Coode Island/Point Lillias: Case Study - Intergovernmental Resource (Miss)ManagementVice President, Australian Conservation Foundation Director, Sustainable Solutions Pty Ltd
Introduction
Between 1985 and 1990 there was a series of serious hazardous chemical fires and leaks in the inner Western Suburbs of Melbourne. Over time community groups voiced increasing concern over the location of Victoria's major non-petroleum hazardous chemical storage situated at Coode Island at the junction of the Yarra and Maribyrnong Rivers. Most ammunitioning and de-ammunitioning of Australian Navy ships take place in Sydney Harbour. Armaments are trucked though the Western Suburbs of Sydney and then transported by barge down the harbour. About 80 times a year the minister for Defence signs a public safety waiver to activate this armaments 'pipeline'. The Australian Capital Territory of Jervis Bay was created in 1913, along with the other bit, with the aim of giving the Australian Navy a home in Commonwealth Territory . Anyone who has been there will know that Jervis Bay is a very beautiful place and over time many people became dedicated to thwarting the navy's dream of using it as a fleet base. Never one to miss a populist opportunity, Prime minister Hawke announced the commonwealth's decision not to relocate the fleet base to Jervis Bay when he opened the Australian Conservation Foundation's relocated headquarters in 1989. However, the Defence Department still cherished hopes of replacing the Sydney armaments pipeline and depot with an East Coast Armaments Complex (ECAC) at Jervis Bay. Since the early 1960s the Defence Department has operated a small armaments storage facility at the Point Wilson Explosives Area (PWEA) on Western Port Philip Bay. The unthinkable event that would eventually cause all of the above factors to collide occurred at 2.20pm on 21 August 1991. Coode Island caught fire, the conflagration involving 18 storage tanks holding a range of hazardous chemicals. A thick black pall of smoke travelled over the CDB, Providing spectacular television footage, before setting out over various places from the inner eastern suburbs to the Mornington Peninsula. By dinner time the smoke had cleared, reassuring noises had been made by the authority's and most Melbourne residents (except for near neighbours of Coode) probably slept fairly soundly. The unthinkable had happened but we all still seemed to be here. However little did we know that the fire had not been put out. All though the night a flame at the base of one of the tanks defied all attempts at extinguishment. At 11am on August 22nd the black cloud re-appeared. By lunchtime an almost universally unmeasurable public was articulating its experience in five words; 'That place has to go'. The Coode Island Review Panel. Within a week the Kirner Government has appointed a six person Coode Island Review Panel, comprising a living treasure as Chair (John Landy), a former mayor of Footscray, (Lyn Kosky) a trade unionist (Brian Boyd), a chemical industrialist (Ron Cameron), an economist (John Harper), and an en environmentalist (the author). The panel had broad terms of reference but its core tasks were:
In developing the panel's work programme a most important early consideration was the development of a framework for public consultation. This included upfront development of a consultation protocol, a clear statement of the panel's intent in this area against which it's performance could be measured. Over the next seven months the panel produced six detailed public reports and undertook four major rounds of public consultation supplemented by a wide range of other consultative activities. Along the way the minister for Labour, Mr. Pope, created a major media event by releasing a post fire audit by regulatory authorities which revealed more than 400 breaches of regulations by the Coode Island Operators. An absolutely disgraceful performance by industry, said Mr Pope. 'Indeed' said the public, 'but if regulatory authorities had been doing their job they would have known about the breaches long ago and maybe they wouldn¼t have happened: that's a greater disgrace.' The panel's phase 1 report contained 15 recommendations on means of making Coode Island safer in the short term. The 57 recommendations in the final report provided a comprehensive policy framework including a recommendation that a highly degraded isolated site at West Point Wilson be subjected to environmental assessment as a site for a proposed bulk liquid chemical storage and port facility. West Point Wilson was the only candidate left standing out of almost 20 options considered by the panel. Throughout March 1993 we were concerned that we would discover some fatal flaw which would preclude recommendation of the site. The final report also recommended the creation of a Statuary Authority to oversee the facility shift, with an Interim Taskforce to be created to keep things moving. The panel recommended to the government that it announce the membership of the taskforce at the same time as it released and responded to the final report (7 April 1992). Only two members of the panel indicated a preparedness to be considered for membership of the taskforce. Environmental assessment of West Point Wilson was supported in general by national statewide and urban environmental groups; it was opposed in general by groups with a nature conservation remit only and Geelong based groups. The West Point Wilson site is very close to the Defence Department's PWEA. The panel's sitting recommendation was dependent, at minimum, on some reconfiguration of facility's on Defence land to achieve proper safety separation between the two storage facilities. The panel recommended that the State Government negotiate with the Commonwealth, with a view to achieving decommissioning of the little used PWEA. Meanwhile, what was the defence department up to ? Unsurprisingly, they were beavering away on their ECAC dream. A Commonwealth Inter Departmental Committee had developed a secret list of over 80 possible sites which had been pared back to five; Gladstone, Port Stephen, (near Newcastle) Jervis Bay (still Defence's first choice) Twofold bay (a bit of a blind really) and Point Wilson. Several environmental groups said Point Stephen was worth considering. When we next saw Defence's list of options it had been pared down to four, Port Stephen had been removed. So after consulting with our Queensland colleagues we then suggested Gladstone and the list became three, but at least this time they gave a reason. Defence said that if we had an ECAC in Gladstone it might be captured before they saw an enemy coming. Unfortunately, as the Defence manoeuvring reached this advanced and obvious stage, some groups deeply committed to saving Jervis Bay began to pick losers and actively began suggesting Point Wilson as the site for an ECAC. They were joined by a minority of the groups opposed to the chemical Facility at West Point Wilson. In December 1992 The Australian Conservation Foundation wrote to the Prime Minister in recognition of the need to remove the armaments pipeline from Sydney, and suggesting the Coode Island Review Panel as a potential model for resolving the complex of issues. We offered to help but the suggestion and offer was never taken up. Back on the Chemical Storage Front. The Kirner Government released the Final Report on 7 April 1992, accepting 55 of the 57 recommendations immediately, with the other two subject to further consideration. However it approached the formation of the Taskforce with less alacrity then had been hoped for and the Quaintly named Safer Chemical Storage Taskforce did not meet until 27 May 1992. It comprised a chair from the construction industry (Peter Vaughan), two representatives of the chemical industry (Alan Seale and Ken Langley), a planner (Jenny Love) a trade unionist (Brian Boyd) an environmentalist (me again), the head of the Geelong Regional Commission (Colin Atkins), and the head of the Port of Geelong Authority (Peter Morgan). The symbolism of the last two appointees, who were there to inter alia represent the Geelong community created some credibility problems. It was seen as a mechanism for externalising possible dissent from the Geelong community which could have been given expression though the appointment of local government or community based representation. Based upon the Panel's recommendation, the Taskforce reported directly to the Premier, (rather than the Minister for Labour as previously) and it tackled its work programme with alacrity and diligence. A draft Bill to create the proposed Statutory Authority was finalised in early August but got lost in the turmoil preceding the calling of an election in early October.
On 1 June 1992 the Minister for Planning and Housing wrote to the premier suggesting a delay in the development of an Environmental Effects Statement (EES) and otherwise marginalising the role of the Taskforce. The Premier Responded (in part):
'The statutory responsibility's outlined in your letter are clear and entirely appropriate. However a number of associated matters should be clarified, if not corrected.
These matters involve:
Following the election of the Kennett Government in October, the Taskforce was directed to report to the Junior Minister for Industry Services rather then the Premier. Industry Services Minister Pescott began opening policy on the desirability of having both a chemical facility and an armaments complex on Western Port Philip Bay, a matter which concerned the Taskforce greatly. Premier Kennett wrote to Commonwealth Defence Minister Ray stating categorically that Victoria needed access to the West Point Wilson site and Ray responded that if that were the case the Commonwealth would abandon Point Wilson as an option for ECAC However by now the Taskforce was on borrowed time. Remarkably it took a further nine months before it was sacked by the minister for Industry Services (on 2 December 1993) along with the chief Executive of its Secretariat. It was replaced by an invisible committee made up of industry and business interests. The new committee rubber stamped a proposal by its Secretariat to re-open the siting options for a chemical storage facility- the open siting process of the Coode Island Review Panel was about to be over turned by a secret investigation. In early February the West Point Wilson EES Consultative committee was told of the existence of point Wilson sites 1 and 2, but no one would show the committee where site 2 was was on a map, the reason being site 2 really was Point Lillias . After two meetings of being confronted with refusals to confirm or deny that secret site 2 was really Point Lilias- a site in the heart of the Ramsar area and which would lead to massive degradation of 800 m of Coastline though construction of an along- shore berth- the Statewide Environment Groups withdrew from the EES Consultative Committee. for about six months . This was not because of our opposition to degredation of Point Lillias, but due to simply being lied to as part of the process- a corruption we were not prepared to tolerate. The point Lillias Environmental Effects Statement was eventually published in December 1995, 40 months after the first meeting of the West Point Wilson EES Consultative Committee ( a record which is testimony to the undue processes followed) In writing the EES, spin doctoring became an art form. In the EES it is claimed:
The Commonwealth press release announced the proposed siting of ECAC at Point Wilson would be subject to an independent Public Inquiry under section 11 of the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1975. This inquiry ruled out consideration of:
Excisions are permitted 'in the urgent national interests' under the Ramsar Convention. While fully supporting that replacing Coode is in the urgent national interest, the combined environmental groups (Australian Conservation Foundation, Environment Victoria, Greenpeace, Friends of the earth and the Hazardous Materials Action Group) remain convinced that point Wilson is a far better option than Point Lillias. Ironically the shake up of the Australian Defence Forces announced a couple of weeks ago massively diminishes the requirement for an concentrated ECAC, and particularly one so far remote from any likely aggressive threat. Despite this, the Commonwealth announced that Australia would become only the second country to excise part of a Ramsar area (although the spin doctors didn't put it quite that way.) Conclusion: This case study has described an open and in many ways seminal process at State Level which was corrupted. It has described at total reluctance at Commonwealth Level to follow any sort of open process at until virtually all options were closed off. When these two process collided it is unsurprising that a grossly sub-optimal outcome occurred. It also instances a worrying trend to replace broadly representative panels, taskforces and advisory committees with monocultural groups of mates and vested business interests. This practise has become particularly entrenched in Victoria and as one who lived for a long time in Western Australia. I find it difficult not to draw parallells with WA inc. Although it seems to me that the boys from WA were never as dismissive of public participation as are the current crop in Victoria
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