FACULTY RESEARCH  
Introductory Page
Matthew Botvinick
Jonathan Cohen
Ronald Comer
Andrew Conway
Joel Cooper
John Darley
Susan Fiske
Asif Ghazanfar
Joan Girgus
Sam Glucksberg
Adele Goldberg
Elizabeth Gould
Michael Graziano
Charles Gross
James Haxby
Bart Hoebel
Barry Jacobs
> Philip Johnson-Laird
      / Curriculum Vitae
      / Publications
      / Case Study
Sabine Kastner
Virgina Kwan
Kenneth Norman
Daniel Oppenheimer
Daniel Osherson
Deborah Prentice
Emily Pronin
Eldar Shafir
Nicole Shelton
Susan Sugarman
Alexander Todorov
Anne Treisman

 PHILIP JOHNSON-LAIRD
 Stuart Professor of Psychology
 Ph.D., University College London, 1967
 CASE STUDY
Why Does Reason Sometimes Fail?
CONTACT INFO 
T: 609.258.4432
E: phil@princeton.edu

3-C-3 Green Hall
Psychology Department
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08540

Mental Models Lab
ARTICLES 

2006

How We Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johnson-Laird, P.N., Mancini, F., & Gangemi, A. (2006) A hyper emotion theory of psychological illnesses. Psychological Review, 113, 822-841.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2006) Models and heterogeneous reasoning.  Journal ofexperimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 20, 121-148.

Newsome, M.R., & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2006) How falsity dispels fallacies. Thinking & Reasoning, 12, 214-234.

Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2006) Mental models, sentential reasoning, and illusory inferences.

In Held, C., Vosgerau, G., and Knauff, M. (Eds.) Mental Models and the Mind.
New York: Elsevier. Pp. 27-52.

Lee, N.Y.L., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2006) Are there cross-cultural differences in             reasoning?  Proceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science             Society, 459-464.

Lee, N.Y.L., Goodwin, G.P., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2006) The psychology of Su Doku problems.  Proceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science             Society, 2543.

Frosch, C.A., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2006) The revisions of beliefs about causes and enabling conditions. Proceedings of the 28th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 1329-1333.

2005
Reasoning about Consistency with Spatial Mental Models: Hidden and Obvious Indeterminacy in Spatial Descriptions

The Shape of Problems

Mental Models and Thought

Naive Deontics: A Theory of Meaning, Representation, and Reasoning

Reasoning About Relations

The History of Mental Models

 

PUBLICATIONS  CURRICULUM VITAE