24.
- ¹¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 1 (1902): 43; O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 2 (1902): 50.
- ¹² Erik W. Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Missionsselskab, 1950), 172.
- ¹³ O. Høyer to Politifunktionærernes Broderkreds, Hebron, March 1900, bundle 1, DKA.
- ¹⁴ Hanauer, "Work at Jaffa and Hebron," *Jewish Missionary Intelligence* (1900): 27-28, copy in bundle 1, DKA.
- ¹⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 4 (1902): 35.
- ¹⁶ Letters to the Brotherhood of the Police Civil Servants, 1900, bundle 1, DKA. The contributors included James E. Hanauer, Henry R. Jessup (American Presbyterian Mission), Longley Hall and C. M. Nicholson (both of the Christian Missionary Society).
- ¹⁷ Commitment to a formal mission, May 1901, bundle 1, DKA; *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 1 (1901): 1-2; Marius A. Borch-Jensen, *Ved Milepælen* (Copenhagen: Det Danske Missionsselskab, 1954), 62.
- ¹⁸ O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 2 (1904): 23.
- ¹⁹ Kvindelige Missions Arbejdere (KMA) to the Oluf Høyer og hustrus missionvirksomhed i Judea, bundle 1, DKA; *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 1 (1901): 7. The tally of annual subscribers to the new journal, reflecting growing support and interest in the mission, began at a promising sixty-three in 1901, rose to ninety in 1902, and jumped to two hundred and fifty in 1903. Annual budgets also increased slightly each year between 1900-01 and 1902-03. See *Beretning om Oluf Høyer og Hustrus Missionsvirksomhed i Judea for 1902*, bundle 1, DKA; *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 1 (1901): 8; *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 1 (1902): 44; *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 1 (1903): 92.
- ²⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 1 (1901): 6.
- ²¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 4 (1902): 35.
- ²² M. Høyer to the Committee, September 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron*, 1, no. 2 (1901): 15.
- ²³ O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 4 (1902): 33; O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 1 (1902): 42; O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 3 (1903): 59-60.
- ²⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 1 (1901): 6; O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 4 (1902): 34.
- ²⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 3 (1902): 24.
- ²⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 4 (1902): 35.
- ²⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 3 (1902): 25.
- ²⁸ O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 2 (1902): 50; O. Høyer, "Meddelelser fra Missionær Høyer," *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 10 (1908): 114.
- ²⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 2 (1902): 50.
- ³⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 3 (1902): 24.
- ³¹ M. Høyer to KMA, "Meddelelser fra Palæstina," December 1902, bundle 1, DKA.
- ³² O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 3 (1902): 24-25; M. Høyer, *Abrahams Døtre*, 1: 11-12.
- ³³ M. Høyer to KMA, "Meddelelser fra Palæstina," December 1902, bundle 1, DKA; M. Høyer, *Abrahams Døtre*, 1: 11-13.

- ³⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 2 (1902): 48.
- ³⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1901, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 1, no. 4 (1902): 33. According to Høyer's estimates, there were by the early 20th century over twenty-five missions and several hundred missionaries serving a population of two million in Palestine. And in Hebron, with 20-24,000 citizens, five missions were active. See O. Høyer, "Foredrag," *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 6 (1908): 65-66.
- ³⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 1 (1902): 40.
- ³⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 2 (1902): 46-47.
- ³⁸ *Beretning om Oluf Høyer og Hustrus Missionsvirksomhed i Judea for 1902*, bundle 1, DKA.
- ³⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1902, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 3 (1903): 55-57.
- ⁴⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 3 (1903): 64.
- ⁴¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 4 (1903): 66-67.
- ⁴² O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 3 (1903): 60-61; Nielsen, *På Pionermision i Arabien*, 22.
- ⁴³ R. J. Gavin, *Aden under British Rule, 1839-1967* (London: C. Hurst, 1975), 172.
- ⁴⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 4 (1903): 68.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*; Ken Blady, *Jewish Communities in Exotic Places* (Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 2000), 31.
- ⁴⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 5 (1903): 79.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 80; *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 1 (1904): 1.
- ⁴⁸ Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen*, 26.
- ⁴⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 4 (1903): 71.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 1 (1903): 83; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 170-71.
- ⁵² Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen*, 19; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 158.
- ⁵³ Mackintosh-Smith, *Yemen*, 261; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 173.
- ⁵⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 5 (1903): 14; O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 1 (1903): 87.
- ⁵⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 1 (1903): 90.
- ⁵⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 2 (1903): 96.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 95.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 96.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 101.
- ⁶⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1904, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 1 (1905): 59; Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen*, 27.
- ⁶¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 1 (1903): 82.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, 84-85.
- ⁶³ O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1904, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 1 (1905): 59.
- ⁶⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1903, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 2 (1903): 102.
- ⁶⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, August – September 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 3 (1903): 107-09, 112.
- ⁶⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, undated, bundle 1, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 4 (1904): 122.
- ⁶⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 4 (1904): 120; M. Høyer to the Committee, November 1904, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 1 (1905): 54.
- ⁶⁸ O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 4 (1904): 120-21.
- ⁶⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 5 (1904): 127; Oluf Høyer did revisit Mukalla briefly in 1911 following the death of Sultan Awad bin Umar al-Qu'ayti, and met with his son, Ralib, with whom he had established good relations. Yet any hopes he might have harbored about reestablishing a mission in the town were again blocked by the British. See O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 11 (1911): 153, 155.
- ⁷⁰ Nielsen, *På Pionermision i Arabien*, 22.
- ⁷¹ Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen*, 4, 19, 26; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 444.
- ⁷² O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 4 (1903): 67; O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 2 (1904): 27; Robin Bidwell, *The Two Yemens* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 75.
- ⁷³ Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen*, 9-10.

- ⁷⁴ Ibid., 10; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 190-91.
- ⁷⁵ Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen*, 26; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 189.
- ⁷⁶ O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 137; O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 3 (1908): 23.
- ⁷⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 3 (1908): 24.
- ⁷⁸ Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, 54; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 189.
- ⁷⁹ Samuel M. Zwemer, et al., eds., *The Mohammedan World of Today*, 2nd ed. (New York; London: Toronto: Fleming H. Revell, 1906): 89-90; O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 135-36.
- ⁸⁰ O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 136-37.
- ⁸¹ *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 3 (1904): 34; Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 177.
- ⁸² O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 1 (1904): 7.
- ⁸³ Ibid., 2.
- ⁸⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1905, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 1 (1904): 3.
- ⁸⁵ O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 136. This was an inaccurate assertion by Høyer, because by 1906 the Keith-Falconer Mission was seeking to build a station at Dhala, a town about 150 km north of Aden. See Zwemer, *The Mohammedan World of Today*, 94.
- ⁸⁶ O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 134; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 211.
- ⁸⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 5 (1904): 130-31.
- ⁸⁸ O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 2 (1904): 20.
- ⁸⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 140-43; O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1904, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 1 (1904): 11.
- ⁹⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 142; O. Høyer, "Lidt om Syd-Arabien i Fortid og Nutid," *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 4 (1907): 43.
- ⁹¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 5 (1904): 130; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 211, 230-31.
- ⁹² Ali Behdad, *Belated Travelers* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 48.
- ⁹³ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 142.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid., 143.
- ⁹⁵ Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 79, 81.
- ⁹⁶ M. Høyer to the Committee, December 1904, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 2 (1904): 66-71; M. Høyer, "Hjemløse Folk," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 2 (1913): 16-17.
- ⁹⁷ M. Høyer, "Hjemløse Folk," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 2 (1913): 16.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid., 14.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid., 17.
- ¹⁰⁰ M. Høyer to the Committee, January 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 2 (1905): 72.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid., 73; O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 2 (1905): 78.
- ¹⁰² O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 4 (1904): 122.
- ¹⁰³ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1906, bundle 25, DKA; M. Høyer to the Committee, April 1903, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 1 (1903): 91; O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 2 (1904): 26.
- ¹⁰⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1905, bundle 25, DKA.
- ¹⁰⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 2 (1906): 21-22.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 22-23.
- ¹⁰⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 7 (1905): 148-49; O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 3 (1906): 46.
- ¹⁰⁸ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 7 (1905): 148-49.
- ¹⁰⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 2 (1906): 27.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid.; O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 1 (1906): 7.
- ¹¹¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 3 (1906): 45.
- ¹¹² Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, 52; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 230-31.
- ¹¹³ Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, 52; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 232-35.
- ¹¹⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 5 (1906): 69.

-
- ¹¹⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 11 (1907): 130-31.
- ¹¹⁶ Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, May 1907, bundle 25, DKA.
- ¹¹⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 3 (1906): 44.
- ¹¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 5 (1906): 69; O. Høyer, "Kairo-Konferencen," *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 5 (1906): 67.
- ¹²⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 5 (1906): 69.
- ¹²¹ Ibid., 70.
- ¹²² *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 2 (1906): 29-31; *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 3 (1908): 27-29.
- ¹²³ DKA Committee notes, November 1908, bundle 25, DKA.
- ¹²⁴ Zwemer, *The Mohammedan World of Today*, 93.
- ¹²⁵ Ibid., 91.
- ¹²⁶ Ibid., 82, 94-95.
- ¹²⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 6 (1904): 141; Borch-Jensen, *Ved Milepælen*, 13.
- ¹²⁸ O. Høyer, "Til Drengeskole-Spørgsmaalet," Aden, 1928, bundle 30, folder 17, DKA; O. Høyer, "Missionen og dens Fremtidsudsigter," *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 1 (1904): 3.
- ¹²⁹ O. Høyer, "Til Drengeskole-Spørgsmaalet, Aden, 1928, bundle 25, folder 17, DKA.
- ¹³⁰ Annual report to the Committee, Shaykh Uthman, 1905, bundle 25, DKA.
- ¹³¹ O. Høyer, "Til Drengeskole-Spørgsmaalet," Aden, 1928, bundle 25, folder 17, DKA; Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 178.
- ¹³² O. Høyer to the Committee, Shaykh Uthman, 1905, bundle 25, DKA.
- ¹³³ Annual report to the Committee, Shaykh Uthman, 1905, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, February-March 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 3 (1905): 83, 88, 90.
- ¹³⁴ Committee notes, 1905, bundle 25, DKA.
- ¹³⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 7 (1906): 95.
- ¹³⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 10 (1906): 132; O. Høyer speech to the annual mission conference, August 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 8 (1908): 95.
- ¹³⁷ M. Høyer to the Committee, March 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 5 (1907): 55.
- ¹³⁸ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 10 (1906): 131; M. Høyer, "Hvor er Aisa henne?" *Fra Arabien* 9, no. 12 (1910): 131.
- ¹³⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, "Hodeidah, Sana, Makalla," 1907, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer speech to the annual mission conference, August 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 8 (1908): 87-88.
- ¹⁴⁰ *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 10 (1906): 135; M. Høyer to the Committee, March 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 5 (1907): 53.
- ¹⁴¹ Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, May 1907, bundle 25, DKA.
- ¹⁴² O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1904, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 3, no. 1 (1904): 13.
- ¹⁴³ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 3 (1905): 88-90.
- ¹⁴⁴ O. Høyer, "Nogle tanker om anvendelse af straf i skolen på missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 6 (1905): 128.
- ¹⁴⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 1 (1907): 9.
- ¹⁴⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 7 (1906): 96-97; O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 5 (1907): 57.
- ¹⁴⁷ Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, May 1907, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 5 (1907): 57.
- ¹⁴⁸ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 10 (1906): 130.
- ¹⁴⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 6 (1907): 71.
- ¹⁵⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1904, reproduced in *Fra Hebron* 3, no. 5 (1904): 127; O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 1 (1908): 5; O. Høyer, "Vore indfødte Medarbejdere," *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 2 (1908): 18-19.
- ¹⁵¹ O. Høyer, "En Festdag for Missionen i Syd-Arabien," *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 7 (1907): 89; Nielsen, *På Pionermission*, 24.
- ¹⁵² O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 11 (1907): 128-30.
- ¹⁵³ Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 180.
- ¹⁵⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 11 (1907): 126-27; O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 5 (1908): 51.

-
- ¹⁵⁵ O. Høyer, "Til Drengeskole-Spørgsmaalet," Aden, 1928, bundle 30, folder 17, DKA.
- ¹⁵⁶ Ibid.; O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 5 (1908): 51-52.
- ¹⁵⁷ O. Høyer, "Lidt muhammedansk Teologi," *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 6 (1906): 80; O. Høyer, "Lidt om Koranen," *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 5 (1916): 67.
- ¹⁵⁸ O. Høyer, "Missionsmarken og Hodejda," *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 11 (1912): 139-40.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 12 (1907): 142-43; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 236.
- ¹⁶⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, Shaykh Uthman, November 1909, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁶¹ Ibid.; O. Høyer to the Committee, "Læreren Salih Hassan," Shaykh Uthman, December 1909, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁶² O. Høyer to the Committee, "Hovedopgaven for os ville være inde i Yemen," Shaykh Uthman, December 1909, bundle 27, DKA; O. Høyer, "Vore indfødte Medarbejdere," *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 2 (1908): 17.
- ¹⁶³ O. Høyer to the Committee, "Læreren Salih Hassan," Shaykh Uthman, December 1909, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁶⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, Shaykh Uthman, December 1909, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, Shaykh Uthman, December 1909, bundle 27, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1910, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 9, no. 7 (1910): 64.
- ¹⁶⁸ *Fra Arabien*, "Missionsmarkens Regnskab, 1.7.09 – 30.6.10," 9, no. 12 (1910): 137.
- ¹⁶⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, August 1910, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 9, no. 12 (1910): 108; Nielsen, *Der kæmpes om Arabien*, 180-81.
- ¹⁷⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁷¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, June 1910, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁷² O. Høyer, "Lidt om Syd-Arabien i Fortid og Nutid," *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 4 (1907): 44-45; O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1909, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 9, no. 3 (1910): 22.
- ¹⁷³ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1910, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 9, no. 5 (1910): 42-43.
- ¹⁷⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 6 (1911): 73.
- ¹⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 7 (1911): 98-99.
- ¹⁷⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 5 (1913): 56.
- ¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 58.
- ¹⁷⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, August 1910, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁸⁰ M. Høyer, *Kvinden: Fri eller Træl* (Holte: Danske Kirkemissions Forlag, 1925), 28.
- ¹⁸¹ M. Høyer, *Abrahams Døtre*, 3: 27.
- ¹⁸² Ibid.
- ¹⁸³ Maria and Oluf Høyer to the Committee, March 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 4 (1911): 51, 53.
- ¹⁸⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, April 1911, bundle 27, DKA; M. Høyer to the Committee, July 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 9 (1911): 126-27.
- ¹⁸⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, April 1911, bundle 27, DKA; O. Høyer, "Vil den danske Kirke være med til at bringe Arabien Evangeliet?" *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 11 (1911): 151; O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1912, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 8-9 (1912): 105.
- ¹⁸⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1910, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 2 (1911): 16-17; O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 3 (1911): 41.
- ¹⁸⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, April 1911, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁸⁸ M. Høyer to the Committee, July 1910, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 9, no. 9 (1910): 98, 100.
- ¹⁸⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, April 1911, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁹¹ O. Høyer, "Missionsmarken og Hodejda," *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 11 (1912): 138-39.
- ¹⁹² O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 4 (1911): 48-49.
- ¹⁹³ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, April 1911, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁹⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1910, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 9, no. 3 (1910): 26.
- ¹⁹⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, August 1910, bundle 27, DKA.
- ¹⁹⁶ Zwemer, *The Mohammedan World of Today*, 84-85.
- ¹⁹⁷ Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, 45; Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen*, 3.
- ¹⁹⁸ O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 5 (1905): 122.
- ¹⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 4 (1905): 111.

- ²⁰¹ G. Wyman Bury, *Arabia Infelix or the Turks in Yamen* (London: Macmillan, 1915), 119-121; Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, 58.
- ²⁰² O. Høyer, "Hodejda – Sana – Makalla," May 1907, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, April-May 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 6 (1907): 67-68; Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 182.
- ²⁰³ O. Høyer, "Hodejda – Sana – Makalla," May 1907, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1907, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 6 (1907): 68.
- ²⁰⁴ O. Høyer, "Hodejda – Sana – Makalla," May 1907, bundle 25, DKA.
- ²⁰⁵ O. Høyer, "Et Råb om Frihed for de muhammedanske Kvinder," *Fra Arabien* 8, no. 2 (1909): 15.
- ²⁰⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 5 (1908): 57; Sardar, *Orientalism*, 30-31. For further discussion see Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Ottomans* (London: Viking, 1993).
- ²⁰⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1908, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 5 (1908): 57.
- ²⁰⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁰⁹ *Fra Arabien* 8, no. 2 (1909): 19; Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 182.
- ²¹⁰ "Udtog af et Brev fra Menahra i Yemens Bjærg," *Fra Arabien* 8, no. 2 (1909): 18-19.
- ²¹¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 5 (1911): 62.
- ²¹² Ibid.
- ²¹³ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1910, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 1 (1911): 10.
- ²¹⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, "Hodejda," April 1911, bundle 27, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 5 (1911): 60-62.
- ²¹⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 5 (1911): 60.
- ²¹⁶ Ibid.; Bury, *Arabia Infelix*, 127.
- ²¹⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, "Hodejda," April 1911, bundle 27, DKA.
- ²¹⁸ O. Høyer, "Lidt om Islam," *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 12 (1907): 26; O. Høyer, "Foredrag," *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 6 (1908): 68.
- ²¹⁹ "Årsmødet i Herning: Missionær Høyers Foredrag," *Fra Arabien* 7, no. 8 (1908): 94.
- ²²⁰ O. Høyer, "Vil den danske Kirke være med til at bringe Arabien Evangeliet?" *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 10 (1911): 139-40.
- ²²¹ Ibid.; O. Høyer, "Lidt om Islam," *Fra Arabien* 6, no. 12 (1907): 138.
- ²²² O. Høyer to the Committee, "Hodejda," April 1911, bundle 27, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 5 (1911): 65; Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 241.
- ²²³ O. Høyer, "Forholdene i Yemen," *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 6 (1911): 76-86.
- ²²⁴ Ibid., 81-82.
- ²²⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 5 (1911): 61.
- ²²⁶ Alfred Levinsen to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 3 May 1911, "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protection," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²²⁷ Danish Foreign Ministry to Ambassador C. Brun, "Beskyttelse af danske i Hodeida," 8 May 1911, no. 132, "Britisk Protection for danske i Arabien," Gruppe 7, o, 36.X.44. Gesandtskabet London. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945; C. Brun to Sir Arthur Nicolson, 10 May 1911, "Britisk Protection for danske i Arabien," Gruppe 7, o, 36.X.44. Gesandtskabet London. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²²⁸ Sir Edward Grey to C. Brun, 21 June 1911, 22659/11, Foreign Office, copy in "Britisk Protection for danske i Arabien," Gruppe 7, o, 36.X.44. Gesandtskabet London. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²²⁹ British diplomatic correspondence to the Swedish Embassy in Istanbul, 18 June 1911, "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protection," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945. The Swedish government handled Danish affairs within the Ottoman Empire as Denmark did not have an embassy in Istanbul.
- ²³⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 6 (1911): 73; O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 8 (1911): 103.
- ²³¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, May 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 6 (1911): 73.
- ²³² O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, September 1911, copy in "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protection," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²³³ Ibid.; O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, August 1911, copy in "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protection," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²³⁴ O. Høyer to the Committee, June 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 8 (1911): 105-06; O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, September 1911, copy in "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protection," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²³⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 8 (1911): 109.

-
- ²³⁶ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1911, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 10, no. 12 (1911): 169.
- ²³⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, February 1912, copy in "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protektion," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²³⁸ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1912, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 2 (1912): 20-21; O. Høyer, "Lidt om 'Tripolis' Spørgsmaalet," *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 7 (1912): 91-94.
- ²³⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁴⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, February 1912, copy in "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protektion," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²⁴¹ Ibid.; O. Høyer, "Missionsmarken og Hodejda," *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 11 (1912): 142.
- ²⁴² *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 8 (1912): 97.
- ²⁴³ O. Høyer, "Hodejda atter aabnet," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 1 (1913): 5.
- ²⁴⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁴⁵ Bury, *Arabia Infelix*, 128.
- ²⁴⁶ M. Høyer to the Committee, March 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 4 (1913): 47-48.
- ²⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁴⁸ O. Høyer, "Lægmission i Syd-Arabien," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 5 (1913): 54.
- ²⁴⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 11 (1913): 127-28.
- ²⁵⁰ P. Wissenberg to the Danish Foreign Ministry, 7 July 1914, "Familien Høyer – Hodejda – ønsker Britisk protektion," 16.X.44. Udenrigsministeriet, 1909-1945.
- ²⁵¹ O. Høyer, "Beretning fra Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 11 (1914): 158.
- ²⁵² O. Høyer to the Committee, October 1914, reproduced *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 11 (1914): 172.
- ²⁵³ Ibid., 173.
- ²⁵⁴ O. Høyer, "Beretning fra Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 15, no. 10 (1915): 108.
- ²⁵⁵ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 3 (1913): 28; O. Høyer, "Eget Hus i Aden," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 4 (1913): 42; O. Høyer to the Committee, April 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 5 (1913): 59.
- ²⁵⁶ O. Høyer to S. Thubron, Chairman of the Aden Settlement, 2 July 1913, folder 1, bundle 29, DKA; Extract from proceedings of the Executive Committee of Aden, 28 July 1913, copy in folder 1, bundle 29, DKA; Correspondence with the Education Office in Aden regarding school registration, August 1913, folder 2, bundle 29, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 9 (1913): 101.
- ²⁵⁷ O. Høyer to the Committee, January 1914, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 3 (1914): 28.
- ²⁵⁸ *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 11 (1914): 163; "Et dansk missionsværk i Adén," *Berlingske Tidende*, 26 April 1914.
- ²⁵⁹ Bombay Education Department form filled out and submitted by O. Høyer, 1914, folder 2, bundle 29, DKA; *Fra Arabien* 15, no. 2 (1915): 19.
- ²⁶⁰ O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1912, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 5 (1912): 60; O. Høyer, "Missionsmarken og Hodejda," *Fra Arabien* 11, no. 11 (1912): 137.
- ²⁶¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, July 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 9 (1913): 99.
- ²⁶² O. Høyer, Outline of Curriculum, 17 April 1911, bundle 27, DKA; O. Høyer, "Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 12 (1913): 140; O. Høyer, "Beretning fra Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 11 (1914): 151. The mission school taught courses in Indian history, geography, and weights and measures. In 1913 two students graduated to accept government jobs, a number which was doubled the following year.
- ²⁶³ O. Høyer to Ibrahim Khan, 19 March 1913, folder 4, bundle 29, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, December 1913, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 2 (1914): 21; O. Høyer to the Committee, March 1914, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 4 (1914): 46.
- ²⁶⁴ O. Høyer, "Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 12 (1913): 140; *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 6 (1914): 69; O. Høyer, "Beretning fra Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 11 (1914): 154-55.
- ²⁶⁵ O. Høyer, "Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 13, no. 12 (1913): 141.
- ²⁶⁶ O. Høyer, "Beretning fra Missionsmarken," *Fra Arabien* 14, no. 11 (1914): 153.
- ²⁶⁷ Ibid., 149-50.
- ²⁶⁸ Bidwell, *The Two Yemens*, 61.
- ²⁶⁹ O. Høyer to the Committee, November 1914, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 15, no. 1 (1915): 6; O. Høyer to the Committee, February 1915, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 15, no. 3 (1915): 32.
- ²⁷⁰ Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, 23-24 June 1915, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer to the Committee, undated, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 15, no. 5 (1915): 52.
- ²⁷¹ Gavin, *Aden under British Rule*, 249; Mackintosh-Smith, *Yemen: The Unknown Arabia*, 150.

- ²⁷² Ibrahim Sujjan to O. Høyer, 10 August 1915 and 6 August 1916, folder 5, bundle 29, DKA; Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, 24 May 1916, bundle 25, DKA; O. Høyer, "Beretning," *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 12 (1916): 143.
- ²⁷³ O. Høyer, "Nyt fra Adén," *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 10 (1916): 117; Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, May 1918, bundle 25, DKA.
- ²⁷⁴ Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, 25 May 1916, bundle 25, DKA; *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 12 (1916): 147; *Fra Arabien* 17, no. 11 (1917): 132.
- ²⁷⁵ O. Høyer, "Var Muhammed Antikrist?, I" *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 1 (1916): 8-10.
- ²⁷⁶ Ibid., 11-13.
- ²⁷⁷ O. Høyer, "Var Muhammed Antikrist?, II" *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 2 (1916): 17-19.
- ²⁷⁸ O. Høyer, "Muhammad," *Fra Hebron* 2, no. 1 (1902): 39; O. Høyer, "Var Muhammed Antikrist?, III" *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 3 (1916): 34-36.
- ²⁷⁹ O. Høyer, "Var Muhammed Antikrist?, III" *Fra Arabien* 16, no. 3 (1916): 36.
- ²⁸⁰ O. Høyer speech at the DKA annual conference, May 1918, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 18, no. 6 (1918): 57-58; O. Høyer to the Committee, undated, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 19, no. 2 (1919): 14-15.
- ²⁸¹ O. Høyer to the Committee, undated, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 19, no. 2 (1919): 19-20.
- ²⁸² *Fra Arabien* 15, no. 11 (1915): 126; Nielsen, *På Pionermission i Arabien*, 28.
- ²⁸³ M. Henriksen to Secretary Wissenberg, Aden, 4 January 1920, bundle 25, DKA; M. Henriksen to Secretary Wissenberg, Aden, 2 December 1920, bundle 25, DKA.
- ²⁸⁴ O. Høyer speech to the DKA annual conference, June 1920, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 20, no. 7-8 (1920): 78.
- ²⁸⁵ Udskrift af Forhandlingsprotokollen, 26 February 1921, bundle 25, DKA.
- ²⁸⁶ Rasmussen to Pastor Nyborg, Aden, 7 October 1924, bundle 33, DKA.
- ²⁸⁷ C. E. Ørberg, ed., *Arabien for Kristus* (Esbjerg: Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien, 1930), 72-74; Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 190.
- ²⁸⁸ *Årsberetning for Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien, 1927-1928*, folder 18, bundle 30, DKA; O. Høyer, "Til Drengeskole-spørgsmaalet," Aden, 1928, folder 17, bundle 30, DKA; Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 191.
- ²⁸⁹ *Årsberetning for Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien, 1927-1928*, folder 18, bundle 30, DKA.
- ²⁹⁰ O. Høyer, "Til Drengeskole-spørgsmaalet," Aden, 1928, folder 17, bundle 30, DKA.
- ²⁹¹ Ibid.
- ²⁹² O. Høyer to the Committee, Aden, 17 February 1928, folder 17, bundle 30, DKA.
- ²⁹³ Ibid.; O. Høyer to Pastor C. E. Ørberg, Aden, 10 April 1928, folder 17, bundle 30, DKA.
- ²⁹⁴ O. Høyer to Pastor C. E. Ørberg, Aden, 10 April 1928, folder 17, bundle 30, DKA.
- ²⁹⁵ O. Høyer, introduction to the unpublished manuscript of the Danish translation of H. R. Jessup's book, *Kamil Abdul Masin*, Hebron, November 1902, bundle 34, DKA.
- ²⁹⁶ M. Høyer to the Committee, October 1905, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 4, no. 6 (1905): 139; M. Høyer to the Committee, October 1909, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 8, no. 12 (1909): 137.
- ²⁹⁷ M. Høyer to the Committee, April 1906, reproduced in *Fra Arabien* 5, no. 5 (1906): 72.
- ²⁹⁸ Nielsen, *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*, 190.

CHAPTER THREE

VIKINGS IN THE SAND: THE TRAVELS OF BARCLAY RAUNKIÆR AND KNUD HOLMBOE

The configuration of Europe's empires was fundamentally altered during the first half of the twentieth century. In the wake of the First World War, the German Empire was dissolved and its holdings on the continent significantly truncated. The Russian Empire was similarly trimmed of territories in Europe, and the new communist leadership denounced unequivocally czarist-era claims on foreign lands. Even greater transformations resulted from the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the former replaced by a myriad of independent states and the latter by an array of mandates under the administration of the principal, namely Britain and France, European victors of the global conflict. However, in Anatolia, the sheer determination of Turkish nationalists succeeded in wresting control of their own destiny and thwarting European designs on large tracts of the peninsula. Towards the close of the interwar period, Germany too had engineered a remarkable recovery under a determined regime that had positioned the country to make a spectacular and devastating bid to reconstitute and expand its continental empire. The Soviet Union, quite oblivious to its former rejection of territorial expansion, similarly stood poised to expand its borders and initiate its transition toward becoming a global superpower. And Italy, seemingly invigorated by its fascist leadership, had made significant strides to assert itself as an empire.

In the Middle East, the volatile political environment evident across Europe was watched with great interest. The decades-long struggle for dominance between the leading powers provided opportunities for regional nationalists and ambitious leaders to perhaps exploit those rivalries. Already during the 1920s, the Turks had successfully used Soviet aid to win their war of independence, and during the Arab Revolt in Palestine trickles of German and Italian support made its way to bolster the uprising against British rule and the influx of Jewish immigrants. However, the European powers sought primarily to protect their own interests and were responsible for significant levels of intrigue and outright violence against the local populations. In such an environment of suspicion and hostility, citizens of smaller European states could operate between the domestic and foreign actors as perceived neutrals. Two men who exploited that ability were the Danes Barclay Raunkiær (1889-1915) and Knud Holmboe (1902-31), each an adventurer eager to explore and uncover the nuances of traditional Middle Eastern societies.¹ Both were drawn to experience life in the desert, a part of the countryside that in the imaginations of the West was a dreamlike, mysterious realm. But the desolate landscapes of sandy, arid plains and rocky plateaus too were reputedly fraught with dangers that demanded the utmost courage of the travelers who ventured to traverse those regions. Denmark had two such men in Raunkiær and Holmboe, who bravely endured the harsh environments and interacted with the local people of whom they knew little. Their accounts, reflecting the Orientalist goal of penetrating Eastern societies, provided a sharp contrast of views, as one man felt repulsed by what he encountered while the other seemed enchanted. On their journeys the Danes also bore witness to the face of empire in the region and how one population group, the Bedouin, struggled to assert their independence. In eastern and central Arabia, Raunkiær observed a weakened and fading Ottoman Empire gradually yielding to the vibrant forces of an emerging Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. And in Cyrenaica, Holmboe saw the valiant Sanusi Order bitterly resisting Italy's occupation of Libya,

and Italian efforts to crush traditional ways of life.

The Making of Two Adventurers

Youth is often a deceptive indicator of inexperience and naiveté. The lack of years suggests that a person does not as yet possess the knowledge and insight enjoyed by individuals more senior in age. Factors that can mitigate such seemingly natural limitations are socialization and an upbringing in a stimulating intellectual environment. Barclay Raunkiær grew up in a household providing very much the proper setting for cultivating the mind of a bright youth since his father, Christen (d. 1938), was a famed botanist and his mother, Ingeborg (d. 1921), was an accomplished writer.² Together they instilled in their son the importance of education and helped him attain the necessary discipline to become an academic. Beginning in 1908, the young Raunkiær entered university to study geography, developing a particular interest in the affect of the physical environment on the evolution of cultures. Just the following year, he accompanied his parents to southern Europe and North Africa where his father was to conduct field work, and, when not assisting the older Raunkiær in his research, the son devoted his time to independent studies, focusing especially on the development of agriculture and the role of irrigation in Tunisia. Carefully tracing the history and nuance of farming activities in the region, based both on classical and medieval accounts and on more contemporary studies, he formed an understanding of how best to cultivate the land. Raunkiær argued that through scientific evaluations of the soil and climate in central Tunisia, combined with the proper planting of crops on optimal locations and the judicious use of irrigation systems, a significant revival of large-scale agriculture was possible in the fertile plains of the area. About a year after returning to Denmark, he published his findings in *Geografisk Tidsskrift*, the prestigious journal of *Det Kongelige Danske Geografiske Selskab* (KDGS or the Royal Danish Geographical Society), an achievement that generated academic exposure and served to underscore the younger Raunkiær's qualities as a serious and competent scholar.³ Within only months of the article's publication, he was approached by members of the KDGS board and offered the opportunity to join a proposed expedition to the southeastern shores of the Arabian Peninsula.

Over the two years between 1909-1911, Danish planners had been persistently working on a venture to send two Danes to Oman and the Hadramawt.⁴ Through diplomatic channels and the good offices of the Danish foreign ministry, the KDGS had sought to secure for the expedition protections and assurances from the British whose empire held sway over the region. In detailed reports to the ministry and Britain's ambassador, the Society explained its intentions to land a party of explorers at the port of Muscat and have the men traverse the desert areas of the interior.⁵ Touted as a strictly scientific expedition in the spirit of the 18th century travels of Carsten Niebuhr (1733-1815), the Danes were to conduct studies "of these little or entirely unknown regions" in the fields of physical geography and ethnography as well as anthropology and archaeology.⁶ Lieutenant M. J. H. Davidsen, an artillery officer, was selected to lead the expedition due to his knowledge of Arabic, and Raunkiær, having impressed with his independent research, was chosen to complete the team.⁷ However, within only weeks of having requested British support, the carefully laid plans began to unravel as the empire declined any possibility of extending protections to the Danes. In a matter-of-fact reply, the British Foreign Office declared:

[H]is Majesty's Government have always been unwilling to protect their own officers and subjects in the regions which the Danish expedition proposes to visit, and...they do not in fact allow British travelers to enter

those regions. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government, to their great regret, find themselves unable to accord any facilities to the Danish explorers or offer them any protection.⁸

The KDGS was rather taken aback by the decision because Raunkiær, in anticipation of British approval, had already been dispatched to London to gain access to the general staff's topographical department and study whatever maps and information was available about southern Arabia.⁹

But the Society was hardly dissuaded from pursuing its goals, and less than two months later it again petitioned the Danish foreign ministry to use diplomacy to convince another empire, this time the Ottoman, to allow a similar expedition.¹⁰ Hoping to quickly win the needed support, the KDGS planned an ambitious, six-month exploration of the region surrounding Hofuf in Eastern Arabia and the lands to the southwest of Baghdad and Basra. In the early fall of 1911, even before any such Ottoman endorsement was secured, Davidsen made his way to Egypt to prepare for the expedition. However, within a short time of his arrival, the Danish officer abandoned his affiliation with the KDGS and chose instead to join a British venture under W. F. Hume, the director of the Geological Museum in Cairo.¹¹ That decision left Raunkiær as the sole participant of the Danish project, and, despite a six-month effort to supplement his knowledge of Arabic by taking lessons from Frants Buhl (1850-1932), the famed Orientalist, the young Dane seemed unprepared to solely assume the responsibilities of leadership.¹² Yet the KDGS board retained confidence in the man it had chosen, and in early November it issued to him detailed instructions for the expedition. Within a budget of 5,000 crowns, Raunkiær was to conduct a preliminary exploration of the lands of Eastern Arabia in preparation for a full-scale Danish expedition to the region.¹³ The Society hoped that from a base camp in Hofuf a number of journeys could be made to the south and southwest, with a premium placed on gathering new information. Security, however, was emphasized and Raunkiær was told to always seek, where possible, local Ottoman assistance as well as err on the side of caution by not venturing forth from a set location before competent guides were hired and reliable intelligence collected. In addition, the utmost respect for Islam and religious sensibilities was called for at every stage of the journey in order to not undermine the KDGS's prospects for developing the region as a future zone of exploration.¹⁴ Raunkiær was consequently entrusted with assuring the Society's immediate future in Eastern Arabia and with conducting the requisite, preliminary reconnaissance needed to compile a foundation of rudimentary geographic and ethnographic knowledge.

The drive to explore the Middle East and to uncover and disseminate information about the vast region was similarly evident in the relatively short journalistic career of Knud Holmboe. Born into a life of upper middle class privilege, Holmboe, whose father was an industrialist from Horsens in Central Jutland, enjoyed a sound upbringing within an inspirational family that emphasized humanism and free will. As the oldest of seven children, Holmboe seemed naturally destined to assume a leading role in the family business, however, his sense of independence and innate passion for spirituality led him to abandon academic pursuits and to seriously consider studying for the priesthood after having converted to Catholicism in 1921 at the age of nineteen.¹⁵ Yet commitment to his new-found religion soon faded and was supplanted by the pursuit of a career in journalism. In that profession, especially in his capacity as a foreign correspondent and freelance reporter, Holmboe blossomed into a recognized name on the pages of Danish newspapers and became renowned for securing interviews with and access to well-known political figures and national leaders across Europe. During the mid-1920s, Holmboe also made his first forays into North Africa and the Middle East where his travels carried him from Morocco to

Persia, and his decade-long body of writings came to reflect his intellectual evolution from a seemingly characteristic Western reporter promulgating a typically Orientalist perspective to a fierce defender of Islam and distinctly Middle Eastern societies.

Holmboe's initial experience in the region came in 1924 on the occasion of having flown from Europe to Morocco, in large measure to meet and interview the Danish Prince Aage who was a famed officer in the French Foreign Legion.¹⁶ In the North African country, the setting for his first book published that same year, the Dane witnessed on his visit to the front lines "a religious war," as he defined it, and a conflict that was "a combat between the old, petrified culture and modern individualistic civilization."¹⁷ He found that French colonial objectives and policies, including the execution of prisoners, were justified by the intractable fanaticism of the enemy, an enemy for which he had no sympathy and he described as "brown men" who were largely "brigands."¹⁸ As he saw it, "the Arabs, conquered or independent alike, are the enemies of all Europeans by nature," and even the native resistance itself was presented as a movement fueled more by petty revenge than nationalism.¹⁹ According to Holmboe, the leader of the regional insurrection, Abd al-Karim, harbored an intense hatred for the Spanish stemming from once having been insulted and assaulted on a Tetuan street by a Spanish officer in a dispute over a woman. The Orientalist themes of regional irrationalism and excessive emotion therefore pervaded Holmboe's manufactured image of the East, as did those of filth and barbarism.

The tone of the young Dane's reporting and analysis continued over the ten months (1925-1926) of an extensive journey that saw him travel from Turkey through the Levant and onwards to Iraq and Persia. In Smyrna (Izmir), on the western shores of Anatolia, Holmboe toured the ruins of the city and concluded that the "Asianization" process which had unfolded there was symbolic of the new Turkey's will and determination.²⁰ The manifestations of nationalism were equally evident in Palestine, where the fervent Zionists, whom Holmboe termed "the vanguard of atheism's civilization," were rapidly laying the foundations for a new nation.²¹ He correctly identified the tensions between the religious and political wings of the movement, but also touted the seemingly unique bond between Western capitalists and Eastern colonists as fostering a communism that evolved naturally from within the society rather than one imposed by force of arms or dictatorial leaders.²² And while expressing sympathy for the industrious Zionists and their religiously devoted fellow Jews, Holmboe was quite critical of Christian feuding within Palestine, as he found it tarnished the religion and its adherents.²³

His assessments of the local populations and conditions were hardly improved as he made his way further East. Having secured a letter of introduction to meet King Faisal and promises of financial support from a Palestinian political group to cover travel expenses, Holmboe set off in the summer of 1925, headed for Baghdad as a passenger of the Nairn Transport Company.²⁴ Yet his stay in Iraq soon soured as local politics disrupted his plans and the anticipated monies were never forthcoming. The Dane instead was plagued by intermittent illness, was robbed during one instance when he was bedridden, and accumulated a considerable debt based on living expenses and medical costs. In a letter to his parents he also complained about the climate and lamented that Baghdad was "a muddle of filth and unpleasant people."²⁵ His audience with "Islam's pope", as Holmboe described the resident shaykh ul-Islam, produced a similarly unflattering account of the city and presented the religious leader as both unimpressive and seemingly corrupt.²⁶ The published article therefore confirmed the prevailing Orientalist view that the Middle East, even the legendary, fairy tale city of Baghdad, was locked in a state of decay. And by October 1925, after months in the region, including visits to both Isfahan and Tehran, Holmboe had seen his enthusiasm for adventure sapped, and he craved a means to escape both the gloom and

his debts.²⁷ In fact, allegedly on the advice of the British police chief in Baghdad, the young Dane simply slipped out of the city, narrowly avoiding arrest as he secured transport back to the Levant.

Upon his return to Denmark, Holmboe should seemingly have had his fill of the Middle East, but in 1928 he ventured back to that cultural sphere by choosing to settle in Morocco. With a young wife and child in tow, he sought to establish himself as a businessman in the North African country, and within months of his arrival, he and another Dane founded The Morocco Northern Exporting Company.²⁸ Holmboe was also induced to return by an emerging interest in Islam, an attraction, he would later write, that first began in 1926 when he witnessed Muslims at prayer in the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.²⁹ Intrigued and fundamentally affected by the experience, finding that Islam harbored the essential elements of truth and authenticity, his early curiosity would eventually blossom into conversion and fervent devotion to the religion. However, as an entrepreneur the young Dane had little success, and by August 1929, he found himself in Gibraltar hard at work on plans to reverse his fortunes.³⁰ Holmboe pledged to his father a commitment to rehabilitate his name after the financial setback in Morocco, and described in detail his intentions to travel through Northeastern Africa and live for several months in Ethiopia.³¹ His hope was to generate a living by refocusing on his career as a freelance journalist and lecturer, and over the subsequent months he wrote of numerous prospective trips and tentative deals with a wide range of foreign publications from the *National Geographic Magazine* to the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Times* of London.³² He also developed plans, together with two Englishmen, to travel by car across much of the core Middle East, from Damascus to Baghdad, down to the shores of the Persian Gulf and onwards to Hofuf, and then across the Arabian Peninsula through Riyadh to the Red Sea.³³

But none of these journeys ever came to fruition. Holmboe was instead limited to conduct a trip by himself from Morocco to Egypt in 1930. That trip, however, became determinative for the rest of his brief life. His experiences came to form the basis for his second and most famous travel account, *Ørkenen brænder!* (English version, *Desert Encounter*) and served to deepen his convictions about the truths of Islam and the faults of Western secular society. In fact, by the time Holmboe set off on his drive across North Africa, he had only just formally accepted Islam a few months earlier in 1929 during a brief visit to England. In Woking, southwest of London, at the European center of the Ahmadiyya movement, the young journalist became perhaps the first Dane to embrace Islam, taking the name Ali Ahmad al-Gheseiri.³⁴ His transformation was also evident in letters to his parents in the fall of 1929 when he remarked with regret that the rebellion in the Rif had been defeated and that Europeans misunderstood the Muslim Arabs and failed to appreciate their qualities.³⁵ “At home in Denmark,” he declared, “people believe that the Arabs are wild. [Truly] they are not as civilized as the Europeans, but they are far more cultured and the Muslim Arab’s morality is of the highest order in the world.”³⁶ He further argued that European influences tended to corrupt rather than improve the Arab nation, and asserted that Arab violence, such as occurred in Palestine, was not, as he wrote years earlier, due to innate and irrational character traits, but rather attributable to deeper and more complex factors.³⁷ By 1930, Holmboe had dismissed the Orientalist interpretations and definitions of Arabs and Muslims, and over the subsequent months his interactions with the North African populations would serve to reinforce his new understanding of the people and their culture.

Setting Forth

With the preparations finalized, Raunkiær departed, much as Holmboe would do two decades later, on a memorable journey through very unfamiliar country. Having secured Ottoman approval for travel to the far fringes of the empire, the Dane headed for Istanbul on 12 November 1911 to collect a series of letters of introduction to Ottoman officials along the route. The Swedish consul in the capital had helped to secure such papers, as Denmark lacked representation in the city, and throughout the journey assistance offered by foreign diplomats would be an important and recurring service. As Raunkiær made his way variously by rail, ship, and car en route to Baghdad, and passed through Mersina, Alexandretta, and Aleppo, the consuls from both Norway and Britain provided aid, and in Iraq the Swedish and French consuls helped him to recruit a Christian Arab from Mosul as an English-speaking guide.³⁸ The Ottoman governor in Basra was similarly very forthcoming in offering assistance, and Raunkiær remarked that “[he] gave me a hearty welcome and supported my plans with the strongest interest and almost fatherly care.”³⁹ However, evidence of cordial relations with the Ottomans tended to have a rather negative effect the further south the Dane advanced. Once he reached Kuwait, it was apparent that Ottoman control of the city was rather tenuous and that his status as a traveler under imperial protection raised suspicions. Not only was the local ruler, Shaykh Mubarak al-Sabah (d. 1915), uneasy about Raunkiær’s presence, but the British believed the German-speaking Dane might be an agent of their main European rival.⁴⁰ Serious thought was therefore given to blocking Raunkiær’s access to the Arabian hinterlands, yet eventually the British Political Agent stationed at Kuwait, William Shakespear (d. 1915), emerged as a staunch supporter of the Dane’s trip and became instrumental in securing his further passage. The young Scandinavian acknowledged as much in almost every account he published after the completed journey, and noted that the Briton both persuaded Shaykh Mubarak to forego his concerns and helped negotiate terms for the services of an experienced guide to the interior.⁴¹ But Raunkiær also credited his own machinations for winning the shaykh’s approval. He alleged that by convincing the elderly Arab of the terrible inconvenience a route toward the interior would pose, the ruler then approved exactly such a route that in turn was one the Dane secretly desired!⁴²

The time required for negotiations and preparations for travel to Central Arabia meant that Raunkiær remained in Kuwait City for almost four weeks. During those many days he familiarized himself thoroughly with the urban landscape and described it in later writings as an area of vibrant commercial activity and exchange. “Kuwait,” he stressed, “is undoubtedly the most important trading city on Arabia’s eastern shore,” and “must be considered as the key to Mesopotamia” as well as the interior.⁴³ Serving as a dual port, attracting both caravans and fleets of ships, the otherwise rather desolate coastline and bay had become a point of significant import and export trade. In early 1912, Raunkiær estimated that the commercial pearling fleet alone consisted of about five hundred vessels and employed 10-15,000 workers, most of whom streamed to the town as seasonal labor.⁴⁴ The cosmopolitan nature and ethnic diversity of the port city, so evident in the mingling of Wahhabi Bedouin with Persian merchants and the common use of rupees and pounds in the Ottoman-claimed area, was further underscored by the presence of U.S. missionaries. Less than two years before Raunkiær’s arrival, the Dutch Reformed Church of America, which had been active in the region since 1889, established a branch of its Arabian Mission in Kuwait and shortly thereafter added a medical clinic under the direction of Dr. Paul W. Harrison (b. 1883).⁴⁵ The Dane, who expressed skepticism about the success of such a mission in an environment of strong Muslim faith, came to benefit from the avail-

ability of U. S. medical care, as when he fell ill, Dr. Harrison treated his ailment. Their encounter too highlighted the meeting of two men with quite divergent opinions of the local population.

Over the first months and initial few years following his return to Denmark, Raunkiær consistently published very critical assessments of the Arabs. While correctly working to dispel the romantic mythology of the noble and free Bedouin, he did little to rehabilitate the subsequently denuded image of the desert peoples, and instead peppered his accounts with condemning commentary. From repeated characterizations of feuding and arguing Arabs as raging dogs, to the consistent view that they lacked the basis for rational thought,⁴⁶ Raunkiær made the not so subtle observation that Arabs were more like animals, or at best children, governed more by instinct and emotion than by reason:

To expect that there should be any reasonable relationship between a dispute's cause and its intensity would be to expect far too much from the East Arabian brain. This mechanism operates with only one type of anger manifestation, namely foaming at the mouth rage, which is the same whether it concerns a murder, theft...or the dispute is over the ownership of a dirty cotton shirt.⁴⁷

He therefore sought to strip away the veneer of romance associated with the Bedouin and leave only, as he saw it, what was real:

One must...be prepared for the unbelievable as regards carelessness, clumsiness, and lack of foresight in dealing with the Eastern Arabs, who otherwise, just like other Orientals, have a certain ability, aided by their picturesque rags and the sunshine, to position themselves in such a way as to appear in a fleeting glance as superior and respectable figures.⁴⁸

Asserting a position of authority from which to make statements of fact based on having experienced life in Arabia, the young Dane was a seemingly convincing and powerful witness whose revelations could resonate with the Danish public. In sharp contrast, Harrison, a man with months rather than weeks worth of regional exposure, found the Arabs were endowed with core qualities that promised them a bright future as a people. Deemed to be loyal, self-confident, and committed to the equality of men, the Arabs, the missionary believed, made the "fine[st] friends in the world."⁴⁹ Harrison further added that he had "yet to meet an Arab who cannot be won as a friend if he is approached on the basis of simple democratic friendship."⁵⁰ Such accolades by the American physician were echoed, though unaccompanied with the drive for Christian conversion, by Holmboe, who, unlike his compatriot Raunkiær, also found the Arabs to possess commendable characteristics. However, even though Harrison and Raunkiær clearly differed in their views on the regional population, there is no evidence that they ever discussed the matter. Instead, the Dane only wrote briefly about his illness and treatment in Kuwait, and the doctor never mentioned in his book the rather unusual visit of a Scandinavian to the remote Arab port.



By the beginnings of 1912 and Raunkiær's arrival on the shores of the Persian Gulf, the area had for years been a point of political and strategic interest for the major imperial powers. Ottoman efforts, beginning in the 1870s, to deepen and consolidate control of Eastern Arabia were intended to bring regional stability and forestall pretexts for foreign intervention, be it British or Persian.⁵¹ Plans for economic development and security, however, foundered on the shoals of inadequate funding and irregular administration. In its stead, local Arab families, such as the Rashidis, the Saudis and the Sabahs, moved to exploit the fluctuating degrees of autonomy and independence that prevailed in the area, and sought to operate between the regional empires to their utmost advantage. Raunkiær's observations in Kuwait, manifested both in his written ac-

counts and numerous photographs, and constituting as a whole a unique collection since he was the only Western visitor from a minor power to record his impressions of the city during the pre-WWI era, conveyed clearly the nuanced presence of imperial power.⁵² The Dane made clear that the last Ottoman garrison he saw between Basra and Kuwait City was located at Safwan, a point just inside the modern state of Iraq.⁵³ But ties to the Ottomans were also evident from Shaykh Mubarak's title of *kaymakan*, the imperial banner flying above the palace, and the ruler's record of generous contributions to the expansion and improvement of imperial communications and the defense of the empire in Europe and North Africa.⁵⁴ At the same time, the stationing of a British official, Shakespear, at the port was part of the regional strategy to protect and defend the interests of the British Empire against first the Russians and later the Germans. Through Raunkiær's book and articles, Danish readers were then exposed to an eyewitness account of what one might call "the great game in the Gulf".

Insight into power politics was similarly an aspect of Holmboe's writings that covered his experiences on the trip across North Africa. From its inception in Spanish-controlled Morocco, through French-ruled Algeria and Tunisia, onwards to Italian-occupied Libya, and finally ending in British-held Egypt, the journey carried the Dane through the territories of powers with often rivaling interests and saw him on occasion accused by one of acting as a spy or agent for another. Fears of incitement of the subjected peoples against the colonial regimes fed suspicions of foreigners, especially those like Holmboe, who sympathized with indigenous populations and dressed in clothes native to their respective lands. The very transformation of the physical exterior was deemed by Holmboe, in perhaps rather Orientalist terms, as an important step in the process of distancing himself from the governing Europeans and simultaneously penetrating and truly experiencing local societies.⁵⁵ He noted that fellow Westerners immediately treated him differently, as he altered his appearance and that those who still detected his true identity through the disguise regarded him at best as an eccentric or at worst as a traitor. In fact, in Holmboe's case, the transformation, beginning with his conversion, would be far more than cosmetic or external and instead quite profoundly internal as it affected his soul and consciousness.

The Dane's journey of emotional and intellectual growth was also deemed, not least by the man himself, as a unique venture that achieved pioneering milestones. In Tetuan, as Holmboe was beginning his travels, he went to the city's main mosque and asserted that his presence within the columned hall to conduct prayers must have been one of the first such instances by a European.⁵⁶ He similarly touted the entire cross-continental drive along the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea as unprecedented, with the specific stretch of desert between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica never before traversed by a European civilian in a car.⁵⁷ Popular excitement about the venture was evidently building in the Italian territories as Holmboe made his way toward the starting point of the treacherous crossing, and at Sirte he observed that "...[I] am being treated like a king by both the natives and the Italians. I am, in fact, the first civilian in the world to have made this trip."⁵⁸ Just two weeks later at Tripoli, where Holmboe waited for official permission to proceed, he was interviewed by a Danish journalist who conveyed that local papers were reporting the trip as a "modern Vikingesque effort."⁵⁹ The rarity of travel through the area and the elevated reputation of those who made the journey was further underscored by the fact that the attempt almost cost Holmboe his life when he lost his way in the forbidding countryside. And by the time he reached safety in Benghazi, he had attained celebrity status, was interviewed by the press, and was even offered cut-rate fees for repairs of his 1928 Chevy at the local dealership.⁶⁰

The brush with death also became the source for a harrowing account of survival and an oc-



Maps 6-7. Holmboe's route across North Africa. Reproduced from Knud Holmboe, *Desert Encounter* (London: George G. Harrap, 1936), 15-16.

casation for revisiting a popular topic in Western mythology of the Orient, namely the mystical qualities of the desert. In some detail, the Dane explained how he and two companions, an Arab boy and a young New Yorker, named Roscoe D. Tarbox, had abandoned their car once they became hopelessly lost and trekked an estimated 240 km over a ten day period, as they crisscrossed the wasteland in a desperate attempt to find the trail that would lead them to salvation.⁶¹ “For the first time,” wrote Holmboe, “we realized that death in the desert was a possibility, for the first time on the trip we became fearful of the great empty expanse that surrounded us.”⁶² However, surviving variously on snails, grass, the odd porcupine and water drained from the car’s radiator, they struggled to find enough sustenance to maintain their strength and to endure the harsh conditions of blistering heat during the days and bitterly cold nights.⁶³ At one point, having become separated from the others, Holmboe declared: “Here I sat on a hillock in Cyrenaica – alone – completely alone, - without water, - without food – and without hope.”⁶⁴ But in the wilderness the Dane found something else to sustain him, because on that isolated spot, stripped bare of all worldly possessions, he stood alone before God and claimed to have learned more wisdom there in five minutes than was possible over a lifetime of studying the great works of leading philosophers. He argued that the experience revealed to him the eternal, central truths in life, convincing him to turn his back on materialism and solidifying and deepening his commitment to being a Muslim. “In Islam, the religion I chose for myself,” he wrote, “and the one I will retain for the rest of my life, I found and continue to find exactly the things that can help me.”⁶⁵


Holmboe’s convictions of faith and ideology would strengthen as he pressed on further through occupied Cyrenaica and witnessed the realities of Italian rule. Even as his encounters with the authorities and Italian civilians were mixed, and he acknowledged that Italian efforts to rescue him and his companions once they were lost, employing both search planes and roving patrols, the Dane became a trenchant critic of the colonial presence and condemned in ever sharper terms the destructive forces of the occupation. From the very moment when he crossed the border from Tunis to Tripolitania in February 1930, Holmboe experienced the security-conscious environment that prevailed in the territory.⁶⁶ Not only were he and Tarbox immediately put under temporary arrest and given a military escort, but the Dane soon heard, at the garrison town of Suara, the first of many native accounts about the nature of Italian rule. However, Holmboe retained an as yet nuanced view of the Italian presence since he expressed unabashed enthusiasm for the modern highway, the famed *Litoranea Libica*, leading to Tripoli.⁶⁷ Upon arrival in the city, he too was much impressed by the exceedingly modern and gleaming European district, but felt the new and shiny, marble-encased buildings conveyed an artificial, almost stage-like effect that reflected a degree of wealth and prosperity that was imported rather than indigenous.⁶⁸ In contrast, it was in the Arab parts of the city where Holmboe found the more genuine, eastern color and life that he sought. And as he walked through the narrow streets and passed the cafés, he felt that the transition of moving across the continent was ever discernible in the culture displayed. The Dane also made clear that within the urban citizenry there was a significant population of Jews who generally tended to favor the occupation.⁶⁹ In fact, Jewish life in Libya flourished for a time under Italian rule, many serving as agents and translators for the colonial authorities, and in Tripoli, where they constituted fully 20 percent of the inhabitants, the community presided over more than forty synagogues.⁷⁰ Many hundreds of Maltese, who along with the Jewish merchant class commanded a significant and traditional role in local commerce, added to the city’s diversity and the cultural complexity that Holmboe encountered and relayed to his audience in various publications.⁷¹

Upon reaching Benghazi, the Dane met much the same national and ethnic mix as in the urban areas of Tripolitania. The Cyrenaican capital had the second-largest Jewish population in Libya, estimated at 3,000 in 1930, and as Holmboe strolled through the city, headed toward the Arab quarter, he struck up a conversation with a 20-year resident from Malta.⁷² In a frank exchange, perhaps true or perhaps fictional and employed by the Danish journalist as a literary tool to deliver a set message, the two men discussed the Italian occupation and framed the local resistance within the context of the small and weak battling the mighty and strong. As if to make the struggle resonate with his audience, Holmboe personalized the distant conflict by having the Maltese man pose the question whether Danes, whose own vulnerability to occupation became a reality a decade later, would not similarly and fiercely resist a brutal invader.⁷³ The conversation between Europeans also served as an occasion to condemn Italian Fascism for giving the occupation a virulently rejectionist and racist strain in its treatment of the “Other.” And Holmboe minced no words when he described Benghazi’s oppressive atmosphere of militarism as a reflection of “that civilization, which is so emblematic of the Europeans, and which triumphantly and destructively marches forward, trampling the Orient’s culture.”⁷⁴ It was, in his mind, a disgrace that so-called civilization, as defined by the Western, technologically-advanced countries, was being imposed at the point of bayonets and in the wake of advancing soldiers. Holmboe even met one of the chief architects of the hardline counter-insurgency tactics, the recently arrived General Rodolfo Graziani, who by 1930 was a national hero for his successes in defeating rebellions in Tripolitania and Fezzan.⁷⁵ Yet the meeting between journalist and soldier was very brief and unassuming, and though the general and many army officers had a reputation for brutality, the Dane was careful not to generalize about the Italian forces. In his reporting, he included an interview with an army officer who, despite having been held captive for four months in Kufra, an oasis and settlement about 1,000 kilometers from the Mediterranean, still favored negotiations with the resistance and recognized the need for an accord with the native population.⁷⁶ A few conversations with other Italian officers indicated similar misgivings about the implementation of colonial objectives, and by revealing these additional perspectives, Holmboe clearly committed himself to presenting an authentic and nuanced account rather than an exclusively crafted, propaganda-laced diatribe.

Among the Bedouin

The Western fascination with desert life, and the cultures that evolved from the vast, open spaces, fed the desire to explore and investigate. Considered a direct opposite of the societies in Europe, where centuries of tradition had shaped patterns of life that were ordered and structured, the desert expanse seemingly offered unbounded freedoms. In the natural and limitless environment one could escape the restraints imposed by modern civilization and embrace an imagined return to simpler, more innocent ways of life and values.⁷⁷ However, the notion of being beyond the scope of social control too meant operating in a realm without the protections inherent in a regulated society. The perceived dangers of a freedom unfettered by set laws and established customs tended to cloud the otherwise accepted romance of desert travel, and a man like Raunkiær, who allowed the theme of danger to dominate his narrative of Arabian experiences, largely stripped the region of its mysterious attraction.

Even before Raunkiær left the relative safety of Kuwait City, he conveyed to his readers a distinct sense that Arabs were untrustworthy and always seeking to exploit any situation to their advantage. He described that when he fell ill, his hired camelteers, in a bid to extort money, im-



Map 8. North-central Arabia, showing pilgrim routes, tribal regions, and place names. Reproduced from Zahra Freeth and H. V. F. Winstone, *Explorers of Arabia* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), 13.

mediately insisted that they were ready to depart and would require additional payment for the delay. Yet Raunkiær, perhaps in order to stress his own heroics, conveyed how he, even as an ailing foreigner, stared down the Arabs and gained another week in which to recover.⁷⁸ Matters were hardly improved when the caravan eventually prepared to depart, because the Dane found the scene was one of confusion and incompetence. In a recurring theme, Raunkiær saw the Arabs as hopelessly disorganized, ever inefficient in directing the loading of their camels, and consistently showing little or no regard for the caravan headman.⁷⁹ What resulted, in the eyes of the Danish traveler, was an orgy of noise and turmoil that was symbolic of the region:

The quiet mumbling of the [morning] prayers is suddenly replaced by the most confused commotion. The familiar Oriental pace and dignity is substituted by a time of frenzied activity which is characteristic by its lack of order and by an often molbo-like clumsiness, a trait that seems inseparably tied to a caravan's departure in Eastern Arabia – and with so much more in this peculiar land.⁸⁰

Depictions of the Arab as duplicitous and undisciplined were further supplemented by characterizations of the local population as being comically inept. Their handling of firearms particularly struck Raunkiær as odd, since he noted that they reduced the effectiveness of such weapons by modifying them to suit local customary and aesthetic tastes. He too attributed their failure to properly maintain modern arms as a consequence of “the Arabs’ extraordinary lack of comprehension for anything that falls outside their narrow, centuries-old traditions.”⁸¹ And in the use of those weapons, the Dane asserted that Arab riflemen were a greater danger to their comrades than their perceived foes!

As the Arabs fire quite without planning or aiming, and at far too great a distance, there is not a great likelihood that the enemy will be hit unless by chance, whereas by way of accidental discharge they can inflict significant harm within their own ranks.⁸²

Far less humorous was Raunkiær’s contention that the Arabs were poor marksmen, in part, because they strove to conserve their ammunition and only fired in times of need, but also due to their propensity to favor close combat where they could use knives and swords and “have the satisfaction of seeing the suffering of their enemies at close range.”⁸³ Such remarks and observations reemphasized the overall impression that the civilized, cultured European was utterly isolated in the Arab wilderness and that Raunkiær, except for his trusted Christian Iraqi companion, needed to rely entirely on his own courage and sense of reasoned judgment.

But the Dane’s memories of the journey to Central Arabia were undoubtedly also colored by his poor health throughout the 50-day trip and the difficulties he encountered in attempting to record information about the people and the countryside. One of his chief duties on the trek was to gather scientifically-useful data pertaining to the region and to communicate his observations directly to the KDGS committee as often as possible.⁸⁴ Equipped with a camera, a barometer, a prismatic compass, and even simple pencil and paper to make dozens of sketches, Raunkiær strove to overcome a wavering constitution and perform his assigned tasks dutifully. However, struggling with bouts of dysentery-like symptoms and stomach flu, in addition to troubles with the local diet and shifting temperatures, his abilities to consistently and systematically record all the relevant data were markedly reduced. Raunkiær too complained that he needed to be highly secretive in using his equipment, because it raised suspicions about his activities and tended to attract unwanted attention that could heighten the danger of theft or worse fates.⁸⁵ As he noted, “the use of more sophisticated instruments was impossible due to the hostility of the population ... whose suspicion and fanaticism placed insurmountable obstacles in the way.”⁸⁶ The Dane

therefore attempted to derive as much information as possible through interviews with the Arabs he met, but this approach also presented problems since he spoke only limited Arabic and he found:

The natives are becoming day by day more difficult to be around, entailing among other things the disadvantage that it is growing almost impossible for one to gather reliable information about the country through which we are traveling.⁸⁷

The sense of isolation and insecurity consequently grew as Raunkiær moved ever further away from the coast and what he perceived as the last vestiges of civilization. Illness, stress, and the simple hardships of desert travel all tested the resolve of the rather novice explorer and fostered in him an element of paranoia. In response to the pressures, the young Dane came to rationalize that less and lighter sleep was in part beneficial since inattention during the night posed a serious danger.⁸⁸ Raunkiær even wrote that he taught himself to catch up on needed rest during the daytime while riding his camel, an innovation that hardly served to further his abilities to observe and study the countryside! Simply completing the journey in one piece had evolved into an end in itself, and the scientific duties, the very essence of the expedition, were necessarily relegated to a position of secondary importance.

Raunkiær's focus on safety intensified as he moved deeper into Central Arabia where Ottoman control was tenuous or non-existent. In the deep interior of the peninsula, the Dane witnessed and experienced the presence of a new, yet old, force that was gradually asserting its dominance and laying the foundations for the future Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Based on an alliance forged in the mid-18th century between tribal and religious leaders, the emerging power consisted of two main branches, namely the Muwahhidun movement, whose adherents were popularly referred to as Wahhabis, and the Al Saud family. Joining traditional martial strength with the legitimacy of spiritual restoration and purification, the bond constituted a potent force in the hands of a strong and dynamic leader. By 1912, when Raunkiær traveled through the area, such a figure existed in the form of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, and under his direction the alliance was on the verge of developing its most effective tool in centralizing regional control. A network of settlements or *hujjar* populated by the Ikhwan (Bretheren), the most fervent members of the Muwahhidun movement, was initiated in early 1913 with the aim of gradually fostering a process of sedentarization and pushing the Bedouin to abandon their traditional ways of life.⁸⁹

The very first *hijra*, al-Artawiyah, was built up around an important complex of wells located on the Kuwait-Qasim caravan route, and only months before the settlement was founded, the young Dane rode through the area without any sense of its future significance.⁹⁰ The famed British Muslim and Wahhabiphile, John Philby (b. 1885), who in 1928 praised the "*Wahhabi* revival...[as having] brought the boon of peace, security and, in a measure, unity to Arabia", asserted that Raunkiær was the last European to visit the site until 1918 when the Englishman himself arrived in the town.⁹¹ But Philby also commented that the Dane seemed quite unaware of the new dawn in Arabia, that he had no feel for the momentous changes afoot on the peninsula.⁹² Such an assessment was partially accurate as Raunkiær certainly failed, and understandably so, to envision that al-Artawiyah would blossom into a town of 10,000 in just a few years – into "the Ikhwan fountainhead" as Philby termed it – or that the Ibn Saud-led forces were poised to hold sway across the region.⁹³ And unlike Philby, who would trumpet that eventual success as "one of the most thrilling and decisive episodes in history", the Dane saw Arabia as rather devoid of indigenous foundations upon which to build a future, describing the existing societies as "culturally worthless."⁹⁴ In his mind, the Muwahhidun movement and its Al-Saud allies were a

manifestation of decline rather than progress, and he assessed in harsh terms the rise and initial spread of the movement in the 18th century:

[s]oon the sect reputed for fanatical intolerance imposed itself, and in a manner that would take centuries to reverse, on Arabia's already so barbarian and warlike population.⁹⁵

Such feelings of contempt for the forces then reemerging in Arabia were undoubtedly exacerbated by Raunkiær's belief that plots against his life had been afoot during his travels.

In the town of Buraydah, a place of some ill repute in Western accounts of the region, the notoriety of the Arabs and their attitudes were underscored by the Dane's perception that during his brief stay he was put in mortal danger. Located fully 500 km from the Gulf coast, and serving as the furthest point of Raunkiær's advance into Arabia, his arrival in the town during mid-March 1912 was a mark of significance and some personal triumph. However, the realization that the townspeople viewed his presence with hostility soon overshadowed any feelings of satisfaction and accomplishment. Even the Bedouins he hired in Kuwait were harassed and driven out of the central market for traveling with a non-Muslim foreigner, and Raunkiær was compelled for reasons of safety to remain confined to the residence of Buraydah's amir.⁹⁶ The local ruler felt obligated to provide such protection as the Dane carried letters of introduction from Shaykh Mubarak, including one to Abdul Aziz ibn Saud in Riyadh. Yet security came at a price, because the amir, sensing Raunkiær's feelings of isolation and vulnerability, exploited the situation to secure for himself both the Dane's revolver and binoculars.⁹⁷ In stark violation of Arab traditions of hospitality and proper treatment of travelers, Raunkiær instead experienced intimidation and extortion. He reported feeling more like a prisoner than a guest, and the notion of Arab nobility and honor was thereby dealt a blow by the Dane's accounts about the Buraydah visit.⁹⁸ In particularly unflattering terms, he condemned the amir's behavior and described him as vile and subhuman. Branding him a "repulsive, crawling creature" and "unappealing to an unusually high degree," the young traveler revealed his utter contempt for the Arab host and reflected in his chosen words the permanent feelings, perhaps even trauma, seared into his memory by the experience.⁹⁹ And revisiting a characterization of Arabs already presented earlier in his narrative, Raunkiær depicted the city's governor as canine-like with curly hair similar to a poodle and as having "brown dog-eyes."¹⁰⁰ Philby would later write that such harsh words were excessive and "unnecessarily lurid."¹⁰¹ In his mind, Raunkiær had "allowed personal prejudice [to] colour his picture of the man", an observation which undoubtedly was accurate.¹⁰² The Dane seemingly failed to appreciate that Buraydah was a city that had frequently changed hands over the prior decade and was a place of some intrigue and instability. The fact that the amir, though in part for his own interests, sought to shield Raunkiær from harm since he traveled under a measure of official protection, was not given much credence either. Instead, the Dane's few days in Buraydah would become the basis for a very memorable yet brief passage in his book, providing an unambiguous assessment that the city's Arabs, specifically, and the wider Arabian population, generally, were jointly loathsome and fundamentally distinct from the Danes.

Raunkiær's confirmation of the Arab as "Other" was only partially mitigated by additional comments and by his revelations about later experiences on the trip. While mercilessly attacking the amir of Buraydah as someone rather devoid of human, civilized qualities, he did report that the local ruler regularly received an Arab-language newspaper published in Istanbul and that he was well-informed and inquired about the ongoing Italo-Ottoman War in Tripolitania.¹⁰³ Raunkiær thereby dispelled the popular perception that the Arabian interior was entirely isolated from the outside world and was an area wallowing in ignorance. The young Dane's arrival at Riyadh,

the political capital of the Muwahhidun-Saudi alliance, similarly occasioned an opportunity for him to reveal an aspect of Arabia that contradicted his overall perspective on the region. After several days of rather harrowing travel from Buraydah, during which time his health continued to deteriorate and his party retraced part of their earlier journey – the latter act identified by Raunkiær as particularly dangerous – they finally reached the important city, the sight of which he described as:

filling the viewer with a powerful, almost captivating emotion, a feeling that perhaps best can be compared with what a pilgrim must feel when he sees the holy city's walls and towers rise above the horizon.¹⁰⁴

Riyadh appeared to him as a safe haven and a welcome relief from the dangers he perceived all around him and the ever worsening discomfort he felt from his various ailments. This generally favorable impression was sustained even as Raunkiær was denied entry to the city proper and was instead directed to a private, walled garden complex outside the urban area. Here he was warmly greeted by Ibn Saud's elderly father, Abd al-Rahman ibn Faisal, who since 1902 had lived in the city following its successful recapture from the Rashidis.¹⁰⁵ In recognition of his son's considerable abilities, Abd al-Rahman soon after resigned his position as amir in favor of the younger man and instead assumed a position as his chief advisor. It was in that capacity that he welcomed Raunkiær to Riyadh, as Ibn Saud had only days earlier departed from the capital. The Dane certainly regretted not meeting the son, but, not knowing the younger Arab's future prominence, the Scandinavian instead focused on the father whom he found a quite fascinating figure:

Abderrahman is a splendid old man whose entire appearance and behavior is marked by marvelousness and radiance, much as a real life fairy tale from *A Thousand and One Nights*, [and is] a lovable though tough old man with the stare of an eagle and a white beard.¹⁰⁶

With words that mirrored so clearly the prevailing, imagined scenes and notions of the Middle East, Raunkiær matched the pattern of so many who preceded him as well as those who would follow. They collectively focused on those aspects of local culture that confirmed the knowledge they had already learned, and together they created a body of accounts that manufactured a certain, rather unwavering perspective on the region. That set view, while often negative and unflattering, was not necessarily false, but was mostly incomplete and in many instances unfair. In fact, Raunkiær undoubtedly experienced fear in Buraydah and was clearly bullied into surrendering his possessions, but to extrapolate beyond the incident itself and condemn the wider population was perhaps excessive. The adherents of the Muwahhidun movement certainly had a well-deserved reputation for uncompromising behavior in their quest to purify Islam, however, only days after the Buraydah visit, the Dane saw another face of the sociopolitical and religious revival when he reached Riyadh. Abd al-Rahman comported himself as a gracious host and treated Raunkiær well even though his status as imam of the capital should, based on the reputed infamy of the movement, have suggested that the old Arab would neither greet nor interact with the non-Muslim foreigner. Quite to the contrary, the Dane was given the opportunity to recuperate a little from his ailments, his party was allowed to resupply, and they were granted permission to join a caravan headed for the eastern city of Hofuf. Raunkiær did, to his credit, acknowledge Abd al-Rahman's kindness and praised him, along with Shaykh Mubarak, as "wise, sober-minded, tolerant and all in all men of decent behavior."¹⁰⁷ But rather than cite these men as evidence of a more nuanced and balanced picture of regional leadership and personalities, he saw

them as exceptions, even anomalies, to the type and quality of humanity one encountered in Arabia. And even when Raunkiær did suggest that Abd al-Rahman fit a set character pattern, it was the one found in storybooks, which in essence endorsed as accurate the personification of caricatures derived from myths and tales.

Raunkiær's assessment of Arabia was further tarnished and distorted as he headed back toward the Persian Gulf on the last leg of the journey. Traveling in a caravan of about one hundred and seventy-five people, the Dane should have felt quite secure, but instead he found that many of the men were of dubious character. In particular, Raunkiær condemned the large number of pearl divers who accompanied the caravan as being "some of the most unpleasant [people] one can be forced to live amongst."¹⁰⁸ The Dane's sense of insecurity was also worsened by growing trouble with his camelteers, who cut off his access to their supplies, and with the emergence of yet another murder plot. Once again, Raunkiær related how he stared down the threat and foiled the particular scheme, which involved three Bedouins who hoped to steal his remaining possessions. Much as happened in Buraydah, the young traveler felt entirely isolated and ever fearful that at any moment his life would be cut short. And those latter experiences on the final trek served to produce some of the most virulently critical comments by Raunkiær, as he vented his anger against the people and places that instilled in him such a sense of dread. Branding the Bedouin as no more than a "jackal-like population", he also railed against the people of the Arabian interior and denounced them as being characterized by "a repellant combination of treachery, hypocrisy, cowardice, and arrogance," and were as a whole anything but industrious.¹⁰⁹ In his mind, the noble Arab was merely a fiction, or at best a distinct rarity, and instead was a breed of humanity with scarcely any redeemable qualities:

It is a shady, lying, thieving, and blood thirsty race, a misunderstood religion's shabby slaves, who, without the ability to think rationally, tread blindly in the unworthy footsteps of their forefathers.¹¹⁰

With words of stinging condemnation, Raunkiær essentially asserted that there existed no foundation for civilization in the interior of the country. The culture, the people, and their religion all failed, in his view, to provide any evidence of promise for the region. As argued consistently in his writings, the spiritual momentum, in particular, fostered by the Muwahhidun movement was deemed to be detrimental for the people and rather like "a wave of blind fanaticism [that has] wash[ed] over Arabia's barbarian and culture-devoid population."¹¹¹ And the Dane further believed that no place else was one made so aware of "Muhammedan [sic] fanaticism's bestial passions" as in Arabia, a judgment which confirmed all the myths about Islam permitting sexual exploitation and physical brutality.¹¹²

It was then little wonder that Raunkiær expressed a deep satisfaction and relief upon reaching Hofuf and the safety offered by the Ottoman garrison. That oasis town, surrounded by forests of palm groves and lush gardens, constituted a welcome return to civilization and a contrast to the harsh and brutal environment of the interior, where the young Dane's fate had been uncertain. Rather than the killers and schemers who had tormented him during his many days of travel, in Hofuf he was greeted by men of culture and treated with "the most exuberant hospitality and kindness by the Turkish authorities."¹¹³ Over the next few days, accompanied by the Ottoman military governor, Raunkiær toured the area around the town and acquainted himself with the physical and sociopolitical landscape. Finding that the region was slowly slipping out of Ottoman control, he lamented such a development and argued that the empire needed to double its commitment of troops and resources to secure the province. However, over the decades since Al-Hasa was reincorporated under Ottoman control in the 1870s, imperial administrators and

policies had failed to cultivate a constituency among the settled population.¹¹⁴ Limited capital for regional development, inadequate security to protect commerce and travel, and an inability to end corruption were all factors assuring a weak Ottoman presence in the area. By April 1912, when Raunkiær visited Hofuf, and just a year before the town fell to Ibn Saud, the empire was hard-pressed to reverse that trend. During that very month, an escort of fifty Ottoman soldiers was needed to assure the Dane's safe passage to the coast, and en route to the Persian Gulf, he reported that only days before a large caravan had been raided along the same path.¹¹⁵ It seemed the degenerate and barbaric that festered in the interior was ever advancing and encroaching on the Ottoman province and threatening to overrun and oust the only civilizing presence on the peninsula. Yet as Raunkiær sailed off toward Bahrain, forever leaving behind the shores of Arabia, he could not help but lament his departure from a place where he had lived life on the edge and experienced a world few other Europeans would ever witness, a land, he wrote:

where almost everything and everyone seems to the foreigner both hostile and forbidding, but yet still, and perhaps exactly because of the grave mood that time and time again sheds light on the most basic aspects of life, cultivates a captivating attraction in the one who has come into contact with it [Arabia] and since departed from there unharmed.¹¹⁶

His words made clear that Arabia, though a place of mystery and allure, was also one of utmost danger, a place from which visitors were lucky to leave alive.

The theme of survival was similarly a central question for Holmboe, as he traveled through the northern reaches of the Libyan Desert and ascended into the highlands of the Jabal Akhdar in Cyrenaica. But unlike Raunkiær, who intently coveted the perceived safety and security offered by Western, civilized society, Holmboe found greater peace and solace in the wilderness and among the people who lived there, away from the intrusions of modern life. The latter Dane, in fact, experienced that it was rather the West, Fascist Italy in particular, and not the Muslim Arab population, that was responsible for spreading barbarism and fanaticism across the land. With his own eyes, he witnessed abandoned Arab villages and wells sealed with either rocks or cement, both manifestations of the hardline, Italian policy meant to deny *al-mahafdia* or resistance safe havens across the countryside.¹¹⁷ He saw the use of Christian Eritrean troops, who dominated the mobile counter-insurgency units, as a deliberate tool to heighten the brutality and ethno-cultural enmity of the conflict. Described as wearing silver chains with the crucifix around their necks and having crosses emblazoned on their uniforms, the East African troops were an unambiguous symbol of Christian aggression against the *umma* and an indication of Italian exploitation of religion to motivate its colonial subjects, manipulating one group to oppress another.¹¹⁸ The nature and human cost of the occupation was further evidenced by Holmboe's contention that summary trials and executions were rampant across the territory. He estimated that during his stay in Cyrenaica, the Italians were hanging about thirty people daily, a frightful rate of killing.¹¹⁹ However, records of the *tribunale volante*, or flying court, the judicial body delegated to decide the fate of arrestees, reveal that during 1930 only one hundred and nineteen people were executed in the region.¹²⁰ Such discrepancy between allegations and actual documentation was matched by the accounts that prisoners were routinely thrown from airplanes overflying the desert, a contention which defies the majority of evidence.¹²¹ Yet, if limited clarity surrounds the activities of Italy's flying tribunals, the military's use of gas to combat the resistance was less in doubt, even as the deployment of such weapons was generally denied by the government. As early as 1925, in the campaign to pacify Tripolitania, gas-bombs were dropped from army planes, and rebels in Cyrenaica reported to Holmboe in 1930 on their con-

tinued use in Italian operations.¹²²

But far worse than random executions and the deployment of chemical weapons was the January 1930 decision by the colonial authorities to concentrate much of the rural population in internment camps on the coastal plain.¹²³ Largely a policy developed out of frustration, an admission that the military lacked the ability to defeat the resistance using conventional tactics, the order constituted the final element in a long war against the people and their way of life. Ever since the 1923 breakdown of the uneasy peace between Italy and the Sanusi Order, the religious brotherhood with strong roots in Cyrenaican society, an ever worsening conflict had spiraled out of control as the parties battled over the territory's meager tracts of arable land.¹²⁴ Intent on taming the population, even displacing it from those coveted areas with fertile soil, Italian policymakers envisioned the Libyan shores as an attractive destination for their citizen settlers and an opportune place for extensive agricultural development. The unmanageable Bedouin and those Arabs engaged in traditional farming were an obstacle to be removed and, as the insurgency persisted, in part sustained by the wider population, more drastic measures were needed to realize Italian colonial designs.¹²⁵ An internment option therefore evolved and masses of people, eventually totaling 100,000, were effectively imprisoned in a series of barbed-wire-encased camps.¹²⁶

Holmboe visited several of these sites, touring one camp already at Syrte in Tripolitania. Here he witnessed a population slowly fading away, wilting under the weight of a merciless policy.¹²⁷ That sentiment was reinforced at Merj, 140 km east of Benghazi, where Holmboe saw yet another of these internment centers, and he described the people as suffering both from disease and a lack of food.¹²⁸ It is estimated that at least 35 percent of the internees died in these camps and that their herds of domesticated animals were decimated due to shortages of pastureland and water.¹²⁹ The Italian leadership and local commanders recognized and accepted that mass death would result from the incarceration of tens of thousands, but the specific objective of the camps was not to exterminate the people but rather to crush the resistance.¹³⁰ That may be a point of little importance to some, such as Ali Abdullatif Ahmida who has categorized the killings as a facet in an "Italian holocaust," and others who have determined that the tactics employed in the counter-insurgency campaign constituted "a policy of genocide."¹³¹ But with the events of the Second World War and the evolution of the definitions of "holocaust" and "genocide," intent and methodology have become important aspects in evaluating the actions of states and their agents. With that in mind, it seems clear that the Italians, rather than focused on killing as an end in itself, were guilty of a blatant disregard for the welfare of the wider population in their pursuit of empire and absolute control. That the results of Italian actions were horrific is undisputed, but the ultimate classification of those events must be open to more nuanced interpretation.

Holmboe, however, who in 1930 could not know what would unfold in Europe, concluded that the actions of the Italian forces constituted extermination.¹³² In the original Danish version of the book about his Libyan experience, the chapter dealing with Cyrenaica is powerfully entitled "A People who are Perishing."¹³³ Those words concisely captured Holmboe's sentiments and served as an unambiguous indictment of Italian actions, but they were curiously absent from the English-language edition. In fact, even the book's original title, *Ørkenen Brænder!*, properly translated as "The Desert Aflame", contained a subtle yet clear, dual meaning that similarly was lost in the English version (*Desert Encounter*) published five years later. Lacking in the latter, international edition, with a title that suggested mystery and discovery, was the passion and condemnation embedded in the Danish words. Holmboe's chosen title, as well as how he intended it

to be correctly translated, constituted a political statement and reflected his conviction that the Sanusi Order, their followers, and the Bedouin way of life were being consumed in a relentless cauldron of violence and destruction.¹³⁴

Witnessing that a human tragedy and terrible injustice was unfolding just across the Mediterranean Sea from Europe, and knowing that its true nature was hidden in the shadows under Italian censorship and propaganda, the Danish journalist was enabled through his abilities as a writer to shed light on the calamity. Upon reaching Derna, the town that was to be the terminus of his Libyan journey, Holmboe used a conversation with the local police commissar to illustrate for his readers the Italian view of the conflict contrasted with the prevailing Arab outlook. And though the statements attributed to the officer may be a composite of the many attitudes and opinions that Holmboe heard from Italian military personnel on his travels, the Dane wanted, in a final, memorable exchange near the end of the book, to convey that a clash of cultures and fundamentally different mindsets was unfolding on the shores of North Africa.¹³⁵ Presenting the Italian as an arch nationalist who had nothing but contempt for the Arabs, he quoted the officer as asking rhetorically, “has such a gang of dirty creatures the right to live when they are depriving a young active nation of all the essential conditions of life?”¹³⁶ In no uncertain terms, the existence of the defiant Arab and his society was deemed an intolerable obstacle to the advance of Italy’s interests. But more profoundly, the local population’s failure to embrace the pace and values of modern, Western life was determined to be evidence of their decay, ignorance, and lack of value to the colonial authorities. Holmboe vehemently rejected such criticism and assessed that Eastern peoples were different from Europeans since they pursued growth and development not in the realm of the external and the material but rather focused inward to evolve spiritually. “The Oriental believes,” the Dane wrote, “that the soul and the development of the soul is the most important of all.”¹³⁷ And with that commitment, he argued, the Easterner generally prioritized a pursuit of the deeper meaning in life and therefore represented a worldview from which Europe was ever distancing itself. In perhaps rather Orientalist terms, Holmboe suggested that the secularization and modernization of the West was creating a mindset and culture that could not coexist peacefully with an ancient and traditional East. The “us” and “them” dynamic was hardening and the Dane, motivated both by sympathy and conviction, was finding himself gradually drifting from the former to the latter.

But Holmboe too wanted to play his part in bridging that widening gap by humanizing the Arabs for his Danish readers and revealing to everyone the inherently criminal nature of the occupation. He strove to present the people as he encountered them, be they civilians or rebels, and to dispel the myths of benevolent Italian rule.

No one in Europe can learn anything about it [the conditions in Cyrenaica], – and when the issue at hand is national expansion and greatness, the Italian Fascists are without scruples. In Europe one is told that the peaceful Italians in Cyrenaica have been attacked by the bloodthirsty Arabs. – Only I, who has seen it, knows who are the barbarians.¹³⁸

He knew that what reigned in the region was tyranny and fear, and that below the idyllic veneer of such a town as Derna, described in a contemporary article as “the pearl of Libia”, an ever tighter, iron fist was closing around the people.¹³⁹ In mid-June 1930, at the very time that it was suggested the region was thriving under Italian governance, oppression was actually spreading and even Holmboe himself was arrested in Derna and loaded onto a prison barge.¹⁴⁰ Accused, correctly as it turned out, of having fraternized with members of the *mahafdia*, he was eventually expelled from the Italian colony. But during his time in the Jabal Akhdar, as well as through

conversations with rebels elsewhere, he became convinced that the people were at heart peaceful and had only turned to violence out of need.¹⁴¹ Their accounts of suffering simply constituted evidence of conditions that no people should have to endure. And by stressing that the men he met in the mountains were some of the noblest imaginable, Holmboe attempted to cultivate in his readers a sympathy for the fighters whose bravery and commitment was undeniable. Even when relating their devotion to Islam, a faith regarded poorly in Europe, the Dane generated an image of the rebels that induced empathy. Those tough, uncompromising men refrained from killing Holmboe once they realized that he was a Muslim, and their souls were soothed by his readings from the Quran.¹⁴² Rather than bloodthirsty killers, living without principles or morals, the Dane presented the Arab fighters as simple, mostly illiterate people whose struggle to survive was sustained only by their comradeship and their religion.

Considerable mystery also surrounded Holmboe's activities during the few days he spent in rebel hands. Writing in *Ørkenen Brænder!* that he was intent on meeting the famed leader of the Sanusi resistance, Umar al-Mukhtar (1862-1931), the Dane asserted that when he voiced those wishes to his friendly captors, they politely explained the impossibility of the request since the venerated commander was elsewhere.¹⁴³ The elderly fighter, a man who had become such a powerful symbol for both the Italians and the local people, a man whose "nocturnal government" still held sway across the Jabal Akhdar, needed to be ever vigilant to avoid capture and to constantly shift his location to elude detection by the Italians. However, unwavering to a fault in his determination to keep resisting the occupation, Mukhtar directed his roving guerrilla bands (*adwar*) to exploit their mobility and the natural advantages of the rugged countryside to strike where and when the enemy was vulnerable.¹⁴⁴ Even with the forces of the *mahafdia* reduced to only hundreds by mid-1930, when Holmboe traveled through the war zone, the old man refused to relent. As if embracing a role as martyr for the cause of Sanusi rule and their chosen way of life, Mukhtar also rejected any talk of retreating to Egypt to reorganize and resupply his forces. In conversations with Muhammad Asad, an envoy from the Meccan-based Sayyid Ahmad of the Sanusi family, who sought in early 1931 to persuade the resistance leader to withdraw, the veteran fighter simply declared that it was his duty and fate to remain.¹⁴⁵ For Asad, who secretly made his way across the Egyptian border with Libya for his clandestine rendezvous in the Jabal Akhdar, the experience of meeting Mukhtar was both powerful and memorable, much as it would have been for Holmboe if he had done the same. But in an otherwise striking parallel with the Dane, Asad too was a young journalist who sympathized greatly with the Sanusi cause and was likewise an impassioned European convert to Islam, having distanced himself from his former identity as Leopold Weiss, an Austrian Jew. The remarkable similarities between the two men would not have been lost on Mukhtar, who undoubtedly could count on one hand the number of times he met Western European Muslims in the Jabal Akhdar. However, Asad never mentioned Holmboe and, consistent with the Dane's book, the commander-in-chief of the fledgling *mahafdia* gave no indication of ever meeting the adventurous Scandinavian. The mystery of Holmboe's true activities while in the company of the rebels then emerges with his own claims elsewhere that he did meet Mukhtar and that the leader offered him the chance to be smuggled across the border into Egypt.¹⁴⁶ Whether empty boasting or simply a revelation which he chose not to repeat later on, uncertainty surrounds the Dane's week in the mountains, perhaps suggesting a tinge of the clandestine, much as would accompany his later activities in Egypt.

Lives Cut Short, Legacies Assured

Raunkiær's successful completion of the Arabian expedition was an occasion for some Danish fanfare. Having traveled about 500 km along a "quite unknown route that passes through the fanatical, freedom-loving and warlike Wahhabis' oases deep inside Arabia's pathless deserts," as one contemporary journalist put it, the Dane had seemingly performed a heroic and valuable service.¹⁴⁷ The KDGS echoed that sentiment and expressed a great satisfaction with the young Dane's achievements. A member of the society's executive committee declared the expedition had far surpassed expectations, and a published KDGS statement described "the journey as highly successful both in regard to the unknown and dangerous route traveled and the results garnered."¹⁴⁸ The contributions to mapping Arabia more accurately were particularly touted as significant since Raunkiær was the first European in decades to travel so far into the interior of the peninsula. And the expedition, along with the studies conducted in Egypt by Lieutenant Davidsen, the officer who should originally have partnered Raunkiær on the Arabian journey, were jointly celebrated as evidence of a resurgent, Danish "Orient-research."¹⁴⁹ Those efforts were seen as elements in Denmark reclaiming the Niebuhr legacy, and though Raunkiær admitted that his contribution was only a first step to achieving that goal, he envisioned that the opportunity to conduct future, needed expeditions existed for the country that dared to assume the hardships and the risks.¹⁵⁰

Whether Denmark would be the land to assume such challenges or not, the publication of Raunkiær's book served to stake a claim for the country in the sphere of regional exploration. The ambitions that fostered the idea for an expedition, and the energies expended to bring it to a successful completion, indicated the level of Danish will and commitment to the endeavor. Raunkiær, who simultaneously became the instrument and realization of that budding ambition, provided a unique, if often negative, perspective on Arabia that was widely circulated as reviews of his book appeared in many domestic and foreign newspapers and journals.¹⁵¹ The exposure underscored that Danes wanted to contribute to the field and, in one very favorable review, the young explorer's book was termed the most important travel account about Arabia since Doughty's *Arabia Deserta*, and he was proclaimed "a worthy successor of Carsten Niebuhr – the Christopher Columbus of Yemen."¹⁵² The Danish Orientalist Arthur Christensen (1875-1945) argued in his review that such praise was misplaced, citing that unlike the famed eighteenth-century explorer who spent many months preparing for his expedition, Raunkiær only had rudimentary knowledge of Arabic and was therefore limited in his ability to interact with the population.¹⁵³ Lack of foundation in the local language and culture, Christensen asserted, also led Raunkiær to present an excessively negative description of the Arab that clashed with Niebuhr's views on the population. In the distinguished scholar's opinion, it was clear that Raunkiær was not a successor to the great Niebuhr, but he did acknowledge that the young man's account provided valuable geographical information and constituted entertaining reading.

But if Raunkiær lacked the pedigree and education to as yet be an explorer of renowned quality and insight, he did possess grand ambitions about the role Danes could play in the economic development of the Middle East. It was especially in the Ottoman provinces of Mesopotamia that he saw many opportunities for Danish involvement. Deemed a region of rather unbounded potential due to its long history of significant agricultural production, Raunkiær sensed the time was right for a small, enterprising country to seize the initiative in fostering a revival of the economy.¹⁵⁴ In fact, Denmark's size and unassuming international profile, he emphasized, represented as much of an advantage as the technological benefits and professional skills it pro-

mised to impart to the local government and population.

In Mesopotamia, citizens of a nation, the name of which local people have no knowledge and which does not stir up political suspicions and bitter memories...will hardly find it difficult to create a new market for Danish commerce.¹⁵⁵

The absence in Denmark of the strengths associated with the Great Powers, which on its face seemed unfavorable, could be exploited by Danes to forge relationships based on trust and performance, and unobstructed by pre-existing animosities or fears of hidden agendas. In the sphere of agriculture, Denmark was particularly disposed to forge strong ties, and Raunkiær envisioned opportunities to develop modern farming techniques in the area and create a market for Danish-manufactured machinery, such as pumps for irrigation and equipment for more efficient planting and harvesting. The young Dane's call for national action and commercial involvement in the Middle East echoed the arguments and efforts of his compatriot, the Orientalist Johannes E. Østrup (1867-1938), who for years had advocated that Denmark should participate in the region's rural development. Between 1910-1911, Østrup served as an advisor to a Danish investment group seeking to build a model farm in Mesopotamia and, in the report he submitted to its members following months in the area investigating various prospective plots of land, he argued with enthusiasm that Denmark possessed the expertise and national characteristics to benefit significantly from economic ventures and trade activities in the region.¹⁵⁶ Both men, writing from a perspective based in academia rather than the business world, believed that great opportunities awaited those Danes who dared to be engaged internationally. Raunkiær came to embrace that view so intensely that he in 1914 turned his back on pursuing a career as a scholar and accepted a job with *Det Østasiatiske Kompani A/S* (ØK or The East Indies Company), a firm focused intently on global commerce.¹⁵⁷

The promise of a new vocation and the ability to further the interests to which he was committed, suggested that Raunkiær had found his niche in life when he joined ØK. Hired to apply his expertise to help the company secure and develop commercial opportunities in the Middle East, he sought, in the spirit of his employer, to be representative of what Danish initiative could accomplish. However, Raunkiær failed to ever realize his potential in business, because he never fully recovered from the physical hardships he endured on his expedition to Arabia. Struggling with intermittent bouts of malaria over the three years after his return and ultimately hospitalized with a severe case of tuberculosis in mid-1915, the young Dane finally succumbed to his ailments and died at the age of only twenty-five.¹⁵⁸

An untimely death was also the fate of Knud Holmboe, who continued even after his experiences in Cyrenaica to engage in dangerous activities and risky behavior. His arrest, brief detention, and eventual expulsion by the Italians did not dissuade him from remaining committed to the cause of the Sanusi-inspired resistance. Upon reaching Alexandria in late June 1930, Holmboe set out to meet Sidi Idris, the Grand Sanusi, who had fled Cyrenaica in 1922.¹⁵⁹ The Dane had promised his captors in the Jabal Akhdar that he would deliver a message to their spiritual leader, assuring him that the insurgency was ongoing. During the subsequent meeting, Sidi Idris invited Holmboe to visit Kufra, the symbolic heart of the Sanusi resistance. He accepted the offer with enthusiasm and very quickly became involved in a plan to resupply the isolated town, preparations for which had perhaps already begun during his stay in the Cyrenaican mountains. In August, Holmboe headed for Kharga, an Egyptian oasis located about 500 km from Kufra, accompanied by a German officer who too was a convert to Islam.¹⁶⁰ Seething with contempt for the West and its efforts to impose the destructive forces of secular and ma-

terialist values on Muslim societies, and radicalized by the images of death and suffering in Cyrenaica that were still fresh in his mind, the Dane declared an unwavering commitment, even at the risk of death, to Islam and the Sanusi cause.¹⁶¹ Jointly, he and the German, were to help organize a caravan to relieve the increasingly besieged Kufra oasis, and along the route from Cairo to Kharga, Holmboe found that many Egyptian youths expressed a willingness to join and assist the effort.¹⁶²

But the Dane's further participation in the scheme was foiled by the British authorities who arrested him in early September. Accused of being a "Bolshevik agitator" bent on fostering a revolt inside Egypt, Holmboe was put in irons and transported to a jail for political prisoners in the capital.¹⁶³ Having yet again raised the suspicions of a colonial regime, he vehemently denied the charges and characterized as libel the many reports that branded him "Moscow's Colonel Lawrence" and tied him to foreign agents.¹⁶⁴ Absolutely convinced that Italy was behind the campaign to tarnish his name and distort his activities, Holmboe condemned his eventual expulsion from Egypt as a miscarriage of justice. Upon his return to Denmark, he sought the assistance of the foreign ministry to protest his treatment, and asserted to the government that while in Egypt he only publicized the truth about Italian rule and was not engaged in propaganda or incitement.¹⁶⁵ He further rejected the British contention that he lacked the money to finance his stay in the country.¹⁶⁶ However, by the time of his arrest, Holmboe had several outstanding debts, including hotel bills and loans from the Danish legations, some of which would remain unpaid until his death!¹⁶⁷ And while the British quickly acknowledged that the Dane was not a communist operative, even agreeing to pay his first-class passage back to Denmark, they resolved to deport him because he was a troublesome critic of European rule in North Africa and constituted an irritant for Britain's colonial neighbor in Libya.¹⁶⁸

Holmboe's inclination to condemn the manner and depth of Western interference in the Middle East intensified after his return to Denmark. Letters from friends in Egypt confirmed his conviction that the intelligence and security services of the European colonial regimes had conspired to assure his expulsion from the region.¹⁶⁹ The concerted effort to remove him from the audience that his writings and testimony might inflame, constituted an effective if clumsy form of censorship, and Holmboe was angered by such treatment much as he lamented the disruption of his plans for further travel. A compulsion to respond to such pressure, as well as generate much needed income, prompted him to initiate an avid writing and public engagement campaign in Denmark.¹⁷⁰ Intending not only to tell his story of adventure and exploration, Holmboe was committed to reveal the face of colonial occupation and to educate people about Islam. His book and articles, published over the last months of 1930 and the first half of 1931, served collectively and specifically as an indictment of Italian rule, but also stressed his assessment that Western influences were terribly damaging culturally to the Middle East. Holmboe believed that an insidious process was afoot, undermining traditional values and religious devotion and creating distorted, materialist societies plagued by the many Western vices. In Egypt, he argued, that trend was manifested in the deplorable behavior of the youth of Cairo who were turning their back on Islam and, without that moral compass, fostering an urban environment even worse than those found in Europe.¹⁷¹ The contrast, so evident in Alexandria, Holmboe wrote, between what was fading and what was evolving, became clear as one passed from the Arab districts, marked by the call to prayer and the cafés, into the westernized parts of town where prostitutes, alcohol, and narcotics were readily available.¹⁷²

Political change, in the form of nationalism, was another Western-inspired development that challenged the loyalties and associations enshrined in the *umma*, and Holmboe held that the

movement toward ethnic and territory-determined identity was not an advancement. The Dane particularly criticized Turkey and Mustafa Kemal for undermining Islam and working at cross-purposes with the real interests of the wider regional population.¹⁷³ In his mind, the centuries-long Central Asian dominance of the Middle East had served to distort the religion, and the rise of Kemalism was only the culmination of that process which had finally led to a repudiation of the central role of Islam.¹⁷⁴ However, with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the abolishment of the caliphate, he argued that the hopes for a revival of an Arab-led *umma* was possible and that Ibn Saud would be well-suited to assume such a role. Unlike Raunkiær, his deceased compatriot who railed against the Muwahhidun movement, Holmboe found that the restoration of religious discipline under a capable leader would be a welcome development.¹⁷⁵ And over the remaining year of his life, the Danish Muslim became ever more attracted to the ideals of the movement, believing that it was rooted in the values from which Islam evolved originally.¹⁷⁶ The drive to purify and recover seemed to combine the democratic ethos of the Bedouin with the structure of a rigorous moral code, serving to create a society with less inequality and the needed strength and determination to assert itself. Rather than a fanatical, bastardization of Islam, he considered the Muwahhidun movement a necessary bulwark against the corrupting influences of a secularizing West that made people the servants of materialism instead of assuring their adherence to faith, the truly most important thing in life.¹⁷⁷ For him, the Dane revealed in an interview, culture was something different and really more precious than civilization, and the essence of culture was Islam.¹⁷⁸

Holmboe's growing hostility and alienation from Western, secular society mirrored his deepening commitment to being a Muslim. Ever more frequently, in private and published writings, he declared his full embrace of Islam. "[It] is truth," he declared in *Ørkenen Brænder!*. "By adhering to its laws," he continued, "one gets nearer to God than through any other religion."¹⁷⁹ That sense of structure or guidelines, as Holmboe put it, was something he felt had been lacking from his life, and he believed that Islam fundamentally changed him and helped him significantly to develop morally.¹⁸⁰ Such an experience of positive transformation through proper actions and deeds similarly filled the Dane with much satisfaction:

I have indeed felt how precious it was to adhere to the dictates of Islam, – since I have begun to follow them I have felt a happiness and joy in life which I have not experienced before. – I can yet again see that nature is beautiful, I can yet again hear the loveliness in music, – that I could not do before, because until I accepted Islam, I had no religion...¹⁸¹

Holmboe had come to believe that faith was essential for the human being and, having found Islam, he asserted, shortly after his return to Denmark, that "I have never been happier than I am now!"¹⁸² The interviewer who recorded that statement was an acquaintance, and he observed that Holmboe clearly exhibited such feelings, as "he appears more content than before and his alert eyes have now an ardent glare that almost looks like fanaticism..."¹⁸³ It seemed the young Muslim exuded unblemished devotion and an intense conviction, manifestations that also convinced another friend, the Orientalist Ditlef Nielsen (b. 1874), to write:

There is no doubt that this conversion was genuine. Holmboe was by nature idealistic, felt repelled by the dogma of the Christian church, and had truly found peace in Islam.¹⁸⁴

Those latter words, written after Holmboe's murder south of Aqaba, reflect only an observer's opinion, but the young convert himself endorsed the portrait that was conveyed in the published

interview, even expressing a hope that the article's content would find its way also to an international audience.¹⁸⁵ In fact, Holmboe was eager not only to reveal his conversion but also to defend and discuss his chosen religion. He felt Westerners were terribly ignorant of the East and needed to abandon the negative views of Islam that defined it as plagiaristic and prone to violence.¹⁸⁶ While admitting that Muslims were permitted to exercise a vigorous self-defense, he denied that Islam was fatalistic or that veiling was mandatory, and repeatedly insisted that Jesus was a Muslim.¹⁸⁷ In a particularly passionate, though private, defense of the faith, he also wrote that "the Koran is a great poem that regrettably has been derided and condemned by the lying and wicked Christian church which has always promoted a distorted image of Islam."¹⁸⁸ The centuries of misinformation, it was suggested, needed to be challenged, and Holmboe seemed intent on seizing the opportunity to rehabilitate the religion and have it take root in Denmark. To that end, he revealed his intentions to write a book about Islam, expressing a hope that an improved understanding of the faith might make it "the religion of the future" in Northern Europe.¹⁸⁹ He also dabbled in efforts to attract fellow Danes to the faith. In April 1931, in a letter to the imam of the Woking Mosque, Holmboe could report that "we are two here in Denmark who have accepted Islam as our religion", after he had convinced his friend and author, Niels Meyn, to sign a declaration of faith.¹⁹⁰ The Muslims in Woking, in turn, were impressed with Holmboe's efforts and visibility, noting that "your zeal and courage are sufficient qualifications for your being brother to us."¹⁹¹ The Dane took those words to heart, as he did their offer to assist him in securing permission to visit the Hijaz.

By the spring of 1931, Holmboe was eagerly planning to yet again depart from Denmark and cultivate his intensifying passion for Islam and the decolonization of the Middle East. The attraction of a possible meeting with Ibn Saud lured him back to the region, as did his intention to reach the holy cities and perform the *hajj* so that "I am fully worthy to fight for the cause we love all of us."¹⁹² However, winning approval for entry into Western Arabia was difficult, and the Woking Muslims, despite their contacts with the Hijazi legation in London, struggled without success throughout the summer to procure Holmboe the necessary papers.¹⁹³ Yet the impasse over travel documents was the least of the Dane's troubles, because when he arrived in Aleppo in French-governed Syria, having traveled down through Eastern Europe and across the Bosphorus into Anatolia, he found that his name was already well-known among the local Arab population. Unbeknownst to him, translated excerpts from *Ørkenen Brænder!* had appeared in the French-language journal *La Nation Arabe* and had incited violent demonstrations against Italian rule in Libya.¹⁹⁴ The French authorities, unsettled by the disorder, immediately expelled Holmboe back over the border into Turkey, where Danish diplomats expressed doubts about his ability to travel further due to his rising international profile.¹⁹⁵ However, within a matter of weeks he managed to secure passage to Transjordan, even though the British too had their misgivings about his activities. In fact, once in the Anglo-Hashemite territory, Holmboe gave no indication of easing his contribution to regional activism and instead expressed a hope that his book might soon appear in Arabic.¹⁹⁶ The translated work could then reach a larger audience and become a tool in "the war of the pen", a phrase coined by Amir Shakib Arslan (1869-1946), the Geneva-based, co-editor of *La Nation Arabe*.¹⁹⁷ Holmboe actually met the Lebanese activist in Transjordan and found him "a splendid man" who,

[i]s without question modern Islam's greatest mind, and there is not a journal in the entire Near East upon which he fails to exercise some influence. On every level, he far exceeds the unappealing, self-interested politicians one meets all over the region.¹⁹⁸

The two men's encounter also produced a promise from Arslan that he would contact Ibn Saud, whom he knew, and thereby assure Holmboe a warm welcome in the Hijaz.¹⁹⁹ The Dane took that pledge to heart and suggested in an interview in early September that his planned six-month stay in Arabia was fully approved.²⁰⁰ However, such an authorization never existed, and when Holmboe finally set off through southern Transjordan headed for the holy cities, he knew that "the dangers on my journey are very great."²⁰¹ Feeling ever more alienated from fellow Europeans, many of whom he condemned as close-minded and judgmental when they arrived in the region, he conversely sensed a blossoming kinship with the Arab population and a conviction that Islam had been the right choice in his life.²⁰² The pull of Arabia, the drive to meet Ibn Saud, and the distinction of becoming the first documented Scandinavian to perform the *hajj*, all suppressed his instinctual unease about venturing alone into the desert south of Aqaba.²⁰³ He chose to embrace the same spirit of adventure that led him to defy conventional wisdom and push through the Jabal Akhdar despite the danger of roving rebel bands. But in the lands beyond the Transjordanian port, he encountered a place where his knowledge of Arabic and his conversion to Islam were not enough to save his life. On 13 October 1931, just two days after departing from Aqaba, Holmboe was robbed and murdered by a small party of Arabs near Al-Haqf, 50 km from the port.²⁰⁴ The motives of those men are hidden in the shadows of history, but may have ranged from mundane theft to elaborate intrigue, the latter explanation suggested by a recent biographer of Holmboe, who alleges that he was specifically targeted for assassination by Italian agents.²⁰⁵ Yet in the immediate wake of the murder, the investigations failed to reveal any evidence of a Fascist plot, and the attention focused more on Holmboe's lack of caution and his disregard of specific and repeated denials of permission to enter Hijaz.²⁰⁶ The Dane seemingly allowed ambition and desire to cloud his judgment, and with his passing Denmark lost a man whose unique insight to the Middle East and Islam was steadily expanding and evolving into a valuable resource.

The Formation of Differing Perspectives

Barclay Raunkiær and Knud Holmboe developed diametrically opposite views on the Middle Eastern and North African societies and cultures they encountered. Their experiences became the basis for popular accounts about their journeys that contributed, if only in a small way, to shaping a national perspective on parts of the world that seemed so very foreign and distant. The observations and judgments found on those pages served to either confirm or challenge, but also expand, the prevailing assumptions about the regions and their populations. Raunkiær, the youthful pioneer, felt shaken by his experiences and projected a rather negative, if intriguing, assessment of the Arabian interior. His compatriot, Holmboe, who curiously never seemed to have read Raunkiær's book, was similarly affected profoundly by what he witnessed and encountered on his travels. However, unlike his predecessor, Holmboe condemned not the foreign societies but rather the manifestations of his own, Western civilization on the cultures beyond its sphere. He assumed a role as critic from within, what Ali Behdad has termed the "Oriental parasite", disrupting the Orientalist discourse through "noise of contestation."²⁰⁷ The addition of that intellectual dynamic, the debate over the domination or superiority of one ethno-cultural block over another, and the evaluation of worth beyond one's own society, was a healthy, educating step toward greater understanding and more beneficial scholarship. But Raunkiær's writings, though marked by an unambiguous Orientalist tone, were distinctly honest, reflecting the hardships and unpleasantness people could expect to experience if they chose to journey through a distant wil-

derness with limited skills and a poor constitution. Much as a 19th century Wahhabi from Buraydah, unprepared for polar exploration, would likely have endured travel across Greenland with scant enthusiasm, so too Raunkiær, though having volunteered, found the trip presented more challenges than he ever anticipated. Holmboe, in contrast, endowed with a greater command of the language and better in tune with local traditions, seemed to embrace the difficulties that emerged and was to a degree invigorated, even emboldened by his abilities to overcome the obstacles encountered. Survival in the desert and in the Jabal Akhdar in a sense confirmed his cultural and religious immersion as complete, and his accounts reflected an ever strengthening affinity for his new-found emotional and spiritual home.

The rivaling Danish accounts about the Bedouin, desert life, Arab society, and Islam therefore offered a balanced perspective if read in conjunction. Holmboe's endorsement of a society where religion retained a significant role, a society where Islam could flourish, was tempered by Raunkiær's assessment that faith, much less that specific faith, could not provide the necessary structure and initiative to sustain modern life. The latter's support of empire as a bulwark against the reemergence of traditional, reactionary rule, was, in turn, opposed by Holmboe who condemned European colonialism as destructive and intolerant. In each their own way, the two Danes enriched the study of the Middle East and North Africa in Denmark by producing a pair of conflicting yet unique accounts that added depth and perspective to the field. More narrowly, their commentaries on empire in an age of undisputed Western dominance provided a spectrum of understanding about the nature of imperial rule and its effects on masters and subjects.

- ¹ Svend Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon* 3rd ed (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1979-84), 17: 63-64; Knud Holmboe, *Desert Encounter* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1937), v-viii.
- ² Ibid.
- ³ Barclay Raunkiær, "Centraltunisien: En erhvervsgeografisk Studie", *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 1 (1911): 12-25.
- ⁴ Barclay Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land paa Kamelryg 1912* (Copenhagen: Nordisk Forlag, 1913), 10-11; Arthur Christensen, "Barclay Raunkiærs Arabienrejse," *Berlingske Tidende Aften*, 29 November 1913.
- ⁵ A. Richelieu, et al., Royal Danish Geographical Society to the Danish Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen, 7 June 1911, 41.R.4, Danish State Archives (hereafter DSA); H. A. Bernhoft, Danish Foreign Ministry to the Royal Danish Embassy in London, Copenhagen, 13 June 1911, "Dansk ekspedition til Oman and Hadramaut," No. 165, DSA, Gesandtskab London (afl. 1948), Group 35j. The membership of the committee included Ole Olufsen (1865-1929), the Central Asia and North Africa explorer, Frants Buhl (1850-1932), the famed Orientalist, and Admiral Andreas du Plessis de Richelieu (1852-1932), a long-time veteran of the Thai navy who also served for three years as that country's naval minister.
- ⁶ A. Richelieu, et al., Royal Danish Geographical Society to the Danish Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen, 7 June 1911, 41.R.4, DSA.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Lewis Mallet (for Sir Edward Grey) to C. Brun, London, 12 July 1911, No. 23688/11, copy in DSA.
- ⁹ Ole Olufsen, KDGS to the C. Brun, Snekkersten, Denmark, 12 July 1911, DSA, Gesandtskab London (afl. 1948), Group 35j.
- ¹⁰ A. Richelieu, et al., KDGS to the Danish Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen, 8 September 1911, 41.R.4, DSA.
- ¹¹ "Premierløjtnant Davidsens Ekspedition," *Berlingske Tidende Aften*, 23 May 1912.
- ¹² "Dansk Ekspedition til Arabien," *Berlingske Tidende*, 13 November 1911.
- ¹³ A. Richelieu, et al., KDGS to Barclay Raunkiær, Copenhagen, 8 November 1911, Ny kongelige Samling, 1922 fol. Manuscript Department. Royal Library.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Safia Aoude, *Hjulspor i Sandet: Historien om Ali Ahmed Knud Holmboe* (Copenhagen: Forlaget Fateh, 2002), 84-85.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 205. In Morocco Holmboe befriended the prince and together they forged the beginnings of a partnership aimed at organizing for the latter speaking engagements in Europe and the United States. Perhaps as a reflection of the royal officer's years in the military, he demanded their emergent arrangement be kept secret and be managed in a covert manner. Prince Aage even instructed in one letter that Holmboe should burn the evidence, an act the journalist clearly ignored. Prince Capitaine Aage to Knud Holmboe, Rabat, 5 February 1925, Holmboe Family Archive (hereafter HFA).
- ¹⁷ Knud Holmboe, *Between the Devil and the Deep Sea: A Dash by Plane to Seething Morocco* (Copenhagen: Klinte Publishers, 1924), 27.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 28.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 27.
- ²⁰ K. Holmboe, "I Flyvemaskine fra London til Angora," *Viborg Stiftstidende*, 25 August 1925; K. Holmboe, "Da Smyrna forsvandt," *Armeniervennen* 5, nos. 3-4 (1925): 13-15.
- ²¹ K. Holmboe, "Palæstina er atter Jødernes land," *Verden og Vi* 16, no. 15 (23 July 1926): 8.
- ²² Ibid.; K. Holmboe, "Det gamle og det ny Palæstina," *Østsjællands Folkeblad*, 23 September 1926; K. Holmboe, "Palæstina bliver paany jødisk," newspaper article, copy in HFA.
- ²³ K. Holmboe, "Hvor Bethlehems-krybben stod," *Verden og Vi* 16, no. 26 (24 December 1926): 8, 10; K. Holmboe, "Den hellige Ilds Fest," *Horsens Avis*, 21 September 1925.
- ²⁴ K. Holmboe to his parents, Jerusalem, 18 May 1925, HFA; K. Holmboe, "Ministerkrise over et spil kort," *Lolland-Falster Social Demokraten*, 13 August 1925.
- ²⁵ K. Holmboe to his parents, Baghdad, 1 July 1925, HFA.
- ²⁶ K. Holmboe, "Hos Islams Pave," *Verden og Vi* 17, no. 2 (26 January 1927): 10.
- ²⁷ K. Holmboe to his parents, Baghdad, 20 October 1925, HFA.
- ²⁸ K. Holmboe to Jens Christian Gylding Holmboe, Casablanca, 20 January 1929, HFA.
- ²⁹ K. Holmboe, "Why I Became a Muslim," *The Islamic Review* 19, no. 10 (October 1931): 345-47.
- ³⁰ K. Holmboe to J. C. G. Holmboe, Gibraltar, 7 August 1929, HFA.
- ³¹ K. Holmboe to J. C. G. Holmboe, Gibraltar, 14 August 1929, HFA.
- ³² Ibid.; K. Holmboe to J. C. G. Holmboe, Gibraltar, 14 September 1929, HFA; K. Holmboe to J. C. G. Holmboe, Gibraltar, 16 September 1929, HFA; K. Holmboe to J. C. G. Holmboe, London, 22 November 1929, HFA.

- ³³ K. Holmboe to his mother, Gibraltar, 13 October 1929, HFA; "Pr. Automobil og Dromedar gennem Ørkenen," *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 2 (15 January 1930): 21.
- ³⁴ Aoude, *Hjulspor*, 243-44.
- ³⁵ K. Holmboe to J. C. G. Holmboe, Gibraltar, 16 September 1929, HFA; K. Holmboe to his mother, Gibraltar, 13 October 1929, HFA.
- ³⁶ K. Holmboe to J. C. G. Holmboe, Gibraltar, 16 September 1929, HFA.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 13-15; B. Raunkiær, "Det kongelige dansk geografiske selskabs ekspedition til Arabien: Foreløbig oversigt," *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 6 (1912): 215-16; B. Raunkiær, "The Expedition of the Royal Danish Geographical Society to Arabia – Preliminary Report," *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 44, no. 9 (1912): 657-58. Hannah, the Christian Arab from Mosul, was a man of considerable experience, having worked earlier for other Europeans all across Iraq and parts of Persia. On the journey to the interior of Arabia, he assumed the identity of a Muslim Arab named Ali.
- ³⁹ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 22; Raunkiær, "The Expedition," *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society*, 658.
- ⁴⁰ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 35-36; H. V. F. Winstone, *Captain Shakespear: A Portrait*. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1976), 110; William Facey and Gillian Grant, *Kuwait by the First Photographers*. (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), 51; Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 140.
- ⁴¹ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 87; Raunkiær, "Beretning om min Rejse i Central Arabien," *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 8 (1912): 285; Raunkiær, "The Expedition," *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society*, 658.
- ⁴² Raunkiær, "Beretning om min Rejse i Central Arabien, 284.
- ⁴³ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 59, 62.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 50; Facey and Grant, *Kuwait*, 78.
- ⁴⁵ Facey and Grant, *Kuwait*, 56.
- ⁴⁶ Raunkiær, "Det uafhængige Arabien," *Gads Danske Magasin* (1912-1913): 300; Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 102, 142.
- ⁴⁷ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 141-42.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 97.
- ⁴⁹ Paul W. Harrison, *The Arab at Home* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1924), 276, 287, 330; Paul W. Harrison, "Realities of Missionary Life," *The International Review of Missions* 6, no. 23 (July 1917): 428-429.
- ⁵⁰ Harrison, *The Arab at Home*, 287.
- ⁵¹ Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*, 19-25.
- ⁵² Facey and Grant, *Kuwait*, 18.
- ⁵³ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 28.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., 57, 87; Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*, 139.
- ⁵⁵ K. Holmboe, "Den første dag i arabiske klæder," undated article, HFA; Holmboe, "Ya-Sin – Dødsuraen," *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 46 (19 November 1930): 7-8; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 10-11.
- ⁵⁶ K. Holmboe, "Den første dag i arabiske klæder," undated article, HFA; Holmboe, "Ya-Sin – Dødsuraen," *Verden og Vi*, 7-8.
- ⁵⁷ K. Holmboe, "Gennem Afrika – fra Atlanten til det Røde Hav," *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 45 (12 November 1930): 6; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 72.
- ⁵⁸ K. Holmboe to his parents, Sirte, 9 February 1930, HFA.
- ⁵⁹ K. Holmboe to his parents, near Tripoli, 28 February 1930, HFA.
- ⁶⁰ K. Holmboe to his parents, Benghazi, 11 April 1930, HFA; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 149-50.
- ⁶¹ Holmboe to his mother?, Qarra, 28 August 1930, HFA; Holmboe, "Gennem Afrika," *Verden og Vi*, 8.
- ⁶² Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 114.
- ⁶³ K. Holmboe, "Ten days disappeared in the Libyan desert," undated article, HFA.
- ⁶⁴ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 128.
- ⁶⁵ K. Holmboe to his parents, Cairo, 24 September 1930, HFA.
- ⁶⁶ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 77.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 80; Claudio G. Segre, *Fourth Shore* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 87.
- ⁶⁸ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 81; K. Holmboe, "Roms Ørn over Tripolis," *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 1 (7 January 1931): 6.
- ⁶⁹ Holmboe, "Roms Ørn," *Verden og Vi*, 7.
- ⁷⁰ Ken Blady, *Jewish Communities in Exotic Places* (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 2000), 319.

- ⁷¹ Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 63.
- ⁷² Harriet Chalmers Adams, "Cirenaica, Eastern Wing of Italian Libia," *National Geographic Magazine* 57 (June 1930): 706; Blady, *Jewish Communities in Exotic Places*, 320.
- ⁷³ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 154-55.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 176-78; Enzo Santarelli, et al., *Omar Al-Mukhtar* (London: Darf Publishers, 1986), 128; John Wright, *Libya* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 152, 163-64.
- ⁷⁶ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 164-73; Holmboe, "Fire maaneder fange hos beduinerne i slavebyen Cufra," *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 21 (28 May 1930): 12-15.
- ⁷⁷ David Atkinson, "Nomadic Strategies and Colonial Governance," in *Entanglements of Power*, ed. Joanne P. Sharp, et al (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 95-96, 98.
- ⁷⁸ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 89-90; Raunkiær, "Beretning om min Rejse," 285.
- ⁷⁹ B. Raunkiær, "Karaveliv," *Illustreret Tidende* 53, no. 38 (16 June 1912): 466-67; Raunkiær, "Det uafhængige Arabien," 294-96; Raunkiær, "Beretning om min Rejse," 285.
- ⁸⁰ Raunkiær, "Karaveliv," *Illustreret Tidende*, 466-67. Molbo is a popular term for a resident on the peninsula of Mols or Djursland located in east-central Jutland. People from this region of Denmark have traditionally been the butt of jokes and depicted as simpletons.
- ⁸¹ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 114-116.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*, 114.
- ⁸³ Raunkiær, "Det uafhængige Arabien," 298.
- ⁸⁴ A. Richelieu, et al., KDGS to B. Raunkiær, Copenhagen, 8 November 1911, Ny Kongelige Samling, 1922 fol. Manuscript Department, Royal Library.
- ⁸⁵ "Geografisk Selskabs Ekspedition til Centralarabien," *Berlingske Tidende Aften*, 4 June 1912; "Et spændende Kamelridt," *Politiken*, 21 December 1913.
- ⁸⁶ B. Raunkiær, *Central- og Øst-Arabien* (Copenhagen: Universitetsudvalget, 1913), 11.
- ⁸⁷ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 106.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.
- ⁸⁹ Alexie Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia* (London: Saqi Books, 1998), 227-28.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 227; Barclay Raunkiær, *Through Wahhabiland on Camelback*, trans. Gerald de Gaury (New York; Washington, D.C.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 84, n. 1; John B. Philby, *Arabian Jubilee* (London: Robert Hale, 1952), 39.
- ⁹¹ John B. Philby, *Arabia of the Wahhabis*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 352-53.
- ⁹² Philby too was guilty of shortcomings in his discussion of Raunkiær and his observations, as he misidentified the Dane as a Dutchman.
- ⁹³ Philby, *Arabia of the Wahhabis*, 349.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 353; Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 281.
- ⁹⁵ Raunkiær, *Central- og Øst-Arabien*, 6.
- ⁹⁶ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 175; Raunkiær, "Beretning om min Rejse," 286.
- ⁹⁷ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 174; Raunkiær, "The Expedition," *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society*, 659; Raunkiær, "Beretning om min Rejse," 286.
- ⁹⁸ "Et spændende Kamelridt," *Politiken*, 21 December 1913.
- ⁹⁹ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 167-68.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰¹ Philby, *Arabia of the Wahhabis*, 188.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰³ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 169.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 202.
- ¹⁰⁵ Raunkiær, "Beretning om min Rejse", 287; Raunkiær, "Det kongelige danske geografiske selskabs ekspedition til Arabien," *Geografisk Tidsskrift*, 216; Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, 212-13.
- ¹⁰⁶ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 207.
- ¹⁰⁷ Raunkiær, "Det uafhængige Arabien," 302.
- ¹⁰⁸ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 211.
- ¹⁰⁹ Raunkiær, "Det uafhængige Arabien," 299-300.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 302.
- ¹¹¹ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 9.

- ¹¹² Raunkiær, "Det uafhængige Arabien," 299.
- ¹¹³ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 226.
- ¹¹⁴ Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*, 143-44, 153.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 160-61; Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 231, 234.
- ¹¹⁶ Raunkiær, *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land*, 236-37.
- ¹¹⁷ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 114, 123-24, 141.
- ¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 140, 146-47; Holmboe to his mother?, Qarra, 28 August 1930, HFA; Wright, *Libya*, 155, 164; John Wright, "Italian Fascism and Libyan Human Resources," in *Planning and Development in Modern Libya*, eds. Mukhtar M. Buru, et al. (Wisbech, England: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1985), 53-54.
- ¹¹⁹ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 186.
- ¹²⁰ Santarelli, et al., *Omar al-Mukhtar*, 70, n. 81; E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 188.
- ¹²¹ G. L. Steer, *A Date in the Desert* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1939), 165; Santarelli, et al., *Omar al-Mukhtar*, 130-31. The veracity of accounts detailing such a method of execution is strengthened by irrefutable evidence that another regime did the same decades later. During the 1970s and 1980s the Argentine military *junta* ordered the killing of leftist opponents by dumping them from aircraft flying over the South Atlantic. That fact in itself does not prove that Italian forces engaged in such cruelty, but it does establish that rightwing dictatorships are capable of such acts. See Horacio Verbitsky, *The Flight: Confessions of an Argentine dirty warrior*, trans. Esther Allen (New York: New Press, 1996).
- ¹²² Holmboe, *Desert Encounter*, 165-66, 239-40, 261; Wright, *Libya*, 158.
- ¹²³ Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, 188; Wright, *Libya*, 164.
- ¹²⁴ David Atkinson, "Nomadic Strategies and Colonial Governance," 101. An estimated 3% of the Libyan land mass is cultivable.
- ¹²⁵ H. A. Benzabih, "The Jabal Al-Akhdar," in *Social and Economic Development of Libya*, eds. E. G. H. Joffe and Keith S. McLachland (Wisbech, England: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982), 201-03; Santarelli, et al., *Omar al-Mukhtar*, 112.
- ¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 112; Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya*, 136;
- ¹²⁷ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 99-100.
- ¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 189-90.
- ¹²⁹ Martin Moore, *Fourth Shore: Italy's Colonization of Libya* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1940), 172; Atkinson, "Nomadic Strategies and Colonial Governance," 112-114; Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, 189. It is estimated that about 600,000 animals were interned with the people. One study calculated that by 1933 the domesticated herds and flocks had been devastated, with camels reduced by 96%, horses by 93%, sheep by 88%, goats by 64%, asses by 44%, and oxen by 13%.
- ¹³⁰ Santarelli, et al., *Omar al-Mukhtar*, 134.
- ¹³¹ Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya*, 135; Wright, "Italian Fascism," 47.
- ¹³² Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 251.
- ¹³³ *Ibid.*, 179.
- ¹³⁴ Holmboe to Imam Abdul Hojid, Woking Mosque, Copenhagen, undated, HFA; "Danish Convert to Islam," *The Palestine Bulletin*, 9 September 1931.
- ¹³⁵ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 211-13.
- ¹³⁶ Holmboe, *Desert Encounter*, 237.
- ¹³⁷ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 212.
- ¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 225.
- ¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 209, 226; Adams, "Cirenaica," *National Geographic Magazine*, 703.
- ¹⁴⁰ Holmboe to Nora Holmboe (his wife), Benghazi, 20 June 1930, HFA; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 227; Adams, "Cirenaica," 724.
- ¹⁴¹ Holmboe to his parents, Benghazi, 30 June 1930, HFA; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 134-35, 200-03; Holmboe, "Fanget af Beduiner i Bjergene," *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 3 (21 January 1931): 10; Holmboe, "Gennem Afrika – fra Atlanten til det Røde Hav," *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 45 (12 November 1930): 8.
- ¹⁴² Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 198-99; Holmboe, "Fanget af Beduiner i Bjergene," *Verden og Vi*, 8-9.
- ¹⁴³ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 204; Majid Khadduri, *Modern Libya* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 24-25.
- ¹⁴⁴ Wright, *Libya*, 155, 168; Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi*, 169
- ¹⁴⁵ Muhammad Asad, *The Road to Mecca* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 344, 348, 359-60.

- ¹⁴⁶ Holmboe to his parents, Cairo, 8 August 1930, HFA; Holmboe, "Gennem Afrika – fra Atlanten til det Røde Hav," *Verden og Vi*, 8.
- ¹⁴⁷ "Det kongelige danske geografiske selskabs Ekspedition til Arabien," *Berlingske Tidende Morgen*, 9 May 1912.
- ¹⁴⁸ "Dansk geografisk ekspedition til Central-Arabien," *Berlingske Tidende Morgen*, 8 May 1912; "Geografisk selskabs ekspedition til Centralarabien," *Berlingske Tidende Aften*, 4 June 1912.
- ¹⁴⁹ "Premierløjtnant Davidsens ørkenekspedition," *Berlingske Tidende Aften*, 14 June 1912.
- ¹⁵⁰ Raunkiær, *Central- og Øst-Arabien*, 15-16.
- ¹⁵¹ W. Thulstrup, "Barclay Raunkiær," *Illustreret Tidende* 56, no. 43 (25 July 1915): 483; "Danish Expedition in Arabia," *The Geographical Journal* 44, no. 1 (July 1914): 85. Raunkiær's book was also reviewed in French, Italian, German, and U.S. publications.
- ¹⁵² Samuel M. Zwemer, review of *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land paa Kamelryg*, by Barclay Raunkiær, *The Moslem World* 4 (1914): 328.
- ¹⁵³ Arthur Christensen, "Barclay Raunkiærs Arabienrejse," *Berlingske Tidende Aften*, 29 November 1913.
- ¹⁵⁴ Raunkiær, "Mesopotamien som nyt land for Danske foretagsomhed," *Illustreret Tidende* 55, no. 3 (19 October 1913): 28.
- ¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵⁶ Johannes Østrup, "Indberetning om undersøgelser i Mesopotamien 1910-1911 og vedføjede planer og henstillinger," bundle 116, folder 3, Niels Neergaard Private File, Danish State Archives; Johannes Østrup, "Verdens ældste Kulturland," *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 4 (1911): 134, 143-44; Johannes Østrup, *Erindringer* (Copenhagen: H. Hirschsprungs Forlag, 1937), 86-87, 107-35.
- ¹⁵⁷ "Barclay Raunkiær," *Berlingske Tidende*, 15 July 1915.
- ¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*; Thulstrup, "Barclay Raunkiær," *Illustreret Tidende*, 483.
- ¹⁵⁹ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 246-48; Holmboe, "En Ægyptisk Revolution," *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 5 (4 February 1931): 6; Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya*, 136
- ¹⁶⁰ Holmboe to his parents, Qarra, 24 August 1930, HFA; Holmboe to his mother?, Qarra, 28 August 1930, HFA.
- ¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, Holmboe to his parents, Cairo, 24 September 1930, HFA; Willy Falkman, *Paa Spor efter Knud Holmboe* (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1932), 37; Holmboe, "Why I Became a Muslim," *The Islamic Review*, 349.
- ¹⁶² Holmboe, "I Fængsel med politiske Agenter og Cocainsmuglere!" *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 11 (18 March 1931): 12.
- ¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 13-14; Holmboe to his parents, Marseilles, 10 October 1930, HFA; "Dansk Forfatter i Lænker!" *Politiken*, 6 November 1930.
- ¹⁶⁴ "Danish Convert to Islam," *The Palestine Bulletin*, 9 September 1931.
- ¹⁶⁵ Holmboe to Foreign Minister P. Munch, Copenhagen, 20 November 1930, HFA.
- ¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶⁷ Danish Legation, Cairo to J. C. G. Holmboe, 28 August 1930, HFA; Danish Foreign Ministry to J. C. G. Holmboe, Copenhagen, 22 September 1930; J. N. Quedens, Danish Consul, Cairo to K. Holmboe, 21 October 1930, 17.U.2, Ges. No. 169-600, HFA; Danish Foreign Ministry to J. C. G. Holmboe, Copenhagen, 16 January 1933, 35.K.1511, HFA.
- ¹⁶⁸ Holmboe to his parents, Marseille, 10 October 1930, HFA; J. N. Quedens, Danish Consul, Cairo to K. Holmboe, 21 October 1930, 17.U.2, Ges. No. 169-600, HFA; Holmboe, "I Fængsel med politiske Agenter og Cocainsmuglere!" *Verden og Vi*, 25.
- ¹⁶⁹ Ahmed Hussein to Holmboe, Qarra, 16 January 1931, HFA; Mohammed Hasmy Omar Hassan to Holmboe, Sohaq, undated, HFA.
- ¹⁷⁰ Industriforeningen to Holmboe, Copenhagen, 14 November 1930, HFA; Kerteminde Haandværkerforening to Holmboe, 20 November 1930, HFA; Agreement with Handels- & Kontorist-Foreningen af København, 6 March 1931, HFA. Over the months of Holmboe's stay in Denmark, he negotiated a number of speaking engagements, many with employee associations. In addition to lectures, he also included slides in his presentations.
- ¹⁷¹ Holmboe, unpublished book chapter/article, 1930, HFA; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 38-39.
- ¹⁷² Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 248; Holmboe, "En Ægyptisk Revolution," *Verden og Vi*, 6.
- ¹⁷³ Holmboe, "Islam efter 1916," *Forum* 1 (April 1931): 249; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 67.
- ¹⁷⁴ Børge Rudbeck, "En time med en Moslem," *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 2 (14 January 1931): 11-12; Holmboe, "Islam efter 1916," *Forum*, 239.
- ¹⁷⁵ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 38, 67; Holmboe, "Islam efter 1916," *Forum*, 248-49.
- ¹⁷⁶ Holmboe, "To Verdener," *Politiken*, 13 August 1931; Holmboe, "Nær Wahhabiternes Arabien," *Politiken*, 18 September 1931.
- ¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*; Holmboe, "Fra Islams Nytid: Ibn Saud og den strenge Wahabisme," *Forum* 1 (August 1931): 503-04.

-
- ¹⁷⁸ Rudbeck, "En time med en Moslem," *Verden og Vi*, 11.
- ¹⁷⁹ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 143.
- ¹⁸⁰ Holmboe to his parents, Cairo, 8 August 1930, HFA; Holmboe to his parents, Marseille, 10 October 1930, HFA.
- ¹⁸¹ Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 158.
- ¹⁸² Rudbeck, "En time med en Moslem," *Verden og Vi*, 12.
- ¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 11.
- ¹⁸⁴ Ditlef Nielsen, "Knud Holmboe," *Politiken*, 9 April 1932.
- ¹⁸⁵ Holmboe to Rudbeck, Copenhagen, 20 November 1930, HFA.
- ¹⁸⁶ Rudbeck, "En time med en Moslem," *Verden og Vi*, 11; Holmboe, "Min Religion," *Politiken – magasinet*, 30 November 1930.
- ¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*; Holmboe, *Ørkenen Brænder*, 24, 251; Aoude, *Hjulspor*, 435-38; Holmboe, "Islam efter 1916," *Forum*, 250; Holmboe to his mother?, Qarra, 28 August 1930, HFA; Holmboe to his parents, Cairo, 24 September 1930, HFA.
- ¹⁸⁸ Holmboe to his parents, Qarra, 24 August 1930, HFA.
- ¹⁸⁹ Holmboe to Imam Abdul Hojid, Woking Mosque, Copenhagen, undated, HFA; Holmboe, "Why I Became a Muslim," *Islamic Review*, 349.
- ¹⁹⁰ Holmboe to Imam, Woking Mosque, Copenhagen, 12 April 1931, HFA.
- ¹⁹¹ Assistant Imam to Holmboe, Woking, 14 April 1931, HFA.
- ¹⁹² Holmboe to Imam Abdul Hojid, Copenhagen, undated, HFA.
- ¹⁹³ Imam Abdul Hojid to Holmboe, Woking, various dates (19 May 1931, 11 June 1931, 11 July 1931, 21 August 1931), HFA.
- ¹⁹⁴ Holmboe to his parents, Mersine, 13 June 1931, HFA; "Rapport du Comité exécutif Libyen à l'étranger," *La Nation Arabe* 6, no. 5-6 (1931): 17-18; Peter A. Shambrook, *French Imperialism in Syria 1927-1936* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), 62; "Anti-Italian Rioters Kill Five in Syria," *New York Times*, 3 May 1931. The main demonstrations took place in Damascus, Aleppo, and Tripoli.
- ¹⁹⁵ Danish Legation, Istanbul to Holmboe, 13 June 1931, 35.K.69, Ges. No. 309, copy in HFA.
- ¹⁹⁶ Holmboe to Paul Schrader, attorney, Amman, 14 July 1931, HFA.
- ¹⁹⁷ Khadduri, *Modern Libya*, 26.
- ¹⁹⁸ Holmboe to Per Faber, Amman, 30 August 1931, HFA; Holmboe, "Nær Wahabitternes Arabien," *Politiken*, 18 September 1931; Aoude, *Hjulspor i Sandet*, 476-78.
- ¹⁹⁹ Holmboe to his parents, Amman, 19 August 1931, HFA.
- ²⁰⁰ "Danish Convert to Islam," *The Palestine Bulletin*, 9 September 1931.
- ²⁰¹ Holmboe to Paul Schrader, attorney, Al Karak, 21 September 1931, HFA.
- ²⁰² Holmboe to his parents, Amman, 19 August 1931, HFA.
- ²⁰³ Holmboe to Hasager, Mersine, 14 June 1931, HFA; Holmboe to Schrader, attorney, Aqaba, 5 October 1931.
- ²⁰⁴ Henry Hellsen, *De Sorte Telte* (Copenhagen: Thaning & Appels Forlag, 1943), 116-118; Falkman, *Paa Spor efter Knud Holmboe*, 139-140; Aoude, *Hjulspor i Sandet*, 591. His murder generated some international notice as brief obituaries appeared both in *The Times* of London and the *New York Times* on 28 October 1931.
- ²⁰⁵ Aoude, *Hjulspor i Sandet*, passim.
- ²⁰⁶ Danish Consulate, Cairo to J. C. G. Holmboe, 11 March 1932, HFA; Poul Scheel to Danish Foreign Ministry, London, 4 November 1932, Kongelige Danske Gesandtskab i London, Ges. 34.N.24, copy in HFA; Nielsen, "Knud Holmboe," *Politiken*, 9 April 1932; Hellsen, *De Sorte Telte*, 114-15, 120.
- ²⁰⁷ Ali Behdad, *Belated Travelers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 115, 120-21.

CHAPTER FOUR

AID WORKER TO A DEVASTATED PEOPLE: KAREN JEPPE AND THE ARMENIANS

Over the final quarter century of its existence, the Ottoman Empire was beset by fundamental and debilitating crises. Invasions and insurrections tore at the empire's territorial integrity and sapped its strength. Economic constraints limited the ability to promulgate effective reforms and allocate the necessary resources for rapid development. And pressures to redefine and reassert imperial identity in the face of emerging, ethnic nationalisms within the empire created tensions and deepened communal divides between subjects. One community, the Armenians, who predated the Turkish presence in Anatolia by many centuries, was particularly victimized by that socio-political instability shaking the empire. Concentrated mostly in the northeastern parts of the peninsula, the Armenians were proximate to the decades-long conflict in the Caucasus where Russian forces had steadily advanced and driven thousands of Muslim refugees across the border into the Ottoman Empire. The bitter geopolitical struggle over territory was aggravated by the overt ethno-religious distinctions between the warring powers, and that tension was transplanted and reproduced inside the empire as many of the fleeing Muslims were settled alongside the Armenian communities. An already simmering dispute over land between Ottoman Muslims and Christians in the border region was thereby accentuated, and the ongoing wars fostered allegations that the Armenians constituted a fifth column population. By the 1890s, suspicion had become conviction, and a concerted, government-sanctioned campaign was initiated to crush the scattered elements of Armenian armed resistance and punish the wider, rather apolitical community and seize their lands.¹ Within just a few years, many tens of thousands of Armenians were murdered or left destitute, creating a humanitarian crisis that demanded some measure of Western intervention.

But the obligation to respond to the human tragedy was assumed by private organizations and individuals rather than state institutions and government officials. Regular people, moved by the gruesome events and by propaganda, joined relief efforts that sought to provide housing, education, and employment opportunities for the Armenians who remained within the Ottoman Empire. Mostly directed and staffed by Christian missionaries, the motivation to offer assistance was largely religious, but individuals also chose to act based on distinctly personal grounds. The Dane Karen Jeppe (1876-1935) was one such person, who, despite being a devout Christian, never sought to convert Armenians to her faith, Lutheran Protestantism, and instead felt drawn to the crisis-ravaged region to fulfill a religiously-inspired duty to help others and realize her own obligation to God.² This acceptance of the Eastern Christian as an equal exhibited a progressive worldview and an appreciation of cultural diversity defiant of conventional Orientalism. However, Jeppe too endorsed the popular Western demonization of the Turk as bestial and bloodthirsty, reflecting the entrenched view of the Other. Over the years she would be slow to purge herself of that latter assessment, but during the more than three decades that Jeppe served as an aid worker focused on Armenian affairs, including six years as a League of Nations commissioner for refugees, she did embrace innovative ideas and contributed to the development of the modern system of humanitarian assistance. Her emphasis on preserving the ethno-cultural identity of refugees, combined and balanced with efforts at resettlement and integration on foreign soil, were elements of policy that today are standard. The fate of the Armenians in the Ottoman

Empire served, even if belatedly, to instruct the international community in how it should manage and aid a displaced and victimized population.

The Urfa Years

On a cold and dreary winter's day in late February 1902, Aage Meyer Benedictsen (1866-1927), an ethnographer and historian, addressed a gathering of fellow Danes, including teachers and students, at a hall in Copenhagen.³ The subject of his presentation was the plight of the Armenian community inside the Ottoman Empire whose conditions he witnessed just the year before and could therefore describe in compelling detail. Karen Jeppe was one of the people in the audience that day and, feeling deeply moved by Benedictsen's speech, she began to seriously contemplate joining the nascent Danish aid effort in the region. Though burdened with frail health, she felt duty-bound to help relieve the suffering of the distant Armenians, leading her in 1903 to join the recently established *De Danske Armeniervenner* (DDA – The Danish Friends of Armenia).⁴ Only a year old, the DDA was a fledgling organization, but its leadership, including Benedictsen, was determined to carve out a role for Danes in the international campaign to aid the Ottoman Armenians. However, prevented by limited funding from establishing themselves independently in the region, the DDA forged a partnership with the *Deutsche Orient Mission* (DMO), founded by Johannes Lepsius, whose activities centered around the town of Urfa in southeastern Anatolia. There the Germans operated an orphanage and a carpet factory, providing both education and employment for the local Armenians. The Danes resolved to contribute to the effort by sponsoring ten children under DMO care and to dispatch Jeppe, a teacher by training, to work for the Germans and be the DDA's representative in Urfa.⁵ Alongside the DMO, U.S. missionaries were also active in the town, having established a mission station as early as 1892 under the direction of Corinne Shattuck (d. 1910).⁶ During the 1895 massacres, Shattuck had valiantly sheltered Armenians from harm and, after the killings, she worked tirelessly to reestablish their community by supporting the revival of local industries and providing sound education and training for orphans.⁷ The legacy of Shattuck's courage and commitment would serve as an inspiration for Jeppe, who, years after their first meeting, wrote that “[Shattuck] was one of the strong, one who was like a rock during the time of need, without fear or concern for her own safety...”⁸ The Dane would strive to emulate that determination and sacrifice, and from the day she arrived in Urfa in November 1903, and incidentally was greeted by Shattuck, she took the first steps toward mirroring, perhaps even eclipsing, the American's reputation.

The drive to educate and strengthen the Armenian community was central to the purposes of the foreign missions, and Jeppe embraced that cause with vigor. In addition to assuming responsibility for directing the operation of the German orphanage, Jeppe committed her expertise as a teacher to innovation in the methods of instruction and types of curricula traditionally used in Armenian schools. Focused particularly on improving the rate at which children learned to read and write, the Dane introduced such effective reforms that they were soon adopted by Armenian teachers at other institutions and gradually became part of an established system used across the region.⁹ The attention devoted to education was also extended to developing vocational training programs that emphasized high skill levels to better guarantee that the Armenian boys who completed their apprenticeship in the mission workshops could earn enough money to support themselves. A commitment to providing the Armenians with the abilities necessary to assert their independence financially was considered by Jeppe a key function of the Western aid initiatives in

the region. She even argued that elements of a positive, social revolution had resulted from the tragic massacres, as widows and single women had become heads of households:

As difficult as it is, the situation is probably in the long run positive for Urfa's women as they thereby [as heads of households] become aware of their own worth, learn to work and generally attain a different role than that which Oriental women usually as a rule occupy.¹⁰

Traditional, cultural restraints on the empowerment of women as well as the simple opportunity for individuals to realize their potential had consequently been reduced, and Jeppe was determined to contribute further to that trend by petitioning the DDA to provide funds for a loans program that would help free people from debt and predatory usury rates. Such a program, she argued, would offer a type of assistance that neither the German or U.S. missions were providing, and therefore promote a Danish role in spurring self-help.¹¹ The notion of an expanded, more independent DDA presence in Urfa seemed even more warranted later in the year when financial difficulties plagued the German mission, and the number of children at its orphanage plummeted from a peak of three to four hundred to less than one hundred. Both Jeppe and Benedictsens came to see the DMO as mismanaging its resources, and he further expressed a profound disagreement with nascent German plans to shift their focus away from aid work and instead concentrate on the conversion of Muslims, especially Kurds.¹² Benedictsens considered such an approach as dangerous and he increasingly favored that the DDA should withdraw from its partnership with the Germans in Urfa and seek a different community to support. He had in mind a move to the north into traditional Armenian lands where he had visited a town, Ahkavank, located on Lake Van, in which work was afoot to develop a teacher's college.¹³ Through his conversations with the local leaders, Benedictsens found they were eager to receive foreign assistance and technical advice as long as they retained sovereign control over the religious content of the education. The Dane, reflecting DDA policies, fully endorsed such a restriction and saw the opportunities for independent work in the town as too promising to forego. He recommended that Jeppe should immediately transfer to Ahkavank where her expertise in education would make her ideal to lead the Danish efforts at the college.¹⁴ However, she resisted any speculation of her abandoning the work at Urfa, declaring that she could not leave until called to do so. "My place is in Urfa," she wrote to the committee, "here I am suited to be in every way and I wish nothing else."¹⁵ In fact, by 1906 Jeppe was developing ambitious plans to improve and expand the existing workshops and even procure a piece of land for the purposes of raising cattle.¹⁶ The Dane was determined to help create a diverse range of economic opportunities for the Armenians and to stress that the quality of work and products should be second to none in the town. Yet skills alone, she warned, were not enough to assure survival, because the conditions prevailing in Urfa and the dangers of illness preyed on the population. The funds made available to Jeppe from the DDA were therefore essential in allowing her to dispense to people, who were otherwise independent, needed aid for medical treatment, food, and clothes.

But through initiative and hard work the economic foundations for the relief effort in Urfa steadily improved, as an ever widening array of workshops and ventures flourished. The establishment of a tannery, a weaving mill, and a dye works all served to provide not only needed employment but also generated income to support the mission's institutions. Efforts to manufacture clothing were also initiated and Jeppe secured patterns and designs from Denmark to bring new ideas and innovation to the production of garments locally.¹⁷ Yet an emphasis on traditional Armenian crafts and techniques was hardly neglected, because the Dane recognized the cultural importance of people maintaining the skills to do such work and she was sure an export

market could be created in her native country. Jointly with another Danish woman, Ingeborg M. Sick, yet independent of the DDA which initially deemed the venture risky, Jeppe started an immediately successful program of procuring Armenian handicrafts and selling them at bazaars organized in Denmark.¹⁸ Her sense of initiative in finding and developing local means to raise money for the aid work allowed Armenians to participate in the recovery of their own community and to contribute to its improvement.

The dual benefit of providing employment and generating income was similarly achieved through Jeppe's 1909 purchase of a farm outside Urfa. Located a few kilometers northeast of the town, in the hill country of Medjeidé (Muyejid) near the Armenian village of Garmuj, the farm would serve both as an annual summer retreat for Jeppe and a select group of orphans, and as a place where Armenians could receive training and gain experience in cultivating the soil.¹⁹ With the help of her young adopted son, Misak Melkonian (1893-1978), the property was developed into a vineyard, and, through hard work, the farm became a stabilizing influence in the area.²⁰ Jeppe, conscious of the need to reestablish dialogue and trust between the Armenians and their Muslim neighbors, strove to reach out to the Kurds and Arabs who lived in the surrounding countryside or simply traveled past the farm. The Dane helped to develop the rural setting as a point of friendly contact and hospitality between the disparate communities in an effort to ensure the safety of the Armenian presence.²¹ Such dedication to cultivating local relations was needed, because despite the promise of the 1908 revolution in which Armenian opposition movements had joined forces with other progressive Ottoman groups to restore constitutional government, events just the following year had badly shaken hopes of ethnic harmony within the empire. The killing of thousands of Armenians in Cilicia, southeastern Anatolia, revived the fears of widespread persecution, and Jeppe, who traveled to the region in the aftermath to collect orphans and bring them to Urfa, was ever sensitive to the dangers lurking within Ottoman society in spite of the new regime.²² Writing years later that she believed that the Young Turk government was sincere in its commitment to reforms, she too sensed that it lacked the needed experience to foster profound change within the empire.²³ Jeppe acknowledged that political freedoms and economic opportunities served to improve the lives of the Ottoman Armenians, but she had little confidence that attitudes about them were altered for the better in the minds of the wider population. The Dane also found that even the changes that were seemingly beneficial to the Armenian community included dangers, as the secularization and Westernization of society threatened to separate its members from their traditions.²⁴ In an attempt to mitigate the most harmful aspects of that process, Jeppe committed herself to help regulate the levels of foreign influence on the Armenians under her care and responsibility, and she worked to incorporate them as partners in the recovery of their community. By late 1911, she could take comfort in the contributions and assistance that Armenians were providing the relief effort and in the fact that the quality of craftsmanship in the workshops was improving.²⁵ Yet Jeppe also lamented that the ongoing financial constraints on the mission made it difficult to address significantly the poverty in Urfa and she noted that "all the suffering one must witness has a depressing effect on the mind..."²⁶ Little did she know that events of a horrific nature were on the horizon, events that would do far more than merely weigh heavily on her mind but also stretch the very limits of her sanity.

Witnessing the Unimaginable

The advent of the First World War and the Ottoman decision to join the conflict on the side of the Central Powers intensified existing suspicions about the disloyalty of non-Turkish and non-

Muslim people within the empire. Fears that minority groups might collaborate with the Allies and encourage desertions from the Ottoman armed forces, prompted the leadership of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the empire's ruling party, to develop plans to address the perceived threat. By the early months of 1915, with Ottoman military fortunes reeling after reverses in the Sinai (December 1914) and the Caucasus (January 1915) and, faced with a determined Allied invasion of the Gallipoli Peninsula (February 1915), the strategic situation appeared dire and the prospect of widespread internal rebellion seemingly imminent. In an effort to preempt the anticipated uprisings, a decision was taken to forcibly remove and ultimately eliminate the Armenian population from Anatolia. Beginning in the spring of 1915 the first deportations were organized, sending thousands eastwards with only the personal items they could carry and forced to leave everything else behind. One observer, the United States ambassador Henry Morgenthau, related that the entire landscape practically became alive with the masses of humanity on the march:

For the better part of six months, from April to October 1915, practically all the highways in Asia Minor were crowded with these unearthly bands of exiles. They could be seen winding in and out of every valley and climbing up the sides of nearly every mountain – moving on and on, they scarcely knew whither, except that every road led to death.²⁷

A temporary destination for some of these columns of unfortunates was the town of Urfa, where the crackdown on the Armenian community had yet to begin in earnest. However, the flood of refugees, the first of whom arrived in June 1915, was an ominous sign, and the Ottomans had already moved to arrest leading Armenian citizens and had confiscated the DMO orphanage for use as a temporary barracks.²⁸ Forced to relocate to a villa near the mission hospital, Jeppe refused to be dissuaded from continuing her work despite the mounting obstacles imposed by the Ottoman authorities. Determined to use her relatively protected status as a neutral European affiliated with the German presence in the town, Jeppe demanded access to the refugees whenever a new column arrived, and she distributed food and water to the people, administered rudimentary medical care, and arranged to have cobblers available to repair or provide shoes. In a desperate effort to alleviate their suffering and show them a little kindness, even if just for a day or two, before they again were marched off, Jeppe repeatedly braved crowds of the weakened, the emaciated, and the dying, enduring scenes that devastated her emotionally.²⁹ Ephraim K. Jernazian, an Armenian Protestant pastor in Urfa, who visited Jeppe at her home, was greatly moved by her dedication to his people, deeming her services as “invaluable” and attributing to her “inexhaustible wisdom and indomitable courage.”³⁰ Such an assessment was apt, because not only did Jeppe strive to help the wretched refugees, she also actively worked to hide and spirit away to safety a handful of Armenians.

In the face of considerable personal risk, the Dane made the decision to defy Ottoman policies and construct underground shelters beneath her Urfa residence in order to provide a temporary refuge for Armenian adults. Having already bribed local officials to exempt her adopted son, Misak, from the draft and having hidden him in the house, Jeppe expanded her resistance efforts to offer sanctuary to dozens of others, including a wanted Gregorian priest, over the course of the next few years.³¹ However, the dangers of concentrating too many people under one roof, such as health risks and the greater possibilities of detection, meant that arranging to smuggle people out and away from the town was imperative. With the help of area Kurds and Bedouin, a network of escape routes was developed, and in the countryside around Jeppe's vineyard an element of protection was extended to her and the Armenians courtesy of a local outlaw, a reputed

shaykh from the village of Garmuj, who provided the Dane with provisions and helped shield her farm from harassment by the Ottoman gendarmerie.³² Such a sense of security was lacking in Urfa where the authorities, despite having eased their presence in the town following the brutal clearing of the Armenian quarter in October 1915, continued to suspect Jeppe of engaging in illegal activities and conducted repeated, yet unsuccessful, searches of her villa. The constant fear that the Ottomans might discover the secret rooms and unravel the efforts to help Armenians flee, exerted considerable physical and emotional strain on the Dane. Struggling to maintain her health under the difficult conditions, Jeppe ultimately lost that battle, as she succumbed to the pressures and suffered a nervous breakdown.³³ One Armenian youth living in the house even alleged the Dane was so distraught and overwhelmed by the many months of grueling work that she attempted suicide on several occasions.³⁴ In symbolic action, as he described it, she had sought to emulate Jesus by sacrificing her life for that of the Armenian people. But each time, Jeppe recovered to continue her work and, even when she fell seriously ill in early 1917 and the DDA committed funds to bring her back to Denmark, she refused to depart from Urfa as long as there still remained Armenians in need of rescue.³⁵ Instead she moved from the town to the better climate and safer conditions at the vineyard and endured for another year the burdens of failing health and limited access to proper medical care. That decision would affect the rest of Jeppe's life, as her body was so severely strained during her extended stay that it took fully two years for her to recuperate after the return to Denmark in 1918. Yet the Dane never regretted the choice she made, because even though the experience damaged her health permanently, the ordeal also strengthened her emotionally and spiritually. Jeppe came to identify herself with the Armenian people and saw their ability to overcome repeated persecutions as a model for her own efforts to endure through sheer will and determination.³⁶

A Working Recovery


The passion Jeppe felt for the Armenian cause was hardly dampened by her obligation to temporarily depart from the region. Within a year of being back in Denmark, she was deeply involved in committee work with the DDA and their efforts to help Armenians assert their national rights and territorial claims. Encouraged by Johannes Lepsius of the DMO, who called for the Scandinavian supporters of Armenia to take a leading role in organizing European-wide backing of Armenian interests, Jeppe eagerly dedicated her energies to that end.³⁷ Leading Armenians responded to such Nordic interest by approaching the DDA with proposals for greater regional involvement, one suggesting the settlement of Scandinavian farmers in eastern Anatolia to serve as a buffer against Turkish aggression, and another calling for the possible establishment of a Nordic mandate over Armenia.³⁸ Jeppe would have endorsed such plans, because, as she wrote years later, even before the outbreak of the First World War, she recognized that the real tragedy of the Armenian people was not just the massacres and the multitude of orphans in need of aid, but rather their lack of an independent country. “[C]learly all oppression is evil,” she declared, “but nothing can compare with what a more advanced race suffers when it is brutalized by one that is inferior.”³⁹ In her mind, the Turks were unsuited to govern the Armenians, and she was adamant that violent resistance to their rule was legitimate. Jeppe even asserted, on the occasion of the Armenian decision in Urfa to defy the Ottoman deportation order, that if only the entire Armenian population in the empire had risen as one they could have prevented much of the suffering that followed.⁴⁰ And though the fight in Urfa was to be a desperate and futile act, she reportedly danced and was overjoyed upon hearing the church bells that summoned the people to

resist, and was quoted as stating that “now the Armenians have found the right way of dying like heroes.”⁴¹

Jeppe’s celebration of the defiant Armenian contrasted sharply with her condemnation of the Turk for orchestrating the massacres and of Islam for inciting people to participate. Religion rather than nationalism, argued the Dane, was the fundamental factor in the killings, and she saw the persecution of Armenians during the First World War as merely a continuation of the policies of the former regime. In dramatized account of her adopted son’s life, the first pages of which were published early in the 1920s, Jeppe asserted that upon her arrival in the Ottoman Empire in 1903, she sensed that a dark shadow covered the realm.⁴² She identified that ominous presence as the spirit of Islam and related how her visit to a mosque had been a horrifying experience, as she felt enveloped by that spirit. Just months later, Jeppe further argued that Islam and Christianity were “diametrically opposed” and were separated by a gaping chasm.⁴³ Unlike Christians, she argued, Muslims were prone to fatalism, were largely unindustrious, discriminated against women, and were scarred by a reliance on selective morality. “There could be an unending amount more to point out,” Jeppe wrote, “but I have yet to penetrate the Mohammedan [sic] mentality sufficiently to do the issue justice.” “These are but the obvious differences,” she continued, “those that shape their society and their actions so clearly that one cannot help but notice them.”⁴⁴ In no uncertain terms, Jeppe was delivering to Danish readers a powerful message, one reinforced by her many years in the region, that Islam was an overtly flawed religion. The barbarism and suffering she had witnessed in Urfa was weighing heavily on her mind, and her assessment of the faith and the people reflected that sense of intense outrage and pain. Over time, Jeppe would ease her general condemnation of Islam and Muslims, as she forged strong bonds with Arab Bedouin in Syria, but the Turks she never forgave as their persecution of the Armenian community continued throughout her lifetime.

A Home for a People

The month of April, 1921 saw Jeppe return to the Middle East and settle in Aleppo, Syria, a town with a large concentration of recent Armenian refugees from Anatolia. Estimated at no less than 8,000 souls, the displaced peoples included many former residents of Urfa, among them Jeppe’s adopted daughter and son and countless of her acquaintances.⁴⁵ Feeling invigorated by the reunification with family and friends, she immediately set about organizing employment opportunities for the refugees, but the influx of humanity was complicating the economic situation in the city and surrounding area. Though long the center of an established Armenian community, Aleppo was in the aftermath of the First World War hard-pressed to accommodate an increase in population, as new borders cut the urban area off from its traditional markets in Anatolia and Persia, and commercial activities were further hampered by ongoing tensions across the region.⁴⁶ Rival French and Turkish territorial claims led to fierce clashes around Urfa in 1920, and by the time of Jeppe’s arrival in Syria, the political situation had eased only slightly and she reported that the countryside around Aleppo was unsafe and rather short of the necessary stability to absorb and employ thousands of foreigners.⁴⁷ The ever-growing pool of available labor, coupled with a dwindling supply of jobs, prompted the local population to actively shun the Armenian refugees as workers. Jeppe immediately recognized that overseas funds and initiative were needed to help mitigate the emergent crisis and, within just weeks of her arrival in the city, she opened a sewing hall to provide employment for Armenian women. The Dane argued that putting them to work was important since they far outnumbered the men within the re-



Map 9. Lebanon and Syria under the French Mandate, 1930. Reproduced from Peter A. Shambrook, *French Imperialism in Syria 1927-1936*(Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), xii.

fugee community. In fact, Armenian males of working age constituted less than 10 percent of the displaced population and, with many having more than a dozen dependents, they were in desperate need of support from their female relatives to help carry the burden of providing for the entire family.⁴⁸

The urgency to funnel refugee women into the workforce intersected with Jeppe's determination to revive traditional Armenian arts and crafts. Having worked for years in Urfa to support local industries that produced high-quality embroideries and dyed silks, the Dane saw the restoration of such enterprises following the war as not only vital to the creation of jobs but also as a means to celebrate and sustain Armenian culture and identity.⁴⁹ "Indeed, it is the handicraft, the skill," she stressed, "which always assist the Armenian to recover every time he is knocked down."⁵⁰ Jeppe's colleagues on the DDA committee shared those concerns and in May 1921, with funds provided from various chapters across Denmark, she was able to found the sewing hall.⁵¹ Soon the effort also secured financial support from a Swedish charity and began attracting investment interests from Armenians in Syria.⁵² The Dane was particularly happy about the latter development, as she anticipated such local involvement could help to assure success. However, access to sources of capital could not mask that a concerted effort was still needed to recover and cultivate the creative skills and artistry that were in danger of being lost following years of destruction and population displacements. To spearhead that drive, Jeppe recruited an initial core group of ten experienced women, whose talents were used to develop designs and patterns that would form the basis for future production.⁵³ That work was further bolstered by the fortuitous discovery in an Aleppo warehouse of a large crate of Armenian fabrics and embroideries that Jeppe had shipped to the city during the early years of the war.⁵⁴ Originally intended for export to Europe, the recovered items became a treasured source of ideas and inspiration for the women at the sewing hall. Within only four months, they had developed eighteen separate designs and seen their collective workforce expand to forty seamstresses. Such progress was matched by Jeppe's commitment to authenticity and high quality. Intent on securing export markets based on a reputation for delivering the finest products, the Dane worked tirelessly, often visiting the sewing hall twice daily, to assure that standards were maintained and that the workers used only the best materials and those made to closely match the colors and texture of Armenian originals.⁵⁵

Jeppe's contribution to the revival of Armenian handicrafts joined idealism and preservation of culture with an emphasis on shrewd business practices and an understanding of economic realities. Credited by Henriette "Henni" Forchhammer (1863-1955), a fellow feminist and an influential figure in her own right, with having "saved from annihilation" the art form of Armenian embroidery, Jeppe also assumed a role as a hardened manager guiding a nascent venture through the treacherous shoals of local and international trade.⁵⁶ Ever conscious of the need to build a business that was sound economically, rather than merely serving as a charitable employer sustained mostly by subsidies, the Dane knew that revenues generated from sales overseas were imperative. And through persistence and negotiation, such commercial links with importers emerged from Europe to as far afield as Australia and the Americas. However, markets in Scandinavia would from the outset be seen as having a pioneering responsibility. Thus, in December 1921, Jeppe advocated the formation of chapters across Denmark and Sweden that would commit to purchase for resale set quantities of product on an annual or biannual basis.⁵⁷ Such a network of supporters, it was argued, could serve to provide a stable and reliable market and in turn draw needed attention to the goods Armenians had to offer. Within a year, this speculation and effort bore fruit as the DDA successfully concluded arrangements to supply handicrafts to Daells

Varehus, a large department store in Copenhagen, and also staged a successful bazaar in the capital.⁵⁸ In time, Jeppe would cite developments like these as evidence of the strong support her work enjoyed among Danes, a fact which she reinforced by asserting that the sewing hall was essentially “an entirely *Danish* venture.”⁵⁹ Notice of her and the DDA’s efforts, what could be termed their national signature in the region, was also made by other aid organizations, among them Near East Relief which already in April 1923 approached Jeppe with an interest to adopt her approach in the development of embroidery workshops.⁶⁰ One aspect of her success in that venture was the discipline she exhibited in not expanding local production beyond the export capacity despite the pressing need to employ the Armenian refugees. Though troubled by the need to show restraint, Jeppe accepted it as unavoidable as earlier efforts to establish a weaving business alongside the sewing hall had ended in failure, forcing its closure in 1922 after less than a year in operation.⁶¹

The challenges of creating sufficient economic development in northern Syria were aggravated in late 1921 when the French agreed to cede Cilicia back to Turkish control. Thousands of Armenians resident in the region, fearful of their fate in the absence of French protection, streamed into Syria as refugees.⁶² Many made their way to Aleppo, only a short distance from the new border, and settled in the town already straining to accommodate its existing population. Jeppe would later estimate that as many 150,000 Armenians had entered Syria by 1925, and she observed that within months of the renewed influx, conditions in the northern city deteriorated as wages declined, prices for food increased, and employment opportunities evaporated.⁶³ The refugees in particular were forced to cope with hardships, and she found that “they are suffering from every distress that can be endured by man, when he is homeless and destitute.”⁶⁴ A concerted campaign of relief, financed both by the French mandate authorities and international aid organizations, would be needed to alleviate the growing burdens on Syrian society. European activists sympathetic to the Armenian cause also lobbied the League of Nations to become involved in the recovery of refugees, who were cutoff from their families and ethnic roots. Attention therefore soon fell on Jeppe as a person whose experience and ongoing work could well serve the wider relief efforts. However, already approached early in 1921 by leading Armenians in Paris, who wanted her to assume a high-profile role in the League’s activities, the Dane expressed initial misgivings about taking on the responsibilities that such work demanded.⁶⁵ She also voiced concerns that adequate funds would be lacking to properly resettle and rehabilitate the people rescued from across the region. And if that was the case, she noted, then it would be better to leave them in captivity rather than give them false hope and insufficient support.⁶⁶ Yet by the late spring, after seriously considering the matter and feeling increasingly obligated to accede to the Armenian calls, she agreed to be a candidate for the new body, the Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East. Having come to realize that her fate, even her very essence, was really joined with that of the Armenian people, and having summoned from their indomitable nature the strength and courage needed to face the immense challenges that lay ahead, the Dane gradually embraced her prospective role within the League.⁶⁷

In September 1921, Jeppe accepted the post of commissioner, becoming part of a three-member team responsible for overseeing the recovery and welfare of Armenian refugees within the former Ottoman Empire. Immediately upon assuming the new appointment, she began work even though the projected service as yet lacked an approved budget and adequate infrastructure. Determined to seize the moment and forge ahead now that she had committed herself fully to the task, Jeppe acted to implement plans already under development months earlier. In her mind, Aleppo should become a center for the recovery work, serving as a beacon for the entire region

south of the Taurus mountains.⁶⁸ Feeding its flame should be the bright lights of safety and promising opportunities offered by temporary housing and job creation in the city and surrounding countryside. And channeling escapees to the Syrian safe haven, she envisioned a network of recovery stations, each staffed with agents dedicated to assist Armenians in flight to freedom. However, Jeppe's idealism about the League's work was significantly tempered by her views on the manner in which such captives should be released and the quality of person her agents ought to entice to escape. Rather than endorse a wholesale and forcible liberation of all such Armenians held across the region, estimated by Jeppe at no less than 30,000 women and children in her zone of operation from Syria to Mesopotamia, she advocated a much more calculated and selective approach.⁶⁹ In fact, she believed that many Armenian captives had been debilitated and corrupted by their years in Muslim households and would therefore fail to be assets in the effort to reconstitute the Armenian community. Such people, Jeppe argued, were often heavily "Turkified" and should consequently be avoided, and children who grew up in urban areas ought to be particularly so, as they had "been the victims of an unlimited licentiousness, and have mentally and physically been infected and spoiled."⁷⁰ A lesser stigma was attached to those Armenians who endured their captivity in the rural areas with either Arab or Kurdish tribes, because that latter setting was seen as harboring at least aspects of moral and pure living. However, in either context, the Armenians were subjected to a process of dehumanization and "decivilization," as they found themselves immersed in Islam and removed from Christianity. Under such pressure, Jeppe believed, "weak and degenerate individuals yield more easily and become Mahometans [sic]," but as a people, she continued, "the Armenian nation could never stoop to embrace Islam, and instead held true to Christianity even through to the most incredible sufferings."⁷¹ It was therefore imperative to discriminate between the individuals in Muslim hands and only seek to liberate those who retained a devotion to their identity and harbored the sense of initiative and commitment needed to free themselves.

Jeppe's cautionary approach to her pioneering work was similarly dictated both by limited funding and uncertain prospects for success. Though able to immediately solicit additional financial support from both Swedish sympathizers and the Armenian Red Cross in Britain upon her accession to the prestigious League of Nations appointment, the Dane lacked the necessary resources to be widely effective.⁷² Conscious that a mass flight of Armenian captives could not be accommodated, and ever fearful that such a flood of escapees might further inundate the Syrian economy and aggravate local animosities, she emphasized patience as a policy.⁷³ The League's legislated authority to actively enforce the recovery of the unfortunates ought therefore to be avoided, and efforts should instead be made to negotiate, where possible, for their release.⁷⁴ Such an approach would promote understanding over deception and dialogue over force, and help to cultivate in the local population an acceptance of the Armenians as people with rights. Jeppe further believed that there existed "a very strong will for flight among the Armenians in Muslim homes," and she did not foresee that its intensity was likely to fade.⁷⁵ Hence, the need for urgency was absent, as it was estimated that over the subsequent four to five years, as the young captives matured, most would retain their passion for their Armenian roots and still seek to be reunited with family members. In fact, the Dane held that there was a ten-year window, a period when the youths were aged between their teens and early twenties, during which time it was entirely possible to reintegrate them into their culture and society.⁷⁶ However, within that group it was further asserted that boys aged fourteen to eighteen years old were particularly motivated for escape, as were unmarried girls and young women who had yet to be tied down with a husband and the duties of motherhood. The League's mission, as Jeppe saw it, was consequently

to facilitate rather than enforce the repatriation of Armenians, and to help gather the scattered but hearty seedlings of a Christian nation in revival.

But as the Dane assumed her official position as a League commissioner in March 1922, she was increasingly uneasy about the future prospects of the Armenian community in the region. The challenges of establishing an out of place people in a new land weighed heavily on Jeppe as she lamented their loss of a national home. "I am not at all satisfied," she declared, "with the Armenians settling in Syria. It is not their country," she continued, "and living among entirely foreign peoples, one cannot know if they might not be at risk of their life and property here."⁷⁷ Her recognition of their vulnerabilities as refugees made it clear that League efforts needed to be focused on far more than the release of captives, including a commitment to equip the displaced population with needed training and skills and furthering integration. The founding in Aleppo of the League's recovery home in September 1922 was a minor if significant step to address that pressing need. In fact, Jeppe had managed to convince her fellow commission members that she should remain in Syria rather than head to Istanbul as first intended, because reputed multitudes were concentrated across the region within reach of the city. Further aggravating the state of affairs was the arrival between 1922-23 of as many as twenty-five thousand Armenian refugees to Aleppo even as the international effort to alleviate their suffering seemingly wavered.⁷⁸ The large aid organization, Near East Relief, decided in 1923 to abandon its efforts in Syria proper and consolidate its resources in Lebanon, leaving Jeppe and her fledgling League operation to cope with the mounting crisis.⁷⁹ Such developments made it imperative that additional financial support be forthcoming to supplement the insufficient funds made available by the League, and the Dane estimated in late 1922 that in the upcoming year she would need £4,000 in private contributions to bolster the meager £1,500 budgeted from Geneva.⁸⁰ Much of that money she hoped to raise in Scandinavia, calling on her Nordic compatriots to assume the responsibility of funding the daunting task at hand. And though those resources were woefully inadequate to address the entirety of needs, Jeppe described the assistance coming from overseas as fuel sustaining the faint Danish flame of her work, a proverbial light in the darkness that was helping to call and draw determined Armenians to seek their salvation.⁸¹ The passion and dedication she felt for the rescue and rehabilitation effort led her to defend it vigorously against those, even including delegates within the League itself, who advocated that the limited assistance provided should be suspended as it fell outside the purview of the international organization.⁸² In the face of such criticism, Jeppe was adamant that the aid, however scarce, was symbolically significant, and in a famed thirteen-word phrase uttered at a League session in September 1923, she declared that "Yes, it is only a little light, but the night is so dark."⁸³ To her the League's involvement and presence, that flickering flame, needed to be sustained until it burned brightly, because it represented hope and "more than anything else, it is this feeling of security, of having got a good and big home, sheltered by the greatest moral authority of the world, that gives them [the Armenians] force and courage."⁸⁴ Those powerful yet simple words captured the Dane's deep conviction in the virtue of the humanitarian work being conducted, and her proclamations served to shore up and strengthen the support for ongoing League funding of the Aleppo-based operation. Over the subsequent years, from the 1923 reapproval of the initial budget until the last allocation of payments in 1926, monies flowed from Geneva as a stable, dependable, yet ever dwindling share of the overall resources available to Jeppe. And even after the suspension of direct assistance from the organization, the Dane retained her title as League commissioner for another year and all the property purchased using League funds passed to her ownership. The resources provided by the organization were therefore vital assets in Jeppe's strides to build the infrastructure of an ef-

fective humanitarian aid agency.

With the advent of 1923, the foundations of the next decade's Danish-led relief efforts in Aleppo were quickly taking shape. Having merged the modest commercial ventures that she began upon her arrival in early 1921 with the League plans for a large-scale rescue and recovery program, Jeppe soon became an indispensable figure in the rehabilitation of Armenian refugees. Even before the doors of the League's relief institutions in the city were opened, more than a hundred people, the vast majority of them children, had already streamed into Aleppo to seek the prospective shelter that it offered.⁸⁵ About half of these were soon reunited with family, thereby removing them as a drain on the Dane's limited resources, but the rest were either too young to fend for themselves or in desperate need of skills to function independently in an urban environment. The immediate response was to provide temporary lodgings in the form of tents until additional funds could be gathered to pay the high rents prevailing in the city, and night classes and training was begun to provide the boys over fourteen with a rapid, six months of education. Financial constraints simply prevented Jeppe from housing the older refugees for longer periods of time, because as 1923 progressed the number of people having used her services had climbed to over three hundred.⁸⁶ However, a measure of much needed assistance was soon forthcoming from the Armenian Red Cross in London, which generously allocated £800 towards the construction of numerous buildings, including a large barracks that could house as many as 200 people.⁸⁷ Jeppe praised such efforts by the Armenians to participate in the restoration of their nation and marveled at the level of communal organization that saw aid dispensed through local and regional networks and coordinated the reunification of refugees in Syria with relatives as far away as the United States. In her mind, this served to underscore yet again the indefatigable nature of the Armenian people and their ability to persevere and flourish against all odds, to literally "create bread from stones."⁸⁸ Strengthened by those core qualities of pride and courage, the Armenians seemingly constituted the ideal population to embrace Jeppe's humanitarian principle of providing help for self-help, of enabling a people to restore their own dignity and identity.

Central to realizing that policy was the expansion of the vocational programs that she founded immediately upon her return to the region in 1921. Determined to provide the Armenians with the skills to become self-supporting, Jeppe not only strove to increase the workforce at the sewing hall, which rose to 150 women and girls in the mid-1920s and twice that number in later years, but she also founded additional businesses.⁸⁹ A tannery and carpentry workshop were both in operation by 1923, and an emphasis on top quality production served to give those enterprises a solid reputation in Aleppo.⁹⁰ Such efforts helped to partially meet the rising need for jobs as Armenians continued to arrive in the city, but additional resources were also required to relieve the ever worsening conditions in the surrounding refugee camps. Léopold Gaszczyk, a Pole hired in 1923 by Jeppe to serve as an assistant, would two decades later describe the impromptu settlements as sites where the unfortunate residents, if abandoned to rely only on their own limited means, were in serious danger of compromising their health and losing their identity:

In the years 1923-1924 immense camps of barracks and all kinds of huts were erected of empty petrol and gasoline tins held together by bandelets (sic) or old boards and in some cases made with sun dried bricks.... [T]hese settlements grew overnight out of the earth just like mushrooms covering larger and larger spaces on the outskirts of Aleppo....[E]xtremely unhealthy [and] lacking of every privacy, they were harmful morally just as well as physically.⁹¹

Pressing needs for direct assistance in the form of medical care, hot meals, and money for refugee families therefore prompted Jeppe to solicit additional Danish aid. The DDA soon responded to this

call and resources were raised in 1925 to open a soup kitchen as part of a feeding program to provide for the poorest children in the shantytowns during the winter months. Within the year, Jeppe was calling on the organization to double its commitment of funds in order to extend the program from three to six months annually, thereby further assuring the well being of the 500 children under their care.⁹² An increased level of support for the aid work also allowed Jeppe in 1926 to dispense over £150 directly to Armenian refugee organizations in Aleppo.⁹³ And with funds initially raised exclusively from Danish-Americans, she opened the following year a medical clinic with the express aim of keeping refugee families intact by guaranteeing the health of the parents.⁹⁴ Through such preventive measures, including the distribution of used clothes collected overseas, the hope was to improve the lives of the refugees sufficiently to prevent a descent into worsened conditions that in turn would demand greater resources to remedy. The effort to sustain tolerable living standards and maintain the health of the displaced population was also imperative if attempts to educate the refugee children were to be successful. Without access to proper diet, housing, and clothes, the Armenian children would constitute a very poor student body incapable of absorbing the education provided by the local schools. The Jeppe-led approach to helping the people beyond her immediate care was therefore rather multifaceted, involving a broad range of measures meant to limit the problems facing the refugees and intended to create an environment where unfettered access to education was a symbolic prize for the population. In very idealistic terms, the Dane envisioned the pursuit of learning as a testament to the nobility and commitment of the people, conveying to her readers and supporters images of young children defying the everyday struggles to pursue their studies, of underpaid but dedicated teachers guiding their learning, and of devoted parents who sacrificed to keep their offspring in school.⁹⁵ The ability to provide the Armenian people with a future rather than merely keeping them alive was consequently a matter of key importance, and Jeppe was throughout her career in Aleppo adamant that the efforts to rescue and recover individuals were largely wasted if aid was not forthcoming in the aftermath to assure them access to opportunities and intellectual/spiritual development.

Agents of Hope

The League of Nations decision to make Jeppe a commissioner and fund her work in Syria committed the organization to an ambitious program of restoring Armenian refugees to their families and nation. Convinced that thousands of women and children were forcibly confined to Muslim households across the region, trapped, as Jeppe put it, behind “the prison doors” of the harems, the international body moved to empower the Dane to spearhead a network of agents and recovery stations.⁹⁶ Jeppe immediately channeled this promised authority into action, as within only months of her appointment, yet long before she officially assumed the position, she was hard at work organizing and coordinating the efforts of a number of men who had previously acted independently to bring Armenians out of captivity.⁹⁷ Paralleling this initiative was the establishment during the summer of 1922 of a rescue post at Jarabulus, located right on the Turko-Syrian border.⁹⁸ Intended to serve as a magnet for Armenians across the divide, the station attracted fifty children and young women over only a brief period of four to five weeks in July and August, constituting a significant portion of the two hundred and twenty-five people recovered across the region during the entire first year.⁹⁹ Such success made it clear that the placement of recovery posts close to the estimated concentration of Armenians increased significantly the number of people who chose to flee. By September 1924, a string of three posts along the Mardin-Hasakah-Dayr az Zawr line in Eastern Syria had helped to elevate the recovery numbers to over six hundred, including one hundred eighty-seven in just the first six

months of the year.¹⁰⁰ That level of progress was in part attributable to the assistance offered by the French mandate authorities and local Arab officials, who helped to provide identity papers and general protection for the escaped refugees. Jeppe's adopted son, Misak Melkonian, and the Pole Gaszczyk too were praised by her as playing important roles in the initial successes, routinely touring the wayward stations and overseeing the vital links with their network of agents and informants whom they relied on to establish contact with the captive Armenians.¹⁰¹ Their efforts helped to maintain and coordinate a system that struggled to inform the unfortunates across the region that hope and promise was within their reach if they had the will, opportunity, and courage to grasp it.

During the course of 1925 more than three hundred people seized that chance, ballooning the League's tally of recovered Armenians to well over one thousand since the rescue efforts first began four years earlier.¹⁰² Constituting the largest group collected as yet during a twelve-month period, the numbers reflected the accelerating success of the League's activities but also the growing financial burdens weighing on the relief efforts. At a cost of about £9 per recovered refugee, the cumulative expense of £2,700 far outstripped the £1,800 allocated from Geneva for the year, and, while private funds easily covered the budget shortfall, the trend suggested that a scarcity of resources might soon undermine both the pace and scope of the work yet needing to be performed.¹⁰³ Jeppe feared such developments in what she described as the eleventh hour of the recovery effort and a time when commitments needed to be doubled rather than restrained. The mistakes of the past, the Dane argued, when too few resources were made available and thousands of Armenians felt effectively abandoned to their fates, should not be repeated, and she was adamant that the League's agents under her leadership needed to venture ever further afield to rescue more people. Even as she conceded that the station at Dayr az Zawr ought soon be closed as the surrounding area had largely been "cleaned", her passion for the cause pushed her to call for a replacement station at Ras al Ayn located right on the border with Turkey.¹⁰⁴ There she predicted that as many as two thousand Armenians were poised to seek their escape, needing only the proximate presence of the League's representatives to seal their decision. From Ras al Ayn, her agents could also conduct with greater ease covert forays into Turkish territory, traveling the countryside disguised as Arab Bedouin or Kurdish tribesmen and spreading the news that a better life awaited them across the border in Syria. A favored destination of such secretive trips was the region around Mardin, a heavily Kurdish area centered about 20 km inside Turkey. One agent in particular, Vasil Sabagh, a Catholic Armenian and former merchant from Urfa, used his prior commercial connections and familiarity with the regional countryside to establish a range of contacts that facilitated the release of Armenians from the local Kurdish communities.¹⁰⁵ Among that latter population, Jeppe envisioned yet another frontier of rescue work since those lands had until then remained neglected due to the League's re-luctance to directly and officially challenge conditions within the Turkish Republic. Prospects for the liberation of Armenians were further worsened by the outbreak of a Kurdish revolt in 1925, cutting the League's agents off from the area. Yet as the fighting raged, thousands of Kurds sought refuge in Syria, bringing with them the very people that Jeppe and her network were empowered to rescue. Out of conflict, in turn, sprang forth opportunity, and the Dane's recovery service quickly sought to exploit the emergent conditions even as dangers persisted in the countryside.

In the hinterlands of northeastern Syria and the areas along the disputed border with Turkey, Jeppe's agents encountered an environment that was both harsh and immensely challenging. Tasked with being the face of the League of Nations on the margins of settled society, the men enlisted by the Dane, her adopted son, and top assistant were a valiant group of individuals whose courage and

dedication allowed them to defy the calamities that lurked in the unfamiliar wilderness. By 1928, as the network of stations and agents was in its final months of operation, Jeppe could report that several of the men had died over the years from either overwork or the ill-effects of the tough conditions under which they lived. Local opposition to the rescue work also posed a danger as people saw their families and interests threatened by the League's interventions. In a 1926 interview, Jeppe even alleged that she was a target of Turkish assassination plots, preventing her, out of fear for her life, to venture into certain districts along the border.¹⁰⁶ Whatever the veracity of such claims, the safety of League personnel was an ever-pressing concern that was only heightened with the murder of the famed agent, Vasil Sabagh. Having committed himself to save at least forty children from captivity, he was bringing his thirty-seventh ward to safety in Aleppo when cut down in the Syrian desert by disgruntled Arabs.¹⁰⁷ The Dane greatly lamented this loss to her network because men of such experience and valor were scarce. His passing also underscored the need to proceed with caution and always be mindful of not inciting the local population. In fact, Jeppe's final report to the League in July 1927 stressed that the modest number of people recovered was attributable to a deliberate and calculated policy of restraint:

This accounts for the comparatively small numbers rescued. If we had been unscrupulous, we could have had very different figures to show. As it is, we know that, *although the scope of our work has been limited, within those limits it has done nothing but good.*¹⁰⁸

Rather than provoke and inflame, the aim was to negotiate and persuade, working to humanize the captive Armenians in the eyes of those holding them and thereby secure their release. Jeppe too acknowledged that not everyone ought to be removed from their life among the Muslims, noting that many were indeed part of loving families and had dependent children.¹⁰⁹ The genuine bonds forged, however artificial and unnatural their origins, should not be arbitrarily cut as this could disrupt lives unnecessarily and also undermine the League's moral authority. Even when such ties were severed voluntarily by women who desired to rejoin Armenian society, the Dane lamented the resultant tragedies left in its wake, as Arab and Kurdish men and children lost wives and mothers.¹¹⁰ Jeppe, in fact, described the experience of Armenians in Muslim households as a spectrum in which both mercy and simple self-interest motivated those among whom they lived. Tales of rape, abuse, and mental anguish might abound, but there were also accounts reflecting compassion and affection, such as the one in which an Armenian boy was adopted by a wealthy Arab and eventually inherited his fortune, or the one about a young woman whose Arab husband taught her to read and helped her recover a lost child. These alternative narratives served to broaden Danish understandings of the conditions prevailing in the Syrian desert and the Turkish hinterland, adding complexity and nuance to an issue often imbued with moral indignation. Even the Arab Bedouin practice of tattooing their Armenian women, a tradition denounced by Danish commentators as burdening them with enduring shame and marking them permanently as property, was actually explained years later to the readers of *Armeniervennen*, as evidence of integration and inclusion.¹¹¹

But whatever positives could be salvaged from the experiences of Armenians across the countryside, nothing diminished the calamity that had befallen the population as a whole. The events of the First World War devastated the community within the Ottoman Empire, and Jeppe was astounded by the ability of the people to persevere:

That catastrophe that befell them was in relation to population size and available relief efforts so overwhelming and frightful that one wonders why they did not perish entirely. When a people loses 80 percent of its men and all its physical property, and further is driven from the lands it has occupied for centuries, one should think they were surely doomed.¹¹²

Convinced that one million Armenians died during the regional conflict, a sentiment she shared with Fridtjof Nansen, her famed Scandinavian colleague, Jeppe found that the people were straining under the tremendous and lasting burdens of having experienced such debilitating losses.¹¹³ Displaced, impoverished, and psychologically wounded, the Armenians were, in her view, sustained only by their “never failing will to live”.¹¹⁴ That innate spirit made them a uniquely noble people and a tremendously important asset to the West, constituting a virtual bulwark against the Orient. “The Armenians,” asserted Jeppe, “are for our race the furthest most outpost in the struggle against Asia.”¹¹⁵ The quintessential “Eastern people”, whose very roots were so firmly embedded in the region, had, in her mind, since evolved into the first and critical line of defense for Western civilization. Their struggle should hence be supported without restraint, and Jeppe resisted vehemently those who argued otherwise. When articles critical of the Armenians appeared in the Danish press, as happened in 1930, many of which were written by Danish engineers who had spent years in Turkey, she staunchly defended the community against such attacks and was simply incredulous that the villainous Turk could be favored over the noble Armenian victim. Determined to dismiss and discredit those responsible, she used her decades-long residence in the region as an instrument to diminish the validity of commentary and assertions made by those with far fewer years of experience:

[T]here are many who come to the Orient *with a preconceived understanding*, and who also believe that they have it confirmed. The shorter the time they remain here, and the less insight they have in the actual conditions, the more convinced they are in their judgment.¹¹⁶

In terms that preempted by decades the anti-Orientalist discourse, Jeppe was striking at the heart of Western misconceptions of the East by condemning those who generalized widely based on their own narrow experiences and asserted as fact that which was solely attributable to perception. However, in almost the same breath, the Dane too placed herself squarely within the sphere of Orientalism by emphasizing the almost insurmountable foreignness of the East:

The Orient is so impenetrable for outsiders, they cannot tell the different races apart, and they do not comprehend the particular way that Orientals act.¹¹⁷

Jeppe, in her fervor to assert herself as an unassailable authority in contrast to other commentators, was effectively solidifying the popular perception that the East was a realm of the mysterious Other and fraught with dizzying complexity. Danes were consequently encouraged, if not obligated, to turn to her for guidance in order to explore and understand the murky, distant world of the Middle East. That perceived role as gatekeeper to genuine knowledge was further emphasized, even to the point of the ridiculous, by one of Jeppe’s many supporters who witnessed her work in Syria:

She [Jeppe] had acquired that rare skill among Westerners to be able to penetrate the soul of the Oriental, this almost debilitating sensitivity that is necessary to win his trust, and a talent which has made her into [one of] our century’s most remarkable Western female figures in the Orient...¹¹⁸

Again the region was described as otherworldly, as inhabited by people who were at their core profoundly different from Westerners. Only a small number of people, such as the famed Dane, could supposedly bridge that chasm and reveal what was otherwise obscured, and explore the private lives and spectrum of personalities within the alien populations. But for Jeppe, the proclaimed arbiter between truth and fiction about the East, the Armenians constituted a people apart from the rest, a people possessing qualities, such as honesty and sense of duty, that tied them more to the West than

to their native soil.¹¹⁹ A broad acceptance of such links, it was argued, should generate more support for the relief efforts and foster greater involvement by France, the power administering the Syrian Mandate.

The French relationship with Jeppe and the League's mission to recover Armenian refugees revealed the complexities of European rule in the region. Having swiftly crushed the emergent forces seeking Syrian independence in 1920, France worked to legitimize its occupation of the area through a manipulation of the many regional and ethnic centers of power within the mandate, even separating Lebanon from Syria and creating a split that would endure. Geopolitical interests similarly motivated the French decision in 1921 to cede traditionally Syrian territory to the Turkish republic, serving to further dismember the former Ottoman province.¹²⁰ In fact, by war's end, France was a weakened country entirely unsuited to oversee a mandate as it lacked the necessary resources to foster regional economic development.¹²¹ French policy was instead focused on generating revenues from the territory and securing internal security. A vital agency in achieving that latter goal was the intelligence service, the *Service des Renseignements*, whose small corps of officers worked tirelessly and skillfully to promote factional and sectarian identities rather than a unified, national ethos.¹²² The Armenians constituted one such community within the Mandate, and the French sought for a time during the 1920s to establish it as an allied population upon whom they could rely for support. Through aid and favored access to government employment, it was hoped to link the fortunes of the Armenians, both native and refugee, to the ongoing French presence in the region, and they soon emerged, both out of need and in pursuit of opportunity, as an unequivocal "client community of the state," by 1925 even receiving full political rights within the Mandate.¹²³ This relationship between an ethno-religious minority, including significant numbers of foreigners, and the occupation forces of a European power served to alienate the Armenians from the broader Syrian population, a development that in many ways worked at cross-purposes with the objectives of Jeppe and the League of Nations. Because while the Dane would ultimately praise the role of the French intelligence officers in having facilitated and actively protected the recovery work, the close Armenian ties, even outright collaboration, with the occupiers served to poison the prospects of integrating the community into Syrian society.¹²⁴ Those concerns were further aggravated by the role of Armenian armed forces in the suppression of the Great Arab Revolt (1925-1927), the conduct of irregular units in the Maydan district of Damascus generating particular notoriety.¹²⁵ Concerted efforts were therefore needed to reverse the debilitating process of alienation and instead institute measures that could assure the minority and refugee population permanence within the Mandate.

New Lands for an Ancient People

In the wake of the failed Arab uprising against French rule, the authorities moved to reform and hone their approach to governing Syria. The policy of supporting non-Arab minorities was rapidly disbanded in favor of a more astute system that sought to co-opt elements within the Arab community rather than maintain an adversarial relationship reinforced by alliances with minorities.¹²⁶ As regarded the Armenians, French administrators worked, in response to the shifting policy, to gradually reduce their concentration within the cities and to disperse them across the sparsely populated countryside. Jeppe favored such changes, having as early as May 1921 argued that the Armenians held captive throughout the rural areas, and the target of future recovery efforts, were largely agrarian people in need of resettlement in farming communities.¹²⁷ And while the Dane also expressed misgivings, as late as October 1926, about the promise of a future for Armenians in Syria, hoping instead for the successful revival of an independent Armenia, she felt that in the interim, be-

fore the dream was realized, resources should be committed to fund settlements.¹²⁸ However, such ambitious plans would require financial support from sources other than the League of Nations, and in 1923 Jeppe opened negotiations with the Swedish chapter of the International Fellowship for Peace and Reconciliation, an organization intent on fostering positive relations between refugees and their neighbors.¹²⁹ During those talks, the Swedes became convinced that Jeppe was the right person to direct the spending of their contributions. Impressed by both her experience and regional reputation, the organization's directors were also soon persuaded by the Dane's ability to deliver Armenian settlers, who were tied to her personally and willing to assume the risks of venturing into the countryside as pioneers.

Over the winter months of 1923/24 there arrived in Aleppo a community of Armenians who were well suited to form the vanguard of the Danish-directed effort to found farming villages in the Syrian hinterland. Hailing from the village of Garmuj near Urfa, they were native to the region of Medjeidé where Jeppe had once owned a farm and she and her son had helped foster an almost idyllic relationship between the Armenians and local Muslim inhabitants.¹³⁰ That positive environment was later crushed by the events of the First World War and the conflict's aftermath, leading to the eventual expulsion of the last elements of Armenian settlement in the Turkish-controlled region. But vestiges of cross-cultural cooperation remained, the remnants of which Jeppe would cultivate and later transplant to the rural areas of Syria where the prewar contacts between Arab Bedouin and the Garmuj Armenians served as a reservoir for the reestablishment of stable farming communities. Intent on recapturing the idealism developed in Medjeidé, Jeppe seized the opportunity to immediately channel the fleeing Armenians into the countryside once she was approached by a Bedouin shaykh, Hadjim Pasha, who coveted their settlement in the lands his tribe controlled. Having learned that the experienced Garmuj Armenians were in Aleppo, the shaykh entered negotiations with Jeppe in early 1924, seeking their assistance in helping his people transition from nomadism to sedentary agriculture.¹³¹ The Dane embraced this initiative and praised the Arab chief as a visionary who recognized the benefit the Bedouin could derive from association with Armenian farmers. In fact, she was convinced that the Armenians were poised to revolutionize agriculture in Syria and would through their presence in the Mandate help to bolster the rural economy by improving efficiency and yields.¹³² This sense of promise led Jeppe to describe the emergent partnership with the Syrian Bedouin as a surreal moment, and as she traveled in April 1924 to Tel Samen, the future site of the first Armenian settlement, to finalize the negotiations, her thoughts were dominated by the symbolism of the event. "[H]ow curious it was," mused Jeppe, "this connection between the League of Nations, the very newest institution of these modern times, and the Bedouin Pasha, the representative of one of our most ancient levels of cultural development."¹³³ The cutting-edge and the traditional were in essence coming together to forge something new at a place far removed from Jeppe's base in Aleppo. Located beyond the Euphrates River in the western desert, Tel Samen was to constitute the center of a League and DDA presence in the remote countryside, capable of serving as a link in the chain of rescue stations established across the region. It would also be a model for the settlements to follow as the agreement called for shared investment and the establishment of the Armenians as tenant farmers under the protection of the local Arabs. In exchange for £250 to cover half the expense of constructing a dam needed to expand irrigation and increase the amount of arable land, Hadjim Pasha committed himself and his tribe to cover the costs of relocating and housing an initial group of thirty Armenians.¹³⁴ Within months these pioneers were joined by their dependents and, as the summer drew to a close, the community came to number fully sixty families. This rapid success was touted by Jeppe as compelling evidence that settlement was a solution to the growing refugee problem and a natural extension of the League's funding of rescue work:

No element could ever be more suited to colonization in this country than these young Armenians with all the energy of their race tingling in their veins, acclimatized and accustomed to the village life among the Arabs. The colony would attract them in thousands and enable them to become Armenians again under the most favorable conditions, with a prospect of future prosperity before them, utilizing that which seemed the greatest obstacle, their 'arabisation', to build up a strong and thriving peasantry fit to understand and to be understood by the native population.

Then we would have erected in this remote place a monument to give evidence of the salutary activity of the League of Nations in the world.¹³⁵

Through a commitment to fund and support colonization, Jeppe argued that the League could truly realize its calling and channel resources into a project by which Armenians would genuinely be integrated and absorbed into Syrian society. Their transition from impoverished refugees competing for limited employment in the cities to productive farmers helping to develop a vibrant agricultural economy in the Mandate, would help to remove them as a burden on the wider community. Access to land would also bestow on the Armenians a tangible stake in the country and enhance their abilities to help themselves. Jeppe believed passionately that such benefits were self-evident and, together with Henni Forchhammer, her tireless ally and compatriot at the League, she advocated an immediate allocation of £2,000 to found an additional colony in late 1924, money that she believed would be returned in multiples based on the economic activity generated and the relief provided to refugees otherwise confined to the shantytowns.¹³⁶ Those calls continued and were widened during 1925 as Jeppe asserted the League could best achieve its role by "inaugurating a conspicuous colonization scheme" and foster, through its full-fledged support, an increased flow of the funds needed to make the ambitious program succeed.¹³⁷ Donors across Europe and Western countries would more readily contribute to the effort if it was wholly endorsed by the League, and the physical manifestations of Armenian settlement would similarly induce investment from their own communities in the cities. An ever greater internationalization of the project would also reassure the prospective settlers of guarantees and tangible protections in the countryside. "Our example and the moral support of the League of Nations," she stressed, "were sufficient to encourage them to leave the frightful refugee camp in Aleppo."¹³⁸ The fears of danger and victimization in the countryside had gradually been replaced by an evolving confidence in Jeppe's leadership and reputation coupled with a growing belief in the reliability of stable, League-supported assistance and the provision of adequate security supplied by the armed forces of France.¹³⁹

But just as Jeppe was mobilizing to seize the colonization initiative, the French were becoming increasingly wary of ceding power to the League of Nations. Adamant that the pace and scope of Jeppe's settlement program fell under the exclusive authority of the Mandate government, France worked to limit the Dane's freedom of action across the Syrian countryside.¹⁴⁰ Such restrictions were largely prompted by French concerns that the new settlements imposed additional administrative and economic responsibilities on the Mandate's institutions and personnel. In their mind, a policy of restraint and caution, slowing the spread of Armenian settlements, was needed, and by 1925, such imposed limits were instrumental in fostering a minor diplomatic crisis between Jeppe, the League of Nations commissioner, and General Maurice Sarrail, the High Commissioner of Syria. The Dane was in fact so frustrated by French obstructions that she characterized the Mandate government as "unusually difficult" and pledged to Benedictsens, the man who first inspired her two decades earlier to aid the Armenians, that she would work to unseat the general.¹⁴¹ And within months, though seemingly unaffected by her efforts, fortune smiled on Jeppe, as the army officer was ousted, in large measure blamed for the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, and replaced by a civilian, Henry de Jouvenel.¹⁴² The new high commissioner was a far more approachable figure and one with experience as a former delegate to the League, so immediately Danes both within the organization and in

the diplomatic corps moved to repair Jeppe's relations with the Mandate authorities, an action which very quickly succeeded in patching the rift that had developed.¹⁴³ Yet problems remained regardless of those efforts since the French still harbored fears about allowing thousands of Christian foreigners to occupy lands in traditionally Muslim Arab areas. Developments to the south in the British Mandate of Palestine represented to them a poignant warning about the tensions that might emerge if the government sanctioned unregulated settlement and seemingly disregarded concerns by the native population.

Jeppe and her colleagues viewed the Zionist venture in a far more favorable light and even considered the movement a source of inspiration. The spirit of initiative and optimism that pervaded the ranks of European settlers streaming into the Mandate captivated Jeppe from the very moment she first observed Jews, mainly young Poles, disembarking at Jaffa and being ferried to shore.¹⁴⁴ Expressing a deep sympathy for their efforts to recover a homeland lost long ago, she wondered if the Armenians could emulate that drive and similarly restore their nation. But regardless of their ultimate fate, she took great comfort in observing that the very men transporting the Jews that last bit of distance to their coveted destination were in fact Armenian. Their participation in the endeavor, mused Jeppe, underscored the enduring Armenian sense of enterprise and revealed a relationship rich in symbolism, as one displaced people was extending a helping hand to another.¹⁴⁵ Jointly, the Armenians and European Jews, were perceived as a population endowed with the skills and initiative needed to transform the region along the lines deemed necessary in the West. For Jeppe that emerging transformation was abundantly clear when she traveled through Palestine in 1924, confirming in her mind the benefits of Mandate policy:

All the while it is exceedingly interesting to see the two worlds meet. At times one passes through orange groves, interspersed with vineyards, olive gardens, and swaying palm trees, and within the gardens one can see well-built houses; everything is enveloped in prosperity. Those are the Jewish colonies. Right next to them lies clusters of filthy, clay huts without a tree, reflecting the familiar image of the Oriental landscape. Those are the Arab villages. The English surely know what they are doing by "bringing in" Jews to Palestine. Now I truly understand the issue at its core.¹⁴⁶

In unambiguous terms, the Dane was embracing the civilizing logic of Zionist immigration even as she distanced herself from the myth of Palestine being a depopulated land. Her focus was instead on the role of European influence as a counterbalance to the stagnant and ossified society that existed in the Mandate. "Shall the Orient ever again blossom," she wondered, "it does not seem to be lacking the natural preconditions, but rather it is Islam that has laid its dead hand over everything."¹⁴⁷ The region's people were, in other words, being held back by their adherence to a debilitating religion that kept them from asserting their potential. And the influx of vibrant foreigners, it was suggested, would therefore help to release them from that grip and remove the shackles of tradition. Armenians were projected to have much the same effect in Syria as the Zionists in Palestine, with Jeppe suggesting that the effort would be as much about cultural influence as settlements.¹⁴⁸ Their mere presence and freedom to flourish was anticipated to have a transformative impact even if the resources available to invest in the enterprise were significantly less than those committed by Jewish immigrants. Forchhammer, in fact, calculated that as little as £10 was spent to settle an entire family of Armenians and concluded that "when one compares with the enormous sums expended on the Zionist colonies in Palestine, [our costs] are quite remarkably affordable."¹⁴⁹

But the scarcity of resources did not dampen the optimism about the impact that Armenian settlement could have on societal reform. Even Jeppe's strong reservations toward Islam, a remnant of the devastating memories she retained of the persecution of Armenians inside the former Ottoman

Empire, would gradually dissipate as she spearheaded the colonization drive in Syria. Intent on making the settlement of her wards a success, she needed to forge stable relationships with local Muslims and cultivate in them a vested interest in the wider project. In the years following the failed Arab Revolt those efforts were aided by the growing cosmopolitan makeup of the population in Jazira, the triangular area of Syria lying east of the Euphrates River and enclosed by the borders with Turkey and Iraq. Displaced Kurds and Armenians found the underdeveloped region offered them refuge and opportunities, and the French worked to improve the economic conditions by building a rail link between Aleppo and the key, emerging commercial center of Qamishli.¹⁵⁰ A coalescing of interests during the late 1920s therefore helped to promote the colonization effort that in many ways was regarded as Jeppe's most memorable accomplishment in her work to assist the Armenian community.

The drive to develop farming communities and settlements in the countryside resonated with donors and supporters because it constituted a romantic yet tangible achievement. With the settling of refugees at Tel Samen in 1924 and the establishment of a neighboring community at Tel Armen later in the year, Jeppe made clear her ability to marshal the necessary resources and support to realize the stated goals of improving Armenian lives. Those skills similarly sustained the effort as French doubts about the enterprise briefly surfaced during 1925 and the emphasis momentarily shifted to consolidation rather than expansion. But once the crisis was over, the program resumed with renewed vigor as Jeppe's son, Misak, took up near-permanent residence in the countryside to oversee the ongoing project, and she proclaimed with confidence that great prospects for expansion beckoned. Trumpeting in early March 1926 that one hundred families were already settled and that another one hundred were poised to join them, the Dane also noted that the existing farms were largely self-supporting and therefore not in need of subsidies that would drain away the funds required to found new villages.¹⁵¹ The colonization scheme was consequently evolving successfully from a purely financial and investment perspective, providing partial vindication for the calculated risks assumed just two years earlier. More importantly, the evidence of sound development and local stability suggested that the conditions were ripe for growth, and Jeppe projected that the area could absorb another 200-300 families, the bulk of whom would be the last of the displaced people from the Urfa and Garmuj areas. By 1926, Jeppe therefore intended to more than double the Armenian presence in the countryside and, early that year, in pursuit of that goal, she and Misak jointly secured a three-year lease of land near the Turkish border where they helped found the colony of Charb Bedros.¹⁵² Within only months, and buoyed not only by French support but also donated funds to procure both seeds and some cattle, the new settlement had blossomed, having attracted forty families from Garmuj and thirty youths from the recovery home in Aleppo.¹⁵³ Such numbers revealed that the colonies were serving as far more than merely alternative homes for displaced farmers from Turkey, but were also emerging as important outlets for the thousands of refugees wallowing in camps encircling Syrian cities.

Yet a need for restraint in channeling Armenians to the countryside was equally recognized by Jeppe and her colleagues. Enthusiasm for the colonization drive had to be balanced with the critical objective of also accommodating the Arab Bedouin population in the area. Enough farm land and sufficient water resources needed to be reserved for non-Armenian settlers with whom a strong and lasting partnership was being sought. At Charb Bedros that aim was emphasized from the outset as Arabs were among the pioneers working to create a successful agricultural community.¹⁵⁴ Efforts to deepen the relationship further focused on making sure that Armenian access to medical care and education in the villages was also extended to the local Arabs.¹⁵⁵ Through the availability of such services, along with the technical assistance offered by Armenian farmers, elements that collectively

underscored their “civilizing” effect, it was anticipated that the Armenians would be seen as indispensable. The DDA even made funds available to aid Arab farmers directly, providing Misak, who was the resident representative of the Armenians in the rural areas, with the necessary resources to alleviate poverty and cultivate good will.¹⁵⁶ Such innovations built on the initial sound foundations forged in 1924 by Jeppe and Hadjim Pasha, two unlikely allies in a partnership that sought to realize goals of practical cooperation but tapped into Western ideals of building Christian-Muslim fellowship. Serving to unlock the purse strings of captivated donors, the promise of Arab-Armenian bliss in the Syrian countryside became a critical aspect of Jeppe’s aid work, the coveted pursuit of which celebrated her regional role like no other aspect of the relief efforts. And while the Dane commended the Bedouin chief as a critical figure in the initiative, her supporters touted her as the linchpin in making the settlement dream a reality:

No one but she can at this moment in time assume responsibility for such a task [colonization]. Beloved by the Armenians, treated with courteous trust by the Bedouin, with kind respect by the French and supported by her position as a League of Nations commissioner this woman possesses a level of influence which few could have imagined.¹⁵⁷

Deemed a critical figure in balancing all the interests and concerns of the myriad of parties affected, Jeppe seemingly vindicated that praise and confidence through her tireless commitment to see the Armenian communities entrenched beyond challenge. By 1929, after nearly five years of physical and material investment, and a time during which drought, locusts, and other challenges had been overcome, the Dane could proudly proclaim that the Armenians had become an integral part of rural life in one region of Syria.¹⁵⁸ Jeppe even related that the Bedouin adopted the Armenians as tribal members, reflecting that they were no longer perceived as a foreign element in the countryside. In fact, not only were their settlements spreading across the Jazira, but the population was increasingly engaged in everything from farming to commercial and professional activities, helping to create the beginnings of a vibrant economy. And Armenians were also selected by the French to take a leading role in helping to develop an expanded cotton production in the Amq plain, south of Aleppo.¹⁵⁹ Such developments reflected the shifting perception of the Armenians from mere refugees to important and contributing members of society.

The League and DDA-directed settlement project was consequently a spectacular success as the anticipated role of the Armenians was seemingly realized. Their joint efforts were helping to revitalize the rural economy, and Jeppe could proudly report in 1931 that the region around Tel Samen, the inaugural farming community, had flourished since the initial commitment of investment.¹⁶⁰ The amount of land under cultivation was by then twice the size of the original area developed, transforming the countryside into one dominated by lush gardens and groves. Just a year earlier, in 1930, the growing ambition and sophistication of the colonization effort was also reflected in the moves to develop a model-farm and village at Tineh.¹⁶¹ Planned as largely a commercial venture involving the hiring of an agricultural expert to oversee the planting and cultivation of vineyards, the project marked a transition by Jeppe’s network from a primary focus on supporting subsistence and small-scale farming to an emphasis on plantation-style agriculture. Tineh was also poised to assume a government-sanctioned, vanguard role in the region as plans were afoot to build and operate in the town a state-funded Arab school, the first of its kind in the area.¹⁶² Such a decision suggested an official and growing endorsement of Armenian influence and local leadership as well as a recognition of their achievements as a community. One Dane, who in 1931 visited the one-year old settlement, even remarked that in conversations with the neighboring Bedouin, he found that they expressed an admiration for Western customs and laws and coveted becoming as industrious as the

Armenians.¹⁶³ Jeppe echoed that assessment and asserted that such attitudes reflected the rewards of a concerted campaign to forge positive ties. “We put so much emphasis,” she declared, “on ever deepening and expanding our friendly relations with the Arabs.”¹⁶⁴ In her mind, that effort was vindicated by evidence of a profound rapprochement across ethnic lines. Over time, Jeppe claimed, the Muslim Arabs had come to recognize their error in viewing the Christians as unbelievers and untrustworthy, blaming such misdeeds on deception and poor influence from the Turks.¹⁶⁵ Now purged of the xenophobia that fueled the Ottoman-incited persecutions of Armenians, the local Arabs were open to reassess their views and become more accepting of others. A dynamic of integration and tolerance, requiring duties of both the arriving and existing populations, developed around the settlements. The once poisonous environment had been replaced by one in which Misak and the Armenians were the Arab farmer’s best friends and his most reliable source of assistance, a gesture that was reciprocated through genuine friendship and loyalty.¹⁶⁶ In fact, as a serious drought plagued the Jazira in 1932, Jeppe reported that the crisis spurred greater cooperation rather than leading to conflict.¹⁶⁷ The carefully crafted bond withstood the strains imposed by nature and prior tradition, proving beyond doubt that the relationship was based on far more than narrow self-interests.

The transformative idealism attached to the Armenian colonization of the remote reaches of rural Syria colored Jeppe’s passion for the enterprise and the legacy others constructed for her. As late as 1934, less than a year before her death, Jeppe contrasted the rural setting of the settlements with life in Aleppo, highlighting the health benefits of the countryside and the hearty attributes of working in a farming community.¹⁶⁸ Even in the face of environmental challenges and other setbacks that forced the DDA to commit considerable funds to restore communities devastated by poor harvests and the death of livestock, the Dane never wavered from her conviction that the frontier areas were the future for the Armenians.¹⁶⁹ That determination was rewarded as “Karen Jeppe’s villages became of great value culturally for the plains. Even many years after her death,” one commentator observed, “people will consider her achievement and speak of her exploits, even among the Bedouin.”¹⁷⁰ A similar sense of profound legacy was expressed almost a decade earlier by another admirer of Jeppe’s tireless work in the countryside:

Thus, one day, when the account of Mesopotamia’s small-holders movement is to be written, the story will include ‘the Girl from Denmark’, she who traveled a great distance to foreign lands in order to found perhaps the largest small-holders movement the world will ever witness.¹⁷¹

It was, in other words, far from the great Syrian cities that the Danish woman and her supporters saw the fulfillment of their role. In contrast to the open spaces and sense of opportunity beckoning in the rural areas, the urban environment was one where the struggle against poverty, disease, and squalid conditions seemed constant and ever necessary to preserve the Armenian community.

The Work in Aleppo

Humanitarian concerns for the lives of refugees residing in Syria demanded that relief efforts in the urban centers be focused on medical services, food aid, and proper housing. Committed to avert a greater crisis than that entailed by the simple displacement of thousands, aid organizations strove to preserve the health and morale of the people, thereby preventing a further deterioration of conditions. Jeppe and the DDA were heavily engaged in such activities that were largely reactive or defensive in nature, ever responding to the challenges emerging among the Armenian population in the refugee camps. Programs delivering preventive medical care and basic nutritional needs were

instituted by the Danes to stave off calamities that would put even heavier strains on the refugees as well as the aid workers themselves and the donor community. Over the initial period of Danish-funded medical services, spanning twenty-one months from April 1927 to the close of 1928, about one thousand people received care, an accomplishment cited by Jeppe as evidence of the strides being made to reassure the most vulnerable members of society that a safety net existed for their benefit.¹⁷² Funds were also dispensed to feed the dependents of patients and pay for improvements to their homes, measures deemed necessary to speed and better assure their recovery. A concerted initiative to institute permanent food aid for the poorest Armenians was similarly begun and repeatedly expanded to cover as many as 1,400 individuals, mostly children, by the spring of 1927.¹⁷³ Jeppe believed that such a service, if sustained for a few years, could be an important factor in saving many of the next generation, and by the summer of 1928, she was proud to report that the entirely Danish-run and funded kitchen was feeding an average of 190 people daily.¹⁷⁴ The DDA came to see their responsibility for this service and its dependable delivery of warm meals as so important that, even as other funding wavered in the early 1930s, the committee approved additional monies to keep the kitchen open.¹⁷⁵ Denmark was also the source of other supplemental funding that in 1927 allowed Jeppe to purchase a large parcel of land outside Aleppo. Intended not only as the DDA's new location locally, the property too became the site of forty specially-built houses for widows and their children.¹⁷⁶ The Dane felt passionately about the need to help such women and allow them to retain their families, providing temporary lodgings for the most at risk widows and allocating funds to aid those who were only marginally better able fend for themselves.¹⁷⁷ Such aid served to give the women the ability to assert their independence and gain the confidence to be successful heads of households.

An emphasis on improved housing and expanded opportunities similarly influenced the campaign to grant Armenian refugees access to the resources and materials needed to construct their own homes. Determined to mitigate and even end the poor conditions of the refugee camps, Jeppe worked tirelessly to raise the issue with donors. In 1929, the need for action was heightened by a new French Mandate policy to raze shacks in the shantytowns in order to thin the population in the camps and create space for limited urban renewal.¹⁷⁸ The Dane both favored and disapproved of this action, as she recognized the deplorable health conditions prevalent in the poorest neighborhoods, but also feared the people might be left homeless. To help avert such an eventuality, money was desperately needed to procure land for replacement housing, and a body administered by the League of Nations, the Nansen Fund, emerged as an important source of aid and loans for Armenian refugees. However, the money available was often insufficient to meet demand, leaving many people with only the shell of a home that consisted of little more than the bare walls. The DDA moved to fill that gap by raising funds to secure building materials, such as lumber and windows, that would allow the Armenians to complete work on sturdy, permanent houses.¹⁷⁹ Such assistance was increasingly needed during the early 1930s as economic conditions worsened and Armenians became unable to repay loans provided by the Nansen Fund. Falling wages, growing unemployment, and ongoing shack demolitions stunted efforts at communal recovery, and by 1934, currency devaluations led Jeppe to conclude that the resources she and the refugees had available were a mere one-third of 1929 levels.¹⁸⁰ The challenges facing her and the DDA therefore lingered as the years progressed, leaving her supporters and associates ill-prepared to sustain the intensity of commitment and resolve needed to continue the aid work once she had passed from the scene.

An Organization Fades

On 7 July 1935 Karen Jeppe died in Aleppo, fostering a seemingly irreversible void in the Danish humanitarian presence in Syria. Having struggled for years with the difficulties of failing health and the burdens of demanding relief work, she finally succumbed to a combination of exhaustion and illness during the summer of her fifteenth year in the Mandate. Evacuated from Tineh, one of the Armenian villages she help found, to Aleppo in late June and admitted to the French hospital of St. Louis, Jeppe was diagnosed with severe fever attributed to an attack of malaria, as well as problems with her liver and lungs.¹⁸¹ Tests at the hospital also confirmed aggravating circumstances as they revealed the presence in her system of coli bacteria, related to typhus.¹⁸² And despite valiant efforts by the medical staff, Jeppe lacked the constitution to overcome her ailments, passing away within about a week of her hospitalization. What followed was an outpouring of grief among the Armenians over the loss of a tireless advocate for the most vulnerable in their community and a great supporter of their cause. In a public and well-attended funeral at the Armenian church of Gregor the Illuminator, located near the DDA compound, people came to pay their respects and file passed the coffin draped with *Dannebrog*, the Danish national flag.¹⁸³ Jeppe's remains were next interred in a humble grave, but, as one commentator noted, the hearts of the Armenians became her true mausoleum.¹⁸⁴ Cherished for her unwavering spirit and love in defense of the people, the Dane achieved a reputation as someone who committed herself to the cause without regard for the consequences, like a mother to her children. Misak, her adopted son, suggested that sense of attachment was genuine and intense, asserting that she was in essence consumed by the affairs of the Armenians, becoming as much his parent as the parent of all Armenians.¹⁸⁵ Another young man to benefit from Jeppe's tenderness was Dr. Kevork Garabedian, a dentist later settled in Iraq, who praised her in much the same terms: "Sweet is the word mother, much sweeter when applied to an unmarried lady by hundreds and thousands in love and reverence." "Miss Koren Yeppe (sic)," he continued, "is one such lady who was called mother by a whole community."¹⁸⁶ Armenians who knew Jeppe therefore came to regard her as exceptional and in possession of unique qualities.

The DDA regarded Jeppe's passing as a similarly monumental development, viewing her contributions and leadership as almost irreplaceable. Within just days of her death, the Committee met to discuss the implications for the organization, concluding that:

...the loss we have sustained is of such a magnitude that one must immediately begin to consider seriously the possibility of even continuing, because Karen Jeppe was not only our leader but the very standard, the very banner under which the entire enterprise was conducted.¹⁸⁷

Their sense of misgivings about the sustainability of the work were further reinforced as the year progressed and reports surfaced about mismanagement and unfavorable developments. An audit of the DDA's finances in Syria and an inspection tour of its facilities concluded that Misak had been less than forthright about local activities and could not account for the use of 20,000 crowns received from Denmark.¹⁸⁸ In August questions also emerged about the ongoing economic viability of the Armenian villages as new assessments suggested they were too distant from Aleppo to export produce to the city, and fears were raised about faltering relations with the local Arabs.¹⁸⁹ However, despite the difficulties, the DDA continued its work even as it failed to find another personality to generate the popular support Jeppe could command. By 1940, the Committee surrendered to that reality and initiated a campaign to raise funds by republishing Jeppe's correspondence in *Armenier-vennen*, emphasizing how essential she had been to the organization.¹⁹⁰ That effort continued over the subsequent years, in part to sustain the Danish connection to the aid work, the dwindling fi-

nancial support for which did not allow the DDA to dispatch another Dane to Aleppo. Finally, in the wake of the Second World War, the organization recognized the impossibility of continuing its activities, voting in December 1946 to end operations by the close of the following year.¹⁹¹

A Woman and Her People

The accomplishments of Karen Jeppe during her decades of work with the Armenians ranged from the mundane to the spectacular. Focused not only on the traditional relief sectors of food aid, medical care, housing and education, the Dane also was empowered both by the League of Nations and the DDA to actively seek the recovery of Armenians from captivity and found farming settlements in the Syrian countryside. Those latter endeavors, that saw Jeppe's agents rescue almost 1,900 people and establish half a dozen villages, were elements in a new humanitarian drive to resolve refugee crises through a concerted international effort.¹⁹² With the League providing moderate funding and the all-important forum to debate strategy and bestow legitimacy, the relief work was bolstered by a network of privately-organized aid groups that supplied the dedicated personnel and balance of resources needed to be successful.¹⁹³ Part of a transition away from smaller, mission-based programs that were focused jointly on assistance and conversion, striving to change the people being helped, the new generation of internationally-coordinated, large-scale efforts intended to dispense aid as an end in itself. The Orientalist vision of the West needing to tame and alter the East was deemphasized in favor of policies to promote welfare and development. In the Syrian context, Jeppe combined the authority of a her League office with the available funds to create the necessary conditions to foster integration of the refugees into the existing society. But ever conscious of the need for the Armenians to retain their identity, she was adamant that the people should neither be converted nor assimilated to the point of losing the uniqueness inherent in their distinct culture.¹⁹⁴ That level and intensity of commitment to the Armenians as Armenians came to resonate with the refugees. In Jeppe and the Danish organization she spearheaded, the people came to recognize the bond that could be forged between small nations, each equally vulnerable to the whims of their powerful neighbors or sovereigns. And even as those ties seemingly weakened with her death and the DDA's gradual withdrawal from regional involvement, a new basis for cooperation and understanding was evolving in the form of an institution of higher learning. The Karen Jeppe College of Aleppo, founded in 1947 and constituting a clear tribute to the late Dane's memory, also came to symbolize the effort to cultivate and develop the existing links between Denmark and the Armenians.¹⁹⁵ In the words of Bishop Zareh, head of the Armenian Orthodox church in Aleppo, the Danish woman represented the special relationship tying the two peoples together, and the decision to name the school after her was as much a tribute as a statement about the future. "The spiritual bonds," he declared, "that bind us to our Danish friends have not been severed, they have simply altered character, been reshaped into cultural bonds, [so] that with these new ties our college does not constitute an end but rather a beginning."¹⁹⁶ That once founded on pity, sympathy, and charity had matured into a relationship of equals, sustained both by the emotional attachment of the past but also by the intellect of tomorrow.

Bonds forged through partnerships and services were precisely how Denmark would assert for itself a lasting role in the wider Middle East. The country's human capital and institutions of higher learning would compensate for the lack of national power and economic strength, providing regional leaders and governments with technical advisers and dependable business ties. Individuals, like Jeppe, organizations and even private companies would carry their nation's vibrancy into the Middle East and be its face, serving through their labors and contributions as unofficial representatives of

the country.

-
- ¹ Fridtjof Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East* (New York: Duffield, 1928), 285-89; Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986), 25; M. C. Gabrielian, *Armenia: A Martyr Nation* (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1918), 231. One of the most contentious historical debates of the past decades concerns the fate of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. In the turmoil that tore at the realm over the last years of its existence, ranging from revolts to invasions, a steady breakdown of imperial loyalties was replaced by new ideologies of identity that increasingly split the diverse Ottoman population. Fear, suspicion and incitement fueled tensions and left the empire ripe for collapse during the First World War. The Armenians were particularly hard hit by the conflict as their numbers in Anatolia were reduced from 1.5 million in 1914 to only 70,000 a decade later. Many fled to escape the instability and the fighting, but far more were expelled or even murdered by Ottoman gendarmerie units and Kurdish paramilitaries. The exact number of fatalities is fiercely contested by historians, some favoring the Turkish claim of 400,000, while others endorse the Armenian estimate of about a million or more. William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 2d ed. (Boulder: Westview, 2000), 148; Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities* (New York; London: New York University Press, 1983), 121; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic*, vol. 2, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 316.
- ² Svend Cedergreen Bech, ed. *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon* 7 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1981), 340-41.
- ³ De Danske Armeniervenner, *Bestyrelses Protokol*, December 1923 – May 1935, 48-49, De Danske Armeniervenner Collection (hereafter DDA), Danish State Archives; Karen Jeppe, "Urfa," *Armeniervennen* 1, no. 3-4 (1921): 10; Ingeborg M. Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark* (Copenhagen: Nordisk Forlag, 1928), 57; Svend Cedergreen Bech, *Hos et folk uden land: Karen Jeppe – armeniernes ven* (Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gads Forlag, 1982), 12; Manuel Vigilius, "Pigen fra Danmark," *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 12 July 1996.
- ⁴ Jeppe, untitled account, 1929, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ⁵ H. F. Ulrichsen, "De første 25 År," *Armeniervennen* 8, no. 5-6 (1928): 17-19.
- ⁶ Karen Jeppe, "Under Aaget," *Armeniervennen* 1, no. 9-10 (1921): 38; Ephraim K. Jernazian, *Judgment Unto Truth* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990), 37-38.
- ⁷ Jeppe, "Under Aaget," *Armeniervennen*, 38; Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 40-41.
- ⁸ Jeppe, "Misak: Et livsbillede fra Armenien," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 7-8 (1922): 32.
- ⁹ Christian Winther, *Armenien og Karen Jeppe* (Copenhagen: Faglig Læsning, 1936), 21; Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 46; Cedergreen Bech, *Hos et folk uden land*, 23.
- ¹⁰ Jeppe to the DDA Committee, Urfa, 18 February 1905, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² Aage M. Benedictsens to the DDA Committee, Urfa, 2 January 1906, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives; Jeppe to the DDA Committee, Urfa, 18 February 1906, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives.
- ¹³ Benedictsens to the DDA Committee, Ahkavank, 17 September 1905, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives; Benedictsens to the DDA Committee, Urfa, 2 January 1906, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁴ Benedictsens to the DDA Committee, Urfa, 2 January 1906, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁵ Jeppe to the DDA Committee, Urfa, 18 February 1906, bundle 10, folder B, DDA, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Jeppe to Lars Boisen Rützou, Urfa, 30 June 1906, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives; Jeppe to Lars Boisen Rützou, Urfa, 19 December 1906, DDA, bundle 10, folder B, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁸ Ingeborg M. Sick, "Karen Jeppe of Denmark and Armenia," *American-Scandinavian Review* 25, no. 1 (March 1937): 20-21.
- ¹⁹ Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-Eggen," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 3-4 (1931): 10; Jernazian, *Judgment Unto Truth*, 39.
- ²⁰ Misak Melkonian, "Meine Mutter," March 1946, copy in DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 82-83; Cedergreen Bech, *Hos et folk uden land*, 33, 61.
- ²¹ Hebe Spaul, *Women Peace-Makers* (London: George G. Harrap, 1924), 53; Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 82-83.
- ²² "Miss Karen Jeppe," *Times* (London), 2 October 1935; Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East*, 296.
- ²³ Jeppe, "Solglimt mellem Bygerne," *Armeniervennen* 1, no. 3-4 (1921): 14-15.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Jeppe to Henrik Scharling, Urfa, 30 November 1911, A.I.3, bundle 2, Danish State Archives.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (New York: Doubleday and Page, 1918), 314.

- ²⁸ Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 92; Jacob Künzler, "Dit Folk er mit Folk: Stormen bryder løs over Asien," *Armeniervennen* 19, no. 5-6 (1939): 18.
- ²⁹ Misak Melkonian, "Karen Jeppe's sværeste Tid: Misak Melkonians Erindringer," *Armeniervennen* 16, no. 9-10 (1936): 35-36.
- ³⁰ Jernazian, *Judgment Unto Truth*, 65-66.
- ³¹ Melkonian, "Karen Jeppe's sværeste Tid," *Armeniervennen* 16, no. 11-12 (1936): 47; Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 89-90.
- ³² Melkonian, "Karen Jeppe's sværeste Tid," *Armeniervennen* 19, no. 3-4 (1939): 11-12.
- ³³ Kevork Garabedian, "Miss Koren Yeppe: The Mother," December 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; L. F. Gaszcyk, "Miss Karen Jeppe," *Times* (London), 2 October 1935.
- ³⁴ Garabedian, "Miss Koren Yeppe: The Mother," December 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ³⁵ Cedergreen Bech, *Hos et folk uden land*, 45; Sick, "Karen Jeppe of Denmark and Armenia," *American-Scandinavian Review*, 21-22.
- ³⁶ Jeppe, untitled account, 1929, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ³⁷ De Danske Armeniervenner, *Bestyrelses Protokol*, 1919-1923, 15, DDA, Danish State Archives.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 24-25.
- ³⁹ Jeppe, untitled account, 1929, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ⁴⁰ Garabedian, "Miss Koren Yeppe: The Mother," December 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴² Jeppe, "Misak: Et livsbillede fra Armenien," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 7-8 (1922): 28.
- ⁴³ Jeppe, "Armenien," *Tidens Kvinder* 1, no. 12 (31 May 1923): 6-7.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ⁴⁵ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, untitled account, 1929, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Atter i Orienten," *Armeniervennen* 1, no. 5-6 (1921): 18; Jeppe, "Frk. Jeppe i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 9-10 (1922): 33.
- ⁴⁶ Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 17; Peter A. Shambrook, *French Imperialism in Syria 1927-1936* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), 295; Jeppe, "Hjemløse," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 3-4 (1922): 10.
- ⁴⁷ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Jernazian, *Judgment Unto Truth*, 118-19; "French Losses at Urfa," *Times*, 28 April 1920.
- ⁴⁸ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives.
- ⁴⁹ Jeppe, "Et par billeder fra arbejdsmarken," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 11-12 (1922): 44.
- ⁵⁰ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives.
- ⁵¹ Jeppe, "Oversigt over Aarets Arbejde," *Armeniervennen* 7, no. 7-8 (1927): 33.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*; De Danske Armeniervenner, *Bestyrelses Protokol*, 1919-1923, October 1921, DDA, bundle 1, Danish State Archives.
- ⁵³ Horome Gaszcyk, "Eine Liebe Erinnerung," Aleppo, 3 February 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; Spaul, *Women Peace-Makers*, 58.
- ⁵⁴ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Frk. Jeppe i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 9-10 (1922): 35.
- ⁵⁵ Horome Gaszcyk, "Eine Liebe Erinnerung," Aleppo, 3 February 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ⁵⁶ Henni Forchhammer, *Et besøg hos Karen Jeppe* (Copenhagen: De Danske Armeniervenner, 1926), 13; Cedergreen Bech, ed., *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon* 7, 223.
- ⁵⁷ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 9 December 1921, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 21, no. 1-2 (1941): 2. Following Jeppe's death in 1935, the editors of the DDA's journal moved to publish a great many of her letters. This effort was not only a tribute to Jeppe's many years of work but also a recognition that her words and spirit remained central to the organization even after her passing.
- ⁵⁸ De Danske Armeniervenner, *Bestyrelses Protokol*, 1919-1923, November 1922, 42-43, DDA, bundle 1, Danish State Archives; *Armeniervennen* 3, no. 11-12 (1923): 45-46.

-
- ⁵⁹ Jeppe, "Oversigt over Aarets Arbejde," *Armeniervennen* 7, no. 7-8 (1927): 33. Emphasis in the original.
- ⁶⁰ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 21 April 1923, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 26, no. 2 (1946): 8.
- ⁶¹ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives.
- ⁶² Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 138; Ellen Marie Lust-Okar, "Failure of Collaboration: Armenian Refugees in Syria," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 1 (1996): 56; Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East*, 317.
- ⁶³ Jeppe, "Landbrugs-kolonien ved Eufrat," *Armeniervennen* 4, no. 11-12 (1924): 49.
- ⁶⁴ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives.
- ⁶⁵ Jeppe to the DDA, Paris, 30 February 1921, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 20, no. 11-12 (1940): 29-30; Henni Forchhammer, "Karen Jeppe og Folkenes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 23, no. 7 (1943): 18.
- ⁶⁶ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Henni Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe* (Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag, 1945), 14;
- ⁶⁷ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 15 May 1921, reprinted in "Karen Jeppe og Folkenes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 23, no. 7 (1943): 19; Jeppe, "Mine Oplevelser blandt Armenierne," 1, no. 2 (1921): 6; *Armeniervennen* 1, no. 11-12 (1921): 41.
- ⁶⁸ Jeppe to Inga Nalbandian, Aleppo, 13 July 1921, reprinted in "Karen Jeppe og Folkenes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 23, no. 8 (1921): 21; Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 18.
- ⁶⁹ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Armenien," *Tidens Kvinder* 1, no. 12 (1923): 6.
- ⁷⁰ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Frk. Jeppe i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 11-12 (1922): 45.
- ⁷¹ Ibid.
- ⁷² League of Nations, "Work of the Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 11 September 1923, A. 69. 1923. IV.
- ⁷³ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 19 December 1922, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 26, no. 1 (1946): 3; Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 21 April 1923, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 26, no. 2 (1946): 7.
- ⁷⁴ Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 187.
- ⁷⁵ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 30 May 1922, reprinted in "Endnu nogle Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 25, no. 5 (1945): 23.
- ⁷⁶ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 26 June 1922, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 22, no. 7-8 (1942): 16.
- ⁷⁷ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Frk. Jeppe i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 11-12 (1922): 46.
- ⁷⁸ Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate*, 138; Lust-Okar, "Failure of Collaboration," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 56.
- ⁷⁹ Jeppe, "Hjemløse," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 3-4 (1922): 10.
- ⁸⁰ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 7 December 1922, reprinted in "Karen Jeppe og Folkenes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 24, no. 1 (1944): 1.
- ⁸¹ Jeppe, "Et par billeder fra arbejdsmarken," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 11-12 (1922): 44.
- ⁸² Forchhammer, "Karen Jeppe og Folkenes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 24, no. 1 (1944): 2.
- ⁸³ Jeppe to Johannes Ravn, Aleppo, 10 April 1931, Johannes Ravn Collection, Danish State Archive; Christian Winther, *Armenien og Karen Jeppe*, 27.
- ⁸⁴ League of Nations, "Work of the Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 11 September 1923, A. 69. 1923. IV; Jeppe, "Et par billeder fra arbejdsmarken," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 11-12 (1922): 44.
- ⁸⁵ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Frk. Jeppe i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 2, no. 11-12 (1922): 45.
- ⁸⁶ League of Nations, "Work of the Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 11 September 1923, A. 69. 1923. IV.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid; League of Nations, "Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 1 September 1924, A. 46. 1924. IV; Jeppe, "Paa vej til Syrien – Hjemme igen," *Armeniervennen* 4, no. 3-4 (1924): 11.

- ⁸⁸ Jeppe, "Account of the situation of the Armenians in Syria," Baalbek, 24 August 1922, DDA, bundle 10, folder A, Danish State Archives.
- ⁸⁹ H. Gaszczyk, "Eine Liebe Erinderung," Aleppo, 3 February 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; Jenny Jensen, "Brev fra Aleppo," *Armeniervennen* 5, no. 5-6 (1925): 17.
- ⁹⁰ De Danske Armeniervenner, *Bestyrelses Protokol*, 1919-1923, DDA, bundle 1, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Oversigt over Aarets Arbejde," *Armeniervennen* 7, no. 7-8 (1927): 33.
- ⁹¹ L. Gaszczyk, untitled circular, Aleppo, 1 February 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ⁹² Jeppe, "Nu maa der hjælpes," *Armeniervennen* 6, no. 9-10 (1926): 34.
- ⁹³ Jeppe, "Vor Virksomhed i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 6, no. 3-4 (1926): 13.
- ⁹⁴ Jeppe, "Blandt de Syge og Fattige i Barak-Lejren," *Armeniervennen* 9, no. 3-4 (1929): 14.
- ⁹⁵ Jeppe, "Sennepskornet," *Armeniervennen* 10, no. 9-10 (1930): 34.
- ⁹⁶ Jeppe, "Armenien," *Tidens Kvinder* 1, no. 12 (31 May 1923): 6.
- ⁹⁷ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 16 December 1921, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 22, no. 3-4 (1942): 7.
- ⁹⁸ Jeppe, "Et Aar i Folkenes Forbunds Tjeneste," *Armeniervennen* 3, no. 3-4 (1923): 11.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ League of Nations, "Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 1 September 1924, A. 46. 1924. IV.
- ¹⁰¹ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 14 February 1923, reprinted in "Karen Jeppe og Folkenes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 24, no. 1 (1944): 2; Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 29 March 1924, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 26, no. 5 (1946): 19; Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 28.
- ¹⁰² Jeppe, "Frk. Jeps Rapport: Arbejdet i Folkeforbunds-Kommissionen," *Armeniervennen* 6, no. 3-4 (1926): 11.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁴ League of Nations, "Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 5 September 1925, A. 32. 1925. IV/C. 451. 1925. IV.
- ¹⁰⁵ League of Nations, "Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 5 September 1925, A. 32. 1925; Jernazian, *Judgment Unto Truth*, 130, 156-57.
- ¹⁰⁶ "10,000 mennesker, som maa dø af sult," *København*, 3 October 1926.
- ¹⁰⁷ Jernazian, *Judgment Unto Truth*, 130, 156-57.
- ¹⁰⁸ League of Nations, "Report of the Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 28 July 1927, A. 29. 1927. IV.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁰ Jeppe, "Fra vort Optagelseshjem," *Armeniervennen* 3, no. 5-6 (1923): 19.
- ¹¹¹ Inger Christensen, "Fra mit besøg i Aleppo," *Armeniervennen* 4, no. 5-6 (1924): 22; Sick, *Pigen fra Danmark*, 165-66; Jenny Jensen, *Armeniervennen* 5, no. 5-6 (1925): 18; Künzler, "Dit Folk er mit Folk: Stormen breeder løb over Asien," *Armeniervennen* 19, no. 7-8 (1939): 30.
- ¹¹² Jeppe, "Hvor længe endnu," Lyngby, 31 August 1929, DDA, bundle 9, Danish State Archives.
- ¹¹³ Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-Eggen I," *Armeniervennen* 10, no. 9-10 (1930); Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East*, 318.
- ¹¹⁴ Jeppe, "Hvor længe endnu?," Lyngby, 31 August 1929, DDA, bundle 9, Danish State Archives.
- ¹¹⁵ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 9 February 1925, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 27, no. 1 (1947): 8.
- ¹¹⁶ Jeppe, "De bagtalte Armeniere: Europas onde Samvittighed," *Armeniervennen* 10, no. 11-12 (1930): 41.
- ¹¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁸ Elizabeth Meyer, "Armeniens ukronede droning," *Politiken*, 17 June 1934.
- ¹¹⁹ Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 9.
- ¹²⁰ Tabitha Petran, *Syria* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 61.
- ¹²¹ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 46-47.
- ¹²² Ibid, 55-56, 77-78.
- ¹²³ Ibid, 206-07, 364; Ellen Marie Lust-Okan, "Failure of Collaboration," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 1 (1996): 58, 60.
- ¹²⁴ League of Nations, "Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 1926; Jeppe, "Fra Redningsarbejdet," *Armeniervennen* 8, no. 1-2 (1928): 4.
- ¹²⁵ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 191; Lust-Okan, "Failure of Collaboration," 61.
- ¹²⁶ Lust-Okan, "Failure of Collaboration," 61-64.

- ¹²⁷ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 15 May 1921, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 20, no. 11-12 (1940): 30-31; Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 15.
- ¹²⁸ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 9 December 1921, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 21, 11-12 (1941): 23; "10,000 mennesker, som maa dø af sult," *København*, 3 October 1926.
- ¹²⁹ Jeppe, "Landsbrugs-Kolonien ved Euftrat," *Armeniervennen* 4, no. 11-12 (1924): 50-51; Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-egnen, II," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 1-2 (1931): 3.
- ¹³⁰ Jeppe, untitled account, 1929, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "Garmudschi-Bønderne og deres Skæbne," *Armeniervennen* 7, no. 3-4 (1927): 15.
- ¹³¹ Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-Eggen, III," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 3-4 (1931): 10.
- ¹³² Jeppe, "Landbrugs-Kolonien ved Euftrat," *Armeniervennen* 4, no. 11-12 (1924): 49.
- ¹³³ Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-Eggen, III," 11.
- ¹³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹³⁵ League of Nations, "Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 1 September 1924, A. 46. 1924. IV.
- ¹³⁶ League of Nations, "Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 1924, A. 85. 1924. IV; League of Nations, "Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," committee minutes, Geneva, 18 September 1924; Jeppe, "Frk. Jeppe og koloni-tanker," *Armeniervennen* 5, no. (1925): 20.
- ¹³⁷ League of Nations, "Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 5 September 1925, A. 32. 1925. IV.
- ¹³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ¹³⁹ Jeppe, "Landbrugs-Kolonien ved Euftrat," *Armeniervennen* 4, no. 11-12 (1924): 50.
- ¹⁴⁰ League of Nations, "Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 5 September 1925, A. 32. 1925. IV; League of Nations, "Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 23 September 1925, A. 111. 1925. IV; Forchhammer, "Karen Jeppe og Folkernes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 24, no. 4 (1944): 14.
- ¹⁴¹ Jeppe to Aa. M. Benedicte, Bresleberg, 12 August 1925, DDA, bundle 9, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁴² Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 182-83.
- ¹⁴³ Danish ambassador, Berlin to Count Moltke, Danish Foreign Minister, 14 December 1925, L. #6079, "Dansk Missionsvirksomhed i Syrien," bundle 2, 43. F. 5. Udenrigsministeriet; Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 37.
- ¹⁴⁴ Jeppe, "Atter i Orienten," *Armeniervennen* 1, no. 5-6 (1921): 18.
- ¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴⁶ Jeppe, "Paa vej til Syrien – Hjemme igen," *Armeniervennen* 4, no. 3-4 (1924): 10.
- ¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁴⁸ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 22 May 1925, reprinted in "Karen Jeppe og Folkernes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 24, no. 3 (1944): 10.
- ¹⁴⁹ Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 30; Forchhammer, "Kolonierne i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 6, no. 7-8 (1926): 31.
- ¹⁵⁰ Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 525-27.
- ¹⁵¹ Jeppe, "Vor Virksomhed i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 6, no. 3-4 (1926): 13.
- ¹⁵² Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-Eggen, III," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 3-4 (1931): 12.
- ¹⁵³ *Ibid.*; League of Nations, "Work of the Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East," Geneva, 1926, A. 25. 1926. IV; Forchhammer, "Karen Jeppe og Folkernes Forbund," *Armeniervennen* 24, no. 5 (1944): 18.
- ¹⁵⁴ Jeppe, "Garmudschi-bønderne og deres skæbne," *Armeniervennen* 7, no. 3-4 (1927): 16.
- ¹⁵⁵ Jeppe, untitled report, 1929, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 21 January 1925, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 27, no. 1 (1947): 6; Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 43.
- ¹⁵⁶ Jeppe, "Urfa-bøndernes kolonisering i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 9, no. 5-6 (1929): 21; Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-egnen," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 5-6 (1931): 18.
- ¹⁵⁷ Forchhammer, "Kolonierne i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 6, no. 7-8 (1926): 31.
- ¹⁵⁸ Jeppe, "Urfa-bøndernes kolonisering i Syrien," *Armeniervennen* 9, no. 5-6 (1929): 21.
- ¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 22; Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate*, 50-51.
- ¹⁶⁰ Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-egnen," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 5-6 (1931): 18.
- ¹⁶¹ Jeppe to the DDA, Aleppo, 14 October 1930, reprinted in "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 22, no. 11-12 (1942): 23.

-
- ¹⁶² Ibid.
- ¹⁶³ R. Munksgaard, "Landet hinsides Euphrat," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 5-6 (1931): 21-22.
- ¹⁶⁴ Jeppe, "Armenierne i Euphrat-egnen," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 5-6 (1931): 19.
- ¹⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁶ Jeppe, "Et Uaar," *Armeniervennen* 12, no. 7-8 (1932): 31.
- ¹⁶⁷ Jeppe, "Et Uaar," *Armeniervennen* 12, no. 5-6 (1932): 19.
- ¹⁶⁸ Jeppe to Major General L. Ernst, Aleppo, 13 October 1934, DDA, bundle 9, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁶⁹ Jeppe, "Tørke," *Armeniervennen* 13, no. 7-8 (1933): 28-29; Jeppe, "Fra landsbyen Tine," *Armeniervennen* 13, no. 7-8 (1933): 29-31.
- ¹⁷⁰ Künzler, "Dit Folk er mit Folk," *Armeniervennen* 19, no. 7-8 (1939): 30.
- ¹⁷¹ R. Munksgaard, "Landet hinsides Euphrat," *Armeniervennen* 11, no. 5-6 (1931): 22.
- ¹⁷² Jeppe, "Blandt de syge og fattige i barak-lejren," *Armeniervennen* 9, no. 3-4 (1929): 14.
- ¹⁷³ Jeppe, "Oversigt over årets arbejde," *Armeniervennen* 7, no. 7-8 (1927): 33.
- ¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 34; Jeppe, "Af årets arbejde," *Armeniervennen* 8, no. 5-6 (1928): 19.
- ¹⁷⁵ De Danske Armeniervenner, *Bestyrelses Protokol*, 1923-1935, DDA, entry for 1 September 1932, bundle 1, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁷⁶ Jeppe, "Husvilde i fremmed land: Karen Jeppe's opråb til Armenierdagen," *Armeniervennen* 7, no. 9-10 (1927): 38-39.
- ¹⁷⁷ Jeppe, "Børneforsøgen i Aleppo," *Armeniervennen* 8, no. 11-12 (1928): 42.
- ¹⁷⁸ Jeppe, "En tak og en bøn," *Armeniervennen* 9, no. 11-12 (1929): 45; Jeppe, "Hedelodden fra Varde i Aleppo," *Armeniervennen* 10, no. 7-8 (1930): 26; Lust-Okar, "Failure of Collaboration," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 62-63.
- ¹⁷⁹ Jeppe to H. F. Ulrichsen, Hjørring, 28 September 1929, DDA, bundle 9, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, "En tak og en bøn," *Armeniervennen* 9, no. 11-12 (1929): 45.
- ¹⁸⁰ Jeppe, "I skyggedalen," *Armeniervennen* 14, no. 9-10 (1934): 34-35.
- ¹⁸¹ Gaszczyk to J. Malmstrøm, Aleppo, 27 June 1935, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives; Gaszczyk to J. Malmstrøm, Aleppo, 29 June 1935, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁸² Gaszczyk, "Beretningen derudefra: Karen Jeppe's sidste dage," *Armeniervennen* 15, no. 7-8 (1935): 28.
- ¹⁸³ Ibid.
- ¹⁸⁴ Winther, *Armenien og Karen Jeppe*, 40; Forchhammer, *Minder om Karen Jeppe*, 63.
- ¹⁸⁵ M. Melkonian, "Meine Mutter," March 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁸⁶ K. Garabedian, "Miss Koren Yeppe: The Mother," December 1946, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁸⁷ De Danske Armeniervenner, *Bestyrelses Protokol*, 1935-1949, DDA, entry for 17 July 1935, bundle 1, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁸⁸ De Danske Armeniervenner, untitled document, 1935, DDA, bundle 9, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁸⁹ J. Malmstrøm to H. F. Ulrichsen, Aleppo, 28 August 1935, DDA, bundle 9, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁹⁰ "Breve fra Karen Jeppe," *Armeniervennen* 20, no. 11-12 (1940): 29. Ironically, one of the letters chosen for republication revealed her distinct discomfort with being regarded as indispensable and vital to the relief effort.
- ¹⁹¹ Malmstrøm, "Nu slutter vi: meddelelse fra styrelsen," *Armeniervennen* 27, no. 1 (1947): 5.
- ¹⁹² Jeppe to Johannes Ravn, Aleppo, 10 April 1931, Private Archive, Danish State Archives; Jeppe, untitled report, 1929, DDA, bundle 10, folder D, Danish State Archives.
- ¹⁹³ League of Nations, Secretariat, *The Refugees* (Geneva: Information Section, 1938), 22-23, 35.
- ¹⁹⁴ Winther, *Armenien og Karen Jeppe*, 39; "Karen Jeppe i Danmark," *Armeniervennen* 13, no. 7-8 (1933): 25.
- ¹⁹⁵ Forchhammer to Dame Rachel Crowdy, Copenhagen, 20 October 1948, Box 1, FF12, Crowdy Papers, Wichita State University Archives.
- ¹⁹⁶ "Fra indvielsen af Karen Jeppe College," *Armeniervennen* 28, no. 1 (1948): 5.

CHAPTER FIVE

DANISH ENGINEERS AND TURKO-IRANIAN DEVELOPMENT 1927-1938

The dynamic between modernization and Westernization is without question one of the most intriguing and complicated development issues that non-Western countries and regions have faced over the past few centuries. Struggling with the challenge to transform their societies both as part of a natural evolution and as a response to pressures from within as well as from abroad, leaders and governments have labored to choose a path best suited to their time and needs. As a matter of history, those resultant development strategies constitute a diverse and varied range of approaches to the management of social, political, and economic change. Some, such as the religious leadership of post-revolutionary Iran and the Saudi royal family, have made deliberate attempts to control the process and to modernize selectively, while other governments have embraced wholesale societal transformation, including a vigorous endorsement of the Western model of development. Regimes such as the Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (d. 1938) and the Pahlavi Dynasty under Reza Shah (d. 1944) adopted the latter path, opting to rapidly and fundamentally alter their societies. Viewed through the prism of Orientalism, such an embrace of the Occident by Easterners tended to confirm the inherent superiority of the West. In both Turkey and Iran, power was centralized around the leader and the emerging nation-state, and neither man hesitated to use the full might of the new entity to crush those groups and movements that opposed the pace and scope of change. In a sense, the stated ideals of forging a specific national community for the benefit of everyone could not be troubled by the resistance that some within that group voiced about its definition and configuration.

But the adoption of Western-style reforms was more a matter of preserving independence from the West than becoming its mirror image. A pursuit of education and technologies from abroad was meant to provide the respective leaders with the tools to strengthen the state and assert its distinct national identity. A significant component of the Turkish and Iranian drive to meld each population into a unified whole was to crisscross the countries with modern means of communications. The building of roads and railways served to link regions together and facilitate the movement of people and commerce much faster and further afield than previously possible. Equally important, improvements in transportation allowed the state to better consolidate its control of the countryside and to more quickly dispatch military and security forces to suppress insurrections or other attempts to defy the policies of the central government. In both countries, one company played a central and pivotal role in helping these states to realize this coveted goal of singular, national cohesion. That firm was Kampmann, Kierulff, & Saxild, A/S (Kampsax), a famed Danish engineering and construction company, which served as a virtual arm of both governments by directing and supervising the building of major railway lines in each country. Assuming the responsibility for projects that were of record-setting dimensions for a Danish company, Kampsax became a prominent symbol of Nordic ingenuity and expertise, and served to illustrate unequivocally that Denmark, despite its status as a puny European state, possessed a citizenry capable of competing and excelling on the international stage and forge a role in shaping the future of the modern Middle East. By 1940, less than two years after the Trans-Iranian Railway was completed, fully four hundred Danish engineers were active overseas, and Danish companies had managed to exploit a niche market in which they provided cutting-edge

technology and services to countries that were wary or even blocked from dealing with firms from the world's major powers.¹

Seizing the Challenge

The end of the First World War saw the convergence of interests between Kampsax, a company in its infancy, and the emerging Turkish Republic. Founded only a year before the close of the global conflict, Kampsax was led by a new generation of ambitious engineers (Per Kampmann, Otto Kierulff, Jørgen Saxild) who were eager to secure contracts for projects overseas, and on the Anatolian peninsula they encountered a virgin state most willing to satisfy that drive.² Beginning already in 1923, the Republic had resolved to initiate a decade-long program to take possession of all foreign-owned and operated rail lines in the country and to institute a wide-ranging construction project to expand the existing rail net and to build new lines.³ Intent on liberating Turkey from the clutches of foreign capital, the leadership was determined to finance the program only through state revenues, generated largely from monopolies imposed on basic consumer goods. However, concerns were raised internationally about such expenditures since the Ottoman debt was still outstanding and the Turks were instead pledging their revenues to cover future rather than past expenses.⁴ Key European powers, like Britain and France, disapproved of the republic's policies and, as mutual distrust festered, the Turks were compelled to seek the technical assistance they required from smaller nations that had negligible interests in the region.

In 1926, while negotiating the purchase of locomotives and train cars from a Swedish company, Nydqvist & Holm A/B, Turkey insisted any agreement be contingent on the Swedes also securing the services of engineering companies willing to complete a number of railway and harbor projects.⁵ Unable to find any such firms in Sweden, the search shifted to Denmark where success was soon achieved with the recruitment of Kampsax and another company, Saabye & Lerche. Forging a partnership under the name of Société Nohab, an acronym for the Swedish firm which headed the venture, but known to the Turks simply as the *Isvec Grup* or the Swedish group, the companies jointly negotiated and concluded a contract with the republic worth \$55 million, almost ninety percent of which was committed to construction projects.⁶ The agreement, signed in February 1927 and at the time the largest international engineering contract ever negotiated by Scandinavians, provided that a Swedish bank would finance the deal in exchange for payments from the Turkish state over a ten-year period, and language was included to assure that Turkish workers would be employed wherever possible to help limit costs and provide training in cutting-edge construction.⁷ In Saxild's mind, such concessions were warranted, because even though business was the main focus of the venture, he too saw the task as one aimed at assisting the Turkish republic to break the international economic boycott it was facing and to help the country develop.⁸

But the project also constituted an opportunity to bolster the Danish economy and to greatly enhance the reputation of Scandinavian engineers. During the talks in Ankara, the Danish government took an active interest in the proceedings and worked to promote the skills and abilities of the *Isvec Grup*. The nation's diplomats were even called to defend their countrymen from efforts, particularly by German embassy personnel and businessmen, to undermine Turkish confidence in the parties with whom they were negotiating.⁹ For Denmark and its engineers the venture assumed a position of pivotal importance as a proving ground for their capabilities, and the pressure to succeed weighed heavily on the men involved. As one managing engineer wrote

years later:

The responsibility as engineer and as a Dane was dominant; it forced one to summon such strength that it is now difficult to comprehend that one's health could endure it.¹⁰

Carrying upon their shoulders the expectations of two nations, both Turkey and Denmark, and sensing that the prospects for other Danes overseas were dependant on how the project progressed, the men were not short of motivation. Together with the Turkish engineers they jointly formed a westernizing body, steadily fostering fundamental change and transforming society through the railway expansion. In fact, Kemal and his supporters considered such construction projects as synonymous with the modernization of the country, and as one Danish diplomat observed:

The energy and eagerness to reform that characterizes the new Turkey's efforts to rebuild the country politically, socially, economically, and militarily have also made themselves evident in the government's policies on communications.¹¹

With the further extension and elaboration of the rail network, the leadership was seen, also by the Kampsax directors, to be restoring vitality to the country and forever extricating it from the decades-old image of being the "sick man" of the region.¹² Like steel veins cutting through the landscape, the new railways were to revive circulation in a lifeless nation and assure Turkey of a promising future. And Danes were to occupy a pivotal role in delivering that future.

From Planning to Building

Upon completion of the contract negotiations, Nohab immediately began to develop detailed plans for the construction of the railways. Small survey teams were dispatched to plot the exact paths of the two lines, one northern and one southern, and to determine soil and environmental conditions, study weather patterns that might influence construction, and explore the availability of necessary building materials across the countryside. In recognition of the daunting tasks that faced the surveyors and planners, who were provided with only the most rudimentary maps, it was agreed that finalized plans for the entire project were not to be completed until the following spring.¹³ Over the intervening months the teams, each consisting of a nationally diverse group of no more than ten men, fanned out to conduct their surveys and gather data which in turn served to divide segments of the lines into four categories: flat and moderately hilly, hilly, mountainous, and very mountainous. Such information and classification would help Nohab to prepare and submit a revised budget and subdivide the entire length of the rail lines into sectors or lots that could be subcontracted to appropriate builders. Eventually those efforts saw the demarcation of fifty such construction zones, each averaging around 20 km and ranging in estimated cost from 1 to 10 million crowns (\$270,000-2.7 million).¹⁴ But actual building would proceed in the meantime regardless of the ongoing planning, beginning with those sections where the preparation work was quickly finished, so that by the autumn of 1927 one hundred and sixty-six kilometers of rail were under construction.¹⁵ Saxild, who arrived in Turkey during the late spring to assume administrative and organizational duties, touted the dawning project as the largest engineering venture underway anywhere in the world at that time, and noted that the planned 1,095 km of railway was equal to two-thirds of the entire network in Denmark.¹⁶ Divided between a northern line set to run from Eregli on the Black Sea to a point near Ankara and a southern line jutting off



Map 10. Routes of the Danish-built railways in northern and southern Turkey. Reproduced from Ingolf Boisen, *Tyrkiet og Danmark gennem tiderne* (Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1962), 8.

the famed Baghdad Railway at Fevzi-Pasha and cutting across the countryside to reach Diarbakir, the project also required the building of an equal length of service roads along the path of construction to supply and simply even provide access to the work sites.¹⁷

The challenges of the topography were particularly pressing for those charged with the task of planning and building bridges along the rail line. Intent on avoiding the extended delays that would arise if the laying of track were to be suspended each time a new bridge was needed, it had been decided that the requisite structures to carry the railway across natural obstacles should be built beforehand. Men like Olaf Rygaard, a Danish engineer, had to venture into the Anatolian wilderness and plan for these major construction projects on sites essentially isolated from all modern amenities. These assessments would be made as to which locations could be delegated to subcontractors capable of building smaller, stone bridges as opposed to areas requiring larger, reinforced concrete structures that were the exclusive responsibility of the Danish companies. Along the northern line, Nohab directly designed and oversaw the construction of five major bridges and on the southern line the consortium did the same on even larger projects such as the viaduct across the Göksu Valley and the main bridges spanning the Euphrates.¹⁸ It was precisely the great river that was Rygaard's destination when he in mid-1928 made his way along the intended path of the southern line. Upon reaching the waterway, the Dane set about hiring local Kurdish villagers to assist in building small rafts for the large drilling tower that he had transported to the site to secure soil samples from the riverbed. Those efforts were the preliminary steps in the largest-single construction project anywhere on the two lines as the eventual rail bridge that would be erected on that location was to be about 355 m long, including four 55 m and four 28 m wide arches.¹⁹ Completed over two years, from 1929 to 1931, at a combined cost of 3 million Danish crowns (\$800,000), the bridge became a symbol not only of Turkish ambitions but also a physical, undeniable manifestation of what Danish engineering companies could accomplish internationally.²⁰ However, Rygaard's accounts of his experiences, both those appearing in the consortium journal, *Bulletin Nohab*, and in his book published years later, focused as much on the human and natural landscape as the construction project itself. Reading more like tales of discovery than reports of regional development, and conveyed more in the words of a romantic explorer than an engineer, his writings reflected a genuine fascination with and appreciation for the rugged Turkish countryside. He described the interior, at least physically, as an ideal natural setting and one inhabited by a populace that was very much approachable and virtuous:

There is something touchingly humane about the straightforward and natural manner in which the average, simple Turk trustingly greets his unknown guest and with his limited means seeks to assure the visitor's comfort for as long as he resides under his roof. And anyone who has lived alone among the Anatolian farmers, spoken with them about their lives, sought to help and understand them, and enjoyed their meager hospitality, will never forget the interaction with these hardy, loyal, and proud peoples whose simple existence, quiet lifestyle, and honorable manner stands in stark contrast with the exhausting, unsettling pace of life in the West...²¹

Yet he, too, observed that the land was ravished by poverty and fractured by diversity, including Kurds and Alevis, who generally regarded the central state with suspicion.²² He openly exposed as fallacy, but never emphasized it as such, the Turkish official claim that the republic was an ethnically homogenous state, by entitling his book *Mellem Tyrker og Kurder* (Amongst Turks and Kurds) and by describing his interactions with the full range of people he encountered. However, in spite of the impoverished conditions, the sense of isolation, and the ethnic tensions that prevailed, Rygaard still found the countryside provided a welcome contrast to the modern

city, and he declared:

...the thought of having to return to the noisy Stamboul [sic] and bid farewell to all our wonderful animals and trade the hearty, healthy life for an existence in the cramped stone desert fills those with sorrow who love nature and the tranquil solitude encountered in Anatolia's impressive surroundings.²³

Rygaard even went so far as to almost lament his participation in disturbing and transforming the interior:

...soon the iron road will forge a dark line through the pristine habitat and the noise from the hammering of piston strokes will crush the indescribable magic [of the land]. The thousand-year peace is ended, slain by the human spirit's drive to dominate nature. Humanity has triumphed but nature bows her head and weeps.²⁴

Such sentiments seemed odd for a civil engineer, a person synonymous with technological advancement, but his misgivings did not extend to a questioning of the regime itself. In fact, even as he expressed regret that the Oriental veneer was being swept away by extensive reforms, Rygaard maintained his overall support for the aims of the state and particularly endorsed its efforts to eliminate religious fanaticism and place education fully under government control.²⁵ By embracing a commitment to Western learning, it was suggested, Turkey under Kemal was joining the modern world and forever breaking the intellectual shackles of the past.

The conviction that the Republic was on the right developmental path was further reflected in the optimism and enthusiasm felt by many Danes witnessing and participating in the railway expansion. The journalist Peter Jørgensen of the *Aalborg Stiftstidende* was captivated by the flurry of activity that pervaded the country as he visited the construction sites along the north line in late 1928, and he found in the steady, persistent pounding of the train's pistons a symbolic expression of the fervent energy and sense of direction that was forging a new state.²⁶ In the work camps and nascent towns that were springing up beside the railway, Jørgensen detected the "pulse of the modern world" and sensed its vitality was fueling an unbounded drive and feeling of opportunity that he likened to the spirit of America's frontier.²⁷ And much as development of the Western United States had been quickened by the extension of the rail net across the country, so too in Turkey, it was argued, the steel highways would unlock access to the agricultural and mineral abundance of the interior. "The old Turkey is dead," Jørgensen declared, "[and] a new one is leaping forth. Anatolia," he continued, "shall be made into a new America, its untold wealth shall see the light of day."²⁸ In a curious Occidentalization of the Orient, the Dane was tapping into the imagery and romance of the American West to enliven for his audience the transformation of Turkish society, but essentially using a new mythology to explain and replace the passing of the old mythology. By emphasizing that the changes underway were helping to forge a tomorrow of limitless possibilities and ridding the land of the primitive and the barbaric, he was promoting the infatuation with the Western model of development. But Jørgensen was also joining in the effort to steadily purge the perception that the Turk was a fearsome fanatic and substituting in its place an image of a citizenry capable of contributing significantly to the social and economic reform of their country. Nohab's Danish representative in Ankara, Poul M. Bülow, who dealt extensively with national government officials, tended to reinforce that changing perception as he praised Turkish professionalism and commitment:

It is with heartfelt honesty that I find it a daily joy to work with the Turkish bureaucrats, and across the range of negotiations one gains the impression that the partnership is based on a trust in us northerners, a trust of which we must show ourselves to be continually worthy.²⁹

This concept of a flourishing Turko-Scandinavian relationship, of a cooperation between equals, was echoed by Harry Wright, a Danish engineer and partner in the Aalborg-based construction firm of Wright, Thomsen & Kier (Wetek A/S). Having been contracted to participate in the initial laying of track, the company dispatched numerous engineers and dozens of foremen to supervise local workers and to fulfill one of the Turkish government's main aims, namely training the domestic labor force to gradually assume a greater share of the construction responsibilities.³⁰ As Wright saw it, such a willingness to assist the republic and treat its peoples with respect was a most promising basis for strengthening inter-regional ties:

It was a joy for a Scandinavian to come to Turkey, because there is probably no other country where Nordic peoples are regarded in such high esteem. I garnered the impression that when a Turk has dealings with a Scandinavian, he knows that he will be unconditionally treated with fairness...³¹

The foreign engineers and skilled workmen were in essence fostering goodwill and reaping the benefits of being citizens of minor powers that had neither embroiled themselves in recent international disputes nor developed policies to isolate certain states from the global marketplace.

But relations between Nohab and the Turkish government were strained on occasion over concerns about costs and the pace of progress on the project. As early as spring 1928 revised estimates of the overall construction expenses, that almost doubled to reach \$100 million, prompted the republic's leadership to scale back the original plans.³² Intent on limiting strains on the state budget, the Turks opted to preserve only the projects that could be completed with the funds initially allocated, resulting in a scrapping of port construction on the Black Sea and curtailing the proposed rail net by about 250 km.³³ During the difficult renegotiations that followed over the summer, a time that saw renewed foreign and local intrigue to undermine Turkish confidence in the consortium, it was also agreed to extend the completion date for the entire project by two years. Such alterations in the rate and scope of construction forced Nohab to layoff thirty engineers, a not insignificant portion of its staff.³⁴ However, for Turkey, a slowing of the pace helped to reduce costs by allowing more work to be completed by domestic manual labor rather than through the use of machines and, with greater amounts of time available, many additional Turkish workers could be trained to fill the positions initially staffed by more expensive foreign workmen. That meant that as the project progressed over the subsequent years, wages actually fell even as labor costs rose to constitute as much as 60 percent of the overall budget on some sections of the railway.³⁵

Immediate concerns with matters of financing also led the Turks to insist on an alternative arrangement from that negotiated in 1927 and to replace it with a simpler system in which the Turkish government would pay directly for the ongoing construction by four times annually depositing funds into a Nohab account in the Banque Agricole in Istanbul.³⁶ That concession exposed the consortium to international currency fluctuations as they were hence to be paid in Turkish pounds, a denomination based on a rather unstable economy, but between 1927-33 the pound actually appreciated moderately with respect to the U. S. dollar, the currency in which the contract payment was negotiated.³⁷ Consequently, Nohab's interests did not suffer due to these changes, and from the quarterly funds received, the consortium derived its agreed fees and the necessary resources to purchase the requisite materials for construction and pay the subcontractors that the state had entrusted the Scandinavians to hire and supervise. Yet this adjusted system of payment was further modified in 1933, a full eighteen months before the project's scheduled completion, when the Turks sought to lower the amount of the quarterly deposits and further extend the target date by a year.³⁸ Over the following two years, until the close of 1935,

arrangements were even made to allow the republic to meet its obligations, at least in part, through the export of goods, mostly agricultural products, to Scandinavia where they were sold to the benefit of the consortium.³⁹ Efforts were therefore made, willingly or with fluctuating reluctance, to accommodate Turkish economic needs and cultivate Nohab's favorable status within the country. That chosen policy seemingly worked because when the northern and southern rail lines were finally opened in November 1935, a Danish diplomat in Ankara could report a general Turkish satisfaction with the completed works and that success had imparted to "the highest... authorities a desire and trust to, wherever the opportunity should present itself, continue the partnership with the appropriate Danish contacts."⁴⁰

Life on the Lines

Far removed from the intricacies of contract negotiations and speculation about future projects were the men and women who built the railways, the engineers and workers, the foreigners and natives, who dug, blasted, tunneled, and persevered through the countryside to realize the intended and promised goals. Faced not only with the daunting task of building a railway through a largely undisturbed landscape, these individuals also needed to prepare the areas along the route to sustain a modern, large-scale construction endeavor. Nohab engineers oversaw the establishment of a system of service roads and supply depots to ease the transport of building materials and equipment, and they also developed a communications network consisting of telephone and telegraph lines as well as mail delivery. But most notably, an entire medical service was created to safeguard the health conditions of the labor force out of concern that the outbreak of epidemics or the lack of adequate care for injured workers would disrupt the project and undermine confidence in the state. Touted as the first such specialized service attached to any Turkish government construction enterprise, it comprised a string of clinics, each with an ambulance and a capacity to care for ten to twenty patients, that were dispersed along both lines, and, in between, smaller aid stations that were set up to dispense immediate treatment of injuries and illnesses.⁴¹ Serving as anchors for the medical network, which was staffed exclusively by the Turks, were two main hospitals on either line, one a government institution and the other operated by Nohab. The expense of such a coordinated health program was significant, operating in 1929 with a budget of about \$160,000, and though the service was financed jointly by the government, the contractors, and a 2 percent deduction from all worker wages, Nohab employees took the lead in enforcing standards of sanitation, living conditions, and food service quality on their routine inspection trips of the work sites.⁴² Empowered by the state to insure proper treatment of laborers, the consortium's agents habitually demanded that subcontractors provide decent housing and nutritious diets or face having to pay Nohab directly for supplying those services instead.⁴³ A commitment of such scope to the welfare of the workers was rewarded by keeping labor discontent at a minimum and almost eliminating the dangers of strikes or recruitment shortages. Many individuals were also drawn to seek employment at the sites under full Nohab management, not only because the wages were better than those offered by Turkish contractors, but in addition the Scandinavians provided favorable conditions by only scheduling seven-hour workdays.⁴⁴ The average laborer naturally came to appreciate decent treatment and fair compensation as well as the foreign individuals who helped promote such policies.

In an environment of evolving, mutual trust the Nohab engineers generally found the available labor force, both the educated and uneducated, reliable and dedicated. Having developed a domestic capacity for railway construction with the experiences garnered on the Hijazi Railway

project at the beginning of the century, the republic was able to provide skilled workmen and builders to supplement the foreign presence. As early as January 1928, fully 150 km of the lines were under the responsibility of Turkish contractors and over the subsequent years the national share in the project would increase.⁴⁵ However, Nohab engineers closely scrutinized the quality of Turkish work and had the authority, stipulated in their contract with the government, to assume control over the construction on any lot, at the expense of the builder, if set standards were not met.⁴⁶ The labor force similarly needed to be monitored as the vast majority of workers were villagers and farmers who lacked the skills to serve as anything but human earthmovers. Many also sought employment only as seasonal laborers in between the times for planting and harvesting, or they joined the work parties annually for a term of days in lieu of paying government taxes. A prevalence of such amateurish workers tended to frustrate some Danes, especially a few of the foremen who as trained craftsmen and consummate professionals were perhaps bothered by having to directly supervise unskilled people. Men such as Henning Larsen and Liebetau Hansen, both employees of Wetek A/S, told a journalist from their hometown newspaper that the workers:

They are like children.... They are impressionable, but not trustworthy. Many of them wanted to steal, and their way of conducting business, for which they had a great passion, follows the worst Jew-methods. All matter of items were intended by them for sale to us Danes.⁴⁷

In classic Orientalist terms, the native population was described as shifty, mildly criminal and ever the persistent, badgering peddlers. Hansen and Larsen even likened their penchant for commerce with that of the Jews, the known, internal “Other” within Europe, whose image was more familiar, more real, to average Danes than that of the Arab or Turk who constituted the external, distant “Other.” And though the two foremen expressed a willingness to continue working in Turkey, noting that the people were not “devoid of qualities,” they did characterize them as being like children, stunted in culture and development.⁴⁸ Yet assessments of that nature were relatively rare and Danish engineers and observers mostly found the local populations were a valued source of information about specific environmental conditions such as the extent and frequency of regional flooding, and that the people constituted decent workers who were friendly, enthusiastic, and trustworthy.⁴⁹ In their capacity as simple laborers, averaging only about 40-50 for a day’s work, they were also more cost effective than using machines, and though many preferred to be paid with old silver coins out of a distrust for the state and its paper currency, their labor was benefiting that very same state and strengthening its power.⁵⁰ From the meager roots of a workforce numbering only about 2,000 people at the close of 1927 to peaking at over 18,000 souls in November 1929, it was clear that the citizens of the Turkish Republic were physically and actively partaking in the transformation of their country.⁵¹

The full extent of the popular involvement was underscored further by the inclusion of women in the labor force. Rygaard observed that many local women were employed along the line, though he also commented that their frightful appearance was an argument for slowing any effort to end the use of veils!⁵² However, whatever their perceived physical limitations, their participation as workers on the project was an interesting contrast to the presence at the construction sites of Western women who as dependents had accompanied their engineer-husbands into the Anatolian countryside. One such woman was Dagmar Nøring, the Danish wife of engineer Sven Nøring, the man directing the building of the Gökso Viaduct on the south line. Just like Rygaard, she witnessed women serving as laborers and even asserted that some local men hired to work on the railway instead made their wives do the actual digging and hauling.⁵³ In

Danish eyes such behavior seemed both abusive and unbecoming for a man, but perhaps the employment of women, whether voluntarily or not, in a capacity equal to that being filled by men, was an indication of positive change.

Two Completed, One Begun

With the close of 1935, Nohab had successfully delivered the railways it was contracted to build. Over the more than eight years the consortium was engaged in Turkey, its engineers oversaw the construction of more than three thousand bridges, the largest of which were built by Nohab directly; about ninety tunnels with a joint length of 19.117 km, the most notable being the 3.4 km-long Batibeli tunnel on the north line; and 650,000 cubic meters of masonry.⁵⁴ The completion of a project of such dimensions was an impressive achievement for Nohab, and everyone associated with the enterprise had good reason to take pride in what had been accomplished. However, at least one Danish observer, Axel Nørgaard, the head of the Royal Danish legation in Ankara, and someone who lamented both his assignment to and duties in the new capital, found that public gratitude from some circles within Turkish society, in particular the media, was woefully lacking.⁵⁵ While acknowledging that Nohab was thanked officially for its contributions to Turkish national development at the ceremonies marking the opening of the north line, Nørgaard asserted that the press “in a genuine (xenophobic) Turkish manner” entirely ignored the role of Swedes and Danes in the construction efforts.⁵⁶ In his mind, the intensity of nationalist propaganda peddled by the state was unsettling, but was also a force that needed to be quietly accepted in order not to harm Danish interests. He and every other Dane active in Turkey had to simply acquiesce in being regarded as a footnote as long as Danish companies had prospects for future work in the country. In fact, over just the first five years of the Nohab venture, fully 30 million Danish crowns (\$8 million) in salaries and payments for goods and services had made their way to Scandinavia, helping to fuel the regional economy.⁵⁷ Every effort, argued Nørgaard, should be made to sustain that flow of revenues by treading carefully when dealing with or discussing “a people like the Turks, whose leading men are overly sensitive.”⁵⁸ The diplomat was particularly concerned about an Olaf Rygaard interview that appeared in the Danish newspaper *Politiken* in late October 1935 on the occasion of the engineer’s upcoming book. While agreeing that none of Rygaard’s comments were “positively false or mostly exaggerated,” and asserting outright that his characterization of Istanbul residents as “filthy and deceitful” was quite accurate, Nørgaard was critical of the engineer expressing such “truths” publicly.⁵⁹ Moreover, he feared Rygaard’s mere mention of the Armenians might antagonize the Turks who “fly into a rage whenever they hear that issue discussed.”⁶⁰ Yet Nørgaard’s concern seemed rather misplaced, because the engineer stressed that the Turkish government was not responsible for the massacres of Armenians, and he claimed that one of the purposes for writing the book was precisely to rehabilitate the image of the Turk and present him as far better than his reputation. A consistent theme of the book, *Amongst Turks and Kurds*, was also to dispel some of the myths about the East, such as those surrounding the harem, and to emphasize the commonalities that existed between Islam and Christianity.⁶¹ Even the negative comment about the citizens of Istanbul, which Nørgaard endorsed, was explained by Rygaard to only include the Levantine, Greek, and Armenian elements of the population and to specifically exclude the Turks whom he found to be by nature “honest and honorable and for the most part really quite pleasant to be around.”⁶²

But regardless of whether Nørgaard’s sense of caution or Rygaard’s more direct approach was

the correct one, the best indication of Turkish feelings toward their Scandinavian builders was the republic's role in helping to secure for Nohab the contract to complete the Trans-Iranian Railway. Not only did Jørgen Saxild deem the experience gained in Turkey as absolutely critical in fostering the consortium's ability to assume responsibility for the much larger and more complex Iranian project, but his partner Otto Kierulff held that Turkish officials' active endorsement of the Nordic companies to their Iranian counterparts was of decisive importance.⁶³ Having faced since 1927 considerable difficulties and complications in their efforts to build the railway, Iran's leadership was wary of putting their faith in another assortment of contractors, but with advice from the Turks, whose path of development in many ways served as a model for their eastern neighbors, they felt confident enough to in April 1933 conclude a contract with Nohab under its new name, the Kampsax Consortium.⁶⁴ However, Saxild, a man who exuded self-confidence, tended to emphasize as paramount *his* personal contact with Reza Shah and the rapport they established. "The Shah wanted the railway," wrote Saxild, "and had all the necessary resources but one, the person who dared assume the responsibility and who could be entrusted to manage that responsibility. That I dared do and the shah dared give it to me."⁶⁵ Saxild's other partner, Per Kampmann, was also rather cavalier in his opinion of the Turks and what the Danes perhaps owed their former employers. On the occasion of having sent to leading Turkish government ministers copies of the recently published Nohab book about the railway project, Kampmann commented that he had as yet received only one reply but did not expect otherwise as "proper manners is not one of the present regime's strong suits...."⁶⁶ In response, the Danish diplomat to whom he was writing, answered that he agreed with Kampmann's assessment and noted that an "alien mentality" pervaded the region "as we are after all, despite everything, still in the Orient."⁶⁷ It seemed, in more direct terms, that irrespective of all the national changes and reforms, "once a Turk, always a Turk." And, in each his own way, the two distinguished Danish gentlemen had apparently overlooked the adage that "actions speak louder than words," and that assistance offered to help win a \$150 million contract was worth considerably more than simple courtesies.

Assuming the Reins of Responsibility

Upon the finalization of negotiations between Kampsax and the Iranian government, the Scandinavians found themselves in charge of a railway project that was largely in disarray. After more than five years of construction, based on plans initiated already in 1924, the envisioned line from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf had only progressed 385 km (240 miles), and oversight had shifted first from the Iranian government to an international consortium, then back to the state in a renewed but failed attempt to directly manage the project, before it finally was entrusted to the Nordic engineers of yet another foreign consortium.⁶⁸ Saxild attributed the earlier problems and delays to excessive "internationalism" which he blamed for having failed to foster any sense of "personal contact, responsibility or moral obligation" between the seven companies (three German, two American, one British, one French) of the consortium and the Iranian government.⁶⁹ The situation was little improved, he and other Danes agreed, when the state itself took control of the project, because the hired engineers were not delegated the necessary authority to effectively manage the enterprise.⁷⁰ Kampsax's leadership was intent on avoiding such difficulties by assuring that the consortium, much as during the Turkish venture, was empowered to act as a virtual agency of the state. Not only were the Scandinavians provided with the authority to serve as the government's chief advisers on the project and to directly supervise all

building activities, but they were also entrusted to conduct negotiations with prospective sub-contractors, secure and finalize agreements for construction services, and administer payments from state funds.⁷¹ In that latter capacity as the gatekeeper to government contracts, the consortium came to wield significant power, much of it resting in the hands of its charismatic, top-ranking engineer:

In fact, Mr. Saxild, the Director General of Kampsax, has a very considerable influence with the government and it would be hopeless to [try and bypass] him, but on the contrary be of the greatest importance to have his assistance and collaborate with him to the fullest extent...⁷²

The Dane and his deputies used that authority to carefully scrutinize the companies seeking to participate in the project, and though the Iranians pressured them to do their utmost to employ the native labor force and thereby maximize the direct flow of benefits from the state's investment to the wider population, the lack of skilled workers or builders schooled in railway construction necessitated the use of numerous European contractors, many of them Italian, and the hiring of thousands of specialized craftsmen, such as bricklayers, stonecutters, and carpenters, mainly from Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, but also from Turkey and Syria.⁷³ And unlike what transpired in Anatolia, where the pace of construction was deliberately slowed to ease strains on the Turkish economy and increase opportunities to improve the quality of the domestic work force, the Iranian leadership actually sought to quicken the rate of building, already in the summer of 1934 floating a plan to offer cash incentives to contractors if they could shave six months off the completion date of the north line.⁷⁴ Such a contrast in approaches was later criticized quite strongly by the Turkish ambassador to Iran in a private conversation with his Danish counterpart. The man from Ankara, who declared himself a great admirer of Saxild, found the Iranians had done far too little over the course of the project to improve the technical skills of their work force and had failed to fully partake of the advantages that the presence of foreign engineers and experts could have imparted to the country.⁷⁵

But for Reza Shah the act of successfully completing the Trans-Iranian Railway became a symbol of greater importance than the physical means by which the monumental project was accomplished. Envisioned as the crowning achievement of the development and Westernization offensive initiated by the government during the 1920s, the railway's construction was also intended to establish unequivocally Iran's resurgent strength and independence by having the requisite funds for the entire enterprise raised exclusively from domestic sources. In February 1926 the Iranian Parliament passed legislation to formally approve the construction project, and as the government was able to generate only a limited portion of the money through internal loans and certain subsidies, the wider citizenry was obligated to shoulder most of the financial burden by way of import taxes imposed on tea and sugar, items that had become traditional staples of the Iranian diet.⁷⁶ The significance and symbolism of such a democratization of contribution, be it voluntary or not, was duly noted by the Danes. Saxild remarked that the average citizen's seemingly unquenchable thirst for sweetened tea was, in effect, fueling the building process, and Kierulff suggested that the mass participation of common laborers, whom he praised, meant the multitudes were helping to transform the country since "it is incontrovertible that civilization and progress follows in the path of railways."⁷⁷ In much the same terms, a Dane writing a history of the exploits of compatriot engineers across the globe, described the Irano-Scandinavian project as constituting an instrument to de-Orientalize the country, the rail line serving to:

...cut through a land that is not only deserted and largely unknown for long stretches, but in addition was shrouded in the mysteries of the Orient. A body of mysteries, one learned, that should now be broken up and replaced by a new age in the spirit of the West.⁷⁸

Such expressed enthusiasm for fostering change was perhaps reflective of the atmosphere that pervaded the corridors of power in Iran and marked the determination of its leadership. Intent on channeling national resources toward the development of domestic industries and creating a capacity for import substitution, the government commissioned the construction of mills, plants, and factories, many of which were equipped with modern machinery, and moved to reform and improve the education system.⁷⁹

Yet alongside the drive to Westernize the country, an integral part of the state-directed program included an effort to redefine Iran's Eastern identity. Rather than reject "the mysteries of the Orient", the Pahlavi regime sought to cultivate a nationalism that reached deep into the murky past and emphasized the country's unique ties to a glorious, imperial, and pre-Islamic history and mythology. That emphasis was manifested physically in the public architecture approved by the state, as the designs of new government buildings, including Tehran's grand central station, incorporated the styles, symbols, and decorations of Iranian antiquity.⁸⁰ But in a complex, dualistic quest to both emulate Western development and embrace a distinctly Eastern past, the state was marked by a desire to share and celebrate its cultural wealth with the wider world, but also by an almost obsessive protection of its modernizing image and a resistance to reveal anything that might present the Iranian nation in an unflattering light. For foreign visitors and workers, whom the government both wanted and needed, such an intensity of official, national self-consciousness could make the experience of traveling in Iran quite unsettling as people faced many restrictions, especially regarding what they could photograph or film.⁸¹ In-golf Boisen, a Danish filmmaker who was hired by Kampsax to document the railroad project, described that he and his crew were always escorted by police while in the field, and asserted that they were closely monitored by the intelligence services that kept their movements under near-constant surveillance.⁸² An exposure to similar levels of state paranoia was endured, between late 1933 and early 1934, by the Englishman Robert Byron who mercilessly ridiculed its manifestation:

To asperse a sunset in these days is a political indiscretion; and equally so, to praise it, if there happens to be a cement-factory in the foreground that ought to be praised instead. Somebody must trespass on the taboos of modern nationalism, in the interests of human reason. Business can't. Diplomacy won't. It has to be people like us.⁸³

In other words, in an age of rising nationalist fervor, it stood to intellectuals, artists and free spirits, in essence people without political or economic interests in places like Iran, to honestly and publicly identify the absurdities that prevailed within such states. The Danish engineers active within the shah's regime during the 1930s clearly did not fall into that category of people. Not only was Kampsax heavily engaged in the realm as the directing company of the railway project, but in 1935 it secured an additional contract from the government to oversee the construction of twenty-one, Soviet-supplied, giant grain silos, the largest of which was to be located in Tehran and have a capacity of 65,000 tons.⁸⁴ Saxild expressed in private conversations that besides the inherent business benefits of the deal, the company saw the agreement as a means to further entrench itself in Iran and strengthen the favor with which it was viewed by the government.⁸⁵ In particular, Kampsax hoped to win the contract to manage the building of the Tehran-Tabriz railway, making the company quite unwilling to echo Byron's criticisms that were certain

to offend the sensitive Iranian leadership.⁸⁶ And even as the coveted rail project from the capital to the northwest lingered in indecision and the ambitious plans to build grain silos were radically scaled back, from twenty-one to just seven, Kampsax retained its key role in the construction effort, and yet another Danish company, Monberg & Thorsen, was selected to supervise the building of the silo at Isfahan.⁸⁷ The symbolism of that latter structure in the fabled city was not lost on the filmmaker Boisen:

The mosques of Shah Abbas and the silo of Reza Shah stand as landmarks for each their epoch in Aladdin's city. The mosques as reminders of the age of empire when Isfahan was known as half the world – the silo as a monument to a ruler who understood his time in history and sought to restore to his country its internal strength.⁸⁸

In terms that highlighted the contrasts of the new Iran, the Dane clearly embraced the imagery of the shah as a visionary leader whose effort to revive the nation was being aided by Danish ingenuity and expertise. Rather than emulate Byron's assessment of the regime, the Nordic artist tended to balance the methods and style of government with the intentions and ultimate goals of the state and its leadership. It seemed the interests of the private sector in Denmark were helping to shape the dominant view of Iranian development, and, imbedded in Byron's comments cited earlier, were words specifically applicable to Danish activities in the country. In fact, F. L. Smidth, a Danish firm and a global leader in the cement industry, had since 1931 been hard at work in Iran on the construction of a cement factory near Tehran, perhaps the very one described by the Englishman, which became operational in 1934 and was capable of producing 100 tons daily.⁸⁹ Much of that domestic, Danish-created capacity was subsequently committed to supply contractors working on the Danish-directed Trans-Iranian Railway and served to realize one of the shah's cherished goals of reducing Iranian dependency on imports.

The role of Danes in furthering the policies of the regime was hardly endorsed by all Iranians or foreign observers. Opponents of the shah, such as Muhammad Musaddiq, the future, ill-fated prime minister, argued that the Pahlavi-directed development program was far too focused on technological advancements and neglected, even blocked, efforts to extend freedoms and democracy to the broader population. In contrast, he advocated, in his capacity as a leading parliamentarian, a policy termed *Iraniyat va Islamiyat* (the Iranian and Islamic way of life) that favored societal development in adherence to cultural sensitivities and consent of the citizenry.⁹⁰ Based on such principles, Musaddiq emerged as a trenchant critic of the Trans-Iranian Railway because it imposed a heavy tax burden on the people and was deemed to be a poor allocation of government funds.⁹¹ By the close of 1930, the project was foundering even after the government had spent over \$15 million, and four years further on, more than a year after the Kampsax consortium had assumed control over the ongoing construction, a U. S. diplomatic report concluded that the heavy investment in rail could never be justified.⁹² In particularly harsh terms, the authors of the document asserted that:

[T]he railway system will remain the property of the people who paid for it, – a truly Greek gift of those private interests expecting to profit from it, seeing that no profit-seeking individual would ever, except in a moment of supreme aberration, permit himself to be saddled with so uneconomic an undertaking.⁹³

Perhaps condemning both the Scandinavian builders for profiting on a misguided venture and certainly the shah and his political allies for allegedly building the railroad to partly facilitate the export of produce from their northern estates, the report estimated that about \$38.5 million from the railway fund alone had been spent by the end of 1934, and that future expenses would thor-

oughly outstrip the revenues that could be generated from that source.⁹⁴ Additional monies would be derived from petroleum royalties and even cuts in the military budget, a move justified by the security benefits that the finished railway would provide the regime by easing the movement of troops up and down the country. It was even rumored, by Kampsax engineers, that the golden dome of the famed main mosque in Qom had been seriously considered as collateral to secure further domestic loans, thereby conveying the impression that the shah was prepared to mortgage Iran's national heritage in order to complete the railway.⁹⁵ Whatever the veracity of the latter allegation, the Reza Shah government did raise and spend a huge sum on the project, committing 2.5 billion rials (\$150 million), or almost 20 percent of all public sector capital expenditures for over a decade (1927-1938), to its successful completion.⁹⁶ Later analysts, in agreement with former prime minister Musaddiq, have deemed that such expenditures were excessive and outright damaging to the country, noting that the north-south route was poor, that the project caused inflation, and that it diverted funds from road construction.⁹⁷ Yet others cited the railway as "constructed entirely for domestic purposes" and focused on "the idea of connecting the fertile northern provinces...with the equally important Persian Gulf region," thereby assisting the drive to mold a nation, easing the movement of imports and exports, and providing a valuable training ground for imparting modern construction skills to Iranian workers.⁹⁸ And for Denmark, the project had historic proportions as the contract surpassed by far the Turkish venture in its dimensions and cost, and became perhaps representative of the Danish self-definition of their role in the region. Seeing themselves as helping states to pursue the proper course of development, their perceived contribution was aptly described by one journalist who entitled an article: "Danish Engineers are Building the New Bridge Between Persia and the World." They believed, in essence, that through their work they were constructing the very tracks on which Westernization was carried into the country, driving the steel highway from north and south to the seat of power in Tehran.⁹⁹

From the Caspian to the Capital

The first length of railway that the consortium committed itself to finish was the shorter, northern line. Pledging to reach Tehran no later than mid-1937, the engineers were to continue the work begun years earlier by their German and U.S. predecessors, who had surveyed and graded sections of the line as well as laid about 130 km of track.¹⁰⁰ That existing spur of rail ran from Bandar Shah across the plains of Mazanderan Province, but was limited to the rather uncomplicated low-lying areas. What remained yet to be built was a stretch of over 300 km, the first one hundred and fifteen of which were to pass through the Talar River Valley and make the steady ascent into the Elburz mountains to reach Gaduk, the highest-placed railway station anywhere on the line, located 2,100 m above sea level.¹⁰¹ Obligated to follow a circuitous route in order to navigate the natural obstacles of the landscape and tackle the steep rise of the highlands, the intervening distance and line of track running to the peak was deemed to rival the famed St. Gothard railway in Switzerland as to "the beauty of its scenery and the boldness of its conception."¹⁰² Such asserted parallels were warranted by the complexities of the construction project that required the building of seventy-five tunnels, many partly spiraled as the line cut its way up through the mountains, and at one point boring a passage more than 3 km long.¹⁰³ Hundreds of bridges were similarly needed to carry the line across rivers and gorges, "bridges that are technical marvels in every regard," lauded a Danish observer, "but ones which human eyes will never see," since they were remote and neither visible from roads or passing trains.¹⁰⁴ The most



Map 11. Route of the Trans-Iranian Railway. Reproduced from Ingolf Boisen, *Danmark og Iran gennem tiderne* (Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1965), 94.

notable of these structures was the Vresk Bridge whose 55 m wide masonry arch spanned a deep river valley and which, by the time of the northern line's completion in 1937, would stand as the tallest rail bridge in the world at 120 m.¹⁰⁵ The porous soil, saturated with moisture from the persistent rainfall of the north, also presented the engineers with a great challenge as extensive drainage works and protective, artificial tunnels were needed to prevent and protect against mud slides.¹⁰⁶ A rash of such difficulties in the early months of construction threatened to undermine Iranian confidence in the abilities of Kampsax to successfully complete the project, but upon Reza Shah's first visit to the building sites in November 1933, commencing for him a semi-annual tradition of personal inspection tours, he expressed great satisfaction with the efforts of the Danish engineers.¹⁰⁷ And despite ongoing intrigue, like the attempts by the former German contractors to organize an international boycott of employment with Kampsax; and repeated instances of doubt generated in Tehran over complications that disrupted construction, such as the occasional earthquake or the outbreak of malaria among the workers, the shah seemingly never wavered in his enthusiasm for the project or his chosen, foreign advisers.¹⁰⁸

The sustained confidence of the monarch in the capacities of the consortium's engineers was in large measure attributable to their abilities to quickly resolve difficulties when they emerged and to keep the pace of construction steady and the quality of work high. To adequately oversee the building process, Kampsax employees were stationed at every subcontracted section of the line and routine inspection trips were conducted by staff members from the consortium headquarters in Tehran to report and monitor overall progress. In their dual role as agents of both the state and the consortium, these men were keenly aware of the need to balance speed with proper standards, recognizing where and when to apply pressure to encourage greater effort or at what time to crack down and either punish or even dismiss underperforming contractors. As reflected in a series of inspection reports by Harry K. Wright, such run-ins were infrequent, but in one instance a contractor was forced to demolish several structures due to poor construction and he was reprimanded for arguing incessantly about his contractual obligations and even for monopolizing and exploiting trade with the laborers.¹⁰⁹ A few Italian builders were also chastised, one for slowing work on his section in order to reduce personal costs and another was threatened with having Kampsax takeover the construction of a tunnel in his assigned sector and complete it at his expense unless the quality of work was improved.¹¹⁰ However, such incidents were not characteristic of Italian contributions on the northern railway as contractors from Italy dominated the construction sites along the line, and Saxild declared that much of the consortium's success was attributable to:

...the Italian engineers' outstanding sense of organization and leadership on the project. All in all, the Italians in Iran have yet again confirmed their reputation as the world's most outstanding reinforced-concrete engineers.¹¹¹

The need for specialty workmen to assist in the construction of tunnels and certain scaffolding used in bridge building also resulted in a heavy reliance on Italians, though Kampsax too looked to recruit skilled workers from its operation in Turkey as work there was gradually nearing completion.¹¹² Experienced labor was simply required if the pace of progress demanded by the shah was to be achieved, but Iranians would still constitute the bulk of the work force as the project raced ahead. By April 1934, only a year after the contract signing, fully 16,500 people, the vast majority of them native workers, were under Kampsax's supervision on the construction sites in the north.¹¹³ And even as building activities invariably slowed during the winter months when conditions in the mountains worsened and temperatures at the highest reaches of the railway

plunged to minus 35 degrees Celsius, the overall, year-long momentum of the project continued unabated. “Everywhere work progressed with great intensity on tunnels, support walls and bridges,” observed a Danish inspector, “and the line’s grand, demonstrated dimensions made a profound impression on [everyone].”¹¹⁴ The needed building materials to supply and sustain such a significant enterprise were of a matching, awesome scale, and Iran entirely lacked the capacities to provide the requisite quantities. Domestic production of cement, estimated to reach 24,000 tons in 1935, fell far short of consortium needs, and Kampsax sought to procure the balance of materials, such as additional cement, rails, and dynamite, from mostly the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.¹¹⁵

Locomotives and railcars were similarly purchased overseas, with the consortium partner, Nydquist & Holm, providing much of the rolling stock. The introduction of diesel-powered trains was particularly emphasized, with one leading expert asserting that “without any doubt it can be said that the [northern] line is unusually well suited for diesel electric traction,” as such machines were maintenance efficient and did not require that refueling and water stations be positioned frequently along the line.¹¹⁶ The steep and winding climb up from the lowlands around the Caspian Sea to the remote, high-altitude station at Gaduk also invited the use of powerful locomotives, such as the 210-ton Garratt from Beyer, Peacock & Co. in Britain, that were specially-designed to negotiate the tight turns on a mountain railway. Boisen witnessed one of these behemoths in service when he toured the northern line in late 1937 and was most impressed by the remarkable machine.¹¹⁷ However, equally noteworthy was the symbolism of this massive train, a manifestation of the international, cosmopolitan nature of the railway project. Not only was Kampsax, as trumpeted by one newspaper journalist, an organization second only to the League of Nations in gathering together peoples of disparate nations in a common purpose, but the very construction enterprise itself served as an economic engine of activity whose ripple effects were felt far and wide in an era of global depression.¹¹⁸ And with the line’s completion in February of 1937, fully two months before the promised delivery date, the Danish-led construction effort had successfully finished the first and shortest installment of the monumental Trans-Iranian Railway.¹¹⁹

From the Gulf to Inauguration

The opening of the northern line allowed Kampsax to shift its full attention to the ongoing building activities in the south that were gradually driving the longer and more difficult segment of the railway toward Tehran. From the contract’s inception, the focus had been, much as was true in the north, on continuing the work begun years earlier by other engineers. Under the direction of a U.S. firm, Ulen & Co., an international consortium had contracted in 1928 to build a 250 km stretch of railway from Bandar Shahpour on the Persian Gulf to Salehabad.¹²⁰ However, after more than two years of construction, the group of companies was dismissed following disputes with the Iranian government, and the project, continued under state management, became riddled with inefficiencies and corruption.¹²¹ The very notion of the railway was tarnished as progress faltered, and when top Kampsax engineers toured the work sites and the finished sections of the south line in 1933 and early 1934 to assess the general conditions and the quality of construction, they were less than impressed. Erik Kayser, the director of the Tehran-Salehabad building efforts, found that Ulen & Co., as well as the U.S. engineer later hired by the government to oversee the project, had mismanaged allocated construction funds by spending far too much money on service buildings and support facilities, such as a power plant with triple the

generating capacity needed, and by failing to prevent shoddy workmanship on numerous bridges.¹²² Kayser's deputy, Mogens Blach, echoed these same sentiments as he discovered that several completed bridges bore evidence of deteriorating pillars, a fact attributable both to an ill-advised use in the southern climate of concrete rather than masonry and to allegations that the laborers had been overworked.¹²³ The inspections also revealed that most locomotives used on the line were in poor condition, many having been damaged when unclean water from the improperly operated regional water treatment plants was added to their engines.¹²⁴ Such indications of administrative disarray and waste troubled both Danes greatly, and Kampsax was compelled to devote many months to reorganize the management infrastructure and work to restore confidence in the project.¹²⁵ Efforts in that regard were much needed as even Iranian officials were by 1934 expressing deep misgivings about the budgeting of vast sums for the construction of a railway in the south. In one meeting with such bureaucrats, Blach reported that the men questioned the favoring of rail over more road development and much needed irrigation of the land in the plain of Khuzistan.¹²⁶ Yet, simultaneously, they acknowledged that the country's prestige was on the line and that the financial burdens of the massive project needed to be endured.

The sheer dimensions and physical challenges of the planned route of the southern railway represented not only a test of Iran's economic capabilities and the strengths of its people, but also an unprecedented task for the engineers of Kampsax. As the Danes traveled along the projected 690 km path of the line, it became abundantly clear that the consortium faced significant topographical obstacles, especially in the so-called "canyon section" of Luristan in the Zagros Mountains. Even simply accessing the area was difficult, making the construction of service roads not only a prerequisite for further work, but also constituting a project in itself. A narrow thoroughfare, built over two years, was cut and blasted through the rugged terrain and carried across deep valleys on wooden bridges made of lumber transported all the way from the Caspian region.¹²⁷ These significant efforts to prepare the work sites, in turn, demanded that mechanized equipment be employed extensively in order to finish the line within the time allotted by the contract. Hundreds of powerful drills, capable of cutting through 4.25 m (14 feet) of rock every twenty-four hours, and dozens of oil or gasoline-powered compressors were employed to build the large-scale network of tunnels required in the canyon district.¹²⁸ In fact, over a combined length of 220 km stretching through the Zagros range, fully 60 km of tunnels were constructed by the consortium, constituting, in the words of one participating English engineer, "one of the greatest feats of engineering in the history of railway building."¹²⁹ And within that distance of railway was a 69 km-long range of lots, namely numbers four through eight, in which the line snaked its way along the narrow river valleys of the Ab-i-Diz and the Ab-i-Cezar waterways and where forty-seven tunnels covered fully 36 km of track.¹³⁰ On a few of the individual lots the ratios were even higher. Lot six, which was subcontracted jointly to the London-based Danish firm of I. L. Kier & Co. and an Iranian builder, had about 55 percent of its 15 km of railway pass through tunnels.¹³¹ The same was largely true for lot seven where the consortium's only English contractor, Richard Costain, Ltd., constructed seven tunnels, the longest of which was 2 km.¹³²

Bridges too were prevalent along the railway's path in the forbidding canyon district. Dozens were needed to carry the line across the deep river valleys as it swung back and forth over the waterways that cut through the rugged terrain. And as was the case in Turkey, Kampsax engineers, led by a Swiss expert, designed most of those bridges. The largest, located in lot seven, was over 200 m in length and cost an estimated \$250,000 to build.¹³³ Consisting of ten arches, each with a span between 10 to 40 m, the structure was the longest of its kind anywhere on the

line. It also constituted, alongside the plethora of other bridges and scores of tunnels, tangible evidence that, in the words of Erik Kayser, “this stretch will stand as an example of the most difficult railroad project ever built.”¹³⁴ The Kampsax-directed construction effort seemed to him an exceptional triumph of Danish engineering, and he was incredulous that the former contractors had experienced such difficulties in the south since, in his view, the stretch from the Gulf to Salehabad was as easy as the remaining segment to the capital was tough.¹³⁵

The tremendous challenges presented by the conditions prevailing in the south were overcome by determination and organization. Masses of workers, already in April 1934 numbering 9,500, were employed to ever quicken the pace of construction as recommended by the Danish engineers.¹³⁶ Compelled to endure grueling temperatures, that during the summer months could soar to heights of 55 degrees Celsius, and the perils of dangerous work sites, the dedication of the labor force was a critical element in the success of the project.¹³⁷ Kampsax’s managing directors were under no illusions about this fact, and fully 2 percent of the funds allocated to individual subcontractors were deducted and devoted to creating an invaluable health service or *service sanitaire*. A mostly Iranian staff of five hundred doctors, nurses and orderlies was distributed across the fifty lots of construction and the three main hospitals purposely built to care for sick or injured workers.¹³⁸ However, access to medical care did require that laborers adhere to the specific and, seemingly inflexible, policies of the consortium. In a rather uncaring tone, director Saxild informed the Danish ambassador to Tehran that a local worker, who had lost an eye and was seeking additional compensation, had already received the 1,500 rials (\$112) stipulated in employment contracts for such injuries and that no further monies would be forthcoming since the man had sought treatment at a facility with which Kampsax did not have an agreement.¹³⁹ In rather contrasting fashion, the consortium established a special recovery center for European engineers employed along the south line. Located at a height of more than 2,000 m above sea level, the facility was designed to allow the men to recuperate from the exhaustion they experienced while working in the canyon cauldrons during the summer.¹⁴⁰ Described by Saxild as an idealized setting with tennis courts, a swimming pool, and all the comforts of modern life, he saw it, perched atop the formerly untamed wilderness, as “truly one of the most beautiful and symbolic monuments to the Shah’s civilizing efforts.”¹⁴¹ Alongside the railway, in essence, the mountain retreat was, though polished and exclusive, an indication that the country was being transformed and that Western customs and tastes were taking root.

Filming the Railway

The desire to document the pace and magnitude of change underway in Iran, as well as Kampsax’s role in fostering such reform, prompted the company’s directors to commission the making of several films. Intent on capturing the spectacular images of the Trans-Iranian Railway’s construction, they began seeking capable filmmakers already in 1935, but Saxild advised that the project be delayed until after the northern line was finished, thereby assuring that footage could be gathered of both the ongoing and the completed work.¹⁴² Filming would therefore not begin until after February 1937 and, with Kampsax acceding to the shah’s request that the southern line be completed six months earlier than stipulated in the contract, the Danish production company, Minerva Film A/S, hired to make the documentary, would be rather pressed for time.¹⁴³ However, the two young filmmakers, Ingolf Boisen and Axel Lerche, who had formed their company only two years before, were up for the challenge, and just a month after concluding an agreement with Kampsax in September 1937, they had arrived in Iran.¹⁴⁴ With deter-

mination and a commitment to the principles of the pioneering British documentary filmmaking movement of the 1930s that promoted the “creative treatment of actuality,” in essence, the dramatization of reality through film, the two men set about shaping a perspective on the country and its transformation.¹⁴⁵

A central focus of the filming was naturally the railway itself. From the inception of planning for the documentary, Saxild had stressed that the scale and tremendous challenges of the project should be emphasized. He argued that scenes with masses of workers, footage of demolitions, and a gradual, incremental revelation of the topography from the mundane to spectacular, would all serve to create a dramatic effect.¹⁴⁶ Boisen and Lerche strove to deliver such images by not only visiting the construction sites in the south but also by risking their lives while hanging suspended from ledges or across rivers to capture desired footage. Along the north line, the men took similar chances to film the train moving through the countryside and over bridges. They also used color film to fully record the natural beauty of the landscape that was so alien from Danish topography, and even managed, despite official Iranian sensitivities, to film local people and scenes of traditional life. Saxild argued that such latter footage could serve to underscore the contrasts between the old and the new, between the Persia of the past and the Iran of the future.¹⁴⁷ Boisen would emphasize this very same point in a letter to the Kampsax management as he worked on the commercial version of the film that was released in 1939:

The idea of the movie is to show that the ancient, civilized land of Iran, under the initiative of a modern ruler, is torn by conflict between the old and new. These conflicts are most evident by contrasts, where the old and new exist side by side, or by the clear triumph of the modern age, such as with the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway. It is as if nature in Iran colluded with tradition to resist the penetration of modernization, and therefore the film can in its description of the greater landscape always adhere to the main theme, namely the creation of modern Iran.¹⁴⁸

The engineer/businessman and the artist both were intent on conveying to the Danish audience that images of the decrepit, the inefficient, and the fossilized Persia were being forcefully supplanted by the mechanized, the visionary, and the revitalized Iran. Equally important was the notion that the Kampsax-directed construction of the Trans-Iranian Railway was a cornerstone of that transformation.

The Day the Shah Smiled¹⁴⁹

With the advent of August 1938, the consortium was poised to complete Reza Shah’s coveted railroad running the full length of the country. The two sections of the southern line were scheduled to meet at Safid Chashmeh, a small station located about 400 km from Tehran and, according to Saxild, almost the exact location where Kampsax engineers in 1933 had planned that the two segments would be joined.¹⁵⁰ Official opening ceremonies were set for August 26th and the day was trumpeted in newspapers and government proclamations as a national event marking the triumph of the shah’s vision and leadership.¹⁵¹ Kampsax was similarly eager to commemorate their role in fostering the momentous occasion, so Boisen was summoned to return to Iran and film the festivities. In just a matter of days the Dane arrived in Tehran, thanks to the convenience of Lufthansa’s Berlin to Kabul air route, and he set about preparing his equipment to record the events at Safid Chashmeh. One witness, perhaps Boisen himself, described the day and setting as ideal, with a cloudless sky and the summer warmth tempered by the high altitude of the remote, mountain valley:

[A] valley surrounded by high mountains that towered over the lush greenery of the fertile soil below and were sharply silhouetted against the deep blue sky. Taken together with the waving flags, the honorary gate, and the red-white-green adornments of the grandstand, it formed a captivating orgy of colors.¹⁵²

In addition to decorations, the station had also been renamed “Fawzia” in conjunction with the day’s celebration to honor King Faruq’s sister who was engaged to marry Reza Shah’s son, Muhammad Reza.¹⁵³ Both Pahlavis were in attendance at the ceremony, and each inserted and fastened one of the two final bolts of the railway before the elder cut the ribbon and opened the line, allowing the first train to roll past and head northwards toward the capital. Saxild noted that “it was clear to everyone that His Majesty was happy and moved by the grand occasion, and when...the first train from the south lumbered into the station, his face lit up with joy.”¹⁵⁴ The filmmaker Boisen would even claim years later that Muhammad Reza told him that August 26th, 1938 was the happiest day of his father’s life.¹⁵⁵ However, the future monarch did not make that same assertion in his own writings, but the dutiful son did stress that his father had initiated and persevered in “perhaps the most remarkable single feat of railroad construction ever completed.”¹⁵⁶

The statistical data related to the project tended to support Muhammed Reza Shah’s assessment. Over the five years and four months of construction, Kampsax oversaw the building of 224 tunnels with a combined length of 83.9 km, 3,250 bridges at a joint length of 22 km, and 2.3 million cubic meters of masonry, as well as the removal of over 20 million cubic meters of earth and debris.¹⁵⁷ The tools required to achieve this mammoth task were not only a large work force that peaked at 45,000 laborers, 5,000 skilled workers, and 450 engineers, but also vast amounts of building materials such as half a million tons of cement, 4,000 tons of dynamite, 100,000 tons of rails, and 1.5 million sleepers.¹⁵⁸ Such numbers and quantities made clear that the endeavor to build the Trans-Iranian Railway was in the same category of engineering feats as the Suez and Panama Canals. And much as France and the United States took great pride in what their citizen-engineers had accomplished, so too did Denmark cherish what its sons had contributed to heightening the reputation and visibility of their country. One Dane, in particular, who appreciated the Danish role in Iran was the Orientalist Johannes Østrup (1867-1938) who for years had tirelessly advocated a greater commercial involvement of his country in the Middle East. He saw in the railway venture a revival of the Viking spirit, the willingness to travel far from home and seek one’s fortune in foreign lands, and he said as much when he stood up, following a speech by Saxild at the Association of Danish Engineers, and thanked the Kampsax director and his colleagues for their efforts.¹⁵⁹ Reza Shah also was gratified by this restoration of spirit, and at the Safid Chashmeh ceremonies he declared, as quoted by Saxild:

Kampsax is the only foreign company that with honesty, loyalty, honor, conscience, and with great skill has solved the assignment placed before it, and the task has been completed to my full satisfaction.¹⁶⁰

The monarch naturally saw the completed railway as an affirmation of his policies and a realization of the new Iran he envisioned. Likewise, he recognized that Danish engineers had been instrumental in delivering to him and the country that coveted goal. In reciprocal fashion, Saxild declared that the shah stood alone as the creator of modern Iran and that he had taken the nation from absolute chaos to independence. The Dane further argued that the railway would have repercussions beyond Iran, suggesting it “will become the point of departure for a new sense of development and a new direction in the spheres of economics and politics throughout this part of the world.”¹⁶¹

But notions of historic achievement and sentiments of mutual appreciation could not defuse tensions that smoldered beneath the surface. Already in 1937 the consortium had been disappointed by Turkish attempts to undermine Iranian confidence in Kampsax by sending to Tehran a railway commission report that was highly critical of the foreign engineers. Saxild was incensed by the behavior of the Turkish commissioners whom he found “had acted most incorrectly toward Kampsax,” and deemed their criticisms “highly disingenuous” and “improper.”¹⁶² He felt betrayed by the Turks who had originally helped Kampsax secure the Trans-Iranian Railway contract and were now attempting to discredit and slander the consortium in order to win new railway contracts for Turkish companies. These machinations were also unfolding at a most inopportune time when there were rumblings of complaints against Kampsax from within Iran, as some domestic contractors asserted they had not made much money and fervent nationalists felt the foreigners had assumed too prominent a role.¹⁶³ It seemed, concluded Danish diplomats in Tehran, that “[the] consortium’s strong organization has probably been a thorn in the side of many Iranian officials,” and they recommended that Kampsax scale back its visibility and fee demands.¹⁶⁴

In fact, issues of payment and difficulties persuading the Iranians to assume full responsibility for the railway would remain troublesome for years to come. The original 1933 contract had stipulated that Kampsax’s compensation would be based on a fee of \$5 in gold per meter of track, with the final figure to be assessed at the conclusion of the project.¹⁶⁵ But with the completion of the railway, a dispute arose as to the overall length. The Iranians claimed the consortium should only be paid for a combined distance of 939 km (i.e., \$4,695,000), while Kampsax asserted that various short segments built as sidelines to the main track should be included, as should the major expansions of the Tehran railyards.¹⁶⁶ Those latter works, in particular, had seen the consortium spend considerable funds to hire prominent experts from the Danish State Railways to serve as consultants.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, Kampsax calculated they were due an additional \$165,000 and would struggle for some time to secure that remaining payment. The Danes also labored to overcome the Iranian reluctance to accept the railway as complete and take control of its operation. Saxild noted in March 1939 that the government had stalled the final handover of the north line for more than fourteen months, and he attributed this to a common regional affliction:

It is, much as we experienced in Turkey, difficult to be finally discharged in the Orient, where it strikes a minister particularly difficult to declare a responsibility expired and an affair brought to a close. Such reluctance stems from his lack of experience and subsequent insecurity.¹⁶⁸

However, rather than attribute the delays to fledgling competence, it seemed more accurate that the Iranians were attempting to limit their exposure to financial liabilities. The government even tried to compel Kampsax to pay for repairs on sections of the railroad that were built before the consortium assumed responsibility for the project. Saxild calmly dismissed such official efforts and saw them as manifestations of nervousness and depression about the impending obligation to independently manage the railroad.¹⁶⁹

The Legacy of a Steel Road

The history of the Trans-Iranian Railway is one filled with irony and symbolism. Built as a monument to Iran’s independence and strength, it became with the advent of the Second World War a coveted target for Allied strategic planners and a significant reason why Iran was invaded,

Reza Shah was unseated for questionable loyalties, and the country was occupied during the conflict.¹⁷⁰ Needing to secure a safe and reliable supply route to the U.S.S.R., the Allies saw the so-called Persian Corridor as a vital link to the beleaguered Soviets and they, in the words of two U.S. journalists, “turned the toy of the Shah into a weapon for defense of the U.S.S.R.”¹⁷¹ This too was ironic as the U.S.S.R. had for a time attempted to literally derail the railway’s completion during 1937 and 1938 by reneging on the delivery of Soviet-produced rails and blocking the transit of Polish-made rails.¹⁷² Yet the consortium obviously overcame these setbacks and, over the course of the war, millions of tons of supplies were ferried up through the corridor, about half of which was carried by the railway.¹⁷³ And though the original line of track was insufficient to meet those needs and had to be greatly expanded by the Allies, the very existence of a transnational path that had been cut, blasted, and tunneled through the country made such improvements possible.¹⁷⁴ For those Danes who remained in Iran during the war, that contribution to the ultimate Allied victory was significant as it gave them a sense of helping to liberate their own country from German occupation. Kampsax’s engineers in the Tehran office also worked tirelessly to assist the war effort by overseeing the construction and improvement of thousands of kilometers of roads and the building of numerous airfields.¹⁷⁵ Hence, Danes played a significant role, both through their completed and their ongoing work, in making Iran the so-called “bridge of victory.”

Bringing the West to the East

With the close of the Second World War both Turkey and Iran faced a future without the supreme leaders who had put each country on a course of radical reform. One had died only a year before the war broke out and the other had been forced from power during the conflict, but both men had secured their legacies as people of vision and uncompromising determination. In the face of opposition, complications, and inefficiencies they forcefully pushed through programs to fundamentally restructure their societies and adopt Western models of development. Convinced, as were most Westerners, that Middle Eastern countries needed to liberate themselves from the clutches of a backward and ossified cultural and political tradition, Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah turned to replace it with the perceived vitality and strength of Western societies. However, ever fearful of foreign influence that might curtail the independence that Turkey and Iran had achieved, the leaders looked to finance their development plans from domestic sources and sought to limit the involvement of major powers. In Iran, the transnational railway was even designed to specifically avoid Russian and British rail connections in an eventually futile attempt to prevent foreign encroachment.¹⁷⁶ The Turks and Iranians therefore looked to smaller powers, like Denmark, to assist them in attaining their goals, and the Danes who endeavored to fill the role as facilitators of change generally seized the opportunity with relish. They largely endorsed the objectives of the reformers, and were conscious of their own impact on the process. As described by the journalist Peter Jørgensen, the Danish-directed railway project in Turkey laid track that served like a dagger piercing the heart of old Turkey and forever exorcising the new Turkey of that past.¹⁷⁷ Much the same was true about perceptions of the work in Iran, and the engineers, without espousing a hardened ideological worldview, had an innate sense that the work they were doing was objectively progressive and broadly beneficial. The notion that rights were being trampled, that regional identities were crushed under the steamroller of nationalism, and that the pace and extent of transformation was perhaps excessive did not shake these technocrats in their conviction that their efforts were helping to lead Turkey

and Iran toward membership in the community of developed nations.

But while a consciousness of Orientalism dominated, as reflected in the conviction that traditions deemed nationally debilitating needed to be purged, the Danish engineers also worked to strengthen the independence and economic vitality of states in the Middle East. Their efforts, though certainly not supported by all, helped to foster in the respective countries a sense of national confidence and pride. Consequently, the legacy of the Danish-directed railway projects was to stand the country in good stead for decades to follow. Deemed to reflect competence and reliability, the construction triumphs forged for Danes a reputation upon which to build a future of stable diplomatic relations and mutually beneficial trade and economic ties. Combining official, conscientious dialogue with the delivery of quality products and sound technical advice, Denmark asserted for itself during the twentieth century a visibility and role in the Middle East well beyond what its geographical size and national limitations would suggest possible. But recently, at the dawn of a new century, the strength and sustainability of those efforts have been tested by the infamous cartoon scandal that altered Denmark's international image and raised questions about the acceptance of Orientalist discourse in the public, mainstream debate about Islam and Muslims. A potentially beneficial, if risky, dialogue emerged from the controversy, forcing people to confront otherwise unspoken attitudes, and relations with Middle Eastern and Muslim states, momentarily frayed by the incident, have largely returned to normal. However, what remains to be determined are the lasting effects of the months-long dispute and whether the motivation to publish the cartoons was an aberration, a reflection of convictions that are deep-rooted, or an indication of newly-formed attitudes developed in reaction to immigration and a changing society.

-
- ¹ Einar Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det* (Copenhagen: Julius Gjellerups Forlag, 1941), 6-7.
- ² Jørgen Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer* (Copenhagen: Lindhardt og Ringhof, 1971), 7, 42-45.
- ³ *Construction des Lignes de Chemins de Fer* (Copenhagen; Göteborg: Nohab, 1937), 18-19; J. W. Collins, "Turkey increasing rail lines steadily," *New York Times*, 26 April 1931; P. Harvey Middleton, *Railways of Thirty Nations* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), 282-83; Geoffrey Lewis, *Modern Turkey* (New York: Praeger, 1974), 224; William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 41; Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 14.
- ⁴ "Ottoman debt parley breaks down in Paris," *New York Times*, 3 February 1927.
- ⁵ Olaf A. Rygaard, *Mellem Tyrker og Kurder* (Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1935), 40-41; *Construction des Lignes*, 21; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 51.
- ⁶ Johannes Saabye to the Danish Foreign Ministry, "Jernbaneanlæg i Anatolien," Copenhagen, 27 January 1927, Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet; Jørgen Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren* 40, no. 13 (1931): 153; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 146-47.
- ⁷ Ejnar Black, *Kampmann, Kierulff & Saxild A/S* (Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1942), 27; "De nye baner i Anatolien," *Jyllandsposten*, 17 February 1927; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 147; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 52-53.
- ⁸ Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 51-53.
- ⁹ Danish envoy to the Danish Foreign Ministry, "Introduktion," Istanbul, 26 January 1927, Ges. No. 28. Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. F.264. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ¹⁰ Erik Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke som Civilingeniører 1845-1945* (Copenhagen: Ingeniørfirmaet Kayser & Sønner, 1945), 102.
- ¹¹ Oldenburg to the Danish Foreign Ministry, "Tyrkiske Jernbaneanlæg i Lilleasien," Bern, 20 May 1927, Ges. No. 303. Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. F.264. Udenrigsministeriet; Andrew Mango, *Atatürk* (New York: Overlook Press, 1999), 431.
- ¹² "De danske ingeniører i Tyrkiet," *Aalborg Stiftstidende*, 13 August 1927; Peter Jørgensen, "Aalborgensere under Halvmaanen," *Aalborg Stiftstidende*, 30 September 1928.
- ¹³ O. Lerche, "De Svensk-Danske Jernbaneanlæg i Lilleasien," *Ingeniøren* 37, no. 11 (1928): 137; *Construction des Lignes*, 60-61; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 56; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 151-52.
- ¹⁴ Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 154, 157; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 58-59; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 153.
- ¹⁵ *Construction des Lignes*, 66.
- ¹⁶ "Verdens største ingeniørarbejde," *B.T.*, 24 August 1927.
- ¹⁷ Lerche, "De Svensk-Danske Jernbaneanlæg," *Ingeniøren*, 134; *Bulletin Nohab* 1 (15 January 1928): 2-8, copy in the Kampsax A/S Company Archives (hereafter cited as KCA). The latter journal was a consortium-produced publication intended to provide information about the progress of the project, but also to offer the employees a source of entertainment and serve as a forum for relating their experiences and expressing their opinions. In its inaugural issue, the editors called on everyone to submit writings for publication, especially "accounts of adventure and experiences garnered in the different areas of construction, so that the reports can provide a collective impression of the life led...."
- ¹⁸ Vilhelm Marstrand, "To Jernbetonbroer over Eufrat," *Ingeniøren* 39, no. 50 (1930): 593-94; Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke*, 110.
- ¹⁹ Per Kampmann, "Dansk Brobygning i Tyrkiet," *Arkitekten* 35 (1933): 172; Marstrand, "To Jernbetonbroer over Eufrat," 594; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 171.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.* The artist Harald Hansen, commissioned by Kampsax, painted a large picture of the Euphrates railway bridge soon after it was completed. The author witnessed the painting in 2001 displayed prominently at the company headquarters in Hvidovre, Denmark.
- ²¹ Rygaard, *Mellem Tyrker og Kurder*, 99-100.
- ²² Rygaard, "Karavanetransport, polygamy, lopper, Kurderliv, m.m.," *Bulletin Nohab* 13 (15 January 1929): 15; Rygaard, "Et vinterridt fra km 284 Syd til Sortehavet," *Bulletin Nohab* 17 (15 May 1929): 10-13, copies in the KCA.
- ²³ Rygaard, "Lejrliv og sprogforvirring paa Sydbanen," *Bulletin Nohab* 11 (15 November 1928): 9, copy in the KCA.
- ²⁴ Rygaard, "Lejrliv," *Bulletin Nohab* 10 (15 October 1928): 7, copy in the KCA.
- ²⁵ Rygaard, *Mellem Tyrker og Kurder*, 14; Rygaard, "Et vinterridt," *Bulletin Nohab* 19 (15 July 1929): 20, copy in the KCA.

- ²⁶ P. Jørgensen, "Det gaar frem, det gaar frem!," *Bulletin Nohab* 11 (15 November 1928): 10, copy in the KCA; P. Jørgensen, "Aalborgensere under Halvmaanen," *Aalborg Stiftstidende*, 4 November 1928.
- ²⁷ Jørgensen, "Det gaar frem," *Bulletin Nohab*, 12; Jørgensen, "Aalborgensere under Halvmaanen," *Aalborg Stiftstidende*, 18 November 1928.
- ²⁸ Jørgensen, "Det gaar frem," *Bulletin Nohab*, 14.
- ²⁹ Poul M Bülow, "Nohab i Angora," *Bulletin Nohab* 4 (15 April 1928): 10, copy in the KCA.
- ³⁰ P. Jørgensen, "Aalborgensere under Halvmaanen," *Aalborg Stiftstidende*, 30 September 1928; "Aarhusianere paa jernbanearbejde i Lilleasien," *Demokraten*, 16 February 1930; "Skinnelægningen," *Bulletin Nohab* 6 (15 June 1928): 5, copy in the KCA; Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke*, 109.
- ³¹ "De danske ingeniørarbejder i Lilleasien," *Ålborg Amtstidende*, 12 January 1928.
- ³² Peter Jørgensen, "Dansk arbejde under Halvmaanen," 18 November 1928; "Fra Vestergade i København til Istanbul," *Århus Posten*, 2 March 1931; Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 155; *Bulletin Nohab* 5 (15 May 1928): 1, copy in the KCA; *Construction des Lignes*, 27.
- ³³ Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 156-57.
- ³⁴ *Bulletin Nohab* 8 (15 August 1928): 1, copy in the KCA.
- ³⁵ *Construction des Lignes*, 79.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 28.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 74; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 63-64.
- ³⁸ *Construction des Lignes*, 28.
- ³⁹ "Jernbanen betales med varer," *Ekstrabladet*, 16 April 1934; "Dansk-Tyrkisk samhandel pludselig helt stoppet," *Politiken*, 20 August 1935.
- ⁴⁰ Axel Nørgaard to the Danish Foreign Ministry, "De dansk-svenske Jernbanebygningsarbejder," Ankara, 18 November 1935, A. No. 6. Gesandtskabet Ankara/Istanbul. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet; A.C. Fensmark to the Danish Foreign Ministry, "De dansk-svenske Jernbanebygningsarbejder," Istanbul, 9 December 1935, I. No. 282. Gesandtskabet Ankara/Istanbul. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ⁴¹ "En hyldest til de danske ingeniører i Lilleasien," *Berlingske Tidende*, 1 March 1932; Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 158; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 149; *Construction des Lignes*, 32-33; Lerche, "De Svensk-Danske Jærnbaneanlæg," *Ingeniøren*, 144.
- ⁴² Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 158-59; "Fra Vestergade i København til Istanbul," *Århus Posten*, 3 October 1931; "Århusianere på jernbanearbejde i Lilleasien," *Demokraten*, 16 February 1930; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 150; *Construction des Lignes*, 34.
- ⁴³ *Bulletin Nohab* 12 (15 December 1928): 1, copy in the KCA.
- ⁴⁴ "Århusianere på jernbanearbejde i Lilleasien," *Demokraten*, 16 February 1930.
- ⁴⁵ "De danske ingeniørarbejder i Lilleasien," *Ålborg Amtstidende*, 12 January 1928.
- ⁴⁶ *Bulletin Nohab* 9 (15 September 1928): 4, copy in the KCA.
- ⁴⁷ "Århusianere på jernbanearbejde i Lilleasien," *Demokraten*, 16 February 1930.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁹ "Dansen bigger bane hen over kamelens ørkenspor," *Ekstrabladet*, 5 December 1927; "Mr. Black: Molboen som bygger jærnbane i Lilleasien," *Ålborg Venstreblad*, 17 January 1929; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 160-61.
- ⁵⁰ Lerche, "De Svensk-Danske Jærnbaneanlæg," *Ingeniøren*, 143; Rygaard, *Mellem Tyrker og Kurder*, 91; "Fra Vestergade i København til Istanbul," *Århus Posten*, 3 October 1931; Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 160.
- ⁵¹ Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 161.
- ⁵² "Tyrken er bedre end sit Rygte," *Politiken*, 27 October 1935.
- ⁵³ "Fra arbejdsdage i Lilleasien til ferietid i Kolding," *Jyske Tidende*, 11 October 1929.
- ⁵⁴ Saxild, "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet," *Ingeniøren*, 160; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 165-68.
- ⁵⁵ A. Nørgaard to Bolt-Jørgensen, Ankara, 12 November 1935, Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet; A. Nørgaard to the Danish Foreign Ministry, "De dansk-svenske Jernbanebygningsarbejder," Ankara, 18 November 1935, A. No. 6. Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet. Among the numerous complaints of the unhappy Dane were the conditions of the building housing the legation. "Rather than being a testament to Danish culture, sense of style, and a means to promote the country," he wrote critically, "this has become a monument of shame for Denmark on Turkish soil."
- ⁵⁶ A. Nørgaard to the Danish Foreign Ministry, "De dansk-svenske Jernbanebygningsarbejder," Ankara, 18 November 1935, A. No. 6. Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet. The notion of ignoring the role of Scandinavians in the construction of railways in Turkey was not limited to the Turkish press. In a 5 January

1930 article in the *New York Times*, entitled "Turkey Building Modern Railroads," the journalist failed to ever mention the contributions of Danish and Swedish workers even as one of the two lines they were building, the Fevsi Pasha – Diarbakir line, was discussed at some length.

⁵⁷ "En hyldest til de danske ingeniører i Lilleasien," *Berlingske Tidende*, 1 March 1932; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 8-9.

⁵⁸ A. Nørgaard to Bent Falkenstejrne, Ankaea, 5 November 1935, Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet.

⁵⁹ Ibid.; "Tyrken er bedre end sit Rygte," *Politiken*, 27 October 1935.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Rygaard, *Mellem Tyrker og Kurder*, 7, 17, 37.

⁶² Ibid., 20.

⁶³ J. Saxild to the Kampsax Offices, Tehran, 19 September 1933, Traktion, folder 1, KCA; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 108; "Ny sejr for dansk ingeniørkunst," *Jyllandsposten*, 22 April 1933.

⁶⁴ Tevfik Rustu Bey to Mirza Mohammed Ali Khan, Ankara, December 1932, copy in "Jernbaneanlæg I Anatolien," Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet; J. Saxild, "Iran of dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936, copy in the Vilhelm N. Marstrand Archive (hereafter VM), "Kampmann, Kierulff, & Saxild og den transiranske jernbane," folder 1, bundle 75, Danish State Archives; "Status of Railway Construction Undertaken by Persian Government," *Engineering News-Record* 113 (25 October 1934): 527.

⁶⁵ Saxild to V. N. Marstrand, 1 October 1936. VM.

⁶⁶ P. Kampmann to A. C. Fensmark, Copenhagen, 1 February 1938, Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet.

⁶⁷ A. C. Fensmark to P. Kampmann, Istanbul, 2 April 1938, Gesandtskabet Istanbul/Ankara. 70.S.27. Udenrigsministeriet.

⁶⁸ George B. Baldwin, *Planning and Development in Iran* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 11; A. G. Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 25, no. 2 (April 1938): 220; "Persia to finish Railway," *New York Times*, 20 October 1930.

⁶⁹ Saxild to V. N. Marstrand, 1 October 1936, folder 1, bundle 75. VM; "Persia to Build Railroad," *New York Times*, 7 April 1928; "Americans get Persia Contract," *New York Times*, 19 April 1928; "Interests Here Share in Persian Contract," *New York Times*, 12 July 1928.

⁷⁰ Saxild to V. N. Marstrand, 1 October 1936. VM; Ingolf Boisen, *Banen skal bygges paa seks aar* (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1946), 48-49.

⁷¹ Ingolf Boisen, *Klip fra en filmmands liv* (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1977), 100; "Den transiranske jernbane," *Tidsskrift for Industri* (15 January 1940): 14; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 50; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 180.

⁷² Report to Major C. H. L. Gazalet, D.S.O., Tehran, 9 April 1937, "Kampsax: Jernbanebygning i Iran," bundle 2, Gesandtskabet Tehran. 70.S.1. Udenrigsministeriet.

⁷³ Unsigned letter to Saxild, 6 August 1934, "Arbejdsprogram og finanplan af 13/5 1313," budget folder 4. Jernbaner: Iran, box 111. KCA; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 83-84, 95; "Skal danske ingeniørfirmaer bygge de persiske jernbaner?" *Berlingske Tidende*, 17 August 1933; "En Hædersdag for danske Ingeniører," *Berlingske Tidende*, 20 February 1937; Holger Jerrild, "Kamelerne viger for Jernbanen," *Dansk Arbejde*, 1 May 1937. Saxild estimated that as many as 500,000 Iranians were employed on the project over the less than six years of construction.

⁷⁴ Unsigned letter to Saxild, Tehran, 6 August 1934, "Arbejdsprogram og finansplan af 13/5 1313," budget folder 4. Jernbaner: Iran, box 111. KCA.

⁷⁵ Ejnar Blechingberg to Saxild, Tehran, 10 June 1938, "Kampsax: Jernbanebygning i Iran," bundle 1. Gesandtskabet Tehran. 70.S.1. Udenrigsministeriet.

⁷⁶ Julian Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 204; M. Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 101; Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 133.

⁷⁷ Saxild to Marstrand, 14 October 1936. VM; Jerrild, "Kamelerne viger for Jernbanen," *Dansk Arbejde*, 1 May 1937.

⁷⁸ Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 172.

⁷⁹ Wilfred Knapp, "1921-1941: The Period of Riza Shah," in *Twentieth-Century Iran*, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi (London: Heinemann, 1977), 48-49; Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1946), 30; Baldwin, *Planning and Development in Iran*, 12; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 95.

- ⁸⁰ Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, 106-07; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 98, 136.
- ⁸¹ Robert Byron, *The Road to Oxiana* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 121.
- ⁸² Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 105-07; Boisen, *Klip fra en filmands liv*, 93, 117-19.
- ⁸³ Byron, *The Road to Oxiana*, 195.
- ⁸⁴ Ejnar Bleckingberg to the Danish Foreign Ministry, Tehran, undated, "Kampsax: kontrakt med Irans regering om opførelse af 21 kornsiloer," Ges. No. 126. Gesandtskab Tehran. 70.S.19. Udenrigsministeriet; "Dansk kontrakt med Iran paa 25 millioner!" *Fyns Stiftstidende*, 11 December 1935.
- ⁸⁵ E. Bleckingberg to O. Engell, Tehran, 1 December 1935, "Kampsax: kontrakt med Irans regering om opførelse af 21 kornsiloer," Ges. No. 126. Gesandtskab Tehran. 70.S.19. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ⁸⁷ Unsigned letter to the Danish Foreign Ministry, Tehran, 18 November 1938, "Silobygning i Iran," Ges. No. 139. Gesandtskab Tehran. 70.S.19. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ⁸⁸ Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 198.
- ⁸⁹ Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 206-07; Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran*, 178. The capacity of the Shah Abdul Azim plant, located near the capital, was doubled in 1936. During the following year, F. L. Smidth began work on a second cement factory in Iran.
- ⁹⁰ Homa Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), 28.
- ⁹¹ Ibid.; Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism 1926-1979* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), 115, 121, n. 15.
- ⁹² "Persia to Finish (sic) Railway," *New York Times*, 20 October 1930.
- ⁹³ Miscellaneous documents from the U.S. Embassy, Tehran, 1934-1935, "Kampsax: Jernbanebygning i Iran," bundle 1. 70.S.1. Gesandtskabet Tehran. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid.; Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, 102.
- ⁹⁵ "Rejsebeskrivelse af tur til Sydlinien," 3-6 November, no year, Sydlinien folder 2, no. 1. KCA.
- ⁹⁶ Donald L. Wilber, *Contemporary Iran* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 19; Farhad Daftary, "Development Planning in Iran," *Iranian Studies* 6, no. 4 (1973): 178; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 134.
- ⁹⁷ Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, 134; Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran*, 203, 206; Knapp, "1921-1941: The Period of Riza Shah," *Twentieth-Century Iran*, 36; Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, 115.
- ⁹⁸ Peter Avery, et al, eds., *From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Revolution*, vol. 7 of *The Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 230; William S. Haas, *Iran* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), 213.
- ⁹⁹ Peter de Hemmer Gudme, "Danske ingeniører bygger den nye bro mellem Persien og verden," *Århus Stiftstidende*, 8 April 1934.
- ¹⁰⁰ Saxild, "Iran og dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936. VM; Frederick G. Clapp, "Tehran and the Elburz," *Geographical Review* 20, no. 1 (1930): 84; "Status of Railway Construction," *Engineering News-Record*, 527.
- ¹⁰¹ Saxild, "Iran og dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936. VM; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 60, 63.
- ¹⁰² J. H. Shotton, "Building a Railroad Through Iran," *Compressed Air Magazine* 41, no. 12 (December 1936): 5192; Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, 219.
- ¹⁰³ Haas, *Iran*, 212; Shotton, "Building a Railroad Through Iran," *Compressed Air Magazine*, 5192.
- ¹⁰⁴ "Nordbanen til Tehran indviet," *Nationaltidende*, 21 February 1937.
- ¹⁰⁵ John Marshall, *The Guinness Railway Book* (Enfield: Guinness Books, 1989), 72; Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundred-årige Virke*, 119.
- ¹⁰⁶ Saxild, "Iran og dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936. VM.
- ¹⁰⁷ Harry K. Wright to Jørgen Saxild, "Majestætens besøg paa Nordlinien," Tehran, 22 November 1933, Nordlinien folder 1. KCA.
- ¹⁰⁸ Harry K. Wright, "Rejsen til Nordlinien – 20/1-23/1 1314," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA; "Rapport Mensuel de la Ligne Nord pour le mois de farvardine 1313," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 82; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 72-73.
- ¹⁰⁹ H. K. Wright, Rejsen til Nordlinien – 20/1-23/1 1314," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA; H. K. Wright, "Rejsen til Nordlinien – 21/2-24/2 1314," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA.
- ¹¹⁰ H. K. Wright, "Rejsen til Nordlinien – 23/5-29/5 1313," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA; H. K. Wright, "Rejsen til Nordlinien – 21/2-24/2 1314," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA.
- ¹¹¹ Saxild, "Iran og dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936. VM; Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundred-årige Virke*, 116.

- ¹¹² Wright, "Rejsen til Nordlinien – 23/5-29/5 1313," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA; Wright, "Rejsen til Nordlinien – 20/1-23/1 1314," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA; Wright, "Rejsen til Nordlinien – 21/2-24/2 1314," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA.
- ¹¹³ "Paa bane-arbejde i Persien i 2,000 meters højde," *Berlingske Aften Tidende*, 13 April 1934; De Hemmer Gudme, "Danske ingeniører bygger den nye bro," *Århus Stiftstidende*, 8 April 1934.
- ¹¹⁴ "Rejsebeskrivelse af tur til Nordlinien," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA.
- ¹¹⁵ "Rapport Mensuel de la Ligne Nord – mois d'ordibehecht 1314," Nordlinien folder 1. KCA.
- ¹¹⁶ H. A. K. Zachariae, "Proposal for Diesel Electric Traction on the Trans-Persian Railway," Copenhagen, February 1934, Traktion folder 1. KCA.
- ¹¹⁷ Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 61.
- ¹¹⁸ "Da Shahan af Persien blev raadvild," *Berlingske Tidende*, 7 October 1936; Saxild, "Iran og dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936. VM; Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 226.
- ¹¹⁹ Ingolf Boisen, *Danmark og Iran gennem Tiderne* (Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1965), 102; "En Hædersdag for danske ingeniører," *Berlingske Tidende*, 20 February 1937; "Nord-banen til Tehran indviet," *Nationaltidende*, 21 February 1937; "Enestaaende sejr til dansk ingeniør-kunst i Persien," *Jyllandsposten*, 21 February 1937.
- ¹²⁰ "Status of Railway Construction," *Engineering News-Record* (25 October 1934): 527; "Persia to Build Railroad," *New York Times*, 7 April 1928; "Interests Here Share in Persia Contract," *New York Times*, 12 July 1928. Salehabad, near Dezful, was later renamed Andimeshk.
- ¹²¹ Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke*, 114.
- ¹²² E. Kayser, "Rapport: Direktør Kaysers rejse paa Sydlinien, 8/9-16/9 1312," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA.
- ¹²³ M. Blach, "Rejserapport 12/10-28/10 1312," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA.
- ¹²⁴ Ibid.
- ¹²⁵ Saxild, "Iran og dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936. VM.
- ¹²⁶ Blach, "Rejserapport 12/10-28/10 1312," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA.
- ¹²⁷ "Rejsebeskrivelse af tur til Sydlinien," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA; Saxild to V. Marstrand, Tehran, 10 October 1936, bundle 75, folder 1. VM; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 53, 141; Boisen, *Klip fra en filmmands liv*, 98.
- ¹²⁸ Shotton, "Building a Railroad," *Compressed Air Magazine*, 5193-95; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 138.
- ¹²⁹ Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 220; Boisen, *Danmark og Iran*, 102; Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke*, 121.
- ¹³⁰ Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 139.
- ¹³¹ "Rejsebeskrivelse af tur til Sydlinien," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA; "Dansk ingeniørfirma slutter million-kontrakt med Persien," *Politiken*, 20 March 1935.
- ¹³² Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, "Trans-Iranian Railway," *Modern Transport* (1938); Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 222, 224; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 144-46.
- ¹³³ Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," 225; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 146.
- ¹³⁴ Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke*, 121.
- ¹³⁵ Kayser, "Rapport: Direktør Kaysers rejse paa Sydlinien, 8/9-16/9 1312," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA.
- ¹³⁶ Ibid.; De Hemmer Gudme, "Danske ingeniører," *Århus Stiftstidende*, 8 April 1934.
- ¹³⁷ "Rejsebeskrivelse af tur til Sydlinien," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 78; Shotton, "Building a Railroad," *Compressed Air Magazine*, 5193.
- ¹³⁸ Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 46; Bonn, "The Trans-Iranian Railway," *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 224; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 93.
- ¹³⁹ Saxild to E. Blechingberg, Tehran, 14 August 1938, "Kampsax: Jernbanebygning i Iran," bundle 1, Gesandtskabet Tehran. 70.S.1. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ¹⁴⁰ "Rejsebeskrivelse af tur til Sydlinien," Sydlinien folder 2. KCA; Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke*, 121-22; Shotton, "Building a Railroad," *Compressed Air Magazine*, 5194.
- ¹⁴¹ Saxild, "Iran og dets Jernbaner," 8 January 1936. VM.
- ¹⁴² Saxild, "Ang. Film," Tehran, 31 August 1935," Persien folder P34. KCA.
- ¹⁴³ Saxild to P. Kampmann, Tehran, 7 January 1937, Persien folder P23. KCA.
- ¹⁴⁴ Contract with Minerva Film, 18 September 1937, Persien folder P34. KCA; Boisen, *Klip fra en filmmands liv*, 62, 86-91; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 16.
- ¹⁴⁵ Boisen, *Klip fra en filmmands liv*, 58.
- ¹⁴⁶ Saxild to Marstrand, Tehran, 2 October 1936, bundle 75, folder 1. VM; Saxild to Marstrand, Tehran, 10 October 1936, bundle 75, folder 1. VM.
- ¹⁴⁷ Saxild to Marstrand, Tehran, 16 October 1936, bundle 75, folder 1. VM.

-
- ¹⁴⁸ Boisen to Kampmann, Copenhagen, 2 November 1938, Persien folder P34. KCA.
- ¹⁴⁹ Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 222.
- ¹⁵⁰ Saxild, "Indvielseshøjtideligheden," 12 September 1938, Persien folder P35. KCA; Knapp, "1921-1941: The Period of Riza Shah," *Twentieth-Century Iran*, 35; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 220-21.
- ¹⁵¹ "Indvielsen af den transiranske jernbane," 25-27 August 1938, Persien folder P34. KCA; "£30,000,000 Railway Across Iran," *Times*, 29 August 1938.
- ¹⁵² "Indvielsen af den transiranske jernbane," 25-27 August 1938, Persien folder P34. KCA; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 220-21.
- ¹⁵³ Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 189; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 223.
- ¹⁵⁴ Saxild, "Indvielseshøjtideligheden," 12 September 1938, Persien folder P34. KCA.
- ¹⁵⁵ Boisen, *Klip fra en filmmands liv*, 147.
- ¹⁵⁶ Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, *Mission for My Country* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), 42.
- ¹⁵⁷ "Ingeniør Saxilds radioforedrag," August 1938, Persien folder P34. KCA; Kayser, *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke*, 122.
- ¹⁵⁸ Ibid.; Ebbe Munck, "Bjerger af Dynamit," *Berlingske Tidende*, 20 January 1938; Boesgaard, *Danske byggede det*, 187; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 99.
- ¹⁵⁹ Vilhelm Marstrand, "Iran og dets Jærnbane: referat af foredrag af ingeniør J. Saxild," *Ingeniøren* 45, no. 5 (22 January 1936): 29.
- ¹⁶⁰ Saxild, "Indvielseshøjtideligheden," 12 September 1938, Persien folder P34. KCA.
- ¹⁶¹ "Ingeniør Saxilds radioforedrag," August 1938, Persien folder P34. KCA.
- ¹⁶² Saxild to Kampmann, Tehran, 7 January 1937, Persien folder P23. KCA.
- ¹⁶³ Copy of report no. 119, Tehran, 16 November 1937, "Kampsax: Jernbanebygning i Iran," bundle 2. Gesandtskabet Tehran. 70.S.1. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ¹⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁵ Ibid.; Saxild, "Linielængde," 13 August 1941, Persien folder P68. KCA.
- ¹⁶⁶ Saxild, "Linielængde," 13 August 1941, Persien folder P68. KCA; E. Blechingberg to Saxild, Tehran, 10 June 1938, "Kampsax: Jernbanebygning i Iran," bundle 2. Gesandtskabet Tehran. 70.S.1. Udenrigsministeriet.
- ¹⁶⁷ Ibid.; Kampmann, "Ang. fuldendelsen af den af de danske ingeniørfirmaer byggede trans-iranske jernbane," Persien folder P35. KCA.
- ¹⁶⁸ Saxild, "Ansvar vedr. Iran-kontrakten," Tehran, 22 March 1939, Persien folder P44. KCA.
- ¹⁶⁹ Report by Mogens Blach, Copenhagen, 5 May 1939, "Skade paa Sydlinien, Lod 1," Persien folder P48. KCA; Report by Saxild, Tehran, 10 May 1939, "Skade paa Sydlinien, Lod 1," Persien folder P48. KCA.
- ¹⁷⁰ Ramesh Sanghvi, *Aryamehr: The Shah of Iran* (London: Transorient, 1968), 53.
- ¹⁷¹ Clyde Farnsworth and George Tucker, "Aid to Russia Gluts Iran Artery; Flow of U.S. Supplies Taxes Port," *New York Times*, 28 April 1943.
- ¹⁷² Saxild, Tehran, 9 January 1938, "Skinnekontrol," folder no. kon. 9. KCA; Saxild, *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*, 96.
- ¹⁷³ Ibid., 114; Kurt Olsen, *Storm over Mellemøsten* (Copenhagen: Hirschsprungs Forlag, 1957), 51; Milan Hauner, "Russia's geopolitical and ideological dilemmas in Central Asia," in *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert L. Canfield (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 195.
- ¹⁷⁴ John Westwood, *Railways at War* (San Diego: Howell North, 1980), 200; Edwin M. Wright, "Iran as a Gateway to Russia," *Foreign Affairs* 20, no. 2 (January 1942): 369; Truman E. Hienton, "Material Aid to Russia," *The Military Engineer* 36, no. 255 (July 1944): 216; Olsen, *Storm over Mellemøsten*, 26-28.
- ¹⁷⁵ Kurt Olsen, "Rapport over Flyvepladser i og ved Tehran udført i 1941-43 for den britiske regering," undated, Persien folder P72. KCA; Kurt Olsen, "Vejarbejder i Iran for HBM's Gov't," 15 November 1945, Persien folder P72. KCA; Boisen, *Banen skal bygges*, 228; Olsen, *Storm over Mellemøsten*, 57-59.
- ¹⁷⁶ Hauner, "Russia's geopolitical and ideological dilemmas," in *Turko-Persia*, 195.
- ¹⁷⁷ Jørgensen, "Aalborgensere under Halvmaanen," *Aalborg Stiftstidende*, 30 September 1928.

EPILOGUE

The narratives of Danes and Danish experiences in the Middle East constitute a relatively neglected and unexplored body of perspectives and learning on and about the region. Encompassing variously confirmation or challenges to the Orientalist discourse, a consideration of the combined body of works serves to deepen our understanding about Western perceptions of the Middle East and widen the diversity of ideas to appreciate and evaluate. Such a broadening of available perspectives is imperative if study of the region is to confront the institutionalized images and views identified by Edward Said in *Orientalism*. Though the term “Orientalist” first emerged in the latter half of the 18th century, identifying those individuals who studied Eastern languages and culture, the phenomenon that Said discusses did not manifest itself fully until the subsequent century when Western dominance of the Middle East merged with a monopoly on representation of the region.¹ Eastern weakness and underdevelopment reinforced perceptions of Western superiority and, as the chasm between the regions widened, the explanations for the gap were increasingly attributed to the unchanging and profound cultural differences separating “us” from “them.” The *homo islamicus*, it followed, was an intractable Other whose faults made inferiority inherent and evolution elusive.² Images of the eternal Muslim, building on the centuries-old fear of the rival faith of Islam, were disseminated and reproduced incessantly for the Western public in paintings, plays, novels and the canon of establishment learning. A reality shaped by the imagined became dominant, and the vision of the East was increasingly inseparable from its political and economic subservience.³ “The Orient that appears in Orientalism,” Said stressed, “is a system of representations framed by a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire.”⁴ The discourse constituted, in essence, a manifestation of not only the power to dominate physically and territorially, but also to define and evaluate the very identity of the Other.

But within the number of Westerners who endeavored to study and experience the Orient there existed a spectrum of perspectives. Orientalism and the ideology of fundamental separation of cultures certainly pervaded every region of Europe and dominated the range of accepted discourse. However, citizens from countries that fell outside the circle of states with significant interests and even holdings in the Middle East, could approach the field of study with less hesitancy about challenging the established view of inherent Western superiority. Danes formed part of that peripheral group, because even though Denmark remained a colonial power into the 20th century, the country never controlled territory in the Middle East nor lands with majority Muslim populations. Danish citizens harbored no overt national interest in asserting their fundamental separation from Eastern societies, leaving greater opportunity to look beyond the established, manufactured understandings of the region. Individuals could choose to delve into the nuance and complexity inherent in any society and add much needed balance to the prevailing discourse. Perhaps the most spectacular example of a Dane asserting such freedom was that of Knud Holmboe, the author/journalist and convert to Islam, who came to embrace Eastern society and what he perceived as a commitment to retain and celebrate the core values of life. His undiluted enthusiasm for the Other did brand him an eccentric within Danish society, but his unique views also generated considerable interest and served to broaden the range of perspectives available on the region.

The experiences of other Danes, though reflecting more critical assessments of the Orient,

similarly added to the diversity of interpretations. Karen Jeppe, the League of Nations commissioner and aid worker, witnessed much violence and suffering during her decades in the region, making such negative images a recurring theme in her accounts. However, as a tireless activist striving to improve the lives of Armenian refugees, she came to celebrate their Eastern Christian culture and identity as equal in worth to that of Westerners. Such a questioning of the wholesale imposition of the West on the East was also posed by Daniel Bruun, the soldier who volunteered to serve with the French Foreign Legion in Algeria. His experiences led him to doubt the inherent value of Western expansion in the region and whether “civilization” was really furthered by savage warfare. The missionary Oluf Høyer, who was active in Yemen during the pre-World War I years, would have endorsed Bruun’s misgivings as he, too, opposed the manifestations of European empire. Yet he considered Islam, if not Muslims, as a spiritual challenge that Christians could not ignore. In his mind, profound, societal transformation through conversion was warranted, so that the Other could be purged of what separated “them” from “us.” Høyer would, of course, never witness any such monumental shift; but years later dozens of his countrymen did play a pivotal role in supporting leaders in Turkey and Iran to realize goals of social, political, and economic reform along Western lines. Danish railway engineers, selected specifically by the latter countries for their abilities and nationality, worked to complete flagship projects that symbolized the onward march of secularism and nationalism in the region during the decades immediately prior to the Second World War.

The foundations of a Danish presence and influence in the Middle East evolved further during the years that followed the onset of decolonization and the establishment of independent states. Danes were strong supporters of that regional process and favored in 1948 the foundation of Israel. However, it is little known that hundreds of Danes, many of them former members of the Danish resistance to the Nazi occupation of Denmark, also served with the British forces in Palestine.⁵ In an ironic twist of fate, some of the very men who helped Jews escape to safety in Sweden in 1943, fought only a few years later to deny Zionists their coveted goal of statehood. Within less than a decade, in 1956, following the Suez Crisis, Danish troops were back in the region, dispatched to serve as peacekeeping troops in the Gaza Strip. And the ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute would again demand a Danish role in 1967, as Hans Tabor, Denmark’s ambassador to the United Nations, was president of the Security Council during the negotiations to pass the famed resolution 242. More recently, the Dane Peter Hansen served as head of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), gaining during his tenure (1996-2004) a reputation as a fierce advocate of Palestinian rights. Concern for the welfare of regional populations has, in fact, shaped Danish policies toward the region since the 1960s when the country moved to formulate a progressive foreign aid program that dispensed financial assistance to further economic development and political stability.

Denmark’s commercial ties with the Middle East have grown steadily over the decades since the days of Kampsax’s spectacular contribution to regional development. Danish exporters of agricultural products, manufactured goods, and pharmaceuticals have secured stable markets, and companies offering technical advice and consulting services have similarly been successful. Even Danish architects, like Henning Larsen and the world renowned Jørn Utzon, have overseen projects in the region, most notably designing government buildings in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.⁶ Such ties indicate a healthy economic relationship, however, Denmark’s commercial dealings with the Middle East do not include a reliance on the region’s most important export, petroleum. Since 1992, Danish natural gas and oil fields in the North Sea have made the country energy self-sufficient and liberated it from the complex dynamics of dependence on

suppliers in the region.

But with the passing and resolution of one problem during the latter years of the twentieth century, another, involving immigrants from the Middle East, emerged gradually to present even greater challenges. Beginning in the late 1960s, guest workers from the region began streaming into the country, filling employment needs on the Danish labor market. During the subsequent decade, a time that saw the construction of the first mosque-specific building in Danish history, many immigrants received permission to bring their families to Denmark, becoming, in effect, the vanguard of a new segment within the Danish population.⁷ By 1994, the number of Muslims in the country, most of whom were ethnically Middle Eastern, hovered around eighty-five thousand, comprising about 1.7 percent of the total populace.⁸ The increased visibility of Islam in society raised the prospects for misunderstandings and tension as devout Muslims, constituting to some degree a domestic Other, moved to assert and protect their identity in a country they saw as excessively secular. A spread of Muslim private schools and a reliance on imams who voiced criticisms of Danish values and culture raised fears and suspicions about the emergence of a parallel rather than an integrated society. Those concerns intensified in the new millennium, as the Muslim population more than doubled in Denmark over the preceding decade, and impressions of Islam in Europe increasingly focused on the most uncompromising elements within the community.

Orientalism in the Twenty-first Century

On 30 September 2005, the Danish newspaper *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten* (The Morning Paper Jutland Post) published a full-page section with twelve cartoons satirizing the Prophet Muhammad. Appearing under the heading, “Mohammeds ansigt” (The Face of Muhammad), the renderings offered a range of perspectives on the religious leader. Some were light-hearted, even complimentary, while others were more critical in nature and struck many Muslims as offensive. Officially intended by the paper’s editors as a bold action in defense of the freedom of expression, the decision to print the cartoons soon came under intense scrutiny, as some leading Danish Muslims moved to protest their publication and sought to internationalize the controversy. In a matter of months, the affair grew from a minor domestic dispute about integration, tolerance, and freedom of the press, into an international incident with potentially long-term and damaging repercussions. The explanations for how this minor event flared into a controversy with a global reach are both simple and complex, requiring an analysis of the parties involved and the motivations and interests that fueled the crisis.

The Leading Players

Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten (MJP) is Denmark’s largest print and internet newspaper, constituting a flagship institution on the national stage and a source of social, cultural, and political expression and influence. Founded in 1871 in Århus, Jutland, the paper has grown over the past two decades from a regional daily to the dominant source of published news in the country. Claiming a daily readership of about 700,000 and an additional 100,000 during the weekends, out of a national population of 5.4 million, MJP can assert a significant role in shaping opinions and be a strong platform for any chosen agenda.⁹ In the national debate on the integration of Muslim immigrants, a matter of persistent and intense interest and concern following the events of 11 September 2001, the paper, which is entirely independent and operated

by a private foundation, has steadfastly supported the policies of the center-right government that came to power in November 2001. During its years as head of the government, the coalition has instituted the toughest immigration laws in Europe and moved to speed and deepen integration. Reflecting its conservative and secular leanings, MJP's editorial leadership has endorsed such tightening of the laws and opened the paper's pages to a lively debate on the role of Islam in Denmark, the problems and benefits of immigration, and the potential challenges presented by the arrival in the country of thousands with different cultural roots. Many commentators and analysts advocating a secularization of Islam, and ever critical of conservative Muslims, have seen their views published in feature articles by MJP and generally endorsed by the paper's editors.

The Muslim community in Denmark has responded to the pressures of integration in differing ways, reflecting the great diversity of its members. Numbering between 170-200,000, Danish Muslims constitute less than 4 percent of the population, and only 12 percent of them are native to the country.¹⁰ As a tiny minority, most of whose members have deep roots in foreign countries, it faces many challenges in the process to accommodate heritage with integration. Naser Khader (b. 1963), the son of Syrian-Palestinian immigrants, is often cited as a poster boy for overcoming this difficulty with success, having arrived in Denmark as a child in 1974 and now holding a seat in *Folketinget* (the Danish parliament).¹¹ The face of his polar opposite is that of Imam Ahmed Abu Laban, a fellow ethnic-Palestinian immigrant who settled in Denmark about a decade later.¹² The self-proclaimed leader of *Det Islamiske Trossamfund* (The Islamic Faith Society), an organization that is representative of perhaps less than 20,000 Muslims in Denmark, Abu Laban is a vocal and persistent defender of traditional Islam. Fiercely opposed to each other, Khader and Abu Laban often square off in the media and have emerged as the symbolic leaders of the split within the Muslim community over the cartoon controversy.

Kåre Bluitgen (b. 1959), an author and teacher by training, is the unlikely figure to whom MJP's initiative to publish the cartoons can be traced. Determined to further understanding and the basis for civil debate across ethnic lines, Bluitgen sought to write a Danish biography of the Prophet Muhammad based on strictly Islamic sources.¹³ His intent was to help ethnic Danes encounter the Prophet through Muslim eyes and thereby better grasp how and why they regard him as a revered figure. However, difficulties emerged when Bluitgen wanted to hire an illustrator to provide cover art and drawings for the book. Several artists declined due to fears of reprisals by radical Muslims and no one would agree to provide their services without remaining anonymous. The editors and journalists at MJP soon learned of this "self-censorship" and immediately assigned an investigative team to explore the depths of the problem and the level of intimidation sustaining it.

MJP: Defender or Instigator?

On 30 September 2005, a Friday, MJP published the now infamous dozen cartoons along with two editorials explaining and justifying the decision. One article, appearing under the title "The Threat from the Darkness," was attributed to the paper's chief editors while the other was by Flemming Rose, MJP's cultural editor. The first essay attacked the vocal religious leaders defending Islam in the public space as "self-important imams or mad mullahs" who are "almost obsessively sensitive" to criticism, often leading them to incite their followers to commit acts of violence, even murder.¹⁴ In a clear reference to the fate of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch film director murdered in 2004 for making a movie critical of Islam, the editors sought to take a tough

stance against similar intimidation and threats “from representatives of a dark and violence-laced medieval age.”¹⁵ The cartoons constituted, in their mind, a bold and determined strike against the notion that Islam ought not be satirized or forced to comply with European secular, intellectual culture. Rose’s article, printed in the center of the page carrying the cartoons, made much the same arguments, asserting that self-censorship is spreading in response to demands by some Muslims for “special treatment” and “special consideration” for their religious sensibilities. Such calls, he argued, “are incompatible with a secular democracy and freedom of speech where one must be prepared to endure insult, mockery, and ridicule.”¹⁶ If that principle is not firmly reestablished, Rose continued, then freedom of speech will descend further down the slippery slope of excessive sensitivity and be hopelessly undermined. In a final act of symbolic defiance, the article ended by printing the names of all twelve cartoonists, including one woman, to show that they had no intention of hiding their identities.

But beyond the idealism of drawing “a line in the snow” and taking a valiant stand in defense of the free press and unfettered speech, MJP also seemed to be enthusiastically embracing the opportunity to unsettle Muslims. The cartoons selected, some pregnant with Orientalist imagery, went beyond the stated purpose of simply defying the Muslim prohibition against depicting the Prophet. Rather than proceed in a measured manner, the paper chose to use a sledgehammer to smash the traditional ban and purposely include cartoons that were, to quote the Swiss scholar Tariq Ramadan, “stupidly malicious.”¹⁷ Even staffers within MJP voiced opposition to the publication and warned of the consequences, but Rose, who himself served as a foreign correspondent in Iran, shrugged off the concerns.¹⁸ In a recent article, he repeats the contention that “the cartoons do not in any way demonize or stereotype Muslims,” but instead serve as a hand extended to their community by treating them like any other group in Denmark.¹⁹ He does, however, admit that the decision to publish was motivated by a desire to split the Muslim community in Denmark, forcing the moderates to reject the hardliners and expose them, the Islamists, as the minority voice.²⁰ That division must be cultivated and widened, he suggests, enlisting the moderates as allies in the struggle to defend freedom of expression and democracy. A reassertion and strengthening of secularism in the public sphere is therefore needed because “if a believer demands that I [Rose], as a nonbeliever, observe his taboos in the public domain, he is not asking for my respect, but for my submission.”²¹ The cartoons, it follows, were then meant as a message by the majority of its refusal to be victimized by the minority, a group whose members in contrast see the publication as a pseudo-racist assault on their most cherished beliefs and sense of identity.

The Danish Dozen

MJP’s now infamous twelve cartoons range from the benign and comical to the outright offensive and hurtful. Intended as a collection of perspectives on the nature and personality of the Prophet Muhammad, the drawings include some that neither depict the revered figure nor endorse the paper’s agenda. One of the twelve cartoonists, Lars Refn, even alleges the MJP initiative is only about provocation, a position he repeated five weeks later in an interview.²² Another satirizes the author Bluitgen and suggests the whole affair is part of a publicity stunt to sell books. Four additional cartoons depict the Prophet as a humble merchant, an average man, as part of a graphic design, and even as someone who would be unmoved by the images appearing in the paper. Half of the drawings are therefore unlikely to offend anyone but the most conservative Muslims and rigorous adherents of the traditional ban on the representation of the

Prophet. The remaining six are significantly more troublesome. One shows a terrified illustrator at his desk, fearful that harm may befall him for working on an artistic rendering of the famed Muslim. Another depicts the Prophet with a halo that could just as well be horns. And the last four, undoubtedly the most controversial of the dozen, jointly tie Muhammad to violence and the oppression of women, two of the most persistent and age-old charges made against him by opponents and critics of Islam. Constituting manifestations of Orientalism and a mainstreaming of venomous speech, the latter half of the cartoons can be likened, in the assessment of the British scholar Ziauddin Sardar, to the anti-Jewish images of pre-WWII Europe.²³ The demonization of all Muslims, no matter their stance on the role of Islam in society, is today accepted as falling within the boundaries of responsible discourse, and a cohort of vehement critics of Islam (Salman Rushdie, V.S. Naipaul, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Ibn Warraq, etc.) is celebrated by many as the voice of reason on the Muslim faith. Yet their rhetoric, branding the religion as hopelessly flawed and inherently incompatible with democracy, is classic Orientalism.²⁴ The motivations of the radical Islamist, a distinct minority within the millions who make up the *umma*, are represented as directly traceable to the true intentions of the Prophet Muhammad, indicting conclusively, it is argued, the very core of the religion by linking fanaticism, violence, and intolerance to its core beliefs. In short, as noted already a decade ago by Edward W. Said, "Islam in the West is the last acceptable racial and cultural stereotype that you can fling about without any sense of bad manners or trepidation."²⁵ The cartoons are then just another manifestation of the confrontational tone aimed at the domestic Other.

From Sparks to Inferno

The response of Danish Muslims to the publication of the cartoons was one of general discontent among moderates and intense anger by conservatives. Feeling that the paper had unnecessarily offended the whole community, many progressive Muslims, even some who months later moved to publicly criticize the country's imams, sensed that MJP's action had impeded further understanding and integration.²⁶ They did not, however, consider the issue serious enough to warrant public protest or legal action. That task was instead left to the conservatives and hardliners, with Abu Laban and the Islamic Faith Society spearheading the effort. Within a week of publication, the group was working diligently to organize a demonstration in the capital and to gather documents for a dossier outlining their complaints. A parallel initiative by eleven Muslim ambassadors in Denmark similarly sought to voice complaints about the cartoons, and in early October 2005 they requested to meet as a group with the Danish prime minister (PM), Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In perhaps an ill-advised pandering to domestic politics, the PM declined to sit down with the diplomats representing hundreds of millions of Muslims worldwide and instead insisted the issue had nothing to do with the government. That decision, while legally correct and justified, conveyed to the ambassadors a sense of disregard for their concerns and led them to bring the matter to the attention of their home governments. By the middle of the month, reports about the cartoons were also beginning to appear in the Middle Eastern media, with *Al-Jazeera* and the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Fagr* running stories on the matter.

An internationalization of the controversy was consequently afoot by November 2005, as the Islamic Faith Society made preparations to dispatch delegations overseas to lobby Muslim governments and call on them to put pressure on Denmark. The actions of Abu Laban and his immediate associates would in fact become a significant factor in raising the stakes in the growing conflict. Armed with a 43-page dossier outlining the grievances of the Muslim com-

munity in Denmark, they set out in December en route first to Egypt with later stops in Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey.²⁷ However, in addition to the legitimate complaints about the published cartoons, the file included numerous false statements about the status of Muslims in Denmark as well as three photocopied pictures allegedly sent to the Islamic Faith Society as hate mail.²⁸ The combination of misleading information and inflammatory images mobilized greater popular support for protests and more concerted action against Denmark and Danish interests. News about the activities of the delegation raised tension levels in Denmark, negating much of the goodwill PM Fogh Rasmussen had garnered with a New Years speech that called on all citizens to improve the tone of debate within the country. In January, the crisis was also further aggravated by the emergence of a solidarity campaign across Europe to republish the cartoons in various newspapers and journals. Beginning in Norway on 10 January, the movement would eventually spread to fifty-six countries and one hundred and forty-three papers by March.²⁹ Paralleling the rise of this effort to support the paper and defend freedom of speech, but also to strike more broadly at the perceived threat of militant Islam, was a rivaling movement in the Middle East to organize an economic boycott against Danish products and services. More serious was the explosion of violent protests targeting diplomatic offices and even embassies of the countries where the cartoons had appeared in national papers. For Denmark, the crisis culminated with the storming of its embassy in Damascus and general consulate in Beirut over the weekend of 4-5 February.³⁰ And while no Danes lost their lives in those incidents, dozens of other people, mostly Muslims, were killed in similar demonstrations, riots, and protests that erupted from Libya to Pakistan. Motivated by a volatile blend of domestic grievances and the perception that Islam is under assault across the world, the agitated crowds expressed their deep-seated anger by torching the flags, symbols, and property of those powers and entities they see ridiculing and even oppressing them. From the pages of a newspaper in distant Denmark had come the incendiaries needed to ignite a firestorm, but the forces necessary to sustain the flames were largely to be found in the Muslim world.

Interpreting the Embers

Following the flare up of protests that peaked in February 2006, overt tensions have waned considerably even as the consequences of the conflict may linger for years. Those who view the Middle East and the Islamic world through the prism of Orientalism will have found in the crisis confirmation of their convictions that Muslims are irrational and prone to violent overreaction. Lacking an appreciation of the history of anti-Muslim imagery and rhetoric, much of it traceable to the murky centuries of Medieval Europe, they will not realize that Muslims recognize intuitively the attacks on the Prophet as a revival of the Christian rejection of Islam as a legitimate religion. For devout Muslims, the cartoons are yet another indication that the vilification of Islam was never really purged from Western consciousness and still exists as an accepted discourse. In Denmark, a seemingly unlikely front in “the clash of civilizations,” Orientalism has found a home in the country’s leading paper, reflecting a growing national unease about the domestic Other represented by the unapologetic devotee of Islam. A legacy of operating on the European periphery of Orientalism, of being an observer rather than a participant in Western imperialist ventures in the Middle East, has been replaced by a central role in the European culture wars of the twenty-first century. The actions of MJP and the government have posed questions about a new definition of the word “Danish,” asking whether its old meaning of pastry or soft bread has been replaced to instead denote tough talk or stance.³¹ Indicating a willingness

among many Danes to flaunt political correctness and challenge religious sensibilities, the controversy seems to fit the reality that Denmark is today the country in Europe with the toughest immigration laws. And while some, including officials within the EU, have characterized the policy and media environment in Denmark as bordering on racism, the more complete and accurate explanation for the unfolding events seemingly lies elsewhere.³² A majority of Danes, including Muslim citizens, actually favor integration that preserves Danish societal values and assures that limits are placed on the power and influence of religious leaders and conservatives. Many also lament the Orientalist and insensitive assault launched against Islam even as they recognize as intolerable the threats of physical violence that pursues those who speak critically about Islamists and their agenda. Danes across the political and ethnic spectrum are prepared to tackle the issues at hand and, however smoothly that process will unfold, and however divisive it may become, both of which remains as yet unclear and undetermined, it seems inevitable that it will be ongoing.

- ¹ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 155-56, 191; Maxime Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, trans. Roger Veinus (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 57.
- ² Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, 60.
- ³ Rana Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 138-39.
- ⁴ Said, *Orientalism*, 202-03.
- ⁵ Lene Nilsson, "Danske mænd i den engelske hær 1945-1948," *Siden Saxo* 22, no. 1 (2005): 6, 10.
- ⁶ Kjeld von Folsach, *Den Arabiske Rejse* (Århus: Forhistorisk Museum Moesgaard, 1996), 105-07.
- ⁷ The Nushrat Djahan mosque, located in Hvidovre, a suburb of Copenhagen, was opened in July 1967.
- ⁸ Von Folsach, *Den Arabiske Rejse*, 158-59.
- ⁹ <http://www.jp.dk>
- ¹⁰ Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23.
- ¹¹ Naser Khader and Jakob Kvist, *khader.dk: sammenførte erindringer* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2000), 17.
- ¹² Kåre Qvist, "Abu Laban lever af hadet," *Ekstrabladet.dk* [online newspaper]. Copenhagen [cited 18 March 2006]. Available from <http://ekstrabladet.dk/visartikel.iasp?pageid=333667/>
- ¹³ Gerd Laugesen, "Den småborgerlige venstrefløj," *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*, 21 January 2006, page 15.
- ¹⁴ "Truslen fra mørket," copy in Det Islamiske Trossamfund, *Sagsmappe om opbakning af profeten Mohammed*, 2005, pages 7-8.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Flemming Rose, "Ytringsfrihed," *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten - KulturWeekend*, 30 September 2005, page 3.
- ¹⁷ "Mohammed cartoons: The anguish of European Muslims," *The Week* 6, no. 247 (24 February 2006): 15.
- ¹⁸ John Hansen, "Redaktøren og de 12 tegninger," *Internetavisen Jyllands-Posten* [online newspaper]. Copenhagen [cited 14 March 2006]. Available from <http://www.jp.dk/indland/artikel:aid=3448562:fid=11338/>
- ¹⁹ Flemming Rose, "Why I Published Those Cartoons," *Washingtonpost.com* [online newspaper]. Washington D.C. [cited 23 February 2006]. Available from <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html?referrer=emailarticle>
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Anders Jenkins, "Da Ingeniøren krænkede kristne," *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten – Indblik*, 6 November 2005, page 7.
- ²³ Martin Asser, "What the Muhammad cartoons portray," *BBC News Online* [online news]. London [9 February 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/4693292.stm
- ²⁴ Ziuaddin Sardar, *Orientalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999), 88-92; Kabbani, *Europe's Myths of Orient*, 129-36; Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*, 23, 27.
- ²⁵ Gauri Viswanathan, ed., *Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2001), 239.
- ²⁶ "Vi siger fra," *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*, 16 January 2006, pages 1, 6-7.
- ²⁷ Lars Nørgaard Pedersen and Kristoffer Pinholt, "Danske muslimer kræver ny imam-aktion," *Internetavisen Jyllands-Posten* [online newspaper]. Copenhagen [31 January 2006]. Available from <http://www.jk.dk/indland/artikel:aid=3522728:fid=11146/>
- ²⁸ Det Islamiske Trossamfund, *Sagsmappe om opbakning af profeten Mohammed*, 2005, pages 2, 21-23; "Fejlinformationer fra imamer," *Internetavisen Jyllands-Posten* [online newspaper]. Copenhagen [12 February 2006]. Available from <http://www.jp.dk/indland/artikel:aid=3552832/>
- ²⁹ Kristoffer Pinholt, "Muhammed-tegninger i 143 aviser," *Internetavisen Jyllands-Posten* [online newspaper]. Copenhagen [28 February 2006]. Available from <http://www.jp.dk/indland/artikel:aid=3585496/>
- ³⁰ "Dansk ambassade angrebet og ødelagt," *Internetavisen Jyllands-Posten* [online newspaper]. Copenhagen [4 February 2006]. Available from <http://www.jp.dk/indland/artikel:aid=3537848:fid=11326/>; "Danish embassy in Beirut torched," *BBC News Online* [online news]. London [5 February 2006]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middle_east/4682560.stm
- ³¹ Helle Ib, "Danish – blødt brød eller hård tone?" *Danmarksposten* 87, no. 1 (2006): 10-11.
- ³² Ibid.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Archival Sources

Rigsarkivet (The Danish State Archives)

- P. Daniel Bruun (DB): Correspondence with friends and family; diaries and travel journals; documents related to service in the French Foreign Legion.
- Just Johan Holten (JJH): Correspondence with family, friends, and colleagues; an extensive autobiographical account.
- Vilhelm N. Marstrand (VM): Correspondence with engineer Jørgen Saxild; documents relating to the building of the Trans-Iranian Railroad.
- Mourier Family (M): letters and papers related to Søren Adolp Arendrup.
- Henrik Møller (HM): Correspondence from Pastor Alfred Nielsen.
- Niels T. Neergaard (NN): Collection of letters and a report from Professor Østrup. The subject of the report is a detailed account of the professor's expedition to Mesopotamia in 1910-11.
- Alfred Nielsen (AN): Correspondence with friends and family; newsletters reporting on daily affairs; various commentaries and autobiographical publications.
- Karl Christian Ludvig Povlsen (KCLP): Correspondence from Karen Jeppe.
- Henrik Scharling (HS): Correspondence from Karen Jeppe.
- Christian F. Schiöppfe (CSC): Collection of papers relating to the careers of Danish officers in foreign military service from 1815 to 1974.
- De Danske Armeniervenner (DDA): Protocols, correspondence, and documents related to the Danish aid mission for Armenian refugees in Syria. Includes a great volume of papers pertaining to Karen Jeppe, the woman directing the organization's Aleppo-based efforts.
- Danske Kirkemission i Arabien (DKA): Protocols, reports, correspondence, and documents related to Pastor Olof Høyer's years as director of the Danish missionary effort in Yemen.

Udenrigsministeriet (UM): Official correspondence, reports, and documents from the Danish Foreign Ministry. Includes papers from consulates and embassies, files on Danish citizens in the Middle East, and affairs dealing with Danish missionary activity in the region.

Det Kongelige Bibliotek (The Danish Royal Library)

Frants Buhl (FB): A collection of diaries and notes from a trip to the Middle East in 1889.

Arthur Christensen (AC): Papers and documents related to the establishment of the Iran-Dansk Autobus Co. A/S (the Irano-Danish Bus Company).

Barclay Raunkiær (BR): Instructions from the Royal Danish Geographical Society concerning the expedition to Arabia, 1911-12.

Wichita State University

Dame Rachel Crowdy Papers (RC): Correspondence from and concerning Karen Jeppe.

Private Archives

Knud Holmboe (KH): Collection of family papers including letters, drafts of articles for newspapers and journals, and documents related to his death and disappearance.

Kampsax Company Archives (KCA): Correspondence, reports, journals, and publications related to the construction of railroads in Turkey and Iran.

Published Sources

Aagaard, Samuel. "Danmark og den Kristne Verdensmission." *Faglig Læsning* 9, no. 10 (1936): 1-32.

Abir, Mordecai. "The Origins of the Ethiopian-Egyptian Border Problem in the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of African History* 8, no. 3 (1967): 443-61.

Adams, Harriet C. "Cirenaica, Eastern Wing of Italian Libia." *National Geographic Magazine* 57 (June 1930): 689-726.

- Ahmida, Ali Abdullatif. *The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, 1830-1932*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Ajayi, J. F. A., ed. *Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s*. Vol. 6 of *The General History of Africa*. Paris: Unesco, 1989.
- Alhaidary, Ali Abd Alhussein, and Stig T. Rasmussen. *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1995.
- Anderson, Lisa. "Ramadan al-Suwayhli: Hero of the Libyan Resistance." In *Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East*, edited by Edmund Burke. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Annesley, George. *The Rise of Modern Egypt: A Century and a Half of Egyptian History 1798-1957*. Durham: Pentland Press, 1994.
- Anscombe, Frederick F. *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Aoude, Safia. *Hjulspor i Sandet: Historien om Ali Ahmed Knud Holmboe 1902-1931*. Copenhagen: Forlaget Fateh, 2002.
- Arendrup, Søren Adolf. "Om de nyeste forbedringer ved støbejernskanonernes tilvirkning og de derved for deres holdbarhed opnaaede resultater." *Tidsskrift for Krigsvaesen* 3 (1867): 17-47.
- Armeniervennen* (1921-48).
- Asad, Muhammad. *The Road to Mecca*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954.
- Atkinson, David. "Nomadic Strategies and Colonial Governance." in Joanne P. Sharp, et al, eds. *Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance*. London: 2000.
- Avery, Peter, et al, eds. *From Nadir Shah to the Iranian Revolution*. Vol. 7 of *The Cambridge History of Iran*. Cambridge: University Press, 1991.
- Badeau, John S., and Georgiana G. Stevens. *Bread from Stones: Fifty Years of Technical Assistance*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966.
- Bailey, Herbert. "The Colonization of Libya." *The Fortnightly Review* 151 (1939): 197-204.
- Baker, Samuel W. *Exploration of the Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia*. Hartford: O. D. Case, 1868.

- _____. *The Albert N'yanza: Great Basin of the Nile*. London: Macmillan, 1972.
- Baldwin, George B. *Planning and Development in Iran*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967.
- Banani, Amin. *The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941*. Stanford: University Press, 1961.
- Barton, James L. *Story of Near East Relief 1915-1930: An Interpretation*. New York: Macmillan, 1930.
- Bedoukian, Kerop. *Some of Us Survived: The Story of an Armenian*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1978.
- Behdad, Ali. *Belated Travelers: Orientalism in the Age of Colonial Dissolution*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994.
- Benedictsen, Aage Meyer. *Armenien: Et Folks Liv og Kamp gennem to Aartusinder*. Copenhagen: De Danske Armeniervenner, 1925.
- Benzabih, H.A. "The Jabal Al-Akhdar: - A Half Century of Nomadic Livelihood." In *Social and Economic Development in Libya*, edited by E. G. H. Joffe and Keith S. McLachlan. Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982.
- Berg, F. Fris. "The Share of Scandinavia in Christian Missions to Moslems." *Moslem World* 14, no. 1 (January 1924): 30-36.
- Berkes, Niyazi, ed. *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- Bharier, Julian. *Economic Development in Iran 1900-1970*. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Bidwell, Robin. *Travellers in Arabia*. Feltham, United Kingdom: Hamley Publishing Group, 1976.
- _____. *The Two Yemens*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.
- Black, Ejnar. *Kampmann, Kierulff & Saxild A/S: De første 25 Aar*. Copenhagen: Kamp-sax, 1942.
- Blady, Ken. *Jewish Communities in Exotic Places*. Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson, 2000.
- Boesgaard, Einar. *Danske byggede det: danske ingeniørarbejder verden over*. Copenhagen: Gjellerups Forlag, 1941.

- Boisen, Ingolf. *Banen skal bygges paa seks aar*. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1946.
- _____. *Tyrkiet og Danmark gennem Tiderne*. Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1962.
- _____. *Danmark og Iran gennem Tiderne*. Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1965.
- _____. *Kampmann, Kierulff & Saxild A/S (Kampsax): De Første 50 Aar*. Copenhagen: Kampsax, 1967.
- _____. *Klip fra en filmmands liv*. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1977.
- Bonn, A.G. "The Trans-Iranian Railway." *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 25, no. 2 (April 1938): 219-27.
- Borch-Jensen, Marius A. *Ved Milepælen: 50 Års Dansk Mission i Arabien*. Copenhagen: Det Danske Missionsselskab, 1954.
- Brent, Peter. *Far Arabia: Explorers of the Myth*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977.
- British Sessional Papers – Parliamentary Papers* (House of Commons). "Correspondence relative to the Arrest of Messrs. Houghton and Barlow at Massowah, and the Return of the Abyssinian Envoy from Egypt." 88 (1877): 333-35.
- Bruun, P. Daniel. *Algier og Sahara: Billeder fra Nomade- og Krigerlivet*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1893.
- _____, ed. *Den Gamle Godsejer Fortæller*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1895.
- _____. *Huleboerne i Syd Tunis: Erindringer fra et Ophold hos Kalifaen af Matmata*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1895.
- _____. *Afrika: Dets opdagelse, erobring, og kolonisation*. 2 vols. Copenhagen: Det Nordiske Forlag, 1901.
- _____. *Paa de Tyrkiske Fronter 1914-1915: Dardanellerne – Gallipoli*.
- _____. *Ungdomsfærd*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1926.
- _____. "Feltliv i Sahara, I-IV." *Fra Alle Lande* (1883): 39-59, 93-109 (I), 233-53 (II), 321-42 (III), 422-41 (IV).
- _____. "Marcheprestationer særlig af beredent fodfolk under kampagnen i Syd-Algier 1881-1882." *Militært Tidsskrift* 14 (1885): 69-104.

- _____. "Schweizeren Gorski: En soldatertype fra Algier." *Tilskueren* (1891): 591-605.
- _____. "Et par Rejsbilleder fra Syd-Tunis." *Illustreret Tidende* 36, no. 17 (27 January 1895): 262-64.
- Buhl, Frants Peter William. *Jerusalem paa Kristi og Apostlenes Tid*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1886.
- _____. *Palæstina i Kortfattet Geografisk og Topografisk Fremstilling*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1890.
- _____. *Muhammeds Liv og Lære*. Vol. 39 in *Grundris ved folkelig Universitetsundervisning*. Copenhagen: Universitetsudvalget, 1901.
- _____. *Muhammeds Liv: Med en indledning om forholdene i Arabien før Muhammeds Optraeden*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1903.
- _____. *Muhammedanismen som Verdensreligion*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1914.
- _____. *Ali som Prætendent og Kalif*. Copenhagen: Københavns Universitet, 1921.
- _____. *Muhammeds Religiøse Forkyndelse efter Quranen*. Copenhagen: J.H. Schultz Forlag, 1924.
- _____. "Dr. Østrups Bog om Islam." *Gads Danske Magasin* (1913-14): 614-16.
- _____. "Monogrammerne i Qoranen." In *Festskrift i Anledning af Professor David Simonsens 70-aarige Fødselsdag*. Copenhagen: Copenhagen University, 1923.
- Burke, Edward, III. "Understanding Arab Protest Movements." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (1986): 333-45.
- Bury, G. Wyman. *Arabia Infelix or The Turks in Yamen*. London: Macmillan, 1915.
- Byron, Robert. *The Road to Oxiana*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Calverley, Eleanor T. *My Arabian Days and Nights*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958.
- Cameron, D.A. "Egypt in the Nineteenth Century." *Edinburgh Review* 188 (1898): 410-38.
- Cannon, Byron. *Politics of Law and the Courts in Nineteenth-Century Egypt*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988.

- Casserly, Gordon. "Tripolitania, Where Rome Resumes Sway." *National Geographical Magazine* 48 (August 1925): 131-61.
- Caulk, Richard A. "Firearms and Princely Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of African History* 13, no. 4 (1972): 609-30.
- _____. "Armies as Predators: Soldiers and Peasants in Ethiopia c. 1850-1935." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 11, no. 3 (1978): 457-93.
- Cedergreen Bech, Svend. *Hos et folk uden land: Karen Jeppe – armeniernes ven*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1982.
- Christensen, Arthur. *Muhammedanske Digtere og Taenkere*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1906.
- _____. *Hinsides det kaspiske Hav: Fra en Orientrejse ved Krigens Udbrud*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1918.
- _____. *Det gamle og det nye Persien*. Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad, 1930.
- _____. *Det nye Iran*. Vol. 32 in *Ledetraad ved Folkelig Universitetsundervisning*. Copenhagen: Folkeuniversitetsudvalget, 1935.
- _____. *Kulturskitser Fra Iran*. Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard, 1937.
- _____. "Politiske Tilstande i det moderne Persien." *Tilskueren* (1906): 844-52.
- _____. "Kadjarerne og deres Rige." *Tilskueren* (1909): 368-76.
- _____. "Orient og Okcident." *Tilskueren* (1913): 99-103.
- _____. "Et Kulturfolks Dödskamp – part 1." *Ugens Tilskuer* 3, no. 135 (2 May 1913): 242-43.
- _____. "Et Kulturfolks Dödskamp – part 2." *Ugens Tilskuer* 3, no. 136 (9 May 1913): 251-52.
- _____. "Kiamil Pascha." *Ugens Tilskuer* 4, no. 165 (28 November 1913): 78-79.
- _____. "Persien og Europa." *Ugens Tilskuer* 4, no. 200 (31 July 1914): 358-60.
- _____. "Den hellige Krig." *Gads Danske Magasin* (1914-15): 163-73.
- _____. "Fra Persien." *Ugens Tilskuer* 5, no. 233 (19 March 1915): 192-93.
- _____. "Bagdadbanen." *Gads Danske Magasin* (1915-16): 17-23.

- _____. "Persien og Europa." *Gads Danske Magasin* (1915-16): 222-27.
- _____. "Den Arabiske Uafhængighedsbevægelse." *Gads Danske Magasin* (1915-16): 662-68.
- _____. "Den nærmere Orient: Det Persiske og det Syriske Problem." *Gads Danske Magasin* (1919-20): 8-18.
- _____. "Ægyptisk Politik." *Gads Danske Magasin* 19 (1925): 40-48.
- _____. "En Reformbevægelse, som brød sammen." *Gads Danske Magasin* 23 (1929): 79-87.
- _____. "Det nye Tyrki." *Gads Danske Magasin* 25 (1931): 193-201.
- Clapp, Frederik G. "Tehran and the Elburz." *Geographical Review* 20, no. 1 (1930): 69-85.
- Clawson, Patrick. "Knitting Iran Together: The Land Transport Revolution, 1920-1940." *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 3-4 (Summer/Fall 1993): 235-50.
- Cleveland, William L. *Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985.
- _____. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 2d ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000.
- Construction des Lignes de Chemins de Fer Irmak-Filyos & Fevzipasa-Diyarbakir*. Copenhagen & Göteborg: Nohab, Saabye & Lerche, Kampsax, 1937.
- Cook, Albert S. "Ibn Fadlan's Account of Scandinavian Merchants on the Volga in 922." *Journal of English and Germanic Philology*. 22, no. 1 (1923): 54-63.
- de Cosson, Emilius Albert. *The Cradle of the Blue Nile*. Vol. 2. London: John Murray, 1877.
- Crabités, Pierre. *Americans in the Egyptian Army*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1938.
- Dadrian, Vahakn N. "The Documentation of the World War I Armenian Massacres in the Proceedings of the Turkish Military Tribunal." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. 23 (1991): 549-76.
- _____. "The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist Conference and the Decision for the World War I Genocide of the Armenians." *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 7, no. 2 (1993): 173-201.

- Daftary, Farhad. "Development Planning in Iran: A Historical Survey." *Iranian Studies* 6, no. 4 (1973): 176-228.
- Davison, Roderic H. "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914." *American Historical Review* 53, no. 3 (April 1948): 481-505.
- Dacey, Edward. "Egypt and the Khedive." *The Nineteenth Century* 2 (1877): 854-67.
- Dresch, Paul. *A History of Modern Yemen*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Dye, William McEntyre. *Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia: Military Service under the Khedive, in His Provinces and Beyond their Borders, as Experienced by the American Staff*. New York: Atkin and Prout, 1880.
- Engineering News-Record*. "Status of Railway Construction Undertaken by Persian Government," 113 (25 October 1934): 527.
- _____. "Iran Builds a Railroad," 121 (22 December 1938): 793.
- Erlich, Haggai. *Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Scramble for Africa: A Political Biography of Ras Alula, 1875-1897*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1982.
- _____. "Alula, 'the Son of Qubi': A 'King's Man' in Ethiopia 1875-1897." *Journal of African History* 15, no. 2 (1974): 261-74.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949.
- Facey, William, and Gillian Grant. *Kuwait by the First Photographers*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999.
- Falkman, Willy. *Paa Spor efter Knud Holmboe: Billeder og Indtryk fra det Moderne Arabien*. Poul Sørensen, trans. Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels, 1932.
- Fischer, Erik. *Melchior Lorck*. Copenhagen: The Royal Museum of Fine Arts, 1962.
- _____. *Melchior Lorck i Tyrkiet*. Copenhagen: Statens Museum for Kunst, 1990.
- _____. "Melchior Lorck." *Fund og Forskning* 11 (1964): 33-72.
- von Folsach, Birgitte. *I Halvmånens Skær*. Copenhagen: Davids Samling, 1996.
- von Folsach, Kjeld, et al, eds. *The Arabian Journey: Danish Connections with the Islamic World over a Thousand Years*. Århus: Prehistoric Museum Moesgaard, 1996.
- de Fontenay, Frank le Sage. *Senusierne: Et religiøst broderskab i Nordafrika*. Stock-

- holm, 1912.
- Forchhammer, Henriette. *Et Besøg hos Karen Jeppe: Skildring fra en Rejse til Syrien*. Copenhagen: De Danske Armeniervenner, 1926.
- _____. *Minder om Karen Jeppe*. Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag, 1945.
- Freeth, Zahra, and H. V. F. Winstone. *Explorers of Arabia: From the Renaissance to the end of the Victorian Era*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978.
- Fra Arabien*. (1904-1946)
- Fra Hebron*. (1901-1904).
- Frye, Richard N. *Ibn Fadlan's Journey to Russia*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005.
- Gabre-Sellassie, Zewde. *Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A Political Biography*. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Gabrielian, M. C. *Armenia: A Martyr Nation*. New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1918.
- Gavin, R. J. *Aden Under British Rule 1839-1967*. London: C. Hurst, 1975.
- Geographical Journal*. "A Recent Journey in Tripoli and Cyrenaica." 40, no. 5 (November 1912): 532-37.
- Ghods, M. Reza. *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
- El-Ghusein, Fa'iz. *Martyred Armenia*. London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1917.
- Great Britain and the East*. "Trans-Iranian Railway Completion." 51 (8 September 1938): 278
- Le Groupe Suedo-Danois et son personnel en Turquie, 1927-1935: construction des lignes de chemin de fer, Irmak-Filios et Fevzi Pacha-Diarbekir*. Copenhagen: Nohab, 1935.
- Hacopian, A. P. *Armenia and the War*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
- Hale, Charles. "The Khedive and His Court." *Atlantic Monthly* 37, no. 223 (May 1876): 513-20.
- Hale, William M. *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.

- _____. "The Traditional and the Modern in the Economy of Kemalist Turkey: The Experience of the 1920s." In Jacob M. Landau, *Ataturk and the Modernization of Turkey*, pp. 153-70. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.
- Hansen, Henny Harald. "Carsten Niebuhr i Den persiske Golf." *Nationalmuseets Arbejdsmark* (1962):
- Hansen, Thorkild. *Det lykkelige Arabien: En dansk ekspedition 1761-67*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1967.
- Harrison, Paul W. *The Arab at Home*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1924.
- _____. "Realities of Missionary Life – Among Arabs near the Persian Gulf." *The International Review of Missions* 6, no. 23 (July 1917): 428-36.
- Hauner, Milan. "Russia's geopolitical and ideological dilemmas in Central Asia." In *Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*, edited by Robert L. Canfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Hellssen, Henry. *De Sorte Telte*. Copenhagen: Thaning & Appels Forlag, 1943.
- Hesseltine, William B., and Hazel C. Wolf. *The Blue and the Gray on the Nile*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Hienton, Truman E. "Material Aid to Russia." *Military Engineer* 36, no. 225 (July 1944): 213-16.
- Hill, Richard. *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881*. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Hogarth, David G. *The Penetration of Arabia*. 2d ed. Beirut: Khayats, 1966.
- Hollis, Christopher. *Italy in Africa*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941.
- Holmboe, Knud. *Between the Devil and the Deep Sea: A Dash by Plane to Seething Morocco*. Phyllis A. Paterson, trans. Copenhagen: Klinte, 1924.
- _____. *Ørkenen Brænder!: Oplevelser blandt Saharas og Libyens Beduiner*. Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag, 1931.
- _____. *Desert Encounter* Harrap, 1936.
- _____. *Desert Encounter: An Adventurous Journey Through Italian Africa*. Translated by Helga Holbek. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1937.
- _____. "Palæstina er atter Jødernes Land." *Verden og Vi* 16, no. 15 (23 July 1926): 7-10.

- _____. "Hvor Bethlehems-krybben stod." *Verden og Vi* 16, no. 26 (24 December 1926): 7-10.
- _____. "Hos Islams Pave." *Verden og Vi* 17, no. 2 (17 January 1927): 5-7, 10.
- _____. "Ti Dage forsvundet i den Libyske Ørken." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 20 (21 May 1930): 5-9.
- _____. "Fire Måneder Fange hos Beduinerne i Slavebyen Cufra." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 21 (28 May 1930): 12-15.
- _____. "Gennem Riffbjergene – med Forhindringer." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 27 (9 July 1930): 12-15, 22.
- _____. "Gennem Afrika – fra Atlanten til Det røde Hav." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 45 (12 November 1930): 5-8.
- _____. "Ya Sin – Dødssuraen." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 46 (19 November 1930): 6-8, 10.
- _____. "Slinger – og kogende vand." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 47 (26 November 1930): 11-14.
- _____. "Beduiner." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 48 (3 December 1930): 5-8, 28.
- _____. "Den Vandrende Dervish og huleboerne." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 49 (10 December 1930): 7-9, 24-25.
- _____. "Touggourt." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 50 (17 December 1930): 17-19.
- _____. "De Udrevne Tungers Fest." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 51 (24 December 1930): 13-14.
- _____. "Ørken af sand – og Ørken af Salt." *Verden og Vi* 20, no. 52 (31 December 1930): 7-10, 28.
- _____. "Roms Ørn over Tripolis." *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 1 (7 January 1931): 6-9, 22-23.
- _____. "Drengen Mohammed vil med gennem Beduinernes Land." *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 2 (14 January 1931): 22, 26.
- _____. "Fanget af Beduiner i Bjergene." *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 3 (21 January 1931): 6-10.
- _____. "I Fangebur på Havet." *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 4 (28 January 1931): 6-10, 28.
- _____. "En Ægyptisk Revolution." *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 5 (4 February 1931): 6-10, 28.
- _____. "I Fængsel med politiske Agenter og Cocainsmuglere!" *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 11

- (18 March 1931): 12-14, 25.
- _____. "Islam efter 1916." *Forum* 1 (April 1931): 239-50.
- _____. "Fra Islams Nytid: Ibn Saud og den strenge Wahabisme." *Forum* 1 (August 1931): 498-508.
- _____. "Dervischer og Falkejægere i Arabiens Ørken." *Tidens Kvinder* 9, no. 37 (15 September 1931): 6-7.
- _____. "Arabiske Dervischer." *Tidens Kvinder* 9, no. 38 (22 September 1931): 6-7, 32.
- _____. "Why I Became a Muslim." *The Islamic Review* 19, no. 10 (October 1931): 345-49.
- _____. "Bag Orientens kinesiske Mur." *Forum* 1 (October 1931): 603-09.
- _____. "Djævletilbederne i Kysylbasch." *Tidens Kvinder* 9, no. 46 (17 November 1931): 6-7, 30.
- _____. "En Flygtning i den Arabiske Ørken." *Tidens Kvinder* 10, no. 15 (12 April 1932): 6-7.
- _____. "Orientalske Fængsler." *Tidens Kvinder* 10, no. 40 (4 October 1932): 8-9, 33.
- Holten, Just Johan. *I Dansk og Ægyptisk Statstjeneste*. Edited by Carl Dumreicher. Copenhagen: M. P. Madsens Boghandel, 1923.
- Hovannisian, Richard G., ed. *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*. New Brunswick, : Transaction Books, 1986.
- Hunter, F. Robert. *Egypt under the Khedive 1805-1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984.
- _____. "Egypt under the successors of Muhammad Ali." In *Modern Egypt, From 1517 to the end of the Twentieth Century*. Vol. 2 in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, edited by M. W. Daly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hussain, Asaf, Robert Olson, and Jamil Qureshi, eds. *Orientalism, Islam, and Islamists*. Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1984.
- Høyer, Maria. *Abrahams Døtre*. 3 vols. Copenhagen: Bethesdas Boghandel, 1909-10.
- _____. *Kvinden: Fri Eller Træl*. Holte: Danske Kirkemissions Forlag, 1925.
- Ib, Helle. "Danish – blødt brød eller hård tone?" *Danmarksposten* 87, no. 1 (2006): 10-

11.

Ibrahim, Hassan Ahmed. "The Egyptian Empire." In *Modern Egypt, From 1517 to the end of the Twentieth Century*. Vol. 2 in *The Cambridge History of Egypt*, edited by M. W. Daly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Illustreret Tidende. "Oberst Søren Adolf Arendrup." 17, no. 845 (5 December 1875): 99-102.

_____. "Aegypten og Abyssinien." 17, no. 854 (6 February 1876): 195.

Jensen, Jensine. *Billeder fra Østerland*. Copenhagen: O. Lohses Forlag, 1939.

Jeppe, Karen. "Armenien." *Tidens Kvinder* 1, no. 12 (31 May 1923): 6-7.

Jernazian, Ephraim K. *Judgment Unto Truth: Witnessing the Armenian Genocide*. Translated by Alice Haig. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1990.

Kabbani, Rana. *Europe's Myth of Orient*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

Kalinowska, Izabela. *Between East and West: Polish and Russian Nineteenth-Century Travel to the Orient*. Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2004.

Kampmann, Per. "Dansk Brobygning i Tyrkiet." *Arkitekten* 35 (1933): 171-76.

Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Karsh. *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1798-1923*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

Katouzian, Homa. *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1990.

Kayser, Erik. *En Slægts Ethundredårige Virke som civilingeniører 1845-1945*. Copenhagen: Kayser & Sønner, 1945.

Kennedy, Valerie. *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

Keyder, Caglar. *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey 1923-1929*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Khadduri, Majid. *Modern Libya: A Study in Political Development*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.

Khader, Naser, and Jakob Kvist. *khader.dk: sammenførte erindringer*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 2000.

Khoury, Philip S. *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-*

1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987.
- Kiernan, Victor. *The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to Other Cultures in the Imperial Age*. 2d ed. London: Serif, 1995.
- Kirk, Grayson. "Strategic Communications in the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs* 20, no. 4 (July 1942): 367-71.
- Kirketerp-Moeller, Hertha. "Fra København til Konstantinopel 1761." *Fund og Forskning* 17 (1970): 79-94.
- _____. "Arsenik og Gamle Håndskrifter." *Fund og Forskning* 24 (1979-1980): 119-40.
- Kjølsen, Frits Hammer. *Capitain F.L. Norden og hans rejse til Ægypten, 1737-38*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1965.
- _____. "A Danish Pioneer in Egypt." *Danish Foreign Office Journal* 57 (1966): 22-25.
- Klausen, Jytte. *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Knapp, Wilfred. "1921-1941: The Period of Reza Shah." In *Twentieth-Century Iran*, edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi. London: Heinemann, 1977.
- League of Nations, Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East. *Official Journal*. Geneva, 1924-26.
- _____. Secretariat, Information Section. *The Refugees*. Geneva: Information Section, 1938.
- Lenczowski, George, ed. *Iran under the Pahlavis*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.
- de Leon, Edwin. "'Johannes, King of Kings,' and his Christian Empire in Africa." *International Review* 7 (1879): 671-87.
- Lepsius, Johannes. "The Armenian Question." *Moslem World* 10, no. 4 (October 1920): 341-55.
- Lerche, O. "De Svensk-Danske Jærnbaneanlæg i Lilleasien." *Ingeniøren* 37, no. 11 (1928): 133-44.
- Lewis, Bernard. *Islam and the West*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- _____. "Islam." In Denis Sinor, ed. *Orientalism and History*. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970.

- Lewis, Geoffrey. *Modern Turkey*. New York: Praeger, 1974.
- Life of Niebuhr*. London: Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 1829.
- Ling, Dwight L. *Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.
- Littell's Living Age*. "The Egyptian Campaign in Abyssinia: From the Notes of a Staff-Officer." 134 (4 August 1877): 278-87.
- Living Age*. "Italy Around the Mediterranean." 332 (1927): 964-74.
- Lockett, Samuel H. "Arabi and His Army." *The Nation* 35, no. 900 (28 September 1882): 257-58.
- Lockman, Zachary. *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Lombardi, P. "Italian Agrarian Colonization during the Fascist Period." In E.G.H. Joffe and Keith S. McLachlan, eds. *Social and Economic Development of Libya*, pp. 95-116. Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1982.
- Longrigg, Stephen H. *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate*. London: Oxford University Press, 1958.
- Loring, William W. *A Confederate Soldier in Egypt*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1884.
- _____. "What Will Become of Egypt?" *Manhattan* 3 (1884): 249-55.
- Lust-Okar, Ellen Marie. "Failure of Collaboration: Armenian Refugees in Syria." *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 1 (January 1996): 53-68.
- Macartney, Maxwell H. H., and Paul Cremona. *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy*. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.
- Macartney, Maxwell H. H. "Young Italy – Old Africa." *The Fortnightly Review* 126 (1929): 802-10.
- Mackintosh-Smith, Tim. *Yemen: The Unknown Arabia*. Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2000.
- Mango, Andrew. *Ataturk: A Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey*. Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 1999.
- Marcus, Harold G. *The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844-1913*. Lawrence-

- ville, N.J.: The Red Sea Press, 1995.
- Marcuse, Peter. "Said's Orientalism: A Vital Contribution Today," *Antipode* 36, no. 5 (November 2004): 809-16.
- Marraro, Howard R. "Italy's Program of Empire." *Current History* 24 (July 1926): 545-50.
- Marstrand, Vilhelm N. "To Jernbetonbroer over Euftrat." *Ingeniøren* 39, no. 50 (1930): 593-95.
- Martin, Bradford G. *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- McCarthy, Justin. *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*. New York; London: New York University Press, 1983.
- McKeithen, James E. "The Risalah of Ibn Fadlan." Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1979.
- Middleton, P. Harvey. *Railways of Thirty Nations*. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937.
- Millspaugh, Arthur C. *American in Persia*. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1946.
- Molbech, Christian. "Om Norden, og hans Reise til Aegypten." *Athene* 7 (1816): 533-47.
- Moore, Martin. *Fourth Shore: Italy's Mass Colonization of Libya*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1940.
- Møller, Henrik. *Landsbydoktor i Syrien*. Copenhagen: Østerlandsmissionens Bogfond, 1932.
- La Nation Arabe*. (1930-1931).
- Niebuhr, Barthold G. "Carsten Niebuhrs Levnet." *Athene* 8 (1817): 1-37, 117-66.
- Niebuhr, Carsten. *Det Tyrkiske Riges Politik og Militaire Forfatning*. H. W. Riber, trans. Copenhagen, 1790.
- _____. *Travels Through Arabia and other Countries in the East*. 2 Vols. Translated and edited by Robert Heron. Edinburgh: R. Morrison & Son, 1792.
- Nielsen, Alfred J. *Skildringer af Syriske Medarbejdere* Copenhagen: Østerlandsmissionens Forlag, 1916.
- _____. *Bag Libanons Bjerger: En bog om Østerlandsmissionens virkested og virkekår*.

- Copenhagen: O. Lohse, 1918.
- _____. *Koranen og Biblen*. Charlottenlund: Østerlandsmissionens Bogfond, 1918.
- _____. *Min Ven Szejken: Et År i Damascus*. Copenhagen: O. Lohse, 1923.
- _____. *Aftener i Damaskus*. Copenhagen: Østerlandsmissionens Bogfond, 1925.
- _____. “Lysner Det?": *Breve fra Muhammedanere*. Copenhagen: Østerlandsmissionens Bogfond, 1926.
- _____. *Muhammedansk Tankegang i Vore Dage*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag, 1930.
- _____. *Vejen Vi Vandrede: Minder fra en menneskealders arbejde i Østerlandsmissionen*. Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag, 1946.
- _____. “Foreword.” In W. Wilson Cash, *Den Muhammedanske Verden i Revolution*. Frede Brøndsted, trans. Copenhagen: O. Lohse, 1927.
- _____. “Syrisk Politik.” *Højskolebladet* 45, no. 14 (2 April 1920): 429-34.
- _____. “Kristendomsundervisning for Muhammedanske Børn.” *Menighedsbladet* 3, no. 14 (3 April 1921): 110-12.
- _____. “Til Gudstjeneste i Moskeen.” *Menighedsbladet* 3, no. 16 (17 April 1921): 128-29.
- _____. “Hvad Muhammedanere Tænker om Kristendom.” *Menighedsbladet* 4, no. 13 (16 April 1922): 195-98 and *Menighedsbladet* 5, no. 14 (23 April 1922): 218-20.
- _____. “Moderne Muhammedanisme.” *Menighedsbladet* 5, no. 10 (11 March 1923): 154-57.
- _____. “Damascus as a Mission Center.” *Moslem World* 13, no. 2 (April 1923): 160-62.
- _____. “Hvordan får vi Muhammedanere i Tale?” *Nordisk Missions Tidsskrift* 16 (1927): 249-63.
- _____. “Difficulties in Presenting the Gospel to Moslems.” *Moslem World* 19, no. 1 (January 1929): 41-46.
- _____. “Moslem Mentality in the Syrian Press.” *Moslem World* 20, no. 2 (April 1930): 143-63.
- _____. “Et biprodukt af Muhammedanermission.” *Menighedsbladet* 12, no. 36 (7 September 1930): 563-66.

- ____. "Arabere og Jøder i Palæstina." *Nordisk Missions Tidsskrift* 19 (1930): 62-73.
- ____. "Hvordan bør der forkyndes Kristendom for Muhammedanere?" *Menighedsbladet* 13, no. (1931): 131-35.
- ____. "Islams Tro på Gud." *Kirke og Folk* 7 (1931): 77-84.
- ____. "The International Islamic Conference at Jerusalem." *Moslem World* 22, no. 4 (October 1932): 340-54.
- ____. "The Two Faces of Islam." *International Review of Missions* 23 (1934): 345-66.
- ____. "En Muslims Stilling til Jesus og Muhammed." *Kirke og Folk* 10 (1934): 219-22.
- ____. "Islam og Palæstina." *Menighedsbladet* 17, no. 29 (21 July 1935): 455-60.
- ____. "Islam in Palestine." *Moslem World* 25, no. 4 (October 1935): 354-58.
- ____. "Libanons og Karmels Glans, Sarons Yndigheder." *Menighedsbladet* 17, no. 39 (29 September 1935): 611-16.
- ____. "Forudbestemmelseslære og 'Tyrkertro'." *Kirken og Tiden* 1 (1935): 212-23.
- ____. "Det Nære Øst." *Kirken og Tiden* 2 (1936): 232-45.
- ____. "Zionismen i Palæstina og engelsk Politik." *Nordisk Missions Tidsskrift* 26 (1937): 193-204, 271-80.
- ____. "Palæstinas Skæbnetime?" *Kirken og Tiden* 3 (1937): 129-40.
- ____. "Muhammeds Liv." *Nordisk Missions Tidsskrift* 27 (1938): 145-60.
- ____. "Palæstina i Krigens År." *Dansk Udsyn* 25 (1945): 278-86.
- ____. "Hvorfor det går langsomt med Muhammedanermission." *Menighedsbladet* 29, no. 4 (26 January 1947): 28-30.
- ____. "Jøderne, Araberne og Palæstina." *Menighedsbladet* 29, no. 29 (20 July 1947): 230.
- ____. "Baggrunden for Palæstina-situationen." *Dansk Udsyn* 28 (1948): 81-89.
- ____. "Fædrelandskærlighed i de Arabiske Lande." *Dansk Udsyn* 30 (1950): 181-93.
- Nielsen, Erik W. *På Pionermission i Arabien*. Copenhagen: Det Danske Missions-selskab, 1948.

- _____. *Der Kæmpes om Arabien*. Copenhagen: Det Danske Missionselskab, 1950.
- Norden, Frederik Ludvig. *Drawings of Some Ruins and Colossal Statues at Thebes in Egypt, with an account of the same in a letter to The Royal Society*. London: Royal Society, 1741.
- _____. *Travels in Egypt and Nubia*. 2 vols. Peter Templeman, trans. London: Royal Society, 1757.
- _____. (translated excerpts of *Voyage d’Egypte et de Nubie*). *Monthly Review* 15 (July 1756): 249-64, 344-61, 485-97; 17 (July 1757): 78-80.
- Norgaard, Lars. “En dansk missionær i Smyrna.” *Sfinx* 3, no. 3 (1980): 95-100.
- Olafsson, Jon. *The Life of the Icelander Jon Olafsson*. 2 vols. Bertha Phillpotts, trans. Vol. 68, 2nd series. London: Hakluyt Society, 1932.
- Olearius, Adam. *The Voyages and Travels of the Ambassadors sent by Frederick Duke of Holstein to the Great Duke of Muscovy and the King of Persia*. 2nd ed. John Davies, trans. London, 1669.
- Olsen, Kurt. *..Og Sol Står Op..Sol Går Ned: Indtryk og Oplevelser fra det Mellemste Østen*. Copenhagen: H. Hirschsprungs Forlag, 1956.
- _____. *Storm over Mellemøsten*. Copenhagen: H. Hirschsprungs Forlag, 1957.
- Orhammer Andersen, Svend. *Den persianske rejse*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1976.
- Oueijan, Naji B. “Orientalism: The Romantics’ Added Dimension.” In Virgil Nemoianu, ed., *Romanticism in its Modern Aspects*, pp. 37-50. Wilmington, Del.: Council on National Literatures, 1998.
- Owen, Roger, and Sevkert Pamuk. *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah. *Mission for My Country*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.
- Pankhurst, Richard. *A Social History of Ethiopia: The Northern and Central Highlands from Early Medieval Times to the Rise of Emperor Tewodros II*. Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1992.
- _____. “Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century.” *Ethiopia Observer* 7, no. 1 (1963): 84-96.
- _____. “The Ethiopian Army of Former Times.” *Ethiopia Observer* 7, no. 2 (1963): 118-43.

- _____. "The Effects of War in Ethiopian History." *Ethiopia Observer* 7, no. 2 (1963): 143-64.
- Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1876
- Pedersen, Gotfried. "Scandinavian Missions to Moslems." *Moslem World* 22, no. 4 (October 1932): 412-14.
- Pelt, Adrian. *Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970.
- Peters, Emrys L. *The Bedouin of Cyrenaica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Petran, Tabitha. *Syria*. New York: Praeger, 1972.
- Philby, Harry St. John Bridge. *A Pilgrim in Arabia*. 2nd ed. London: Robert Hale, 1946.
- _____. *Arabian Jubilee*. London: Robert Hale, 1952.
- _____. *Arabia of the Wahhabis*. 2nd ed. London: Frank Cass, 1977.
- Polson Newman, E.W. "The Italians in Africa." *English Review* 58 (April 1934): 445-52.
- _____. "Italian Policy in Africa." *The Contemporary Review* 147 (May 1935): 549-56.
- Porch, Douglas. *The Conquest of the Sahara*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984.
- _____. *The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force*. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
- Prakash, Gyan. "Orientalism Now." *History and Theory* 34, no. 3 (1995): 199-212.
- Railway Age*. "Persia Opens Caspian-to-Gulf Railway." 105, no. 17 (22 October 1938): 602.
- Ralston, David B. *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600-1914*. Chicago; London: Chicago University Press, 1990.
- Rappaport, S. *History of Egypt: From 330 BC to the Present Time*. London: The Grolier Society, 1904.
- Rasmussen, Stig T., ed. *Den Arabiske Rejse 1761-1767*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1990.

- Raunkiær, Barclay. *Gennem Wahhabiternes Land paa Kamelryg, 1912*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1913.
- _____. *Central- og Øst-Arabien*. Vol. 209 in *Grundrids ved folkelig Universitetsundervisning*. Copenhagen: Universitetsudvalget, 1913.
- _____. *Through Wahhabiland on Camelback*. Gerald de Gaury, ed. and trans. New York; Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
- _____. "Centraltunisien: En erhvervsgeografisk Studie." *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 1 (1911): 12-25.
- _____. "Det kongelige danske geografiske selskabs ekspedition til Arabien: Foreløbig oversigt." *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 6 (1912): 215-17.
- _____. "The Expedition of the Royal Danish Geographical Society to Arabia: Preliminary Report." *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* 44, no. 9 (1912): 657-60.
- _____. "Karavaneliv." *Illustreret Tidende* 53, no. 38 (16 June 1912): 466-68.
- _____. "Beretning om min Rejse i Central-Arabien." *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 8 (1912): 283-89.
- _____. "Det uafhængige Arabien." *Gads Danske Magasin* (1912-13): 292-302.
- _____. "Mesopotamien som nyt land for Dansk foretagsomhed." *Illustreret Tidende* 55, no. 3 (19 October 1913): 26-28.
- Reinisch, Leo. "Egypt and Abyssinia." *The Geographical Journal*. 9, no. 3 (March 1897): 314-18.
- Rifaat Bey, Mohammed. *The Awakening of Modern Egypt*. London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1947.
- Robinson, A.E. "The Egyptian-Abyssinian War of 1874-1876." *Journal of the African Society* 26, no. 103 (April 1927): 263-80.
- Rodinson, Maxime. *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*. Roger Veinus, trans. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987.
- Roesdahl, Else. *Vikingernes Verden*. 5th ed. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1994.
- Rosenkilde Nielsen, Bent. "F.L. Nordens Rejse til Egypten og Nubien 1737-38." *Tidsskrift for Søværnen* 109 (1938): 599-612.

- Rubenson, Sven. *The Survival of Ethiopian Independence*. New York: Africana Publishing, 1978.
- _____. "Ethiopia and the Horn." In *The Cambridge History of Africa*. Vol 5, edited by John E. Flint. London: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Rudbeck, Børge. "En time med en Moslem." *Verden og Vi* 21, no. 2 (14 January 1931): 11-12.
- Rudolph, William. "Strategic Roads of the World." *Geographical Review* 33, no. 1 (1943): 110-31.
- Rygaard, Olaf A. *Mellem Tyrker og Kurder: En dansk ingeniørs oplevelser i Lilleasien*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1935.
- Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
- _____. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
- Sanghvi, Ramesh. *Aryamehr – The Shah of Iran: A Political Biography*. London: Transorient, 1968.
- Santarelli, Enzo, et al. *Omar al-Mukhtar: The Italian Reconquest of Libya*. John Gilbert, trans. London: Darf Publishers, 1986.
- Saxild, Jørgen. *En Dansk Ingeniørs Erindringer*. Copenhagen: Lindhardt & Ringhof, 1971.
- _____. "Jernbanebygning i Tyrkiet." *Ingeniøren* 40, no. 13 (1931): 153-62.
- _____. "Iran og dets Jernbaner." *Danmarksposten* 17 (November 1936): 235-43.
- Schick, Irvin C., and Ertugul Ahmet Tonak. *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*. Translated by Rezan Benatar, et al. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Schulz-Behrend, George. "Sources and Background of Werfel's Novel *Die Vierzig Tage des Musa Dagh*." *Germanic Review* 26 (1951): 111-23.
- Segre, Claudio G. *Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.
- Shah, Ikbāl Ali. "Trans-Iranian Railway: Triumph of Construction in Difficult Country." *Modern Transportation* (30 April 1938):
- Shambrook, Peter A. *French Imperialism in Syria 1927-1936*. Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998.

- Sharafuddin, Mohammed. *Islam and Romantic Orientalism: Literary Encounters with the Orient*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1994.
- Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975*. Vol. 2 of *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Shotton, J.H. "Building a Railroad Through Iran." *Compressed Air Magazine* 41, no. 12 (December 1936): 5190-95.
- Sick, Ingeborg Maria. *Pigen Fra Danmark: Et Rids af Karen Jeppes Liv og Gerning*. 4th ed. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1945.
- _____. "Karen Jeppe of Denmark and Armenia." *American-Scandinavian Review* 25, no. 1 (March 1937): 18-25.
- Smith, Walter George. "The Armenian Tragedy." *Catholic World* 111, no. 664 (July 1920): 485-92.
- Spaull, Hebe. *Women Peace-makers*. London; Calcutta; Sydney: George G. Harrap, 1924.
- Spring, Christopher. *African Arms and Armour*. London: British Museum Press, 1993.
- Stauning, Jørgen. *Beskrivelse over Aegypten og Nubien*. Copenhagen, 1775.
- Steer, G. L. *A Date in the Desert*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1939.
- Stevens, Roger. "European Visitors to the Safavid Court." *Iranian Studies* 7, no. 3-4 (1974): 421-57.
- Stone, Charles Pomeroy. "Military Affairs in Egypt." *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*. 5, no. 17 (March 1884): 154-83.
- Talhami, Ghada H. *Suakin and Massawa under Egyptian Rule 1865-1885*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979.
- Thompson, Elizabeth. *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Thorlacius-Ussing, V. "Melchior Lorck." In *Danske Tegninger fra Melchior Lorck til Fyenboerne*. 3 vols, pp. 13-24. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1945.
- Thulstrup, W. "Barclay Raunkiær." *Illustreret Tidende* 56, no. 43 (25 July 1915): 483.

- Tidsskrift for Industri*. "Den transiranske jernbane: Da Kampsax skabte et stolt ingeniør-storværk i Iran." no. 2 (15 January 1940): 12-16.
- Toledano, Ehud R. *State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth Century Egypt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Toynbee, Arnold J., ed. *The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916.
- Turner, Bryan. Review of *Orientalism*, by Edward Said. *Iranian Studies* 14, nos. 1-2 (1981): 107-12.
- Tuxen, Poul and Aage Marcus, eds. *Koranen*. 2d ed. Translated by Frants Buhl. Vol. 9 of *Verdensreligionernes Hovedværker*. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1954.
- Van Gelsen, Geert Jan and Ed de Moor. *Eastward Bound: Dutch Ventures and Adventures in the Middle East*. Amsterdam; Atlanta: Rodopi, 1994.
- Vassiliev, Alexei. *The History of Saudi Arabia*. London: Saqi Books, 1998.
- Verbitsky, Horacio. *The Flight: Confessions of an Argentine Dirty Warrior*. Translated by Esther Allen. New York: New Press, 1996.
- Verden og Vi*. "Pr. Automobil og Dromedar gennem Ørkenen." 20, no. 2 (15 January 1930): 21.
- _____. "Islam." 21, no. 38 (11 November 1931): 5-6.
- Villiers, Frederic. "Negus Negusti and the Abyssinians." *The Century*. 44, no. 3 (July 1892): 441-53.
- Viswanathan, Gauri. *Power, Politics, and Culture: Interviews with Edward W. Said*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2001.
- Wandel, C. F. *Carsten Niebuhrs Rejse i Jemen eller Det Lykkelige Arabien 1762-1763*. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 1929.
- Ward-Jackson, Peter. "Some Rare Drawings by Melchior Lorichs." *The Connoisseur* 135, no. 544 (April 1955): 83-93.
- Westwood, John. *Railways at War*. San Diego: Howell North, 1980.
- Wilber, Donald N. *Contemporary Iran*. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- _____. *Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran*. Hicksville, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1975.

- Winstone, Harry Victor Frederick. *Captain Shakespear: A Portrait*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1976.
- Winther, Christian. *Armenien og Karen Jeppe*. Copenhagen: Faglig Læsning, 1936.
- Woolbert, Robert G. "Italy's Colonial Empire." *Current History* 41 (February 1935): 542-49.
- Wright, Edwin M. "Iran as a Gateway to Russia." *Foreign Affairs* 20, no. 4 (July 1942): 762-66.
- Wright, John. *Libya*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
- _____. "Italian Fascism and Libyan Human Resources." In Mukhtar M. Buru, et al, eds. *Planning and Development in Modern Libya*, pp. 46-56. Wisbech, United Kingdom: Middle East and North African Studies Press, 1985.
- Wylde, Augustus B. *Modern Abyssinia*. London: Methuen, 1901.
- Zwemer, Samuel M. "A Danish Traveller in Arabia." *Moslem World* 4 (1914): 328-29.
- _____, et al., eds. *The Mohammedan World of Today: being papers read at the First Missionary Conference on Behalf of the Mohammedan World held in Cairo, April 4th-9th, 1906*. New York; Toronto; London: Fleming H. Revell, 1906.
- Ørberg, C. E., ed. *Arabien for Kristus: Skildringer fra Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien ved dens Missionærer*. Esbjerg: Dansk Kirkemission i Arabien, 1930.
- Østrup, Johannes Elith. *Arabiske Sange og Eventyr*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1889.
- _____. *Skiftende Horisonter: Skildringer og Iagttagelser fra et Ridt Gennem Ørkenen og Lille-asien*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1894.
- _____. *Tyrkiets Historie i det nittende Aarhundrede*. Vol. 92 in *Grundrids ved folkelig Universitetsundervisning*. Copenhagen: Universitetsudvalget, 1904.
- _____. *Moderne Aandsliv i Orienten*. Vol. 152 in *Grundrids ved folkelig Universitetsundervisning*. Copenhagen: Universitetsudvalget, 1910.
- _____. *Profeten Muhammed: En Folkelig Fremstilling*. Copenhagen: Kunstforlaget Danmark, 1911.
- _____. *Islam: Den Muhammedanske Religion og dens Historiske Udvikling*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad, 1914.

- _____. *Tyrkiets Fredsbrud*. Copenhagen: V. Pios, 1915.
- _____. *Østerlandene og Verdenskrigen*. Copenhagen: Steen Hasselbalchs Forlag, 1916.
- _____. *Islam i det Nittende Aarhundrede*. Vol. 7 of Aage Friis, ed. *Det Nittende Aarhundrede*. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1923.
- _____. *Orientaliske Høflighedsformler og Høflighedsformer*. Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 1927.
- _____. *Maurerne og Marokko: den vestlige orient's historie fra år 711 til vore dage*. Copenhagen: Baltisk Forlag, 1928.
- _____. *Det Nye Ægypten: Nillandets nyere historie, dets politiske, økonomiske og åndelige udvikling i vor tid*. Vol. 349 in *Folk og Lande i Fortid og Nutid*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad, 1929.
- _____. *Det Nye Tyrki: Tyrkiets nyere historie, dets politiske, økonomiske og åndelige udvikling i vor tid*. Copenhagen: G.E.D. Gad, 1931.
- _____. *Europa og Islam i vor Tid*. Vol. 387 in *Grundrids ved folkelig Universitetsundervisning*. Copenhagen: Folkeuniversitetsudvalget, 1931.
- _____. *Hvad Europas Kultur skylder Orienten*. Vol. 8 in *Ledetråd ved folkelig Universitetsundervisning*. Copenhagen: Folkeuniversitetsudvalget, 1932.
- _____. *Arabiens Historie: Med særligt henblik paa den nyere og nyeste tid*. Vol. 357 in *Folk og Lande i Fortid og Nutid*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gad, 1933.
- _____. *Erindringer*. 2nd ed. Copenhagen: H. Hirschsprungs Forlag, 1937.
- _____. "En Dag i Damascus." *Illustreret Tidende* 35, no. 10 (3 December 1893): 122-23.
- _____. "Historisk-topografiske bidrag til Kendskabet til den syriske ørken." *Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Skrifter* 4, sixth series (1895): 59-91.
- _____. "Vor Tids Islam." *Dansk Tidsskrift* (1900): 198-210.
- _____. "Den Osmanniske Race og Dens Fremtid." *Tilskueren* (1903): 461-72.
- _____. "Damaskus." *Frem* 6, no. 51 (20 September 1903): 3-6.
- _____. "Et fremtidsland og Danmarks interesser deri." *Gads Danske Magasin*. (1906-07): 385-95.
- _____. "Islams Jærnbane." *Tilskueren* (1908): 682-96.

- ____. "Orientens Morgenrøde Eller – ?" *Tilskueren* (1908): 782-88.
- ____. "Revolutionen i Konstantinopel." *Tilskueren* (1909): 478-83.
- ____. "Verdens ældste Kulturland." *Geografisk Tidsskrift* 21, no. 4 (1911): 132-44.
- ____. "Pan-Turkisme." *Ugens Tilskuer* 1, no. 34 (26 May 1911): 270-71
- ____. "Ungtyrker – part 1." *Ugens Tilskuer* 1, no. 45 (11 August 1911): 362-63.
- ____. "Ungtyrker – part 2." *Ugens Tilskuer* 1, no. 46 (18 August 1911): 270-72.
- ____. "Ungtyrker – part 3." *Ugens Tilskuer* 1, no. 47 (25 August 1911): 379-80.
- ____. "Tyrkiets Fremtidsfare." *Ugens Tilskuer* 3, no. 129 (21 March 1913): 198-99.
- ____. "Afgørelsens Mænd." *Ugens Tilskuer* 5, no. 214 (6 November 1914): 44-46.
- ____. "Den Glødende Halvmåne." *Illustreret Tidende* 64, no. 2 (8 October 1922): 46, 48.
- ____. "Europa og Islam." *Gads Danske Magasin* 19 (1925): 545-53.
- ____. "Palæstina og cirkelns kvadratur." *Gads Danske Magasin* 23 (1929): 496-505.
- ____. "Østerlandsk Tankegang." *Gads Danske Magasin* 24 (1930): 364-74.
- ____. "Hvorhen med det unge Danmark?" *Danmarksposten* 13, no. 3 (March 1932): 45-46.
- ____. "Asiatiske Kriser." *Gads Danske Magasin* 28 (1934): 274-84.
- ____. "Orient og Occident." *Gads Danske Magasin* 29 (1935): 609-25.
- ____. "Omkring det østlige Middelhav." *Tilskueren* 69-77.
- ____. "Abbas I." *Encyclopedia of Islam, 1913-1936*. Edited by M. Th. Houtsma, et al. New York; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993.

Reference Sources

- Bricka, C. F., ed. *Dansk Biografisk Lexikon*. 19 vols. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1887-1905.
- Cedergreen Bech, Svend, ed. *Dansk Biografisk Leksikon*. 3rd ed. 16 vols. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1979-1984.

- Doessing, Th. and Robert L. Hansen, eds. *Dansk Tidsskrift-Index*. 64 vols. Copenhagen: H. Hagerups Forlag, 1915-1978.
- Elwell-Sutton, L. P., ed. *Bibliographical Guide to Iran*. Sussex, United Kingdom: Harvest Press, 1983.
- Hill, Richard. *A Biographical Dictionary of the Sudan*. 2nd ed. London: Frank Cass, 1967.
- Marshall, John. *The Guinness Railway Book*. Enfield, United Kingdom: Guinness Books, 1989
- Milkias, Paulos. *Ethiopia: A Comprehensive Bibliography*. Boston: G. K. Hall, 1989.
- Nersessian, V. N. *A Bibliography of Articles on Armenian Studies in Western Journals 1869-1995*. Surrey, United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1997.
- Prouty, Chris and Eugene Rosenfeld. *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia and Eritrea*. 2nd ed. Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 1994.
- Rise Hansen, Carl, ed. *Sources of the History of North Africa, Asia, and Oceania in Denmark*. Translated by Mogens Møller. Vol. 3 of *Guides to the Sources for the History of the Nations*. Munich: K. G. Saur, 1980.
- _____. *Ydre Missions Arkivfortegnelser*. Vol. 1 of *Studier i Kristen Mission og Kulturpolitik*. Copenhagen: G. E. D. Gad, 1988.
- Thomsen, Svend, ed. *Danske Blandede Tidsskrifter 1855-1912*. Copenhagen: Bianco Lunos Bogtrykkeri, 1928.

Newspapers

- Aftenposten* (Copenhagen)
Berlingske Tidende (Copenhagen)
Dagbladet (Copenhagen)
Dagens Nyheder (Copenhagen)
Daily Telegraph (London)
Demokraten (Århus)
Ekstrabladet (Copenhagen)
Fyens Stiftstidende (Odense)
Horsens Avis
Iraq Times (Baghdad)
Jyske Tidende (Kolding)
Kristeligt Dagblad (Copenhagen)
København (Copenhagen)
Lolland-Falster Social Demokraten

Manchester Guardian
Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten (Århus; Copenhagen)
Morgenbladet
Nationaltidende (Copenhagen)
New York Times
Nordjyllands Social-Demokrat
Ny Illustrerad Tidning (Stockholm)
Palestine Bulletin (Jerusalem)
Politiken (Copenhagen)
Tidens Tegn
Viborg Stiftstidende
Times (London)
Østsjællands Folkeblad
Ålborg Amtstidende
Ålborg Stiftstidende
Ålborg Venstreblad
Århus Amtstidende
Århus Posten
Århus Stifstidende

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jonas Kauffeldt is a Danish citizen and a long-time resident of the United States. He holds two Bachelor of Arts degrees (History, International Studies, 1992) from the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida, and a Master's degree in International Affairs (1995) from the Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida. In the summer of 2006, he successfully defended his dissertation and earned a Ph.D. degree in Middle Eastern History from the Florida State University.