R. M. Hare
(Richard Mervyn Hare)
An Annotated Bibliography
(born 21 March 1919; died 29 January 2002)
By Keith Burgess-Jackson, J.D., Ph.D.

1949

"Imperative Sentences." *Mind,* n.s., 58 (January 1949): 21-39. Reprinted, with appendix, as chap. 1 of PI. Hare shows that there can be a logic of imperatives as well as of indicatives. Why is this important? Because some writers "think that, because ethical sentences are not true indicatives, logical methods cannot be used in ethics with as much confidence as in other enquiries." If Hare can show (1) that ethical sentences are (or entail) imperatives and (2) that there is a logic of imperatives, then he can rescue ethics from the irrationalists. Every imperative, like every indicative, has two parts: a descriptor, which describes a state of affairs, and a dictor, which describes the mood (either imperative or indicative). "All men are mortal" and "Let all men be mortal" have the same descriptor (men mortal) but different dictors. "[S]ince logic is mainly about descriptors, and commands contain descriptors, commands are a proper concern of the logician." Here is an example of a valid inference in which all the sentences are imperatives: Let all men be mortal; let Socrates be a man; therefore, let Socrates be mortal. This is no less valid than the corresponding inference in the indicative mood: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.

1950

Review of *Moral Obligation* and *Knowledge and Perception,* by H. A. Prichard. *The Oxford Magazine* 68 (15 June 1950): 558. Hare praises Prichard's rejection of "the objectivism of Moore" and "the naturalism of Mill and others." That a situation has certain characteristics does not entail that one "ought to try to bring it about." Prichard, to his credit, understood "how difficult and perplexing a subject philosophy is."

Review of *Morality and God,* by Edward Wales Hirst. *Philosophy* 25

(October 1950): 376-7. Hare criticizes Hirst for violating Hume's Law—with a twist. Instead of deriving values from natural facts, Hirst derives them from supernatural facts (about God's existence and character). Hare says that if Christianity is to be relevant to "present-day ethical controversies," it must come to grips with recent "logical researches."

"Theology and Falsification: A Symposium." *University* 1 (1950-51): xx-xx. Reprinted as appendix to chap. 1 of ERE. Hare replies to Antony Flew's argument that since nothing is allowed by theists to count against their claims, their "claims" are not assertions. Hare agrees that religious claims are not assertions, but denies that they are unimportant. They are expressions of a blik, or worldview (or attitude toward the world). Even atheists have a blik. "Flew has shown that a *blik* does not consist in an assertion or system of them; but nevertheless it is very important to have the right *blik*." It sounds as though Hare is saying that religious claims can be understood only from within a blik, i.e., that there is no transcendent space from which to evaluate bliks as true or false.

1951

"Freedom of the Will." *The Aristotelian Society,* supplementary volume 25 (1951): 201-16. Reprinted, with one omission, as chap. 1 of EMC. Hare asks what it is about the word "ought" that gives rise to the "'ought' implies 'can'" principle. First, he argues that the principle is not limited to moral uses of "ought." It applies whenever one uses "ought" to give advice or guidance. "You cannot instruct people in a rule to do the impossible." "Ought" implies "can" because "ought" is prescriptive. Second, he shows how advice differs from persuasion. The latter is a success concept ("achievement word"). Third, viewing moral judgment as persuasion leads to "ethical irrationalism," as exemplified by Stevenson's emotivism. Advice is directed to persons *qua* cognitive (i.e., free and rational) beings. Persuasion is directed to persons *qua* affective beings. (Hare is using "persuasion" to mean *nonrational* persuasion.)

Review of *The Philosophy of Plato,* by G. C. Field. *Mind,* n.s., 60 (January 1951): 128-9. Hare criticizes "Platonists" such as Field for

not using "the methods of logical analysis" in their studies of Plato. Some of Plato's ontological claims, for example, can be understood (and defended) as logical claims. Hare also criticizes Field for not paying sufficient attention to Plato's practical philosophy.

Review of *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics,* by Stephen Edelston Toulmin. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 1 (July 1951): 372-5. Hare praises Toulmin for asking the relevant question—"What to do"—but finds fault with his answer. Toulmin violates Hume's Law by inferring an "ought" (X provides a good reason to act) from an "is" (X falls under a practice that minimizes conflicts of interest). No appeal to usage can establish a moral judgment. "The trick is performed only by smuggling in the essential moral premiss disguised as a rule of inference. . . ."

Review of *Value: A Cooperative Enquiry,* edited by Ray Lepley. *Mind,* n.s., 60 (July 1951): 430-3. Hare criticizes the contributors to this volume for presupposing what should be questioned, namely, that value can and should be studied scientifically. What the contributors (philosophers generally) should do is study the logical behavior of "good" and other evaluative terms. This study would show that "good" functions very differently from "brown." Another presupposition is that words such as "good" have referents. This is decriptivism, which leads to relativism. The whole "enquiry" is therefore misplaced.

1952

Review of *Morals and Revelation,* by H. D. Lewis. *Philosophy* 27 (xxx 1952): xx-xx. Hare criticizes Lewis for failing to stress "the distinction between ethics, considered as the study . . . of moral thought, and morals, in the sense of the actual propounding of moral judgments and systems." Hare also rejects the idea that ethics is a "battle" between objectivists and skeptics. Viewing it that way will retard progress.

The Language of Morals. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952. See [here] for a summary.

Review of *The Ethics of Aristotle*, trans. J. A. K. Thomson. *The Oxford Magazine* 72 (25 February 1954): 240. Hare praises the readability of the book, but criticizes the translator for "missing important philosophical points."

Review of *What Is Value? An Essay in Philosophical Analysis,* by Everett W. Hall. *Mind,* n.s., 63 (April 1954): 262-9. Hare praises Hall for using "linguistic analysis," but criticizes Hall's analysis. Hall's aim is to show that value, like fact, is "in the world" (i.e., objective), albeit in a different way. His method is to show, *inter alia,* that value-sentences are not reducible to factual sentences. Specifically, it is to show that the "syntax" of imperatives is "completely different from" that of indicatives. Hare argues that the alleged differences do not exist. "Thus Professor Hall is unsuccessful in establishing a difference between the logics of singular imperatives and singular indicatives."

Review of *Philosophy and Psycho-analysis*, by John Wisdom. *Philosophy* 29 (xxx 1954): 284-6. Hare praises Wisdom's "subtle mind," then proceeds to criticize him. Wisdom came to despair of providing a logical analysis of "expressions of common speech." Instead of taking up the difficult challenge of "construct[ing] simpler models of language which would illuminate its logic," Wisdom "abandon[ed] formal analysis altogether." In other words, Wisdom gave up and retreated to "literature." Wisdom is to Socrates and the sophists as Wisdom's successors are to Plato and Aristotle. The former "had their fun"; the latter must do the hard work of analysis.

"Universalisability." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* n.s., 55 (1954-55): 295-312. Reprinted as chap. 2 of EMC. Hare argues that moral judgments are "U-type valuations," i.e., universal prescriptions. They are not "E-type valuations," i.e., singular prescriptions (or imperatives). Universality differs from generality. The former is opposed to singularity or particularity, the latter to specificity. Universality is all or nothing; generality is a matter of degree. "One ought not to tell lies" is more general than "One ought not to tell lies unless this is necessary in order to save innocent lives," since it has

no exceptions; but both are universal, since neither makes reference to individuals (particulars). Hare replies to the objections that (1) he makes the choice between principles a matter of inclination and (2) he makes the choice between principles arbitrary.

1955

"Ethics and Politics." *The Listener* 54 (13 October 1955): 593-4; *The Listener* 54 (xx October 1955): 651-xx. First essay (of two) reprinted as chap. 1 ("Can I Be Blamed for Obeying Orders?") of AMP. Hare criticizes the argument from "S wills me to do x" to "I ought to do x." The premise is descriptive, the conclusion evaluative. Hence, the inference violates Hume's Law. To repair the structural defect, one must add an evaluative premise to the effect that I ought to do whatever S wills, and one must *decide* whether to endorse this principle. Morality consists of making decisions of principle. Everyone, even a soldier, is responsible for his or her behavior. (Cf. Sartre.) Moral choice (for normal adults) is inescapable. We can leave means to the experts, but ends are up to us, as individuals.

1956

Review of *Ethics,* by P. H. Nowell-Smith. *Philosophy* 31 (xxx 1956): 89-92. This is "a very thoughtful and stimulating book." Hare criticizes Nowell-Smith's terms "contextually implies" and "logically odd," neither of which is "entirely clear." Hare praises Nowell-Smith's classification of words into D-words (descriptive), A-words (intermediate), and G-words (evaluative). A-words, such as "terrifying" and "funny," have different meanings in different contexts. This variety of meanings generates some of the perplexities experienced by logicians. Hare says he doesn't understand what Nowell-Smith means when the latter says that he is "a champion of the traditional moral philosophy."

Review of *Filosofia Analitica e Giurisprudenza,* by Uberto Scarpelli. *Mind,* n.s., 65 (January 1956): 102-3. This is "an extremely penetrating essay." Hare expresses hope that the philosophy being done in English-speaking countries and on the continent of Europe (France, Germany, and Italy) will converge. One ground for hope is the inter-

est among Italian jurisprudents (such as Scarpelli) in "logical analysis as an aid to the study of law." Hare encourages jurisprudents to conduct their logical inquiries "in as concrete terms as possible, with more attention to the actual discourse and decisions of the courts than to the abstract, tidy theories of jurists."

<center>1957</center>

"Geach: Good and Evil." *Analysis* 17 (April 1957): 103-11. Reprinted with "small amendments" as chap. 3 of EMC. Hare says that Geach's target—"The Oxford Moralists"—is too heterogeneous to be of any use. Hare agrees with some of the views attributed to The Oxford Moralists but not to all. He says Geach should name people instead of creating such a "composite . . . creature." Geach conflates prescriptivism and emotivism: "To commend may be to seek to guide choice; but it certainly is not necessarily to seek to influence or affect choice." As for Geach's own theory of the meaning of "good," Hare says it is correct where "good" precedes a functional word, such as "hygrometer," but incorrect where it precedes a nonfunctional word, such as "sunset." Unfortunately for Geach, "the mere occurrence of a functional word after 'good' is normally an indication that the context is *not* a moral one" (italics in original). Hare then criticizes Geach for thinking that "man" is a functional word. Geach would probably consider Hare's criticism question-begging, for he (Geach) is a teleologist (like Aristotle, but unlike Hare) who believes that there is a specific good for man.

"Oxford Moral Philosophy." *The Listener* 57 (21 February 1957): 311; *The Listener* 57 (28 March 1957): 520. These are letters to the editor. In the first letter, Hare criticizes G. E. M. Anscombe's talk "Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt Youth?" (*The Listener* 57 [14 February 1957]: 266-7, 271). Anscombe argued that Oxford moral philosophy does *not* corrupt youth, since that implies that youth would not otherwise be corrupted. In fact, "Oxford moral philosophy is perfectly in tune with the highest and best ideals of the country at large. . . ." These ideals include consequentialism, with its thesis of negative responsibility (i.e., responsibility for what one allows, not merely for what one does). Hare accuses Anscombe of "tortuous sarcasms" and of "hat[ing]" certain people or views. Her method is to allude to cer-

tain philosophical views—which are caricatures—and then say, "Isn't this very much in line with. . . ," hoping thereby to turn the listener against the views. Hare denies that students who go to Oxford will meet the sort of corrupting people Anscombe describes. In the second letter, which is immediately preceded by a letter from Anscombe, Hare makes a number of sarcastic and insulting points. As this exchange shows, Anscombe (1919-2001) and Hare (1919-2002) did not get along.

Review of *The Problem of Knowledge*, by A. J. Ayer, and *Logic and Knowledge: Essays, 1901-1950*, by Bertrand Russell. *The Spectator* (4 January 1957): 25-6. Hare praises Ayer's book for its "rare combination of vigour and maturity." He praises Ayer personally for being "more concerned with the truth than with self-defence." Russell's book makes some of his essays accessible, but it's badly edited. Hare says it contains "many advertisements of [the editor's] own rather adolescent opinions about philosophy and philosophers." Hare also takes a swipe at Russell for journeying from common sense (which is good) but never coming back (which is bad). Common sense should lead to paradox and then back to "an illumined common sense."

Review of *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, by C. A. Mace. *The Spectator* (1957): xx-xx. I have been unable to locate this review.

"Are Discoveries About the Uses of Words Empirical?" *The Journal of Philosophy* 54 (November 1957): 741-50. Full version, entitled "Philosophical Discoveries," printed in *Mind,* n.s., 69 (April 1960): 145-62. Reprinted, revised, as chap. 2 ("Philosophical Discoveries") of EPMe. Hare describes a dilemma: Either philosophical statements are empirical discoveries (about how words are used) or philosophical statements are decisions (about how to use words); if they are empirical discoveries, then they are contingent; if they are decisions, then they aren't the sort of thing that can be known. But philosophers want to say both that their statements are necessary and that they are knowable. Hare escapes between the horns of the dilemma, but not by postulating (like the "metaphysicians") a "non-empirical order of being," i.e., a realm of synthetic *a priori* statements. Philosophical statements are neither empirical discoveries nor decisions, but instances of remembering. (Compare Plato.) The philosopher's job is to

elucidate (Hare's word) concepts that we learned and use but haven't brought before our minds. It is to say what we know when we know something. It is to discover a *definition.*

Review of *Philosophical Analysis: Its Development Between the Two World Wars,* by J. O. Urmson, and *The Revolution in Philosophy,* by A. J. Ayer et al. *Philosophische Rundschau* 5 (1957): 269-80. This review is in German. Since I don't know German and don't have a translation, I can't annotate it.

"Religion and Morals." Chap. 7 in *Faith and Logic: Oxford Essays in Philosophical Theology,* edited by Basil Mitchell, 176-93. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1957. Reprinted as chap. 2 of ERE. Logical positivists considered ethical and religious utterances meaningless, since (1) they defined "meaning" in terms of knowing what would have to be case for an utterance to be true and (2) they believed that ethical and religious utterances lack truth value. Hare says this was not a criterion of meaningfulness but of "empiricality." Different types of utterance can have different types of meaning. Religious discourse hasn't been studied as much as other types, such as scientific discourse. Many philosophers lack religious experience (or are uninterested in religion), and many of those who have religious experience lack philosophical expertise. Hare proceeds to display similarities between moral and religious language. The word "god," for example, has both evaluative and descriptive meaning. It prescribes behavior (e.g., worship) and conveys information.

<center>1959</center>

"Broad's Approach to Moral Philosophy." Chap. 18 in *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad,* edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 563-77. The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 10. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1959. Reprinted as chap. 1 of EPMe. C. D. Broad wrote in *Five Types of Ethical Theory* that "The interest of ethics is . . . almost entirely theoretical." He appeared to be saying that ethics has no bearing on practical moral questions. Hare says that when he read Broad, as an undergraduate, he was "scandalised." Hare had gone into philosophy precisely because it promised assistance in answering such questions. Hare traces Broad's view of ethics to G. E.

Moore, who, with H. A. Prichard, preceded—and influenced—the logical positivists (including the emotivists). (It's often thought that it was logical positivism that made ethics irrelevant to practical affairs.) Hare admits that his "irritation at Broad's remarks was entirely unjustified," since it stemmed from ignorance of the history of ethics. What, then, can ethics contribute to answering practical moral questions? Two things. First, it clarifies the questions by distinguishing between factual, conceptual, and evaluative statements. Second, by showing (through analysis) that moral judgments are universalizable, it eliminates certain actions, viz., those that one is not willing (or able) to universalize.

1960

"A School for Philosophers." *Ratio* 2 (February 1960): 107-20. Reprinted as chap. 3 of EPMe. Hare explains how philosophy in Great Britain differs from philosophy in Germany. The same subject is being studied, but "in two different ways." Hare describes the daily routine of fellows and tutors. Tutors teach pupils to think effectively and to express their thoughts clearly. Regular seminars, which are attended by other fellows and tutors (as well as pupils), serve as testing grounds for ideas. These seminars are highly structured and demanding, like chess. Rhetoric and evasion are not accepted. British philosophers are impatient with obscure, overblown prose. Writing books is a by-product of teaching and discussing. The best way to get a book read is to make it "short, clear and to the point." As for the claim that British philosophers don't do metaphysics, Hare denies it. It's simply not *called* metaphysics. British philosophers call it logic. It is oriented to the study of word meanings (uses). Its aim is to avoid linguistic pitfalls.

Review of *An Enquiry into Goodness*, by F. E. Sparshott. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 10 (October 1960): 372-4. The book is well organized and comprehensive, in the sense that it treats most of the "topical problems about philosophical method," but the discussion is "elusive." Hare says he "was left with the impression that [Sparshott] had been sitting on the fence." Sparshott claims that commendation is not essential to "good," since there are other ways to commend X besides saying that it's a good X. "A similar argument would show

that the function of entering into an undertaking was not 'essential to' the words 'I promise'; for can we not enter into undertakings by many other means than saying 'I promise'?" The book, while instructive, does not contain "a clear-cut train of reasoning." It is inferior to G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica,* which Sparshott denigrates.

"'Rien n'a d'importance': l'anéantissement des valeurs est-il pensable?" In *La Philosophie Analytique,* edited by L. Beck, xx-xx. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1959/1960. Reprinted (in English, as "'Nothing Matters': Is 'the Annihilation of Values' Something That Could Happen?") as chap. 4 of AMP. Hare tells the story of a young man of his acquaintance who read Albert Camus's *L'Etranger* (*The Stranger*) and insisted that "nothing matters." Hare sat him down for a discussion. He showed the young man that to say that something matters is to express concern for (or about) it, "to be disposed to make certain choices, certain efforts, in the attempt to affect in some way that about which [one is] concerned." To say that *nothing* matters is to say that one is unconcerned about "absolutely everything." The young man admitted that he was concerned about "many things." In the remainder of the essay, Hare discusses (1) the sources of our values, (2) the impossibility of annihilating values "as a whole" (since "a man is a valuing creature"), (3) the pointlessness of quarrels over whether values are objective, and (4) the confusion between subjectivism (which is an ethical position) and relativism (which is a moral position). In modern parlance, subjectivism is a metaethical theory, while relativism is a normative ethical theory. Hare adds that relativism is "an absurd position"—and "a very pernicious view" to boot!

"Ethics." In *Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, edited by J. O. Urmson, xx-xx. London: Hutchinson, 1960. Reprinted as chap. 4 of EMC. Reprinted with minor changes in *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, new rev. ed., edited by J. O. Urmson and Jonathan Rée, 100-9. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989. Hare distinguishes between normative ethics (which he calls "morals"), descriptive ethics, and metaethics (which he calls "ethics" or "ethics proper"). Ethics is the philosophical study of morals. "We cannot, even if we can establish the meaning of the moral words, pass from this to conclusions of substance about moral

questions." (Hare appears to have changed his mind about this by the time he wrote *Freedom and Reason*.) Hare then discusses naturalism (which includes supernaturalism), intuitionism, and emotivism, which are ethical (i.e., metaethical) theories. Along the way, he distinguishes between relativism and subjectivism. Relativism is a moral doctrine (i.e., a normative ethical theory), while subjectivism is an ethical (i.e., metaethical) theory. Hare uses "emotivism" as a catch-all term for nondescriptivist ethical theories, such as his own universal prescriptivism. He says the division between descriptivists and nondescriptivists is "the most fundamental in ethics." The relation between descriptive and prescriptive meaning "continues to tax ethical thinkers."

1962

Review of *Generalization in Ethics: An Essay in the Logic of Ethics, with the Rudiments of a System of Moral Philosophy*, by Marcus George Singer. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 12 (October 1962): 351-5. The book is "a full and closely reasoned treatment of the most central feature of moral arguments." "[N]othing but profit can come from the serious study of it." Singer's focus is the following type of argument: "If everyone were to do *x*, the consequences would be disastrous (or undesirable); therefore no one ought to do *x*." Hare criticizes Singer's inattention to "the distinction between singular and universal terms." Hare is also critical of Singer's disregard for the prescriptivity of moral judgments. Perhaps Singer considers prescriptivism (Hare's theory) a form of relativism. This is unfortunate, because "generalization arguments cannot be successfully mounted unless moral judgments are recognized to be prescriptive." Singer asks what would happen if everyone did x. Hare thinks this puts too much emphasis on quantity. According to Hare, "If an action is wrong, it is wrong because it would be wrong for *anyone* (N.B. not 'everyone') to do it in just these circumstances, whether or not anyone else did it in the same or in different circumstances." In other words, generalization differs from universalization. The generalist asks, "What if *everyone* did what I'm about to do?" The universalist asks, "Can I will that *anyone* in my situation do *x*?"

1963

Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. See here for a summary.

"Descriptivism." *Proceedings of the British Academy* 49 (1963): xx-xx. Reprinted as chap. 5 of EMC. H views descriptivism—the term was suggested to him by J. L. Austin—as a mistake. Some descriptivists "impugn [the] distinction" between description and evaluation, so H seeks to "establish[] its existence" (55). The distinction concerns not *terms,* but different *meanings* of a given term. That evaluative meaning exists can be established by finding two terms that have the same descriptive meaning but different evaluative meanings. When you subtract "x is a wine which tastes Ø" from "x is a good wine," there is something left over, namely, an evaluation. H follows Charles Stevenson (whom he doesn't mention) in saying that two people can "agree about the description but disagree about the evaluation" (62). H devotes the remainder of the essay to refuting various descriptivist arguments—or rather, to showing that descriptivist arguments are not successful against *him.*

Letter in *Times Literary Supplement* on review of *Freedom and Reason* (26 April 1963). I have been unable to locate this item.

1964

"Pain and Evil." *The Aristotelian Society,* supplementary volume 38 (1964): 91-106. Reprinted as chap. 6 of EMC. H admits to grinding an axe in this essay, the aim of which is to show that there is a "distinction between descriptive and evaluative judgements" (89). Some people have said that the distinction "breaks down" in the case of pain, for "I am in intense pain," they say, is both descriptive and evaluative. H argues that it's logically possible for someone to be in pain (in the sense of having a distinct sensation) but not to suffer (or to dislike it). That pain and suffering often or even always (in fact) coincide doesn't prove that they must (logically) coincide. The essay is an analysis of the concept of pain.

"Adolescents into Adults." In *Aims in Education*, xx-xx. Edited by T. C. B. Hollins. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964. Re-

printed as chap. 5 of AMP and as chap. 7 of ERE.

* "A Question About Plato's Theory of Ideas." In *The Critical Approach: Essays in Honor of Karl Popper*, xx-xx. Edited by Mario Bunge. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1964. Reprinted, with minor corrections, in EPMe.

* "The Promising Game." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 70 (1964): 398-412. Reprinted in *Theories of Ethics*, 115-27. Edited by Philippa Foot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. Reprinted in *The 'Is-Ought' Question*, xx-xx. Edited by W. D. Hudson. London: Macmillan, 1969. Reprinted (in Polish) in *Etyka* 21 (1985): 151-64. Reprinted in EET.

* "Wat is Leven?" *Elseviers Weekblad* (19 December 1964). Reprinted (in English, as "What Is Life?") in *Crucible* (1965). Reprinted in AMP.

"The Objectivity of Values." *Common Factor* 1 (1964).

1965

Review of *Norm and Action*, by G. H. von Wright. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 15 (1965).

* "Plato and the Mathematicians." In *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, xx-xx. Edited by Renford Bambrough. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965. Reprinted in EPMe.

1967

* "The Lawful Government." In *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, 3d series, xx-xx. Edited by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967. Reprinted in *Moral and Social Problems*, xx-xx. Edited by James Rachels and F. Tillman. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Reprinted in AMP. (Address, 1964.)

"Conventional Morality", "Decision", "Deliberation", "Ethics", "Intention", and "Right and Wrong". In *Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, xx-xx,

xx-xx, xx-xx, xx-xx, xx-xx, and xx-xx. Edited by J. Macquarrie. London: SCM Press, 1967.

* Review of *Freedom of the Individual*, by Stuart Hampshire. *The Philosophical Review* 76 (April 1967): 230-3.

* "Some Alleged Differences Between Imperatives and Indicatives." *Mind,* n.s., 76 (July 1967): 309-26. Reprinted in PI. (Address, Manchester University, 1965.)

1968

* Review of *Contemporary Moral Philosophy,* by G. J. Warnock. *Mind,* n.s., 77 (July 1968): 436-40.

Review of *The Concept of Education,* by R. S. Peters. *Mind,* n.s., 77 (1968): xxx-xxx.

1969

* "Practical Inferences." In *Festskrift til Alf Ross,* xx-xx. Edited by V. Kruse. Copenhagen: Juristvorbundets Vorlag, 1969. Reprinted in PI.

Review of *Directives and Norms,* by Alf Ross. *Mind,* n.s., 78 (1969): 464-xxx.

* "Community and Communication." In *People and Cities,* xx-xx. Edited by S. E. Verney. London: Fontana Books, 1969. Reprinted in AMP. (Address, Coventry, 1968.)

Review of *Law, Morality and Religion,* by Basil G. Mitchell. *Philosophy* 44 (1969): xx-xx.

1970

* "Meaning and Speech Acts." *The Philosophical Review* 79 (January 1970): 3-24. Reprinted, with appendix, in PI.

"Condizioni intellettuali per la sopravvivenza dell'uomo." *Proteus* 1 (1970).

Reply to "Liberals, Fanatics and Not-So-Innocent Bystanders", by R. S. Katz. In *Jowett Papers, 1968-1969*, xx-xx. Edited by B. Y. Khanbhai et al. Oxford: Blackwell, 1970.

General Introduction and Introduction to *Meno* in paperback edition of *The Dialogues of Plato*, xx-xx and xx-xx. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Edited by R. M. Hare and D. A. F. M. Russell. London: Sphere Books, 1970.

<p align="center">1971</p>

Review of *The Prisoner and the Bomb*, by L. van der Post. *New York Review of Books* 17 (20 May 1971).

* "Wanting: Some Pitfalls." In *Agent, Action and Reason*, 81-127. Edited by R. Binkley, R. Bronaugh, and Marras. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971. Reprinted in PI.

* *Practical Inferences*. New Studies in Practical Philosophy, ed. W. D. Hudson. London: Macmillan, 1971; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.

* "Austin's Distinction Between Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts [with Appendix]." In *Practical Inferences*, 100-16. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. (Address, Oxford University, 1963.)

* *Essays on Philosophical Method*. New Studies in Practical Philosophy, ed. W. D. Hudson. London: Macmillan, 1971; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972.

* "The Practical Relevance of Philosophy." In *Essays on Philosophical Method*, 98-116. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. (Address [Inaugural Lecture], Oxford University, 1967.)

* "The Argument from Received Opinion." In *Essays on Philosophical Method*, 117-35. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

"Drugs and the Role of the Doctor" and other contributions. In *Personality and Science*, xx-xx. Edited by I. T. Ramsey and R. Porter. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1971.

1972

* "Principles." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* n.s., 73 (1972-73): 1-18. Reprinted in EET.

* *Essays on the Moral Concepts.* New Studies in Practical Philosophy, ed. W. D. Hudson. London: Macmillan, 1972; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973.

* "Wrongness and Harm." In *Essays on the Moral Concepts*, 92-109. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. (Address, Oxford University, 1970.)

* "Rules of War and Moral Reasoning." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (winter 1972): 166-81. Reprinted in *War and Moral Responsibility*, xx-xx. Edited by Marshall Cohen et al. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Reprinted in EPMo.

* *Applications of Moral Philosophy.* New Studies in Practical Philosophy, ed. W. D. Hudson. London: Macmillan, 1972; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973.

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* "Why Racism Is an Evil." Chap. 16 in *Objective Prescriptions, and Other Essays,* 179-85. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.

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* "A Philosophical Autobiography." *Utilitas* 14 (November 2002): 269-305.

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"Postscript." In *Foundations for Moral Education*, xx-xx. Edited by J. M. Halstead and T. H. MacLaughlin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, xxxx. Canceled?

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LM = *The Language of Morals* (1952 cloth/1964 paper).
FR = *Freedom and Reason* (1963/1965).
PI = *Practical Inferences* (1972/19xx). I have this in photocopy only.
EPMe = *Essays on Philosophical Method* (1972/19xx).
EMC = *Essays on the Moral Concepts* (1973/19xx).
AMP = *Applications of Moral Philosophy* (1973/19xx).
MT = *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point* (1981/1981).
P = *Plato* (1982/1982)
EET = *Essays in Ethical Theory* (1989/19xx).
EPMo = *Essays on Political Morality* (1989/19xx).
ERE = *Essays on Religion and Education* (1992/1998).
EB = *Essays on Bioethics* (1993/1996).
SOE = *Sorting Out Ethics* (1997/19xx).
OP = *Objective Prescriptions, and Other Essays* (1999/199x).

* = I own at least one version.

Bibliographies are in PI (1949-71), MT (1971-82), *Hare and Critics* (1981-89), *Moralisches Denken* (1949-92), *Zum Moralischen Denken* (1949-95; which I have), and SOE (1949-98).