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Southeastern Europe

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and

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Preface

Through the long-awaited publication of this volume of studies on the politics and culture of Southeastern Europe, UNESCO-CEPES is expressing its support for the activities carried out by the UNESCO Chair in Southeast European Studies, at the University of Arts in Bucharest, Romania. It is also giving proof of the broadening of its base of activities from that of international co-operation in higher education - the fundamental activity and mission of UNESCO-CEPES since its founding in 1972 - to one that reflects the other main sectors of activity of UNESCO as a whole, particularly the natural sciences, the social and human sciences, and culture. Such an enlarged mission evokes the second function of UNESCO-CEPES, that of the UNESCO Office in Bucharest.

The UNITWIN/UNESCO Chairs programme was launched in 1991, the acronym, UNITWIN, standing for "Programme for Reinforcing Inter-University Co-operation and Academic Mobility through Twinning Arrangements". In the words of Professor Dumitru Chiţoran (*in*, *Higher Education in Europe* 21 2-3 [1996]: 91-92) one of the initiators of the programme:

> It was meant to mark a return to the spirit of international academic solidarity, through twinning, networking, and other linking arrangements among universities. The Programme was also designed as an innovative form for the rapid transfer of knowledge and for institutional development in higher education, including the establishment of transnational centers for advanced studies and research, as a means to redress the widening knowledge gap between industrially developed and developing countries. One other aim of the programme is to alleviate the negative effects of the brain drain.

Regarding the "UNESCO Chair in Southeast European Studies", the 1999 UNESCO publication, *Directory/Répertoire UNESCO Chairs UNITWIN Chaires UNESCO* (Paris: UNESCO, 1999) lists the fields and disciplines that it covers as "language, cultural development, and intercultural dialogue". The Chairholder of this UNESCO Chair is the eminent Romanian art historian, Professor Răzvan Theodorescu, who, as of January 2001, is Romanian Minister of Culture. It is his inspiration that has given rise to the publication of this volume. In addition to the Chairholder, the Chair also has two associate professors, Romanian academics, Nicolae-Şerban Tanaşoca and Adrian Pop, both of whom have contributed to this volume.

According to the Directory cited above, the "UNESCO Chair in South-East European Studies" has the following objectives:

> To promote an integrated system of research, training, information and documentation activities in the field of languages and civilization in the subregion including [the] following activities: Development of postgraduate study programmes in various universities of the subregion; preparation of a comparative analysis of development, including the Central European countries, the Mediterranean area and the Near East; Establishment of an information and communication center; Establishment of a cultural advisory group for the resolution of conflicts in the subregion (p. 236).

Thus the authors, who have contributed to this volume, have undertaken a mostly historical comparative analysis of the cultural and political heritage of the Southeastern European subregion by concentrating on certain major common elements: the Byzantine heritage in terms of language, particularly rhetoric, political tradition and structure, religion, and art (I-III); the continued survival of islands of Latinity in the subregion following the Hellenization of the Eastern Roman Empire and the arrival and settlement of newcomers, particularly the Slavic peoples (IV); common Christianity-related themes in the folklore of the subregion (V); common and clashing themes in the various Nineteenth and Twentieth Century nationalist awakenings and struggles in the subregion (VI); and finally, the common experience of totalitarian rule in most of the area that has been followed by different approaches to transition (VII).

Three of the contributors to the volume have dealt extensively with the Byzantine heritage.

In the first study, Professor Nicolae-Şerban Tanaşoca, a classical philologist by training, who is Professor of General and Comparative Literature at the University of Arts in Bucharest, examines the link between imperial ideology and classicizing rhetoric in different types of Byzantine historical writing, particularly chronicles and histories, and the role of Attic Greek and classical Latin survivals in the development of a distinctive literary style. The latter, he points out, reflects the linguistically diglot nature of the literati in the late Roman Empire - Greek for culture; Latin for government - and explains why the evolution of Byzantine historical writing over time reflected a decline in its scientific value and ossification in terms of its literary merit.

In the second study, Professor Răzvan Theodorescu explains how the relatively abrupt and spectacular conversion to Orthodox Christianity of the Slavic peoples in Southeastern Europe around the year 1000 pushed the rulers of the nascent medieval states of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Kievian Russia to undertake the construction of richly decorated religious edifices (the Royal Church of Pliska, the Preslav Circular Church, the Church of the Studenica Monastery, etc.), usually in capital towns as a reflection of the architectural splendour of imperial Constantinople. That this type of construction did not appear in those areas, North of the Danube river, where the Romanian state would crystallize, is explained by the fact that the local inhabitants were already Christian and had been so for many

centuries, for they had formed part of the Christian Community of the Roman Empire. The local rulers and Church leaders, therefore, did not feel the need to mark, through brilliant ecclesiastic art and architecture, a transition from a previously barbaric and Pagan state.

In the third study, Professor Stelian Brezeanu, a specialist in Byzantine and medieval Balkan history at the University of Bucharest, focuses on the Byzantine political heritage in Southeastern Europe, particularly during the Thirteenth through Fifteenth Centuries, a period that witnessed the break-up and the extinction of the Byzantine Empire. He traces the subtleties of the meanings of the titles and the regalia adopted by the rulers of the successor states: Bulgaria (the First and Second Czardoms), Serbia, Kievian Russia, and eventually, the Grand Duchy of Muscovy and the Romanian Principalities. For these new states, the adoption of Byzantine titles, including that of *basileus*, autocrator, or czar, and symbols of imperial authority, could, when rulers like Czar Simeon of Bulgaria (893-927) or Stephen Dushan (1331-1355) of Serbia were at the head of powerful state structures, serve to back a claim to rule in Constantinople as universal *Basileus*, or, for weaker rulers, to claim protection and recognition as members of the "family of princes" who recognized the universal authority of the Constantinople *Basileus*. In the case of the nascent Romanian Principalities, adoption of third-level vassalage and the corresponding title of prince (*domn*) in regard to far-off Constantinople as well as remaining within the Christian Orthodox fold served as an ideological underpinning to resistance on the part of Walachia (Argeş) and Moldavia to incorporation into the feudal Kingdom of Hungary, particularly after Voivode Bassarab inflicted a very real military defeat on King Charles I of Hungary (1308-1342), at the Battle of Posada in 1330. In short, as the power of Constantinople waned, successor states on a Byzantine model, with autocephalous Orthodox Patriarchates, would consolidate themselves, only, finally, to be conquered and dominated by the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. The one state that escaped the latter fate, the Muscovy Czardom, would, in a later era, "proclaim itself the political heir of the New Rome".

The fourth study, a second contribution by Professor Nicolae-Şerban Tanaşoca, moves from a discussion of Latin survivals in Byzantine rhetoric to one of ethno-linguistic survival, specifically, of "islands of Latinity" or of "Romanity" in the Eastern European successor states of the Roman/Byzantine Empire, a saga that he carries up to the present day. The people in question, who are variously called "Vlachs", "Aromanians", and South-Danubian Romanians, are linguistically linked to the "Daco-Romanians" of North-Danubian Romania and could be found as far West as Istria in what is now Croatia. Some of their communities, Moscopolis, for instance, acquired great cultural and economic importance in the Eighteenth-Century Pindus region of Northern Greece and in Macedonia. As these communities formed non-contiguous "foreign" nuclei that were surrounded by more numerous and homogenous ethno-national groupings, and were linked, linguistically, with Romania, North of the

Danube, their presence became problematic as the principal Balkan peoples coalesced, in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, into nations with conflicting nationalisms.

Professor Tanaşoca, who provides a wide-ranging analysis of the scholarly literature on the Vlachs/Aromanians from several national points of view, considers them to be a people who, by their presence in the Balkans and their cultural and economic skills, have been a force for transnational linkages in the area. The chapter includes a fascinating study of the Asenid Dynasty, founded by two brothers, John and Peter Asen, who, after 1185, created the Second Bulgarian Czardom in rebellion against the Byzantine Empire that had extinguished and absorbed the First Bulgarian Czardom in 1018. The peculiarity of this successful dynasty, that was centered at Târnovo, well South of the Danube, is that its founders were probably Vlachs, and not Bulgars.

The succeeding study (V) that deals with Christianity-related Balkan folk traditions, dwells on a major contribution of the Byzantine Greek heritage, that of the Orthodox Church. Dr. Sabina Ispas, Director of the Institute of Ethnography and Folklore of the Romanian Academy, delivers a *tour d'horizon* of the various ways Christian Orthodox teachings have infused themselves into local folk traditions throughout the Balkans, giving rise to a fairly uniform body of folklore that can be found from Southern Greece to Northern Romania and from Western Serbia to the Black Sea.

The final two studies (VI and VII), that deal squarely with the modern and contemporary history of Southeastern Europe, have been written by two Romanian specialists.

Dr. Gheorghe Zbuchea, author of the first one of these studies, on nationalism and national ideas in Southeastern Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, is a Senior Lecturer in Balkan History, both at the University of Bucharest and at Spiru Haret University, also in Bucharest. He develops a broad historical panorama of the ultimately successful, but conflicting, national movements of Greece (the first to achieve independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1822), Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia (including an analysis of the conflicting aims and ideals of Serbia, the first of the Yugoslav states to be fully independent in 1878, and of Croatia, the other pole of South Slav nationalism, freed by the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918) with a discussion both of the origins of modern Greek nationalism among the Phanariot Greek community of Moldavia and of the vicissitudes of the communities of Balkan Romanians (Vlachs, Aromanians) in Northern Greece and Southern Yugoslavia.

Dr. Adrian Pop, the author of the final study, is the Deputy Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History in Bucharest. He delivers a *tour d'horizon* of the end of communism in Eastern Europe, including the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. In so doing, he has identified six transition paths: "transition through negotiation" (Poland and Hungary); "transition through

capitulation" (the former German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia); "transition through *coup d'état* and liberalization" (Bulgaria); "transition through popular uprising and *coup d'état*" (Romania); "transition through liberalization and collapse" (Albania); and "transition through liberalization and implosion" (the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia).

The authors of this volume have clearly illustrated many aspects of the long, tumultuous, and rich history of Southeastern Europe. Although the region contributed one of its geographical names, "Balkan" (derived from the word for mountain in Turkish) to world political terminology as a synonym for extreme political and national fragmentation, Professor Theodorescu and his team of scholars have shown us that the region shares many commonalities: numerous historical, cultural, and political themes that could serve as a basis for greater subregional cohesion. They have also reminded us that in this subregion of Europe, "almost three-thousand years ago, the European continent was spiritually born".

Jan Sadlak

Director of UNESCO-CEPES

Foreword

RĂZVAN THEODORESCU and LELAND CONLEY BARROWS

This volume includes the principal lectures that were delivered during the first academic year (1997-1998) of operation of the UNESCO Chair in Southeast European Studies at the University of Arts in Bucharest.

Benefiting from the continuing support of the UNESCO European Center for Higher Education (UNESCO-CEPES), this Chair hopes to lay the basis for a series of multi-disciplinary lectures delivered by visiting professors – historians of the arts, of beliefs, and of literature; political scientists, ethnologists, geographers, etc., that will be periodically produced in printed form. Their common concern is one of the most complex cultural regions of the European continent and of the world: Southeastern Europe.

This volume is constructed around certain common themes that emphasize the peculiarities of this European area that is situated at one of the main crossroads of certain old empires and modern civilizations. It presents the Southeastern European region as a space with, at least, three features:

A *Christian space*, consisting both of an ancient, sedentary Christianity inherited from the Roman world (the case of Romania) and a newer Christianity that emerged through the conversion to Christianity of certain barbaric and nomadic tribes (the case of the Slavic and the Turanic peoples, later, the Serbian and the Bulgarian nations). A comparative look makes possible some conclusions as to the conversion to Christianity in the Balkan-Slavic world and as to the Romanian exception, which explains some elements of a *longue durée* parallel history. The Christian spirit, which shaped the medieval and modern civilization of Southeastern Europe, created, at the same time, the Byzantine model for political and state structures in the Slavic and Romanian worlds.

A *space of Latinity*, too, that emerged from the provincial horizon of Rome. It gave birth to the Latinity of the "Second Rome" – called Byzantium – with many echoes in the field of politics, arts, and literature, and to an imperial ideology and classicizing Byzantine rhetoric, in that ethnic and cultural island of the Balkans – a king of old and fragmentary "Romania" – preserved in the Balkan memory since the medieval "Kingdom of Bulgarians and Vlachs" through the "Aromanians" of today.

Lastly, a *post-totalitarian space*, covering much of the area. Here civil society is improving itself in a rather slow but positive way, after the momentous changes of 1989-1990. It has inherited a part of

the nationalist tradition of the Nineteenth Century, with many nuances that vary from country to country, in some cases reaching a climax in terms of a national idea as in the case of "Greater Serbia" – the results of which are evident in recent events in former Yugoslavia.

Research on the civilization of Southeastern Europe, with its natural extension toward Central Europe and Russia, remains one of the major aims of humanist interdisciplinary studies devoted to this dramatic contemporary world. The region is a place of modern conflicts over sometimes planetary issues, a place of uncommon religious tolerance in the past, a place where, almost three thousand years ago, the European continent was spiritually born.

I. Imperial Ideology and Classicizing Rhetoric in Byzantine Historical Writing

NICOLAE-ŞERBAN TANAŞOCA

A. PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Byzantine historical writing provides researchers with a vast field of investigation useful for obtaining a professional knowledge of Byzantine culture and civilization. At the same time, it stimulates researchers to think fruitfully about the condition and the limits of general historical knowledge as well as about the position of the historian in a given society, Byzantine society in this case. Up until now, this field of investigation has not been sufficiently exploited for a number of objective reasons. Neither Byzantine historical writing, nor indeed, the entire corpus of Byzantine literary production has been the object of high quality publications produced according to the standards of modern philology. There is a need for monographs that are focused on the intellectual and political characteristics of Byzantine historians. There is also a need for scholarly studies about the world that these historians, each one in his or her own way, described in their writings. The necessary work tools are also lacking (dictionaries, grammars, glossaries, and thesauri of historical devices and figures of speech) needed to decode the mysteries of Byzantine historiographic and literary activity.

On the other hand, some rare attempts have been made to go beyond the usual approach that has been (predominantly philological or a reflection of the perspective of criticism of sources of this corpus of historical writing) rightly considered to be one of the richest and most interesting aspects of Byzantine creativity.

Very little, for instance, has been written about the Byzantine historiographic method and outlook, about the Byzantine philosophy of history, or about the aesthetic consciousness of Byzantine historians. For this reason, contemporary information about Byzantine historical writing and judgements as to its scientific and literary value are dominated by prejudices and commonplace phrases borrowed from older conceptions of Byzantine studies. Under their burden, the distinct outlines of various personalities who illustrated this historical writing are sometimes blurred, the connections between it and Byzantine life or the philosophical, literary, and political ideas in different stages of the history of Byzantium are not always visible or understandable, while Byzantine historical writing as a whole is belittled as a cultural phenomenon and is viewed in most cases as only a source of historical information.

In recent years, a strong tendency in favour of the renewal of studies focusing on Byzantine historical writing as well as on the Byzantine world and civilization in general has come into being. Increased objectivity, along with increased efforts directed at interpreting Byzantine historical writing as an intriguing cultural phenomenon in and of itself, as an original expression of a well-individualized society, has cast a new light on some of its less known aspects and features. Increased understanding has eliminated a number of formerly held scholarly outlooks and tentative conclusions.

An example is the way in which Herbert Hunger (1978) abandoned the old, rigid classification of the corpus of Byzantine historical writing as one composed of *histories* and of *chronicles*, imposed by Karl Krumbacher at the end of the Nineteenth Century, choosing instead to bring together in one cultural compartment all historical works and to stress the common features of all of the so-called histories and chronicles of the same epoch. How impressed the reader is today by the work and personality of John Skylitzes now that his historical writings have been belatedly disinterred from the alluvia of George Kedrenos's compilation and published for the first time in a scholarly publication series by Johannes Thurn. Equally refreshing has been Gyula Moravcsik's attempt (1966), to reveal and to characterize the classicism of Byzantine historical writing, that is, its permanence as related to the cultural style of the entire Byzantine intellectual creation. Finally, to give one more example, the research undertaken by such scholars as Rosario Anastasi (1969) or J. Ljubarsky has been helpful in bringing about a better understanding of the historiographic originality of such a Byzantine historian as Michael Psellos, both in terms of his historical philosophy and of his method and writing technique.

On a different occasion, the author (1979a) undertook a vast lexicographic survey of the erudition of the language of Byzantine historical writing between the Sixth and the Tenth Centuries. His aim was to make a contribution to the elucidation of a problem in linguistic history related to Byzantine vocabulary, that of Latinisms. He then drew up a complete *répertoire* of words of Latin origin and of their Greek derivatives as existing in the language of Byzantine historians who lived and wrote during that period. On the same occasion, the author sketched a few general remarks as to the value and the stylistic role of Latinisms in Byzantine literature, particularly in historical writing.

In what follows, this problem is evoked, but from a different angle, *i.e.*, that of the specificity of the language of the historian and of his ideological conditioning. By looking at what became of the Latinisms used by Byzantine authors of histories and chronicles between the Sixth and the Tenth Centuries, one can attempt to define the twofold conditioning – rhetorical and ideological – of Latin, as well as the way it became integrated into the evolving cultural and ideological style of Byzantium. The age in question is that of the formation of the classic Byzantine civilization that flourished in the Tenth Century, during the period of "the

first Byzantine humanism" (Paul Lemerle, 1971) that was nurtured by the so-called Macedonian Dynasty (867-1056).

This approach to Byzantine historical writing is in its turn an effort in favour of the renewal of methods in the movement of ideas in current Byzantinology. The author hopes to provide a solid basis for research by limiting himself to Latinisms of the Sixth through Tenth Centuries and by making use of the results of a very thorough analytical investigation. An opening up to a synthesis was encouraged by other research activities on Byzantine ideology covering exactly the same time span. A recent example of this type of renovating research was that of Gilbert Dagron (1969) who studied the formation of Byzantium and of the Byzantine mentality. Another encouraging element was the fresh impetus of activities focusing on the characterization of the language of historians.

A principal impetus for these activities was provided by the session debates during the XXth World Congress of Historical Sciences that was held from 10 to 17 August 1980, in Bucharest. This study, therefore, takes advantage, on the one hand, of the progress of Byzantinology, and on the other hand, of developments related to the theory of history.

B. BYZANTINE HISTORICAL WRITING BETWEEN THE SIXTH AND THE TENTH CENTURIES

For Byzantine historical literature, the age between the Sixth and the Tenth Centuries is critically important and very rich in achievement. During this period, the classic types of Byzantine historical writing were established: the contemporary history, the universal chronicle, the historical poem in verses which in most cases are encomiastic, the historical encyclopaedia structured on various topics, and the historical pamphlet, a borderline genre, falling between history and fiction. At this time also, both prose and epic poetry develop their own (specifically Byzantine) styles that mature in the Tenth Century during the Macedonian Dynasty. This evolution toward the establishment of an original Byzantine style closely accompanied the processes of crystallization of a Byzantine classical political ideology which the writing of history was called upon to disseminate and to serve.

The Sixth and the Tenth Centuries, which delimit the long phase of development of Byzantine historical writing with which this chapter deals, were times of intense and varied production, centuries of great intellectual effervescence and of original creation in all the fields of intellectual activity. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Centuries are not as relevant, from a historiographic perspective, as is the Tenth Century, because these three centuries did not give rise to very many written texts having a genuinely historiographic character. The period was one of domestic unrest, *i.e.,* the fierce controversies about the cult of icons and of incessant clashes with foreign invaders: Slavs, Avars, Bulgars, Arabs, which brought about a decline of Byzantine culture, a spectacular diminishing of the strength and

the world prestige of the Empire, and also, for a while, a territorial constriction.

Equally important is the fact that a fundamental change in the basic nature of the Byzantine State and of Byzantine culture, *i.e.*, Hellenization, occurred during this period. This change is all the more relevant in that the age itself was a "troubled" and "obscure" age, a time when the Empire went through a crisis and had to restrict its territory to regions inhabited predominantly by Greek-speaking peoples. If during Justinian's golden century the Empire was still bilingual and made equal use of Latin and Greek, if it was still a truly Roman Empire, by the Tenth Century, after the crisis, the Constantinople Empire was a purely Greek state in which only the Greek language was used. Few contacts with Latin culture and civilization were preserved, and the Empire set itself apart from the old Roman state (although continuing it to a certain extent) and of the Latin language and the Western world, from which it would be fully separated in the next century, after the great religious schism of 1054 between Rome and Constantinople.

It is necessary to mention, in passing, the principal Byzantine historians and chroniclers who were active between the Sixth and the Tenth centuries. It is they who actually represent the documentary basis for this study.

In the Sixth (Justinian's) Century, Byzantine historical writing could boast several high-caliber personalities. It was the period of Procopius of Caesarea (d. 565) who wrote about Justinian's wars and constructions. Procopius was also the author of a pamphlet, titled *The Secret History*, that was directed against the very same emperor. Procopius, who is considered to have been the first great Byzantine historian, wrote in an archaizing language that was closely linked to ancient classical historiographic traditions. A lawyer by profession and thoroughly acquainted with Latin, he was the typical official court historian.

To the same literary and historiographic category belong Agathias of Myrina (c.532-c.580), whose intention it was to follow Procopius, and Menander *Protector*, the continuator of Agathias of Myrina. John of Epiphaneia, Secretary to the Antiochian Patriarch, was the author of certain works about the Byzantine-Persian wars and is also linked to ancient traditions, but was at the same time strongly influenced by Eastern culture and was much more attached to Christianity than his contemporaries were.

A very interesting Sixth Century personality was that of John Lawrence of Lydos (Lydia) who wrote a number of scholarly texts about the Roman world. John Lawrence was a typical representative of Justinian's Byzantine public servants, a keen supporter of ancient culture, and a fierce advocate of turning Latin into the official language of the Byzantine state.

In the same Sixth Century, one also meets John Malalas, the author of the first universal Byzantine chronicle, a work that set the basis for a new and fully original historiographic genre. Also a lawyer by training, Malalas wrote *Chronographia* (a universal chronicle) on world historical events

occurring between Genesis and the author's own period. Written in a language closely resembling the spoken tongue, the chronicle refers to all sorts of events, political, military, religious, as well natural disasters, mirabilia, and other strange things. This work was very widely read. This type of historical writing would be widely cultivated in Byzantium. Frequently chronicles would be compiled in order to bring recent periods up-to-date.

So far as the Seventh Century is concerned, only three monuments of historical writing have survived. The first of these is Theophylactus of Simocatta's *History*, that was dedicated to the rule of Emperor Mauricius. It is an archaizing work, characterized by a fastidious rhetorical style. It opened a new phase in the evolution of Byzantine historical writing as its contents are more dominated by religiosity and political conformism than, say, the work of Procopius. The second high caliber historical text of the Seventh Century is the *Chronicon Paschale*, an anonymous chronography written along Malalean lines, in which there are vast compilations of the work of John Malalas. Finally, the third historiographic monument of the century is Georgios Pisides's versified work. It consists of three epic encomiastic poems devoted to Emperor Heraclius, all pervaded by religious fervour and a literary archaizing classicism.

The only known historian in the Eighth Century is Georgios Synkellos, a high ecclesiastic servant in Constantinople, author of a universal chronicle. He did not have time to carry his writing beyond the year, 284, the date of the accession of Emperor Diocletian.

Three historical works have survived from the Ninth Century. The first, written by an anonymous author, is entitled *The Life of John the Armenian* and can be viewed as either a contemporary history or as a fragment of a universal history in which the innovation (which will be typically Byzantine later on) was the determination and the justification of the political attitude of the author in theological terms. It is a clearly anti-iconoclastic writing.

The second work is the *Universal Chronicle*, by Theophanes the Confessor, a typically Byzantine (and classical) chronicle relying on a large number of sources – the works of predecessors – mainly made accessible by means of the compilation of a previous chronicler that is now lost. Theophanes was a monk of aristocratic origin who was politically aware and religiously involved along anti-iconoclastic lines. He wrote in a very accessible language for his less cultivated fellow monks and was well acquainted with (and interested in) events in Eastern Byzantium, which, all in all, were typical features of the intellectual life of that time.

The third *Chronography* of the Ninth Century belongs to Georgios Hamartolos. It is a compilation of events of world history up to the year 847. Only its final part is original. A typical Byzantine monk, the author turns religious values into fundamental criteria for the choice and classification of historical raw material. His work is deliberately written in plain language, and he is manifestly opposed (on religious grounds) to those who cultivated the traditions of ancient Pagan rhetoric. Georgios

Hamartolos's *Chronography* circulated widely in the Orthodox world until very late, both in the original and in Slavonic translation.

A rich corpus of historical writings came into being in the Tenth Century at the time of "the first Byzantine humanism" or of the "Byzantine Renaissance", under the patronage of the Macedonian Dynasty. The best cultivators of the ancient rhetorical traditions, restored in a moderate spirit and in good taste, with no archaizing excesses, were Joseph Genesios, Simeon Magister (author of a universal chronicle), John Kaminatos (author of a narrative of the conquest of Salonika by the Arabs), Leo the Deacon (a historian of events occurring at the end of the Tenth Century), but especially Constantine VII *Porphyrogenitus*, himself both an emperor and an erudite author of encyclopaedic historical works concerning almost all aspects of state life. Finally, the continuators of the work of Theophanes the Confessor should be mentioned, authors of a corpus of chronicles about Byzantine historical events between 813 and 961. They continued Theophanes's work in an effort undertaken at the initiative and even with the contribution of Constantine *Porphyrogenitus* that resulted in a representative text for the moderate classicism of the Macedonian Renaissance.

In short, Byzantine historiography between the Sixth and the Tenth centuries was produced by a very large number of authors of various social backgrounds and ranks in Byzantine society. From the petty bureaucrat to the Emperor, from the humble and fanatical monk to the cultivated, high ranking servant of the Patriarchate who was deeply involved in court life, from the imperial servant of Western origin, to the Anatolian aristocrat - all Byzantine social categories had their say so far as the writing of history was concerned.

The intellectual backgrounds of these authors of historical writings varied a great deal. Some of them had graduated from Byzantine law schools and had acquired a good command of the Latin language and culture. Others had been educated in the Greek ecclesiastic environment, especially in monasteries, and were dominated by a narrow confessional vision of the world and of its history. There were also some intimate connoisseurs of Eastern cultures (which influenced them all), as well as intellectuals with backgrounds in Greek or Greco-Roman classical philosophy, prone to a certain philosophical scepticism.

The styles of these historians varied. Some wrote in an archaizing Greek of ancient inspiration, others in a language close to the currently used one of the period; some emulated ancient historiographic models; others stuck to the chronicle pattern established by Malalas; some tried to be as personal as possible in what they wrote; others went in for mere compilation.

A certain diversity can be identified in the political and even the ideological commitments of these writers. Some of them were legitimists who worshipped the Emperor and whose conformism was rigorous and unshakeable. Others were free spirits, who expressed certain reservations (if not open hostility) toward the central power.

Obviously, Byzantine historical writing between the Sixth and the Tenth Centuries is not a uniform and homogeneous bloc. It includes different voices reflecting distinct personalities as well as various trends of thought. However, there are many elements of unity and similitude among the various works, and within the whole Byzantine tradition of historical writing, one can identify a certain air of unity and homogeneity.

This unity is visible at two levels. There is, first of all, the stylistic level at which a degree of unity is conferred by the Byzantine classicizing vision of literary writing and by the existence of certain canons concerning the structure of written work and of phrase modulation. Then there is the ideological level, in its broad sense, at which unity is conferred by a certain Byzantine vision of man, society, the world, and history. Byzantine historiographic conceptions and methods were also unitary and stable from the Sixth to the Tenth Centuries. Historians feel they are taking part in a common work throughout the centuries, hence the practice of continuity in the cases of a number of chronicles which, interrupted at a certain point by their initial authors, are taken up by successors. Byzantine historians did not know how to innovate in regard to the truth of the past or in regard to the discovery of new sources. The past was not investigated; however, its memory was passed on from one generation to the next.

The literary diversity of Byzantine historiography has to be understood mainly as a variety of genres, types of writing, and literary forms permitted and defined by very strict literary canons, either inherited from the rhetoric of late ancient times or based upon Byzantine rhetoric. Theoretically, personal originality was neither an aim in itself, nor a source of diversity for the various works written by Byzantine authors. Even less legitimate was ideological originality.

Ideology was considered to be unique and eternal. It was the ideology of Christian political Hellenism, as it was called, developed in principle in keeping with certain basic elements: the divine origin of the imperial power; the "symphonic" association between the Emperor and the Patriarch, between the State and the Church, in ruling over the fate of society through the mutual support that the lay and the religious authorities gave each other, in spite of their different types of sovereignty. There was the oecumenical, universal nature of the imperial power held by the *Romei's Autocrat*, the one and only legitimate heir to the Roman Empire and the missionary character of an empire intended to Christianize and to civilize the whole world.

Since history was expected to glorify the successes and to truthfully narrate the temporary failures of the Empire in the carrying out of its apostolic and civilizing mission, the differences between its narrators could only be personal or related to the evaluation of a certain moment or personality. But innovation in terms of the (immutable) general ideological principles was out of the question.

Despite the variety of studies comparing the works of Byzantine historical writing, the corpus can be considered as having a unitary

personality, of being a well individualized hypostasis of historicism, with all its specific features. This view is supported by the reality that Byzantine historiography was dominated by strict rhetorical principles to the extent that the writing of history represented a literary effort governed by rigid ideological principles and that it was propaganda. There were, without a doubt, both a single Byzantine historiographic language and a single Byzantine historiographic ideology, both of which the present study will attempt to define in a satisfactory way.

C. LATINISMS IN BYZANTINE HISTORICAL WRITING BETWEEN THE SIXTH AND THE TENTH CENTURIES

The presence of a significant number of words of Latin origin in the vocabularies of Byzantine historians from the Sixth to the Tenth Centuries is a characteristic feature of the language of Byzantine historical writing of the time. At the same time, Latinisms constitute a differentiating note of Byzantine historiography in relation to both its classical models, to which, in most cases, it adhered very closely, and to the languages of the fields of the Byzantine culture of the periods in question. They also equally represent an element of *rapprochement* between the language of Byzantine historiography and that currently spoken by the Byzantine people that included a high number of Latinisms. Therefore, an analysis of the literary and ideological meaning of the ways in which Latinisms penetrated the language of Byzantine historians serves as a good way to describe the specificity of this language.

From the Sixth to the Tenth Centuries, Byzantine historical writing made use of a number of Latin words drawn from the vocabulary of the state apparatus. The principal Byzantine offices and ranks had Latin names, as follows: *imperium, augoustos, comes, senatores, patrikios, illoustrios, koubikoularios, magistratos, offikia, skrinia, praiphektos, praitorion, noumerarios, primikerios, vestes, asekretis, taboularios, kyaistor, aktouarios,* etc. Many terms were derived from the military vocabulary: *exerkitos, milites, matrikes, hypokamison, armilausion, kampagos, kampagion, loros, korte, aplikton, kastron, metaton, kourson, kourseus,* etc.

Also, the vocabulary pertaining to the imperial liturgy was predominantly Latin. It expressed an adjusted form of the imperial cult that lasted throughout the history of Byzantium and included the following: *modiolon, sensos* (*sentzos*), *poulpiton, kamelaukion, kaisarikion, toupha, paganos, pallion, fibla, prokensos, prokinseuein, opsikion, moutatorion, kitation, kiteuo, kortina, vela,* etc. The same could also be said of the ovations in Latin that were recited at the Byzantine court for the imperial glory until very late in the history of the Byzantine Empire. Examples of Latinisms in the vocabulary of social relations and law include the following: *phamilia, phalseuma, kodix, edikton, indoulgentia, exkouseia, moultos, annona, kataboukoulon.*

One category of Latinisms that was quite well represented in historical writing is found in the vocabulary of international relations. It includes

Byzantine names for similar foreign institutions (*magistroi*, *domestikoi* for the Persians), institutions such as royalty (*rex*), and traditional Roman names concerning relationships with foreigners (*phoideratoi*, *pakton*, *pakteuo*, *traktaizo*, *trakteuo*). Certain Latinisms to be found in historical writing are also identifiable as having been derived from the religious vocabulary: *antimission*, *manoualion*, *doumnikalion*, *kellai*, *sekreta*, etc. The vocabulary of chronology was dominated by Latin elements, particularly during the first centuries of Byzantium. Not only were all the names of the months in the Byzantium calendar of Latin origin (*ianouarios*, *febrouarios*, *martios*, *aprillios*, *maios*, etc), but so were also certain elements of old chronology such as *nonai* and *eidoi*, as well as more recent elements, such as *indiktion*. There were many Latin words in the vocabulary of metrology: *milion*, *kentenarion*, *follis*, *denarion*, *modios*, *monetarios*, etc. The vocabulary of navigation and transportation also included Latinisms that are frequently represented in historical literature: *agrarion*, *barka*, *klassikos*, *veredos*, *veredarios*, *karroucha*, and *lektikion*. Finally, Byzantine historical writing between the Sixth and the Tenth centuries has quite a number of Latin or Roman source terms in the field of town planning (*regeones*, *phoros*, *strata*, *kinsterna*, *vivarion*), architecture (*palation*, *porta*, *skala*, *portikos*), lighting and heating systems (*kandella*, *kandelabron*, *karbounon*), food (*makelles*, *makellarios*, *lardi*, *mouston*, *bouttis*), and race courses (*velon*, *velarion*, *venetoi*, *albatoi*, *notarioi*, *bigarioi*).

The penetration of Latinisms into the language of Byzantine historical writing owed very little (as in the case of the learned antiquarian and book salesman, John of Lydos) to the Latin sources used by writers in their aspirations to evoke, in very precise terms, a different type of world. The vast majority, of terms of Latin origin used by Byzantine historians are not *Fremdwörter*, archaic, or foreign words, but rather *Lehnwörter*, *i.e.*, belonging to Byzantine civilization, however borrowed and assimilated by the historians to designate the world in which they moved and that they described.

The appeal to Latinisms can be explained in terms of the need to faithfully depict Byzantine realities. These Latin words were used currently in Byzantium. Their occurrence in historical writing resulted from the effect of the spoken tongue upon this type of writing. If one were to measure comparatively the frequency of and the forms under which Latinisms occur in historical writings and in other texts of that time, one might conclude that such writings only reflect, to a minimal extent, the richness of the Latin influence upon Byzantine vocabulary. From this perspective, suffice it to compare historical texts rich in Latinisms, such as the *Histories* of Procopius or the *Chronographia* of Theophanes the Confessor, to certain very technical writings like *Strategikon* or the *Eparch's Book*, by Pseudo-Mauricius, to immediately realize that, out of the huge number of Latin words currently used in Byzantium, historians only chose the strict minimum. This situation occurred because of reasons

of aesthetic, rhetorical, and historiographic outlook, reasons that will be discussed below.

It is also necessary to briefly point out the mistake made by some researchers who, relying on Byzantine historical texts, drew wrong general conclusions about the Latin influence upon Byzantine Greek. Because of the very nature of the literary genre intended to reflect real events, historical writing was forced to resort to Latin words. On the other hand, given its aesthetic role, it had to avoid as much as possible the so-called "vulgar" (commonly used) Latin words. It is obviously and equally true that the high incidence of Latinisms in precisely those spheres of vocabulary that were linked to the direct influence of the state is not a mere coincidence. It actually reflects, at a secondary level, the situation of the first level of the current speech. Byzantine Greek was, of course, mainly subjected to the invasion of Latin words related to Roman civilization, after the Greek speaking regions of Europe and Asia had been incorporated into the Roman Empire, and their populations, associated with its historical fate.

The Romanization of the Greek vocabulary was the result of a complex historical process that began with the first contacts between Greeks and Romans, reaching its apogée during the Roman domination of the Greek regions that were incorporated into the Roman state. Here the Empire imposed its civilization by force of arms and also by superior organizational capabilities. The typical example of the "Romanization" of the Greek world is the replacement of the ethnic name of the Greeks, *Hellenes*, with *Romaioi*, *i.e.*, Romans.

Although, in the beginning, the new names had political significance, defining the citizenship of ethnic Greeks, the word, *Romaioi*, established itself with the victory of Christianity that turned the latter into a state religion. The designation, *Hellene*, that became a synonym for Pagan, was abandoned. But at the same time, the Romanization of the Greek vocabulary was a reflex of adjustment to the vigorous reality of the Greek language and civilization to the new conditions created by Roman policy, a means of survival for Hellenism, and ultimately, an indication of its true strength. The partial Romanization of the Greek language and mentality was the first step in the development of Byzantinism as a new phase in the history of Hellenism.

A thorough contemporary explanation of the process whereby ancient Hellenism was turned into Byzantine Hellenism, a process in which "Romanization" played a very important role, has been provided as a result of the research of Gilbert Dagron (1969) the gist of which is summarized below. According to this reputed historian of the origins of Byzantium, it is necessary to abandon the outdated standpoints of such scholars as Ludwig Hahn (1906) and Henrik Zilliacus (1935) who claim that a fierce clash occurred between Latin and Greek during the Late Empire.

It seems instead that Greek peacefully replaced Latin. During the period of the Antonines, a balance was struck between Latin and Greek as instruments of expression. The balance gave rise to a collective

consciousness and a relatively unitary Greco-Roman civilization. The two languages had already agreed on respective fields of supremacy. Latin was to be the language of the *politeia* (the language of the state), while Greek belonged to the *paideia*, the disinterested, cosmopolitan, and rhetorical culture. But then, Greek gradually took over functions related to the language of politics. With the help of Christianity, a time came when Greek would be the language of the Eastern Church, a guarantee of the idea of state unity, and the creator of a new doctrine of the legitimacy of state power that would impose itself in the long run. This language transformed itself into the expressive instrument of a new form of political organization, late Hellenism, the forerunner of Byzantinism. The effect of this process was a certain Romanization of the Greek language spoken in the *Basileia ton Rhomaion*, "the Empire of the Romans".

At the same time, there was in Byzantium a purist and "nationalistic" Greek language, hostile to the flow of Latinisms. It was the tool of a rhetorical culture that had remained faithful to ancient Hellenistic traditions. It is here that one should look for the origins of Byzantine "diglot". In the meantime, in the Western world, Latin also assumed new roles, becoming a language for the *paideia*.

At this point, the balance between the two languages was upset, and each of them started to be the expressive instrument of a distinct culture and civilization. As a result, Byzantine culture and civilization come to harbour a Greek language which was Romanized, vulgar, and open for innovation and Latin influences (and which gradually became the present day neo-Greek), as well as an Atticizing "pure" Greek, used by archaizing scholars who were unwilling to accept any foreign influences.

The Latin words found in the works of Byzantine writers of the Sixth to Tenth Centuries belong to a vocabulary particularly linked to the civilization and the influence of the state and mark with a Romanic seal the Byzantine Greek vocabulary. These words had penetrated the Greek language many years earlier, through a process that has already been mentioned. In the Sixth and Seventh Centuries, this process of Romanization had largely come to an end. An analysis of the Latin words used by Byzantine historians does not focus on neologisms, but rather on those vulgarisms – or "Byzantinisms" – introduced by writers using the traditional language of historical writing expressed in classical Greek.

First perceived as foreign terms, if not for the Greek language, at least for the artistic register, these words became increasingly familiar and gradually lost their initially strange sound. Through derivation and composition, they entered into the structure of certain new Byzantine words which sounded increasingly Greek (for instance, *koubikoularios* becomes *spatharkoubikoularios*; *magistros* turns into *protomagistros*; *prokensos* changes into *prokinseuein*, etc).

In an ever Hellenized vocabulary and by virtue of certain typically Greek tendencies in favour of motivation and homogeneity (André Mirambel, 1959), certain Latinisms even suffered a semantic degradation when used in the writing of history. They lost their official or technical character and

became civilization-terms in current use. Through the effect of institutional reforms, on the other hand, very many Latinisms ceased to be used, a process documented by the historical writing that occurred over this period. This process mainly affected the official Latin terms designating the emperor and the imperial family – *augustos* or *kaisar* – terms that are replaced with *basileus* as of the Seventh Century.

Latinisms found in Sixth to Tenth Century Byzantine historical writing (or at least most of them) are, therefore, words in common use in Byzantium as a result of the ways in which the Hellenistic world adopted Roman civilization. They were already part of the Byzantine vocabulary by the Sixth Century and were preserved in parallel with the Roman political tradition as a legacy from the past and also as evidence of the Roman legitimacy of the empire. These words belong chiefly to the spheres of vocabulary connected to (or directly influenced by) state life. Their occurrence in texts is not a result of the influence of the sources on the language of historians, but rather an effect of the pressures bought to bear by the common tongue upon scholarly language.

D. RHETORIC AND IDEOLOGY IN BYZANTINE LITERATURE

In order to better highlight the literary and ideological significance of the use of Latinisms in Byzantine historical writing, it is necessary to sketch, in a few lines, the theoretical framework of the problem of Latinisms as conceived by Byzantine authors, in other words, to attempt to give a definition of the theoretical principles governing historical writing (a literary genre at that time) according to which writers were supposed to solve the practical matter of harmonizing their language with the realities that they described. An attempt was also made to define the ideological motivation for Byzantine literary doctrine and for Byzantine rhetoric.

Byzantine rhetoric was a direct continuation of late ancient rhetoric from which it borrowed the principles of literary practice and the criteria of critical evaluation for various types of works. Greek literature in the Hellenistic age and especially during the period of Roman domination had drawn up a classicizing vision of literary writings. As a defensive response to Asian influences, the First Century B.C. had witnessed the establishment of a new doctrine on mimesis, literary language, and style. At the center of artistic imitation that was in principle conceived according to Aristotelian norms, one no longer finds reality, but classical literature, the great models of which were drawn from the golden age of ancient literature. These models were carefully catalogued and minutely ranked in keeping with the genres to which they were related (each genre having its own style and language). They provided authors of treatises with their basic norms and dogmas concerning literary practice. On the other hand, the classic literary and linguistic ideal made the writers move away from daily realities and from the spoken language, thus favouring the appearance and the development of a bookish literature written in a

pedantic and archaizing language, the vocabulary of which was manneristic and artificial.

These tendencies in ancient critical thought, that had been supported and promoted by such rhetoricians as Caecilius of Kaleacte, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and the unknown author of the *Treatise on the Sublime* were appropriated and continued by those authors who laid the basis of Byzantine rhetorical education: Hermogenes of Tarsus, Aphtonios of Antioch, and by such grammarians as Dyscolos and Herodian.

Certain fathers of the Christian Church, who themselves had been the pupils of the last Pagan rhetoricians, like for instance, the famous Libanios, strengthened with their authority the classicizing tendencies in late Greek critical and aesthetic thinking. Such was the case of Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianz, Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom, some of whom even taught rhetoric themselves. For such men, the appreciation of literary art and its understanding from the angle of the rhetorician, that is, from a formal perspective, was not simply the result of their scholarly training. It was also a means whereby they could distinguish between artistic expression and ideas and thus fructify, from a Christian point of view and in critical and selective ways, the cultural inheritance of Pagan antiquity. By this means, they managed to achieve an unmistakable synthesis of Christianity and Hellenism, one that was theirs only and formed the basis of Byzantine culture. Classical and even classicizing rhetoric thus contributed to the preservation of the cultural legacy of ancient times, but at the same time annexed the more recently appearing corpus of Christian literature, with all its Judeo-Hellenistic traditions, mainly represented by the Holy Scriptures. The artistic and aesthetic evaluation of this legacy was undertaken through the same classicizing vision of literary writing, while in terms of literary interpretation, the critical concepts and criteria had been used previously to appreciate ancient Pagan works.

As one can conclude from a study of many of the treatises written by Byzantine authors and from exegeses found in other written works, Byzantine literary criticism was not very innovative. Even some of its outstanding spirits – such as Theodore Metochites in the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Centuries (1260-1332) – only succeeded in formulating one principle of literary activity: the transformation of obsequious imitation of both Pagan classic antiquity and Christian classic literature into creative emulation. But even this emulation was expected to conform to the rigorous limits of the classicizing framework, without allowances for any innovations in terms of genres, any salutary inspiration from real life, or any appeal to the expressive resources of the spoken tongue. The major ambition of a Byzantine writer was to seal, with a personal style, a number of very elaborate works that were written in an Attic cabinet Greek and burdened by erudition.

For a long time, it was believed that Byzantine authors did nothing but humbly imitate the writing of ancient times because of their cultural limitations, their scholarly and obsessive love of classical antiquity, and

their preference for sophisticated and elegant expression. In other words, this preference on the part of Byzantine authors was attributed to their traditional and classicizing aesthetic education that was favoured and at the same time hindered by the permanent contact of the Byzantine Empire (unlike in the case of the West) with classical literature and the traditions of ancient education. An attempt was also made to explain the huge distance between this style and the requirements of modern taste (inspired by the Renaissance) in terms of such factors as the Christian faith, prone to pushing Byzantine authors away from the realities of daily life so that they might focus their interests on "the world beyond". At a literary level, this same religion forced these authors to copy the language and the style of the Fathers of the Church.

According to the same explanation, another factor could have been the special psychology of the Byzantine élite, the fact that its members were conceited and tended to overrate themselves as successors of the ancient Hellenes who had produced the high cultural values of ancient times. Finally, a third possible explanation for this style was Byzantine obsequiousness toward an imperial power that intellectuals attempted to flatter by a panegyrical and encomiastic use of the highest and most refined forms of elegant expression inherited from classical antiquity.

Although partially justified, such explanations seem, nowadays, to be outdated and even slightly naïve. Contemporary scholars like Herbert Hunger (1978), Paul Lemerle (1967 and 1971), Hans-Georg Beck (1952), Emanoil Kriaras (1966), and Victor Lazarev (1967), were able through research, to elucidate both the historical and the cultural meaning of Byzantine rhetoric. This rhetoric is a general feature of all Byzantine cultural and spiritual manifestations. It is a cultural style equally easy to find in aulic ceremonial liturgy, in Byzantine painting with its strictly coded norms in rhetorical terms, in Byzantine science conceived in the same rhetorical, scholarly, and bookish manner as literature, in a not very original philosophy, focused on formal aspects, and even in Byzantine theology, in which H. G. Beck (1952) discovered a truly theological, rhetorical, and formalist classicism in its concreteness and in its spontaneous and personal achievements that lacked any links with Byzantine religious life.

The style is that of a society wishing to give the world (and itself) the illusion of absolute steadiness, of total immobility in the forms of the past, the only forms deemed to be legitimate. It is the style of a society that is conservative and traditionalist *par excellence*. The ultimate explanations for such a situation undoubtedly need to be discovered in the agrarian predominance and in the lack of industrial and economic development relying on market-focused production. The fundamental features of the social and economic basis of the Byzantine world were very different, in this respect, from those of the Western world.

At the same time, this classicizing cultural style was suitable for the typically Eastern nature of a Byzantine society that was hierarchically organized and ruled in a centralist way. In Byzantium, society was

structured as if on a number of steps, the highest step culminating at the level of the Emperor who embodied perfection and represented the divinity on whose behalf he governed. Each step had its mission, its legal and social status, its political meaning, a language and readings matching its concerns, and suitable clothing.

Movement from one step to another was possible, provided one observed a number of rules. There had to be a certain order – *taxis* – in everything, and everything had to be governed with a certain wisdom – *oikonomia* – according to Hélène Ahweiler (1975). Culture was viewed as an initiation into mysteries that would only be gradually revealed, and each social step only gave access to its specifically permitted secrets. Knowledge, in its turn, also implied order and wisdom. At its highest level, the expression of truth had to remain hidden from those who were not of this elect. For this reason, culture assumed different forms and styles, and different cultural works had different degrees of accessibility. Rhetoric, writing in an ancient language, and classicism were the means by which the ungifted were denied access to a truth for which they were not prepared and which was only meant for those who made adequate efforts and resorted to a certain *askesis* (exercise) in order to earn the right to perceive it.

But hierarchical structure was not only typical of Byzantine society. Mankind and the world itself were also hierarchically structured. The pinnacle of this world hierarchy could only be the Byzantine Empire. Rhetoric and classicism provide Byzantine culture and literature with a glamour and a mystery that called for respect from all outsiders to the circles of Byzantine culture, just as the splendour of the Byzantine court and its sophisticated ceremonial attracted respect and admiration from barbarians.

In the spirit of this outlook, Byzantine writers observed certain literary canons, among which (to remain within the sphere of literary vocabulary), a number of rules about the choice and the use of words.

According to the standards of ancient rhetoric as understood in Byzantium, word selection was never fortuitous. There were poetic and non-poetic words as well as suitable or unsuitable words for each literary genre and level of expression. Byzantine writers observed this pattern, classifying words in terms of their capacity to serve various genres. Emanoil Kriaras (1966), who devoted special attention to this topic, succeeded in describing the attitudes of a variety of Byzantine authors over the centuries and also their various ways of choosing and of classifying words. For instance, in the vision of Joseph the Philosopher, who wrote a *Rhetorical Compendium*, there are elegant words (*kompsai lexeis*) and natural words (*physikai*). The former are suitable for rhetoric, the latter for philosophy.

In his turn, Theodore Metochites criticized the use of popular, vulgar, plain, and understandable words:

> If you are so in love with the undisputed clarity of easy-to-grasp popular expressions, why don't you hurry to mix with all those loungers at the crossroads; why don't you take yourself faster to the markets teeming with people? There will you find that language you cherish so much, whose understanding is so easy! (*in*, Ihor Ševčenko, 1962, pp. 202-203, 206).

This remark was Metochites's answer to those who criticized his style, which proves to be over-elaborate, verbose, and difficult to understand. Elsewhere, the same Metochites offers the key, to which allusion was previously made, to the ideological meanings of Byzantine rhetoric:

> For well educated people, not for those made to wander in their speech by ignorance, each thing has its own place: sometimes you need to be explicit, at other times it's preferable to solemnly amplify your style and hide your thoughts from the common people's understanding, using artistic ornaments.... We assiduously observe this principle..., even if it makes you crack with spite for a thousand times, as you lack any gift of criticism from your cradle and have never gone deep into the definitions and the laws of the artistic, beautiful style! (*in*, Ihor Ševčenko, 1962, pp. 202-203).

The practical model to be followed by Byzantine writers in everything related to word selection, style, and language was the classic text, the "great" author of ancient times. Nikephoros Choumnos (end of the Thirteenth Century) claimed that the touchstones for evaluating contemporary writers should be Demosthenes, Plato, and Aelius Aristides:

> If you want the salvation and glory of literature, if you wish to fully commit yourself to sciences, then study the language of the great, illustrious, ancient writers whom nobody could outrun. If you want success, your words ought to be borrowed from the pure Attic language, built according to this rule, truly and naturally matching all things. (*in*, Jean-François Boissonade, Vol. 3, 1830, p. 360).

In addition to ancient writings, the Byzantine canon for perfect writers also included Christian writings, primarily the Holy Scriptures, a reality that obviously enriched the Byzantine literary vocabulary, giving it a note of originality in comparison with that of antiquity. In a very significant fragment, the same Choumnos allows writers to appeal to "the holy books" and makes it a written recommendation: "just as ancient Greeks even quote full passages from the poets, you can quote, if needed, from the Scriptures and the holy books" (*in*, Boissonade, Vol. 3, p. 363). Even Byzantine authors who themselves were perceived as being classical underwent the same treatment, thus illustrating the persistence in Byzantium of the methods recommended by the rhetoric of late antiquity, as well as the enrichment of the inspirational material.

Characterized by a fidelity to the rhetoric of late antiquity that was sometimes pushed to the verge of obsequiousness, Byzantine rhetoric

came thereby to set literary norms recommending inspiration by antiquity and the imitation of classic authors, but also inclusion of the canon of Biblical and patristic literature. The value of Byzantine rhetoric goes far beyond that of a mere epigonic prolongation of ancient Greek rhetoric. It constitutes a typically Byzantine laboratory, with specific meanings pertaining to a well-individualized cultural style, and can be explained by the specificity of its ideological grounds. Through its most gifted representatives, Byzantine literature managed to create original works, applying rhetorical principles mainly inspired from the ancient model to a linguistic material specific to Medieval Greek.

E. THE LANGUAGE AND LATINISMS OF BYZANTINE HISTORICAL WRITING

According to Byzantine authors, who again, it should be stressed, inherited an ancient vision of things, historical writing was a literary genre, *opus maxime oratorium*. Therefore, the rhetorical and literary character of historiography strictly conditioned the language of the Byzantine historian. He thus observed all norms relating to practice and largely joined the generally classicizing tendency of Byzantine literature in the cultural style as has been analyzed above.

It would, of course, be fastidious to try to analyze all the aspects of the classicism of Byzantine historical writing in a few pages. In a brief study published a number of years ago, the Hungarian Byzantinist, Gyula Moravcsik (1966) laid down the fundamental themes of such research in a truly excellent book. Following in Moravcsik's footsteps, it is possible, first of all, to cite several effects of the classicizing tendencies of Byzantine historians, in terms of language and writing, and then to focus on the particular and highly significant aspects already brought up, namely the meanings to be found in the use of Latinisms.

Regarding language and style, Byzantine historians imitated ancient writers and chose role models. Some historians wrote in the manner of Herodotus; others emulated Thucydides, Plutarch, or Polybius. Nevertheless, model imitation went beyond questions of language and style. A discovery was then made that the imitation of classic ancient historians could go so far as the borrowing not only of words and phrases, but also of elements of content, which obviously, also diminishes the verisimilitude and veracity of the product as an accurate source.

Thus, in his *Life of Basil I*, the first of the Macedonian emperors, Constantine VII *Porphyrogenitus* credits his forefather with the statement, "We need money, nothing of what has to be done can be done without money", allegedly made when, upon mounting the throne, the new emperor had found an empty treasury. The words in question are, instead, a *gnome apophantike*, a "declarative generalization", quoted as an example in a textbook on rhetoric written by Aphtonios, as Romilly J. H. Jenkins (1963) pointed out, and which can be found, in the *Alexiade* (*in,* Bernard

Leib, 1937, p. 59), at the point at which Anna Comnena attributes it to her father.

The same author describes John Taronites, a Ninth Century *eparch*, using the same words by which Theophylactus Simocattes, a Seventh Century Byzantine "classic" historian, characterized the Sixth Century *quaestor*, John. Byzantine historians not only credited the heroes in their histories with fictitious speeches, according to the ancient model, but also sometimes imitated "classical" texts found in the works of ancient historians. As Vasile Grecu pointed out, the speech that Laonikos Chalcocondyles attributed to Walachian prince Radu the Handsome (Radu cel Frumos), was copied from Herodotus, while the speech attributed to the Venetian, Victor Capella, (according to the same historian), is taken word for word from Thucydides. Ernst Stein (1949) proved that, in his efforts to equal that same Thucydides, Procopius of Caesarea ended the history of each year of Justinian's war against the Ostrogoths with the phrase "and winter ended and with it the … year of the war [as] narrated by Procopius", except that Justinian's war years ended in summer, not in winter.

Again, based on Thucydides's famous description of the plague that broke out during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, Procopius depicted a 542 A.D. epidemic. Later, John Cantacuzino (G. Moravcsik, 1966) would also appeal to this early description in order to describe a plague in 1347. Along the same lines, Constantine *Porphyrogenitus* credits the dying Moravian prince, Sviatopluk, with the parable of the bundle of rods illustrating the need for solidarity among heirs. This allusion is nothing but an imitation of one of Aesop's fables having the same topic. Meant to entertain readers, it was permitted by the literary nature of Byzantine historical writing.

Another ideologically revealing trait is the habit of Byzantine authors of giving various peoples other names than their real ones, actually the names of ancient peoples who had inhabited the same regions: Moesians, Scythians, Triballi, etc. This habit has given rise to major problems of interpretation and has generated serious confusion in the minds of those who use Byzantine histories as historical sources. Throughout the centuries (sometimes from writer to writer in the same century), the real contents of these stereotypical archaizing names was quite different from reality. For instance, both Bulgarians and Balkan Vlachs are called Moesians, while the designation of Scythians included Russians, Cumans, Petchenegs, and Tartars. This practice is not simply a rhetorical tic. It is also a vision of the world, for the Byzantines who considered themselves to be *Romaioi*, *i.e.*, Romans, their eternal empire was confronted with the same barbarians who existed in ancient times. The differences between various barbarian peoples are basically unimportant. At the same time, the fact that Byzantine historians gave archaizing names to other peoples as a rhetorical device proves that they lacked both a genuinely scientific spirit and a concern for existing realities, allowing themselves to be dominated by abstractions and dogmatism. This characteristic emphasizes the critical

difference between Byzantine literature and Western Latin medieval historical literature, the latter being infinitely more realistic.

The treatment that Byzantine writers gave to Latinisms matches the inclination in Byzantine historical writing in favour of rhetorical classicism. For Byzantine historians, Latinisms were, first of all, a matter of style, rhetoric, and literary language, having little to do (as was the case in other ages or regions) with scientific scruples or accuracy. What they wanted to do was to give those words of Latin origin, lacking a well-established literary past, a convenient rhetorical status, thus enabling them to meet both literary requirements and the various needs related to communication and historical reflection.

The problem was neither insoluble nor new. In their works, the Greek historians of late antiquity – Polybius, Plutarch, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Arrianus, and Apianus – had had to solve the same problem when writing about Roman realities. Indeed, some of them were well acquainted with Latin. They had used and even translated Latin sources without denying their Hellenism and without abandoning the ideals and traditions of Greek rhetorical culture, despite their attraction for (and attachment to) Rome. These authors had had the necessary time and cultural resources to draw up a Hellenic style for Roman historical writing. In order to express the notions designated by Latin words – most of which were realia – they had been able to use two methods: borrowed translations and linguistic borrowings as such, *i.e.*, neologisms.

The following are examples of Plutarch's loan translations: *eparchos tes aules = praefectus praetorio*, *to demosion tamieion = aerarium*, *eparchia = provincia*, *nomos sitikos = lex frumentaria*, *embola = rostra*, *semeiophoros = signifer*, *pateres syngegrammenoi = patres conscripti*. The following are a few examples of neologisms used by the same writer: *diktator*, *milion*, *assarion*, *tribounos*, *liktoreis*, *senatos*, and *denarion*. As can be observed in the case of neologisms, the Latin forms adjust to Greek and join its morphological system.

Although he was not an excessively purist and archaizing writer, Plutarch (as researchers have observed) was scrupulous in limiting his vocabulary, to some extent, to words that were used by Polybius and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in their works. He did the same thing with the borrowed Latin terms that he used, avoiding all innovations in this respect. Even if Latinisms are largely present in other manifestations of the Greek language (inscriptions, papyri), the vision of Greek authors in the Age of Rome still seems to reflect reservations in regard to Latinisms that were not politically motivated (for most of these authors were favourable to Rome, and some of them had even learned Latin), but had to do with rhetorical scruples.

A method frequently used by the Greek writers of late antiquity to stylistically "neutralize" Latinisms and to somehow isolate them in the texts is that of the so-called glosses. Latinisms are introduced by certain topical expressions, that is, they are "translated", their etymology is established, and thus they formally qualify as Latinisms. The most

frequent introductory phrases are: "as referred to by the Romans", "the so-called", "which the Romans call", "what Romans used to call", "how the Romans call it". Here are a few examples of such glosses taken from Plutarch:

Keleras prosegoreusen, hoper esti tacheis (Plutarch, *Numa*, 7); *hoi kaloumenoi keleres* (Plutarch, *Romulus*, 26); *en tois archeiois, ha prinkipia Rhomaioi* (Plutarch, *Galba*, 12); *loupas gar ekaloun hoi Latinoi tas lykainas* (Plutarch, *Romulus*, 4).

By these means, the Greek writers of late antiquity preserved the purity of their classicizing style, of their "Attic" language, and developed a new dimension of their corpus of historical writing – that of the erudition of the Latin language and of Roman civilization - thus providing this category of literary messages with a stylistic status of its own.

Byzantine writers would employ all the methods developed in the attempts of ancient Greek literature to solve the problems of the use of Latinisms. They appealed to loan translations and to neologisms, but, as was indicated above, both groups generally belong to a linguistic legacy consisting of older realities of the current language and even of words already used by men of letters.

The fact that certain Byzantine historians insisted on using glosses is thus not all that striking. What follows is an example from Procopius

Ten agestan... houto gar hoi Rhomaioi to poioumenon te Latinon phone ekaloun (*Bella* II: 7, 15); *helkei de litras to kentenarion hekaton, aph' hou de kai onomastai. Kenton gar ta hekaton kalousi Rhomaioi* (*Bella* I: 22, 4); *pyrgokastellon auton hekaston einai te kai kaleisthai pepoieke. Kastellous gar ta phrouria te Latinon kalousi phone* (*Aed.*, II: 5, 8); *phoideratoi epiklethentes: houto gar autous tote Latinon phone ekalesan Rhomaioi, ekeino, oimai, paradelountes, hoti de ouch hessemenoi auton to polemo Gotthoi, all' epi xynthekais tisin enspondoi egenonto sphisi, phoidera gar Latinoi tas en polemo kalousi xynthekas* (*Bella*: IV, 2, 1).

The use of glosses is a common feature of all Byzantine historians in the Sixth and the Seventh Centuries. Many cases can be found in the writings of Theophylactus Simocattes, in which almost every Latin word is accompanied by a gloss. We also find them in the works of Agathias and of Menander *Protector*, but mainly in those of John of Lydos, who takes advantage of any opportunity to elaborate on each and every Latinism he comes across, thus proving his Latin erudition.

Glosses were seldom used after the Seventh Century; however, they are once again found no earlier than in the Tenth Century, in the works of historians who wrote during the Macedonian Renaissance. Constantine *Porphyrogenitus* used them quite frequently. What follows is his explanation for the origin of the word *boukellarioi*, a category of army

servants in charge of supplies, which also states the name of an Anatolian Byzantine root:

To thema ton Boukellarion
Ouk apo topou tinos ten prosegorian ektesato, oute men apo ethnous houto kaloumenou, all dia to epakolouthein tois stratiotais kai tas trophas auton epipheresthai – boukellarios gar kata Rhomaion dialekton ho phylax tou artou kaleitai – hoste einai tous stratiotas elaphrous kai abareis pros ton polemon: boukellos gar to krikeloeides psomion kaleitai, kellarios de ho phylax tou artou. To gar oikeion onoma tou ethnous kai hellenikon, Mariandynoi onomazontai, epeklethesan de Galatai (*De thematibus*: VI: 1-8 [*in*, Agostino Pertusi, comp., 1952]).

The following is the explanation that Constantine *Porphyrogenitus* gives to another Latin name of a root:

To de thema to kaloumenon Opsikion pasin echei gnorimon ten prosegorian: opsikion gar rhomaisti legetai, hoper semainei te hellenon phone tous proporeuomenous emprosthen tou basileos epi eutaxia kai time (*De thematibus* IV: 1-3 [*in*, Agostino Pertusi, comp., 1952]).

If one compares the changes in various Greek glosses of Latin words found in Greek historical literature from late antiquity to the Tenth Century, one discovers the following: In ancient times, a gloss had a part to play in the process of communication and a logical reason for being. It was a way to preserve the purity of a certain style and of educating readers in regard to the Latin language and civilization. In the Byzantine age, between the Sixth and the Seventh Centuries, the method seemed to be out of place, for the words being explained had already entered the Greek language, designating elements of a civilization with which all readers were acquainted. By then the gloss had become a mannerist reflex, with no real communicative role and with a doubtful aesthetic effect. And if one were to consider that the Byzantines called themselves Romans or *Romaioi*, the explanations given in the glosses, *i.e.,* - "Romans say", "as the Romans call it" – become even more ambiguous and unreasonable.

By the Tenth Century, however, glosses were being skilfully manipulated by historians such as Constantine *Porphyrogenitus.* They recovered their communicative role and were used discreetly, within the strict limits of messages conveying needs. It can be said that this procedure was yet another way in which the Macedonian Renaissance brought back good taste to historical literature.

The disappearance of glosses after the Seventh Century had nothing to do with awareness of the disharmonies that they produced; rather, it was the result of the fact that Byzantine writers were no longer familiar with Latin. True enough, most Byzantine historians in the Sixth and Seventh Centuries knew Latin very well, for they still lived under the régime of an official diglot (Latin as the state language; Greek as the cultural language),

while Eighth and Ninth Century authors had a very poor command of Latin. Only in a few cases were glosses preserved and transmitted from one writer to another, whereby they turned into rhetorical *topoi*, such as in the etymology of Caesar's name.

F. LANGUAGE VARIANTS AND LATINISMS IN BYZANTINE HISTORICAL LITERATURE BETWEEN THE SIXTH AND THE TENTH CENTURIES

Seven decades ago, Karl Krumbacher (1898), the founder of modern "scientific" Byzantinology, divided Byzantine historical writing conventionally into two categories: histories and chronicles. This distinction, which came to be commonplace in the field of Byzantinology, appeared to be justified by the Byzantine vision of historical writing that distinguished between historians (*hoi historesantes*) and chroniclers (*hoi chronographesantes*). Even the titles given to their works, *Historiai*, *Chronika*, *Cronographiai*, seemed to argue in favour of such a sub-classification.

By and large, the differences between the two variants of Byzantine historical writing are the following. Histories are writings that deal with well-determined spans of time, usually periods during the life of the respective author. Histories were the work of cultivated people who were frequently outstanding personalities of the Byzantine state who had taken part in certain events that they presented from a very personal angle, sometimes with obvious political purposes. Histories were written in a markedly classicizing style and followed the model of the famous historians of antiquity. They reflected the use of certain methods that were amply represented in ancient classical histories, such as the fictitious speech or letter.

Chronicles, however, are texts that describe the unfolding of world-historical events, from Genesis to the period of their authors, provided that the authors in question have had the time to complete them. In many cases, chronicles are of monastic origin. They are pervaded by a religious spirit and, frequently, even by a sort of fanaticism that distorts the narrative of older as well as more recent events.

Chronicles devoted special attention to religious events and details. The materials that they included were not selected on the basis of objective criteria according to the perceived historical importance of given events; rather, they tended to take account of the spectacular, the sensational, and the bizarre aspects of the subject being narrated. In chronological order and on a yearly basis, chronicles gathered stories taken from various (similar) sources about natural disasters, miracles, quaint happenings, great deeds, political actions, famous wars and battles, illustrious heroes, amazing and unusual things, monuments that had been raised, the founding of cities, important decisions in religious life, synod meetings, defrockings and canonizations, etc. They were written in an unpretentious language, closer to the spoken tongue, at least so far as vocabulary was concerned. They did not attempt to imitate ancient writings and were often animated by a spirit that was hostile to Pagan, "Hellenic" classicism. Their

literary models were the *Bible*, used as a source for the oldest historical events, and religious writings. Chronicles were usually taken up repeatedly and underwent compilations and amendments, while Byzantine histories generally continued each other.

The latest research has distinguished even further between histories and chronicles. Contrary to the opinions of certain older researchers, stress is now laid upon the fact that chronicle literature was not written in the spoken popular tongue, but rather in a language which was more open to oral influences and did not very much reflect the influence of ancient classic models. Text content and structured elements are evoked in order to point out that frequently histories obtained inspiration from the analytical model of chronicles. At any rate, the fitting of chronography into the Byzantine hierarchy of literary genres was governed by rhetorical rules that were quite rigorously observed by writers. In Herbert Hunger's vision (1978), chronicles are a "*Trivial-literatur*", a literature of "wide consumption", somewhat resembling present-day thrillers or certain serials that disseminate historical fact for common use. But both histories and chronicles belong to the same Byzantine historiographic literature, are inspired by the same vision of history, and reflect the same major tendencies in each age. They stand for two stylistically different levels of historical writing rather than representing two different types of historiography. At any rate, one cannot claim that their separate sets of characteristics represent two social classes, the dominant and the oppressed.

On the other hand, it is possible to speak of the language of chronicles and of the language of histories as representing two variants of the same language used by Byzantine historians, rather than of two different languages. Generally speaking, there are many points of convergence regarding essential aspects between the two variants. These include the conceptual dowry of Byzantine historians, their scholarly methods, and their vision of history. As for the common literary use and the ideal norm of the literary language, the freedom of historians was manifested in the preferential use of a certain classic model, in the choice to archaize, in the use of certain dialectical Ionic or Attic features, with implicit vocabulary-related consequences, and in the appeal to a simpler (or, on the contrary, more sophisticated and bombastic) syntax.

What freedom chroniclers had is reflected in their appeal to the resources of the spoken tongue, especially in regard to vocabulary. The style of historians is more personal and easier to identify according to stylistic criteria, while the style of chroniclers is more impersonal and homogenous. As for Latinisms, historians and chroniclers had different attitudes. The former avoided them because to them they were facts of the spoken tongue, while the latter naturally used them for exactly the same reason. One can even say that the use of Latinisms was among the unifying elements of the style of chroniclers.

The rhetorical determination of the frequency of Latinisms in the works of Byzantine historical writing can be easily observed in the following

paradox: Procopius of Caesarea, a Latin speaking historian who lived in an environment in which Latin was not only fashionable, but was also the official language of the state, has throughout his work (1700 pages in the latest edition, that of G. Wirth, 4 vols., 1963-1964) not more than fifty Latinisms, most of which he described as such and systematically glossed. On the other hand, in the 500 pages of his chronicle, Theophanes the Confessor, a Ninth Century Byzantine aristocrat and monk, not familiar with Latin, used 197 Latin words or words derived from Latin on Greek soil. Obviously, the choices of both writers reflected variants of a certain historiographic language. Living in the same century as Procopius, in his turn, John Malalas of Antioch, the father of Byzantine chronography, used more than 150 Latinisms and Latin derivatives in 500 printed pages of chronicles. He never resorted to glosses in the case of words already in use, but only for words which had not yet been assimilated. The reason for his use of Latinisms was not his honourable command of Latin (he translated quotations from Virgil), but – as in the case of Theophanes two centuries later – the rhetorical norm governing his work, the variant of the historiographic language that he chose.

During the Macedonian Dynasty, the promoters of the so-called "first Byzantine humanism" led by the learned Emperor Constantine VII *Porphyrogenitus* attempted to merge the two historiographic language variants. In their respective writings, Constantine VII *Porphyrogenitus*, Joseph Genesios, and Theophanes's successors used a language somewhat closer to the spoken tongue, without fully giving up the rhetorical traditions of so-called elevated literature. The number of Latinisms to be found in these Tenth Century historical works is the same as in the case of the chronicles. Moreover, in addition to the official and scholarly variants of different words, one can discover counterparts in their vulgar, common use. In Constantine VII's, *On Ceremonies*, for instance, *admission* is used in parallel with *adminsio*, *missa* with *minsa*, *prokessos* with *prokensos*, etc. The deliberate appeal to Latin words – to vulgarisms, generally speaking – is made clear in the Foreword of the above-mentioned work. Here the Emperor explains that he has used words belonging to the spoken, plain language to make himself more easily understood and in order to give things the names by which they are usually called. This new style, that tended to remove the linguistic barriers between chronicles and histories and to completely unify the language of Byzantine historians, did not, however, succeed in tempering the archaizing and classicizing zeal of Byzantine writers. Purists quickly responded, and the effects of their reaction – even so far as Latinisms were concerned – are best seen in the works of Leo the Deacon. Consequently, the two language variants used in historical writings, although quite often confronting each other, persisted until the end of the Byzantine era and even survived into the modern Greek world.

Within the scholarly variant of Byzantine historiographic language, the Sixth Century work of John Lawrence of Lydos offers a very instructive and special case.

The Lydian was a highly interesting personality who worked in the *praetorium* prefecture, had a masterful command of Latin language and culture, and was a keen supporter of keeping Latin as the official state language. Stubbornly conservative, he wrote a number of works of historical erudition on the Roman calendar and on Roman institutions and holidays. Proud of his Latin and even Etruscan erudition, John of Lydos was also a true lover of the Hellenic style in historical works, an archaizing purist who used the clearest and cleanest cabinet Attic. One should not be deceived by the large number of Latinisms in his works, which, at first sight, might give the impression that he was one of the most Latinizing of Byzantine writers. Every time he wrote the names of Roman republican and imperial institutions, of clerks, of arms, of categories of holidays, of birds, of other animals, or of any other things, John of Lydos dutifully accompanied them with glosses and thus isolated them in the text. His purist spirit was equally visible in fragments of translations from Latin authors – jurists and historians, philologists and poets – that he introduced ostentatiously into his work. After all, John of Lydos was the most typical representative of the conservative vision of the Latin-Greek diglot (language of state versus language of culture), drawn up as early as Justinian's rule, but promptly attacked by the representatives of a rising Hellenistic Byzantinism.

If one wants to have a good image of the individual variants of the language of historical writing of Byzantine historians of the Sixth through Tenth Centuries, the example of John Lawrence of Lydos is substantial in comparison with that of the other Byzantine cultivators of history. This bureaucrat, who was a contemporary of Justinian, gave a very personal embodiment to the language of scholarly history and had no imitators. His is the second variant of historical language. One is tempted to call it an antiquarian language. It gets very close to the type of language used in encyclopedic works such as the Tenth Century great *Suda Lexicon*.

Another Byzantine historian who used a very personal language, even though he remained within the limits permitted by the rhetorical norms of the genre, was Theophylactus Simocattes, Emperor Heraclius's panegyrist. In his archaizing zeal, Simocattes used archaizing names not only instead of the usual names of various barbarian peoples, but also to designate certain Byzantine institutions. Thus, he gave the designation, *satrap*, previously used by Herodotus to designate Persian provincial governors, to administrators of Byzantine themes. This usage, however, on the part of Theophylactus Simocattes, was probably not simply an excess of literary rhetoric culminating in the occultation of historical realities through language. It may, indeed, well be that Simocattes was a better historian than some of his predecessors or successors. He not only used earlier histories as sources, but also archival documents to which he had access by virtue of being the secretary of Emperor Heraclius. One should not forget that he lived in a period during which the Byzantine Empire was being restructured, indeed at the decisive moment at which it changed into an Eastern-type, theocratic and Hellenistic state. Simocattes was also the

first writer to use the term, *basileus*, to designate the emperor both in writing Byzantine history and in the realities of political life. (The term had previously been reserved for Persian kings.) Therefore, one can assume that by using the term, *satrap*, Simocattes was only underlining the fact of the genuine Orientalization of the Byzantine Empire and of its new role as successor to the Persian monarchy after the victories of Emperor Heraclius over the Persian armies.

How vigorous the rhetorical impact was on "scientific" reflection, on reality, in Byzantine historical writing can be observed by studying the case of the poet, Georgios Pisides, another Heraclian panegyrist and author of certain epic poems having a historical content. The poems by this poet lack almost any Latinisms, for elevated Byzantine poetry was very keen on forbidding any use of vulgarisms. The trade-off was that Homer's shadow can be observed in all the verses of *Herakleias and the Wars*. Just as in the case of later aulic and panegyric rhetoric, the historical event is tossed into the rhetorician's retorts and is processed to its core. What comes out is none other than an ideal ideological scheme, an abstract and impersonal effigy of the "good emperor" who is successful in times of war and is governed by a spirit of justice and philanthropy in times of peace. Through rhetoric which acts, therefore, as a means, ideology has the last word in Byzantine historical epic works, as in the other imperial cultural fields.

G. CONCLUSIONS

Having reached the end of this study of the ways in which Byzantine historians of the Sixth to Tenth Centuries used borrowed words of Latin origin, what general conclusions can be drawn about the specificity of the language of Byzantine historical writing?

The decisive impact of rhetoric on this language is perhaps the most striking feature of Byzantine historical writing, distinguishing it from the historical writing that occurred in other ages and among other peoples. The rhetorical norm determined the attitudes to Latin words of given writers, the aesthetic criterion taking precedence over any scruples as to realism and accuracy. For this reason, Byzantine historical writing is primarily literary and only secondarily scientific.

In their turn, rhetorical norms were determined by a certain imperial ideology the ultimate purpose of which was to assert the pre-eminence of the Byzantine Empire, including its political, cultural, and religious mission in the world, and to legitimize a certain social order that the writing of history was called upon to serve in its capacity as an instrument of propaganda. Thus, in the final analysis, Byzantine classicism is both an expression and an instrument of imperialism in its historical, Byzantine meaning.

Efficient in so far as propaganda and artistic achievement were concerned, this outlook (reflected as such by the language used in the writing of history) was a barrier to its development in terms of scientific

progress. This outlook also played a part in the cultural isolation of Byzantium and prevented it from assimilating other cultural values, promoting as it did the illusion of perfection born from solitary contact with the models of classical antiquity.

Classicizing rhetoric and imperial ideology were unifying factors that gave Byzantine historiography its unmistakable profile. However, within this historiographic framework there were well individualized and fairly rigorously coded language variants from a rhetorical perspective: the language of histories, the language of chronicles, the language of learned antiquaries. At the same time, various authors, having stronger than average artistic and cultural personalities, reflected various personal historiographic language variants, but even they ultimately submitted to an unquestioned dominant norm.

Under the apparent immobility of historiographic forms and language, the Sixth to Tenth Centuries experienced a definite evolution, a tendency to draw up a unique and efficient style and language for historical writing that was able to serve the needs of communication, to reflect an adequate knowledge of reality, and to observe certain common-sense aesthetic criteria. Although this tendency finds its best expression in the historical writing of the Macedonian Renaissance, it was not capable of a total triumph, for it was successfully countered by a purist, archaizing, and conservative response.

The ways in which the Byzantine authors understood how to establish norms and criteria for evaluating historiographic language is in full harmony with their vision of a cultural language, the roots of which can be traced to the Greek-Latin diglot of the late Roman Empire, when Greek and Latin, specifically and respectively, served the cultural and the political fields. The Byzantine élite could never transcend its diglot vision and thus transferred its Greek-Latin polarity to its own Greek culture. The language of Byzantine historical writing was, therefore, strongly influenced by this diglot that gave rise to a lack of realism, sterility, and inadequacy in dealing with certain realities. It determined the limited capacities of historians to communicate within Byzantine society and throughout the world.

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II. The Medieval State and Artistic Geneses in Southeastern Europe

RĂZVAN THEODORESCU

A. COURSE AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONVERSION TO CHRISTIANITY

In a recent attempt at an anthropological perspective on the conversion of certain Pagan groups to the Christian order, it was possible to make some insightful remarks about the meanings of this crucial religious phenomenon occurring in different ages and from one meridian to another.

> Conversion to Christianity means different things to different peoples and entails divergent social consequences.... The process of conversion in all times and places involves both epistemological and pragmatic changes to the existing cultural order (R. W. Hefner, 1993, pp. 30 and 319).

Present day Europe is a continent in which everybody would like to integrate, but without a general burning need to do so. Recent surveys indicate that while 36 percent of Europeans acknowledge their national identities, only 12 percent acknowledge that their European identity was born under the sign of the Cross. Almost seventy years ago, the English Catholic historian, Christopher Dawson (1932), formulated this theory about the Christian identity of Europe; a theory that, although attacked from all sides, was perfectly justified by the facts.

True enough, the Europe of ethnogenesis, in which medieval states were established before and after the famous "year 1000", proved to be the very place where the Mediterranean Christian territory met Paganism. More specifically, the three peninsulas (Iberian, Italian, and Balkan), plus the former Gaul bordered on the Pagan territories in the *Barbaricum*, beyond the Alps, the Rhine, and the Danube, where most evangelizations and Christianizations took place, in Friesland and Germany, up to Poland, Pannonia, Russia, and Scandinavia, as well as in the South-Danubean enclave of Bulgaria.

All these conversions to Christianity were, without exception, of the top-to-bottom type, undertaken at the initiative of various military chiefs who were leaders of nomads who had either become sedentary as early as the Fifth to the Seventh Centuries, or, as in the case of the peoples near the Dnieper, in Pannonia, in the Balkan-Pontic, and the Balkan-Adriatic regions, between the Eighth and the Tenth Centuries, were in the process of doing so.

Most conversions were spectacular. As transitions from one state of being to another, they have drawn the attention of modern historians both from a historical and from an ethnological standpoint. They determined the creation of appropriate alphabets, the most notable cases being the Glagolitic and the Cyrillic alphabets, as well as the building of ostentatious and monumental edifices meant to impress the converted people. After all, conversion, as was properly observed (A. Djurova, pp. 644-671), gave rise to a new type of communication, noticeable in the new Slavonic alphabet, and in the adjustments to the norms of Christian art. Both writing and art reflected an edifying and civilizing undertaking to which the evangelizing competition of the *basileis*' Constantinopole and pontifical Rome was an essential contribution.[1]

B. THE SITUATION OF THE BALKAN SLAVS

The interdependence of state and ecclesiastic autonomy is an obvious constant of early medieval history in Eastern Europe appearing in each and every case.[2] The tribal community that was established in the Northeastern Balkan Peninsula after 681, with the two predominant Pagan religions, of, respectively, the Slavs and the Asian Turanians, entered an age of quickened centralization and feudalization. This metamorphosis occurred at the same time as the mass Christianization of the Bulgars in the seventh decade of the Ninth Century during the rule of Khan Boris, who when baptized, took the Byzantine imperial name, Mihail. At the same time, long arguments were underway between the ruler of Pliska and Louis the German, between Pope Nicholas I in Rome and the Byzantine Patriarchs, Photyios and Ignatius, as well as over the question, in 869-870, of the establishment of a Bulgarian autocephalous archbishopric that would be obedient to Constantinople by virtue of certain old claims of the latter to *Justiniana Prima*'s Roman-Byzantine diocese.

In a highly similar context, but in Russia, the end of the Tenth Century and the beginning of the Eleventh witnessed the final act of a process of ethnic genesis when the Russian people emerged from a mixture of Slavic tribes with Finnic or Varangian-Scandinavian elements, in that *ruskaia zemlia* of medieval texts, from Ladoga to Kiev, and adopted Christianity *en masse* between 988-989 under the rule of the Great *Knez*, Vladimir Sviatoslavitch. Even though there had been isolated conversions earlier, like that of Princess Olga in Constantinople in 955, Vladimir acquired,

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[1]See A. Grabar, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1938), pp. 1105-1116, an exemplary text about research methods through which the artistic phenomenon (the building of representative walled churches) is linked to conversions through missionary work as of the beginning of the Middle Ages: "On constate aussi que dans les pays des missions l'art chrétien n'apparaît pas d'une manière désordonnée, mais s'implante d'après un certain système ou plutot d'après plusieurs systèmes.... On y observe, en outre, que certains missionaires considéraient l'art lui-même comme un moyen d'agir sur les populations récemment converties; tandis que pour d'autres l'oeuvre d'art n'était qu'un moyen d'assurer le culte. Mais dans les deux cas, les missionaires s'éfforcèrent de donner une valeur symbolique particulière à certaines oeuvres d'art qu'ils patronnaient" (p. 1108).

[2]Many of these thoughts are the result of the author's own research. See R. Theodorescu, 1978, pp. 211-248.

through Byzantium, the title of *Basileus*, a *Porphyrogenitus* wife, a number of priests and monks from the Empire, and some valuable relics from the Crimean Chersonese, which forged the link between Kiev and Byzantium. The conversion of 989 also coincided with the establishment in 990, in completely shady circumstances, of the Kiev archbishopric, autocephalous in its turn, which in 1037, during the very "Byzantine" rule of Jaroslav the Wise, became a metropolitan seat of the Constantinople Patriarchate, with a Greek ruler and an establishment of aulic Constantinople inspiration.

Still, around the year 1000 in old Pannonia, the Christianization through Rome of the Hungarian tribes that had stopped here a hundred years earlier, picked up again. The process continued, in a different and larger scale, the activities of the Ninth Century Latin missionaries in a Slavic environment, that had been mixed with Avaric remains and French-Bavarian infiltration, and that was ruled by the Zalavár military chieftains. At this point, the century came to an end.

The Tenth Century had witnessed the gradual feudalization of local social structures along with the coexistence of regional rulers who were comparatively autonomous in terms of their links to the Arpadian clan. Such was the situation of a certain Gyula, who was perhaps from Southern Transylvania and was christened in Byzantium (like Princess Olga of Kiev, who lived at about the same time). He had been at the inception of an "apostolic" kingdom having an official Christianity of papal Roman coloratura. Such had earlier been the case of Stephen I of Hungary, son of the "Duke" of Geza, "Christianizer" of the Hungarians, through the action of the Episcopal clergy and the Benedictine monks in the political and ecclesiastic centers of the recently created state, in Alba Regia and Esztergom and in Kalocsa and Veszprem.

The situation was somewhat different in Serbia. Here one finds a double lack of strictly chronological coincidence between, on the one hand, the Christianization of the local ruling class and the appearance of an ecclesiastic hierarchy relying on it, and, on the other hand, between the Christianization process in itself and the impetuous assertion of the newly established state in the international political arena.

If, as in the case of the Bulgarians, the Russians, and the Hungarians, relatively little time passed between the appearance of their state and their Christianization, in situations in which the feudalization of society and conversion to Christianity had strictly overlapped, the Serbian case was somewhat different.

Fully sedentary even before the year 800, the Slavs inhabiting the Western parts of the Balkan Peninsula, like the Bulgars of the Eastern parts, were evangelized early in the course of the Ninth Century, therefore, four centuries before the establishment of a feudal Serbian Kingdom, through the action of the Frankish channel to Rome and through Byzantium. Particular geographical conditions helped to preserve a religious division with many isolated episcopates, as well as a political division with countless "kings" and "dukes", hereditary *zupans* and *archons* in Zahlumya and Raška and in Bosnia and Duklya. It was only in

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the seventh decade of the Twelfth Century that Stephen Nemanya, the Great *Zupan* of Raška, would establish a Serbian feudal and relatively unitary and independent state. His son, also named Stephen (who would later assume the title of *Autocrator*), received in 1217 both a royal crown and papal recognition. His other son, Sava, was recognized two years later – this time by Byzantine Nicaea – as ruler of a Serbian autocephalous archbishopric. By this means, the first Nemanyids became the originators of a long series of sovereigns who, in a highly singular manner for Europe, were all of them at the very center of a royal cult that marked their entire political and religious work as an illustrious moment among the geneses of medieval civilizations in Southeastern Europe.

Events such as Christianizations and the establishment of local churches among the Slavic and Turanian-Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe were complemented, as part of the same historical step, by the construction of representative monuments to the ideology, the aims, and the policies of certain newly created states. This study, however, and the research upon which it is based, only focuses on the more restricted Balkan region.

The fact that these monuments appeared in the very genetic cores of their respective nascent states, as the *sedes regiae* of their rulers and roughly all at the same time, with their Christianization and their "official" establishment recognized by one of the two "supranational" spiritual authorities of the Middle Ages, is a first common feature which is easy and natural to prove by a mere juxtaposition of data.

The undisputed representative (and at any rate grandiose, according to European standards) monument of the first Bulgarian state was that of Pliska, a huge "royal" triple-nave basilica with dimensions of 99 by 29.50 meters. It was certainly the first of the "seven splendid cathedrals" built by Boris – and later described by Theophylactus of Ohrid by the phrase "as if he [had] lit a seven-candle chandelier" (J. P. Migne, 1864, col. 1229). It was constructed in a very specific architectural style, of Eastern-Byzantine synthesis – with a massive, severe, and extremely monotonous build-up of carefully worked stone – sometime during the rule of Boris-Mihail or of his son, Simeon, in the second half of the Ninth Century, when the Bulgarians underwent Christianization.

The construction of this basilica, with its three apses, a central nave that was much wider than the collateral naves, and its alternation of columns and pillars, was contemporaneous with the mass evangelization of the Northeastern Balkans. This fact explains the presence of a baptistery and of a large atrium with two porticoes (both equally needed for the christening of neophytes). It is known that following some Tenth Century work of restoration, the monument reproduced an ancient architectural type already out of fashion in Byzantium, but just as eloquent here. In the new barbarian capital, this style represented continuity both *stricto sensu*, by the use of an architectural plan of a paleo-Christian basilica that had been built in this region during Justinian's rule, and through an exclusively spiritual meaning, by

reference to certain illustrious ages of ancient times, to which the rulers of this new state, established out of the conglomeration of (until recently) Pagan and migratory tribes, wanted to be politically linked. The ages in question were those of the Roman-Byzantine period during which, over three hundred years earlier, in the same regions, there had been the development of a basilican architecture. It was now repeating itself, being replicated even in Pliska, next to the huge "royal basilica".

This phenomenon followed immediately upon the consolidation of Christianity as a monumental testimony of the building zeal of the recently converted, typical of such a moment in the life of a people.

On the other hand, one should not forget that in the well-established spiritual and political centers from which envoys left for Bulgarian territories, namely Rome and the Carolingian Empire, a similar basilican rebirth took place during this Ninth Century. It seems to have been determined by a genuinely "Constantinian" imperial outlook. It had previously been illustrated either by the renovation or by the building of a number of Roman basilicas during the pontificates of Leo III and Pascal I (including Santa Maria in Domnica, Santa Cecilia in Trastevere, and Santa Prassede), as well as the construction of other basilicas in the German territories (Corvey, Salvator, and Saint Peter of Werden). The same period, around the year 900 and during the first years of the Tenth Century (certainly during the rule of Simeon), witnessed the construction of the second representative monument of the age, the so-called "round" or "gilded" church, in the new Preslav Residence that was linked to the Christian and Slavic stage of old Bulgarian culture. It was a sumptuous and singular edifice, representative of the age during which the first Bulgarian Czardom reached the peak of its power.

The Bulgarian feudal ruler had grown up in Constantinople. He had been the protector of the Byzantine missionaries, Clement and Nahum, and would be later crowned as a *basileus*, near the Wall of Byzantium, by the Patriarch himself.

The Preslav circular church was very probably the princely chapel of the Bulgarian capital. At the beginning of the Tenth Century, the first Bulgarian Czardom felt a need to take up once again certain Roman-Byzantine traditions of church architecture that were filled with known meanings. The case of the central area was correlated by medieval peoples (as in Ravenna or Aachen) with the idea of a central almighty and "imperial" rule, an initiative thus making possible the building of an exceptional place. Such a place had moved lines and volumes, and rich and glamorous ornaments, that were mainly represented by the glass, ceramics, and coloured stone intarsia of marble columns and cornices, but also by a predominantly zoomorphic and high relief type of sculpture, that was quite far from the Constantinoplitan "classicism" of that time, but very close to the sensibility and aesthetic sense of the so-called Slavo-Bulgarians, who could not have forgotten, only several decades after their Christianization, some specific elements of the polychrome pomp to be found in the art of steppe nomads.

Turning to Serbia, one observes that in the medieval historical evolution of Southeastern Europe, the role model was to be the most representative monument of an old local civilization, the Studenica Church in Raška, in the very geographical and political heart of the territory belonging to the Southern Slavs in the Western parts of the Balkan Peninsula. It had been constructed under the patronage of the Holy Virgin in the last two decades of the Twelfth Century, between 1183 and 1196, by two brothers who were soon to become the protagonists of the establishment of an independent Serbian kingdom and of the autonomous church of Serbia. They were Stephen and Sava, the first crowned sovereign and the first archbishop of Serbia, respectively.

Even if, since the rule of the Great *Zupan* Stephen, father of the two Nemanyids, places like Kuršumlya and Djurdjevi Stupovi had been able to confirm the fact that the actual independence acquired by the Serbs from Byzantium was accompanied by the building of their own monuments, it was only the church of the Studenica monastery that properly marked the fact that Serbia had joined an ideological and political Southeastern European order of a certain distinction. On the one hand, the King had been married to one of the daughters of the imperial Comnenoi, but then later would be married to a Venetian duchess. On the other hand, the high prelate was himself linked by the Athos monks both to the Nicaean Orthodox patriarchal clergy and to the Catholic clergy in Salonika and in Latin Constantinople. In the architecture and sculpture of the church in question, the echoes of the Italian-Dalmatian Romanesque style encountered the trends of Byzantine iconography of a few years before 1200. Its mural, monumental, and hieratic painting reflected influences of the Byzantine Comnean art style.

That the link between these two exceptional political and cultural personalities of the second Nemanyid generation with the Studenica monument was programmatic and decisive for the role of the latter is proved by the great influence exerted by Sava, who was biologically and ideologically very close to the sovereign, over the iconography programme of the main church. Here, a major role was assigned to Saint Stephen, who not only gave his name to all future Serb sovereigns, but was also the patron of the state and of the royal power in Nemanyid Serbia.

A second common feature of the monuments in question that is linked to their visual characteristics is pomp which could tell quite a story about the role, the place, the power, and the richness of certain founders. These frequently wanted to be represented as being equal to the Byzantine emperor and to the bearer of the imperial crown of the West. They wished to be remembered as "Christianizers" of peoples, and they hoped to mark the turning point that they and their monuments represented in the history of their lands – by the nobility of the materials and by the special accuracy of the artistic and technical accomplishments of places built on the first day after conversion. They wanted the fact of conversion to be registered by both their contemporaries and their successors in such a

way as to make certain that it would be a reality shared by all and would form part of the collective mentality itself of the age around the year 1000.

Little is known today about the appearance of the great (so-called "royal") Pliska basilica. There is reason to believe, however, that it was richly adorned as were the neighbouring palaces. It is known that these were smartened up, by request of Boris-Mihail, with Byzantine-like frescoes. The marble of the columns and of the covering of the inner faces, the painted ceramic intarsia, the glass and the coloured stone which had evolved into mosaics at a certain point, and the sculptured details (especially on the cornices) were suggestive of the Preslav "round church" (the latter probably being one and the same with what contemporaries called the "gilded church" built by Simeon" and mentioned in the writings of certain monks in 908), offer strong reasons to believe that they had become totally integrated as part of the same scenery. This scenery had been pervaded by a certain slightly barbarian pomp, very coloured, and bearing the print of Byzantium.

The Bulgarian scholar, John the Exarch, noted in his *Sestodnev*, at the beginning of the Tenth Century, the greatness of the outer city edifices, adorned as they were with "paintings and sculpted wood". Primarily, however, as in the hyperbolic manner typical of medieval chroniclers, he evolved the feeling of a traveller, who, having come from very far, had reached the inner precincts of the residence on the river Ticha and, astonished by the beauty he had encountered there, had associated it with the greatness of the new faith which had spread throughout Bulgaria.

When entering the inner city and seeing high palaces and churches adorned with stone, wood, and paintings on the outside, as well as with marble, brass, silver and gold on the inside, he does not know what to compare them with, for he had never seen such things in his country (*La Culture médiévale bulgare*, 1961, p. 45).

In the case of the Preslav round church, such a qualifier as "gilded" (given to it by one of its contemporaries), backed up by certain archaeological findings of the last fifty years, brings to mind an image of true richness in terms of adornment. One is thus able to perceive with the mind's eye the pomp of this principal creation of a Bulgarian ruler under whose reign the Slav state in the Northeastern Balkan Peninsula reached its peak of development.

John the Exarch also recalled the gold which adorned the cupola of the Preslav church, as well as the marble. In the same way, Russian chroniclers and Hungarian bishops in their Latin texts about the churches of Alba Regia and Kiev had evoked the golden glow of the parietal ornaments and the liturgical receptacles. They had also admired the marble - that again, according to written testimonies, but also to material evidence – had adorned each of these places in Tenth- and Eleventh-Century Bulgaria, Russia, and Hungary. The same gold and marble would obsessively persist (probably owing to their symbolic value) in the memory of such a person as Gavriil the *Protos*, when he put pen to paper to write about Neagoe Bassarab's Curtea de Argeş foundation, half a millennium

later. And gold and marble were prominent in what was the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century *monumentum princeps* par excellence for Serbia, the Studenica Church of the Holy Virgin.

As the life of the founder of the Studenica Church, written by its first Superior, marked the beginning of old Serbian literature, the history of Serbian medieval painting began with the initial 1208-1209 frescoes done on a gold-yellow background by a Greek or a Constantinople artist brought in by Sava Nemanya . He wanted to imitate for his Raška master the glamour and the aspect of Byzantine mosaics, by the very costly method of applying a thin gold sheet, in what had also acquired an extra-aesthetic meaning.

As was the case of the white marble that ennobled this church – in a Serbia which had so far only built in stone and brick and would continue to do so to a great extent – these frescoes actually used their glamour and contents to confirm a particular founding trait. The Great *Zupan* Nemanya, who had built the Studenica where he would later become a monk, endowing it with precious icons and chalices, luxurious surplices and books, wanted to envelope, in the splendour of precious materials and scintillating colours, the monument supposed to preserve his memory and that of his two sons, Sava and Stephen. For the adornment of this edifice, the sons, like the father, could always resort, imbued as they were with an almost imperial munificence, to craftsmen based in a city, Constantinople, which provided artistic measure and political legitimacy. These matters were noted in the *Jivot Stefana Nemanje*, a biography written by Nemanya's son, Sava, the Superior of Studenica and Archbishop of Serbia, and by his royal brother, Stephen. They acknowledged the presence of an extremely "Byzantine" cultural monument in their own country, as Boris-Mihail, but especially Simeon, had already acknowledged in Bulgaria, and Vladimir (but especially Jaroslav), in Kiev .

It was only natural for each of these monuments to have, as was the case of the most important places in a recently established feudal state, a set of well-defined and eminent roles. Indeed, this function was their third common feature. The roles in question, included serving as places for coronations, where the founding sovereigns and their successors were charismatically "anointed"; as burial places for the members of a newly created "dynasty", and sometimes, as premises belonging to the highest hierarch in the country and implicitly to the institution he represented. These places were further legitimized in the eyes of the faithful by serving as the repositories of, for instance, the bones of various bishops or sovereigns glorified by means of artistic images and texts.

Because the Bulgarian religious foundations were the oldest in the series of monuments falling within the scope of this study, they also provide the least reliable information. Yet, they enable one to suspect that the great Pliska basilica was the place at which all the important ceremonies during the rule of Boris-Mihail took place and with a pomp that carefully matched their size. It seems that quite an important part was played by the so-called *mitatoria* placed in front of the altar). It is also

possible to infer that the Preslav "round" church, an even more remarkable monument if one considers that its construction took place under the diligent watch of a *cartophylax*, was Simeon's court chapel. Here, in the Tenth Century, the sovereign's liturgy must have been performed by the Patriarch whose religious seat could be found inside the same official residence.

The Studenica church, that preserved the relics of the founder of this monastic seat, had painted scenes that glorified him as the great *Zupan*, Stephen, later known as Simeon the Monk, the founder of the medieval Serbian Kingdom. These scenes had been designated under the literary influence of the zealous hagiographer and author of liturgies, Sava Nemanya. He had directed the ceremonial bringing over of the relics of the Hilandar saintly monk (1207-1208), his father. In general terms, he had become the outstanding personality of this political and spiritual establishment. According to the local medieval mentality, he was the protector of Serbia and the intervener for all the sovereigns until the end of the Thirteenth Century. In a similar way, later Serbian monasteries (Mileševa, Dečani, and Sopočani) would commemorate, in an absolutely particular way, all royal donors whose tombs and relics they were to shelter.

Because such a place was the ostentatious necropolis of founding kings, *knezes*, and *zupans*, as well as a place for coronations, or, in certain cases, like that of the Pliska basilica, for example, a collective christening place, a *monumentum princeps* became, thanks to its prestige, a creator of posterity, to be imitated, so far as architecture and parietal ornaments were concerned, by architects, sculptors, and painters in the succeeding generations. This role represented the fourth common features of such places. The imitation worked in the same places or in more distant venues. Each time, however, they would work for the successors of "christianizing" sovereigns or of those who had founded churches and states and who could thus perceive themselves as political, ideological, and founding continuators of the works of their famous forerunners. Undoubtedly, the large numbers of basilica churches having triple-nave plans constructed in Pliska (more than ten, among which some were of considerable size) at the end of the Ninth and into the Tenth Centuries, as well as the Preslav edifices built according to the same plan structure, can be explained by the influence that the large "royal" Pliska basilica had upon the builders.

These were, as noticed, convenient for the religious needs of the recently converted. Possibly one should add that the rebirth of a basilica in the Ninth Century, during the rule of the recently converted Boris-Mihail, that memory (albeit hypothetical, but frequently present in the historiography of this period), had linked to the Byzantium of Constantine the Great and of Justinian, could also be identified in the dating of certain parts of a basilica church with the patronage of Saint Achilles of Prespa, as well as of another church with a very suggestive patronage – Saint Sophia of Ohrid that was imperial and Constantinoplitan at the same time. This last sanctuary had probably been the cathedral of this large Macedonian

urban center. As such it was mentioned by Theophylactus in his biography of Bishop Clement, along with the churches of the latter that were built according to a very different monumental vision.[3]

These churches illustrated a specific moment of Simeon's rule, namely the presence in Ohrid and Preslav of two disciples of Saint Cyril and Saint Methodius, Clement and Nahum, who had arrived in Bulgaria after 885. Clement gave Prince Boris-Mihail his principal assistance in introducing the Slavonic liturgy into Southwestern Macedonia and in constructing the Imaret Djami, a monastery under the patronage of Saint Pantelimon, that was completed in Ohrid, before 892-893. Later, Clement become a bishop and started a whole range of missionary actions. He was buried in the new monastery in 916. Nahum was very active in the new Bulgarian capital, Preslav. He was, however, buried in another monk's church, that was built around the year 900, on the Southern shore of Lake Ohrid. His remains now lie in the currently existing Church of the Holy Archangels.

These two monastic establishments received the same triconch or three-apse version of the three-cusped plan of paleo-Christian origins. This basic plan had been taken up again, as everywhere, in Ninth and Tenth Century Europe, from the Carolingian Far West to Mount Athos,[4] because of its Trinitarian symbolism (so precise and evocative for the whole corpus of missionary work that was being undertaken under the sign of the recently successful Cross against the iconoclasts). The style was also appreciated for its functional character, as linked to the liturgical service that had its meaning enhanced in a freshly evangelized territory, particularly in those services in which pew hymns were sung in the lateral apses.

Ohrid was the starting point for the spreading throughout of monastic churches built according to triconch plans that accompanied Slavonic Orthodox missionary activities between the Eleventh and the Fourteenth Centuries. They would even be constructed in Macedonia, beside the Holy Mountain (Castoria), in Bulgaria (Pliska), in the Serbian territories (Kučevište and a group of churches in the Morava Valley, Starcevo-Gorica), in Byzantine Dobrudja (Niculițel), and up to the Walachian lands of the first Bassarabs and of the Balkan monk Nicodemus before the year 1400 (Vodița, Tismana, Cotmeana, Cozia).

Returning to Tenth Century Bulgaria, it is possible to state with certainty that the sumptuous "round" church in Preslav inaugurated a fashion around the year 900 of adornment by means of multicoloured painted ceramics, marble coatings, polychrome pavements, and sculpted cornices, all of which could be found inside other Tenth Century Preslav monuments, even if they had been built according to different plans.

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[3]"Thus, Ohrid had three churches, a cathedral and two other churches built by Clement, much smaller than the cathedral, but also more beautiful due to their circular shape" (J. P. Migne, 1864, col. 1229).

[4]According to C. Margo (1976, p. 359) there is "reason to believe that this influence has nothing to do with Ohrid, but belongs in fact to the Caucasus".

As for the other *monumentum princeps*, that is, Studenica, its posterity is as undisputed as it is remarkable, since it became a veritable model for Serbian art in the Thirteenth Century, particularly during the rule of Milyutin (Stephen Urosh II) (1281-1321). The speciality was iconography with a particular focus on the cycle devoted to the founder of the Serbian Kingdom, the Great *Zupan* Stephen-Simeon, who has been so frequently mentioned in these pages. The "Byzantine moment", that has been so artistically marked by the author of the first frescoes of the major religious foundation of the Nemanyid Dynasty, established its own posterity, without the shadow of a doubt, before and after 1250, in Mileševa and Peć, through the works of "Greek" artists who were crossing Serbia between 1230 and 1260. At this time, Serbian painters could emphasize the value of their mural paintings thanks to the "Studenica moment", completed around the year 1200, which was a sort of artistic trailblazer. In like manner was Twelfth Century Russian painting, much indebted to another "Byzantine moment", the Kiev Saint Sophia church, built by Jaroslav the Wise.

Stone and brick symbols of Christianization as well as of state and ecclesiastic beginnings indicate the extent to which architecture is undoubtedly "the most political of art forms" (R. Scruton, 1973: 327-345). The monuments dealt with so far belong to very active Eastern European civilization areas, to certain worlds, which, through the contacts between the Slav or Slavo-Turanian cultures of migrators, gradually became sedentary in a region surrounded by the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Bulgarian Stara Planina, or in Raška and Byzantium. These peoples and the pre-Romanic Carolingian Empire brought these parts of the continent, from the Ninth until the Thirteenth Century, to remarkable cultural developments in the beginning of the Middle Ages.

C. ROMANIAN EXCEPTIONALISM

It is obvious, however, that this *tour d'horizon*, that was combined with an attempt at a comparative study meant to bring out some of the common features of each Southeastern European *monumentum princeps*, deliberately left out one geographical area, that of Romania. The reason for doing so is even more relevant, given the frequent mentioning of the great and richly adorned monuments in Pliska, Preslav, and Studenica.

The Romanian territories lying between the Carpathian Mountains and the Danube witnessed the ethnic and cultural genesis of the only Latin-derived Eastern European people. Among them, Christianity began gradually to spread as early as late antiquity, moving toward one of the Northern borders of the "classic" world, thus making the Carpathian and Danubian territories part of a chain whereby Rome, its provinces, and the missionaries of the Eastern Church preached the word of the new faith between Spain and the Caucasus. By the same token, however, Romanians were marked by the exceptional historical circumstances, that during the pre-medieval centuries of huge movements of people, as in the

Balkan Peninsula and in Pannonia, their situation was different. They were not confronted with a situation whereby an old rural Romanized and Christianized population was overrun by tribes of warriors, horsemen, and shepherds, *i.e.*, Pagan migrators, who themselves would be later on Christianized and settled as they willingly and fully settled the new territories. According to historians of culture, the Romanian lands were the only ones that did not witness, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, the construction of rich, ostentatious, and showy monuments intended to impress the people and also, given the exceptional quality of such edifices, to speak of a new ideology and mentality, radically different from those of the nomadic and Pagan age. By comparison, according to these same historians, none of the monuments that linked the existence of the proto-Romanians to the beginning of a Romanian state life was able to suddenly and dramatically mark a new - an utterly new - page of history. For this reason, Romanian chroniclers felt no need whatsoever to underline in their texts the appearance of the most important places related to the Walachian and Moldavian lay and ecclesiastic feudality.

The Romanian monuments that critically mark the appearance of the two aforementioned feudal states, the Princely Church in Câmpulung, the Saint Nicholas Church in Curtea de Argeş, and the Saint Nicholas Church in Rădăuţi, the three of them the princely necropolises of, respectively, the Bassarabs, the Bogdanids, and the Muşatins, belong to the Fourteenth Century. They are thus removed from the Eastern European typological series with which this study has dealt so far. The Argeş and Suceava state, church, and metropolitan beginnings, that can be found in the same Century, are strongly different from Bulgarian, Russian, and Serbian Orthodox beginnings and are not reflected in the oldest Romanian chronicles. This latter detail is very significant, for it indicates that such places were not perceived by the Romanians living during that period as being unusual or representative of the start of a new age. The Romanians in question were old Christians who were quite familiar with cult monuments. It was only in the Seventeenth Century that the Cantacuzino Annals began to speak of the legendary Radu Negru, who had built, both in Curtea de Argeş and in Câmpulung, a "large and beautiful" church (M. Gregorian, 1961, pp. 83-84). These two adjectives, both very plain, simple, and well balanced, if compared with other descriptions in the texts cited above, were the only ones used by the chronicler.

The same information is provided at the start of the following Century by the Grand Headman, Radu Popescu, while, during the same late medieval age, the first author mentioning a foundation of the other legendary voivode, Dragoş of Moldavia, seems to have been Nicholas (Nicolae) Costin. Before him, the *Anonymous Annals* of Moldavia and Grigore Ureche's *Annals*, only linked the name of Alexander the Good (Alexandru cel Bun) to certain founding initiatives. And even if it is discovered that a monument of the Romanian Fourteenth Century, such as the Saint Nicholas Church in Curtea de Argeş, apparently meets the basic requirements for an Eastern European *monumentum princeps*, it is

necessary to consider that the absence of certain basic features that were identified above, the lack of an ostentatious inner and outer adornment, as well as, later on, the lack of references to it in chronicles, place the Carpathian cult edifices in a different aesthetic order and in another cultural and historical typology.

Yet, this church somewhat resembled the Serbian Studenica in the sense that it corresponded to a Byzantine-inspired establishment of an official church in a newly created feudal state. Moreover, it was built almost at the same time as the formal establishment of Walachia. It harboured some of the most worshipped relics in Balkan orthodoxy, as well as the tombs of some of the voivodes of the Bassarab dynasty. It had an alleged and ephemeral metropolitan role and therefore enjoyed a vague posterity in the Fourteenth Century through the other Walachian princely city, *i.e.*, Târgovişte.

This situation was far from springing from an alleged modesty of means on the part of the Romanian state and the church founders. On the contrary, in certain historical circumstances, the situation was quite the opposite. In 1330, Bassarab I gave the Hungarian king a huge amount of money, while, in 1338, Peter (Petru) I Muşat was a source of credit for the king of Poland. This specific situation of the voivodal monuments of the first Romanian Middle Ages, when set in the general Eastern European picture, is deeply rooted in (and accounted for by) the position, in the region, of the only medieval Romanity.

Unlike what happened from this standpoint in the "recently Christian" areas in Eastern Europe, either of Western affiliation, such as Hungary, or Byzantium-driven, like Russia, to give only two examples from the immediate territorial neighbourhood of the "Eastern Latinity", the Romanians, who were integrated into a perfect continuity of civilization in an area of Greco-Roman "old Christianity", were the only people in these parts of the continent who preserved the structures of a Christian life of Latin origin dating back to late antiquity and with no eclipses and with a predominantly folkloristic character.

In contrast, the Turanian and Slavic populations, that had been nomadic for some time before finally settling on the eve of the establishment of feudal states, underwent top-down Christianization in the same periods and sometimes with important territorial conquests that programmatically triggered off ample and sumptuous artistic achievements meant to give legitimacy in their own way to a new *regnum* and also to have an echo among their contemporaries and for posterity.

In the case of Romanian Christianity, archaeological sources speak of certain forms of craftsmanship, and also certain written sources refer to some collective mentalities existing throughout the whole pre-medieval age until the Eighth and Ninth Century ethnogenesis ends. The picture one gets is of a sedentary population which, on one hand, had its own economic and political structures – with *ţări* turned into *ţara* - and with the Fourteenth Century principality set East and South of the Carpathians, and on the other hand, equally specific art structures. The

latter look simple, but are pervaded by a harmonious simplicity of "classic" descent that can be found in the almost severe, yet so classical walls and volume of Curtea de Argeş and in the discreet elegance of Cozia - even if some of these monuments have room for meaningful and "aulic" architectural, iconographic, and heraldic suggestions coming from the very heart of imperial Byzantium.

Founders who were familiar with aulic ceremonial decoration and could compare themselves to what was most "modern and fashionable" in terms of European smartness had built these churches. They did not need to adorn such monuments with marble, gold, gems, or rare wood. (Much later, with a different mentality and in a historical moment having little to do with the solemn majesty of "state beginnings", rulers such as Matei Bassarab, Vasile Lupu, and Constantin Brâncoveanu would massively and artfully use such materials for their most outstanding monuments.)

Between the Fourth and the Fourteenth Centuries, these traditional art forms had witnessed a remarkable step-by-step continuity whereby the blinding pomp lacked any programmatic role and had no connection with spectacular conversions to Christianity or with the establishment of a state the subjects of which had all been nomadic until very recently. There was no need for such a *monumentum princeps* for Romanians, for Christianity had been known in Romania for centuries before any attempts were made at state founding, while state founding itself, as is already well-known, was the result of certain changes in a community-driven local population who, given the political structures in Dobrudja, Banat, and Transylvania, as well as their ancient Daco-Roman ethnic roots, had managed to conceive ideological, mental, and aesthetic coordinates that were drastically different from those of the neighbouring peoples. The absence of a *monumentum princeps* in the old Romanian civilization thus becomes – in a European East the basic features of which more than one thousand years ago had to do with conversions and with policies of "denomadization" – the proof of a notable cultural persistence.

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III. A Byzantine Model for Political and State Structure in Southeastern Europe between the Thirteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries

STELIAN BREZEANU

A. INTRODUCTION

As an inheritor of the political aspects of Rome and of Hellenistic culture, supported by Christian spirituality, the New Rome was, in the words of the French scholar, Paul Valéry, the first truly European empire. A perpetuator of the highest values of ancient civilization, the Byzantine Empire represented – for as long as it existed – the main political and cultural model in the Christian world, a true "Versailles of the Middle Ages".

Its influence can be recognized during the first centuries of the Western medieval period, particularly so far as the fine arts and political ideology are concerned. One thing to be noticed, indeed, is that, even as late as the first centuries of the second millennium, Western "national" monarchies owed more to Byzantium than to the Western Empire. Yet, the influences of New Rome were much stronger in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, owing to a number of specific factors. Here, the Slavic states in the Balkans came into existence in territories belonging to the Empire. Later on, territories that had been seized by the Slavs were reintegrated into the domain of Constantinople and placed under its suzerainty. Additionally, the Southern and Eastern Slavs were christianized by the Empire. For this reason, the Slavic churches that had been placed under the authority of the Oecumenical Patriarchate became important focuses of the influences of Byzantine civilization. Even in the Romanian Principalities, the metropolitan churches created by the Constantinople Patriarchate played the same major part in helping Byzantine models make themselves known in the Romanian world.

From the political point of view, Byzantine influences are more easily to be found during the declining years of the Empire, *i.e.*, starting in the Thirteenth Century. Although these influences appeared at all levels of political life, they are particularly evident at high rank, as in the domain of power symbols. The object of this chapter is to assess the scope of these influences and their role in the political awakening of the states in question in the area of Byzantine civilization.

The sources used in the development of this topic, while few, if one considers the extent of the period in question, are highly diverse. The most important written sources for both Byzantium and for the Orthodox states are the chancellery papers that are particularly important for

understanding the meaning of the titles of rulers, essential for the study of political ideology. The accounts of the lives of saints during the Nemanyid Dynasty, along with the Byzantine, Russian, and Romanian chronicles, represent the most important narrative sources. Among other types of sources, numismatic and iconographic objects are particularly useful, for often enough they will include the specific titles of princes.

The question of the influence of Byzantine models on political life in Orthodox states has been an object of concern for many academics and students for more than a century. Among the first significant investigations, one should mention the work of L. Bréhier (1906) devoted to imperial institutions and to the concept of *autocrator*. Substantial research was also undertaken by F. Dölger (1953, 1956, and 1961) and by G. Ostrogorsky (1936a, 1936b), two reputed experts on Byzantine issues who focused on political institutions and on power ranks and symbols. They also tackled the influence of Constantinople upon political life in Orthodox states. Finally, during the post-Second World War decades, the most important contributions to the study of this matter can be found in the works of D. Obolensky, who also wrote a classic monograph on the Byzantine Commonwealth (1971).

B. THE IDEA OF UNIVERSAL EMPIRE: THEORY AND REALITY

Before sketching the main elements of the imperial idea in the New Rome, two preliminary remarks have to be made without which a full understanding of the concept is not possible. First, one cannot undertake an analysis of a political concept or theory in the abstract, without relating it to the specific reality that it influences. All medieval political theories sprang from a number of philosophical or theological axioms, yet they developed under the influence of concrete reality that reflected the consequences of various economic mutations, social disputes, and political achievements. Consequently, the first concern of this study is the way in which political theory adjusted to and was shaped by a permanently changing reality, the relationships between Christian Rome and the surrounding world being the very domain in which Byzantine political ideology developed this capacity. At the same time it observes the way in which theory went beyond the level of reflection to order, or to contribute to, the formation of certain political structures on behalf of a political ideal. Second, a distinction has to be made between the tangible existence of geographically limited rule over several countries and peoples and an idea that was only typical of the Middle Ages, according to which divinity used peace and order as the basis for fair rule, whereby this very order, an image of the heavenly order, represented the world *de jure*.

In a world in which war and disorder were scourges that made peace seen to be an imperative of social life, common people perceived this last idea as "a collective dream, an aspiration for an ideal state of things", which they identified as being the Empire, while the political actors viewed it as a plan of action. As a result, the concept of empire was virtuality,

linked to an ideal of unity and civilization, rather than one of universality in its territorial reality.

The Empire belongs to God and is managed by the Emperor. Its founder is not Augustus, but Christ, and at the end of time, it will continue to be a universal realm in the divine Kingdom of Christ. These were the central ideas to be found in the hymns with which the people of Constantinople welcomed the Emperor, on Easter Monday, for more than a thousand years, and which were preserved for posterity by Emperor Constantine *Porphyrogenitus* in his work, *De ceremoniis* (Book of Ceremonies), a true monument of Byzantine political ideology (see Porphyrogénète, 1935 edition).

These ideas can be summed up in two words: *eternity* and *universality*. The two concepts are complementary because, as Virgil wrote, "the Empire is boundless" (*imperium sine fine*). In other words, spatial infinity was associated with temporal infinity. Eternity and especially universality appeared at an ideological and political level and were historically constructed. In theory they implied the unity of the human race as a divine product, while on practical grounds, they presupposed the aspiration of political unification of the inhabited world (*oikoumene*).

The two concepts were first noted in the Hellenistic world, the common civilization of which acquired its logical framework in the monarchy (taken in the etymological meaning of the word) of Alexander the Great. According to the Stoics, the theorists of the new organizational formula of the world, it was the duty of the monarch to shape the terrestrial political order as a reflection of the cosmic order. A few centuries later, the new order (*pax Romana*) would once again be best theorized by the Stoics, and after the decline of their philosophy, by the Neoplatonists.

At this point, it would be helpful to highlight the part played by the political achievements of the city on the Tiber in making possible the idea of universality in Roman ideology. As was very persuasively proved by J. Vogt (1929), the aspiration of Rome to an *orbis Romanus*, to universality, is the historical product of so-called *Weltherschaft*, *i.e.*, the conquests of the Romans on the ruins of the Hellenistic Mediterranean world within Augustus's Principality.

The creation of Christian monarchy by Constantine the Great and his successors, the most important event in Roman history after Augustus's initiative, was the basis of Byzantine political ideology. Its founder and obviously most reputed theorist was Eusebius of Caesarea. The fundamental text of his theoretical construct is *Triakontaeterikos*, written in 336, on the celebration of three decades of Constantinian rule and on the opening of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem. Some of the political ideas in this text also appear in other works of the Caesarea bishop (*Praeparatio*, *Demonstratio evengelica*, and *Vita Constantini*). Eusebius's central theological and philosophical theses are the following: the cosmos as *basileia* and *monarchia*; the mimesis of "the Great *Basileus*" (God) as a prerequisite of cosmic harmony and a source of the earthly *basileia*. In other words, terrestrial order is the mirror image of cosmic

order: since there is one Kingdom and one Law in Heaven, there should also be one Emperor and one Law on earth. On the other hand, in Eusebius's vision of the founding of the Christian Empire, the idea of mimesis is critical to fully understanding his political theory, alternatively referred to as "political philosophy" (Francis Dvornik, 1962), "imperial religion" (L. Bréhier, 1906), or, more appropriately, "political theology" (E. Peterson, 1934). In this vision, the Emperor is a *hyparchos* (a regent or a lieutenant) of "the Great *Basileus*" on earth, guarantor of earthly harmony, and provider of cosmic harmony. The Emperor had to rule over the whole terrestrial kingdom; he was "the helmsman of the universal ship", "the father and the master of the universe".

This idea, that was fully developed by the Fifth and Sixth Century theorists, actually gave rise to a genuine political action plan for the emperors of the New Rome, the mission of which it was to preach the faith in a redemptive God to all the peoples of the world. In its first phase, this mission assumed an internal dimension, the conversion of all subjects to Christianity. Once this mission had been accomplished internally, it was to continue for the benefit of barbarian nations, thus expanding the borders of the faith in Christ and of the Roman Empire. In this vision, the borders of the Empire were conceived as the limits of Christianity. Any expansion was a new conquest for the faith, just as any expansion of the Church outside the Empire following missionary activity potentially stood for a new acquisition of Christian Rome. In this way, the Emperor was perceived as the first missionary of belief in Christ. *Pax Romana* would thus merge with *Pax Christiana* and result in a deeply original outlook, the *Pax Byzantina*. Constantine and his successors accordingly became agents of the idea of divine monarchy, and their political action was at the same time a missionary one. This perceived role meant that both the Empire and the Emperor were invested with apostolic and charismatic responsibilities.

These ideas were prevalent in Byzantine political thinking for eleven centuries. Yet, in practice, they took account of various achievements and adjustments depending upon the actual possibilities of the Empire. The same possibilities also conditioned the echoes of Byzantine ideology beyond its borders. From the standpoint of the political achievements of imperial ideology and of its influence on the surrounding world, several stages can be identified in the evolution of political ideas in the New Rome.

The first stage covers the three centuries separating the founding of Christian monarchy by Constantine from the Arab expansion, which reduced the Byzantine Empire to its core territory, Asia Minor. During this period, the grounds for a Byzantine imperial theology were laid, with the decisive contribution of Constantine, but also, from a political point of view, with that of Justinian, when he made a major attempt to restore the old *Orbis Romanus*.

At the level of real policy, these two events had a meaning that was strongly militant. Following Constantine's action, the North-Danubian region, as well as other regions, successively came into the political and cultural orbit of the Empire, thanks to the successful missionary work

accomplished by the Church. Christian missionary activity and imperial policy went hand in hand everywhere, both in terms of motivation for the spreading of the faith and of the results obtained. In its turn, Justinian's work was dictated by political motives, but could also be considered as beneficial for an Orthodoxy which was actually in a position to recover territories that had lapsed into Paganism. In the words of one of the Constantinople Church representatives, Orthodoxy brought back peace and understanding to the faithful.

What were the echoes of this world of ideas beyond the boundaries of the Byzantine world? The barbarian kingdoms established on the territory of the former empire in the West felt that they belonged to the all-encompassing Roman community. At a higher level, barbarian kings found that they could legitimate their power through affiliation to the civilized world of the New Rome on the Bosphorus. Even taking anti-Byzantine attitudes into account, they were thought of (and they thought of themselves) as representatives of the Empire in the conquered territories. Ranks and power symbols of Roman origin awarded by Constantinople could be found throughout the barbarian world, even in the Mediterranean Germanic states, re-conquered by Justinian. They were also held by Frankish, Burgundian, and even insular Anglo-Saxon kings, as well as by Christian kings in the Caucasus and by the rulers of the Ethiopian Kingdom of Axum. The world supremacy of Christian Rome had never been more real in terms of both actual rule and of economic, cultural, and ideological influence.

The next two centuries, from the Islamic conquests to the mid-Ninth Century, were a defensive period in the policy of an empire forced to mount guard on all its borders and to surrender most of its provinces. In the new circumstances, the doctrine of universal vocation and of Byzantine world supremacy failed to attract supporters. "The homeland" (*patria*) and "Orthodoxy" were incorporated into the political ideology of Constantinople as new values that enlivened the populations of the Anatolian plateaux to which the Empire was indebted for having helped overcome the Seventh Century crisis. Reduced to its Greek population core, the New Rome became a Greek "national" empire, while Orthodoxy turned itself into a national religion. The mere idea of an offensive policy was out of the question. Constantinople only acted offensively toward the Slavic communities in Thrace, Southern Macedonia, and Greece, attempting to integrate them into its political and cultural system. As Empire *foederats*, Slavic tribes were converted to Christianity and subsequently underwent a slow process of assimilation.

From the standpoint of the evolution of Byzantine ideology, the period between the victory of the iconoclasts and the Fourth Crusade (1204) is a distinct stage, characterized by a forward looking policy, which culminated in the "Byzantine *épopée*" of the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries. This new militancy in the foreign policy of the Byzantine state was legitimized by the singleness and the universality of the New Rome, which was put forward, once again, by Byzantine political theorists after centuries of silence. The

European political picture, however, had undergone spectacular changes during the Byzantine power eclipse between the Seventh and the Ninth Centuries. During the same period, the West had witnessed the establishment of several Christian kingdoms and of the Carolingian Empire, followed by the German Empire.

Slavic states and the Hungarian Kingdom had also been founded or were on the verge of being set up in Southeastern and Eastern Europe. For this reason and displaying an admirable capacity to adjust, Byzantine political ideology ceased to claim world supremacy as per the outlook of Constantine and Justinian. It preferred now to choose a type of political doctrine that provided the New Rome with supremacy in the Christian world and turned Constantinople into a legitimating factor in the political world of the time. In other words, political doctrine now spoke of the "Family of Kings" according to which Christian princes formed a spiritual family led by the Constantinople Emperor, the authority of whom was, in the vision of Patriarch Nicholas the Mystic, "above all terrestrial forces and the only power instituted on earth by the heavenly lord" (*in*, J. P. Migne, 1864, p. 165, C-D). Consequently, the *Basileus* was the "spiritual father" of all Christian princes, while in their turn, these princes were his "brothers", "sons", or "subjects" (*douloi*). A veritable ceremonial, described down to its tiniest details by Constantine VII *Porphyrogenitus*, was devised for the welcoming of foreign envoys to Constantinople, with strict observance of the place granted by the Emperor to each and every state in a fictitious political hierarchy.

The means by which Byzantium secured recognition for its supremacy in the Christian world went as far back as the periods of rule of Constantine and Justinian. The most frequent (and at any rate the most productive) means was the obligation of all states to experience – by force, if necessary – Orthodox Christianization. It was by such means that the Bulgarian Czardom, the Serbian Kingdom, and the Great Principality of Kiev joined, one after the other, what Obolensky (1971) has called the "Byzantine Commonwealth". There were also cases in which Constantinople gave certain symbols of power to Christian principalities, like, for instance, the famous crown delivered to the King of Hungary. Finally, when feasible, Constantinople used the Macedonian soldier-emperors to actually conquer the Balkan Peninsula and spoke of this policy as belonging to the doctrine of "reinsertion" into the Roman Empire of territories previously overrun and conquered by barbarians.

What was the response of Christian princes to claims of world supremacy on the part of Constantinople? In a first stage, the new doctrine – along with its political implications – seems to have been accepted in the Christian world. The strongest confirmation came from sources linked to the beginnings of the Carolingian Empire. While Pope Leo III conceived of the Aachen empire as a sort of "counter-empire" to the Bosphorus New Rome, Frankish doctrine as expressed by Eginhard (1923) claimed the status of a local Frankish empire, while Charlemagne wanted recognition as holding the title of Emperor and dutifully agreed to belong to the

"Family of Kings" led by the "Roman Emperors" and to be given the rank of "Brother". A century and a half later, Otto the Great more or less claimed the same status for his empire.

The Bulgarian ruler, Czar Boris, accepted into the same "Family of Kings" following Christianization, received the rank of "Beloved Son", shared with the Christian kings of Tenth and Eleventh Century Armenia. Venetian *doges* and Serbian princes accepted the titles of imperial "*douloi*".

In the next stage, however, this position of Byzantium in the Christian world was questioned and even became a point of contention. The first disputes erupted in the West and concerned Charlemagne's successors, who, assuming the agenda of the Pontifical Empire, acquired the title of "Emperor of the Romans", and questioned the status of the Constantinople *Basileus*. But these negative reactions lacked practical significance, given the weaknesses of the last of the Carolingians. Far more serious was the questioning coming from Czar Simeon, who in his turn annexed the title of "Romans' *Basileus*". Indeed, he tried to replace the Constantinople *Basileus* by force.

The most important attempt to create a rival empire took place in the Twelfth Century in the West, when Frederick Barbarossa, in contact with reborn Roman law and with Justinian's political ideas, claimed the whole Roman inheritance for himself, adding "Holy" to his title in 1155 and denying the title of "Roman Emperor" to his Bosphorus rivals, conceding them, instead, the title of "King of the Greeks". Moreover, Barbarossa and his son, Henry VI, came close to implementing a plan for the conquest and the annexation of the Byzantine Empire.

The two centuries between the Fourth Crusade and the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople form the last stage in the evolution of Byzantine imperial ideology. This stage was first dominated by an offensive policy intended to contribute to the reconquest of Greek territories that had been occupied by the Latins in 1204. This ideology was later characterized by a defensive survival policy in the face of fearsome opponents. In the new historical conditions, the doctrines of the uniqueness of the Empire and of its world supremacy were given up for good. At the same moment, Byzantine political ideology proved its huge power to adjust to changing political realities. The organizational formula of the Greek world after 1204 offers a most important argument in this respect.

At the beginning of the Thirteenth Century, when the Empire crumbled into several principalities and a Latin empire was established in Constantinople, Theodore Lascaris announced from Nicaea his agenda for the reconstitution of the old imperial unity. He formulated the slogan, "Let there be one flock and one shepherd again". This programme for the restoration of monarchy in its Greek expression, with the relinquishing of Balkan Slavic territories, is all-pervasive in the political actions of the Lascarid emperors and of Michael Palaeologus. But even this minimal agenda proved to be beyond the means of both of them.

Thus, to preserve the idea of imperial unity, a new formula was born: the family of Greek states propagated by the Constantinople Palaeologi. Equally significant for the flexibility of Byzantine political thinking was the fact that the heads of the Constantinople Church tried to preserve the position of the temporal leaders of the New Rome in the Orthodox world by the authority that the Oecumenical Patriarchate continued to have in Eastern Christianity. The Patriarch repeatedly invoked the ideal of civilization epitomized by Orthodoxy and its institutional structures in order to keep alive a shakier than ever ideal of political unity. This period was one during which Southeastern European states, that were outside the Empire, were no longer afraid of the response of a dying empire. They not only annexed its Balkan territories, but also – more than ever – its imperial qualifications and power symbols, or, in other words, the Byzantine state model.

1. Titles

The titles of medieval princes were the expression of a political ideology and, frequently, of a claimed theory. Both elements can be found in the titles of Byzantine sovereigns: world emperors, whose power came from heaven and who were direct successors of Roman caesars. Until the Seventh Century, their titles were a continuation of the titles of Roman emperors, with the proviso that the sovereigns of New Rome were required to confess their faith in Christ. The major change took place in 629, with the appearance of the title of *basileus*, which from this moment onwards had the meaning of "world emperor".

The event has generated long-lasting controversies among many experts in the field. For most historians, the appearance of the new imperial title and its later career are perceived as a consequence of the so-called Hellenization of the Byzantine world following the ethnic mutations of the Seventh Century. The coronation of Charlemagne in 800 produced a response in Constantinople in terms of the titles of sovereigns by the introduction of the concept of "imperial" people. From then on, the Emperor of New Rome would be the "Romans' *Basileus*" (*Basileus ton Rhomaion*). This designation, in fact, served as a denunciation of the perceived Frankish usurpation of the imperial title and of the lack of legitimacy identified in Western political creation. But the components of the old titles of the Roman emperors did not suddenly vanish from the titles of the Constantinople *basilei. Imperator*, *augustus*, *caesar*, *dominus*, *despotes*, and other titles appeared more or less until the Eleventh Century.

It was only toward the Mid-Eleventh Century, following almost two hundred years of hesitation, that the titles of the Byzantine emperors achieved their classical form: "[name of the Emperor] in Christ, the Son of God faithful *Basileus* and *Autocrator* of the Romans". But even after this moment, the titles of emperors still varied in terms of the nature and the destination of the sources by which they were conveyed to posterity. In

their classical forms, they could be seen in formal documents that were sent by sovereigns to foreign princes, in which they played a distinctively propagandistic role. The same form and role were to be found in that of the chrysobulls distributed by the emperors to religious establishments. Finally, such titles were also identifiable in certain imperial miniatures, probably because of the same propaganda role that they were called upon to play. On the other hand, so far as current domestic documents were concerned, the titles were considerably less questions of protocol, as in "*basileus*", "Romans' *basileus*", "Romans' *autocrator*, *despotes*", and so on. The same could be said of acclaiming and cheering, as recorded by Constantine VII *Porphyrogenitus*, as well as in historical and political writings, and in inscriptions on coins, medals, and enameled objects.

An attempt to analyze each title element in its classical form yields the following:

The phrase, "[name of the Emperor] in Christ the Son of God faithful (and Orthodox)" was an innovation obviously made possible only after the Christianization of Constantine the Great. It was definitely documented in the Sixth Century. It certainly came up during the Fifth and Sixth Century Christological disputes and represented solid evidence for the fidelity to Christian faith and Orthodox dogma after emperors had been obliged by the Church (ever since the Fifth Century) to sign a written oath on coronation day. In fact, the phrase had a meaning that was even more profound. Ever since the rule of the first Christian Emperor, it reflected the belief that the Empire of the Romans was the only power established by God on earth and that the source of power of its sovereigns was Christ, the son of God. Perhaps it is not a mere coincidence that in many imperial documents the adjective, "faithful" (*pistos*) disappeared, while the idea of the divine origin of the Emperor's power is clear from the very title: "[Name of the Emperor] in Christ the son of God *Basileus*". Hence the belief that the New Rome was the center of the legitimacy of all temporal powers in the medieval Christian world. Hence also the tendency of Byzantine sovereigns to justify their supreme position inside the "Family of Kings", as well as the title of "spiritual father" of all Christian princes.

The title, *basileus*, that first appeared in 629 as a replacement for *imperator*, has a long history in the ancient world. In Greek writings, it designated kings ruling in the archaic, classical, Hellenistic, and finally Roman periods. At the same time, it was used to indiscriminately designate all the kings in the *Barbaricum*. In parallel, the word also appears in philosophical and religious (including Christian) texts to designate the concept of "monarch" in its abstract meaning, as well as divinity itself. It is highly probable that it is in this usage that one should look for the source of the 629 innovation and for the new meaning acquired by the title, *basileus*, connoting unique and universal power of a divine origin. Even if Constantinople was later compelled (often by force) to grant the title of *basileus* to certain foreign princes – Western emperors and Bulgarian czars – the political doctrine protected the uniqueness of the

sovereign of New Rome, explainable by the fact that he was the one and only "Romans' *Basileus*".

Autocrator, the other classic title, had the longest and the most interesting evolution for the purposes of this study. It went back as far as certain Sixth Century Greek texts in which it was thought to serve as a substitute for the title of *imperator*. In the succeeding centuries, it played the part of an adjective accompanying the "*basileus*" and "caesar" titles (*autokrator basileus* and *autokrator* caesar). Starting in the Tenth Century, if not earlier, *autocrator* also appeared as a noun in the title, next to *basileus* (*basileus kai autokrator*), in a form that would become permanently set in the following period. The meaning of the title became "absolute ruler" or "supreme ruler", *i.e.*, synonyms for *despotes* and *megas basileus*. It is no mere coincidence that the word is particularly found in the titles of emperors who had associates or co-emperors. In such a situation, the title only applied to the main *basileus* (*autokrator basileus*) who was also the "*megas basileus*". It was not applied to his colleagues, who were simply *basileis*. But this practice was not consistent, especially when the throne associates were father and son. In such cases, both of them were called "*autocrators*" or "*megaloi basileis*".

Finally, one wonders if this innovation of turning the adjective into a noun in Tenth and Eleventh Century imperial titles should not be linked to the increasingly frequent foreign contestations occurring when South Slav and Western Christian sovereigns usurped the supreme title. In this form, the title reflected Byzantine doctrine according to which the *basileus*, "as a representative of God, was the only ruler of the world, with the duty and the right to supremely rule over this world in temporal and spiritual matters" (F. Dölger, 1953). In other words, the title of *autocrator* stressed even more emphatically the top place of the *basileus* in the "Family of Kings" and the inferior position of all the other princes in the Christian world. At the same time, at least commencing from the Eleventh Century, the title was linked to the sharp decline of imperial authority within the Byzantine state.

2. Symbols of Power

External signs of power were meant to underline, alike for domestic subjects and foreigners in a visible way, the supreme sovereignty and the divine origin of the imperial authority. In the transition from Augustus's Principality to the domination of Diocletian and Constantine, and then to the Greek monarchy of divine origin, these signs became increasingly numerous, either borrowed from Eastern monarchies, or inspired by Christianity.

One of the most important symbols was the golden tiara with pearls and a cross, which replaced the golden necklace of Roman caesars. The tiara used to be received from the Patriarch during coronation, in a rite, which was first considered auxiliary in relationship to the election of the emperor according to constitutional factors. Later, when election by the

Senate, the people, and the army was ritualized, coronation at the hands of the patriarch acquired an exceptional practical significance. Therefore, one should not be surprised that this act, a symbol of the divine origin of imperial power, was to be externally perceived as a capital moment for the prince's consecration, especially because foreigners had almost no knowledge of the Roman tradition whereby the Emperor's power was delegated to him by the people. Indeed, Byzantine emperors themselves, who cultivated this belief in divine kingship, sent crowns to Christian princes, thus acknowledging their supreme majesty and their exclusive right to consecrate princes into the "Family of Kings". The first mention of a crown (*stephanos*) given to a Christian prince dates from the Sixth Century, but the best known is, to this day, the crown of the Hungarian kings sent by Emperor Michael VII to Geza I in 1075. It can be assumed, even if there are no historical documents to prove it, that other princes belonging to the political community of the *Basileus* also received crowns from the Constantinople sovereigns.

Another power symbol was the red and gold colour of objects having to do with emperors and, in certain cases, with imperial family members. Both the mantle and the footwear chosen for coronation were red. Emperor Leo VI later made it a habit for the children of imperial couples to be born in a room lined with purple silk, whence the epithet *porphyrogenitus* (born in the purple) given to all the babies delivered in such conditions. Red was also the colour of the ink which the Emperor used to sign and to date the official papers of his chancellery. Indeed, this practice became a monopoly as instituted by a 470 edict issued by Emperor Leo I. Sometimes even the parchment on which important documents were written was colored red, but in such cases the ink was golden. Both the Emperors and their families were portrayed in red, in mosaics and in miniatures.

Gold was another symbol of the "Romans' *Basileis*". The gold coins, issued by Constantine the Great and recognized as a medieval standard for a thousand years, was the most palpable sign of the universal authority of the Emperor in the eyes of their subjects and of foreign peoples. Highly revealing in this respect is an anecdote left for posterity by the Greek traveler, Cosmas Indicopleustes in the Sixth Century (1909).

The King of Ceylon did not have to take any pains to settle a dispute between a Persian ambassador and a Byzantine merchant in regard to universal rule. The issue was resolved with reference to the power symbols of the sovereigns. The Emperor's gold coin was thought to be of better value than the silver *drachma* of the "Great Kings". The seal affixed to official documents issued by the imperial chancellery and called *chrysobulloi logoi i.e.*, diploma with a gold seal – the so-called *khrisovs* of Romanian medieval chancelleries – was also made of gold.

Finally, other important symbols of the universal sovereignty of the *Basileus* were related to the writing of imperial acts addressed to foreign princes and thus having a propagandistic role. As was already mentioned, they were signed and dated by the Emperor in red or in gold and bore the print of the golden seal. The writing material was also the object of an

imperial monopoly. Until the Ninth Century, documents were written first on papyrus, then on parchment. Later, in parallel with the decline of the Empire, they started again to be written on paper.

These symbols, that were intended to impress foreigners, were among the first to be taken over by Christian princes when they usurped titles and prerogatives previously belonging to the Constantinople *Basileus*.

C. RECEPTION OF THE MODEL

1. The Case of Bulgaria

The entry of Bulgaria into the Byzantine community took place in 865 when Boris and his people were Christianized and when the ruler assumed the title of czar (from the Latin, *caesar*). But Boris, the successor of Crum and Omurtag, was clearly aware of the identity of his state and did not accept the subordinate position intended for him by the Constantinople *Basileus*. Solid evidence of his awareness can be derived from his efforts to obtain the best possible terms for his state and church. He argued that the title, czar, conferred power on him equal to that of the Byzantine Emperor. And he participated in the diplomatic games between Rome and Constantinople following his Christianization.

Boris's successor, the famous Simeon (893-927), went beyond a defensive policy in regard to the Empire. He opted for an offensive policy and developed an imperial programme of his own to its fullest extent. The basis for his political outlook was not only the Turanian tradition, as had been developed by Crum and Omurtag with a view to the establishment of a Balkan empire on the ruins of Byzantium, but also the political education that he had received in Constantinople over the years during which he had been a hostage at the court of the *Basileus*. From the very beginning, Simeon addressed the Byzantine issue in very strong terms and was consequently conceded the title of *basileus*, but only as the "Bulgarians' *Basileus*". However, the Preslav czar was thoroughly acquainted with Byzantine political doctrine and could not ignore the difference between the oecumenical character of the authority of the "Romans' *Basileus*" and the local power character of a "Bulgarians' *Basileus*".

After several failed attempts to become a *basileus* in Constantinople through diplomatic means, Simeon returned to a policy of force, attacking Constantinople and taking the title of "Romans' *Basileus*" or "Romans and Bulgarians' *Basileus*". Patriarch Nicholas the Mystic denounced Simeon's usurpation (calling it *tyrania* and *apostasia*) as well as denouncing the ahistorical and illegal nature of his title.

The dispute between Simeon and Byzantium went much farther than a quarrel over a mere title. The violent and sanguinary conflict, that ranged for more than three decades and involved Preslav and Constantinople, was for far higher stakes, thus casting a light on the intentions of all the medieval sovereigns who attempted to conquer the Bosphorus metropole. Their aims too were to become "Emperors of the Romans" in the very heart

of Constantinople. Simeon's son and successor, Peter, who married a niece of Byzantine Emperor Romanus Lecapenus, was thus conceded the title of "Bulgarians' *Basileus*" and managed to implicitly integrate into the Byzantine hierarchy with the rank of "Beloved Son", leading also to the raising of the head of the Bulgarian Church from Archbishop to Patriarch. The vision of the relationship between the two fundamental institutions of the medieval state, which was defined three centuries later by Pope Innocent III in his correspondence with Czar Ioniță (Kaloyan) – *imperium sine patriarcha non staret* – was materialized in an equality of rank between the head of the Bulgarian Church and its temporal sovereign. Yet, according to Constantinople, a firm distinction existed between the local nature of the powers of the Preslav czar plus those of the local patriarch, on one hand, and the universal character of imperial authority and of the sacerdocy of New Rome, on the other.

Half a century later (in 972) after the successful war against *Knez* Sviatoslav, Emperor John I Zimisces conquered Bulgaria and reestablished the border of the Empire on the Danube. On this occasion, he also did away with the Bulgarian Czardom and Patriarchate, thus putting an end to Bulgarian "tyranny". But only a few years later, Samuel was to take over the political tradition of Simeon and Peter and to reestablish both the Bulgarian Czardom and Patriarchate in the Western part of the Peninsula. The most important event of this episode, in terms of the progress made by the Bulgarian idea of statehood before Bulgarian resistance collapsed in 1018, was the fact that John Vladislav, the last Ohrid czar, assumed the title of *Autocrator*, which represented a whole political agenda in itself, aimed at rejecting all Byzantine claims for the integration of the czardom into the state hierarchy of Constantinople and at asserting the sovereign nature of his power.

After almost two centuries of Byzantine domination in the Balkans, the year 1185 witnessed the uprising of the Haemus Vlachs and Bulgarians, ending with the establishment of the Târnovo Czardom that was successively ruled by the three Vlach brothers, Peter Asen, John Asen, and Ioniță (Kaloyan). From the very start, the new czardom indulged in the Byzantine political tradition. Nicetas Choniates (*in*, Choniates, 1975) wrote that, after his first victories, Peter placed a golden crown on his head and opted for red footwear. This last detail is directly evocative of the regalia of the New Rome. The youngest brother, Ioniță, proclaimed himself *Imperator Bulgarorum et Blachorum* and Constantinople denied him any recognition of this title, when he addressed Rome. But after a long exchange of letters between Târnovo and Rome, Pope Innocent III also refused to accept the Czar's claim and only recognized the title of *Rex Bulgarorum et Blachorum* after Ioniță had been solemnly crowned by a Roman cardinal. A significant fact regarding this occasion was the common stance taken by Rome and Constantinople, both carriers of the political traditions of Constantine and Justinian, and only willing to recognize one universal and Roman emperor. Equally interesting is the point made by the Pope who, after raising the Târnovo Church to the rank of an archbishopric, rejected the claim of the

Balkan sovereign on the grounds that "there cannot be an empire without a patriarch".

During this first stage of the Târnovo Czardom, its sovereigns acted defensively in relationship to Constantinople and claimed recognition of the supreme title in a territory taken by force from Byzantine rule. A quarter of a century later, in favourable historical conditions, John Asen II embarked on an offensive policy, thus continuing Simeon's tradition. He removed his Church from the authority of Rome and crushed the troops of the Greek *Basileus* of Salonika in the 1230 Battle of Klokotnitsa, thus expanding his rule in the Western and Southern parts of the peninsula, where most of the inhabitants were Greek. As arbiter of the Balkan political scene, John Asen solemnly proclaimed himself "in Christ the son of God faithful Czar and *Autocrator* of Bulgarians and Greeks" in Slavonic, as well as "*Basileus* and *Autocrator* of Romans and Bulgarians" in Greek. Moreover, he issued a gold coin and established a Byzantine-inspired hierarchy of ranks in Târnovo, where the top positions were held by *despotes*, *sebastocrators*, and caesars.

But the dream of John Asen (as well as of Simeon) was to be crowned as the Roman and universal *Basileus* in Constantinople. The first success in this direction took place in 1235, when the Târnovo Church was turned into the seat of a Patriarchate by the Nicaea Oecumenical Patriarch. But the carrying out of this entire imperial agenda failed when confronted with the opposition of John III Vatatzes, the new Nicaean statesman, whose political aim was to restore the unity of the Comnenoi Dynasty and to reconquer the New Rome from the Latins.

After the death of John Asen II in 1241, the Bulgarian Czardom began its decline because of heavy attacks, first from the Tartars, and then from the Serbian Kingdom. Moreover, during the Fourteenth Century several autonomous principalities chose to detach themselves from the Czardom. In spite of these problems, Constantinople still considered the Târnovo sovereign to be a "Bulgarians' *Basileus*" and a "beloved son", belonging to a "Family of Princes" led by the Byzantine Emperor. Yet, even in these conditions, Czar John Alexander (1331-1371) returned to the political tradition of Simeon and John Asen and claimed universal power.

A number of miniatures from manuscripts written at Czar John Alexander's court depict him with all the regalia of a universal *basileus*, flanked by Jesus Christ and St. John the Baptist. The same political idea can be identified in the title that he assumed: "Czar and *Autocrator* of Bulgarians and Greeks". But the times had changed: In terms of real policy, the Czar could no longer follow in the steps of Simeon and John Asen II and attempt to conquer Tzarigrad (the Slavonic designation for Constantinople). It was for this reason that John Alexander's panegyrists proclaimed Târnovo the "New Tzarigrad" (*Novy Tzarigrad*). In their vision, a *translatio imperii*, from Constantinople to Târnovo, was thus taking place. But less than a quarter of a century after the Czar's death, the Târnovo state had ceased to exist, and the Balkans had entered a new age, that of Ottoman domination, that would last for five centuries.

2. The Serbian Experience

The Raška Principality was the core of the future Nemanyid State. A vassal of the Empire during the Eleventh and the Twelfth Centuries, the Principality became independent after the death of Emperor Manuel I Comnenus in 1180, when the Great *Zupan*, Stephen Nemanya, broke all the bonds of vassalage to Constantinople. A few years later, his son Stephen married the daughter of Emperor Isaac II Angelus, who gave him the title of *sebastocrator*. This step was the first one marking the entrance of Serbia into the "Family of Princes" presided by the *Basileus*. In 1196, the Great *Zupan* delegated his power to his son, *Sebastocrator* Stephen (1196-1228), who was the real founder of the Serbian medieval state.

Stephen would take advantage of the important changes in the power relationships produced by the fall of Constantinople in 1204 as the result of Latin attacks, the crumbling of the Byzantine political scene in the first decades of the Thirteenth Century, and the Catholic offensive in Southeastern Europe. Finding itself in a region in which the political and religious interests of the Latin and the Byzantine world came into contact with one another, the Serbian Kingdom vacillated between the West and Byzantium in order to preserve its political and cultural identity and to strengthen its international position, profiting from all favourable circumstances. In 1217, Stephen Nemanya obtained the royal crown from Pope Honorius III. In this way, Serbia became a kingdom, and its sovereign, known to world history as Stephen the-first-crowned (*Prvovecani*). Only two years later, however, Stephen's brother, the famous Sava, who was later sanctified, persuaded the Byzantine Oecumenical Patriarch to create an archbishopric for the Serbian Church. Undergoing both an Orthodox and a Catholic christening, having a kingdom integrated into the Western political hierarchy and a church belonging to the Oecumenical Patriarchate of New Rome, the Nemanyids proved, from the very beginning, the vocation of Serbia as a bridge between the West and the East in the Christian world. Soon enough, Stephen *Prvovecani* also adopted the Byzantine idea of a temporal state. By a 1220 diploma, he proclaimed himself "with God's mercy, King (*Kralj*) and *Autocrator* of the Serbs". His annexation of the source of divine power and mainly his adoption of the title, *Autocrator*, represent an open assertion of the sovereign nature of his power in relation to that of the neighbours of the Serbian Kingdom.

During the reigns of his successors, thanks to increasingly vast economic resources and an obvious cultural development, the reputation of the kingdom of the Nemanyids never ceased to grow. Stephen Milyutin (Stephen Urosh II, 1282-1321), Stephen *Prvovecani*'s most important successor, opened a new stage in the policy of the kingdom, reconquering the Macedonian metropole of Skopje and turning it into the capital city of the kingdom. By means of the Southern expansion of Serbia into Byzantine territories, Stephen Milyutin was actually opening up his state to Greek influences, which would be more important after the King

married Simonis, the niece of Emperor Andronicus II. Serbia was coming to occupy an increasingly important position in the "Family of Kings" of Byzantium, the sovereign of which was – for the Skopje court – "New Rome's Universal Emperor" and "Andronicus, the Universal Orthodox Emperor".

A new page in the reception of the Byzantine political model by Serbian sovereigns was written by Stephen Dushan (Stephen Urosh IV), (1331-1355). Growing up in Constantinople, like Simeon of Bulgaria before him, Dushan assimilated Byzantine political and cultural education in its purest form. When he acceded to the throne, his kingdom was ready to become the most significant power in Southeastern Europe, especially after the great 1330 Velbuzhde victory over the Bulgarians and the Byzantines. After the annexation of the Western parts of the Bulgarian Czardom, Dushan next conquered the Byzantine territories in the Western and the Southern parts of the peninsula, so that he was entitled to proclaim himself "Ruler of almost all the Roman Empire". In this way, Dushan was prepared to take over the imperial agenda in its full format. In 1345, he proclaimed himself "*Basileus* and *Autocrator* of Serbia and Romania" (*i.e.*, New Rome) in Greek, as well as "Czar and Autocrat of the Serbs and the Greeks" in Slavonic. One year later, he proclaimed the raising of his archbishop to the rank of "Patriarch of Serbs and Greeks" and was then formally crowned as Emperor in Skopje by the recently named Patriarch.

Constantinople had a violent response to Dushan's double usurpation. The Serbian Patriarch and Emperor were excommunicated by the Oecumenical Patriarch, who broke off all relationships with the Serbian Church for the next three decades. But not even the attitude of Constantinople could prevent Dushan, who was extremely confident in the strength of his arms, from bringing to fruition a political agenda the principal lines of which were the following: to establish an imperial court hierarchy led by *despotes*, *sebastocrators*, and caesars, to set up a Byzantine-inspired chancellery able to help him issue official documents bearing the gold bulla and the Emperor's signature in red ink, to exert patronage over the monasteries of Mount Athos, and – in an imperial gesture, following the line traced by Justinian and Leo VI the Wise, not to be found in the attitude of the Bulgarian medieval sovereigns – to write a legal code: the famous *Zakonnik*, first drawn up in 1349 and later revised in 1354.

In spite of all these decidedly imperial acts, Dushan's attitude toward Constantinople did not lack ambiguity. He proclaimed himself the Roman "successor" (*nastavnik*) to the Roman Emperor and agreed to the liturgical commemoration of his name after that of the *Basileus* of the Athos monasteries. In both cases, Dushan praised the legitimacy of the universal sovereign of New Rome.

After Dushan's death, his political edifice collapsed in less time than had been needed to construct it. It crumbled into a few states: a restricted empire in which the title of czar was perpetuated until 1371 by Dushan's

son, Stephen Urosh V, a kingdom ruled by the late Czar's brother, Simeon, and several principalities led by the supreme sovereign's auxiliary princes calling themselves *despotes*, *sebastocrators*, and caesars. But none of them could continue Dushan's policy.

One of Dushan's most significant successors was Ugliesha, the ruler of a despotate, the center of which was Serres, in which most of the inhabitants were Greek. He embraced the same patronage policy over the Mount Athos monasteries and asked his chancellery to issue a number of *chrysobulls* according to which his formal title was "in Christ the son of God, *despote* and *autocrator*". By this means, Ugliesha asserted the sovereign position of his state in a Balkan political scene radically changed after Dushan's disappearance.

The main result of the imperial policy of the great Serbian sovereign was, ultimately, the exhaustion of Balkan resources in outdated activities at a very serious moment for the fate of the peoples of the peninsula. The Ottomans took advantage of the power void following Dushan's death and, after two decisive victories over the Christians – on the banks of the Maritsa River (1371) and in Kosovo (1389) – established a centuries-long domination over the Balkans.

3. A Strict Fidelity: Russia

The 988 Christianization of Kievean Russia was of historical importance for medieval Europe. The largest state in Eastern Europe in terms of area was thus entering the area of Byzantine civilization and the "Family of Princes" led by the *Basileus*. Although Byzantine sources are not very clear in this respect, it can be assumed that, because Vladimir had married the sister of Emperor Basil II, the Great *Knez* had been given the title of "beloved son", enjoying the same rank that Bulgarian Czar Peter had enjoyed after having married the niece of Romanus I Lecapenus.

The beginning of this period was marked by two major events in the history of Russia. First, as early as the Twelfth Century, the Kievean state was divided into a number of aristocratic republics and principalities that were incessantly struggling among themselves for new territories and political supremacy. The only element of unity was "the Metropolitan Church of Kiev and all Russia", established in the Tenth Century and exerting full authority over the whole of Russian christendom. The second - even more important - event was the beginning of Tartar rule over the Russian world in a domination which would last for almost two-and-a-half centuries (1240-1480). The rule of the Golden Horde was effective and was expressed by the requirement of a yearly tribute to be paid by each principality and by confirmation of the "Great *Knez*" by the Khan. The mid-Fourteenth Century witnessed a political development that would decide the fate of Russia during the next century: the ascension of the Muscovy Principality. Thanks to the abilities of the Muscovy *knezes*, to their lack of political scruples, and to the move of the Russian Church from Kiev to Vladimir and then to Muscovy, its prince was given the title of "Great *Knez*"

by the Golden Horde, implicitly thereby winning for Muscovy a preeminent position in its relationship with all the Russian princes.

Between the time of the great Tartar invasion and the mid-Fourteenth Century, Constantinople and the Russian world ceased to have any relationships, only deciding to reestablish them in 1350. There were two elements involved in that decision. On one hand, the Oecumenical Patriarchate was in an increasingly serious financial crisis, as it lacked material support from the sovereigns of a territorially and economically lessened empire. On the other hand, relationships had to be resumed because of the fierce dispute between Muscovy and Lithuania for the supreme ecclesiastic title of former Kievean Russia, "Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev and all Russia", requiring the Oecumenical Patriarchate to provide arbitration. The ecclesiastic dispute also had a political stake, since its resolution would determine, for the long term, around which of the two principalities the unity of Russia would be achieved. However, for more than half a century, the Byzantine Church had a duplicitous policy toward Muscovy that reflected the major clash taking place in Constantinople between the pro-Muscovy and the pro-Lithuania parties. The title in dispute was successively conceded to each of the candidates by the Patriarchate. It was only in 1408 that the Patriarchate definitively sided with Muscovy, the Metropolitan Bishop of which became the title holder of the "Metropolitan Church of Kiev and all Russia", after the Grand Duke of Lithuania had been baptized into the Catholic faith and had become King of Poland.

The hesitant (if not cynical) attitude of the Oecumenical Patriarchate had obvious effects in terms of the position of Muscovy toward Constantinople. In a letter sent by the Great *Knez*, Basil I, to Patriarch Anthony IV, the Russian prince wrote that Russian churches only commemorated liturgically the Patriarch's name, not that of the *Basileus*, for "we have a Church, not an Emperor". In other words, the Muscovy prince recognized the authority of the sacerdocy (but not of the Empire) over Russia.

The reply of Patriarch Anthony to Basil I, in a letter written around 1395, was a true Byzantine political testament in which the former mapped out in impeccably clear terms an imperial doctrine regarding the *Basileus* and the place of the patriarch in the Orthodox community. "It is not possible for Christians to have a church but no empire", wrote the high priest. The Church and the Empire "exist within a great unity and community and we cannot separate them from one another". Anthony did not overlook the Prince's serious confusion when refusing to recognize the Emperor's authority, for "the holy *Basileus* is no ordinary prince, governing over mere regions.... He is anointed with the holy unction and is consecrated as the Romans' *Basileus* and *Autocrator* just to rule over all Christians". In opposition to the local authority of other princes, the Roman Emperor is the one and only "master and ruler of the oecumene", the "universal *Basileus*" and the Christians' "natural king", whose decisions and orders are accepted and obeyed throughout the world. The

commemoration of his name would be nothing but a recognition of his universal sovereignty (F. Miklosich and J. Müller, eds., 1862, pp. 190-192).

But one should not think that the aforementioned letter by the Great *Knez* reflected a constantly hostile attitude on the part of Basil I – and even less so of the other Russian princes – toward the *Basileus*. On the contrary, one year before the fall of Constantinople, the Great *Knez* Basil II wrote the following to the last Byzantine emperor: "You have received the high imperial scepter, your patrimony, to govern all Orthodox Christians in your kingdom and to help us govern our state and Church" (*in, Russkaya Istoricheskaya Bibliotheka*, Vol 6, 1880, Col. 583).

Never before had faithfulness to the Byzantine political doctrine been expressed so strongly by an Orthodox Community prince. But it is necessary to explain Basil's position as the writer of the above-mentioned letter. On one hand, Basil's words reflected certain hard feelings in regard to the attitude of Constantinople in the (still existing) dispute for the title of "Metropolitan Bishop of Kiev and all Russia". On the other hand, they were the response of the Great *Knez* to the opportunistic attitude visible in the Byzantine emperors in the second half of the Fourteenth Century over the issue of religious union with Rome, when some of them even chose to embrace the Catholic faith, thus hoping to save the Empire. Finally, one should not forget that the Muscovy prince was situated geographically between the *Basileus* and the Tartar Khanate, *i.e.*, between a distant and diminishing authority, the interference of which in the affairs of Muscovy could not be accepted, and a real power that had to be paid a tribute and that, in exchange, would grant the ruler the title of "Great *Knez*". It was not difficult to choose between the two authorities. But it was, no doubt, a provisional choice, with no long-term effects.

Subordinated as they were to the Tartar Khanate, the rulers of Muscovy could not appropriate for themselves the prerogatives and the symbols of the Byzantine Empire. In this respect, they were, until 1454, an exception in the whole Orthodox world. Only after doing away with Tartar suzerainty and uniting Russia around Muscovy was Ivan III the Great (1462-1505) able to assume the title of czar, albeit unofficially, but his real policy was prenational rather than imperial. Even when his grandson, Ivan IV (the Terrible) officially became a czar (1547) and proclaimed himself the "Czar and Autocrat of all Russia", thus making it possible for the Russian Church to proclaim itself a Patriarchate (1589), Russian political options still failed to belong to a universal project. The theory of "Muscovy as a Third Rome", first enunciated by the monk, Phylothei, was a product of the ecclesiastic world and did not make a big impact in Sixteenth Century Russian policy.

4. The Romanian Principalities: An Imperial Plan?

The case of the Romanian world has certain special elements in terms of its relationship with the Slavic Orthodox world because of its position in the contact area between the Catholic West and Orthodox Byzantium.

During the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, when Constantinople returned as a military force along the Danube, there were no apparent close contacts between the Empire and the Romanian North-Danubian communities, even if in ecclesiastic terms the latter could gravitate South of the Danube. The year 1200 first witnessed the end of the Byzantine presence near the Lower Danube and then the start of the two-hundred year effort of Rome to incorporate the Carpathian-Danubian region into its scope of religious authority. The main auxiliary of the pontifical policy was the Hungarian kingdom which, through its political expansion in the intra- and extra- Carpathian region, was supposed to be fulfilling a crusade-type of mission, converting the "schismatic" Romanians to the Catholic faith.

For the Romanian world, this moment was critical. On the verge of establishing their own states, Romanians had to make a double choice: between two areas of civilization in the Christian world, as well as between the two political and statal organizational models then known in medieval Europe: the Western and the Byzantine.

At the beginning of the Middle Ages, the Romanian world was organized into dozens of "țări" (*i.e.*, lands, from the Latin, *terrae*), that were unions of rural communities having their own governing institutions. In its most archaic form, such a "țară" had a number of distinctive features. Its society was horizontally structured and mainly rural, functioning as a legal community later defined in various medieval sources by "the custom and the law of our land", which corresponded to the phrase, *consuetudines terrae*, in Latin medieval sources. More than twenty such "Romanian lands" are known to have existed in the period before the Eighth Century, most of them in the intra-Carpathian region of Transylvania.

The Eighth and Ninth Centuries witnessed the end of the "archaic phase" of the "Romanian lands" and the beginning of a new phase which would last until the mid-Thirteenth Century and would be dominated by the feudalization of the ță*ri*, led from this moment on by voivodes invested with military authority. A number of events happening around the year 900 and mentioned in the anonymous *Notary's Chronicle* bring forward the intra-Carpathian territorial dukes, each of whom was the voivode of a *țara* (*terra*).

Feudalization sped up during the following centuries on both sides of the Carpathians. The process is exemplified by the mid-Thirteenth Century as described by a document, the *St. John Knights' Diploma* (1247), dating from the reign of Bela IV (*in*, E. Szentpétery, ed., 1937) which describes the social and political structures of Romanian society South of the Carpathians, where, one century later, the first Romanian state would be established. The *Diploma* asserts that between the Southern Carpathians and the Danube there was a hierarchical society the poles of which were the *maiores terrae* and the *rustici*, *i.e.*, the two fundamental classes of a social order in full swing. At the same time, the document speaks of the existence of certain *tsaras* in the region: the *Severine Tsara*, which was nothing but a border mark of the Hungarian kingdom, established around 1230, and the two *tsaras* ruled by the voivodes (*i.e.*, dukes), Litovoi and

Seneslau, both lying in the sub-Carpathian region, West and East of the river Olt (*Documenta Romaniae Historica*, D, I, 1978, pp. 22-23).

During the same period, the region lying South of the Carpathians (including the Romanian *tsaras* to be found there) underwent in its turn a Westernization process. As a result, certain Romanian political factors were integrated into the Arpadian political system: the voivode, Litovoi, owed the King the so-called *auxilium et consilium*. Also, a number of Western inspired legal norms were introduced into the Romanian *tsaras* and limited their autonomy in a process which became very advanced in Transylvania.

The Fourteenth Century witnessed the beginning of the last phase of the crystallization process of the Romanian States. The result of this process first appeared South of the Carpathians, where Voivode Bassarab (1310-1352) took advantage of the long crisis of authority of the Hungarian royalty to unify under his rule the *tsaras* lying East and West of the river Olt. The momentary eclipse of Hungarian power was linked to the extinction of the Arpadian dynasty (1301), the resulting interregnum, and the difficult start of the rule of King Charles Robert of Anjou (1308-1342). It coincided with the clear maturing of Romanian society as is suggested by the 1247 *Diploma*. A 1324 *Royal Diploma* presented Bassarab as a vassal of the Hungarian crown (*voyvodam nostrum Transalpinum*), while his principality was a vassal *tsara* (*Terra nostra Transalpina*).

A few years later, however, a decisive break occurred in the relationship of the two parties, because Charles Robert's foreign policy remained faithful to the political principles of the Angevin house. The new Angevin Dynasty, that claimed the throne of Hungary in 1308, was educated in the spirit of Sicilian and French political ideas which had guided the state-building processes in two of the most powerful "national" monarchies in the medieval West: the Kingdom of Sicily, previously ruled by the very founder of the royal Angevin house, Charles Robert of Anjou, and the Kingdom of France, from which his family had come. The basic policy lines of the new dynasty were to reclaim for the crown all public attributes that had been usurped by the great barons, to convert to the Catholic faith all "schismatics", toward whom the Angevins adopted St. Bernard de Clairvaux's rigid stance – *qui nobiscum sunt et nobiscum non sunt* – and to expand in Southeastern Europe under the banners of the crusade and against all local "schismatics" and "Pagans". The 1330 royal campaign against the Romanian voivode who was, in Charles Robert's own words, "the shepherd of my flock" ("*Ipse Bazarad est pastor ovium mearum*"), was meant to turn the "Transalpine *tsara*" into a royal province.

But the military campaign changed into a total catastrophe for the Hungarian side. Charles Robert lost most of his army and was badly wounded in the November 1330 Battle of Posada. The king's defeat also meant the failure of his agenda. The Romanian voivode capitalized on the results of Posada and strengthened the domestic and international position of his principality. Thus, his rule paved the way for the establishment of the autocratic principality: the unification of the political

scene South of the Carpathians and the winning of *de facto* independence for his state in relation to the Hungarian crown. But in spite of all these successes, the nature of this state did not fundamentally vary from that of the Romanian principalities in the previous centuries for as long as Bassarab's power as "Great Voivode" (*i.e.*, Grand Duke) was that of a mere "captainship", to use Grigore Ureche's term of definition for the authority of the first Moldavian princes (*in*, G. Ureche, 1958 ed.). In other words, the nature of this power was basically military rather than political.

Bassarab's son, Nicholas Alexander (Nicolae Alexandru) (1352-1364), actually laid the foundations of the first Romanian autocratic state. The process that got underway was related to a critically important event in the history of the Walachian Principality in the Fourteenth Century: the 1359 establishment of the Metropolitan Church of Ungrovlachia under the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The initiative came from the Romanian ruler, and the Patriarchate accordingly moved the Vicina Metropolitan Bishop, Jacynt, into the Argeş Walachian seat, without any change of rank.

The first important aspect of this event was religious. When the Walachian Church was put under the direct authority of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, an end was put to the century-long attempt of the Papacy to convert the Orthodox Romanian population between the Danube and the Southern Carpathians to Roman Catholicism. Earlier pontifical curia and Angevin chancellery papers stress the pressures that were exerted upon the Romanian prince to make him place the Walachian Church under Roman authority and to accept the Catholic faith. The 1359 document was a major setback for these efforts. At the same time, the young Romanian Principality acquired an ecclesiastic articulation that was indispensable for its political aspirations, in a world in which *imperiun sine patriarcha non staret*.

The second major aspect of the event, of more relevance to the scope of this study, is political. In solidarity with the gesture of his patriarch, as was explicitly started in the text of the synodal decision confirming the establishment of the Argeş Metropolitan Church, the Emperor recognized the legal existence of Bassarab's Walachian Principality. The political aspirations of Walachia for independence thus enjoyed international recognition for the first time by no less than Constantinople, *i.e.*, from one of the two medieval centers of political legitimacy.

True enough, following the huge success at Posada, the Bassarab Principality appeared to be acting and existing independently, but without the political consecration of either Constantinople or Rome, it could not join the "Family of Princes" of the medieval world, the so-called *Weltbeherrschungorganization* led by the Constantinople *Basileus*.

From a legal perspective, Nicholas Alexander's 1359 act, which was an open challenge to the suzerainty of the Hungarian crown, was equally important (and complementary) to the victory at Posada. From that moment on, the Walachian Prince could add "*Autocrator*" to his already existing title of "Great Voivode". In an exchange of letters in 1359 between

the Patriarchate and the Prince, Nicholas Alexander's title was *megas voivodas kai authentes pases ungrovlachias*. The meaning of "absolute ruler" of the word, *authentes,* seems to reflect the meaning of the phrase in Slavonic documents, *gospodin samodrzevani,* or that of the phrase, *domn singur țiitor*, existing in Romanian medieval records. One can easily observe that these phrases are the equivalent of the Byzantine qualification of *autocrator*, used audaciously a decade later in a Greek text by Vlaicu-Vladislav, Nicholas Alexander's successor.

It is possible to explain why the Constantinople Patriarchate did not use the adjective, *autocrator*, for Walachian princes, for it could only be used to eliminate the *Basileus*. The adjective, *autocrator*, has the same meaning as the phrase, *rex est imperator in suo regno*, which had begun to be used one century earlier by the lawyers of the King of France, as an assertion of the full power of their sovereign, both internally, where he held all the attributes of a quasi-imperial authority, and externally, where he depended upon no political authority whatsoever.

The fact that contemporaries interpreted the 1359 event in the same way is made clear by the historical sources dating back to that time. First, one of the Western chronicles gives Vlaicu-Vladislav the title of *Rex Bessrat* (King of Bessarabia). In other words, the Great Voivode Bassarab's grandson is a "king" according to one of his contemporaries.

Much more important is a 1365 Hungarian King's document (*in*, E. Szentpétery, 1937) including the royal proclamation that announced the war against Vlaicu-Vladislav in order to bring Walachia back to Hungarian suzerainty by force of arms. In the document, Louis I accuses Nicholas Alexander of "forgetting about all the good things he received from us and of ungratefully and defiantly breaking both the bonds with us, and a certain understanding about taxes we were supposed to get by virtue of our natural rule". It is clear that Louis I was thinking of the 1359 event, when Nicholas Alexander eluded Hungarian vassalage and proclaimed himself "Great Voivode and Autocratic Ruler", without any change of stance at the time of his death, as can be inferred from the inscription on his tombstone.

The Hungarian king was even more annoyed with the position of Nicholas Alexander's son who, faithful to his father's policy,

> did not recognize us as a natural lord, did not ask for any approval, and assumed the deceiving title of "ruler" in the above mentioned Transalpine land which was ours by right of birth, choosing therefore to confront his lord from whom he should have acquired the power symbols and daring to take his father's place... with the treacherous acceptance and the secret approval of the Romanians and the inhabitants of that land (S. Brezeanu, 1999, pp. 199-200).

Vlaicu was accused of borrowing certain "bad parental habits" by assuming a fictitious title (*titulus fictus*). In other words, the new Walachian Prince had derived the necessary conclusions from the

autocratic position of his authority and from its source of internal legitimacy, conceded by the Metropolitan Church, and had proclaimed himself "Great Voivode and Autocratic Ruler", being the first Walachian prince who did not ask the Hungarian king to give him permission to rule and to hand him the power symbols.

One should note that, at the time of the 1359 decision, Nicholas Alexander gave up a position of vassal in the hierarchy of the Hungarian kings in exchange for nothing but a subordinate relationship in regard to the Byzantine Emperors. The point is to some extent well taken. As has been repeatedly stated, the medieval world consisted of a hierarchy of states rather than of equality among states, which, in the case of Southeastern and Eastern Europe, designated the already known "Family of Kings" that was presided by the Byzantine emperor. Affiliation to the Byzantine Commonwealth, however, was in firm contrast to the real subordination of the Great Voivode of Argeş, that was derived from his position of vassalage with regard to the King of Hungary. Moreover, the fact that the Voivode joined the Constantinople Commonwealth did not prevent him from assuming the title of "Autocratic Ruler" and from asserting the divine source of his power without fearing any response on the part of the *Basileus*. On the contrary, during the brief periods when Walachian rulers were constrained to recognize the suzerainty of the Hungarian crown, both the adjective "autocratic" and the assertion of the divine origin of their power disappeared from their titles.

During the periods of rule of Nicholas Alexander's successors, the transfer of the prerogatives and of the symbols of Byzantine imperial origin were completed. Vlaicu-Vladislav asserted the divine source of his power for the first time in a formal document. He issued his own currency and began the Walachian patronage of certain Mount Athos monasteries. The Walachian chancellery was organized during this period and began to issue the so-called *khrisovs* inspired by the imperial documents known as *chrysoboulloi logoi*. Last but not least, mainly during the rule of Mircea the Elder (Mircea cel Bătrân), a princely hierarchy was crystallized, with high offices recalling those of Constantinople in terms both of names and of responsibilities. But this hierarchy lacked such Slavic South-Danubian czar's offices as *despotes*, *sebastocrators*, or caesars.

The attribute of *despote* in the title of Mircea the Elder, as well as the two-headed eagle, should not be viewed as a direct influence of the New Rome. Both the title and the two-headed eagle were linked to Mircea's rule over Dobrudja, a territory that had previously been ruled by Prince Dobrotitsa, who had been given the title of *despote* by the *Basileus* about half way through the mid-Fourteenth Century. They both disappeared from the titles and symbols of Walachian princes after the Ottomans conquered Dobrudja in 1420. Therefore, in only several decades since the establishment of the Argeş Metropolitan Church, which became the source of power legitimization of the Walachian princes, Walachia was enjoying all the prerogatives of an autocratic state. One should not be surprised to discover that in a 1424 document (*in, Documenta Romaniae Historica*, D, I,

1978, pp. 227-228) written during the reign of Dan II, the Bassarab Principality was called *Regnum Valahie* and was juxtaposed to the Kingdom of Hungary (*Regnum Hungarie*). All the differences between the nature of rule of the Romanian princes and that of their old suzerain were thus annulled.

The evolution of the other Romanian Principality, *i.e.*, Moldavia, from voivodate to autocratic principality followed roughly the same path as that of Walachia, with a delay of a few decades.

The core of the future Moldavian state was created around 1352, at the initiative of King Louis I of Hungary. After fighting the Tartars living East of the Carpathians, he established a border mark on the upper course of the Siret River, in a region ruled by Dragoş, a Romanian nobleman who had come from Maramureş and who received from the King the title of Voivode. Dragoş and his close successors, who ruled over the local population, remained in a state of strict fidelity in regard to the Angevin royalty. A decade after the voivodate had been established, an anti-royalist reaction took place in Moldavia, at the initiative and under the leadership of Bogdan, the Romanian Voivode of Maramureş. Already as early as 1350, Bogdan had rebelled against Louis I, whose policy had been to annul Romanian autonomy in Maramureş and to establish a royal district instead. Defeated after almost two decades of fighting in Maramureş, Bogdan was successful in Moldavia, where he expelled the King's representatives and broke all the bonds of vassalage between Moldavia and the Hungarian crown. Yet, following Bogdan's death, his son, Laţcu, was put under a twofold pressure – Catholic and Hungarian – and ultimately agreed to the establishment of a Catholic bishopric in Siret (1370) and to recognize the suzerainty of Louis I, for the Hungarian king had reached the apogée of his power after the union of Hungary and Poland.

In the vision of the pontifical and the Hungarian chancelleries, Laţcu was a mere *dux*, a king's vassal, while Moldavia was referred to as *terra nostra Moldavana*. This situation remained unchanged during the rule of Laţcu's successor, Peter (Petru) I Muşat (1376-1391), until Louis I died (1382), and his outdated construct collapsed.

The start of the decisive detachment of Moldavia from Hungarian suzerainty took place during the second half of Peter I Muşat's rule, as the Romanian Prince took advantage of the struggle between the Poles and the Hungarians for the Angevin legacy. The existence of the Moldavian Metropolitan Church was formally attested in 1386-1387. It served as a critical step in the evolution toward becoming an autocratic principality. But even then, the Voivode refused to accept a representative of the Oecumenical Patriarchate as the head of its Metropolitan Church, preferring a Moldavian prelate. This choice triggered a long dispute between Suceava and Constantinople that was only resolved in 1402, when Alexander the Good and the Patriarch decided to reach a compromise.

The first issuance of Moldavian currency also took place during the rule of Peter (Petru) I Muşat. It can be assumed that Peter (Petru) I added the

title of Autocratic Ruler to that of Voivode and enjoyed all the resulting prerogatives, but there is no written evidence to document such an assumption. It is certain, however, that his successor, Roman Muşat (1391-1394), was the first Moldavian Prince to proclaim himself "Great Voivode and Autocratic Ruler by the Grace of God" in a 1392 Voivode's *khrisov* to be reconfirmed one year later (*Documenta Romaniae Historica*, A, *Moldova*, 1975).

During the rule of Roman's son, Alexander the Good (1400-1432), the form, *autocrator*, is attested in Greek. In parallel with the use of the title, "Autocratic Ruler", just as in the Walachian case, other Byzantine inspired attributes and symbols are also attested: the divine source of the Prince's power, a *khrisovs*-producing chancellery, and a princely hierarchy derived to a certain extent from that of Constantinople. The three high imperial offices – *despote*, *sebastocrator*, and caesar – are lacking in this case as well.

Perhaps more than in the Walachian case, medieval historical tradition is aware of the profound change in terms of the nature of power which took place, in Moldavia, during Roman Muşat's rule. Moldavian historical sources in the following centuries reflected the transition from the "captainship" of the first voivodes to the new stage marked by *samodrzac* Roman Muşat. Even more important are the words of John of Târnava, the official biographer of King Louis I of Hungary, who was also the latter's Chancellor. Analyzing the evolution of the Moldavian Principality from the status of "*terra nostra Moldavana*", as referred to in the chancellery papers of Louis I, to the Muşatins' state in the last decade of the Fourteenth Century, which had adopted the adjective, autocratic, the Hungarian chronicler concluded that "this principality had turned into a kingdom" (*illa terra in regnum est dilatata*). John of Târnava actually identified the accumulation of political prerogatives, added to the old military power of the Moldavian voivodes, which changed Moldavia (in the same way that Walachia had been changed several decades earlier) into an autocratic principality.

It has been said that the transfer of Byzantine ideology and political institutions to the Romanian principalities in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries was part of an imperial plan. The patronage of certain Mount Athos monasteries initiated by Vlaicu-Vladislav in Walachia and continued by the Moldavian rulers in the Fifteenth Century is a strong point in favour of this idea. One can note that in Serbia as well, after Stephen Dushan's death, the rulers of certain principalities detached from the great sovereign's empire continued his patronage policy on Mount Athos, with no connection whatsoever to an alleged imperial agenda. The financial support given by Romanian princes in the Middle Ages to the Mount Athos churches was part of an Orthodox policy of prestige and solidarity. The presence of the word, *autocrator*, in the titles of the Romanian princes is another argument in favour of this view. But no matter how solid this thesis may seem, it cannot stand a close examination.

The qualifier, *autocrator*, first appeared in the titles of Thirteenth Century Serbian kings, where its presence did not imply an imperial plan. It later reappeared in several principalities succeeding Dushan's empire, but these principalities followed no imperial line.

The appropriation of the word, *autocrator*, by the Romanian principalities is the expression of a reflex meant to provide protection against an impending external threat as well as to assert a sovereign position in relation to their neighbours. On the other hand, one cannot afford to neglect the internal function of such an adjective regarding the efforts made by the Suceava and Argeş voivodes to assert their full authority in regard to Romanian boyars (*i.e.*, barons). Finally, other arguments related to the imperial agenda of the Romanian princes evoke the existence of certain symbols belonging to the power constellation of the Constantinople *Basileus*, among which the two-headed eagle. In most cases, however, there were special reasons for the voivodes to take them over, as in the case of the two-headed eagle, first appearing during the rule of Mircea the Elder as a sign that he also ruled over Dobrotitsa's Despotate, and three centuries later, during Șerban Cantacuzino's rule, as evidence that the Walachian Prince belonged to the Cantacuzino imperial family. When the reasons ceased to exist, the princely power symbols in question were discarded in the Romanian principalities.

On the other hand, major arguments can be made against an imperial agenda in the policies of the Romanian princes. First and foremost, it is difficult to believe that the small North-Danubian principalities could formulate imperial plans in the real policy contexts of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Century Southeastern Europe. Neither medieval political tradition nor their resources could support such an agenda. Their critical problem was survival in a space dominated by the policies of their neighbours. The transfer of Byzantine ideology, and chiefly, the term *autocrator* and the idea of the divine origin of power, with all due conclusions, were made to work for reasons of survival.

Second, one should take note of the lack of any intention on the part of a Romanian prince to assume even the title of king, far less the supreme imperial title. On the contrary, in Mircea the Elder's chancellery there was a recurrence of the idea of the hierarchical structure of the medieval world: – emperors, kings, and princes (*domni*), the Walachian voivode always going for the lowest rank in this hierarchy. The same idea reappeared, one way or another, in the thinking of other princes, among whom, Neagoe Bassarab in the *Invățăturile....* (*i.e.*, the "Teachings" that he prepared for his son) (*in*, Bassarab, 1996 ed.). In his turn, a very successful Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul), in spite of the huge political prestige he gained as the result of his victories over the Turks, did not allow himself to be seduced by the Balkan projects of a Romanian *basileus* in Constantinople and pursued far more realistic political ambitions.

Finally, the strongest argument of all is the status of the Church in the two principalities. At the level of the Slavonic empires, great efforts were made to harmonize the two fundamental medieval institutions in the

emperor-patriarch tandem, preceded by the king-archbishop tandem so far as the Asenids and the first Serbian kings were concerned. But the Romanian princes in the Middle Ages never aimed to raise their churches to archbishopric rank, let alone the supreme rank. The metropolitan rank of churches was the expression of the political stance of the Romanian voivodes in the "Family of Princes". Yet, this apparent modesty did not mean they were not aiming – through the Byzantine inheritance – at a position of sovereignty in relation to the political claims of their neighbours.

In conclusion, the annexation of certain Byzantine prerogatives and symbols by Romanian princes does not reveal any imperial plan, but needs to be viewed as a protection reflex directed against external dangers and – secondarily – as a domestic autocratic governmental agenda.

It would be instructive to compare the evolution of Western kingdoms, which were fully involved in a centralization process, with the situation in Southeastern Europe at the time. A century before Nicholas Alexander had assumed the title of *autocrator*, Western "national" monarchies, confronted with the supremacy tendencies of the Hohenstaufen emperors, were displaying their own protective reflexes by means of the famous phrase, *rex est imperator in regno suo*. Similarly, imperial prerogatives and symbols in the Romanian principalities belong to a pre-national rather than to an imperial plan. However, at a different level – mainly cultural and artistic – the Romanian principalities were among the most important perpetuators of the civilization of Christian Rome after it had been conquered by the Ottoman Turks.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The way in which the Byzantine political model was received by the members of the Orthodox Commonwealth varied from country to country. In Bulgaria and Serbia, after an initial defensive phase, the next step was full annexation of the imperial model. Quite on the contrary, the Romanian principalities were late in taking over only certain elements of the model and stopped halfway. Finally, after a strict policy of fidelity toward the Byzantine Empire and a century after Constantinople fell into Ottoman hands, Muscovy achieved the complete annexation of this agenda and claimed over the next centuries to be "the Third Rome". How can such a bottom line be explained?

Given its substance and forms of manifestation, the Byzantine idea of the state worked for the Orthodox peoples like a treasure shared by all of them in keeping with their needs, conditions, and political traditions. The Turanian traditions of the First Bulgarian Czardom and – and even more importantly, Crum 's political inheritance - influenced Simeon's imperial agenda the objective of which was the conquest of Constantinople. Three centuries later, Simeon's political covenant was to guide the imperial plans of John Asen II. In its turn, the evolution of the power relationships between the Empire and its neighbours was also reflected in the political

aspirations of the neighbours in question. The conquest of Constantinople in 1204 by the Latin forces and the disputes over the supreme title between successor states were historical circumstances that favoured John Asen's rise and imperial agenda in its all-encompassing sense. A century later, the agony of the Byzantine state under the Palaeologi was fructified by Stephen Dushan in an imperial plan that was as ambitious as that of Simeon and John Asen II. The geographical positions of the Orthodox states – and first of all their relative distances from Constantinople – also played a part in the historical circumstances of the way in which the Byzantine model was received. As Bulgaria and Serbia were immediate neighbours of the Empire and had a very early start in the intensive appropriation of the Byzantine influence, they were the first to draw up and to implement imperial projects. At the other end of the spectrum, the Romanian Principalities and the Great *Knezate* of Muscovy were farther from Constantinople and lacked direct political and military contacts. Therefore, they only assumed imperial symbols and prerogatives during the last century of the Byzantine state or even after its fall.

Possibly the most important factor accounting for the reception of the Byzantine political model was the set of political needs of the Orthodox states. It can be said that this reception was first achieved (with the possible exception of Muscovy) as a reflex of protection. Even where the South-Slav states were concerned, the imperial idea of New Rome had a dominating and even an imperialist meaning, regardless of whether or not the Empire of Constantine and Justinian, of the Macedonians, or of the Comnenoi is evoked.

During the first stage of the Bulgarian Czardom, Boris took the title of czar with all its political implications because of a need to define his political identity in the face of an empire that took great care to proclaim its universal domination by calling its sovereigns *basileis* and *autocrators*. The same attitude could be identified as reflecting the first sovereigns of the Târnovo Czardom, established in a lawfully imperial territory. Even to the extent that the Serbian king, Stephen-the-first-crowned, was concerned, the term *autocrator* and other elements of Byzantine ideology had the same political function, even though there was no threat coming from the Byzantine state.

The defensive role of the Byzantine political inheritance was even clearer in the case of the Romanian principalities that were threatened by the policies of their Catholic neighbours. After passing this phase and depending upon the power relationships that they established with Constantinople, some states, the Balkan Slavonic ones, for instance, immediately assumed a full imperial agenda. Later and in different historical circumstances, the Muscovy Czardom, would proclaim itself the political heir of the New Rome in the modern age.

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IV. *Aperçus* of the History of Balkan Romanity

NICOLAE-ŞERBAN TANAŞOCA

A. ROMANIAN AND FOREIGN RESEARCH ON THE BALKAN ROMANIANS

1. The Balkan Romanians

The Balkan Peninsula is indebted to its geographical position and structure, as well as to its historical circumstances throughout the centuries, for its ethnic composition of unique diversity and complexity. Distinct peoples live together or are neighbours on its soil in an inextricable texture unparalleled anywhere else in the world. On the one hand, this situation has made possible a degree of *rapprochement* and many exchanges among peoples of various nationalities which has evolved far enough to lead to the creation of a relatively unitary Balkan mentality and common civilization. On the other hand, however, aspirations to the preservation of an ethnic individuality has had, from time to time, to confront the very opposite tendency, one of national homogenization propounded by one or another of the Balkan states. The result has been a number of acute conflicts, if not of proverbially violent clashes, among the constituents of this mosaic of populations.

Long ago, during the existence of the great imperial structures that incorporated the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, such confrontations, born out of a wish for universality, were not overly harsh. They became much more intense after the establishment of modern national states in the region and the resulting denationalization of large numbers of minority group peoples belonging to one nation, but left inside the borders of another. In some situations, the final result was the total disappearance of minorities.

In the Balkan ethnic context, in addition to the Slavic peoples of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as well as the Albanians, Greeks, and Turks, to mention only the main ethnic components of the Peninsula who were able to establish national states, one also meets the scattered population of the Vlachs. First attested by Byzantine sources, at least from the Tenth Century onward, their presence can be observed to this day in all the Balkan states, where they live in more or less compact groups, speak languages which are different from the ones used by the other nationalities, and have their own habits and customs.

With very few exceptions, Romanian and most foreign researchers have perceived these Balkan Romanian Vlachs as successors of the Roman or Romanized populations of the Balkan area of the Roman Empire, or even as Romanians who migrated from the former Dacia,

crossing the Danube. They were detached from the initial body of Carpathian-Danubian Romanity - the thriving life of which in the North of the Balkan Peninsula until the Seventh Century is well-known - as a result of the historical circumstances created by the Slavic and Bulgarian invasions. Scattered throughout the Peninsula and reduced to more modest, rural, and partly "Barbarized" life forms, this Romanic population preserved its ethnic identity and habits and continued to speak the same language. It became separated from the Romanians living North of the Danube, with whom it had originally formed a compact unity. Its people gradually became estranged from them, and, because they lacked state organizational forms and a cultural life of their own, they had to endure an assimilation process undertaken by the peoples among whom they lived.

Currently, Balkan Romanians are represented by three distinct groups: the Aromanians inhabiting the South of the Peninsula, the Pindus Mountains, Thessaly, Acarnania, Etolia, Macedonia, and Epirus; the Megleno-Romanians to be found in several towns in the North of Greece and in the Republic of Macedonia; and the Istro-Romanians, very few in number, who live in the Istrian Peninsula. Except for the Megleno-Romanians, who lost their ethnic designation and chose to be called *Vlasis*, it being the name used by Slavs when referring to them, all these Vlachs are called, in their own languages or dialects, either Romanians, or *Armâni*, *Rëmëri*, or even *Rumâni*, in keeping with the dialectical variants resulting from the evolution and the diversification of the Latin, *Romani*, just as in the case of the Daco-Romanian word, *Rumâni*. The Romanic idioms that they speak are considered by the overwhelming majority of Romance language specialists to be dialects of the Romanian language or, as Matilda Caragiu-Marioțeanu (1975, 1993) points out, dialects of the old common Romanian. In its turn, verbal and written historical tradition looks upon these peoples as branches of the trunks of the same Romanian single people living between the Carpathian and the Pindus Mountains, according to the Fifteenth Century Byzantine scholar, Laonikos Chalcocondyles.

In the more distant past, the number of Balkan Peninsula Romanian groups was far larger than in more recent times. The Balkan Romanians in the Northern group, living near the Haemus Mountains, along the valleys that go down as far as the Black Sea region, as well as in Thrace and Rodope, disappeared completely after having established Asenid Vlachia and having taken part in the movement for the restoration of the Bulgarian Czardom in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries. Indeed, they even provided the ruling dynasty. Another vanished group was the Western group of Romanians in Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro Montenegro), Croatia, and along the Dalmatian coast. Their presence through the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries is attested by many sources of various origins. Traces of these two extinct Balkan Romanian groups can only be found today in the Romanic toponymy of the regions they inhabited, an

indication that these peoples were speaking their own dialect, one that was close to the former Daco-Romanian.

Starting during the second half of the Eighteenth Century, a considerable number of Aromanians emigrated from the Balkan Peninsula because of certain economic concerns and political needs in an attempt to preserve their nationality. One can cite, in particular, the founding of some important settlements by Aromanian merchants, most of whom were born in Epirus and who were forced, as the result of Ottoman persecutions at the end of the Eighteenth Century, to settle in the Habsburg Empire (Austria, Hungary, and Transylvania). Then, after the First World War, came the efforts on the part of the Romanian government to colonize Dobrudja with a few thousand Aromanian families. In addition to the latter, some compact Megleno-Romanian groups also settled on Romanian territory and preserved both their ethnic features and their language.

The settling of Aromanians in the Habsburg Empire is linked to the first so-called Aromanian national renaissance. Continuing a cultural direction undertaken as early as their presence in the Balkan Peninsula within the flourishing urban center of Moscopolis (that was destroyed by Ali Pasha of Yanina), those Aromanians who had emigrated to Central European cities came into contact with Habsburg Empire Romanians (chiefly Transylvanian Romanians). Here, in the effervescent atmosphere of the Enlightenment, they developed a movement of cultural assertion in their own language which they tried to promote by writing grammars, primers, and even histories of their people. Focusing on the Romanity of Aromanians and even on recovered Romanity, this movement triggered the response of the Greek-Orthodox clergy grouped around the Oecumenical Patriarchate. They viewed the possible Aromanian departure from the cultural boundaries of a Hellenism that they had supported both intellectually and materially, as being akin to religious apostasy.

The second Aromanian national renaissance began to take shape in the second half of the Nineteenth Century through the efforts of mid-century revolutionaries, also known as the Forty-Eighters, who, in their national aspirations to bring together all Romanians into one national state and to creatively assert the cultural identity of the Romanian people in its own language, did not want to exclude the Balkan Romanians.

After the Union of 1 December 1918, Romanian statesmen and cultural personalities were able to draw up an adequate institutional framework and to make strenuous and systematic efforts in the diplomatic field. They succeeded in establishing a comprehensive school network in the Balkan Peninsula and thus in integrating a remarkable number of Aromanians into the Romanian cultural scene. Active until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Romanian schools in the Balkan Peninsula gave the young Aromanians who enrolled in them the opportunity to receive a classical education of sufficient quality for them to be able to continue their studies in Romanian or in foreign universities. Most of the graduates of these schools settled in Romania. The vast majority of the Dobrudja colonists were products of this school system. This same movement also gave rise to

the appearance of an Aromanian dialectal literature in a cultivated language, to be followed by cultivated attempts at literature in the Megleno-Romanian dialect.

Balkan Romanians who did not wish to become involved in this trend, like those who currently lack an institutional and cultural framework able to support the assertion of their ethnic individuality, integrated into the cultural and intellectual lives of the peoples among whom they were living and were gradually assimilated by them. In recent years, however, efforts have been made to reassert a degree of international co-ordination in favour of minority rights, even though this effort is being made simply on behalf of the Romanian national consciousness. It is also linked to the standpoint of a Romanic nationality other than that of the Romanian people.

2. Romanian Research on Balkan Romanians

The concern of Romanian cultural personalities for Balkan Romanians did not begin during the Nineteenth Century, nor was it determined by the political and cultural initiatives of the Forty-Eighters that were intended to recover the energies of the Balkan Vlachs for use by the Romanian people for their greater good. Since its humanist beginnings, Romanian historical writing and historiography have reserved an appropriate place for Balkan Romanity among their areas of interest in forms and means suitable for each distinct period. Such pioneer Romanian historians, as Miron Costin (1959) and Constantine "the High Steward" ("Stolnicul" Constantin) Cantacuzino not only mentioned the existence of Balkan Romanians, but also their common origin and the similarity of their language with that of the North-Danubian Romanians, invoking the experience of direct contacts with them or the existence of various written sources. Somewhat later, Dimitrie Cantemir (1901) allocated a very important place to Balkan Romanians in his *Chronicle*. He was the first Romanian scholar to have identified a direct link between the political activities of Balkan Romanians, led by the two brothers, Peter and John Asen, and the establishment of the Romanian medieval states of Moldavia and Walachia, relying on a very personal and not exactly error-free interpretation of the main Byzantine sources related to the Asenid uprising and to the restoration of the Bulgarian Czardom at the end of the Twelfth Century. In this way, Cantemir made room in Romanian national historiography for a topic of research and speculation that would never be abandoned. Both with the assistance of Dionysius Fotino (1818-1819) and of Daniel Philippide (1816) and through the Cantacuzino *History* edited by the Tunusli brothers (1806), the theme brought up by Cantemir (1901) was developed in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century so-called Greek-Romanian historiography, while references to the Asenids became a question of common knowledge in Romanian national history, being taken over by the Romantic school of historical writing led by Mihail Kogălniceanu (1837).

Derived from the work of the same Dimitrie Cantemir, but at a level of accuracy and benefitting more from documentary information, is the work of the Transylvanian School members, particularly of Gheorghe Şincai (1967), Petru Maior (1970), and Samuil Micu (1963). The three of them devoted special attention to a Balkan Romanity, including all its manifestations as revealed by the sources, that was integrated into the body of national Romanian historiography. Şincai introduced into the body of known evidence the largest quantity derived primarily from Byzantine sources related to the Balkan Peninsula Romanians. His contribution in this direction was tremendous, despite the sometimes-awkward interpretations of data brought together in D. Cantemir's *Chronicle*. At the same time, the historians of the Transylvanian School were the first to respond to German and Hungarian works by defending the idea of the Romanity of the South-Danubian Vlachs and by questioning the socio-professional interpretation that was starting to be given, in certain scholarly circles, to the word, Vlach, as allegedly designating nomadic shepherds of unknown ethnicity. Thus these historians adopted an intellectual stance that would be constantly defended in Romanian historical writing, in a continuing debate with foreign historians, the echoes of which can still be heard today.

The Transylvanian School rejected all attempts by historians such as Franz Joseph Sulzer (1781-1782), Johann Carl Eder (1791), and Johann Christian Engel (1794) to question Romanian continuity in Trajan's Dacia after Aurelian's troops had evacuated the province in 271. Instead, they defended the theory of the Romanian "persistence" in Transylvania, thus forging a useful weapon for defending Romanian historical rights in this historic province. The same theory served as an argument for the aspirations of Romanians to be recognized as a nation in the political sense, enjoying the same rights as the privileged nations in the area: the Hungarians, the Saxons, and the Szeklers.

The debate over the continuity of the Romanian presence intensified during the second half of the Nineteenth Century, in an atmosphere created by the hardening of the nationalities policies of the (now dual) Austro-Hungarian Empire in parallel with the assertion of a veritable Austrian and Hungarian historiographic school that vehemently questioned the continuity of Romanian settlement in Dacia. Although the members of this school were not adamantly motivated by anti-Romanian political purposes, such scholars as Robert Roesler (1871), Franz Miklosich (1862, 1879), Wilhelm Thomaschek (1881), and Paul Hunfalvy (1883, 1887) attempted to prove that the Romanian people came into being South of the Danube River and later emigrated to former Dacia, bringing with them a Slavic-Byzantine civilization, typical of the environment from which they had come. Invoking historical sources that provide detailed information on the life of Balkan Romanity before the Thirteenth Century, and at the same time bringing up the linguistic criterion of the *rapprochement* between Romanian and such a Slavonic language as Bulgarian and the surviving Illyrian language, Albanian, opponents to the

idea of continuity believed that they could prove that all the Romanians living between the Carpathian and the Pindus Mountains came from ancient Moesia, Illyria, and Macedonia. Many things were also written in Central European historiography about the Romanian-Bulgarian state of the Asenids, the founding of which actually confirmed the Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century existence of a Romanity which was still strong and capable of political creation and military efforts South of the Danube.

Faced with such attempts at minimization, even though Balkan Romanity had clearly played a major role as attested in historiography and in linguistics, Romanian historical writing was called upon to draw up new hypotheses about the relationship between Balkan and Daco-Romanity over the centuries. Dimitre Onciul (1899, 1919-1920, 1968), for example, theorized that Asenid Vlachia did not lie South, but North of the Danube, functioning, for a while, as a genuine confederation on both sides of the river. According to this theory, the two parts were separated, once again, by the Tartars. At this point, the Romanians entered into a feudal relationship with the Hungarian Kingdom and continued a type of civilization that was pervaded by significant Slavic-Byzantine elements inherited from the Bulgarian czarist tradition. On the other hand, Alexandru D. Xenopol (1884, 1885, 1893, 1891), who did not see eye to eye with Onciul and rightly considered the hypothesis of the latter to be insufficiently documented, adopted an extreme point of view whereby he questioned – with certain contradictions and second thoughts – the whole hypothesis concerning the Romanianity of the Vlach people and their language. He was tempted to identify them as an ethnic group, and their language, as Romanic, not as Romanian.

Coming closer to the truth, but at the same time severely criticizing and rejecting Onciul's theory, Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu (1878, 1898) persisted in viewing Balkan Romanians as simple Romanians, and the idioms that they spoke, as dialects of the Romanian language. He also understood intuitively that the so-called Albanian influence observable in Romanian was nothing but the effect of the Thracian-Illyric impact on all the languages of the Balkan peoples, regardless of whether they were Latin or Slav (in fact, an argument in favour of continuity). By proposing the hypothesis of the ethnic persistence of Romanized or Slavonized Thracians and, in this way, echoing the words of other foreign scholars, among whom the representatives of the incipient Viennese school of Balkanology were the most important, Hasdeu (1878, 1898) dealt a heavy blow to theories that over-stressed Latinization, and paved the way for a better understanding of the process of formation of the Romanian people, both the Daco-Romanians and the Balkan Romanians.

Although at the start of his career he hesitated to attribute a Romanian ethnic character to the Balkan Vlachs and refrained from identifying dialects of the Romanian language in the idioms that they spoke, Nicolae Iorga ended up by accepting the traditional viewpoint to be found in Romanian historical writing in this respect and even wrote a brief history of the Balkan Peninsula Romanians (1919). Although this work is very

suggestive and expresses views of great interest, it is, at the same time, imbued with highly personal opinions. For instance, Iorga advanced a theory (unconfirmed by the sources, however) according to which Asenid Vlachia and the Great Thessalian Vlachia were one and the same.

Nevertheless, Nicolae Iorga made a tremendous contribution to the field by including the question of the historical development of Balkan Peninsula Romanians, with all its specific points, into the general picture of the evolution of all of Southeastern European Romanity and of the Romanian people. He revealed fundamental similarities, analogies, and identities linking the existence of Balkan and of Daco-Romanity. Iorga viewed the situation from a world historical perspective. He closely studied the lives of the Romanian people both as successors of the ancient Roman and Romanized populations of Southeastern Europe and as citizens of the Roman Empire within the scope of the vast European restructuring that occurred as a result of the clash between the barbarians and the Empire.

Iorga (1922) developed a basically sound theory, the details of which might, however, need some refinement. It describes so-called "popular" *Romanias* or "countries", which during the invasions, formed islands of Latinity that were spared and exploited by the invaders. They were thus able to preserve their tradition of civilization and their attitude of superiority in regard to the invaders over the whole contact area. The Southeastern European *Romanians* (*i.e.*, the North and South-Danubian Vlachias) were the core areas. From these cores, found to the right and to the left of the Danube, the Romanian states in old Dacia and the Vlach autonomies in the Balkans arose and expanded.

Thanks to the representatives of South-Danubian Romanity and particularly to scholars who were formed within the Aromanian national renaissance movement that was evoked above, the quality of Romanian historiography and linguistics devoted specifically to questions of Balkan Romanity during the first half of the Twentieth Century improved notably. From that time on, because, on the one hand, the scholars concerned knew their native environment well and, on the other hand, because of the natural evolution toward objectivity and accuracy, linked to a stronger assertion of the critical spirit in history and the social sciences, the world of the Balkan Romanians would no longer be studied simply in order to find explanations regarding the origins of the Romanian people and of their cultural and political forms in the Middle Ages, but also as a subject in its own right. In terms of historiography, Ioan J. Caragiani, whose work was published long after his death, in 1929 and 1941, and later on, George Murnu (1905, 1906, 1907, 1913, 1939, reprinted in 1984), were initiators of this type of concern, and both of them produced studies about the Aromanian past. Studies of this type were taken to a high level by historians such as Valeriu Papahagi (1935, 1937), who did massive research in the archives of Venice on the Aromanian role in the trade between the West and the East, as well as other contributions in the field. In a similar vein, Victor Papacostea (1929, 1931a, 1931b, 1937, 1939a, 1939b, reprinted in 1983), holder of the Chair of History of Balkan

Peninsula Romanians at the University of Bucharest, made insightful contributions to the knowledge about the national renaissance movement of the Moscopolis Aromanians.

Progress in linguistics linked to the advanced study of European Romanics, of the Romanian language, and of Balkan Romanian dialects reached a high level of scientific performance through the work of scholars such as Tache Papahagi (1932) and Theodor Capidan (1925-1928,1932, 1942, 1943), specialists in the Aromanians and the Megleno-Romanians. The work accomplished has been continued and perfected by a younger generation of scholars, in particular, Elena Scărlătoiu (1979, 1980, 1991, 1992, 1998), Gheorghe Carageani, and Nicolae Saramandu (1884), and Matilda Caragiu-Marioțeanu (1975, 1993).

Research on the Western group of Balkan Romanians as well as on the Haemus Romanian group and the Asenid Vlachs has been primarily the work of the Cluj School as an extension of the already existing work in the field. An example is the work of Sextil Pușcariu (1906, 1926, 1929) in the domain of linguistics and of research on the Istro-Romanians. In the same connection, one should cite the writings of Silviu Dragomir (1959), in particular his rich and valuable historical investigations regarding the Romanians in the North of the Balkan Peninsula and along the Dalmatian coast. In the same Cluj circle, Nicolae Bănescu (1943) dealt with the genesis and the character of the Asenid state, defending, in opposition to the views of Bulgarian historians, the Romanity of the founding dynasty and the critical role played by the Balkan Romanians in the restoration of the Czardom.

The field is indebted to a generation of historians who grouped themselves around the *Revista istorică română* [Romanian Historical Review] for an important and new approach to the history of the relationship between Balkan Romanity and North-Danubian Romanians. The various members of this group have adopted some of N. Iorga's older ideas, while viewing them with a critical eye and lending them a modern touch. These historians have tried to rethink the sensitive issues of the origins of the Romanian states in the Middle Ages. Thanks to Gheorghe I. Brătianu (1945), who not only rehabilitated the foundation theory, but also the value of tradition as a historical source, it became possible to evaluate the political history of the Asenids in the light of world history, in a new way, which better explains why the Balkan Romanians disappeared from

the history of the Czardom during the second half of the Thirteenth Century and why the Bulgarian view of this imperial state has been irrevocably successful. Romanian historians identified these reasons from among foreign policy issues that forced the Asenids - as a means of countering the Hungarian claims to supremacy in the Balkans – to adopt the papal argument for the legitimacy of their state, thus resurrecting the doubtful precedent whereby certain old Bulgarian czars were crowned by Rome. Through the efforts of Petre P. Panaitescu (1929, 1944, *postum* work 1969), who considerably enlarged the documentary basis for research

through the discovery of new sources imparting information about the Romanity of the Asenids, N. Iorga's theory (1922) in regard to "popular" *Romanias* (Vlachias) gained acceptance in terms of contents and insights. As could be expected, the question of Balkan Romanity became a subject of this field of research. Finally, Constantin C. Giurescu (1931) undertook a thorough and critical study of sources. By doing so, he managed to completely do away with the theory whereby the Vlachia of the Asenids lay either North of the Danube, or in Thessaly, bringing it back to the Haemus Mountains and to ancient Moesia. Indeed, in his synthesis of Romanian history (1936), C. C. Giurescu produced an integrated history of the Balkan Romanians from their beginnings to modern times.

Following the Second World War, the intensity of Romanian research on the Balkan Romanians subsided for a while, owing to certain political scruples that were never openly admitted and to the wishes of the Romanian State and of its cultural personalities not to be perceived as continuing the pre-war Balkan Romanity policy. According to the latter, the Romanian government had promoted the cultural, educational, and religious autonomy of the Aromanians as well as the principle of special links between them and Romania proper based on the common Romanity of Aromanians and Romanians. Thus, the existing Romanian schools and churches in the Balkan Peninsula were closed, and historical and even linguistic studies of the South-Danubian Romanians were to a certain extent neglected.

Ion Coteanu (1957) and Alexandru Graur (1955; 1956), introduced into linguistic research the theory that the Balkan Romanian dialects developed and turned into independent languages because they were massively pervaded, due to progressive bilingualism, by allogeneic linguistic elements – South Slav or Greek. This theory was rejected by Alexandru Rosetti (1958), who transformed the whole debate into a welcome opportunity to clarify a general issue of linguistics, the definition of a dialect in relation to a given language. Through other researchers, like, for instance, Ştefan Ştefănescu (1963, 1965, and, 1971) and Eugen Stănescu (1970), D. Onciul's ideas about such matters as the North-Danubian extraction of Asenid Vlachia were brought up again. Although neither researcher generated any new valid points or a proper response to the objections raised by the critics of this theory in the past, their work was fruitful from the standpoint of the development of a cordial relationship with Bulgarian historians who tended to accept this thesis.

Still, such a hypothesis did not solve the problem of the entrance of Vlachia into the discussion. True enough, S. Dragomir (1959) published a comprehensive study of the Vlachs who lived in the Northern Balkan Peninsula, but he had conceived it a number of years earlier. All references to Balkan Romanians disappeared from Romanian history syntheses that limited themselves to the territory of the contemporary Romanian State. Finally, a tendency developed to replace the term, "Balkan Romanians" with the term, "Vlachs", in order to distinguish them from the so-called "genuine" Romanians who lived North of the Danube and in Dobrudja.

Recent years have given rise to important changes in the emphasis of research. There has been, for instance, a surge in concern for the integration of the history of the Balkan Romanians into national Romanian history. In parallel with the appearance of certain cultural products in the Aromanian dialect and with the republishing of older texts, increasing efforts are being made to study the past and to present the Balkan Romanians in a systematic manner.

The result of this interest is giving rise to a great deal of scholarly activity in regard to Balkan Romanians, both to those in the Balkan countries, where they are perceived as Vlachs and are distinguished from the North-Danubian Romanians, and to those in other parts of the world. Romanian researchers, for instance, have given and are still giving special attention to the problems faced by the Byzantine Empire Vlachs (E. Stănescu, 1970; Stelian Brezeanu, 1997; Nicolae-Şerban Tanaşoca, 1974, 1984, 1989, *in*, E. Stănescu, 1989, and 1997; N.-Ş. Tanaşoca and Anca Tanaşoca, 1989; Petre Şerban Năsturel 1977-1978), in medieval Serbia, (N.-Ş. Tanaşoca and A. Tanaşoca, 1994; A. Tanaşoca, 1995), and in the Ottoman Empire (A. Tanaşoca, 1981). They are also rethinking the place of the Asenids in Romanian and Southeastern European history (N.-Ş. Tanaşoca, 1981, 1987, 1989, *in*, Stănescu, E. 1989, and 1989; St. Brezeanu, 1997; Sergiu Iosipescu, 1916), as well as the place of the Aromanians in Romanian general history (Neagu Djuvara *et al.* 1996). New evidence has been brought to light (Şerban Papacostea, 1983), and the older attestations of the Romanity of the Balkan Romanians have been studied in the contexts of research aimed at the generation of historical synthesis (Adolf Armbruster, 1977). Linguistics experts have studied the dialects of the Romanian language, M. Caragiu-Marioţeanu (1975, 1993), Gh. Carageani (1987, 1988, 1991, 1993), N. Saramandu (1984), E. Scărlătoiu (1979, 1980, 1991, 1992, 1998), and Haralambie Mihăescu (1966, 1993). Special attention has been and is being devoted to the study of musical and artistic folklore, as well as to the customs and the ethnography of Balkan Romanians (P. Marcu, H. Stahl, Paul Petrescu, Irina Nicolau, and L. Marcu).

To summarize and to briefly describe the main features and tendencies of Romanian research on Balkan Romanians, the following ideas emerge:

With few exceptions, Romanian scholars have always considered that research on the history, the language, and the culture of Balkan Romanians – or Vlachs, as they are called by the peoples among whom they live and in the sources about them – is part and parcel of research in Romanian studies in general, including historical, linguistic, and culture studies. At the same time, Romanian scholars recognize that the destiny of the South-Danubian Romanian people was different from that of the North-Danubian Romanians.

At first, the Romanian scholars active in the domain of Balkan Romanity attempted to clarify all the issues related to Romanian medieval state creation and ethnogenesis, as well as all those linked to the origins of the forms of culture and civilization in which the spiritual lives of the

ancient Daco-Romanians developed. Later on, they began to study Balkan Romanity in and for itself, as a major Balkan reality, knowledge of which would be useful to scholars in obtaining a better understanding of the life in the Peninsula as a whole. Although some subjective tendencies in the past influenced the study of this question, Romanian scholarship has constantly attempted to be as objective as possible in its efforts. Research was never called upon to provide justifications for political expansion in the Balkans.

At the same time, it is necessary to admit that despite all the successful research undertaken in this direction, a full corpus of sources on Balkan Romanians has not yet been developed, at least not in terms of historiography and of historical linguistics. A need remains for a set of comprehensive working instruments (bibliographies, lexicons, and cartographic works) and a synthesis measuring up to contemporary academic standards regarding this question.

3. Tendencies in Foreign Research on Balkan Romanians

Western humanist historical writing, the roots of which can be found in Byzantine historical writing, has also, in its turn, been interested in Balkan Romanians, the Vlachs mentioned in various sources, who blended their fate with that of Byzantium and of the Balkan Peninsula Slavs. The Vlachs appear to have been equally involved in peaceful as well as in conflicting relationships with the Constantinople Latin Empire and with the Levantine Frankish groups. Foreign travellers encountered them throughout the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan Vlachs drew the attention to Southeastern Europe of humanist researchers who felt the need to define the ethnic individuality and the origin of these people, without making them the focus of any special works.

Byzantine and Western humanist historiography display the incipient elements of certain theories regarding the ethnic individuality and the origins of the Balkan Peninsula Vlachs that have been further developed in modern academic histories.

By virtue of a classicizing and archaizing tendency, Byzantine historians designated the Vlachs according to names derived from ancient literary models: Dacos, Getae, Moesians. These names corresponded to the provinces in which the Vlachs had been known to live, which in their turn were also given archaizing names. Thus Vlachs were designated as Dacos, if they inhabited what had been known as Dacia, and Moesians, if they lived in what had been known as ancient Moesia. In addition to these archaizing names, frequent use was made of the usual and colloquial term, *Vlachoi*, an equivalent of the previously mentioned archaizing words, which covered both South and North-Danubian Romanians. This method was used, for instance, by Nicetas Choniates, the historian of the Asenid uprising.

In order to be less pedantic, Western humanist historical writing preferred to use such terms as *Blaci*, *Blachi*, or *Valachi*, obviously

borrowed from the Byzantine environment, where crusaders had their first contacts with Balkan Romanians. Often enough, so-called corrupt words, such as *Blasci*, *Blacti*, etc., came to be used because of lack of a direct knowledge of local realities. French chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade adjusted these terms to their national language – old French – and the result was *Blas*, *Blac*, *Blascois*, next to which corrupt forms also appear in some of the works of later writers.

According to most scholars, the word, Vlach, used by Byzantine writers to designate Romanians, is of Slavic origin. But even in the case of the Slavs, it was the result of a loan from Old German – *wolch/wloch*. Indeed, the Byzantine Empire may have taken the term directly from the Germanic peoples. Successively borrowed by all the peoples who came into contact with the Romanians in Southeastern Europe and adapted to the phonetic systems of the various languages to be found there, the ethnonym, Vlachs, initially designated the Latin language citizens of the Roman Empire and, in general, the speakers of all Romance languages. In their turn, Italians were named in Slavic languages and in Hungarian with words from the same family: *vlasi*, *olaszok* (the Hungarian *olahok* = Romanians). By virtue of its use, the term, Vlachs, used to designate Romanians, indicates that users of the term were aware of the Romanity of the people concerned, and later, of the individuality of the Vlachs among Romanic peoples. At the same time, the fact that this term was used to designate both North- and South-Danubian Romanians is an indication of an awareness of a unity common to all the groups of Romanians in Southeastern Europe.

This awareness was expressed in the Eleventh Century by Kinnamos, who considered that Romanians were Italian colonists. In the Fifteenth Century, Laonikos Chalcocondyles, knowing of the Italic roots of Romanians, also asserted his belief in the unity of Romanians from Dacia to the Pindus and admitted that he was incapable of saying where the initial homeland really lay, South or North of the Danube.

Western humanist historical writing adopted this view not only as a result of the contacts of individual writers with Byzantine scholars, but also as the result of direct links with Romanians living North and South of the Danube, made possible by the Papacy and its attempts at proselytizing. In the later exchanges between Pope Innocent III and Ioniță (Kaloyan) at the end of the Twelfth and the beginning of the Thirteenth Centuries, the Balkan Romanians were viewed as successors to the Romans, an idea that was turned into an instrument of pressure by both parties. In the one case, the idea was intended to serve the cause of Catholic conversion, and in the other, that of the recognition of the sovereignty of the Asenid State.

Evidence of the Romanity of the Balkan Romanians was frequently manifested throughout the centuries. For instance, the Ninth Century testimony of Dioclea's presbyter perceived the Dalmatian coast "*Mavrovlachs*" or "*Morlachs*" as "*Latini Nigri*". In the case of Seventeenth Century classic Byzantinology, particularly a specific reference to Charles Du Fresne Du Cange (1657) and his comments on Geoffroy de

Villehardouin's chronicle, a remark can be found according to which Vlachs, including Ioniţă and his people, were of Roman origin, exactly what Byzantine writers and the previously mentioned pontifical correspondence assumed to be the case.

Western and Byzantine humanist writers were not the only writers who were aware of the Romanic origins and the Romanian ethnic identity of the Balkan Vlachs. There was also, for instance, Johannes Lucius Dalmata (Ivan Lučić), a Croat humanist in Trau, a Seventeenth Century Slav, who maintained direct contacts with Balkan Romanians. He devoted a special chapter to them in his work on the Kingdom of Croatia and Dalmatia (1966) and was keen about their Romanic origins, citing not only their (Romanic) language, but other supporting evidence taken from the pontifical correspondence with Ioniţă and from the works of various Byzantine writers. Another important point made by Lučić was that not only King Ioniţă of the Vlachs and Bulgarians was a Balkan Romanic, but also John Hunyady, the regent of Hungary. The theory that the South-Danubian Romanians and the Romanians of ancient Dacia were one and the same was so deeply rooted in Lučić's mind that he was one of the first humanists to suggest that former Dacia should be repopulated with the descendants of those Romanians who had been taken prisoner by the Bulgarians after the latter had conquered Moesia. Later portions of this study will return to other aspects of Lučić's interpretation of the word, Vlach.

Unlike the case of Western humanist historiography that makes frequent mention of Romanians and of the Romanity of their language, Byzantine historical writing makes very few references to Vlach Romanity despite the large number of writings in Greek. This situation is all the more surprising in that the Romanians themselves, as mentioned above, did not call themselves Vlachs, but only Romanians, in the known dialectal variants of their language.

Byzantine writers alleged that the Romanians began to call themselves Vlachs to mask the fact of their "barbarization". This implication, which also arose because of the paucity of information about Vlach origins, has a simple ideological explanation. It is known that the Byzantine authorities considered themselves to be *Romaioi*, Romans, the only legitimate perpetuators of the Roman Empire. The Latinophone element in the Empire, finding itself in an endemic state of conflict with the Greek element, was not looked upon kindly. As the Empire was gradually Hellenized, Latin Romanics were viewed as a factor of papal subversion. The problem became more complicated as Rome, on the one hand, and Constantinople, on the other hand, claimed the right of ecclesiastic rule over Illyria. After the ethnic Hellenization of the Byzantine Empire had been fully completed and the Romanic mass torn off its body as a result of the Slavic invasion, their settlement in the North of the Balkan Peninsula followed by that of the Bulgarians, Constantinople conceded the existence of the Romanics, the Romanians, and the Vlachs, allowing them to be shepherded by the Slavic church. In the Eleventh Century, when the

Romanians, renamed Vlachs, found themselves once again inside the borders of the Empire, they were perceived by Byzantium as an ethnic group the members of which did not belong to the Empire and which acted as a barbarian carrier of Slavonic culture. The fact that Ioniţă's Romanians were converted to Catholicism, after negotiations during which the idea of Vlach ethnic Romanity played a key role, could not help but develop in the Byzantine mind the idea that an assertion of Romanian Romanity reflected a diminished commitment to the Empire.

On the contrary, through the efforts of writers, such as the Eleventh Century Kekaumenos, one witnesses, for the first time in Byzantine historical writing, a tendency to question the Romanity of the Vlachs. The above-mentioned author is the first to speak of the Daco and Bessic origins of the Vlachs, considering them to be permanent potential rebels against a Roman Empire that, in the meantime, had been Hellenized and that had been previously ruled by Trajan, none other than the Emperor who had defeated Decebalus. However, one should observe that Byzantine thinkers did not feel the need to draw up a scholarly theory of the non-Romanic origins of the Balkan or of the North-Danubian Romanians. They limited themselves either to neglecting the Romanic origin of the Romanians and its possible political implications, or to harshly criticizing them and putting them into an extremely bad light. The same attitude toward the ethnic or linguistic Romanity of the neo-Latin peoples of Western Europe, the same tendency to "barbarize" them and to view them as objects of principled hostility, can be found throughout Byzantine historical writing. In the Byzantine vision of things, the case of the Romanians was not unique among that of Romanics as a whole.

The traditional humanist view of the ethnic identity of the Romanity of the North- and South-Danubian Romanians dominated scholarly thinking, with a few exceptions like those cited above, until the Nineteenth Century. Not even the Eighteenth Century opponents of Romanian continuity in ancient Dacia (J. C. Engel, 1794; J. C. Eder, 1791; F. J. Sulzer, 1781-1782) or the Nineteenth Century ones (W. Thomaschek, 1868, 1881; R. Roesler, 1871; P. Hunfalvy. 1883, 1887, etc.) ever thought of questioning these traditional truths. The controversy surrounding the Transylvanian School and Romanian historiography and historical writing only focused on the possible location of the original Romanian homeland, which the supporters of continuity placed both North and South – or only North – of the Danube, while its opponents thought it to be exclusively South of the Danube.

At the same time, the Nineteenth Century witnessed such a powerful assertion of modern national states and cultures that it is considered to have been the "century of nationalities". If, to Romanians, the Nineteenth Century brought about the union of the two Principalities into a unitary state as well as the beginning of the political unification and the winning of state independence for the Balkan peoples, the Slavs and the Greeks, the same Century witnessed the rebirth of their independent political existences, the reestablishment of states that had been suppressed by the

Ottoman conquest, and a cultural assertion in the modern and national languages of these peoples. In forms that cannot be closely examined in this study, the Yugoslav peoples, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks gave free rein – each one in its own way – to the Romantic stream of thought that accompanied national movements all over Europe.

According to the Romantic credo, each nation is the embodiment of a metaphysical and eternal principle, as well as of a national idea, while the history of each nation is the organic development of this spiritual entity at the earthly level. The writing of history is called upon to expose the national soul of this development and to provide national self-consciousness to each and every nation, thus enhancing its assertion in the contemporary world. Conceived along these lines, Romanticized history made an undisputed contribution to the assertion of modern national cultures and to the stimulation of the so-called constructive impetus of peoples organized in the new forms of national and democratic states. At the same time, it also distorted, to some extent, the image of the past held by given peoples, who described themselves through modern, national, and democratic visions of the concepts of state and culture.

Romanticized history may have been more distorting in the Balkan Peninsula than elsewhere for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the all-around level of education and culture following the Ottoman domination was rather low. On the other hand, there were certain specific circumstances, such as the existence of an imperial Byzantine-like state form in the medieval past of the Balkan peoples and ethnic interpenetration in the Peninsula, as a result of which each national state had its allogeneic minorities. In such conditions (but with a few honourable exceptions), Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian historians have tended to nationalize the embodiments of the old empires and czardoms to be found in the past of their nations, over-exalting their political structures at the peaks of their extension and crediting them with an ethnic homogeneity that they certainly did not have. They also tried to hide the presence of minorities within their territorial perimeters and to diminish the historical contributions of the latter to the common life of the Peninsula. The result has been a number of historiographic wars carried out in parallel with armed struggles at the beginning of the Twentieth Century by the Balkan states liberated from Ottoman rule.

The ways in which the history and the languages of the Balkan Romanians were described during these years represent a typical case of the sorts of Balkan excesses perpetrated by Romanticism. One by one, the Yugoslavs, the Greeks, and the Bulgarians, followed by the Albanians in the Twentieth Century, questioned and dissembled the Romanian presence in their countries and history. In order to preserve the organic homogeneity of their ethnic contents and to avoid wronging their national tutelary geniuses, they tried through various means to remove the inconvenient Vlachs from their history. Of course, there were networks of Romanian schools and Romanian national churches which, according to the statesmen of Balkan bourgeois national countries, could serve to

encourage the assertion of a Romanian national minority viewed as a potential instrument of the Romanian State and at all moments as an allogeneic factor that was all the more suspect as it tended to manifest itself actively in the economic and cultural lives of the host countries.

Starting with the work of Konstantinos Koumas (1832), Greek historical writing, for instance, questioned the Romanity of those Vlachs inhabiting Greece and considered them to be nothing but Romanized Hellenes. This theory, later adopted by other scholars, was systematized in an extreme and easy to attack form by a cultivated Greek archaeologist, Antonios Keramopoulos (1939), in the 1930s and, in recent times, it became the quasi-official version of the treatment of the origins of the Aromanians in the writings of Greek history. This view was adopted in spite of the fact that a whole number of historians and philologists, such as Konstantinos Paparigopoulos (1885), Panaiotis Aravantinos (1905), and Nikolaos Veis, had favoured the similarity of ethnic identity on the part of Romanians and Aromanians and had defined the Aromanian idioms as dialects of the Romanian language. Nevertheless, the situation evolved so far that it has become currently possible for certain Greek philologists, such as Achileas Lazarou (1986) (given the insufficient development of Romanian linguistics in Greece) to claim that the Aromanian dialect of Greece comes from Old Greek or that the influence of the Greek language caused such structural changes in the dialect as to eliminate its Romanic character. But Greek historians do not question the Romanic character of the Vlachs living outside the real or ideal national territory of the Greek state and do not try to explain the identity of the ethnic name, Vlachs, given by the Greeks to all Romanians, not only to the Aromanians.

Bulgarian historical writing and historiography too have tried to completely remove Romanians from the medieval history of Bulgaria. The father of modern Bulgarian historical writing, the verbose compiler, Paisij Hilandarski (1972), still felt the need to explain the unbelievable situation described by the sources – *i.e.*, that the Asenids were perceived as Vlachs rather than as Bulgarians because the two brothers, John and Peter Asen, had lived for a long time in Walachia and were consequently called Vlachs by their fellow countrymen – his successors did not bother to make such efforts. However, Marin Drinov (1915), the first critical Bulgarian historian, while admitting that Romanians took part in the Asenid uprising, lived in the Haemus region, and contributed to the restoration of the Czardom, denied, yet without being able to cite any evidence whatsoever, the ethnic origin of the dynasty as stated by the sources, claiming that the Asenids could have had any ethnic origin but Romanian.

Generally speaking, Bulgarian historical writing takes over, exaggerates, and develops a set of theories that were advanced by Constantin Jireček (1879, 1901-1904, 1912), for whom the designation, Vlach, in Medieval sources is not a mere etymon designating Romanians, but also a socio-professional term meaning shepherd. Moreover, Jireček (1876) supported the thesis of the Bulgarian origin of the Asenid dynasty. Another source of inspiration is Feodor Uspenskij (1879), whose thesis was that, out of sheer

hostility toward the Bulgarians, Byzantine writers overlooked them, choosing instead to write about the Vlachs.

Through the works of scholars such as Vasil Zlatarski (1933, 1934, 1940) and Petăr Mutafčiev (1928, 1932), these theories became dogmas of Bulgarian historiography. In the debate between Bulgarian and Romanian historians on this topic, the latter were and still are accused by the former of chauvinism and Romanian, anti-Bulgarian imperialism simply because they try to defend the veracity of the sources that attest the important part played by the Romanians in the restoration of the Czardom. Not even the deliberate choice of a materialistic conception of history, following the Second World War, succeeded in changing the position of Bulgarian historiography in this respect. On the contrary, Bulgarian historians have frequently thought that they could identify, with reference to historical materialism, further ideological elements capable of supporting their position and have criticized either the bourgeois nationalism or the unscientific spirit of Romanian and other foreign historians who have preferred to remain faithful to the written sources and to support the special importance of Romanian participation in the anti-Byzantine uprising at the end of the Twelfth Century, as well as the Romanian ethnic origins of the Asenids. Not even a medievalist such as Borislav Primov (1971) who, having been inspired by the research of the Soviet historian, Ghenadi G. Litavrin (1960), aimed at a fair criticism of both Bulgarian and Romanian scholarly literature on this issue, managed to rid himself of certain traditional and national prejudices and to avoid the unwarranted ideologizing tendency already mentioned in his evaluation of the sources and of the secondary literature that both parties devoted to this matter.

Recent Bulgarian historical writing is characterized by a recrudescence of the tendency to deny credit to the Romanians for the restoration of the Bulgarian Czardom. Historians like Vasil Gjuzelev (1989) and Ivan Božilov (1980, 1985), who utterly ignore the source data and the works of modern and contemporary scholars having addressed the problem, accuse Romanian scholars of tampering with the sources. Gjuzelev and Božilov question both the competence and the probity of foreign researchers whose opinions support the Romanian point of view. Others, like Genoveva Cankova-Petkova (1978) and Dimităr Angelov (1984), merely overlook the valid points made by Romanian historians and refer to the works of Vasil Zlatarski (1933, 1934, 1940), P. Mutafčiev (1928, 1932), P. Nikov (1937), and B. Primov (1971) as if they had irrevocably settled the matter of the participation of Romanians in the restoration of the Czardom. Ivan Dujčev (1942, 1985) suggests that the Romanian viewpoint was only expressed in certain works of "popularization".

A forthcoming academic treatise on Bulgarian history rejects as unsupported by the sources, as unscientific, the view held by Romanian historians who – without denying the Bulgarian role, particularly the function of the Bulgarian imperial traditional ideology and the importance of the Bulgarian Church in the restoration of the Czardom – have

attempted to read the sources dating back to that time and to discuss the Romanian contribution to this event.

The objections of scholars from outside the Balkan Peninsula to such Bulgarian historical writing have been strong and constant, beginning in the Nineteenth Century and continuing to the present day. Nineteenth Century Russian Byzantinologist, Vasili Vassilevsky (1879), and Austrian historian, Constantin von Höfler (1879), as well as contemporary American historian, Robert Lee Wolff (1949), Francis Dvornik (1968), a Czech historian of the Slav world, and the Russian scholar, G. G. Litavrin (1960, 1972, 1985), have taken positions of varying intensity against the alleged exaggerations of Bulgarian historians, coming closer to the Romanian position as synthesised by N. Bănescu (1943). Bulgarian scholars, however, have never taken these objections seriously, not even to the extent of attempting a rejection by means of proper counter-arguments.

It is a simple matter to identify the inconsistencies in and the incoherence of the ways in which, out of sheer nationalist prejudice, Bulgarian historians try hard to remove Romanians from the past of their own people. Thus, they sometimes recognize the ethnic meaning of the word, Vlach, but they will consider that if it does not always designate Bulgarians, it does not designate Romanians either. They only do this, however, in the cases of those Vlachs who are identified as having lived outside medieval Bulgaria, in Thessaly, or North of the Danube. They feel no need to say anything about the criteria by which, when interpreting the same texts, they decide if the focus is to lie on the ethnic or on the socio-professional meaning of the term.

In keeping with this totally arbitrary procedure, Vlachs are Romanians, when the aim is to prove that the Bulgarian Czardom included the Romanian territories lying North of the Danube, but they became Moesian Bulgarians, when the aim is to show that Romanians did not participate in the Asenid uprising and to deny the Romanian origin of the dynasty. Yet the sources for that period claim that the Asenids were Vlachs. Sometimes, indeed, there have been times when Bulgarian historians have simply avoided any reference to the word, Vlach, in regard to their territories, deleting it from the sources that they quote. One should also add that in Bulgarian academic studies, such distortions of the historical truth about Balkan Romanity could easily occur because of the poor development of Romanian studies in Bulgaria, a situation giving rise to similar exaggerations about the Romanian language and its Balkan dialects.

The views on Balkan Romanity that have been held by Yugoslav academics have been somewhat more flexible. On the one hand, they promoted studies in Romance languages through a school of linguistics the achievements of which have been impressive, as, for instance, in the case of the work of such a scholar as Petar Skok (1918). The Yugoslavs also developed a comprehensive school of Balkan historical geography – the so-called Jovan Cvijic School (1918) – which, in its turn, promoted a large number of field studies and a general open-mindedness in the approach to all research, including that focusing on ethnic minorities.

Unlike in Greece or in Bulgaria, the general academic level has been high, and the aspiration to objectivity, accordingly, strong. For Yugoslav scholars, Balkan Romanians are a linguistic, ethnographic, sociological, and historical concern, but not one that might necessarily be a point of divergence with Romanian historiography and linguistics or with other scientific/academic schools. Yugoslav academics have made an important contribution to the understanding of the role and the social, political, and legal status of the Vlachs in the currently extinct Western Romanian group. They have also made contributions to the study of Ottoman Empire Vlachs and of their status. In addition, they have made significant contributions to research on the Megleno-Romanian and Aromanian dialects. Serbian historian, Dušan Popović (1937), is the author of a memorable and, in its own way, exemplary work – *O Cincarima* – on the Aromanian role in the economic life of Serbia. He proved that, along with the Greeks, Aromanians played a critical role in the beginning of the modern history of Serbia, when the bourgeois economy emerged and began to develop. D. Popović is also the author of some outstanding pages on the Aromanian contribution to the development of all the Balkan peoples among whom they mixed and by whom the Aromanians were eventually assimilated. Finally, recent research on the Vlachs in Yugoslavia was assisted by the holding, periodically, of international symposia organized under the aegis of the Bosnian Academy.

However, there is a problem in the attempted solution of which even Yugoslav scholars have been somewhat influenced by a historiographical Romanticism pervaded by certain nationalist prejudices. This problem concerns the ethnic identity of the Vlachs in old Serbia as well as the semantic value of the term, Vlach, in medieval sources. All Yugoslav historians recognize references in the sources to the initial existence of certain Balkan Romanics called Vlachs. They agree that the very word, Vlach, is indicative of the Romanity of these old Balkan inhabitants.

Croatian historians, writing at the turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, such as Franjo Rački (1881), Vjekoslav Klaić (1897, 1899-1911, 1901), and Radoslav Lopašić (1890, 1894) claim that "Vlachs are native inhabitants, Latins or Romanized Illyrians, who underwent slavicization". Stojan Novaković recognizes the initial Romanic origin of Vlachs, but thinks that they were able to maintain this identity for only a very short time after the arrival of the Slavs. For P. Skok (1918), the Vlachs initially were Romanic shepherds living in hamlets. Milenko Filipović (1963), an outstanding ethnologist in present day Yugoslavia, also recognizes the existence of local Romanics, called Vlachs, who later underwent Slavicization when coming into contact with the Serbs. He asserts that they pervaded the toponymy with traces of their Romanity (1973, published 1983, p. 154). The contemporary researcher, Vasa Čubrilović (1983, pp. 153-154), gives the following definition of a Vlach:

In the first centuries when Slavs settled in the Balkans, a Vlach was somebody based in the Peninsula, who spoke a Romanic language

and usually lived in the mountains, where he raised cattle. Throughout the years, Vlachs spread all over the Peninsula and were subject to Slavicization.

But what most Yugoslav historians identify, when referring to the Vlachs mentioned in the Croat and Serbian medieval sources, are the Vlachs who are ascribed a status of their own in Yugoslav medieval political structures. Thus, these historians view Vlachs as a social category rather than as an ethnic group. Drawing upon his authority in Serbian modern history, S. Novaković (1891, 1911, 1912) launched and imposed the view that the name Vlach or *Vlaski* designated a people who inhabited the Balkans prior to the arrival of the Slavs. This name, he argued, was given to Balkan shepherds by the Goths or by other Germanic populations. The Serbs accepted the term and its "economic rather that ethnic" meaning as a sort of legacy. Novaković states that the word marks not so much the ethnic group as the condition and life style of nomadic shepherds, as opposed to that of settled farmers. According to him, in Serbian medieval documents, Vlachs are always perceived as shepherds and never as a non-Slavic ethnic group. Therefore he thinks that, as early as the Thirteenth Century, the word, Vlach, designated a social category irrespective of ethnic origin, rather than an ethnic group. Almost all Yugoslav historians have accepted this theory, even if some of them have added some critical caveats to it.

Yugoslav historians have not reached full consensus about the relationship between the Romanic population found by the Slavs and called Vlachs and the later social category, including Romanics, who did not undergo Slavicization and possibly other non-Romanic ethnic elements. Even the personal opinions of various students of this matter give proof of a certain evolution through time, reflecting greater or lesser degrees of hesitation. P. Skok (1918) and M. Filipović (1963) clearly state that the term, Vlach, in its socio-professional acceptation, was derived from Romanics by those Slavs who, while living by means of transhumant shepherding and carting, also had military duties as "*vojniks*". Turkologist, Branislav Djurdjev (1963, pp. 143-149), distinguishes between Slavicized Vlachs, in the Ottoman Empire, who were former Romanics, and Slav Vlachs, a social category with no Romanic origins. It is generally assumed that the disappearance of the ethnic meaning of the word, Vlach, happened before the Fourteenth Century and that there were few cases – only in certain regions – when it occurred at a later date.

The somewhat different positions of Yugoslav and of Bulgarian historical writing and historiography are also evident in the way that the former recognize the persistence, in parallel with a socio-professional meaning, of an ethnic significance in the word, Vlach. However, they limit this significance to regions outside the historical territory of medieval Serbia. For instance, they perceive the medieval Vlachs as Romanians. They also grant an ethnic significance to Vlachs from other groups than Western Romanians who formed social strata on Yugoslav soil.

Aromanians, for example, are recognized as ethnic Vlachs and are also known as *cincars*, unlike the others. The same goes for Istro-Romanians as well as for North-Danubian Romanians and their further ramifications in the Serbian Banat.

It is also necessary to mention that there were and still are in Yugoslav historical writing voices of scholars such as Ivan Božic (1983a, 1983b) who asserts the ethnic identity of Balkan Vlachs with Romanians, but views the Vlachs as a social category reflecting the mere survival of an organizational form typical of an ethnic group that was later denationalized. This view is shared by historians who, without questioning the socio-professional evolution of the word, Vlach, in the Yugoslav region, stress that this is a survival rather than an extension of meaning that entailed semantic mutation, *i.e.*, the complete Slavicization of Vlachs, to be more specific, at a time very close to the present. This view is compatible with other historical evidence, such as accounts written by foreign travellers in the Balkans.

To sum up, foreign scholars during the age of humanism who did research on Balkan Romanity reached an almost complete consensus that Balkan Romanians represented Balkan branches of the Romanian people, *i.e.*, people having a Romanic (Romance) unitary language and a common Thracian-Roman origin. Many scholars, even those in the Balkan Peninsula, perceived the neighbouring Vlachs as Romanians who must have come from ancient Dacia. However, in the Nineteenth Century, mainly because of certain ideological prejudices, the ethnic character of the Romanic origin and identity of Vlachs with the North-Danubian Romanians was more or less skilfully questioned. The efforts to do so involved source manipulation and tampering, as well as low level, albeit heated, arguments and disputes. The debate focused on the word, Vlach, as found in medieval sources in a way that denied its ethnic implications. Only socio-professional implications were accepted.

To prove this hypothesis, only two arguments have been used: the authority of Seventeenth Century Lucius Dalmata, who mentioned that, in his time, Vlachs had become a synonym for shepherd, but did not forget to specify the Romanic origin of a population predominantly channelled into a certain profession; the second argument is a vague indication left by Anna Comnena and taken out of its context, which seemed to authorize the identification of nomadic shepherds with the Vlachs. Two important points were ignored: the considerable Romanic population known as Vlachs, living in the Peninsula and speaking Romanian language dialects, as well as the whole mass of historical sources that attest the presence, until very recently, of a Balkan Romanian population in a region in which it can no longer be found today. One can also observe that in most cases, Balkan country historians who do recognize the ethnic relevance of the word, Vlach, do so only when designating regions in the Peninsula other than the real or ideal territories of their respective states. The Greeks, in the case of the Bulgarian Vlachs; the Serbs, in the case of the Bulgarian and the Greek Vlachs; the Bulgarians, in the case of the Greek Vlachs.

Moreover, nobody has ventured to explain the mystery by which the term *Vlach* or *Vlasis* was able to retain its ethnic designation, that was obviously undisputed in all Balkan languages, for the North-Danubian Romanians.

The narrowly nationalistic vision of research on Balkan Romanity has thus led to distortions of the objective truth. Objective truth can only be reached by going beyond this view and by examining the semantic value of the word, Vlach, in a general Balkan perspective. When juxtaposed, irrespective of their origins or categories, all sources – whether diplomatic or narrative, Eastern, Byzantine, or Western – speak with one voice and certify the unity of the Vlach phenomenon throughout the Peninsula and North of the Danube, *i.e.*, the space and time of the unity of Carpathian-Danubian-Balkan Romanity. The corroboration of historical with linguistic data, as well as with the results of interdisciplinary research, only strengthens this conclusion.

It is possible, easy, and desirable to find a way out of the deadlock created by the narrowly nationalist perspective of research on Balkan Romanity. This possibility is proven by the work of scholars who, living outside the Balkan Peninsula, were not influenced by old prejudices and political suspicions which, although historically explainable, are out of place. Good co-operation among all scholars in Balkan and non-Balkan countries is vital in order to carry out research on an ethnic group which, to a great extent and according to all indications, is about to become extinct. Drawing up a history of Balkan Romanity is not only a question of making a contribution to the history of the Balkan people, but also one of tracing the fate of the Roman factor in the history of the Peninsula. The role of this factor should provide both unity in diversity and a Balkan specificity.

B. THE "ROMANIAN PROBLEM" IN THE MIDDLE AGES – THE HISTORICAL MEANING OF THE KINGDOM OF VLACHS AND BULGARIANS

At the end of the Twelfth and into the beginning of the Thirteenth Century, Southeastern Europe became the theatre of fierce military and political conflicts during which the political map of the area experienced many sweeping changes. This period witnessed the crisis of Byzantine rule over the Balkan Peninsula, the dissolution of imperial authority, and the assertion of local political structures that were autonomous or even independent in regard to the central power of the *Basileus*. Byzantium was conquered and sacked in 1204 as a result of the Fourth Crusade. Constantinople thus became the center of a new empire – the Constantinople Latin Empire – that would last until 1261. At the same time, a number of Catholic and Western European (Frankish) political structures were durably established in the Balkan territories of the Byzantine Empire. Serbia made a powerful show of its vigour under the Nemanyids, developing as an independent state. But the most important event in Balkan history of that time was, of course, the restoration of the Bulgarian Czardom that had been destroyed by John Zimisces and Basil II

Bulgaroktonos at the end of the Tenth and the beginning of the Eleventh Centuries.

A former competitor of Byzantium, Bulgaria underwent a resurgence in Southeastern Europe, reaching the apogée of its power and of its territorial expansion under John Asen II (1218-1241). This Second Czardom lasted until the Ottoman conquest.

As part of the offensive of the Catholic West toward the East, the Hungarian Kingdom asserted not only its power, but also a clear tendency to expand in the Balkans, particularly to subjugate the Southern Slavs. Aroused by the resurgence of Bulgaria, which they actually helped bring about, the Cumans dominated the military scene in Southeastern Europe from an area North of the Danube. They threatened the whole Balkan Peninsula with devastating incursions until the middle of the Thirteenth Century, when their place was taken by the Tartars.

Romanians also played a part in these times of unrest. The end of the Twelfth and the beginning of the Thirteenth Centuries witnessed the first and the most significant political manifestation of the Romanian people before the Romanian feudal states were established in former Dacia. What is evoked by this statement is the series of actions that led to the restoration of the Bulgarian Czardom. It is known that the initiators of the insurrection that triggered the Bulgarian restoration were the leaders of a Balkan–Vlach–Romanian community of shepherds – three brothers, Peter and John Asen, and Ioniță (Kaloyan) - who rose up in 1185 against Byzantine rule because of its harsh fiscal policies and excessive centralism.

According to the documents of the time, the Balkan state established by the Asenids, as they are usually, albeit wrongly, named in works of historical writing, was known as the Kingdom of Bulgarians and Vlachs or, according to the official name given by the Pope, *Regnum Bulgarorum et Blacorum*. On 8 November 1204, Ioniță was crowned as Bulgarian and Romanian King (*rex Bulgarorum et Blacorum*) by Pope Innocent III, acting through Cardinal Leon de Santa Croce. On 7 November 1204, the same cardinal consecrated Basil of Târnovo as Primate of the Bulgarian and Romanian Church (*primas Bulgarorum et Blacorum ecclesiae*). The Romanian and Bulgarian Kingdom was a political and ethnic reality for the Western chroniclers of the time. The point at which this political structure turned into a Bulgarian Czardom (the second time such a thing happened), was relatively late, in 1241, the year of the death of John Asen II. At this point, references to Romanians were dropped, and they vanished from the spotlight.

Certain Bulgarian researchers, however, have not only denied the participation of Romanians in the events preceding the restoration of the Second Czardom, or their leading role in the anti-Byzantine insurrection which assisted the reestablishment of the Bulgarian state, but have questioned their very existence in the Balkan Peninsula. In opposition to a profusion of attestations and to the mentioning of Vlachs and Romanians in all the sources of the period, be they Byzantine, Western, or Eastern,

those who have opposed the idea of a Romanian contribution to the establishment of the Second Czardom have only been able to marshal one argument that has to be carefully considered.

According to this argument, the designations, "Vlach" and "Romanian", were not synonymous. "Vlach" was not an ethnic synonym for "Romanian", but a word with a socio-professional meaning, designating all Balkan shepherds, regardless of ethnic origin. Thus, the Vlachs were Bulgarian shepherds living in the North of the Balkan Peninsula, while *Vlachia* was the region they inhabited in the Northern part of Bulgaria. Carrying this argument further, the three brothers, Peter and John Asen, and Ioniță, were supposed to be Bulgarians, Bulgaro-Cumans, or, according to certain scholars, even Russian Cumans living in the Northern part of the Balkan Peninsula.

There have been very few cases in the analysis of historical evidence in which such a richly and clearly documented reality has been so grossly misconstrued through fallacious and/or sophistic interpretations, as in the case of Romanian participation in the establishment of the Second Bulgarian Czardom. Romanian and foreign researchers have proven without doubt that, in the Byzantine and Eastern European sources of the time, the term, *Vlach*, was an ethnonym, just like *Bulgarian*, *Cuman*, *Hungarian*, or *Greek*. To read the texts is to dispel any doubts in this regard. In fact, in all Byzantine sources (the most numerous) either predating the Thirteenth Century or in later texts, the word *Vlach* has an unquestionable ethnic meaning. Western and recently even Eastern (Arabic) sources emphatically confirm this reality. Whether one likes it or not, one has to accept the reality indicated by the sources: the Asenid uprising was started by Vlachs, that is, by Romanians.

If, in this respect, things are clear and are only contested because of inherited prejudices, ill will, or perversity, not to mention a lack of the sense of history, the geographic origin of the Asenids is more difficult to locate. The Southern limit of Asenid Vlachia, that Nicetas Choniates, using an archaizing term, calls Moesia, seems clearly to be the line of the Balkan Mountains, as attested by all contemporary sources. The description of military operations carried out by the Byzantine forces against the Vlachs and the Bulgarians as reflected in Byzantine sources and mainly in Nicetas Choniates's chronicle, as well as the description of military operations carried out by the Latins of Baldwin of Flanders, the Constantinople Emperor, against the Vlachs and the Cumans, as reflected in Western sources, especially in the writings of G. de Villehardouin and Robert de Clari, prove that beyond the range of the Balkan Mountains at the beginning of the Thirteenth Century, lay the country of the Vlachs.

It is more difficult, however, to establish the Northern border of Asenid rule. Did it reach across the Danube or dit it not? According to Byzantine sources, the safest and richest of which obviously is Nicetas Choniates's historical work, the Cumans lived North of the Danube and had even established their center here. Thus, one can infer from Choniates's text that Vlachs, *i.e.*, Romanians, could cross the Danube as allies of the

Cumans and thus bring support to the Asenids. Without questioning the Romanian presence under the barbarian suzerainty of the steppe Cuman knights, one can make do with this indication to conclude that the Asenid Vlachs were Balkan Vlachs who came from the Balkan Mountains and from the Moesian region lying between the Danube and the Haemus. The same sources allow one to conclude that the Western limit of the Asenid Vlachs was somewhere around Vidin, while their Eastern limit was the Black Sea coast. One cannot be certain that Vlachs were also living in Dobrudja and that the Asenids ruled over this region as well; however, Ansbertus, the chronicler of the Third Crusade, evokes the expansion of Asenid rule to "where the Danube flows into the sea" (Ansbertus, 1928, pp. 15-70). During the period of rule of John Asen II (1218-1241) and more specifically, at the apogée of his power, Dobrudja was not under his rule, as certified in the *Diploma of Privilege* he awarded to Ragusan merchants, in 1231. Attempts have been made by Romanian and foreign scholars such as Dimitre Onciul (1899, 1919-1920, 1968), Aloisiu Tăutu (1964), and Borislav Primov (1971) to place Asenid Vlachia North of the Danube, either in Oltenia, or in Banat and Oltenia, with a possible extension South of the river, but none of them have been able to marshal adequate evidence to prove such an allegation. Therefore, the historical events linked to the Second Bulgarian Czardom mainly and overwhelmingly involved the South-Danubian Romanians, the Balkan Vlachs, and not the North-Danubian Romanians or the Daco-Romanians, about whose participation there is a lack of any reliable evidence.

What was the position of the group of Asenid Romanians in the general picture of Eastern Romanity? Here as well, scholars have come up with different answers. They seem, however, to agree that the Asenid Romanians were a Romanic (Romanian, to be more specific) group which distinguished itself from the other known groups of Balkan Romanians. Consequently, they were different from the Istro-Romanians or the Western Balkan Romanians, from the Megleno-Romanians and also from Aromanians or the South-Balkan Romanians. According to Tache Papahagi (1932), they belonged to the same Romanian branch as the Daco-Romanians, for this learned linguist considered the Haemus to be the dividing line between Daco-Romanians and Aromanians. To other scholars, for instance, Theodor Capidan (1943, 1925-1928), and Petre P. Panaitescu (1969), the Asenid Romanians were the very likely ancestors of the Megleno-Romanians, for the latter moved South at a later date. Finally, S. Dragomir (1959) considers that the Asenid Romanians formed a unity with the Romanians in the Northwestern Balkan Peninsula. At any rate, scientists, linguists, and historians alike describe the Asenid Romanians as an intermediate link among Daco-Romanians.

As for the fate of the Asenid Romanians following the reestablishment of the Czardom after the mid-Thirteenth Century, when they disappeared from the written sources, some historians think that they were denationalized and assimilated by a predominant Bulgarian population that dominated all the state and cultural traditions in the Czardom. Other

scholars, such as George Murnu (1984) and more recently, George Ivănescu (1980), believe that the Asenid Romanians emigrated North of the Danube to join the Daco-Romanians who had been living in that area for centuries. This hypothesis, which was introduced into Romanian historiography by G. Murnu (1984 ed.) and was only superficially studied by his successors, lacks neither interest nor verisimilitude. Its argument seems thorough and in concordance with the logic of events.

After Thrace had been conquered by the Byzantine forces, and grounds for a conflict with the Second Bulgarian Czardom established, the Haemus Romanians are thought to have been no longer able to take their flocks of sheep to the rich Thracian pastures for the winter. Thus, they allegedly began to migrate to the Walachian plain and ended by remaining there. But again, this proposal is a mere hypothesis, with no specific documentary evidence to support it.

The movement of the Asenids is expressive of the interests held by a Romanian group in the Byzantine Empire. The sources enable the development of a plausible explanation of the phenomenon. At the origin of the Asenid rebellion was the abusiveness of the Byzantine taxation system, namely an attempt to impose special taxes on Balkan Romanian shepherds. According to Choniates, the need for these taxes was triggered by the huge expenses incurred for the wedding of Emperor Isaac II Angelus with the daughter of the Hungarian King, Bela IV. A better explanation, however, is to be found in the heavy military expenses of an Empire forced to fend off the Normans. Viewed from this angle, the Asenid uprising falls into a tradition linked to a constant of the relationships between the Vlachs and the Byzantine authorities.

The Romanians had always attempted to oppose the fiscal demands of the Empire. In 1066, in an act of solidarity with the Bulgarians and the Greeks in the region, Romanians in the Thessalian city of Larissa rose up against the fiscal abuses of Constantinople. The resulting rebellion, a very serious one, ended up being led, albeit unwillingly, by the *archon* (governor) and *strategos* (general) Niculitsa, Governor of Hellas, who had actually been ordered to crush it. In 1094, Vlach shepherds in the region of Moglena, seemingly instigated by the Cumans, refused to pay any money to the Lavra Athonite Monastery to which Emperor Alexius I Comnenus had farmed out the collection of taxes in the area. A source dating back to the end of the Thirteenth Century speaks of bloodshed during a conflict between the Vlachs in the Boleron Theme and imperial revenue agents (Maximos Planudes, *in*, N.-Ş. Tanaşoca, 1974). According to Georgios Pachymeris, large numbers of well-off Thracian Vlachs in the Fourteenth Century who owned fine houses and many sheep were dispossessed by the Emperor and forcibly moved to Asia Minor in a massive colonization effort motivated by fear of an impending Tartar invasion and anticipation that the Romanians would side with the invaders.

The anti-Byzantine response of the Romanians was not simply a question of a typical conflict arising in opposition to the imperial fiscal

system. In order to understand the problem, it is necessary to understand the status of the Romanians inside the Byzantine Empire. By the very nature of their principal occupation, namely the transhumant herding of sheep, the Vlachs usually lived in the mountains and were considerably more mobile than the rest of the population as a direct consequence of their principal economic activity. Their freedom was accompanied by certain privileges granted by the imperial power, which are now coming to be better known thanks to sources derived from the Serbian and the Ottoman chancelleries (N.-Ş. Tanaşoca and A. Tanaşoca, 1989) that prove the existence of a number of very old Byzantine practices.

Because of the degree of autonomy of the Vlachs, Benjamin of Tudela, writing in the Twelfth Century, called them "*abasileutoi*", *i.e.*, persons who were not the Emperor's subjects. Vlachs were recognized as members of patriarchal communities of shepherds with their own local governments and administrations, as well as, within certain limits, their own jurisdictional powers. Their chieftains had managed to distinguish themselves – through their wealth and power – from the rest of the community and had created a type of aristocracy. Since the Vlachs were permitted to graze their sheep on state pastures, they were required to pay certain taxes directly to the Emperor, but were exempt from other fiscal obligations toward the Byzantine state. Similar practices could be found in Serbia and in the Ottoman Empire involving, not only implied specific taxes of the kind studied by Germaine Rouillard (1933), but also military obligations in regard to the state. More precisely, the Vlachs were expected to guard the mountains to which access was difficult. They were reputed for their military skills, which was why they frequently joined the Byzantine army and were thought to be extremely reliable. To them, serving as soldiers was not only a duty in regard to the Empire, but also a clear sign of privileged status.

Sources refer to large numbers of Vlachs having joined the Byzantine Army. In 979, Emperor Basil II appointed Niculitsa "Commander (*Archon*) of the Hellas Vlachs" (Kekaumenos), a title suggesting that his command was actually a military one. At the beginning of the Eleventh Century, Vlachs were mentioned in the Bari *Annals* as soldiers and warriors in the troops of Emperor Constantine VIII, in Sicily. In 1166, during his campaigns against Hungary, Manuel I Comnenus made use of the Vlachs incorporated in General Leon Vatatzes's army (Ioannes Cinnamus, *in*, A. Meineke, ed., 1836). They had been recruited from the very region in which the Asenid uprising would burst twenty years later. It was a Vlach leader who informed Emperor Alexius I Comnenus that the Cumans had crossed the Danube. The same Emperor conscripted a large number of Vlachs (most of whom were shepherds) on the eve of the Battle of Lebounion against the Petchenegs, at the end of the Eleventh Century (*in*, Comnène, *Alexiade*).

Returning to the Asenids and to what occurred in 1185 in the Balkans, one discovers from reading Nicetas Choniates that Peter and John Asen and their Vlach entourage evoked the fiscal demands made by Emperor

Isaac II Angelus as a sort of "*Patroclus's pretext*" to rebel against Byzantine authority. They claimed a degree of autonomy and hoped to join the Byzantine forces in their struggle against the Normans. But such an alliance required the recognition of the Vlach fiscal and administrative privileges in regard to the Empire along with their military duties, all being part and parcel of their traditionally privileged status. Despite being at war with the Normans, Isaac II rejected the Vlach position and attitude as insolent. The Emperor's lack of wisdom facilitated the spread of the uprising, even though some of the decision-makers at Court, including Nicetas Choniates, later the Governor of Philippopolis, thought that the requests of the Vlachs should have received a favourable response. Thus one can conclude that the dissatisfaction of the Asenids and their rebellion against Byzantine authority were consistent with the traditional interests of the Balkan Romanians. It can therefore be explained as the response to an attempt on the part of the imperial power to jeopardize their interests.

Although the Comnenoi had recognized the privileged status of the Vlachs, the resulting understanding was violated by Emperor Isaac II Angelus representing a governing structure the actions of which were more rigorously centralized and the fiscal policy of which proved to be harsh and burdensome to a great extent as the result of its egalitarian approach.

Was Asenid Vlachia a political reality? Except for D. Onciul (1899, 1919-1920), who wrongly placed it North of the Danube, most researchers have either not come up with a clear answer to this question or have given no answer at all. To repeat some opinions that were expressed in previous studies (N.-Ş. Tanaşoca, 1981; N.-Ş. Tanaşoca and A. Tanaşoca, 1994), it can be said that, at the end of the Twelfth Century, Asenid Vlachia was a political reality. It was one of those areas of Vlach autonomy mentioned in the Byzantine sources of the time and referred to in various Balkan regions of the Empire. Thus, it is known that, as early as the end of the Tenth Century, the Byzantine province of Hellas, was a Vlach "*mark*" or "*captainship*", as Grigore Ureche called it. Its ruler was Niculitsa, a high Byzantine official, an *archon* of Greek or – according to G. Murnu (1939) – Romanian origin. Another place called Vlachia, a so-called *toparchy*, is identified by Nicetas Choniates in the same Thessalian region, at the beginning of the Thirteenth Century. It developed autonomously in relation both to Byzantium and the Latin Empire and was finally conquered by the Epirote state. It is not difficult to see in this new "*toparchy*" an updated form of the old Vlach "*mark*" mentioned by Kekaumenos. Thessalian Vlachia later became the so-called Greater Vlachia, a genuine principality enjoying a relative degree of autonomy within the Byzantine Empire.

Other examples of Balkan Vlachias that can be identified from the sources are the Rodope Vlachia, the ruler of which was Dobromir Chrysos, an ally and friend of the Asenids, as well as Little Vlachia and Upper Vlachia, mentioned by the Byzantine chroniclers of the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks. These entities are described as fully submitted regions that had actually surrendered to conquest. Western sources have confirmed the evolution of these *Vlachias* toward

autonomous organization. Feudal principalities developed, the establishment of which was obviously facilitated through the grant of a truly autonomous organization according to a vision and a practice that were brought to the Balkans by Western, Latin, conquerors. The distinction made in Ioniţă's title, as granted by Pope Innocent III, tends to support the idea of a Western outlook. The distinction that it makes between Vlachia and Bulgaria as separate territorial and political realities further attests the advance, from the political point of view, of the Balkan Romanian shepherd communities toward autonomous organization. This period was one of political maturation for the Romanian communities of the Balkan Peninsula.

The evolution of the South Danubian forms of independent political life has to be linked to the general evolution of all Romanian communities, both North and South of the Danube, in this same direction. Just as in the case of the North Danubian political structures led by *knezes* and voivodes, the Southern Asenid Vlachs, like the other Balkan Vlachs, tended to evolve in the direction of independent political life. From this point of view, the Asenid movement is illustrative of a pan-Romanian tendency, an inner trend of the Romanian world throughout Southeastern Europe. The appearance of the Asenid state is the first manifestation of this pan-Romanian tendency, mentioned in historic documents, to develop an independent political life.

There is reason to believe that, at the start of the Asenid movement, the minimal political objectives of the two brothers, Peter and John Asen, were the possibility of organizing an autonomous political life for a significant group of Romanians living in the Northern parts of the Balkan Peninsula, in peaceful association with Byzantium. According to Choniates's description of the events and to the way in which the Asenid state is presented in the works of the French chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade and even in the narration of Frederick Barbarossa's chroniclers (Ansbertus, Magnus Presbyter, etc.), the Asenids did not move South of the line of the Balkans, considering it to be the border of their Vlachia and defending it as such. The rulers were viewed as Kings of Vlachia rather than as Bulgarian czars. The fact that they raided South of the mountain border in joint operations with the Cumans had only a strategic value and did not prove any expansionist tendencies. Not only Peter and John Asen, but even their brother, Ioniţă, who was crowned by the Pope as "King of the Romanians and Bulgarians", were perceived in the Western mind as Vlach princes of a Romanian state. It was only the fierce opposition of the Court of Emperor Isaac II *Angelus* to any recognition of the "*toparchy*" of Peter and John Asen in Moesia that encouraged a tendency for the scope of the uprising to spread and to hasten the separation from the Empire, thus laying the basis for the restoration of the Bulgarian Czardom.

According to Byzantine sources and mainly to the rhetorical literature produced during the Angelus Dynasty, there were two trends of opinion among the Vlach rulers. The first of these, represented by Peter Asen, favoured retention of autonomy, once it was acquired. The second,

illustrated by John Asen, was to be tempted by the imperial chimera himself.

Here it is necessary to stress that the latter tendency prevailed, first because the imperial court rejected the minimal Vlach claims and only then because the Bulgarian imperial ideology and the Cuman allies favoured conquest and plunder. Thus, the Byzantine mentality pervading the lives of the South-Danubian Vlachs and the decision of the latter to associate themselves with the Bulgarians, who had their own state, ecclesiastic, and cultural traditions, and then to make common cause with the Cumans are the reasons for the evolutionary split between Asenid Vlachia and the North-Danubian Vlachs and the eventual extinction of the former and their assimilation into the Bulgarian population, during the Second Bulgarian Czardom.

There was little room, if any, in the Byzantine political tradition, for genuine political autonomy. From its inception, the Byzantine absolutist vision of political power prevented the existence of autonomous centers of power that were strictly delimited from a territorial and ethnic perspective. Similarly, this vision prevented the emergence of a legal opposition, however much limited to certain domains of life. Opposition could only take the form of an imperial competition with the central power, the opponents being forced to proclaim themselves Emperors in order to legitimize their quest for autonomy. They either replaced the incumbent Emperor, or they perished.

At the political and state level, the major sign of independence was the co-existence of an Emperor and a Patriarch. According to the Byzantine vision, the Emperor could not exist without the Patriarch, as the Church was closely linked to the state. When Niculitsa assumed the leadership of the Larissa uprising, he was cheered by the rebels with phrases intended for the Emperor. He was viewed as a prospective emperor, one very keen on establishing at least a local empire. As others before him, and because he did not seek the Constantinople throne, Niculitsa could reach an agreement, a compromise, with the central authority.

Indeed, this period was characterized by strong centrifugal tendencies within the Byzantine world. When, later on, the Asenid movement began as a Romanian manifestation of this tendency, it ended up as a typical Bulgarian-Romanian manifestation. The same can be said of the Greek *archons* who, detaching themselves from Constantinople, aimed to establish small empires: the Salonika Empire, created by the Epirus Despots, the Trebizond Empire, that would last for some time, and the Nicaea Empire, which would assist the resurrection of Byzantium and the return of its capital to Constantinople. As demonstrated by Nikolaos Oikonomides (1976), all these political structures arose from rebellion and local secessionist movements directed against Constantinople.

In 1185, when the Balkan Vlach ruler, Peter Asen, decided in favour of red footwear and a tiara, he implicitly proclaimed a local empire. The imperial streak characterizing the Asenids, the result of the Byzantine political mentality in which they had been nurtured, explains incessant

claims and demands made to Westerners, by the dynasty and the family, including Peter and Ioniță, that their imperial title be recognized and that their state be granted the right to have a patriarch and a patriarchate. This attitude is not one of "imperialism", but rather an expression of the need to secure independence by the choice of political forms typical of the world in which they lived. The first Asenids wanted to be *basileis*, not necessarily in order to replace the *Basileus* in Constantinople, but to make sure that their independence from him was warranted and, if possible, approved by him.

A difficulty arose, however, because the only form of *basileia* or empire that Byzantium had been forced to recognize for centuries past was the Bulgarian Czardom. The Czardom, led by Boris-Mihail, Simeon, and Samuel, had been recognized by the Empire and had had a patriarchate of its own. A Bulgarian imperial ideology existed as a faithful copy of the Byzantine ideology. There had been a Bulgarian state and an ecclesiastic tradition that could not be erased from Balkan consciousness by the destruction of the Bulgarian Czardom at the hands of John Zimisces and Basil II *Bulgaroktonos*. Resorting to Bulgarian help, the Asenids resuscitated this imperial tradition that conferred legitimacy, an historical precedent, and the memory of a better status both for Romanians and for Bulgarians. Joining hands with the Bulgarians, the Romanians not only had an ally in terms of military and human resources, but also – more importantly – an ideology and the moral and political support of a spiritual doctrine and tradition. What led the Romanians to restore the Second Czardom was not a "Bulgarian" national sentiment, but the need to legitimize their own aspirations to independence and to give a larger scope to their movement in opposition to the lack of understanding of the Byzantine authorities. At the same time, however, by this resuscitation of the ghost of Samuel's state, the Asenids, according to Nicetas Choniates's texts, wished to stress that "God [had] decided to give freedom [to the] Bulgarians and Romanians", with a clear distinction made between the two ethnic groups, and that their action envisaged "the union of the two rules, Vlach and Bulgarian, into a single one, as it used to be".

The Asenids were thus sufficiently scrupulous to envisage a somewhat federal state (to have recourse to modern terminology) for Romanians and Bulgarians alike, even if they derived its prototype – rightly or wrongly – from the past. In other words, the Asenids were careful to secure the autonomy of their own Vlachia. It should nevertheless be made clear that the result would have been very different if the Asenid uprising had been nothing more than the expression of Bulgarian aspirations to acquire national freedom and to restore their own imperially derived Bulgarian state.

The maximal political agenda of the Asenids aimed, therefore, at a restoration of the Bulgarian Czardom in such conditions as to warrant the carrying out of their minimal political agenda, *i.e.*, the autonomy of Vlachia. In this way, the Asenid state ideology expressed the converging interests of the Romanians and of the Bulgarians. Although this ideology

was a repetition and resuscitation of the ideology of the First Czardom, it also reflected a new specific edifice, whereby an original Romanian corpus of political thinking and a spiritual tradition made themselves felt.

This ideology, that was, at the same time, a theoretical support and a means of legitimization for the new state, evolved over the years and eventually adopted the classic ideological pattern of the first Bulgarian Czardom that had inspired it. This evolution was influenced by the inner changes characterizing the state and by the new international context in which it took place. The increasing numbers of Bulgarians who lived in the new state, the ending of the union with Rome, and the re-Byzantinization of the Vlach and Bulgarian Church were factors that changed not only the ideology of the state, but its political substance as well.

It should come as no surprise that the Asenid brothers wished to restore the Bulgarian Czardom, in spite of their Romanian origins. Even after the first Bulgarian Czardom had been done away with, in 1018, by Emperor Basil II *Bulgaroktonos*, and the Northern, border of the Byzantine Empire, brought back to the Danube, the Bulgarian imperial idea continued to be a watchword of rebellion, capable of bringing together not only Bulgarians, but many other Balkan inhabitants who were unhappy with the vicissitudes of perceived Byzantine oppression. Interestingly enough, there were cases when a foreigner, not a Bulgarian, would raise the flag and attempt to restore the Czardom.

The first anti-Byzantine movement which began as an evocation of the Bulgarian idea was that of Peter Deljan (1040-1041). Its outburst was primarily the result of the high level of taxation by the Byzantine authorities when John the *Orphanotrophe*, the Minister of Emperor Michael IV *Paphlagonian*, decided to change the orders left by Emperor Basil II (which were tolerant toward the Bulgarians) and to demand that the tribute to Byzantium no longer be paid in money, but in kind. At the same time, the 1037 replacement of the Slavic Ohrid Metropolitan Bishop by a Greek bishop, named Leo, bred further discontent, for this act represented a new violation of the status granted to Bulgarians by Basil II.

Peter Deljan claimed descent from Czar Samuel, as the son of his successor, Gabriel Radomir. He proclaimed himself Czar in 1040, in Belgrade. Although at the start of this uprising, Alousianos, the son of John Vladislav, the last Bulgarian Czar, supported Deljan, he later turned against Deljan, captured and blinded him, and surrendered him to the Byzantine authorities. Alousianos had escaped from Constantinople where he had been living as a high ranking hostage and had joined Deljan before betraying him.

Peter Deljan's uprising gives proof of the Bulgarian commitment to the old dynasty, while suggesting the latent power of the Bulgarian state ideology as a support to Balkan (not necessarily Bulgarian) rebellion against Byzantium.

Another important uprising took place in 1073. It was led by a Bulgarian, George Voitech. It was particularly supported by the Serbs. Constantine Bodin (Peter), the son of Prince Mikhail of Zeta, proclaimed

himself Czar in Prizren and took the imperial name of Peter. This uprising was linked to the efforts of the Serbs to free themselves from Byzantine tutelage. It reflected the role that the ideology of the Bulgarian Czardom could play in bringing together Balkan ethnic groups. Almost at the same time, Demetrius Zvonimir was recognized by Pope Gregory VII as King of Croatia, while Mikhail, Bodin's father had received Zeta's crown from the same pontifical hands (1076-1077). This appeal to the ideology of czardom was a characteristic of Balkan uprisings meant to confer legitimacy to such movements. At the same time, the government in the old Bulgarian Czardom had been less centralist and oppressive than that of Byzantium.

On the other hand, it is necessary to observe that, as R. L. Wolff (1949) points out, the capacity of the Bulgarian political initiative had severely decreased prior to the Asenid uprising. An important factor in this direction was the partial Hellenization of that segment of the Bulgarian aristocracy that had survived the collapse of Samuel's state and the existence of which artfully blended in with the general interests of the Byzantine Empire. In its turn, the Bulgarian Church gradually passed into the hands of Greek or Hellenized clergy. This situation caused such a reputed historian as Vasil Zlatarski (1933, 1934, 1940) to define the period before 1185 as an age of Hellenization in Bulgarian medieval history.

At this point, it is appropriate to mention that no Bulgarian rebellions appear to have occurred under the Comneni, and that the Eleventh Century movements (except for those already mentioned, evoking Bulgarian imperial aspirations) took place as the result of other inspirations – mainly heretical religious ideas – and were not led by Bulgarians. As an example, the Paristrium cities rebelled for tax-related reasons between 1072 and 1080. Although the *vestarch*, Nestor, very likely a Serb, was sent to crush the rebellion, he ended up leading it. Even if this rebellion sprang from local discontent with the administration, the rebellion of the Paristrium cities had nothing to do with the Bulgarian imperial idea, in spite of the obvious participation of a number of Bulgarians living in the area. The Philippopolis Paulicians, led by Traulos, in the North of the Balkan Peninsula, decided to make common cause with the Petcheneg rule on the North side of the Danube because the rebels chose to side with these "Scythian barbarians". Another uprising in the same period (1070-1080) brought together Philippopolis Greeks and Bulgarians led by the Greek, Lekas, with the same Petcheneg support and in the name of the same Paulician heresy that was directed against Constantinople. Simultaneously, and to some extent in concordance with Lekas's rebels, the Bulgarian, Dobromir, rebelled in Mesembria against the authority of the Byzantine state and church.

None of these rebellions, however, were of any help in the reassertion of the Bulgarian imperial idea. Their single result was that they favoured the expansion of the Petchenegs, by weakening the Byzantine state and the unity of the Orthodox Church. Finally, the 1066 Larissa movement, started by Greeks, Bulgarians, and Vlachs, and eventually led by its alleged suppressor, Niculitsa, was yet another case of a rebellion that did not

strive to proclaim the restoration of the second Bulgarian Czardom, even though certain researchers have claimed the contrary, despite the lack of adequate documentary evidence. The Vlachs appear to have played the main part in this rebellion, as they were the key target of chronicler Kekaumenos's conformist indignation. However, the Larissa rebels had had certain direct links with the Bulgarian Czar Samuel, to whom Niculitsa, the father of the *Archon* and *Strategos* of the same name, had surrendered the Serbian fortress. It is therefore possible to conclude that Bulgarians took part in rebellions led by other Balkan malcontents, without necessarily aiming to restore their Czardom.

While the Bulgarian initiative in anti-Byzantine actions decreased in the Thirteenth Century, Vlach initiatives increased considerably. After the collapse of Samuel's state, Romanians started to be seen in the light of history and of Byzantine political expectations. The latter took good care to distinguish them from the Bulgarians by means of a suitable policy. Thus, from the very beginning and immediately after he had re-conquered Macedonia, Basil II recognized the Bulgarian Church and established a separate diocese for "the Vlachs all over Bulgaria", the Episcopal seat of which was Vranje. The obvious purpose of this step was to undo the likely union of the Vlachs and the Bulgarians, to separate Romanians from the Slavo-Bulgarian Church, and to encourage their independent assertion in regard to the Bulgarians. The same could be said about the way in which the Vlachs in the Hellas Theme, previously occupied by the Bulgarians, organized themselves into an autonomous "captainship".

This study has previously referred to a number of events in which Vlachs took part as soldiers supporting the Byzantine military and political forces. When speaking of the Byzantine policy of dissociating the Vlachs from the Bulgarians, which must have been implemented over a fairly long period, it is also necessary to recall that Samuel's brother, David, was killed by Vlachs near Castoria and Prespa. Very likely, the Vlachs in question acted on orders from Constantinople, the Byzantine authorities feeling that the establishment of a Bulgarian state would block the trade route between the Adriatic and the Aegean and thus set back Byzantine interests.

Twelfth Century Romanians, therefore, had the power and the capacity to lead an anti-Byzantine movement, as proved by the Larissa rebellion in 1066. Privileged under the Comneni, when provoked by the Angeli, they turned into rebellious elements from the political and military point of view. But did they have any grounds for making common cause with the Bulgarians? Were they able to give a new life to the Balkans as well? The answer is yes. As Goerge Murnu (1984) points out, the Romanian-Bulgarian solidarity was as old as the beginnings of the first Bulgarian state. The very birth of the Romanian people was determined by the breakaway of the Latin-speaking Roman citizens of Southeastern Europe from the body of an empire which accordingly became Greek. The name, Vlach, ascribed to Romanians in medieval sources, proves, on the one hand, that they preserved their Romanic individuality, and on the other

hand, that they joined the Slavs, particularly the Bulgarians, to such a great extent that they returned to the boundaries and went under the authority of the Empire. The latter, no longer wanting to recognize them, now perceived them as being a barbarian race.

The alienation of the Romanians from the Byzantine Empire and their "barbarization" became a reality that was only strengthened by their affiliation with the Slavo-Bulgarian cultural area and the way in which they adopted a degree of "cultural Slavism". Like G. Murnu, the author of this study believes that a certain looseness in the political régime of the first Bulgarian state, a less oppressive centralism than that of the Byzantine Empire, and a certain tolerance facilitated Romanian solidarity with the Bulgarians. The memory of a common past, a set of shared interests in a confrontation with the Twelfth Century Byzantine taxation system, and some common traditions of anti-Byzantine resistance, such as the aforementioned 1066 Larissa rebellion, undoubtedly brought Romanians close to Bulgarians. This situation explains not only their alliance against Constantinople, but also their wish to restore the old Bulgarian Czardom, this time through the action of a Vlach aristocratic family.

After failing in their attempt to receive recognition from the Byzantine rulers, the Vlachs looked for Western support in their bid for freedom. They first approached Frederick Barbarossa and asked for recognition of their Empire in exchange for specific assistance to him against Byzantium. The Emperor turned down this offer, not wishing to start a conflict with Byzantium. He was trying to remain at peace, in spite of all the vexations to which he was being subjected. Nevertheless, Vlach military assistance was important to the participants in the Third Crusade in the consequence-free conflict that opposed the latter to Byzantium at a certain point. For the Western chronicler, Magnus Presbyter, the perception that "the Vlachs are on our side" was proof of a guarantee of military power. Later, they turned to Rome and to Pope Innocent III, who helped them – as is well known – to obtain recognition for their state and to integrate it into the political world order.

Rome and the powerful Innocent III intended to set the Balkan balance into an easily controllable structure. The establishment of the Romanian-Bulgarian kingdom was one of the factors included in this new balance formula favoured by the Papacy. What Innocent III wanted was not only to convert the Romanians and Bulgarians to Catholicism and to achieve a religious union with Rome, but also to consolidate the Western political front through the crowning of Ioniță, an act obviously implying the creation of a Catholic kingdom directly dependent on the pontifical seat. In this way, the Asenid political structure would no longer be controlled by Byzantium, but would fall into the orbit of the Latin Empire, which was on the verge of replacing the Byzantine Empire, and of a Hungary, the expansionist tendencies of which were pushing it to claim suzerainty over the Balkan Peninsula including the Bulgarian and finally the Serbian Kingdoms.

Because Pope Innocent III wished to preserve the Byzantine Empire and to unite the Byzantine Orthodox and the Catholic Churches, he spared the Byzantine state up to the point when, because of the Venice-inspired anti-Byzantine deviation of the Fourth Crusade, the Latin conquest made possible the existence of a new, Latin, Empire. Only after the fall of Constantinople, in 1204, did Innocent III agree to recognize the Bulgaro-Vlach state, disregarding its wish to acquire imperial status and to reach a compromise on ideological grounds. Thus papal recognition was granted to a state which thought of itself as an empire.

For the Pope, the Asenid state was a reliable instrument meant to deter the imperialist aspirations of the Constantinople Latin Empire. For this reason, during the 1205 conflict between the Latins and the Asenids, Innocent III sided with the latter, even though he took care to remind them that any attempt to restore the Bulgarian Empire at the expense of the Latin Empire would be severely repressed. On the other hand, as he had recognized the Nemanyid kingdom, he similarly opposed any tendency of the Asenid state to incorporate Serbia. Finally, Innocent III firmly and even harshly repressed the imperialist temptation of the Hungarian kingdom which, in the name of some illusory rights, tried to turn the Asenid state into a vassal of its own, even going as far as to confront the pontifical power and to arrest its envoy, the cardinal, who would crown Ioniță.

Papal policy proved to be efficient. During the rule of Boril (1207-1218), Ioniță's successor, the Romanian-Bulgarian Kingdom kept to its limits as established by the Papacy, contributed to the eradication of Bogomilism, and fell into step with the offensive of Rome against dualist heresies, refraining from any kind of conflict with the Latin Empire and Hungary and from providing any support to the Cumans, who were threatening not only the Balkan Peninsula, but Western Europe as well. It was only when John Asen II (1218-1241), Boril's successor, definitively severed all links with the Roman Church that the Papacy allowed the Hungarian kingdom to combat it and to bring it back under the control of Rome. But even then, all the attempts the old Czar made in order to get closer to the Catholic Church, once again, were firmly discouraged.

The support of Rome meant a great deal to the Romanians. It is clear that their place in the new state, the Romanian-Bulgarian Kingdom, was only recognized as long as they preserved their unity with the Roman church. The formula of ethno-political dualism, which was officially sanctioned by Rome, was meant to support and preserve Romanian Romanity within a Bulgaro-Slav traditional state. It was not a mere coincidence that Rome constantly encouraged the assertion of Romanian Romanity, as proven by the correspondence between Ioniță and Innocent III. For the first time in history, the Romanity of Romanians, their Roman origins, became a critical hallmark, a political idea, as well as a diplomatic tool. This idea, that was an important element at the origins of the Second Czardom, not only represented an original Romanian contribution in terms of a new synthesis of the ideology of the first Bulgarian state and the Romanian sense of Romanity, but was also viewed as having arisen as a

result of the contact of Romanians with Rome. Its immediate effect was a reawakening of consciousness related to the national, Romanic, and European identity of the Vlachs. The return of John Asen II to Byzantine Orthodoxy quickly resulted in a return to the Bulgarian imperialism of the First Czardom and to Slavism. Moreover, it determined the abandonment of the perception of the value of Romanity and implicitly undermined the grounds for the preservation of Romanian nationality within the reborn Bulgarian Czardom.

It can, however, be shown that one of Ioniță's arguments in favour of the legitimization of his claim to rule over the Bulgarian Czardom was his descent from former Czars, Peter and Samuel. Yet, the first thing that should be noticed regarding his letters to the Pope is that he cited these rulers as his predecessors, rather than as his ancestors. Secondly, even admitting that Ioniță had claimed descent from the Bulgarian imperial family, doing so was a common practice for the time. As already indicated, both Deljan and Bodin did exactly the same thing for purposes of legitimacy. Third, one should notice, as Gheorghe I. Brătianu (1945) did, that the Asenid appeal to allegedly Bulgarian imperial origins sprang from the common efforts of themselves and of the Papacy to counter Hungarian claims to suzerainty over Bulgaria.

Historians have considered the claim that Pope Nicholas I crowned some former Bulgarian czars simply in order to bring justification and legitimacy to the new political structure in the Balkan Peninsula, to be doubtful. One can correctly assume that this dynastic legend was fabricated in Rome rather than in Târnovo. How could Ioniță have found old books "proving" his royal descent in the archives of the former Czar, two centuries after the First Czardom had been destroyed by the Byzantine forces? Nevertheless, the appeal to this Bulgarian origin that was not necessarily unlikely and perhaps occurred along the maternal line, according to Nicolae Iorga (1919, 1937), as well as the mentioning of the links between the old kingdom and Rome, which had been unquestionably real, acted as elements of Bulgarian tradition in the ideology of the second Bulgarian Czardom.

What was the role and the meaning of Romanian-Cuman collaboration during that period? Obviously, without Cuman support, the Romanian-Bulgarian state could not have asserted itself in the international arena. Suffice it to go over both Byzantine and Western chronicles to realize the critical importance of the alliance with this powerful force of steppe knights for Romanians and Bulgarians alike. The Cuman cavalry terrified the Byzantines and the Latins, and the Cumans acted as a shock weapon for the Romanian-Bulgarian state. By inviting the Cumans to cross the Danube, the Asenids posed a serious problem not only to Byzantium, but also to Europe itself. They opened the borders of the civilized world to the devastating charges of these Eurasian steppe knights, thus paving the way for the last great extra-European invasion before that of the Tartars.

It is obvious that this collaboration between Balkan Romanians and the Cumans was nothing more than a South-Danubian ramification of an even

older Cumano-Romanian "symbiosis" that had been the main feature of North-Danubian Romanian life in the Twelfth and the Thirteenth Centuries. Under Cuman "protection", the same Romanian pattern of existence began to manifest itself South as well as North of the Danube. Even the Turkic names of the Asenids, as well as the name of the Romanian Bassarab Dynasty, proved the existence of a Romanian-Cuman "symbiosis", also attested in other forms that are more obvious and explicit. We know, for instance, that the Asenids had come close to the Cuman chieftains through marital links. These acted as guarantees for a brotherhood of arms in which each party had different goals. Both for the South-Danubian as well as for the North-Danubian Romanians, the Cuman element decidedly represented a burden, as well as an element of "barbarization" and of historical involution. Byzantine chronicles provide a sufficiently clear account of the ways in which the Cumans interfered in the domestic affairs of the restored Czardom. Always eager to plunder either Byzantine or Latin lands, the Cumans pushed for an aggressive and offensive policy which often enough exceeded Romanian and Bulgarian intentions. It was they who stimulated the "imperialist" trend in the Asenid state policy.

There are indications that a pro-Cuman party existed in Târnovo. In as far as two of the three brothers were concerned, Peter Asen seems to have represented the pro-Byzantine and moderate trend, while John Asen chose the pro-Cuman direction. It matched his temperament that was prone to excesses. As for Ioniță, his death during the siege of Salonika actually seems to have been an execution, a punishment carried out by the pro-Cuman party in response to his attempt to reestablish peace. It was no coincidence that, of all Ioniță's successors, it was John Asen II, the spokesman of Bulgaro-Byzantine imperialism, who came back from exile among the Cumans to seize the throne with Cuman support.

After John Asen II had returned to Orthodoxy and as he promoted the ideology of the old Bulgarian Czardom in its extreme form, causing him to claim Byzantium itself, the Bulgar-Vlach King took the title of "Czar of the Bulgarians and the Greeks". In his own new spirit, John Asen II rewrote the very history of the beginnings of the Asenid movement and of his state. As a son of Niculitsa, he attempted to exaggerate the contribution of the latter and to turn him into the initiator of the 1185 insurrection, while diminishing Peter Asen's role, even though written sources clearly indicate that Peter was the first Asenid czar. According to John Asen II, whose name is also linked to the development of a Slavic intellectual life in the Second Czardom, it was John Asen, and not Peter Asen, who founded the state and started the rebellion against the Greeks. In the same spirit, any mention of a union with Rome disappeared, as later happened to any hint of Romanian Romanity, of Vlachs, and finally of Romanians as such.

The Second Czardom definitely overlapped symbolically with the First, a view of the events stressed in Bulgarian historical writing, because it became a true historiographic dogma in medieval chronicles and was also eventually adopted by Byzantine writers, while Western historical writing

preserved, in a variety of forms, the memory of the Romanians who took part in the founding of a state that the Papacy called the Kingdom of Romanians and Bulgarians. Thus, Orthodoxy and Byzantinism, which for the North-Danubian Romanians were support factors for their medieval states, were perceived in an opposite way by the South-Danubian Romanians. To the latter, both Orthodoxy and Byzantinism diminished them through the power of Bulgarization that they entailed. While North of the Danube, Catholicism became the spiritual weapon by which the Hungarian state tried to remove Transylvanian Romanians from political life and to subdue those who lived outside the Carpathian arc, South of the Danube, Catholicism supported, as much as it could, both Romanian nationality and state independence.

But to what extent did the Second Czardom play a part in the historical life of the North-Danubian Romanians, *i.e.*, of the Daco-Romanians? It was not simply the confusion of past scholars, such as Dimitrie Cantemir, that led to the crystallization of a historical legend according to which Asenid Vlachia was the future Walachia or even Moldavia, for an analogous Bulgarian legend appeared during the same Eighteenth Century in Paisij Hilandarski's works. Modern historians like Dimitre Onciul (1899, 1919-1920, 1968) thought that the Second Czardom exerted its rule North of the Danube. Here was where Vlachia supposedly lay. Following the Tartar invasion, Bulgaria found itself South of the Danube, while Vlachia, out of which Walachia would surge at a later date, lay North of the Danube and was, at least nominally, subjugated by the Hungarians.

According to this theory, the dualist Romanian-Bulgarian state that the Papacy consecrated as a kingdom was consequently dismembered, even though its memory was preserved through the Slavo-Byzantine institutions of the North-Danubian Romanian lands. Therefore, the Second Czardom was at the origin of modern Romanian civilization and cultural Slavism and as well as of a Romanian Byzantinism characterized by a Slavonizing tendency. Equally strenuous research by other historians led by Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu (1878, 1898, 1976) has clearly proven the lack of supporting evidence for this alluring hypothesis.

It is hardly possible to speak of any attempt to extend Asenid authority North of the Danube, for only one document hinting at such a possibility exists, a pontifical letter to the Hungarian king according to which Ioniță tried to assume authority over the Greco-Christians in Hungary. N. Iorga (1919, 1937) also thought that he could speak of an attempt made by Ioniță and his successors to include North-Danubian Romanians in an imperial synthesis with assistance from their Cuman suzerains. This hypothesis is feasible, but relatively difficult to accept because North of the Danube, the Cumans themselves represented an "imperial" force that was able to impose a certain direction even to the policy of the Czardom.

Some Romanian historians have thought that the Second Czardom influenced the forms of cultural Slavism in the medieval Romanian states North of the Danube. Such influences would have been brought to bear through the authority embodied in the bishoprics along the Danube. Were

such influences to have occurred, the process would have begun during a later phase in the history of the Czardom, in the aftermath of the Tartar domination, when the Romanian-Bulgarian links strengthened in opposition to the Ottoman threat and when the Orthodox states in Southeastern Europe attempted to form a coalition in the Fourteenth Century. But since at that point the Czardom was already divided into two structures, the Târnovo and the Vidin Czardoms, the Second Bulgarian Czardom was no longer a great Balkan power. Rather, it found itself at the same level as the North-Danubian Romanian states and it even needed their assistance.

Yet, it appears that the Banat and the Oltenia regions did have a strong relationship with the Romanian-Bulgarian state during the rule of the first Asenids. Although the relationship was documented under Boril's rule, the surviving evidence is insufficient to support an emphatic statement in this respect. As for modern Romanian cultural Slavism, it is more likely a legacy of the first Bulgarian state, consolidated by later contacts with the mainly Serbian and of course the Bulgarian South Slav world.

Romanians are therefore at the origin of the Second Bulgarian Czardom for which they set the basis by virtue of a specific historical impulse and a tradition of solidarity with Bulgarians, through the Asenid anti-Byzantine reaction. Combined with purely Romanian elements such as the idea of Romanian Romanity, the ideology of the old Czardom gave direction and legitimacy to creative Romanian political efforts. But this ideology also bore the seeds of change into a purely Bulgarian Empire. The reduced numbers of Balkan Romanians, the severing of all links with Rome, the breaking away from Catholicism, as well as the return of the state to Bulgarian imperial traditions and to spiritual Byzantinism entailed the disappearance both of Romanians as such and of their memory from the history of this Czardom. Although intellectually important, since it represented the first assertion of the idea of Romanity as a political hallmark, the moment did not have any historically measurable effects for the lives of the North-Danubian Romanians. Viewed as a world-historical factor, the Bulgarian idea did not serve as a lasting creative catalyst to Romanians. On the contrary, it proved to be an agent of undisputed alienation when confronted with their own Romanic core, chasing them away from the front line of history. On the other hand, the encounter with Rome, occasioned by the Byzantine crisis and by accompanying political events in Southeastern Europe, turned out to be favourable and to generate a beneficial impetus to the Romanians, placing them, albeit not for very long, among the European powers of that time. This situation represented a new confirmation of an old truth, namely that the assertion of Romanian Romanity, seen as a critical factor and a differentiating principle of their national being, was the only way in which Romanians could fully act in world history as a distinct ethnic and political entity.

C. THE "AROMANIAN" ISSUE

1. Stages of the "Aromanian Issue" in the Development of Romanian Balkan Policy

Many pages of Balkanology have been devoted to the so-called national rebirth of the Aromanians in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Generally speaking, both Romanian and foreign researchers claim that this Aromanian national rebirth, identifiable at the level of both written culture and institutional life, was the result of an initiative taken by Romanian Forty-Eighters. These persons, owing to the mediation by outstanding émigrés in the aftermath of the 1848 Revolution, Christian Tell, Nicolae Bălcescu, Ion Ghica, Ion Ionescu de la Brad made contact with the Aromanians who lived in the Ottoman Empire. As a result, they experienced intensely the rediscovery of many distant "brothers" and decided to fulfil, as soon as possible, the ideal of reinserting them into the mass of a culturally and politically reborn Romanianism.

Context permitting, after the union of the Romanian Principalities, Bucharest became the center of a national effort of cultural propaganda among Aromanians. It was supported by the Romanian State that managed to acquire and to preserve the right to open and to develop a network of Romanian schools for the Aromanians in the Balkan Peninsula. The schools were later followed by a similar network of churches in which religious services were conducted in Romanian. These actions marked the beginning of a Balkan Romanian policy intended to strengthen a status of cultural autonomy and to provide protection to the Aromanians by the Romanian State. Carried out with tenacity and diplomatic skill in the changing and often unstable circumstances of political life in the Balkan Peninsula, this action proved successful and remained a constant direction of Romanian foreign policy until 1945.

In terms of both political practice and the writing of history, the Aromanian issue was also a source of high-pitched confrontations and controversies between Romanians and other Balkan inhabitants. Romanian historians and statesmen considered the Aromanians to be "brothers" – or "first cousins", in the words of René Pinon (1908) at the beginning of the Twentieth Century – of the Daco-Romanians, openly considering them Balkan Romanians or even Romanians who had emigrated, over the centuries, from ancient Dacia to the South.

While these Romanians supported their distant relatives according to what they deemed to be a moral duty and a national political imperative, non-Romanian Balkan historians and statesmen claimed, with very few exceptions, that the Aromanians were not Romanians and that the intervention of Romania in their favour was a form of cultural imperialism, an act the hidden agenda of which was an attempt at political and territorial expansion and annexation. Having reached the peak of its influence during the Balkan Wars, the Aromanian policy of Romania underwent a decline as further wars determined the dismemberment of the

Ottoman Empire and the strengthening of Balkan national states. The network of Romanian schools and churches shrunk quite considerably and was only tolerated in Greece, owing to certain special circumstances. The Second World War and the changes it brought about in the social and political structures of Southeastern Europe simply did away with the Aromanian issue and sealed the fate of Aromanians under the guise of a gradual, but increasing, de-Romanianization. Today, the "Aromanian issue" is no longer a political reality, but rather a topic of great interest for objective research that has so far been insufficiently exploited.

The following pages will provide only an outline of the development of the Aromanian issue and establish certain priorities for investigation in the future. It will also attempt to sum up the reliable results obtained up to this point and to describe some very recent research.

The point that has to be made from the very start is that no matter how critical the importance of the Romanian initiative in bringing up the Aromanian issue was and no matter how decisive the actions of Romania were in support of this reawakening, they were not the first impulse of the process. The prerequisites for the Aromanian rebirth were Balkan and were set by the natural development of Romanian Balkanity itself, which never lacked awareness of its own ethnic individuality nor the impetus to defend its rights. Therefore, both the cultural and the political efforts made by Aromanians, who produced what came to be known as the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Aromanian national rebirth, were only the results of the growth of and the inner changes in the Balkan Romanian world in the context of the history of Southeastern Europe. As the Aromanians had been aware of their own ethnicity and linguistic individuality since the Middle Ages, during which they had enjoyed a degree of relative autonomy, they could not help but be part of the general process of Balkan national reawakening in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. They too asserted their cultural autonomy.

The Aromanian issue was just one of the components of the larger Eastern European issue during the period. Having to face the impetuous and sometimes intolerant assertion of various forms of Balkan nationalism over this period, when national states were established and strengthened in the Peninsula on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the Aromanians developed their own national movement and found a natural support for it in Romania. At the same time, the Romanians making up the United Principalities, in their turn, could not overlook the Aromanians in their attempt to define the future framework of their national, cultural, and political assertion. The attempt to interpret the Aromanian issue, as some historians and politicians have done, as an artificial creation of self-serving Romanian diplomacy, and the Aromanian national rebirth, as a product of Romanian propaganda and material investment in the Balkans, is indicative, not only of a tendency to give voice to fabrications, but also to a regrettable lack of a sense of history. To the citizens of the Romanian State, this rebirth represented the latest and most vital manifestation of modern and contemporary Balkan Romanity, just as the Asenid movement

represented the contemporary manifestation of the vitality of Haemus Romanity in the Middle Ages.

It is in this spirit that this study addresses the issue. It endeavours to show how the Aromanians in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries asserted their ethnic and cultural individuality in new ways, in response to their contacts with the Daco-Romanians who had created their own state and were promoting their own national culture. In evolving in this fashion, the Aromanians demonstrated a perfect historical, existential, and creative continuity that was very much part of the "Eastern Revolution" as described by Victor Papacostea (1983).

This study also demonstrates that, in parallel with this assertion, the Aromanians developed an awareness of their unity with the North-Danubian Romanians and the realization that this unity had been hidden by centuries of separation and independent development in special circumstances. In the case of the North-Danubian Romanians, they too became increasingly aware of their national and linguistic identity with the Aromanians, this awareness becoming a motive for increasing support and an incentive for action.

2. Balkan Prerequisites of the Aromanian National Rebirth

Relying on written diplomatic and cultural sources, the research of Valeriu Papahagi (1935, 1937) and Victor Papacostea (1983) convincingly identified the Balkan prerequisites for the Nineteenth Century Aromanian national rebirth as being linked to the development of urban life in Epirus and in the Pindus Mountains, in the Eighteenth Century. Urban development in this context was stimulated by the Southward movement of the East-West trade route through the Balkan Peninsula resulting from changed relationships among the great powers of that time. A result was the appearance of a new market for the Venice trade in Epirus, entailing the development of new transit and distribution centers for the goods coming this way. These centers were the Aromanian cities, among which Moscopolis and Aminciu (Metsovo) ranked at the top, followed by Cālāreți, Siracu, Clisura, and Gramoste. As they were now directly involved in the international goods circuit, these Aromanian shepherds, Epirus and Pindus Vlachs, who used to be wagon builders and craftsmen with a good knowledge of how to process sheep-derived natural products (milk, wool), became merchants operating on a European scale. They also introduced important elements of industrialization into their towns producing market-focused textiles and undertaking smaller metal-working activities.

Aromanians integrated into Byzantine urban life can be identified as early as the Eleventh Century, but by the Eighteenth Century, they were no longer an individual or minority presence in various Greek centers such as Thessalian Larissa. Rather, they had come to form a true Romanic patriciate as a result of the transformation of their villages into genuine urban centers. Although beginning at the end of the Sixteenth Century, the development of the Epirus and Pindus urban centers reached its peak

in the Eighteenth Century. The process was facilitated by the traditional status of autonomy that had always been accorded to the Balkan Peninsula Vlachs, to which were added the very liberal rights that they had obtained in the Ottoman Empire. Over time, the Aromanians strengthened these rights and liberties.

Unfortunately, little detailed information concerning the Aromanian cities in this long flourishing period is available. The situation of the most important of these centers, Moscopolis, is best known, even though no thorough study has been devoted to it. It is known that fourteen main corporations of craftsmen and merchants were centered in Moscopolis, out of a total of fifty large and small associations of this type. They grouped together goldsmiths, silversmiths, coppersmiths, armorers, weavers, tailors, grocers, shoemakers, builders, house painters, etc. The heads of the main corporations formed a supreme leadership council invested with judicial powers. Only disputes with foreigners and penal cases were referred to the Ottoman judicial authorities, either the Berat *pasha* or the Karitsa *cadi*.

Throughout the years, Moscopoleans became important capital holders and together with the Aromanians in the other urban centers mentioned above established a rising middle class to which the Balkan Peninsula was later very much indebted for its modernization. A city with large, solid, and spacious houses, the remains of which can be seen to this day, Moscopolis had a large number of churches. As usual with Aromanians, the city inhabitants were grouped into neighbourhoods that frequently assembled people of similar origins. Urban organization still preserved traces of the old *phalkaris*, the Aromanian traditional form of social life. The élite, or in other words, the city patriciate, was recruited from the founding "tribe".

Over time, Moscopolis also developed a very intense cultural life exemplified by the creation of a higher education establishment, the so-called New Academy, and by the setting up, in the second half of the Eighteenth Century, of the only printing press in the Ottoman Empire. As proven by the research of Victor Papacostea (1983), Moscopolis was one of the centers from which modern philosophical ideas and progressive thinking were disseminated throughout the Balkan Peninsula. During the headship of Theodore Anastasie Cavaliotti, the New Academy was a citadel of free thought in which an intellectual combat was waged between scholastic Aristotelianism, on the one hand, and the new ideas of Western incipient Enlightenment and Cartesian rationalism, on the other hand, as the latter underwent further dissemination. The high cultural level of the Moscopoleans was attested by foreign travellers who reported the existence of an impressive number of books in local houses. Western European visitors could find ancient works and everything that was needed for intellectual activity and delight.

Among the Moscopolean cultural personalities of note, one can cite Theodor A. Cavaliotti; Chrysant of Zitsa; John Chalkeus, a professor in Venice; Ioasaf, the Ohrid Patriarch; Dionysius Manduca, the Metropolitan Bishop of Castoria; Dimitrios Pamperi; Daniil Mihail Hagi Adami the

Moscopolean; and Constantine Hagi-Tchagani, a student of Johannes Thunmann (1774) in Halle at a later date and who provided unique information about the life and history of the Aromanians.

Like their Aromanian predecessors who had joined the circle of Greek Christian scholars in the Balkan Peninsula in the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, all these highly cultivated personalities wrote their works and, when possible, taught in the cultural and linguistic framework of post-Byzantine Hellenism, in classical or Byzantine Greek, the sacred language of the Christian East *par excellence*. During the same period, this language served as the language of high culture in the Romanian territories, a reality easily explained by the Aromanian affiliation to the "Greek" Church and to Byzantine Orthodoxy. During the Balkan Middle Ages, the vision of the world was such that it would have been inconceivable for Aromanians, who were Vlach subjects of Byzantium and then of the Ottoman Empire, to express themselves in a national language, given that they lacked a state of their own and that their Church was not free of the Constantinople hierarchy. By the same token, those Aromanians who were influenced by the Balkan Slavic world, as in the case of the Haemus Vlachs, centuries earlier, adopted the instrument of linguistic expression of their world, namely Slavonic.

One should not, however, assume that the Aromanians were not aware of their ethnic individuality or that they thought of themselves as being Greek, unable to distinguish between real Greeks and themselves. Often enough in the Middle Ages, confessional awareness prevailed over national awareness, while attachment to forms of local autonomy proved more vigorous than any sense of linguistic and ethnic belonging. Their belonging to "Romaic" culture and civilization that was inspired by the Byzantine imperial tradition and their belonging to an Eastern Christian "Greek" church facilitated Aromanian manifestations of their ethnic features, in terms of oral culture, folklore, and daily life.

Aromanians were by no means ethnically frustrated because they had adopted Greek as an instrument of cultural expression. Quite the contrary, they had the feeling that they were partaking of a superior cultural life, in which there was sometimes real competition and rivalry. Neophytos Doukas (1810), one of the Eighteenth-Nineteenth Century champions of Hellenism, gave special credit to the Vlachs as masters of "Hellenic" culture considering that frequently they did better than the Greeks themselves, in terms of cultural effort, owing to their dynamism and generosity. Indeed, the medieval religious legislation of the Ottoman Empire had grouped all the Balkan Orthodox Christians as the so-called *Rum mileti*, the *Romaic* or Byzantine people.

Under the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment and as a result of a development that is beyond the scope of this study, the Eighteenth Century witnessed a mutation in the self-awareness of the Eastern Christian communities that eventually gave rise to forms of modern national awareness based on nationality, language, and ethnic origins rather than on confessional affiliation. Given the fresh impetus of

philosophical thinking, the Greeks rediscovered classic, Pagan, antiquity and capitalized on it in a different manner than what had previously been the case with reference to Christian Byzantium. Hellenism, no longer viewed as a synonym for Paganism, was rehabilitated. Thus, a national Hellenic culture replaced Christian imperial Romaic culture, and the Greeks attempted to appropriate the whole patrimony inherited from Byzantium. Orthodoxy tended to become a Hellenistic variant that began to prevail in the sense of religion existing in Greek self-awareness. The Constantinople Patriarchate gradually turned into an instrument of Hellenism and an intransigent agent of the Greek nationalization of Eastern Christendom.

At the same time, the other Christian peoples in the Balkan Peninsula also underwent a similar modernization process. They too wanted to assert their respective nationalities in higher cultural forms and thus reacted against this tendency to Hellenize. The struggle between Hellenism and the nationalisms of the other non-Greek Christian peoples, as well as many rivalries among the latter, were a major trait of the Nineteenth Century history of the region. Such struggles also extended into the Twentieth Century, when the Balkan national states established their boundaries and in later attempts at the imposition of ethnic homogeneity. These struggles quite often assumed regrettable degrees of intolerance and violence.

Moscopolis lay in a typically Balkan environment, one that was in keeping with what scholars, not very aptly, have called the ethnic "promiscuity" of the Peninsula. It was an area in which Greeks, Aromanians, Albanians, and Slavs lived together in a singularly colourful mosaic and in which, unfortunately, acute tensions and clashes occurred during the period of national rebirth. During the Byzantine epoch, this mosaic pattern was what inspired a character called "*the Bulgaroarvanitovlach*" or "*the Servobulgaroarvanitovlach*" in a text written by a historian of that period. An expression of the (still peaceful) cosmopolitanism of that region was the fact that Eighteenth Century Moscopolean scholars began to have what V. Papacostea (1983) described as "comparative linguistics concern". Both Daniil the Moscopolean and Theodore Anastasie Cavaliotti draw up multilingual glossaries and spoke several Balkan Languages (Greek, Albanian, Aromanian), also using them in writing. It is to these persons that are owed the first written mention of Aromanian. In particular, Daniil the Moscopolean assembled his *Lexicon Tetraglosson* (Greek, Romanian, Albanian, Bulgarian) integrated into a set of *Introductory Teachings* having a religious, scientific, and epistolary character. Cavaliotti drew up a reading handbook, a *Protopeiria*, along with a trilingual – Greek, Aromanian, and Albanian – vocabulary. The purpose of such writings was to give non-Greeks easier access to the secrets of the Hellenic cultural language. In the work of Daniil the Moscopolean, the Hellenic choice was obvious, for he wrote an epigram in which he lobbied for cultural Hellenization, for "Romanization", to use his own term. He claimed that this task could be accomplished by giving up all uncultivated

barbarian languages and by taking up, instead, the "holy" language of Greece. Daniil believed that the cultural Hellenization of the Balkan non-Greek Christians would be the ideal instrument of emancipation, one capable of doing away with cultural primitivism and perhaps even with Ottoman rule.

The same idea appeared to be less obvious, if not downright doubtful, to certain researchers who studied the work of Cavaliotti. The main feature of Cavaliotti's thought is his attempt to equalize all the Balkan languages within an equal opportunity policy intended to give them all fair chances to improve through direct contact with – or inspiration from – the language of Greek higher culture. For this reason, Cavaliotti can be viewed as the forerunner both of Balkan cultural nationalism and of the Aromanian national emancipation movement. His position can also be inferred from the fact that his book was published in Venice and was most likely destroyed by the Patriarchal authorities, not the least because he used the Latin alphabet. In any case, these two scholars displayed the two basic tendencies of Aromanian cultural development: the so-called Greek tendency and the Romanizing tendency (later to become a *Romanianizing* tendency).

It is an undisputed truth that, in the second half of the Eighteenth Century, the written form of the Aromanian dialect was expressed in the Greek alphabet, first appearing in the Aromanian place of origin, *i.e.*, Moscopolis, through a process of cultural assertion of a significant group of Balkan Vlachs. It has also been proven that the Moscopolean Aromanian urban area, which was pervaded by progressive ideas and a strong philosophical spirit, triggered off, if only for practical purposes, certain comparative linguistic concerns that were deemed capable of receiving and promoting the spirit of inter-ethnic tolerance and dialogue between Balkan nationalities. In the modern age, the Aromanian cultural assertion undoubtedly began under the sign of Christian solidarity and mutual respect among the Balkan Peninsula nationalities, a proof of progress and genuine civilization in itself.

3. The Beginnings of Aromanian Written Culture among Aromanian Émigrés in Central Europe

As Aromanians were almost always merchants or wagon builders by profession, they were often required for reasons of business to travel to the Western European countries, to the Habsburg Empire, to Germany, to Hungary, to the Romanian territories, and to other parts of the world. In most cases and in most countries, they found themselves in the company of Greeks who were frequently grouped into a number of merchant associations in the places in which they settled owing, on the one hand, to their religious confession and cultural affiliation, and on the other hand, to their common condition as Ottoman subjects. For this reason, Aromanians were identified with Greeks and were in no hurry to deny an identity that could lead to their being granted certain privileges. At the same time, one

cannot speak of a Balkan Aromanian mass emigration until the Eighteenth Century. At the end of that Century, a catastrophe took place that entailed a population movement of precisely this kind. It was the fall of Moscopolis after several devastating raids launched by Muslim Albanian troops under the command of Ali Pasha, the Yanina satrap, in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish Wars.

It would be beyond the scope of this study to reflect overly much on this migration of Moscopoleans that was followed or accompanied by inhabitants of Metsovo, Kalari, and other Pindus or Epirus Aromanian towns. Many Aromanian patriciate families from these urban centers took refuge, with all their belongings and their huge amounts of money, mainly in the Habsburg Empire, later settling either in Vienna, Budapest, or Miskolc, or in Transylvania, Banat, and even in Germany. Everywhere they went, they founded chambers of commerce, banks, and industrial companies. They quickly recovered from the trauma and hardships of exile, managing to join the Austrian or the Hungarian aristocracy, acquiring titles of nobility, and gradually melting into the Austrian and the Hungarian nations or, in the case of those who moved into Transylvania and Banat, undergoing Romanianization. The following are a few of the patronymics of these remarkable families: Dumba, Sina, Tirca, Tricupa-Cosminsky, Mocioni, Gojdu, Șaguna, Gabrovsky, Derra, and Vretovsky.

Aromanian colonies in Central European cities, but mainly in Budapest and Vienna, flourished very rapidly. As the result of the directions of cultural development that had begun in the Balkans, these colonies were affected both by Hellenizing and by national Romanizing tendencies. However, the general trait of all Aromanians in these centers, irrespective of their cultural choices, was their careful preservation and manifestation, under a variety of forms, of their ethnic, Vlach identity. Grouped around churches of Eastern, *i.e.,* Greek, persuasion, they retained the designation, Vlach, to emphasize their ethnic individuality in their official and distinguishing titles. Thus, both the Orthodox Church and the Orthodox community in Vienna were designated as being "of the Greeks and Vlachs", while the privilege through which Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) granted certain rights to this community and Church referred to "*die Griechische und Walachische Nation*", *i.e.,* the Greek and Vlach nation. The commitment to Vlachity can also be observed in the traditional and endogamous nature of the first generation of descendants of the new Austrian and Hungarian "barons" of Aromanian origin.

As in the Pindus, Aromanian men only married Aromanian women. At a later date, in 1815, the city of Budapest was to witness the formal founding of an Aromanian Ladies Society established for cultural and philanthropic purposes. According to one of the regulations of the Budapest Greek-Aromanian Church, one of the priests had to be of Aromanian origin to be able to hear the confessions of these ladies who, just as in their native country, spoke no Greek at all.

The Aromanian émigrés in Central Europe who engaged in cultural Hellenism did not perceive any incompatibility between Christianity and

philosophy in general, expressed in Greek, and their Vlach ethnic features that distinguished them from genuine Greeks. The Aromanian brothers, Siacişţea and Marchide Puliu, who ran a Greek printing press in Vienna, printed many Hellenic nationalistic texts, among them being Velestinlis Rigas's proclamation of Greek independence. They also printed Aromanian national materials, such as Constantine Ucuta's primer, to which reference is made below.

Aromanian families continued to flourish at the upper levels of society in their foster countries. Thus, the Sina family made important contributions to the establishment of the Hungarian Agrarian Credit and the Hungarian Insurance Company, as well as to a number of other activities and institutions: the railway system and steam navigation, the dredging of rivers, the Hungarian National Museum, the National Theatre, the Music Academy, the Corps of Firemen, and the palace of the Hungarian Academy of Science. At the same time, Baron Simeon George Sina built the Greek Academy in Athens and worked as a representative of the Greek King, Otto I, in Berlin, Vienna, and Munich. In addition to being married to an Aromanian lady from the Ghyka family, this second generation descendant of an Aromanian, who had settled in the Habsburg Empire, also had business links with the Romanian territories, and owned a number of properties in the United Principalities. Some exchanges of letters indicate that he was involved in certain financial matters with the Romanian Prince, Alexandru Ioan Cuza. Yet, he did not express any awareness of Romanianity.

On the other hand, other Central European Aromanians, aware of their Romanianity, wrote a series of texts that marked the beginning of the Aromanian national rebirth. The first of these persons was Constantine Ucuta, a *protopope* in Posen (Poznan), in former Western Prussia, who wrote the *New Pedagogy*, the first Aromanian primer, using the Greek alphabet, aimed at educating Aromanian children in their mother tongue. This book was published in 1797 in Vienna. Ucuta's "Foreword" is a veritable cultural manifesto for the promotion of Aromanian as a language of culture. Starting with the words of Saint Paul, "He who prays in a foreign tongue only does it with his soul, not with his mind" (for he merely utters or repeats words he cannot understand), Ucuta considered it necessary for Aromanian children to be able to speak with God in their own tongue, to develop a truly Christian sense at an intellectual level. Therefore, in writing his pedagogical book, Ucuta wished to help children learn their own language. Indeed, he apologized for having borrowed words and terminology from Greek, mentioning that all languages and cultures exchange various elements, the Hellenes serving as a loan source for everybody.

This modest book by the Posen Aromanian *protopope* marked a step both in terms of progress in quality and in Aromanian self-awareness, but it led to a conflict with the Greek clergy and with those Greek intellectuals under the control of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, which excommunicated the author and forbade his work on the grounds of heresy. Having been

born in Moscopolis, Ucuta was no agent of any type of propaganda, but because he grew up and was educated in a Central European environment pervaded by Enlightenment ideas and also because he may have been in contact with North-Danubian Romanians, Ucuta chose to give voice to a wish that had been developing in the Aromanian environment from which he had come. The wish itself had evolved as the result of a long evolution.

A second representative of the Aromanian national rebirth was George Constantine Roja, a physician by profession, who was born in Bitola in 1776, moved to Timişoara when he was an adolescent, and then went to the University of Budapest. Here he wrote a doctoral thesis titled *Research on the Romanians Who Live Across the Danube* (Budapest, 1808) and signed it, "Vallachus Moschopolitanus". One year later, Roja produced *The Craftsmanship of Reading in Romanian with Latin Letters which Belong to Old Romanian* (Budapest, 1809), in an attempt to unify the Aromanian dialect with the Daco-Romanian language and to establish a single literary language for all Romanians. Through the efforts of Roja, who undoubtedly kept in touch with various representatives of the Latinist Transylvanian School, the idea of Aromanian and Daco-Romanian unity became a component of the ideology of the Aromanian national rebirth. By virtue of the unity of the North- and South-Danubian Romanians and their common Latinity, Roja argued that the Latin alphabet should be used to write Aromanian. Possibly under the influence of the Greek linguistic mentality, he also tried to create a common cultural language.

Theodor Capidan (1932) also identified the likely influence of the Transylvanian School which, through the efforts of Petru Maior, had attempted to develop a Romanian literary language, borrowing Aromanian elements as part of his effort. Roja disagreed with Cavaliotti over the question of written Aromanian. This disagreement was interesting, for it reflected in one of the latter's contemporaries a divergent position, but one that was only divergent in terms of the written aspect and had nothing to do with his intention of cultivating the Aromanian dialect. One can conclude that Cavaliotti himself was not only a supporter of the study of Aromanian but also of its cultivation. What cannot be doubted is the continuity of intellectual links between the Moscopolean scholars in the previous generation and Roja who, given his contacts with the Transylvanian School, the Daco-Romanians, and the Central European environment during the Enlightenment, continued to work for Aromanian cultural assertion, enriching the ideology of this movement with the idea of Aromanian and Daco-Romanian unity.

Roja's history must have enjoyed a wide audience, judging by its, large for the time, print run of 637 copies. He turned into a sort of Aromanian literary font who, many decades later, inspired the efforts of George Murnu to enrich the Romanian literary language. Roja can be considered the Aromanian representative of the Latinist school and the founder of the Aromanian branch of this school, along with its specific problems.

The third mastermind of the movement at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century for the national assertion of Central European

Aromanians was Mihail G. Boiagi who was born in 1780, in Budapest, into an Aromanian family whose place of origin was Albania and who died in 1842 or 1843. He was the author of a Romanian or Macedo-Vlach *Grammar* published in 1813 in Vienna. Although it was written in German and Greek, it included an anthology of Aromanian texts. A keen supporter of Aromanian Romanity, Boiagi conceived his grammar to be an answer to the attacks of Neophytos Doukas. The latter opposed the use of Romanian in its Aromanian hypostasis as a language of culture, the attempts of the Aromanians to free themselves from the Greek cultural sphere, and their efforts to establish themselves as a nation of their own, thus seceding from the Greek world.

Boiagi's "Foreword" to his own grammar is filled with national pride and common sense. At the same time, it is pervaded by a very special national pathos. Defending the principle of the cultivation of national languages, one that had special significance in the Aromanian case, the author exclaims: "even if the Romanians were Hottentots [Khoi-Khoi], they would still have the right and the obligation to improve themselves in their own language". As for Neophytos Doukas's remarks about the small changes needed to polish the Aromanian dialect, Boiagi replied that the language will refine itself in parallel with the cultivation of the spirit, which is yet another generally valid principle. In response to the publication of Boiagi's, *Grammar*, the Patriarchy decided to blacklist the book and to excommunicate the author, even though he continued to be a teacher in the Vienna Greek school.

It was Max Demeter Peyfuss (1974, 1989) who emphasized the links existing between Boiagi and Serbian and Slovene progressive circles. Also, Peyfuss (1974, 1989) stressed the fact that Boiagi had made special efforts to emancipate the Aromanian spoken tongue from the rule of the Greek literary language, placing him in the context of similar attempts made by intellectuals of other Balkan peoples. According to Peyfuss (1974, 1989), Jernej Bartolomej Kopitar published his Slovenian grammar in 1808; Vuk Karadjić came out with a Serbian grammar in 1814; Neophyt Rilskij printed a Bulgarian grammar in 1835; while the victory of demotic Greek, following Adamantios Koraïs's efforts in the Eighteenth Century, would only be made evident in 1888, thanks to Jannis Psycharis.

Owing to the three masterminds cited above, the Aromanian cultural rebirth at the end of the Eighteenth and the beginning of the Nineteenth Centuries inaugurated a trend of ideas with a well-articulated doctrine. It was equally linked to progressive thinking among Central European peoples and to the trend started by the Transylvanian School among Daco-Romanians, albeit with specific differences, in the latter case.

The Aromanian rebirth, however, is perceived as an intellectual movement with strong Balkan roots and as a result of the development of the Aromanians themselves. Given the favourable circumstances of their assertion in the Central Europe of Emperor Joseph II, Aromanian scholars developed a tradition of their own and joined the Transylvanian Romanian militants in their effort to generate a better perception of Romanian

culture. A large number of impulses, ideas, and linguistic elements travelled both ways in this relationship.

The Greek response was strong and negative. While unable to prevent the further development of the movement, the Greek authorities restricted it to the centers of the Aromanian diaspora.

Among the Aromanian scholars who made their voices heard during this period of rebirth, it is necessary to mention a few less famous writers such as Nicholas Ianovici, who compiled a dictionary in five languages (classical Greek, modern Greek, Aromanian, German, and Hungarian), and perhaps Georg Montan, author of a *Brief History of the Vlach Nation in Dacia and Macedonia*, completed in Budapest, in 1819, in German, and of other works. Although Ianovici never published his dictionary, leaving it in manuscript form (and available for consultation at the Library of the Romanian Academy), the result of his efforts was important, thanks to the ideas they supported. Of Moscopolean origin, the author pleaded for a common Romanity of Aromanians and Daco-Romanians and, in support of his argument, favoured the Latinizing tendency in the written Aromanian dialect, suggesting that certain Graecisms be replaced by Latinizing neologisms. The samples of the Aromanian dialect that he cited reflect the situation of Moscopolean Aromanian at the time he wrote.

Although Montan had a name of Latin consonance, one cannot be totally certain that he was Aromanian. M. D. Peyfuss (1974, 1999), however, argues that he definitely was Aromanian, invoking, among other things, the fact that he was acquainted with the Aromanian and the Balkan environment, as can also be seen in some of his other works, as well as the support given to him by Aromanian families in the Habsburg Empire and by Aromanian ladies in Budapest for the publication of his historical works. In this regard, Roja's influence could also be noticed. Montan's historical texts, pervaded as they were by the ideas of a common Romanity and of a unity between Aromanians and Daco-Romanians, served to heighten the dissemination of the ideology of Aromanian rebirth in the wider circles of Romanian and Central European society.

In addition to all these writings, one should also mention several religious manuscripts that have been discovered over the years, some of which have been published. They reveal that a written form of Aromanian existed at the time, both in the Balkan Peninsula and within the Aromanian colonies in the Habsburg Empire. The writers of these documents did not include those Aromanians who expressed themselves in Greek, but whose national awareness could be certified by what they wrote in Greek. The latter included Dimitri Nicholas Darvari, Constantine I. Darvari, Constantine Immanuel Ghyka of Djanfalva, John Nicolidis of Pindo, and Basil Papa Eftimiu.

4. Pre-Nineteenth Century Daco-Romanians and Balkan Romanians

The medieval traditions of Romania have not preserved memories of any common origins of Daco-Romanians and of Balkan Romanians or any

information about contacts and co-operation between the two groups. Likewise, nothing is said in these traditions about existing contacts between the Asenid Romanians and the Bulgarians. Later on, however, Romanian humanist historical narratives in all three of the historical provinces of North-Danubian Romania (Moldavia, Walachia, and Transylvania), would constantly assert the linguistic unity and the common origin of the ancient Daco-Romanians and the Balkan Peninsula Romanians, relying on both written sources and the direct knowledge of certain Aromanians who had travelled to the North-Danubian Romanian territories.

It would be totally wrong to assume that it was only out of sheer political opportunism that this idea of the national and linguistic unity of Daco-Romanians and Balkan Romanians appears in the Nineteenth Century within the corpus of Romanian culture. Such can be inferred from the results of some research undertaken in the Balkan world. It would be misleading to believe that this idea was the exclusive product of Romanian scholars. It is in fact as old as Romanian humanist writing itself, and it appears even earlier, in the works of certain foreign humanists such as the Byzantine author, Laonikos Chalcocondyles in the Sixteenth Century, to cite one of the first exponents of the idea.

The interest in the "Cotso-Vlachs", but also in the Asenid Haemus Vlachs, with which the former are identified, has been evident in Romanian historical writing since the end of the Seventeenth and the beginning of the Eighteenth Centuries. The short chronicle written by Nicholas Milescu the Sword Bearer (Nicolae Milescu Spătarul), that was taken up again by Constantine "the High Steward" Cantacuzino (1958), as well as by Miron Costin (1959) and Dimitrie Cantemir (1901), devotes a number of pages to Balkan Romanians. It describes their Romanic ethnicity along with their linguistic unity with the Daco-Romanians, with whom they seemed to have an overlapping identity. Miron Costin (1959) claimed that he had the opportunity to speak to a number of Aromanians and that, by doing so, was able to get to know their language and to check his scholarly information straight from the source. As is well known, D. Cantemir theorized that a union developed between the Romanian territories and the Asenid Bulgaro-Vlach empire. He also referred to the kinship, which existed between the latter, on the one hand, and the Muşat and the Bassarab dynasties, on the other hand.

The Transylvanian School represented both by its leaders, Gheorghe Şincai, Samuil Micu (1963), and Petru Maior, and by its less well-known partisans, clearly argued for the common origin, as well as the linguistic and national unity of the Daco-Romanians and of all the Balkan Romanians. The latter were perceived as the successors of those Romans who were moved from Dacia to lands South of the Danube by Emperor Aurelian, in 271. This school drew up a systematic, complete, source-inspired, and (a bit over-) rigorously articulated representation of the origin and the evolution of Eastern Romanity and of the Romanian people, viewed as an ethnic and linguistic whole. The Transylvanian School

continued Cantemir's tradition, from which it borrowed the critical elements of his view of Romanian history. At the same time, it took advantage of the available written sources and of Western scholarly texts, but, as already stated, it also used information gleaned from Aromanian émigrés in Central Europe and from scholars who initiated an Aromanian rebirth, the starting point of which was Balkan Moscopolis. The Transylvanian School responded to the latter by providing cultural and ideological support. The idea of Romanity was the meeting ground of Aromanian and Transylvanian intellectuals, while resistance to intolerant Hellenism proved to be a common reaction of both Romanian and Aromanian scholars committed to the assertion of their Romanity.

At no time during the age of humanism of Romanian culture or during the century of the Enlightenment did co-operation between Aromanians and Romanians go beyond the scope of cultural activities. The Central European Aromanians did not relinquish the privileges from which they benefited because of their "Greek" status or the ranks they achieved in the Habsburg Empire, nor did they rush in to identify themselves blatantly with the Romanians in the Principalities during the period of the Phanariots. Neither Aromanian émigrés, nor the Aromanians who remained in their places of origin, nor South-Danubian Romanians conceived of any systematic political action, during the period of "the first Aromanian rebirth", to organize the future of the Balkan Vlachs. While incessantly asserting their ethnic and linguistic individuality, trying to increase it, and rediscovering their common origins with the Daco-Romanians, the Central European Aromanians remained attached to their traditional connections with the Greek world. In this respect, their attitudes were similar to those of their brothers who had never left their native lands. They continued to think, as pointed out below, of a "Romanic" restoration, of an Eastern Christian Empire of Hellenic cultural expression, but one that respected their rights and their ethnic features. For this reason, they massively and decisively participated in the struggle of the Greek people for political emancipation. Those Aromanians who settled individually in the Romanian territories, about whom future investigations will reveal new information, simply allowed themselves to be assimilated by the local people. The same was true of the Greeks who decided to remain in Romania during the centuries of Ottoman rule.

The success of the national idea in the spirit of the century, the radicalization of the Southeastern European national movements, the union of the Romanian Principalities of Walachia and of Moldavia, and the emergence, through the Forty-Eighters, of a clearly stated democratic, national, and political ideal which envisaged the creation of a Romanian state for all Romanians changed this situation. Another significant contribution to this change was that of the various Balkan national movements that aimed at the establishment of national states in the region. Thus, in the Nineteenth Century, Aromanians had to face the pressures of full-blown nationalism in the Peninsula and, in their turn, set

for themselves an agenda of their own for the cultural and political assertion of their nationality.

D. BEGINNINGS OF THE SECOND AROMANIAN REBIRTH

1. Genesis of the "Aromanian Issue"

Researchers stress that Nicolae Bălcescu, the central figure of the Romanian movement of the "Forty-Eighters", unambiguously expressed the idea of the possible contribution of the Aromanians to the progressive evolution of the Romanian state. In a letter to Ion Ghica, dated 1 October 1848, Bălcescu declared that he would have liked to settle among the Pindus Romanians so as to assist them in their cultural and civic improvement, confident that a day would come when "they will prove useful to us where they are and where they live" (Bălcescu, 1940).

Obviously, Bălcescu had discovered the Aromanians before his post-revolutionary period of exile. All the historical writing of the time, particularly that of M. Kogălniceanu (1837), claimed the Aromanians as part and parcel of the Romanian people and drew what appeared to be the obvious conclusions. Their names could be found in Romanian history books and even in the titles of various works. What was really new was the attitude toward this issue in terms of political practice, as well as the degree of excitement it brought into being in the United Principalities after 1848 and especially after 1859. This period was the beginning of "the second Aromanian rebirth", which was nothing more than a continuation of the first period of rebirth that had occurred in Central European cities, at the start of the century.

The effects of this rebirth were the following. It entailed the appearance of a mass Aromanian national awareness. Aromanians were recognized as a distinct nationality by the other Balkan Christians and as a branch of the Romanian people by European diplomacy. A dialectal Romanian written culture made its presence known. Balkan Aromanians began to benefit from cultural autonomy under a Romanian protectorate. As the Aromanian issue became international, it turned into a component of the whole Eastern problem.

One cannot afford to neglect the part Aromanians themselves played in the genesis of the Aromanian issue. While in the Balkan Peninsula, Aromanians were trained mentally for a national political action of their own, they lacked the means to draw up a well articulated agenda. They had been disappointed, on the one hand, by the Hellenism which they had served (and which had become intolerant in the aftermath of Greek success). On the other hand, the very creation of a Greek state led, along with the religious ideology propagated by the Oecumenical Patriarchate, to the promotion of a Balkan pan-Hellenism of a sort that threatened the national individualities of all of Eastern Christendom. Aromanians could only feel frustrated and rise up in revolt when faced with the repressive measures taken by the Patriarchate in regard to authors who had

published Aromanian books and were promoting Aromanian ethnic and linguistic individuality.

They had the same reaction to Greek nationalist ideas when zealously propagated in the name of Orthodox Christianity by such people as Cosma the Etolian who managed to turn many Epirus Romanian villages into fanatical nuclei of support for the Hellenic cause. Unlike them, the Aromanians in the Principalities, who had come into contact with Daco-Romanians and with their movement of national assertion, did not need much prodding to turn into intrepid fighters for the Aromanian cause.

Dimitrie Bolintineanu's personality is truly representative of this category of people. A poet and a politician, he was the son of an Aromanian who had settled in Romania and had married a Romanian woman. All his life he was one of the ardent fighters for the preservation of the linguistic and ethnic individuality of the Aromanians and for their recognition as part of the Romanian people. He became the promoter of a political and cultural movement that involved Aromanians such as the poet, Grigore Haralambie Grandea of Metsovo, Dimitrie Cozacovici, also of Metsovo, who was very attached to Mihail G. Boiagi, and to Ion Câmpineanu's confident, the poet Mihai Niculescu of Târnovo. Other Aromanians linked to Bolintineanu were Yisu Sideri and Toma Tricopol of Crushevo, and Dimitrie Atanasescu of Târnova, a picturesque tailor and schoolteacher whose entire life was devoted to wandering and fighting for Aromanian interests. Bolintineanu's movement also involved outstanding personalities of the 1848 revolutionary movement and of Romanian political life, including Ion C. Brătianu, Cezar Bolliac, Christian Tell, and Vasile Alexandrescu Urechia.

D. Bolintineanu submitted to the Porte the first memorials about the condition of the Aromanians and drew up their political agenda, with a clear definition of its objective. The latter called for the preservation of the national characteristics of the Aromanians through an intensive use of their language in their own schools and churches, with the support of the Romanian state. Bolintineanu also articulated a foreign policy framework for the Aromanians that opted for continued loyalty to the Porte, in accordance with the policy of the Romanian state. In making this effort, Bolintineanu advised Aromanians to refrain from anti-Ottoman revolutionary movements, at least for the time being. The poet himself compared the Aromanians to the Transylvania Romanians whose objective was – at least at that stage – survival. Nevertheless, he had an open mind in regard to the most daring hopes for the "mysterious" future. As a minister of public education, Bolintineanu took care to implement this agenda, while as a writer, he promoted the Aromanian cause that was already underway and wrote well-known Macedonian poems. His work was cultivated by other poets, such as H. Grandea. Finally, he conceived his *Voyage to Macedonia Romanians* partly as a work of bookish fiction (according to Theodor Capidan, 1942), but also as an instrument of political propaganda. Enthusiastic, generous, and careful at the same time, Bolintineanu's line managed to set the norm for decades on end so

far as the policy of the Romanian state in regard to the Aromanian issue was concerned. Taken up by the Liberal Party, this attitude was later shared by the Conservatives as well. Its later abandonment by right wing circles and by certain leftists in the Twentieth Century had a lasting negative impact on many efforts, the ultimate purpose of which was to recover the Aromanians for the Romanian nation.

2. Memorials and Manifestos

Among the activities (mainly the writing of memorials) which preceded the systematic organization of the struggle for the Aromanian reawakening in the second half of the Nineteenth Century, special attention needs to be devoted to Bolintineanu's memorials addressed to Grigore Ghica between 1849 and 1856 that influenced the specific measures taken by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza to organize an education system for the Aromanians. Although his intentions were not put into final form, Bolintineanu's memorials to Fuad Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Porte and later Grand Vizier, were the means by which he made a number of suggestions for ways to improve the lot of Aromanians in the Ottoman Empire. Starting with the years 1853-1854, he proposed the reestablishment of the organization of Aromanians into a militia-like structure, able to protect public roads and mountain passes, the building of schools and churches in which teaching and religious services would take place in the Aromanian language, and the transformation of the Aromanian communities into a security factor for the Ottoman Empire.

Later, I. C. Brătianu's 1853 memorial to Louis Napoleon also tackled the Aromanian issue as did Anastase Panu's 1863 memorial, also to Louis Napoleon, through which the author suggested that the Aromanians be organized autonomously under the authority of the French Emperor. They would thus become agents of French policy in the East, at the obvious expense of the Porte. A number of manifestos such as those written in 1856 (in the Aromanian language) and in 1859 in Greek (Cozacovici's appeal signed by C. Tell, D. Bolintineanu, C. A. Rosetti, and C. Bolliac) targeted Romanian but mainly Aromanian public opinion, inviting the latter to make their own cultural assertion. In 1858, D. Bolintineanu and Gr. H. Grandea founded a journal called *Dîmbovița*, which turned into a solid propaganda instrument for the Aromanian cause and pioneered the appearance of a number of periodicals linked to this movement (in 1868, Grandea produced the first issue of the *Pindus Bee*).

This concern for the Aromanian issue drew the attention of foreign powers interested in the situation in the East. The first consular report on the matter addressed to a European power was the work of the French consul, Emile Poujade, in the first years of the 1860s.

In 1860, D. Cozacovici, another Aromanian protagonist of the Aromanian reawakening, initiated the founding in Bucharest of a Macedo-Romanian Committee among the members of which were such personalities as the Goga brothers, Mihal Niculescu, Yisu Sideri, and Toma Tricopol. Consisting exclusively of Aromanian businessmen and men of

letters who were linked – either by tradition or in person – to the previous generation of militants for Aromanian rebirth (D. Cozacovici had been a friend of Boiagi), this Committee gave proof of the existence of a strong Aromanian initiative, one that was far more than the artificial product of the Romanian government and intelligentsia.

Obviously, the rebirth of Aromanian national awareness could only gain its strength and scope from contact with Daco-Romanians as well as from constant support by Romanian public opinion and society, and by the Romanian State. The question is, could any other instance have offered this support? None of the Balkan nations was willing to recognize the ethnic and linguistic individuality of the Aromanians. The Greeks had proved this point with a vengeance through the repressive measures taken by the Patriarchate against the cultural works of the Central European Aromanian émigrés. Their intolerance was also made manifest in their relationships with the other Balkan Orthodox peoples, upon whom they wished to impose Hellenism in the guise of the "true" faith, as well as through religious Byzantinism. The future was to give rise to even more painful proofs of the incompatibility of various forms of reckless Balkan nationalism and the Aromanian wish to preserve their ethnic and linguistic individuality. Initiated by Aromanians who lived in a Daco-Romanian environment, the movement for national rebirth on the part of the Aromanians was made possible by the fundamental role played by the Romanian State in terms of propaganda and protection. Without this external support, the Aromanians, as a distinct ethnic group, would only have survived for a few generations. They would not have been able to develop a culture of their own in the pressing framework of modern nationalism in the Balkan states.

The late contact of Aromanians with North-Danubian Romanianism lent an unmistakable meaning to their movement. Through the reawakening of their nationality and their coming into contact with an already established Romanian culture, Aromanians could only become Romanians, in their turn, by adopting a literary national language slightly different from their own dialect. This being the case, they necessarily turned into agents of Balkan Romanianism. As a result, they came to be looked upon in highly suspicious ways, and it was this very problem of suspicion that made many of them give up their national ideal and resign themselves to becoming Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Albanians. The alternative was to become Romanian and to emigrate to Romania. Thus, the Romanian State recovered the energies of the Aromanians that had been on the verge of estrangement, but the price to be paid was that the Aromanians had to resettle in Romania. That this solution occurred is proof that both Bolintineanu and Grandea were epitomes of their own nation. In the long run, Bălcescu's idea was as Utopian as it was noble. Its romantic spirit was to be frequently transgressed by the political pragmatism of a Romanian State that was forced to face the real-life challenges of the time.

The Romanian State first expressed official concern for the Aromanians in 1860, thus turning their case into a Southeastern European issue. Costache Negri, the Romanian diplomatic envoy to Constantinople, lobbied the Porte on behalf of the Aromanians, requesting the improvement of their status. In 1862, Anastase Panu, a former Moldavian *caimacan* of Aromanian descent, drew up a comprehensive list of Romanian claims concerning the Aromanians. This agenda now tied the Aromanian issue to the monasteries that were to undergo secularization according to the 1848 Proclamation of Islaz. Panu's programme, which the State decided to take up at a later date, included the following points: *(i)* Education for a number of Aromanians in Romania; *(ii)* the creation of Romanian cultural institutions in Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus with money obtained by the secularization of the monasteries (12,000 ducats); *(iii)* the formal lobbying of the Porte and the major protecting power (Russia) for the carrying out of this agenda; *(iv)* the re-establishment of the Ohrid archbishopric to include an Aromanian bishopric. Although attracted by this project, Prince Cuza hesitated to implement it because he feared that it would make the relationship with Greece even more sensitive than it was.

Panu's agenda was nevertheless gradually put into practice. Two Aromanians led the efforts to establish a network of Romanian schools in the Balkans: Dimitrie Atanasescu, the teacher and former tailor of Târnovo, and Archimandrite Averkie (Anastasie Iaciu Buda) of the Athonite monastery of Iviron.

Having travelled to many Ottoman Empire cities and also to Russia, Atanasescu responded to D. Cozacovici's 1859 appeal to create Romanian schools in the Balkan Peninsula. As he wanted to become a schoolteacher, he went to Bucharest, contacted C. Bolliac, and having learned the Romanian literary language, he finished his education at the Bassarab High School, with the support of Bolliac and his family.

In 1864, D. Cozacovici approached Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza and asked for help in founding a Romanian school in Târnovo. After being granted material support to set up this school, he initiated a strong campaign as the result of which he established other Romanian schools as well, even though he had to combat the Greek religious authorities supported by the Ottoman Empire.

Atanasescu, who became a writer of textbooks, a teacher, and a founder of schools, set a lifelong example to be followed by other apostles of the Aromanian national reawakening. He fought fiercely, suffered serious material losses, went through severe physical and moral pains, and was arrested and then released. Although Atanasescu's textbooks were confiscated and burned, he eventually achieved his ambitions. He published textbooks with a total print-run of 21,000 copies that he distributed free of charge to pupils. He continued to be the same enthusiastic fighter and disseminator of national ideas until his final hour, toward the end of the Nineteenth Century. By his activities and destiny, Atanasescu illustrated the scope, the limitations, and the possibilities of

the Aromanian national cultural rebirth. His personal initiative, that lacked the support of a state-organized movement, was a very good example of Aromanian spontaneity in adhering to the agenda of the Forty-Eighters.

Archimandrite Averkie, the second Aromanian protagonist of the Aromanian national rebirth, showed how propitious the spiritual context was for a national reawakening among the members of the Aromanian clergy, following their contact with Daco-Romanians. He was born in Avdela, but grew up in Selia, near where his uncle, Alexie Bardă (Badralexi), lived. Having lost his father and discovering his vocation for monasticism, Averkie, whose lay name was Anastasie Iaciu Buda, ran away from his guardian's house and joined the Athonite monks.

After he had become an Iviron Superior and archimandrite, and because he was committed to the interests of the Monastery in which he had taken his clerical vows, he was sent to Romania to resolve certain problems concerning the Radu Vodă Monastery, a branch of the Iviron Monastery and which was involved, along with other monasteries, in a dispute, to be settled in court over real estate. He had already become friendly with General Christian Tell during the post-1848 visit of the latter to Athos as a political exile rather than as an émigré. Through his relationship with Tell, Averkie became familiar with a number of Romanian politicians. According to his grandson, Ioan Şomu Tomescu, during his contacts with Romanian intellectual circles, Averkie came to realize that there was a difference between the status of the Aromanians under Hellenic domination and the condition of Romanians in a free country. He expressed his admiration for the existence of a Romanian written culture. As a result, he decied to help Aromanians develop their national existence through a written culture of their own.

Although Averkie was committed to monasticism, could not be accused of betraying the interests of Athos on the issue of the secularized monasteries, he supported the founding of Romanian schools and even the introduction of the Romanian language into Aromanian churches. It was he who first looked after Ioan Şomu Tomescu, getting him to Bucharest and training him to become a schoolteacher. He did the same with other groups of Aromanian children for exactly the same purpose. He was also the head of the Pedagogical Institute that was founded for the same reason in Bucharest and that functioned between 1865 and 1870. Returning to the Balkans, Averkie died after a number of conflicts with the Greek clergy brought about by his nationalist activities. Moderately reliable family sources and traditions claim that Averkie was poisoned by certain protagonists of Hellenism.

Related to Averkie, Professor Ioan J. Caragiani (1929-1941), who had settled in Iaşi, was yet another promoter of the Aromanian national reawakening. Later, he would be involved in negotiations with the Albanians in order to establish a common Romanian-Albanian political autonomy in the Peninsula. Moreover, I. J. Caragiani became known for laying the basis for Aromanian "scientific" historiography (1929-1941).

Of the three personalities who implemented the plans drawn up by the first leaders of the Aromanian national reawakening movement, not one of them could be qualified in any way as a vulgar and obedient agent of the Romanian State, despite what various Balkan historians have claimed. Although Dimitrie Atanasescu, Archimandrite Averkie, and Ioan Caragiani did link their movement to Romanian society and to the Romanian State, they did so because of the logic of common origins that could not help but become apparent as time went on. All three of them, Balkan Romanians, they were outstanding personalities, firm in their beliefs and inspired by an ideal for which they made many material and social sacrifices. The deep echo of their works among Aromanians, the rapid success of the schools that they founded, and the development of Romanian education in the Peninsula proved that they responded to a genuine Aromanian aspiration that had been prepared over a long period of historical development.

3. The "Aromanian Issue" between 1879 and the First World War

The goal of the next pages is to merely provide an outline of the evolution of the Aromanian issue in a period when it was a top priority of Balkan policy, between 1879 and 1919, when the Aromanian national rebirth reached its peak.

The year 1879 witnessed the founding of the Bucharest Society for Macedo-Romanian Culture. Chaired by Calinic Miclescu, the Primate of Romania, and having Vasile Alexandrescu Urechia as its secretary, the institution was led by a Council made up of thirty-five personalities. These included Dimitrie and Ion Ghica, Dumitru Brătianu, C. A. Rosetti, Ion Câmpineanu, Gh. Chiţt, Nicolae Ionescu, Christian Tell, Menelas Ghermani, Dr. Ioan Kalinderu, D. A. Sturdza, Titu Maiorescu, Vasile Alecsandri, and Ioan Caragiani. As it had a legal status, the Society represented the genuine core of the Aromanian rebirth movement. Although the Society was not a government body, it had highly unusual responsibilities, such as the right to issue documents attesting civil status, including certificates of nationality intended to assist Aromanians in obtaining Romanian citizenship with comparatively reduced bureaucratic efforts. Since it was a representative structure for the Aromanians, the Society also guided and coordinated their education in the Romanian language. Its initial objectives were to establish a Romanian bishopric for Aromanians and a boarding school for young people who were studying in Turkey, to raise funds and to subsidize the publication of Aromanian journals and books, and to support the Church. Beginning in 1880, the Society issued an Aromanian journal called *Brotherhood for Justice*, but it could only continue this effort for one year. Still, in 1880, it published a Macedo-Romanian album with 173 Romanian and foreign contributions to the cause.

The fact that the Society for Macedo-Romanian Culture was founded in 1879 was not purely coincidental. Immediately after gaining full state independence in 1878, Romania had the opportunity to freely develop a

foreign policy of its own and used this Society to express its legitimate claim to play a part in the Balkans. However, this claim never implied territorial annexations, only the strengthening of Aromanian cultural autonomy. The Society functioned until 1948.

What were the results of the work carried out by the Society for Macedo-Romanian Culture in co-operation with the Romanian State? The first result was the inauguration, despite the opposition of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, of a large network of Romanian schools throughout the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Patriarchate had finally to give in to the idea, after a Vizier's order, issued on 12 September 1879, granted the Romanians the right to open national schools on the territory and under the protection of the Ottoman Empire. On the eve of the Balkan Wars, there were over 100 Romanian primary schools in the Ottoman Empire, as well as several secondary schools, including a high school in Bitola and a trade school in Salonika. Although these schools all required their students to pay tuition fees, they were subsidized by the Romanian state. The Romanian budget for the year 1914 allocated 815,000 lei for the schools in Macedonia.

The Aromanian schools outside Romania were placed under the direct authority of the Romanian State that appointed all the teachers. They were also subordinated to a General Inspectorate. For several decades, this Inspectorate was headed by Apostol Margarit, whose role of overwhelming importance in the success of the struggle for the Aromanian national reawakening was only clouded by certain examples of personal abuse on his part as well as by his increasing dictatorial and subjective attitudes, that were observed near the end of his career. These problems were somewhat damaging to what had been the good results of Romanian propaganda. Attempts to place the schools under the authority of local *ephors* ultimately failed. This fact proved that the Romanian educational work in Macedonia, where, as Take Ionescu very wisely put it, the schools were seeking pupils, not the other way round, was forced to rely on the guidance of the Romanian state.

The Romanian schools in the Ottoman Empire were highly successful. They produced generations of graduates, many of whom later chose to settle in Romania. Yet, the main problem for these schools was that of persuading Aromanians to remain in their native environments. This goal could not be accomplished. Many people tried to think of possible explanations or remedies. The truth was that the only power which tolerated the development of the Romanian education system was the Ottoman Empire. The other Balkan nationalities displayed an open hostility to the Romanian education system, for they were competing for the Ottoman legacy even before the formal collapse of the Empire, ready to partition it as best they could. The support of Romanianism could be interpreted as engaging in open combat against all the Christian nationalities in Macedonia.

The reasons for which the Aromanians educated in these schools emigrated were numerous. There was, first of all, the growing hostility of

the Balkan environment to the Aromanians. Secondly, there was the appeal of the many professional opportunities available in Romania for persons educated in the Romanian language. Even the disputes among the various political factions of the Romanian parties had an impact on school life and subsequently on the decision to emigrate or not to emigrate.

As for church organization, its progress did not match the positive evolution of the education system. Although on 16 June 1889, the Patriarchate finally permitted the use of the Romanian language in churches built by Aromanians, its attitude, in principle, remained aloof, if not hostile, either openly or through well-hidden manoeuvres. On 27 June 1891, a Sultan's *irade* was promulgated, authorizing the use of the Romanian language in Aromanian churches and the use of Romanian books during religious services. Despite all efforts and in spite of an attempt, in 1896, to elect Antim, who was known to support the Aromanian cause, as the Ohrid metropolitan bishop, there were no possibilities of establishing an Aromanian bishopric able to free the Aromanians from the authority of the Greek church and to support their unhindered development.

Catholic propaganda, conducted mainly by a Lazarist named Faveyral of Bitola, was strongly directed toward the conversion of the Aromanians. Apostol Margarit was linked to certain attempts to bring about a religious union with Rome. However, one has to be very careful when discussing what were in fact rumours rather than real attempts. There are, of course, solid grounds to suspect that Margarit co-operated with France, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Holy See. He tried to rely on support from the Western powers concerned and from their representatives in the Ottoman world, with a certain encouragement from the Romanian government which signed a secret treaty of alliance with Austria in 1883, thus enabling him to accomplish his own national purposes. However, there is no proof that Margarit was ever an Austro-Hungarian agent or a secret agent in the service of Catholicism, as was claimed by the hostile Greek Oecumenical Patriarchate.

As for certain attempts of Aromanians to unite with Rome according to the example of the Asenids, the attempts in question were the sudden expression of various political frustrations rather than a decision born out of a deeply rooted belief. In reality, the Aromanian community was too attached to the Orthodox tradition to make such a shift. This tradition was a critical element in its national consciousness. Here was yet another proof of the genuineness of a national aspiration that ran as deep as ancient Orthodoxy.

But the most important success of Romanian diplomacy and of the Aromanian community in the Ottoman Empire were the *irades* of 9 and 22 May 1905 that recognized Aromanians as a *milet* and gave them the right to organize themselves into separate communities. In this way, administrative autonomy was granted to Romanian villages that were recognized as institutions belonging to a nationality that was different from that of the other Balkan ethnic groups. This achievement was the work of

Alexandru E. Lahovary, the Romanian envoy to Constantinople, who co-operated with the envoys of other European powers, particularly that of Germany, that was known to be on excellent terms with the Porte at that time. The fact that the Sultan recognized the Romanian nationality in his own empire fully consolidated the national rebirth of the Aromanians and sealed their ethnic and linguistic identity with the Romanians who lived in Romania. Thus, the Sultan's act marked the formal recognition of Aromanians as a Romanian minority and granted them a status that would persist after the dismemberment of imperial Turkey. But this act was also an anticipated form of revenge exacted by the Ottomans on the Balkan peoples who later started to fight each other over their legacy.

It did not take long for the *irade* to be questioned. Even before its promulgation, during confrontations focused on Macedonia, which many states were keen on annexing, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece tried to attract the Aromanians to their respective sides using both peaceful means and terror. The various Bulgarian and Greek partisan groups (*komitadgies*) that periodically raided Macedonia ultimately failed in their efforts. Especially after the *irade* was promulgated, the Greeks tried to intimidate the Aromanians through terrorist attacks, setting houses on fire and killing schoolteachers, priests, and other notables in order to persuade them to give up the implementation of the new law. The Aromanians spontaneously organized themselves into armed groups that took action in response to previous violence, but the Romanian state emphatically turned down all their requests for weapons. King Carol I himself firmly rejected the idea of treating together the claims of Aromanian armed groups and those of peaceful religious groups. On the other hand, at the diplomatic level, the Romanian government took a strong stance against these acts of terrorism. A serious crisis affected the initially good relations between the Greek and the Romanian governments, but fortunately, a solution was found owing to the tactful and patriotic attitude of political leaders such as Take Ionescu and Eleutherios Venizelos.

Happily satisfied by the recognition of both their ethnic individuality and their cultural and administrative rights, the Aromanians were dealt a harsh blow in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. The August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest sealed the establishment of national states in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire and divided the Aromanians among these states. Their cohesion was thus shattered, and they were left at the mercy of various national governments that had made no formal commitment to respect Aromanian ethnic autonomy and national rights. The letters exchanged between the Romanian Prime Minister, Titu Maiorescu, and leaders of the Balkan states, by which the latter promised to observe the rights of all minorities living within their territories, did not have the expected outcome. Of all the Balkan states, Greece alone complied with the promises that were made, even though these were never ratified by the Greek Parliament.

One explanation for this particular case could be the diplomatic support that Greece received from Romania during its later conflict with Turkey. In

Yugoslavia, not only were no new schools built, but the existing ones were closed. This continued scarcity of Romanian schools was paralleled by a change in their status. The schools in Greece were only tolerated by the state and were not recognized as educational establishments having rights equal to those of the Greek educational institutions. The Romanian diplomas they issued were only recognized in Romania.

Regarding Aromanian relationships with the Greeks, it is necessary to mention the context of the First World War. During that confusing period, when Greece was divided between Ententists and supporters of the Central Powers, the Pindus Aromanians began an insurrectional movement with Italian support in order to establish, in the Pindus region, an Aromanian political body, completely independent of Greece. Supported by the Society for Macedo-Romanian Culture and by certain Romanian personalities, this movement was exploited by other political actors to obtain recognition of Romanian claims to the whole region of Banat. Represented at Versailles by a delegation led by George Murnu, the Aromanians found themselves in a no-win situation. The Utopian intention to establish an Aromanian or an Aromanian-Albanian state was invalidated by Balkan and general realities. The geographical characteristics of the area concerned failed to provide for economic self-sufficiency. The Aromanians were overly dispersed throughout this area and were surrounded by more numerous neighbours who opposed the whole idea. Finally, there was a lack of consensus among Pindus Aromanians in favour of such an arrangement. The frailty of the dream of a Romanian-Albanian state could be observed in the treatment that Albania meted out to its Romanian minority. The Albanian state did its best to do away with all educational and religious activities carried out by the Aromanians and quickly took the next logical step, that of questioning the very existence of Aromanians on its territory.

One is forced to conclude, in the light of these events, that so far as the Aromanian issue was concerned, the policy of the Romanian government was not very substantial or forceful. However, if one considers that, as the result of what policy there was, valuable energies were recovered while Romania was undergoing its political maturation, one must conclude that none of the material and spiritual efforts expended were in vain. Definite success was registered in terms of prestige and spiritual comfort as well, not to mention in terms also of proof of the desire of Romania for peace and co-operation for the general goals of civilization in the Balkan Peninsula. In sacrificing the Aromanians, Romania gave proof of its commitment to a greater European cause. Given this situation, one can speak more of an unavoidable fate than of voluntary or of deliberate mistakes.

4. The Fading but Possible Metamorphosis of the "Aromanian Issue"

The years, 1919-1948, represented a period of stagnation and decline in the evolution of the Aromanian issue. The Turkish-Greek War that ended

with the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 entailed the resettlement in Greek Macedonia of over one million Greeks from Asia Minor.

This act was a truly finishing stroke for Macedonian Aromanianism. Aromanian shepherding was destroyed by the parcelling of the large pastures so that all the newcomers could receive a piece of land. The latter were protected in the practice of the liberal professions and in trade through a process perceived as a threat by Aromanians who suddenly faced competition. The situation being what it was, those Aromanians who were still keen on their Romanity decided to emigrate to Romania.

With the support of the Romanian State, the Dobrudja Quadrilateral was settled by several thousand Aromanians who were then forced to move into Romanian Dobrudja, when the Quadrilateral was retroceded to Bulgaria, in 1940. To this systematic movement of people, one must add the more gradual emigration of all the Salonika and Grebena secondary school graduates to Romania. The events of the Second World War entailed the permanent closing of the Romanian schools and churches, while the issue of the possessions of the Romanian state was settled in the 1950s.

A marginal, yet tragic, episode was the reckless attempt of a right wing Aromanian group to establish an Aromanian "principality" in the Pindus region, under the protection of the Axis powers. Rejected by the Romanian government headed by General Ion Antonescu, but blatantly supported by the Iron Guard, this unsuccessful attempt cast serious suspicions over the Aromanians and their loyalty to the Greek state. Certain Greek circles took advantage of this situation to identify any Aromanian national assertion as a fascist manifestation, going so far as to take unjustified, excessive, and non-differentiated reprisals against the Aromanian people. Today these tensions seem to have subsided.

The reopening of the Aromanian issue was recently initiated by certain groups of extremely active Aromanian émigrés in Western Europe. For the time being, it is too early to venture an opinion as to these attempts. However, it is noticeable that the goal of these efforts is different from earlier efforts. These partisans insist upon the separateness of Aromanians in regard to the Romanian state and its citizens. To them, Aromanians are ethnically different from Romanians, and they view the Aromanian dialect as a separate language.

These points-of-view, however, are not innovations derived from accurate study. Rather, they are dictated by political opportunism. In major national issues, such distractions can only be detrimental. At any rate, they are out of place.

The current attempts of Greek Aromanians to assert their ethnic individuality within the Greek state and culture seem to be more interesting. If resorting to equally unlikely historical and linguistic theories, they are proving, through the spontaneous and organic character of their manifestations, which are taking place along the line of an uninterrupted tradition, that to this day Aromanian Romanity represents a surprisingly strong potential for spiritual suggestions and virtuality. Only the future

will tell whether this movement represents a source of ethnographic oddities or considerably more.

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V. Landmarks of Christianity-Related Balkan Folk Traditions

SABINA ISPAS

A. THE CONCEPT OF FOLKLORE (POPULAR CULTURE)

An objective perspective on contemporary culture cannot afford to overlook a specific expressive form, usually referred to as folklore, traditional culture, or popular culture. Part and parcel of the cultural legacy of mankind, folklore incorporates group or individual creation developed on traditional grounds and oriented in keeping with the group. At the same time, it reflects various community aspirations as adequate expressions of their cultural and social identities. Standards and values are conveyed orally, by imitation or other means. Folklore is conveyed by language, literature, music, dances, games, mythology, rituals, customs, beliefs, trades, architecture, etc. To all this, a number of legal and behavioural norms can be added. They act with a variable weight, but they come together in predominant percentages and include orality, anonymity, collective character, variability, and syncretism.

Folklore turns out to be a traditional and interpersonal knowledge system that exists at the above-mentioned level when an object of information, that is included in the collective knowledge structure, is processed at the expressive level through a singular act of performance and creation. As it consists of a body of creative forms, of physical gesture, and of oral and intellectual expression, folklore relies on tradition, but not exclusively so.

In contemporary society, folklore includes both tradition as a cultural legacy and innovation as springing from the needs of the modern world. It does not simply belong to non-literate societies, nor does it consist of tradition alone. Tradition is a socially tested and accepted norm that only exists to the extent of daily needs. A product created by an individual turns into folklore provided the community accepts it and conveys it further. The performance of a folkloric fact is creation and at the same time, it bears the print of uniqueness, but the creative performer does not have any rights of paternity over his or her products, for the community claims these rights. Each folkloric community comes up with its own degree of innovation.

Rituals, which, as they touch upon the sacred, can only be used and performed within certain patterns with a normative value and role, are the exception to this rule. Ritual innovation – closely linked to the system of beliefs, practices, and customs – is possible and manifests itself in large

time and space units which include information and model-conveying throughout several generations. Innovation, however, acts slowly, is determined by profound changes at the level of mentality, and is directly coordinated by religious belief. A major innovation is triggered by a change of role which, in its turn, is historically and socially determined and guided by the needs of the group.

The conveyance of the expressive forms through which folklore actually works is absorbed rather than learned, and developed rather than invented. At the same time, it is unitary and provides distinction and individuality to the consumer group. Folklore manifests itself in "primitive" and "advanced" societies, in rural and in urban areas, and in subordinate and dominant groups. Creation, recreation, and learning techniques are distinguished from extra-folkloric forms. The existence of a folkloric product is linked to the moment of performance, since there is no folkloric product in a natural form to be found outside this framework. Genuine folklore only exists in a specific context. Folkloric reproductions in any other contexts than those immediately and operationally determined transform folklore as such into folklore as a topic for scientific research, folklore as a curricular subject, folklore as entertainment and special artistic information, and folklore as a source of inspiration and processing. In none of these situations does folklore work as such, becoming instead a cultural merchandise used for purposes other than its own.

Researchers gave up the idea of discussing the category vaguely designated as "the people", when debating the subject of folkloric creation, focusing instead on special groups that are determined by a certain status that they might have, *i.e.*, occupation, age, sex, place of origin, religion, ethnic background, etc. Folklore is a vital element in the life of each member of a given group, even though no member personally knows all the other members of the group. They are kept together by a common background and a certain tradition, as well as by common values, norms, and symbols. At the same time, folklore acts as an element of unity at group level in that it provides identity landmarks and leads the group toward a common destiny.

In order to understand folklore, it is necessary not only to stick to the traditional (literary, musical, or choral) texts, but also to try to grasp the system through which they are used and controlled. This system does not lie in the given folklore itself, but among the people who produce it and put it to good use. Folklore is the living culture in an ascending dynamics, in terms of the evolution, enrichment, and improvement of expressive forms, in keeping with individual and group needs and determined by general social, political, and cultural conditions. It is part and parcel of social, economic, and political values. For this reason, folklore is economically, politically, and culturally significant, having a part to play in the history of each people and a well-defined place in contemporary history.

Folklore is a communicative process rather than an aggregate of facts. It is a series of phenomena, the mere existence of which implies the idea of successive transformation, change, and evolution. Thus, the folkloric

phenomenon cannot be separated from its historical dimension. This process has a twofold perspective: *(i)* that of its existence throughout history, by means of the preservation of certain expressive structures and forms, of an "inventory" of structures, formulae, and meanings making up a basic stock, shared by a group with a precise and coherent identity, used each and every time in keeping with specific needs and capable of being enriched with new forms and structures whenever various situations entail new needs; *(ii)* that of the straight and specific process in itself, the actual birth of the product, viewed as a unique, unrepeatable, and irreversible act. The value of the past is subordinated to the needs of the contemporary moment. By folklore, one does not mean what is older or more developed, but merely the lore, *i.e.*, a "science", that is directly linked to the cultural identity and to the social requirements of a community (S. Ispas, 1997).

At first, the meaning of the term, folklore, was ambivalent and designated both the phenomenon and the discipline that dealt with it, later called folkloristics, and currently sharing a highly complex field of research with ethnography, ethnology, ethnomusicology, ethnochoreology, and cultural anthropology, while interfacing with sociology, theology, and other socio-humanistic disciplines, as well. Germans still use the term, *volkskunde*. The Romanic peoples speak of popular traditions, and the Greeks refer to laography. Throughout the world, however, nobody anymore considers the traditional sphere to be the predominant feature of folklore. A modern, dynamic, and process-linked vision prevails in all the schools dealing with this field, in Eastern Europe. In humanist studies, each period is marked by the addition of new meanings as well as by particularities of interpretation of the central concepts. These are used as strategic terminology in a logically overlapping series of strata resulting from the information acquired from successive research projects.

The first volume of the *Standard Dictionary of Folklore, Mythology, and Legends* (1940) includes no fewer than twenty-one definitions of folklore. Earlier, in 1936, Pierre Saint-Yves published in Paris his *Manuel de Folklore*, in the pages of which he made a number of remarks, the current relevance of which cannot be questioned:

> Folklore is the science of traditional culture in the popular environments of the "civilized countries" and mainly in popular environments. In reality, studies of folklore ought to be assigned to different experts: traditional language and literature, to philologists; the whole field of general, philosophical, and religious ideas, including the customs directly inspired by them, to philosophers; popular sciences, to scientists; popular arts and occupations, to technicians.

One should keep in mind the complex vision of this so-called popular culture or folklore, which includes all the compartments of human existence, as well as its entire spiritual and material creation. By its very complexity, such a vision goes beyond the investigative capacity of only

one specialization. The ways in which both this phenomenon and society as a whole have become diversified currently require that all those who wish to study oral cultures have very thorough and insightful qualifications. The author of this study believes that certain forms of contemporary audio-visual culture come very close to being forms of folklore. Even written and oral mass media forms are folklore to the extent that variations occur. The terms, tradition and folklore, overlap. "[...] Folklore reflects the worldview of different folk groups and strengthens the identity of these groups" (S. Ispas, 1997, p. 20).

Rural area or village folklore is just one part of the folklore of an ethnic group and is usually more conservative, coherent, and balanced, than other parts. It displays an aspect of popular culture that offers models having a distinct value for given communities. The community expresses itself in a cognitive and affective way in regard to other people, the environment, and the universe. The vision that such a community has of the outside accounts for the attitudes and skills which determine the actions of its inhabitants. The vision of the universe generally appears as a projection of immediate economic circumstances. A tension is set up between the intellect and the emotional that guides the vision of the world.

Societal identity takes shape through the principal symbols, beliefs, signs, and traditions that give meaning to the coexistence of members of groups and enable the latter to recognize their own members from among masses of individuals. Folklore expresses the cultural identity of a family as well as that of occupational, national, religious, ethnic, age, and sex-determined groupings. It enables the establishment of links among groups with similar affinities. An identity implies a "merging" of territory, language, and people that is legitimized through a genealogy and a territory conceptualized as such. If they are lost, identity is weakened, and an irreversible alienation takes place.

In order to remake a local identity, for instance, a peasant identity, it is necessary to begin by remaking individual identity. The expressive forms of folklore - singing, dancing, storytelling, ritual performances, religious practice, etc. – bring the group together under the sign of a common destiny. Thus, identity becomes a justification for individual social existence. Identity in this sense must be perceived as a psychological and social structure. At the same time, it must provide security by setting and resetting the grounds for the coordinates of the initial state of the group.

International political influences, religion, and language shape ethnic identity. Increases in individual self-awareness are determined by the progress of social development. Individual identity develops as a result of the capacity of individuals to actively structure their knowledge and experience in relation to their personal ideals, conflicts, etc. Some experts claim that the "man of the future" will be "frail" because he or she will have only a very small number of identity landmarks. Group and individual identities undergo a swift process of redefinition and restructuring owing to the contemporary diversification of society at all levels. On the one hand, folklore as a system of systems is subject to an intense and very

diverse aggression, and on the other hand, it is viewed as a pillar of identity definition that provides coherence and security for groups undergoing transformation.

All of the above provide yet another explanation for the complex situation of Southeastern Europe. In this region, totalitarian mind sets of varying depths and intensities, in keeping with the totalitarian forms and structures at work in each and every state, encountered democratic mind sets developed through and from various traditions, including traditions of ownership (*i.e.*, those of Greece, Turkey, etc).

During the communist era, some states opted for a relative secularization of folkloric structures through a complete ban on religious practices. Others secularized these structures by introducing a number of pseudo-sacred festive-ceremonial forms, while still others distorted all of the profound meanings that their folklore might have had, using it on festive occasions as a kind of pseudo-entertainment, good for shows or contests. Nevertheless, in none of the countries concerned was the state leadership able to completely destroy the sacred basis of oral culture.

Each of these oral culture types currently has several forms of organization. Group and individual identities are being restructured accordingly. Indeed, in some cases, the revitalization and the re-capitalization of traditional folkloric models are being excessively guided and coordinated. Fragments of old identities, most of them derived from rural areas, are meeting new structures determined by different socio-economic processes. It is as much necessary to have a correct knowledge of traditional forms and their true meanings as it is to have a correct perception of the identity landmarks of the neighbouring cultural communities with which contacts are being re-established following half a century of estrangement.

The resumption of movement along old trade routes and the revigoration of various tourist itineraries, particularly in Turkey, Greece, and Israel, have very clear meanings. Folkloric culture suggests answers to present-day anxieties. This type of cultural contact sets the basis for models that will take shape in legendary continental areas that seemingly revived old, if not ancient, political-administrative structures.

This contemporary age has given rise to the prerequisites for an ethnic crisis occurring in the guise of socio-cultural identity. What experts call "senseless identity" frequently appears as an irrational ritualistic element, guiding daily actions, or as a certain type of superficial festiveness. Folkloric creation is the result of collaboration between system components (cultural patterns, models, etc.) and the capacity of the individual to use them according to a model that is guided by group needs, space, time, etc.

The individual creator and carrier of folklore is the product of all the educational elements that have contributed to his or her appearance: his or her social group, his or her family, his or her folkloric or extra-folkloric institutions, his or her personal assimilation, and his or her capacity for reproduction and creation. An impoverished community that is deprived of

its individual creative capacities loses its individuality, becomes alienated, and runs the risk of dissolution. The traditional forms in which specific folk creation appears are frail and can easily be lost. Once the forms of folklore enter a passive phase, they can only be updated in parallel with a change of role, context, and performer-creator. Therefore, it is vital to be familiar with these specific folk forms because they belong to the characteristic structure of the group, are part and parcel of its identity, and exist as the result of its shared history. Folklore needs to be studied in the same way in which an individual studies and learns about the history, the language, and the geography of a country. It should also, however, be approached in a universalistic framework, through the history, the geography, and even the languages of its neighbours.

There are two large functional groups: the *ritual* and the *non-ritual*.

Ritual was dominant from the very beginning of folkloric creation, being marked by the element of collective lyricism. The latter includes rituals linked to the calendar cycle with fixed or mobile dates and rituals linked to the family life cycle. The attitude of the community toward the observance and the preservation of certain genres or species is differentiated according to the importance granted to individual existence and circumstances.

Funeral rituals, as an example, are better preserved than other rituals owing to the difficulty of eliminating fear when faced with the mystery of death, something common to most people, irrespective of social category, education, and religion. The system of customs that is linked to funerals played (and still plays) a critical role in the balancing of a liminal situation, both at sacred and at social levels. It is also linked to the bivalent protection of the community of the living and of the new state with which the deceased has to cope, according to traditional beliefs and mentalities.

Various practices related to births and christenings are preserved out of a fear, that is sometimes unacknowledged and may even be unconscious, that the child's future might be jeopardized were they to be disregarded. In moments of acute crisis, the community rediscovers protective practices which, while defying explanation, retain the strictly ritual features for which they were created, as in the case of disease prevention and healing practices, reactions to long periods of drought, etc.

The loss of the ritual character of some of the genres or species could be actively perceived in Southeastern European communities, in the aftermath of the First World War, owing to the new contacts that they had made and to the access that they had gained to a new level of institutionalized culture that began to permeate the inhabitants of rural areas as an offshoot of the Westernization processes that had occurred in towns. These processes varied, depending on the political situation in each country and local traditions as shaped by history. One of the unifying factors was the dominance of Orthodoxy, which, in many respects, offered a relatively unitary basis for the setting of mentalities. Internal functional mutations began to take place in a number of ritual or even non-ritual species, according to their specific inner laws.

After the Second World War, parts of the traditional cultures in the region experienced a special type of aggression (changes in the structure of private ownership, a ban on certain group activities and meetings, materialistic-atheistic education, the development of ample and staged amateur movements), while the structures of traditional genres were undermined and their specificity, distorted. Artificial festiveness eroded the basis of genuine folklore. To these traumas, one can add examples of biased interpretation and, frequently, of the lack of accurate, objective, and modern information about folkloric phenomena.

The latter situation induced certain experts to change their views regarding traditional culture from a theoretical standpoint, coming to identify a mixture of mythological elements, a sum of ancient and unchanged remains, and to strenuously preserve a "primitivism" in ways that had become obsolete much earlier in other European regions. The dynamic, renewable aspect of folklore, as well as its real functionalism, came implicitly to move in increasingly secular or lay directions, without any explanation as to how they could possibly have survived in a strange guise, to say the least, *i.e.*, that of lay rituals. It is necessary, once again, to reiterate the need to distinguish between genuine folklore and folklore turned into consumer goods or shows.

The traditional models and structures that are the concern of various experts and are viewed as landmarks of traditional genuine folklore crystallized, in most cases, during the medieval period, being obviously marked by the specific nature of each area and folkloric region, as well as of each province, land, or particular ethnic group. Without ignoring the previously mentioned functional character of folk creation, and taking into account (according to its true value) the contribution of innovation to the birth of a product of folklore, one can conclude that these systems of folklore, known to have come into being during the Middle Ages, worked and will continue to work as aesthetic, functional, and value-related standards.

The invasion of modern technology, which, according to some observers, follows a folkloric pattern, quite often presents itself as a kind of threat to traditional folkloric structures. Folklore and technology represent two cultural worlds that find themselves in relative conflict. The impact of industrialized culture conveyed through the media gradually erodes folklore. Given the new sophisticated broadcasting technologies, the present-day "information siege" dramatically varies from what occurred during the first half of the Twentieth Century and during previous centuries. In Europe and in the Middle East, with which Southeastern Europe has had frequent contacts, isolated cultural areas no longer exist.

Today, broadcasts of information often occur simultaneously over wide geographical areas and sometimes over the whole planet. Thus, a regional model in regard to the sending of information has evolved and has given rise to folkloric models the values of which are universal. The widespread use of radio, television, recordings, video-cassettes, modern art, and the requirements of often-cosmopolitan fashion have tended to erode

traditional cultures and folklore. Unassimilated elements frequently breed valueless hybrids that permeate a wide area for a certain period.

Traditional communities had their own institutions, which regulated individual and group existence: the system of festivals, the legal norms, the kinship system, male and female age sets, etc. One institution that had a decisive authority was the Church. The authority of the Byzantine-rite Orthodox Church in the cultural perimeter with which this study is concerned is one of the important, basic factors in the creation of Southeastern European systems of folklore. The folklorization of Christian precepts and dogmas turned into constitutive parts of oral culture. They led to the melting down of theological and philosophical information, along with elements derived from paleo-Christian times, both existing as intrinsic elements in folkloric culture, of which the individual imbued with folklore is no longer aware. From this point on, a false parallel has evolved between folkloric culture and the official or dominant religious structure in a given community. The folkloric phenomenon is the result of all the factors that act upon the human spirit and express the needs of the group.

B. SPACE AND TIME: SACRED AND SECULAR

The sacred is that special and well-delimited element in the vicinity of which the profane permanently lie. The existence of a cosmos free of the sacred is a recent idea in the history of mentalities. The sacred is perceived as a reality distinguishing itself from the surrounding nature. It is marked by hierophanticism and implies feelings of fear, fascination, mystery, and majesty. Religious man does not perceive space and time as being homogeneous. From the standpoint of religious thinking, the sacred involves bans and commitments that are considered to be essential for human existence. Obligations and bans do not take into account either rational explanations, technological breakthroughs, or even social institutions.

Through the sacred, the human being becomes a protected, directed, and hopeful entity. He or she uses the sacred to come to terms with the wish, the power, and the knowledge on "the other side" of existence. By means of the sacred, he or she integrates him- or herself into the universe and overcomes his or her state of anomie. At the same time, the human being discovers certain rules, enjoying both the revealing of rites and the conveying of myths and transcendent information. Sacred time and space are endowed with one special quality, that of power. Inside the sacred, the human being can contact the divine and transcend the profane. All sacred forms are hierophantic. When the sacred comes down, space and time detach themselves from daily life and the environment and acquire special qualities. Sacred space can become holy space having variable size and layout. It ranges from the icon in the corner of a room, from the hearth or the table on which lies the knot-shaped loaf of bread (*colac*), the funeral wheat porridge (*colivă*), the holy water (*aghiasmă*), etc., to the doorstep adorned with plants having protective powers, the field marked by the

furrow of a plough, the church viewed as a sanctuary, the graveyard considered as a temple, and even goes so far as including entire holy cities: Jerusalem, Mecca, etc.

Human existence is linked to space and time viewed as two coordinates regulating not only the individual or the group life, but also the form, the use, and the value of all their material (and spiritual) goods. Perceptions of space and time relate globally to human experience and need to be settled according to axiological, astronomical, administrative, and religious criteria. Space and time are accepted in keeping with predetermined or combined criteria having to do with the places of action of the sacred or the daily secular. In traditional (folkloric) systems, space and time bear the print of religious signs and marks meant to protect and to warrant the presence of the sacred. Traditional society could not live outside the sacred without damaging its integrity and its very being as a whole. In most of Southeastern Europe, the time axis of work is delimited by the embodiment of God and the birth of Jesus. For a smaller number of communities, sacred time and space are related to the personality of Mohammed.

Time prevails over space, as the marking of sacred places or of favourable spots for human life is determined by certain moments in time (for instance, the choice of a place upon which to build a house may be influenced by the progress of daytime or night-time rituals). Time is measured by the use of data made available by the measurement of space, mainly by means of astronomical observation and research. The sun, the moon, the stars, the shifts from day and night are landmarks according to which the life of humankind in traditional society is organized. From a given perspective, it is possible to assert that the systems of traditions and customs, as well as the ideas contained in texts, particularly the components of rituals – but even those that are not linked to rituals – constitute a way of replicating in a secular manner that which is considered in religious services and books (including non-Christian ones).

"Three things appear to distinguish man from all other living creatures: the systematic making of tools, the use of abstract language, and religion"(W. A. Lessa and E. A. Vogt, 1965). A veritable time code for communication among the members of a community is created. It is the same for everybody and, as in the case of other codes, the food code, the ownership handing code, the vegetal value code, etc., should not be infringed. Given the links that the time code establishes between the sky, the earth, and history, the calendar becomes a sort of "breviary of profane and religious liturgies", a depository of a gradually expanding collective memory to which people add their own individual histories. The religious angle from which each community perceives existence is therefore a fundamental mark in the assessment of space and time values. For Christians, time was created when the world was created: "*Mundus non factus est tempore, sed cum tempore*", to quote St. Augustine.

The Christian era, also known as the common or the modern era, was introduced and calculated, in the Sixth Century, by the monk, Dionysus

Exiguous (the Little), born in Scythia Minor. He counted the years from the birth of Jesus. Year I was the year of redemption or the year of embodiment. The current Western calendar was established by an Alexandrian named Sosigenes and was known as the Julian Calendar. Adjustments to this calendar through the Gregorian reform were gradually made (between the Sixteenth and the Eighteenth Centuries) in Roman Catholic and Protestant countries.

The "new style" was officially adopted in the civil organization of predominantly Orthodox states in the Twentieth Century: Bulgaria and Russia in 1918, Serbia and Romania in 1919, Greece in 1923. The 1923 Constantinople Inter-Orthodox Congress opted for a calendar adjustment in the other Orthodox Churches as well. A successive switch to this calendar was undertaken by the Constantinople Oecumenical Patriarchate, the Greek and Albanian Churches, the Cypriot Church, the Polish Orthodox Church, the Antioch Oecumenical Patriarchate, the Romanian Orthodox Church, the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Alexandria (1928), the Czech and the Slovak Orthodox Metropolitan Seat, the Finnish Orthodox Church, and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (1968). The Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches, the Jerusalem Oecumenical Patriarchate, and the Monastic Republic of Mount Athos continue to observe the old style. Easter and all the mobile church holy days related to Easter are still celebrated according to the old calendar, the same as in the case of the churches that retained the unrevised Julian calendar.

According to Sosigenes's calendar, the New Year began on 1 March. Later, 1 January was chosen as the start of the New Civil Year, the start of the New Religious Year being set at 1 September, a date that coincided meaningfully with the start of the Jewish civil year, which, according to the tradition of the Old Law, marked the beginning of the creation of the world. Tradition also claims that it was on this day that Jesus began his public work. The so-called Byzantine, Constantinople, or Adam's era was used as early as the Seventh Century B.C. in the Byzantine chancellery, later being adopted by South-Danubian Slavs and Russians, and also being utilized in the Romanian territories until the Eighteenth Century. In the Dodecanese Islands, 31 August still marks "the end of the year", while 1 September marks "the first day of the new year" (G. A. Megas, 1963). The Roman-Catholic Church consecrates the religious New Year on the first Sunday following 30 November as Advent Sunday.

Calendar structure is the organizational basis for the so-called popular calendar customs cycle, regulating the whole life and work of traditional communities. This system also regulates the customs surrounding the family life cycle the liminal moments and commemorations of moments of which are directed by the calendar system. Thus, marriages can only take place in certain periods, always before or after the main religious holy days (Easter, Christmas, St. Peter and St. Paul, St. Mary), as well as before or after the fasting days of the week. For this reason, the traditional days for weddings are Saturday and Sunday.

The commemoration of the dead also takes place according to the religious calendar. It is linked to specific moments falling before or after the principal holy days: a week before the start of the Easter holy week, all Saturdays during Lent, Maundy Thursday, and Whitsunday. Prayers for the dead are also offered on 7 November and one week before Christmas, both on fixed dates.

The celebration of one's name day, traditionally in the Orthodox world of Southeastern Europe, that of a saint in the Christian calendar, was a personal holiday. Birthday celebrations have only recently been accepted in traditional communities.

The main concern of a traditional community was to prevent wicked and devilish forces from entering its living space with the purpose of destroying material goods or of committing physical or psychological aggression against community members. This necessity explains the need to extend the sacred into daily space and time.

The start of the religious year on 1 September is marked by the commemoration of St. Simeon Stylites. According to popular belief, the earth is supported by four pillars (four fish or four trees) which are gnawed by the Devil throughout the year. Only on Christmas Eve or on the night before Easter are the trunks holding the earth able to become intact again, for one more year. According to a Greek belief, those who gnaw the earth-supporting trees are the *kallikantzaroi*. They will only cease their activity when Jesus is born, thus saving the earth from utter collapse.

A complex work of criticism has analyzed the folk narratives circulating throughout Southeastern Europe associating the image of the world-supporting tree trunks with pillars. The latter, in turn, have been associated with the old symbology of the Cross.

In the folk calendar, the temporal dimension of the year is marked by two moments commemorating two military saints and martyrs belonging to the start of the Fourth Century: St. George and St. Demetrios. For the whole of Southeastern Europe, these two dates are actual "year markers". Romanians claim that the two saints hold "the keys of time", and that on these dates deals between ploughmen and stock raisers can be made or unmade. For cattle- (and especially sheep-) raising communities, the pastoral season starts on St. George's Day and finishes on St. Demetrios's Day. In-between these dates, the shepherds and their flocks go up into the mountains, and pens are built. The shepherds and the flocks remain in the mountains until autumn. Then, the pens are dismantled, and the shepherds and their flocks come down and prepare for winter.

On St. George's Day, in Romania, tradition calls for the ritual sacrifice of a lamb. At the same time, the Saint himself is honoured by specific rites called *rugi* or *nedei* (bonfires). On this day, Romanians, Bulgarians, and Greeks adorn their gates, windows, and pathways with green branches; young people "sit in swings"; and all sorts of obviously ritual dances are performed. Bulgarians and Greeks accompany their dances and other rituals by narrative songs having a ritual role. A narrative ritual song about St. George's struggle with the dragon is sung during a dance led by

the eldest man in the village. The freeing of the princess and the throwing of water are also evoked. Horse races are organized in other regions. Romanians believe that during the night of this Saint's day, treasures are set on fire; however, these treasures can be discovered with the help of fern flowers that bloom particularly for this occasion.

The way in which this holy day is associated with a revived vegetable ceremony is typical of Southeastern European communities. Certain Greek towns and villages still commemorate the New Year on 1 September, for the month of September is for them, as well as for Romanians, the "vintage month" or "the month of the Cross" (G. A. Megas, 1963). Local legends say, that on this day, the Archangel writes down the names of those who are to die during the coming year. This tradition can be linked to a frequently identified European motif, the origin of which lies in popular accounts, namely the "archangel and monk" motif.

During this month, the agricultural motif is actively present in various rituals: plates filled with seeds are sent to the local church for blessing by the priest; the last sheaf of wheat from the harvest is hung on a house beam. Houses, in turn, are adorned with flower garlands. In some cases, in Greece, garlands made of flowers are thrown into the sea. Moreover, gifts are given to children, godfathers, and parents. It is clear that, until very recently, folk communities were very much aware of the religious new year. In exchange, a common holiday, associated with the vintage holiday, was the Day of the Cross, celebrated through full fasting in all communities.

The ban on food and work is typical of many rituals and is a common practice in a number of religions. These bans make contact with the sacred easier and create the prerequisite for hierophanticism. Thus, there are insular villages in Greece in which such phrases as the following are heard: "On the day of the Cross stay in... port, cross the sails, and tie the ropes", or "On the day of the Cross stay in... port, but on St. George's Day get up and set out to sea" (G. A. Megas, 1963, p. 156).

While Romanians use sweet basil as a sacred and protective plant on Epiphany Day, in some Greek villages sweet basil branches are distributed in memory of a still circulating legend according to which a sweet basil bush appeared at the place where the cross was found. At about the same time, people started to make wine, and the vineyard, along with the vines themselves and the wine, were symbolically associated with the Eucharist. Traditionally, everywhere in Southeastern Europe, women are prohibited from crushing grapes, this task being reserved exclusively to men.

The vegetal code still marks folk practices that are focused on the ways in which wheat is transformed into dough and is then baked in a variety of forms.

Wheat and dough symbology is deeply rooted in Southeastern Europe and in the culture of the Eastern Mediterranean. The taking over and the resemantization of this symbology in Eastern Christianity occurred very early. Good evidence in this respect can be found in St. Augustine's *Confessions,* which speak about the way in which certain traditions

belonging strictly to Eastern Christianity were banned by Bishop Ambrose of Milan. When St. Monica, St. Augustine's mother,

> came up to the saints' graves and, as was the custom in Africa, brought the broth, the bread, and the wine, she was stopped by the gatekeeper, and when she found out it was the bishop who set this ban, she piously followed it in submission [...] after she brought a basketful of festive food for pretasting and sharing, she did not pour more than one tiny glass of wine prepared to her taste, mild enough, to make the gesture of dignity, and if it were the graves of the deceased that had to be honoured in this way, she would take that single present – not only thinned out with a lot of water, but even very slightly warm (similar to the Eucharist...) – by small mouthfuls, as it was piety she sought rather than pleasure.

Mention is made of the "basketful of fruits of the earth" which used to be taken to the graves of martyrs. This offering recalls not only those of the Greco-Roman world, but even the sacrifices performed in the Judaic monotheistic creed which used to require both animal and vegetal sacrifices, among which wheat dough, barley, and oil played very important roles. The identification of wheat with the body of Jesus is easily recognized in almost all the rites that include the giving of alms (the case of Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and Russians) and where wheat is present either as gruel – the funeral wheat porridge (*colivă*) – or as leavened dough – plain or knot-shaped bread.

Some of the first and oldest evidence about wheat belong to prehistory and to the civilizations of the Middle and the Near East. In the Middle East, the growing of wheat took place in the river valleys, particularly in the Tigris and the Euphrates Valleys, as well as along the Nile Valley in Egypt. Sites dating back to the year 1000 B.C. or the year 500 A.D. have been registered in the Danube Valley, in the British Isles, and in Northern Scandinavia. Wheat is associated with rituals in very early periods. Information is available about its presence in worship services for Demeter, Ceres, Osiris, etc. Wheat can be found in several ceremonial and ritual forms, either as boiled and germinated grain, or processed as dough, which is next boiled or baked.

The unprocessed wheat that has not been ground, kneaded, etc. is the vegetal substance that is the most sacred. Its use is frequently found in calendar cycle rituals, but is also known to appear on matrimonial occasions, as, for instance, when sheaves of wheat are woven into the bridal wreath, as customary in Romania. Wheat seeds are prepared for germination on St. Andrew's or St. Nicholas's eve and are used as sacred plants with a ceremonial role during meals on Christmas and New Year's day. Vegetal revival is the sign and the prefiguration of ordinary life and even of eternal life given to people when the Messianic predictions come true. In certain rural regions, pieces of straw are placed on the table upon which the knot-shaped bread, a ritual food, is also placed. Green wheat

sheaves are woven into wreathes prepared for Midsummer's Day, on 24 June (when both the summer solstice and St. John's Day are celebrated).

In Romanian villages, on Midsummer's Day, the *Drăgaica* is chosen from among the most beautiful and deserving of young girls. She is dressed and adorned as if she were a bride and is later taken to the green wheat fields by a procession of people who sing and dance. In Greece, Macedonia, Thrace, and Eastern Rumelia, the peasants choose the *Kalinitsa*. Elected from among the most beautiful of young girls in the neighbourhood, the *Kalinitsa* is in her turn dressed as a bride, has a flower garland placed around her neck and, accompanied by a procession of girls and boys, walks in a procession around the village, singing and dancing:

> My beautiful Kalinitsa,
> My young bride,
> My mother sent me to the well for water
> For cool water
> To water the sweet basil.
>> (*in*, G. A. Megas, 1963, p. 36).

The Romanian version of the *Drăgaica* ritual is more explicitly linked to vegetal and fertility rituals and only retains a ban on getting close to the water to remind participants of a possible connection with an aquatic spirit ("*Drăgaica* claims a human head"; "do not bathe on the day of the *Drăgaica*"). The Romanian text is explicitly linked to the green fields of wheat and can be associated with the fetching of the barley sheaf on the second day of the Mosaic Easter, a gift dedicated to God and marking the moment exactly seven weeks before the Holiday of the Fifty.

The latter connection is made because in Southeastern Europe, 24 June is associated with the celebration of the birth of St. John the Baptist, whose personality captured the borderline between the Old Law and the New Law, the symbolism of purifying and resurrecting water (eternal life is given to the newborn "out of water and spirit"), the crossroads of time (the celebrations linked to his name divide the year into its two halves), and the consent granted to the new monotheistic religious direction.

The Romanian text in Dobrudja, where the *Drăgaica* ritual is still performed, as also in the Buzău region, states the following:

> Jump up, *Drăgaica*, jump!
> *Drăgăicuţele!*
> There's the summer of all riches,
> With a wreath of ripe gold ears.
> Jump up, *Drăgaica*, jump!
> Cut away the golden ears,
> Ears of rich and plenty [...].
>> (*in*, Ovidiu Bîrlea, 1983).

Perhaps, in a broader context, mention should be made of the habit of certain women in Serres, Greece, who march in procession through their

villages after having placed a plate with germinated barley or lentils on the Epitaph, next to the crucified Jesus and the censer.

It is useful to recall some information about the old Mosaic cult, for there seems to be a very close link between the practices and the meanings of the sacrificial acts of that period and some of the folk traditions and practices of the Orthodox area that are deeply rooted in the paleo-Christian age, when certain Judaic prescriptions were still being observed. The three great Judaic holidays, Passover, the Holiday of the Fifty, and the Holiday of the Tents, which commemorate events from the history of the entry of the Jews into the Holy Land, are at the same time linked to certain aspects of agricultural labour: the beginning and the end of reaping and the start of harvesting. All these meanings foreshadow the road to Redemption and underline events presented in the New Testament and announcing Messianic salvation.

By comparison with the tradition of animal sacrifice in old Judaic practice, what was preserved and abstracted was the practice, as well as the themes, related to bloodless sacrifices. The materials for bloodless sacrifices were wheat and barley sheaves, various grains, oil, wine, bread kneaded from "clean" wheat flour and baked in an oven, on the griddle, or in a clay pot. (This bread was unleavened, except for the bread baked for the Holiday of the Fifty and the Reconciliation sacrifice, which was leavened, wherefrom the current Orthodox tradition of leavened dough was preserved, given that, on the Holiday of the Fifty, the Church as a congregation of the faithful was established.) To these sacrifices one must add incense as a symbol of prayer and salt as a symbol of holiness.

The tradition of the first and the last sheaf which is either left in the field, or brought home as a bunch, or woven into various shapes (a wreath or a cross), is very common among European peoples. Between these practices, some of which were accompanied by ample ceremonial songs, such as the reaping songs in Romanian folklore and the old Indo-European tradition of the "spirit of the crop", which brings together all the germinating energy of the wheat field and takes refuge in the first or the last sheaves, ethnologists have established numerous and sophisticated links. However, from what is known, no analysis has been made of the meaning of these practices that are spread out among Southeastern European farmers (Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs) by relating them to Judaic practices and to their possible resemantization in the Judeo-Christian age. For the Greeks, the last sheaf, woven into a cross or a comb and called *Kteni* or *Psathi*, is brought home and kept in a place where everybody can see it, as it is known to have special propitiatory and apotropaic powers through its very contact with the sacred. In certain regions of Greece, a small cross-shaped portion of the field is left uncropped and is called "the ploughman's beard" (G. A. Megas, 1963, p. 140). Romanians call it "God's beard" or the food for birds and animals. Similar practices accompanied by ritual songs have been reported in Bulgaria.

Vegetal structures are a constant presence throughout Southeastern Europe. Represented in various guises, in their natural states, or in various degrees of processing, they constitute a so-called "substitution system". The most frequent replacement of the human by the vegetal can be identified in calendar cycle rituals as well as in various transitional moments in the family life cycle. In this role, wheat – regardless of the form: green sheaf, ripe sheaf, straw, boiled, crushed, or kneaded grains turned into dough – is what is most present and has a wide range of meanings. In addition to wheat, vines and grapes are also worth mentioning and are followed by various types of flowers, each with its own connotative particularization: sweet basil, marjoram, celandine, midsummer flowers, valerian, fern, belladonna, iron herb, etc.

Folkloric literary texts grant a special place to the complex processes undergone by wheat from the moment its seeds are sown until the dough is baked and the ritual dough shapes are produced, among which knot-shaped bread is the most significant, as it is a familiar form of ritual food for Romanians and the peoples of Southeastern Europe in general. The traditional legend provides a hierarchy of values relating to wheat and corn, as the latter meets the former, hailing it with the following words: "Good day to thou, household plenty!", and receiving the following answer: "We thank thee, household honour!" (Elena Niculiță Voronca, 1903, pp. 131-139).

Oral tradition preserves the belief that "God left wheat on the earth when Our Lord, Jesus Christ, was born, and Romanians honour him by eating boiled wheat first on Christmas". "Summer wheat bears the face of God. Wafers are only made of summer wheat". "As our bodies are made of clay, the body of Jesus is made of wheat". It is also said that "there was no wheat here and the birds brought it in their breaks from across the sea. St. Basil was the first to have sown wheat" (E. N. Voronca, 1903, p. 131-139).

Related to wheat as a vegetal in contact with the sacred (and also having in mind the symbology of flight and the role of the bird in the relationship between man and God), the following is found in the text of a legend:

> Jackdaws go to a monastery in the womb of the earth and bring wheat sheaves in their beaks for the holy nuns who heap them up into stacks. Out of those wheat sheaves the nuns make wafers and bread. This is the place where God sends books from the sky and, when they wake, the nuns find the books in the church. Out of the books, letters are then written to be sent throughout the world to all the monasteries. There we meet Saint Wednesday, Saint Friday, all the days and their name is Saint Agura (Mount Athos) (Voronca, 1903, p. 139).

In the sacred text, wheat is used with particular significance, linked to the "right judgment" on reaping day, when the righteous and the faithful are saved, while the wheat – "the clean" – is sifted and then put in God's granary and kingdom (Matthew 3:12; 13:30). He who sows "the good seed"

is "the Son of Man" – Jesus Christ – the field is the world and the wheat cockle sown by the Devil stands for "the evil sons". The reaping signifies the end of the world, while the reapers are none other than the angels (Matthew 13: 37-40).

The most elaborate manifestation form relating to grain in the ritual existence of a folkloric community consists of dough and what is baked from dough, as well as the kinds of dough and the ways in which it is assimilated to acts having a sacred significance.

The first form, found predominantly in daily life, is bread (*pâine*, in Romanian). Having a Latin origin, *panis, panis*, the word designates a kind of food with frequent ritual connotations. It also appears in traditional Romanian culture in the form of cake or *turta* (from the Latin *torta*, related to *panis*), *i.e.*, thin flat bread made of unleavened dough. There is also the *colac* or the knot-shaped bread, from the Slavonic *kolaci*, *i.e.*, a leavened bread made of "clean" wheat, round shaped, and resembling a wreath, to be used in family life and calendar cycles as a ritual food, and finally the *pita* (from the Bulgarian *pita*). The knot-shaped loaf is the ritual form in which this ritual bread is found in a number of European cultural traditions, as proved by the following examples of local terminology: in Albanian, *kuljaki*; in Aromanian, *culac*, "dough baked on ashes"; in Istro-Romanian, *colac* or *covrig*; in Turkish, *kulac*; in Hungarian, *kalacs*; in Friulian, *colazz*; in Venetian, *colacci*; in Calabrian, *cullaciu*, *i.e.*, "*sorta di pane intrecciato a corona sormontato da un uovo*"; in Ruthenian, *korac*; and in Bulgarian, *kolac* (V. Nicolova, 1994, pp. 249-251). For Romanians, as well as for other Orthodox people, the knot-shaped loaf is a predominant form of ritual food, that, in some areas, is kneaded with "new water", while for Bulgarians, Romanians, and Greeks, "clean women" actually do the work. In a knot-shaped bread typology one can speak of the "covered" bread, given to ranking sponsors; the "Andrew" bread, made by young girls with "new water"; the christening bread, given to the godfather and godmother; the Christmas bread, woven into "three vines" given to carol singers; the wedding bread, given by godsons to their godparents; and the death bread or bun.

"Knot-shaped bread well-wishing" texts in the ritual of carol singing and of the wandering plough, as well as a number of legends, stress the sacrificial meaning of the knot-shaped bun as a ritual form of bread.

Bread is a food made of dough, which is the processed form of harvested grain, and is most often described as a sacrificial food. It can be found in the Last Supper, when the Eucharist comes into being. Jesus Christ himself is called, before entering into his period of sufferings, "the bread of life" and "living bread coming down from the sky". The origin of the substance out of which bread is made (Eucharist bread included) is the body of Jesus. The Crucifixion carols sung during Christmas, along with the story of God and the text of the legend, give credence to this fact:

Where the hammer drove,
In the hands and feet,

Nails and spikes alike,
Blood started to flow,
And it poured on down,
Turning into wine,
Gathering around.
And around my waist,
This new belt of hip,
Tightening around,
My flesh fell away,
And down on the ground,
Holy wheat it bred,
While the Christians came,
To eat it away.
        (C. Brăiloiu and S. Ispas, 1998, pp. 277-278).

In the Christian vision, the Eucharist "secretly and bloodlessly" reproduces a "bloody" sacrifice. St. Ignatius calls it "the immorality remedy". Sunday used to be called "bread day" or "the day the bread is broken". In a spiritual sense, bread is "the food and the word of God". It is one of the things made by man through which Jesus Christ shows his godly power in the miracle of the multiplication of bread (Mark 8: 6-9; Luke 9: 13-17; Matthew 15: 32-38).

Bread is also present in the Judaic tradition in the Temple of Jerusalem. The pieces of bread to be given away represented a bloodless sacrifice to God (the link with the mystery of the Eucharist is obvious). There were twelve pieces of bread in all that represented the gift to God of the twelve tribes of Israel. They were only to be eaten by priests on Saturday, during the Sabbath, when the time came to rest and to pray.

The dough, the processed substance of which bread is made, is mentioned in the Old Testament, in the Book of Exodus (specifically, the mentioning of how Jewish women took some dough with them from Egypt) as an essence of divine grace and profusion.

The sacred and symbolic value of dough is present in the Old Testament text and is developed in the New Testament. Metaphorically speaking, the dough is "the teaching and the work of grace". The heavenly kingdom is compared to "... leaven, which a woman took, and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened" (Matthew 13: 33). There is also a dough of evil, envy, and hypocrisy. In his epistles, Paul advises the Corinthians to clean "the old dough" in order to turn it into "a new kneading". In light of these symbolic meanings, the text of the wandering plough, recited at the start of each New Year and describing the long and agonizing process through which the sheaf of wheat becomes dough and (knot-shaped) bread with a sacred and ritual role in such traditions, acquires a sacred, expiatory function.

The vegetal symbol is constantly present in the rituals performed in Southeastern Europe. The motif of suffering ritual plants, wheat and hemp, in legends, fables, and carols, is a significant cultural reference

point for the whole area. Older symbols have acquired new meanings through Christianization and have become bearers of new messages about the mystery of the Eucharist and the forgiveness that is earned through the suffering that stands for humanity.

In Romanian popular literature, in several groups of variants belonging to a series of folkloristic species, there are some important texts about the vegetal passions. There is, first of all, the legend about the young girl who is visited by werewolves or ghosts during a social event and is saved because she tells the story of the hemp or wheat passions. Sometimes, the tale takes the form of a lyrical song having an erotic theme. The agony of the hemp can be identified in variants of legends and exorcism rites. The passions of the wheat appear in fantastic tales, lyrical songs, the Crucifixion carol, and the dispute of the flowers carol.

The passion of the wheat appears in the following narrative form:

A boy, who is persecuted by his stepmother, is assisted by the enchanted ox for which he has been caring. When the ox dies, the boy receives one of its horns as a gift, but is not permitted to open the horn until he gets to the "strengthened folds", "to his house". The boy disobeys, opens the horn, and is helpless when many herds of animals scatter away. Then a dragon appears (the beast from the North, the devil, etc., as the demoniac expression of popular legend) and helps the boy recover his riches, but asks him to give up his own life "right when nothing could make him happier". On the day of the boy's wedding, the demon reappears and demands to be followed. The knot-shaped bread loaf on the wedding table jumps in front of the dragon and starts to tell "the passion of the wheat".

> People ploughed the field, sowed and harrowed me, trod upon me with their feet and their oxen, and I endured; you too must endure! [...] In the earth I swelled, I germinated, I got out and I endured; you too must endure! [...] They scraped at my root, they harvested me, they took me home [...] they beat me with a club until they crushed me, they winnowed me, put me in sacks, took me to the mill, and there they ground me 'til I turned into flour, and again I endured; you too must endure! [...] They put me back in sacks, took me home again, sifted me through a sieve, dipped me in water and kneaded me. After that they lit the oven and let it burn until it was red. Then they put me on a shovel, got me into the oven and there I burned and burned and burned, dear me, until I got to be the way you see me now, and still endured; you too must endure!

When the story of the plant's passion ends, the dragon bursts open, and the boy is saved. The same basic narrative characterizes the text of the wandering plough. It contrasts with the account of the making of wishes symbolized by the knot-shaped bread, the Crucifixion carol, and the song about the substances of which the Eucharist bread is made. Basically, the agony in this case represents the technological process the vegetal substance undergoes in order to be transformed into dough. The presence

of dough and of wheat in its various forms (green or ripe sheaves, boiled grains, funeral porridge, dough) in rituals is a constant throughout Southeastern Europe and among its Orthodox populations: Bulgarians, Greeks, and Romanians.

Grain and bread symbology, as well as – implicitly – their profound meanings have been recorded by research results. The principal meaning of bread in various customs is that of marking a new beginning. This new beginning, however, occurs under the sign of cleansing, of eliminating guilt and sin through the narrative or the prefiguration of a plant the agony of which atones for guilt. This motif is an equivalent of sacrifice, with vegetal sacrifice, this time, replacing human sacrifice, *i.e.*, the ultimate sacrifice. Thus, Christian sacrifice, through the symbolic gesture of the Last Supper, substitutes the sacrifice of "clean" wheat – the bread – and of processed vital substance – the juice of the grape – the blood, for a sacrifice of flesh and blood. The verbalization of the "passion of the wheat" (in some of its more recent variants, wheat is replaced by maize [corn] or rye) is the up-dating of a sacrifice made in a "liminal moment", "a beginning", and meant to put an end to violence, to purify space and time, and to make room for the sacred in daily life.

In the sacrifice the main object of which is wheat, humankind is involved as a sacrificer and as an accomplice in agony. In its finite shape of bread, the vegetal and the agony it has experienced make up a symbology of expiation and atonement for sin and disobedience. The meal during which knot-shaped bread is eaten embodies not only a communication rite, but also a character of expiation, the freeing from sin of those who take part in this common dinner, viewed as a kind of ritual feast:

> The meal that followed enclosed a communion rite, but at the same time an expiation character. The relationships between the wheat field as a living and divine being and the social group are fully incorporated in these practices.... The old sacrifice of the god, contained in the ritual, is transported at this stage in the story of the violent death of divinity.... It is a phase when the form of the communion-sacrifice gives in to the form of the oblation-sacrifice... (I. Ionică, 1943).

The forms of dough in popular culture in Southeastern Europe have a remarkable diversity and richness.

The text of the legend or the legendary tale about the agony of the hemp is a narrative about the girls in a village (in some cases, several villages) who decide to get together for a spinning social "in a deserted house, out in the field", or "without letting the boys know". During the event, several young strangers show up and spend time with the girls. One of the girls, sometimes the youngest, notices that the boys have "geese feet", "keep their tails under the bench", or "have hoofs", signs which identify them as being ghosts. The girls are frightened and run away from the house, except for one of them who had fallen asleep. Left to the mercy of the ghosts, this girl spins her hemp and at the same time tells the story of "the agony of

the hemp", representing the whole agricultural and domestic process, from sowing to weaving, by which hemp is changed into cloth out of which a shirt is eventually made. This shirt, a variant of "the plague shirt" or "the victory shirt", is also attested in Greek folklore and is produced by an identical technology. When the girl completes her spinning session, the story comes to an end as well; the roosters herald the beginning of a new morning, and the ghosts vanish.

A number of studies deal with the ritual significance of the social occasion of group work and, implicitly, of the series of events occurring on such occasions. A much-involved social group is the so-called premarital women's association. Such women's associations, that are not always endowed with premarital initiation roles, can also be found in South-Danubian Slavic and Greek folklore. During social events, a specialized repertoire was performed having, in most cases, premarital or ritual functions. The goal of many rituals was to lure the boys into the group so that acts of divination could be undertaken in order to find out who is meant to marry whom. By comparison with the role of girls in a social association, that of boys, who had their own association that became active on the occasion of community ceremonies that included carol singing or the performance of Morris dances, was passive. The boys were temporarily present and marginally involved in the event. The social event also had a protocol of its own, establishing the functions of participants, and had to be well-defined in time and space.

A major variant of the previously mentioned legend begins with the non-observance of certain compulsory customs. For instance, not all the girls, but only some of them, are invited to take part in the social event. The time and the place are not what they should be. The girls meet in an isolated venue, outside the village, sometimes without informing the boys. These actions make possible the contact with malefic powers, with the demoniac – ghosts, dragons, goblins, St. Theodores's horses, the Tuesday ghoul, the Thursday hag, etc., characters appearing frequently in Southeastern Europe, each of them having certain common features for the whole area, as well as regionally specific traits: the dragons of the Bulgarians, the werewolves, the vampires, and the ghosts of the Greeks, the *zane* of the Albanians, the pixies of the Romanians, etc.

There was a registered ban against such social events on Tuesday or Thursday evenings, as well as on St. Theodores's night. Whoever infringed the ban was punished by the Thursday hag, the Tuesday ghoul, or St. Theodores's horses turned into young lads. The non-observance of bans did not extend the area of authority of these devilish forms of expression but placed the protagonists on the "border between the worlds", where contacts are possible and forces can move in opposite directions. The ghosts or the St. Theodores's horses, which join the social event of the girls do not perpetrate an unwarranted aggression against ban infringers having to do with space and time, but punish the pretentiousness of those who try to get into contact with them but are unable to cope with the special features of their existence.

The group of narratives in which the central place goes to the motif of the "passions of the hemp", belongs to the motif that refers to "the crop power of the field or, more widely, to vegetation in general" (Ionică, 1943). It represents an older stratum of popular thinking referring to the face of the visible world. An interesting chapter on legends could be written about the powers of things that while composing a true essence, can concentrate upon, scatter away, and even separate themselves from their essence.

> Indeed, they can be stolen and destroyed.... At their limit, these powers – which find an interesting parallel in the old Italian *numina*.... [achieve their] personified appearances either as souls (*genii*), or as mothers of these things (Ionică, 1943).

It is worth stressing that this type of mentality is present over a large area of Southeastern Europe, but is manifested in a special form in the relationship between man and the vegetal.

> Plants were some of the main coordinates of spiritual life, which is why ancient botanical legends that have survived make up an important chapter in popular tradition. As in the world of plants, there were a number of protectors against the supernatural embodied in the "pixies" who robbed men of their bodily powers, the "ghosts" who stole the crop in the field, and the animals' milk, the "wizards" and the dragons who brought down hail from the skies.

(About the acceptation of myth as a technical term, see below the discussion of legends.)

In Romanian popular tradition, hemp is frequently used in expiatory apotropaic rituals: "How come hemp is not good if it gets you out of hell?"; "Hemp is great. It is holy for it dresses man and is so tormented". "Hemp is so much work, He who never worked in his life should wear a tow shirt at least on his death[bed] and will find it easier to go there [to Heaven] if he is seen to have carried its burden in this world" (Voronca, 1903, pp. 1077-1127).

In these texts, preserved from old oral tradition, one can easily decode the idea of atonement for sin through passion, not only the passion of the plant, but also that of the person who grows and processes the hemp. At the same time, creation is sacrifice. Existence is the transition toward this self-sacrifice. Mircea Eliade (1968) wrote that, although inanimate things were born and grew up just the way human beings did, they lead a longer life than man does. They obtain more out of "the vital substance" from which they were shaped on this earth and have more magical powers. Their presence near a human being is favourable. These living things, which sometimes have a gynecomorphous birth and die later than man, place him or her, on one hand, in a favourable astral correspondence, while on the other hand, provide him or her with a longer and more fruitful life.

According to texts on alchemy that speak of "the agony of metals", eternal life cannot be reached without suffering and death. The most important action in which hemp is involved is the making of "the victory shirt" or "the plague shirt". The passion motif of the hemp, as it shows up in certain variants of legends, seems to be the verbalization of an ancient custom by which a community was protected from the spreading of severe epidemics – plague, cholera, typhoid fever, and flu. The last Romanian attestation of this practice was reported during the First World War.

The practice was the following. A number of old women or maids would gather in a house and, during night-time, would spin and weave from hemp a bleached fabric made into a shirt that they would carry ceremoniously to the end of the village or to the nearest crossroads. It seems that a text might be recited while the shirt was being carried: "My dear, from now on mind your own business, spin your hemp, and leave us alone" (S. Ispas, 1993).

A similar practice is reported to have existed in Greece. In certain regions, alms were distributed with only women taking part in the ceremony, while men had to pay a sum of money. The fact that "for all diseases, when many people died, the plague shirt had to be made..." proves the continuity of this practice under the same name even after the plague had passed. The specific features of this custom were the following: the shirt was made over one night, usually on Tuesday or Thursday (when social events and group work were normally forbidden). Certain rules regarding purity had to be observed, and the shirt could only be made of hemp. The fact that the shirt was made precisely during those days when work was forbidden served as a means of suppressing demoniac forces in order to purify space and time, to obtain forgiveness, and to atone for sin through voluntary sacrifice. By this means, self-sacrifice was changed into an instrument of prevention in the struggle against violence.

The motifs of the agony of plants have been analyzed and linked to the cult of the dead, as well to agrarian or seasonal ceremonies. Mircea Eliade (1968) assembled information about the death of the Canaanite deity, Mot, at the hands of Anat, the goddess of war. She catches him, stabs him with a sword, winnows him with a winnow, burns him in flames, and scatters him on the field, where he is eaten by birds. This ritual killing is specific for gods and for vegetal spirits, for Mot is treated as if he were a wheat sheaf.

Special attention should be devoted here to the comprehensive analysis undertaken by H. Jeanmaire (1976) in a book called *Dionysos: Histoire du culte de Bacchus*. The myth of the god, Dionysus, who is torn to pieces by the Titans, is cooked and eaten, and whose head is reconstructed, along with an analysis of the objects known to have been used in Dionysiac practices, lead to an explanatory myth regarding initiation rituals. Neither an agrarian nor a seasonal character are obvious in the myths that are typically Greek. Yet periodic disappearances and appearances are well marked. A myth will tell a story of an episode in the childhood of a god or of another mythical personality. There are no obvious features that can be

linked to an image of ripe wheat or fruit. Symbols do not focus on agriculture. Only a few hints suggest connections with the myth of Osiris.

The legend of the death of Dionysus reveals certain diabolical features which have never disappeared from the inner soul of this deity, not even after he acquires a new Olympian look. Dionysus is said to have spent the time between his death at the hands of the Titans and the moment at which he came back to life in Hades.

In the Greco-Roman world, the months of February and March witnessed the celebration of the *Anthesteria*, while the Greater Dionysiac celebration took place during March and April. The *Anthesteria* celebration seems to be the oldest and most important Dionysiac celebration. The three *Anthesteria* days were unpropitious, for it was during this period that the souls of the dead, as well as the shadows from Hades, came back to earth. The last day was devoted to them. People said prayers for the dead and cooked *panspermia*, a sort of porridge made of various grains, which had to be eaten before nightfall. Once the night settled in, the shades were chased away with shouts.

This sort of ritual scenario is well-known to agricultural civilizations. The dead and the powers of the netherworld are believed to govern both fruitfulness, riches, and the distribution of both. Dionysus appears as a god of both fertility and death. One cannot overlook the ancient tradition according to which Dionysus "came from the North", from the culture area of Thrace. The myth of Dionysus's torments is primarily what drew the attention of Christian commentators as early as the Second Century A.D.

In the stories about the agony of plants, the price of redemption is given in terms of vegetal sacrifice which, in all the cases evoked above, symbolize the reorganization of the amorphous through the work of man, in other words, the transition from a natural state to cultural richness. Culture is, after all, a processing of nature into a new order, with different functions, and another existence altogether.

C. THE LEGEND: ORIGIN, FUNCTION, DETERMINATION

To understand the exceptional role that is assigned to folk texts in determining individual and group identity, it is useful to consider one of the most important varieties of non-ritual epic, the legend, the function of which is to relay accurate information in traditional communities.

Given the informational and instructional value of legends, all generic structures of traditional cultures are ordered around them. Starting from them, the mental points of reference of a community are organized.

Well represented in the literature of the Middle Ages, known and analyzed by medievalists, the legend proves to be, even today, a point of reference in the identification of collective oral thinking. Given the circumstances of active globalization, today, and the reformulation of many traditional concepts, new directions are emerging in the revalorization of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, and the relation of the individual to the transcendental. Contemporary society is currently

witnessing the atomization and the diversification of group-guiding values and, as a consequence, the diversification of groups.

The transmission of information by audiovisual means, particularly the explicit penetration of different age groups by the Internet, bring forward an arsenal of images that folklorists could easily integrate into what are usually considered to be changing motifs. In folkloric studies, such a process is very important, particularly with regard to the role and place of the so-called contemporary legend. The general framework of the legend is valuable from a theoretical perspective, both in terms of the traditional legend and of the new form of legend that contemporary society is creating.

Legens,-tis is the participle of *lego*, "I read". As a masculine noun, it can be found in Ovid's work: "reader"; *lego, legi, lectum, legere – lego,* is identical to its Greek counterpart, the primitive meaning of which – "to gather, to choose" – developed differently in Greek and in Latin; thus, *legere vestigia* – "to collect traces, to follow; *legere viam* – "to make a journey"; *legere saltus* – "to wander, to walk in the woods; *legere celum* – "to move your eyes, to look at the sky". Cicero uses *legere libros* – "to read books" and *legere judices* – "to choose judges". Ovid uses *dum legar* – "as long as I am read", Ovid and Pliny the Elder use *legere nomino, tempus* – "to choose the right name or time"; Plautus uses *legere sermonem* – "to collect (wait for) a speech".

Several principal meanings can be observed, which were probably used to choose a term that first designated a collection of texts which later designated a folkloric category: to gather, to collect, to read. The "right" choice and ideas of anthology are constantly found in this effort.

In the Thirteenth Century, Jacobus of Voragine composed his *Legendae Sanctorum (Legenda aurea)* which included the lives of the saints and was a favourite, if not a compulsory, reading during community meals in the monasteries and also during certain forms of religious service. The term was borrowed from literary Latin – *legenda (ae)* – and designates "the life of a saint" or of a martyr.

Throughout the years, mainly through the appearance of certain theoretical traits in the field which would later be called folkloristics, the term acquired specific meanings and connotations that were well-defined and included a social component. A brief presentation of some of these opinions is instructive. Such an analysis also entails the mentioning of other oral narrative species which converge with the legend at a certain point. It would be useful, however, to make a few points about "genres", quality, and meaning in folkloristics and in folklore.

The first topic to be covered in a grammar on folklore is the system of genres. Genres make up systems consisting of different channels for cultural communication. Oral tradition, *i.e.*, folklore, is divided into genres and generic systems that differ from those of so-called author cultures. Such systems, in fact, impose an organization in the lives of both rural and urban communities in all spiritual and material forms of manifestation. They respond to all the needs of the group and create the landmarks, the physical and moral existence of the group itself and of its members. To

establish the system of genres of an ethnic community, one has to take into account a number of elements: contents, style, structure, context, role, frequency distribution, and origin. These elements have different weights and are coordinated by historical data.

A system of classification, one including genre and species categories, can have several goals. The simplest and, at the same time, basic classifications deal with genres. The problem is that, for oral creation, the syncretism of which makes it more difficult to draw firm lines and for whom motifs, functionality, and polysemy group its units into confusing and fluctuating constellations, a different type of conceptualization is needed, one built upon structures that vary from those of classic literary theory. This opinion is supported by the so frequently quoted travelling motifs, which are in fact multifunctional and polysemous, as well as by the different social, historical, and cultural circumstances needed for the lives of various folkloric communities, the identities and ethnic profiles of which are defined, among other things, by the genres and species systems. As stated above, such a system is a means of communication, a way of dividing reality according to an ethnic identity having a specific expression in a system of oral culture genres and species.

The systematization of written texts and even of the complex phenomena of oral culture can also be undertaken in terms of functionality (which is one of the most important factors to be taken into consideration in the event of an international systematization that would be beneficial to the entire field of folklore studies) by stressing technical production modalities. These would include (but would not be limited to) the type of performance, the relationship between the text and the tune, the motif assembly technique, the functional model, the key words, and the stylistic factors. An international system of oral creation genres and species should first have a functional basis and should next follow those nodes in which different plans of analysis and various levels of generalization converge. The system should be able to lead to the conceptualization of units with higher abstracting and formalizing capacities, as well as to models actually expressed in (and through) the genuine variants of the folkloric fact.

Beyond such theoretical and very general concerns, one should not overlook the classifications in topics and motif catalogues or those used in producing international bibliographies and in managing folklore archives. By referring to analyses of materials that were systematized through prime syntheses of this kind, it is possible to refine those principles and qualities required in order to establish such a system of supranational categories and terminology.

Romania is one of the countries in which mythology was very often used as a screen for confusing analyses, in which various authors speculated about certain texts and their meanings, in order to discover either their origins or the semantic enrichment that Christianity brought into the national culture. For the Romanian, Bulgarian, and other Southeastern European folkloristic schools, pagan mythology is still one of the favourite

sources of inspiration for analyses or speculations. Literary texts are still systematically emptied of any Christian meaning, of any possible contact with European medieval culture. Experts are still strenuously trying to prove the primitivism of traditional culture and its absolute autonomy in the face of everything that could mean an integration into the sophisticated medieval culture of Europe.

A tripartition of the epic text was established: myth, legend, and popular tale.

The mythological theory is taken to painfully acceptable limits by Max Müller (1881), for whom the heroes of legend and tale, as well as the gods, are mere anthropomorphic forms of natural phenomena. Old Arian words indicating natural phenomena were perceived, because of "the language disease", as the names of deities. Metaphors and poetic images were taken in their literal rather than their figurative meanings, after the Indo-European populations migrated from India to Europe. Mythological legends were created around deities, but as they lost their religious support throughout the years, they paved the way for the development of a popular literature which in its turn generated the tale.

Th. Benfey (1859) developed another aspect of Indianism after close contact with old Indian texts through a translated version of *Panchatantra*. In his view, the origin of European tales lies in India, from which a common core spread over the whole world. This theory has a monogenetic perspective that credits Indian tales with having a kind of archetypal value.

Without questioning M. Müller's solar mythology, Archer Taylor (1948), the founder of the Anthropological folkloristic School, pushes the origins of folkloric phenomena back into prehistory, according to which the universe, seen from an animistic angle, gave people throughout the world similar information that was closely assimilated by those who found themselves at the same level of evolution.

Andrew Lang (1913), a supporter of the survivalist theory, thinks that it is possible to reconstruct aspects of the mentality of primitive man by studying contemporary data provided by folklore.

The two experts in question belong to the Anthropological School which made its presence known at the end of the Nineteenth Century and in the first half of the Twentieth Century. Its aim was to establish the behavioural laws of a culture through the study of oral culture and through research carried out with support from the social sciences. In terms of both the study angle and the anticipated outcome, anthropologists differ from humanist folklorists who consider oral literature to embody the material principle of folklore. They lay great stress on the narrator or the singer. (Of the modern researchers who favour this perspective, one of the best known and most frequently quoted is Albert Lord (1960), who, starting with Milan Parry's Serbo-Croatian collection, shows – experimentally and even statistically – that the performer improvises, guiding him- or herself with reference to a stock of images filed away in his or her memory.)

James George Frazer (1915, 1918) and the Cambridge School support the myth-ritual origin of folklore. According to this school, it was thought

that a mythical tale always accompanied and commented upon a sacrificial or fertility ritual. Throughout the years, the myth detached itself from the rite and became an "oral tradition" partly penetrating the fantastic tale, the ballad, etc.

Hans Naumann (1921) developed a theory about "myth and the social classes", according to which cultural goods belong to "aristocratic classes", while court poetry, the songs of bards, and religious or lay chants later passed from those who generated and developed them in the lower classes, through imitation and sometimes through contents suppression, to become what was known as "*gesundkenes kulturgut*". Obviously, this perspective is an exclusionist one, but at the same time it confirms the role of a culture coordinator, a model, and a promoter that has to be assumed, in many situations of critical community importance, by this élite core that is called "aristocracy", especially in the structuring of community cultural systems. J. Bédier (1908-1913, 1925) is known to partly support this position.

Fundamental contributions to the "narrative species" study methodology as well as to the territorial distribution of narratives, and even of their approximate time and place of birth, were made by the supporters of the Finnish school of historical geography. Three of its founding members, Kaarle and Julius Krohn and Antti Aarne (Arne and Thompson, 1961) claim that it is possible to establish the primitive shape of a motif or of an episode, along with the place and the approximate age of their birth. The Finnish school opened up a wide perspective for researchers in comparative folklore and stimulated the publication of some large motif- or theme-focused monographs. One of the very first comparative studies, called *Cinderella*, was written in 1883, by Marian Cox.

A special type of narrative species research was undertaken under the influence of a number of psychoanalytical studies made by Sigmund Freud, C. G. Jung, and Paul Radin (see S. Freud, 1925; C. G. Jung and C. Kerényi, 1968; C. G. Jung, 1977).

The humanist, anthropological, and psychoanalytical trends do not exclude each other, but function in a complementary relationship and round off the complex image of the narrative phenomenon as an all-encompassing structure.

Claude Lévi-Strauss (1960), who has been interested in interpreting the narrative (and especially the mythical) text from a new angle, considers popular stories to be an important part of an expressive culture that also includes drama, rituals, music, drawing, painting, dancing, etc., that can be contrasted with practical culture: technology, economics, politics, and social structures. The main (empirical) shortcoming of expressive culture is the manipulation of the feelings of participants. (These remarks actually describe the phenomenon designated as folklore by experts, while this part of Lévi-Strauss's analysis (1960) attempts to define folklore in relation to what is considered to be extra-folkloric.)

Regarding popular stories, the French anthropologist states that there is a need "to classify them according to their social function, contents, and structures" and observes that the same story has a variable function, in keeping with the performance time and space. Some people consider the text as a myth, others see it as a mere form of entertainment. This remark, that is well-known to folklore specialists, once again stresses the multivalence and the polysemy of motifs and episodes. Lévi-Strauss (1960) makes an interesting point when commenting upon this change of function, the difference not lying in the abstract concept of the sacred, but in the actual integration of the sacred and of entertainment in particular cultures. He provides comparatively little information about the mechanisms and models which guide the narrative phenomenon and direct species functionality. Such fine distinctions belong to the study of folklore and were only, to a small extent, the concern of those who had an anthropological view of the phenomena of oral culture.

Several personalities have dealt with the phenomena of oral narratives. It is necessary to mention their remarks about genres and species systems. Their works are the basis of present-day structuring and, one way or another, make up the system upon which contemporary folkloristics relies in the analyses it performs.

In discussing legend formation, Arnold van Gennep (1910a) distinguishes between two classes of "narratives": one having an aesthetic value, the other one, a utilitarian value. In terms of contents, the scholar makes distinctions starting from thematic grounds, from the understanding of the beliefs existing in the narrative or from the quality of the characters.

A. van Gennep (1910b) distinguishes among particularities specific to various types of narratives. He identifies two groups of narrative types, actually juxtaposing the narrative species according to the degree of credibility with which they are provided by the folkloristic individual. In van Gennep's opinion, myths and legends are narratives which can be "objects of faith" (and are considered true), while tales and fables cannot be so considered. Myth has the substance of a legend which is localized in space and time outside human action. Its enactors are divine characters, and their texture is a combination of beliefs translated into magical and religious acts. The legend has a precise location and well-determined characters whose acts seem to have a historical basis and are endowed with a heroic quality. Legends are localized and individualized narratives, and they are also "objects of faith" (are considered to be true).

The tale is a miraculous and romantic-sentimental story, the action of which takes place in an unspecified venue and the characters of which are not individualized. The tale conveys a "childlike" vision of the universe and is known to manifest "moral indifference".

The fable, which A. van Gennep (1910b) places next to the tale in the previously mentioned polarity, is a versified narrative in which animal characters have human qualities or behave like human beings. If the text is in prose, the result is an "animal tale".

In a work devoted particularly to the formation of legends, A. van Gennep (1910a) considers the legend to be a "combination of themes" that he calls a "thematic cycle". Thematic cycles cope with certain contradictory tendencies: localization and personification versus de-localization and de-personification. In addition to these "legend formation laws", the author mentions other pairs of tendencies which act in the thematic plan, such as: individualization/de-temporalization, convergence/dissociation, etc.

So far as topics are concerned, legends can be linked to the natural or to the supernatural world. Natural world legends are explanatory, have a local character, and can be woven at any time, within any community. They refer to the stars, the sky, the earth, and the waters, have animal characters, but are different from the fables, which are not localized and – with few exceptions – are not considered true. Demigods or civilizing heroes are described as hybrid beings endowed with an almost divine power and an almost human psychology. Supernatural world legends refer to demons and gods, being ritualistic and dramatic. Here the confusion between legend and myth is obvious. The narrative and the rite make up a whole. The narratives thought to be true translate into actions while they are being told, being therefore dramatized legends – or myths – in a real sense.

J. G. Frazer (1915, 1918) considers myth to be a "fake science", and legends, to be "fake histories".

Analyzing data obtained from research on the native culture in the Trobriand Islands, Bronislaw Malinowsky (1968) commented upon the status of myth in primitive psychology. Seen from the angle of this "primitive" community, myth is sacred. It is perceived as being entirely true. Myths are recited, while various rituals are performed throughout the year. They serve the rituals to which they are associated. Commenting upon concepts such as magic, science, and religion, the author stresses the fact that myth is not a story, but an expression of strong, moral wisdom. Myth expresses, raises, and encodes faith; saves and strengthens morality; guarantees the efficiency of the ritual; and contains practical rules which direct the actions of people. Myth is "a vital ingredient" for human civilization.

Legends are assigned a solemn status. A legend has to inform, is considered true, and contains important factual information. Legends do not have stereotypical forms or magical effects. Their main role is to provide information that can be conveyed at any time of the day or the year, whenever somebody wants to be informed.

In Malinowsky's view (1968), the tale is a work of fiction with specific particularities including a dramatic aspect appearing throughout its rendering and an entertainment function. The points made by this remarkable ethnologist were fructified in later years and developed analytically by experts, while in general terms, they served as landmarks for many future works, especially in the field of ethnology.

This relationship between truth, fiction, and miracle, which helps establish the functionality of a folkloric category and eventually the specific

system of genres, characterizes many societies. It is operating in Romania as well as in the other parts of Southeastern European culture, within a genre and species system, for popular prose. In the folkloric environment, narrative denominations occur as a sort of movement along this bipolar axis, while insiders in regard to folklore only recognize the true story, such as the legend or the rote memory, as well as the tale or "the lie", the fantastic, novelistic, or animal tale.

A whole series of narratives are related to a hero, whose birth and death are perceived as quasi-historical events. The elements working together to form the hero as a notion come from three different sources: myth, legend, and history, each having a different proportional weight. The personality of the character, in a limited acceptation, is a legendary hero.

The difference between a hero and a god is the following: while the hero carries out certain ephemeral actions, with repercussions in the history of mankind, the god defines himself in relation to cosmogony, acts upon nature, and plays a permanent role. It is precisely this distinction that this chapter focuses upon when discussing certain aspects of religious legends. Unlike the legend or the hero saga, the tale detaches itself from any coordinates of time and space.

Taking a historical perspective, one can understand that the evolution of the original debate in this direction was both necessary and natural. The mythological theory, the prime promoters of which in 1812 were the two brothers, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm (1835, 1856), led to the mentioning of the existence of such a link for the first time. As the two brothers assumed, a veritable Pantheon, which openly manifested itself and developed during the pre-Roman age, was dissolved during the medieval European period, so that only fragments of the beliefs in ancient myths survived.

This author considers that it is incorrect to use the term, myth, to designate legends of a religious, specifically Christian origin. She attempts to evoke the image, for instance, of Romanian folk culture from the standpoint of Orthodoxy, the predominant Christian confession in Romania, in some of its most frequently and divergently discussed forms of manifestation: the texts concerning mythological characters and the so-called mythological and religious legends. She also proposes a few ideas for obtaining a better grasp of the meaning of the apocryphal from the angle of literary history.

Each category, species, or subspecies of folk creation was the object of many researchers of a separate study. Thus, the bibliography of this topic is very rich.

When analyzing the myth – legend – tale tripartition, researchers mainly had in mind the formal aspect, that of the narrative contents, of the context, the link with the space and time when the action took place or when the narrative was told, the hero's quality, etc. Myth is usually associated with the sacred and the truth. Legend is related to the secular or the sacred and the truth, while the tale is linked to the secular and to fiction (Lauri Honko, 1989). Only Claude Lévi-Strauss (1960), and to some extent, Vladimir I. Propp (1973), consider that there are no "serious

grounds" for isolating the tale from the myth. Here there are serious doubts, for it is fundamental to associate the text with the ritual in the case of myth and to distinguish between the contemporary "official" and "revealed" religions, which can be found in modern society, and the so-called "primitive" religious systems of archaic or modern communities, the structure, functionality, and dogmatic and symbolic significance of which are of a different order.

The Sophists, and following them, the Stoics and the neo-Platonists, interpreted traditional myths and theogonic tales as allegories intended to spread religious and philosophical truths about nature and behaviour. The Renaissance interpreted myths as moral allegories or artistic representations of human wishes and emotions. Such an assertion could be sustained only if focused on the formal, structural plan and on the symbolic significance of myth. At the functional level, which is considered to be the most important for the definition of folkloric categories, the differences are substantial.

Positivist ethnologists have considered myth to be an explanatory form of thinking intended to be overtaken by scientific thinking. Functionalists evaluated it in terms of its pragmatic function of solving problems that affected the destiny of individuals in a given society. In their vision, myth validates institutions and rites. Theologians and idealist philosophers perceived myth as a symbol of transcendent truth, of timelessness. From the standpoint of literature, myth was considered as a symbol of universal archetypes, "primordial images" sprung from the collective subconscious.

The myth, the legend, and the tale were actually approached from two angles: the literal and the symbolic.

The mythic hero is predominantly divine, sometimes human, but complementary to the divine. In a tale, the hero is predominantly human, with non-human opponents. Analysis has proved that, in certain situations, a tale is able to perform functions which provide it with relative sacralization, but these functions have nothing to do with ritual. In certain communities, even the time and place at which tale-telling might occur recalled such sacred connotations. For instance, tales were not told before sunset or in places supposedly haunted by ghosts, while legends could be related anytime and anywhere (Bîrlea, 1983). By comparison with the myth, which is valid for the whole community where it works as such, the tale has various degrees of verisimilitude, ranging from the whole community in which it is circulated to various groups making up the community, that are distinguished in terms of age, social status, sex, education, socio-professional affiliation, etc.

In its turn, legend is a truth accepted by the community, just as a myth is. Within a community, myths make up packages of relationships organized in a unitary system in terms of meanings and symbols, being both complementary and religiously integrated. M. Mauss (1969) makes the following pertinent points regarding the position of myth in social activity:

Le Dieu, le rite, le nom, le mythe, tout cela forme un conglomérat dont on ne peut dissocier les éléments que par abstraction; il n'a pas d'antériorité de nom sur l'idée, ou du rite sur le mythe. Parce qu'éclectique, cette méthode sera aussi plus objective et sociologique. Car le nom, ainsi rattaché au rite, cesse d'être une simple expression verbale; il devient partie intégrante de tout un système de choses dont il est inséparable, et ces choses sont sociales.

Systems were created for tales only at a formal level. Relationships can be true and sacred or not, but they do not belong to the religious system. What is actually taking shape is a system of parallel relationships.

From the point of view of this chapter, the myth, the legend, and the tale are three modalities by which knowledge can be attained. The myth is a form of sacred and systematic knowledge, covering all the necessary levels of a community. The legend is a form of "scientific" knowledge, having the value of a general experience carried out by means of "discovery". The tale is a form of mediated knowledge, placed between the two previously mentioned forms and at the human level, being achieved through an artistic explanatory effort. Out of these three units, which are considered to be fundamental, other subdivisions result, the existence of which is determined by the weight and the combined relationships among various coordinates linked to rite, sacredness, time, space, and verisimilitude.

A fundamental element for the integration of a narrative into one of these three fundamental divisions is the hero's status. Present-day researchers can resort to comprehensive literature on the situation of "official religions", as in the sort of situation, as cited by Heda Jason (1978), that compels one to make a fine distinction among the features of the "hero" in those cases in which actions are carried out by the respective deities. From the position of a contemporary believer, the position of God or of the saints is radically different from that of a hero in ancient mythology or in the myth of a present-day "primitive" population in the text of a legend or a tale. In fact, no text having the function of a myth can be attested.

Such a distinction is critical; however, most researchers have simply overlooked this type of situation. It is precisely here that the contemporary legend should be situated, for it finds itself – one way or another – under the incidence of a divine force. (The case of historical legends, that relate events that are unconnected to the miracle or to the toponymy and the onomastics in the same category, are not being evoked.)

When the mythological hero finds himself in a civilizing hypostasis, he reveals sacred knowledge and turns into an initiator. The civilizing hero in the legend is a discoverer. The hero in a tale, one who is also civilizing, is an initiator about whom a story is told. The action of initiating, that is secret for outsiders, makes up the contents of a tale which is nothing but a narrative of the hero in his initiatory stage. In the three categories, the civilizing hero of the narrative finds himself in various moments of his

fantastic existence. In the myth, this existence is complete and is integrated into the mythical system to which it belongs. In the tale, the civilizing hero takes part in the initiating act. In the legend, he is seen in a specific moment of an action he performs upon the world.

The mythological hero was studied by experts not only as a cultural and civilizing hero, but also as a traditional hero, with a more encompassing and less restrictive personality.

In 1876, J. G. von Hahn wrote the *Sagwissenschaftliche Studien*, published in Jena. He analyzed the biographies of fourteen heroes and established sixteen characteristic episodes for the biography of a hero, divided into four basic groups: birth, youth, return, and complementary events. The established episodes can form groups in different ways and can vary in number from one narrative to another; however, these episodes always evoke the life history of a hero, a mythological character, a fantastic tale, or a legendary protagonist, as well as that of a "popular" hero, such as Alexander the Great.

In writing *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, Joseph Campbell (1956) limited the possible events in a hero's life to the following three: separation, initiation, and return. Of course, this author could not have been familiar with V. I. Propp's work (1973) that thoroughly analyses the initiatory background in which the actions of a hero in a fantastic tale take place.

In his book, *The Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth, and Drama*, Lord Raglan (1956) established twenty-two episode-events from the analysis of which, in the case of a traditional hero, one reaches the conclusion that the history of such a hero is not concerned with real incidents in a man's life, but rather with ritual incidents in the career of a ritual character. The history of the traditional hero is "the history of his ritual progress". His victories, that are different from those of the king (the latter being a historical hero), precede his accession to the throne (just as in the case of the fantastic tale hero). Lord Raglan perceives this hero as being different from the hero in a given tale and the historical hero. He ends his career by losing his throne, by being expelled from his kingdom, and by dying under mysterious circumstances. (In many fantastic tales or in variants of historical legends, the hero finds himself in a similar situation.)

In this type of situation, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether or not the given hero lives his life stage by stage - and certain folkloric species or categories pinpoint such stages in the hero's existence - or whether or not heroes who are viewed in complementary situations make up the life model of a typical hero, one specific to a given culture.

Starting from Hahn and Raglan's works, Dutch folklorist, Jan de Vries, identified ten elements that he considered to be critical for the scheme of a so-called hero. De Vries considers that hero legends and epics are myths of a society and a culture developing in relation to a cult of heroes. In his vision, heroic myths and legends change into tales through a change in social perspective rather than through a formal structural mutation. Urbanization entails the historical rolling down of heroic song and myth from the center of culture to its periphery.

In his "Biographical Patterns in Traditional Narrative" (1948), Archer Taylor showed that the mythical hero's biographical diagram actually fits the miraculous adventures of the hero of a fantastic tale.

C. G. Jung and C. Kerény (1968) make a few interesting remarks about "the divine child" as a mythological hero. The mythological figure does not stand for a biological age. Instead, he represents the very essence of divinity. Maturity is the simplest visual expression of his temporal and eternal existence. He does not get old and die. The mythological hero has exceptional qualities from his very birth, being in no way inferior to mature deities. Without commenting upon the psychoanalytical data in the work of the previously mentioned authors, one must keep in mind the strange role that the hero's mother has to play in regard to her son. She exists and does not exist at the same time. She abandons her child and dies, a situation that causes the little boy to become an orphan loved by the gods.

Numerous remarks can be made about the hero and his various hypostases in different cultures. The present study does not analyze the status of the hero in legends, tales, or myths; however, the point made above will be useful further on, when, through an analysis of a number of texts of legends, it will become possible to stress the fundamental differences between the mythological or traditional hero and the legendary protagonist, springing either from dogmatic sources, or from apocryphal sources of the "official religion".

The sphere of the notion of folklore is as large as that covered by cultural anthropology, but only in order to draw attention to the complexity of the folk creation phenomenon and to underline what will always be considered as the poetic text which accompanies any folkloric manifestation in the cultural context to which it belongs. Such phenomena, and mainly those which have to do with consciousness, cannot be considered statistically or individually. A "social product" is multivalent, multifunctional, and integrated into a relational chain no link of which can be broken or neglected without serious consequences for the identity of the product and of its consumers. Therefore, in the present study, the main concern is what is called folk literature or literary folklore, even though these classifications are not specific and sufficiently representative for the phenomenon. Folk literature includes prose and poetry in the forms of tales, stories, narratives, recollections, legends, any kind of epic songs – hero epic or ballad – poems, cradle songs, children's texts and games, riddles, proverbs, texts related to any type of ritual, myths, texts to be found in the practice of various beliefs and customs, incantations, exorcisms, dances accompanying texts – in short, any text which uses the word, the "verbal art", as an expressive means.

Most researchers in folk literature ascribe a prevailing importance to the oral circulation of this product. Oral transmission provides greater chances for anonymity and variability. However, orality in itself is not in a position to establish the affiliation of a given text with folk literature. The oral (what is spoken or told) is usually opposed to the printed (written, published, photographed, filmed, etc.) quality of a text. By operating a

reduction, one discovers that one is actually talking of a transmission and reception system through audio and visual means having specific consequences in regard to memorizing capacity and possibilities for reconstitution, and beyond all these, regarding a manifestation mode typical of creative and consuming communities, expressed by their individual members. The existence, at a mental level, of the folkloric text is not a narrative-coagulated entity, the details of which can evolve into fine semantic distinctions, as in the case of literature by a specific author. This existence takes place at the level of the mental model, linked to the relatively fixed form of the motif, to species structures, and to the components and the meanings of rituals. Also linked to this mental existence is the capacity to produce variants. However, a lucid identification has to be performed in the case of ritual species which, although orally conveyed, have an obvious intransigence related to form ossification, that has to preserve the sacred functions and the mythical or religious values (depending upon the given situation). To them one can add the whole adjacent arsenal which often has a printed form, even though it belongs to folklore.

Viewed from this angle, orality as a means of transmission is not more adequate for the folk text than it is for an author's text, even if this means of transmission is used predominantly in the case of folk texts. In the case of oral transmission, once the folk text is interpreted, it becomes irreversible and cannot be repeated in the same form. The fact of printing facilitates the re-consulting of a form as it was established by the author, but does not exclude the turning of the respective text into a folk product whenever circumstance call for such a phenomenon to occur. The folk individual appropriates, reshapes, assimilates, and adapts the product that he or she needs.

At present, the most obvious phenomenon of this type can be observed by studying certain romance texts and by assimilating certain poor quality pictures or novels. The existence and the analysis of the motif at the level of the relationship and the mental model, irrespective of the specific form in which the author wraps a certain idea, lead to the attestation of facts that are affiliated not only to the folklore of the second millennium, but also to folk creation occurring a very long time ago. In fact, what is being evoked is a set of cultural models, the universality of which no longer needs to be proved. These models belong to that initial revelation of which the great contemporary religions speak and make up the so-called resistance structures of world culture.

It is certain that not everything that is transmittable is necessarily folklore, while, at the same time, forms of folklore exist that cannot be transmitted orally.

The creator has a well-distinguished attitude toward the concept of paternity. Ritual species and ceremonial species with ritual implications are never presented as personal creations. In the latter cases, the norm instituted by the ritual does not allow for any innovation (innovation does work, but in a wider temporal frame). The metric structure, the mental

model, and the elements of language belong to the information stock of the individual and have been absorbed during his or her education in the folk community, while he evolved from childhood to maturity. The use of the information acquired in these circumstance is only natural within the creative act, in the same way that it is equally natural for any individual to make use of information that he or she has obtained in school, regardless of his or her specific profession as, for instance, a physicist, a chemist, a biologist, or a philologist. The folk product reception and recognition mechanism is linked to the affiliation of the individual to a cultural group and to his or her quality as an insider.

This subtle shift from folk creation to creation by an author, from a folkloric to an individualistic feeling, from the attitude of a creator to that of a consumer in distant historical ages, among which the Middle Ages prove to be very interesting, was achieved by Paul Zumthor (1972) and Jacques Le Goff (1986) in the case of French culture, as well as by Alexandru Duțu (1972, p. 50), for Romanian culture:

> In the age we are studying, ...copyright ...functions very seldom, while writing starts to be a means of expressing an individual vision only in the Nineteenth Century and not before. Until very late, originality appears as a result rather than as an original impulse, namely to the extent to which the works that were achieved integrated in[to] a complex of specific concerns for society at a certain point. Otherwise, it would be strange if we still asked ourselves why *The Adventures of Telemachus* are circulated without Fénelon's name.

The opinion of the consuming community is of greater complexity. Although this community is relatively passive during the act of creation and is latently accumulative toward what it stores in its own treasury of cultural goods, the community recognizes, within certain limits of time and space, a number of links between the creator and the created piece, mainly because the number of valuable creators in a given folk community is rather small. The moment when a folk product appears, it relates to a special event which mobilizes its creator. The product begins to have the creator's trademark and is delimited in time and space. In a sort of "shift" from the cultural element, *i.e.,* a collective product with a passive existence, to its take-over and use by the creative individual, the anonymity of folk creation lies somewhere in-between. An important role is played by the collective memory, which only preserves what is of interest for the group and has a perennial value, on the one hand assimilating the information, on the other hand, neglecting the creator when he or she is no longer significant.

The issue of paternity has large historical and social implications. In the Eighteenth and even in the Nineteenth Centuries, in order to increase interest in a literary work, to envelop its authors in a mysterious halo or to protect themselves from potentially unpleasant consequences, the authors in question would conceal the real paternity of certain literary and even

scientific works. In earlier ages, when communities were relatively closed (as in the cases, for instance, of feudal courts and of literary circles) and wide distribution systems did not exist, authors might be so well-known to their specific groups that the formal registration of their names was not necessary. Such a product, that was the object of restricted distribution, that was familiar to a relatively closed circle of people, and was easily recognizable by means of its style and its preferred theme, actually foreshadowed a situation currently known in folk circles. The situation was the same for the minstrels and the troubadours of medieval courts.

There are no set borders between literary folklore and authored literature, but rather a permanent exchange which takes place slowly, but surely, and with mutual benefit.

The issue of paternity was also raised on the occasion of the publication of the first folk texts in previous centuries. The collectors and editors in these times were good informers and creators having a healthy sense of initiative. The fact that it was impossible to faithfully render a folk text according to the variants received from different informants caused these first collectors to become high quality informants themselves.

The variant is a materialization of the motif that is restricted by species functionality. But variability also functions in the case of authored literature up to a certain point, meaning that, until the final form of the work is completed, the author makes up a number of variants relying on his own model. As in the case of orality and anonymity, what is different is the extent to which the phenomenon manifests itself, not its absence or presence.

The circulation of manuscripts of literary works in the Middle Ages represents yet another form of variability expression that is close to folk variability. The copyists who worked on texts were similar, in some respects, to folk creators. Their work, too, was influenced by a whole list of elements such as education, temperament, creative capacity, social command, fashion, public taste, etc.

From the angle of the history of the creation of the product of folk literature, the collective nature is obvious, such efforts assembling essences produced throughout many generations of creators. If perceived from this standpoint, culture as a whole has a collective character. The progressive element appears when the community has gathered together sufficient information (which means all types of knowledge, aesthetic, and informational values) to be able to afford a quality leap toward a new value, bringing about a new informational and value-related perspective. The cultural product becomes a collective asset, prepared to undergo refinement for the creation of a new product (technical, scientific, and artistic). Choice is an individual act, but at the folk level, the initiative of the creative individual is limited by the functional needs of the community. The general stock of instruments is collective, while the moment at which a folk product is created is individual. The performer is not obligated to change his product, but he has to comply during creation with the requests of the community. Without such a relationship, there can be no

communication between the individual and the group. The individual resorts to the stock of collective goods preserved through tradition, which make up his personal information, since he is a product and at the same time a representative of the group. Collective goods are marks and working materials in any creation.

The major innovation is determined by the function, a historical and social parameter, which in its turn develops from the needs of the group. Each human existence is an individual – a biological body, a complex structure with physiological and psychological manifestations and responses in a full process of change – and at the same time a person – a complex of relationships with society. Social personality changes throughout one's life. In this twofold capacity, the creator/performer of folk goods appeals to the treasury of cultural goods of the society or of the group, fitting variably and unequally into the above-mentioned parameters. Such is the case of folk creation and its producers, as well as of colportage and of apocryphal and popular creation.

The legend and all its divisions, given the context of Southeastern European culture, have developed in lands having an old Christian (Orthodox) tradition, that has been functioning as an existential truth and norm for its communities in the whole of Southeastern Europe for a millennium-and-a-half. In addition to the canonical books or teachings, such a knowledge stock also included the deuterocanonical, apocryphal information specific to the same Southeastern European region that is ethnically diverse and at the same time unitary in terms of faith and beliefs.

For the societies of the Middle Ages, the folk or the popular category, the latter being better suited at least in such a special context, is not pertinent. Communities of different sizes had varying methods of distribution, other than the rapid and technical means of the Twentieth Century. These methods suited the informational needs of social groups in these pre-modern times. In manuscript or in printed form, all kinds of literature reached out to restricted groups where, through what is called a collective reading, it was circulated, distributed, and assimilated. Collective reading of this sort was tremendously important for the dissemination of any kind of information in the medieval age, at least in Southeastern Europe.

Collective reading was practiced by qualified persons who were literate in and familiar with the language in which the information was presented. Each large or small community or social group had one or several such readers (depending upon needs), who not only transmitted the information to the other members of the group, but also worked as selectors and interpreters of the information in question. The amount of information available to this reader/selector was not, of course, large by present-day standards, but it was sufficient to cover needs for the new, the ethical, and the aesthetic that might appear anytime and anyplace. In like manner, it was sufficient to offer explanations and to provide answers to the great existential questions that every human community feels the need to ask.

Moreover, the information obtained in this way was complemented by the information obtainable from the paintings, icons, and mosaics that adorned the interiors of religious edifices.

In order to warrant social communication and to preserve administrative, cultural, moral, and legal unity, this information had to be highly coherent and unitary. In the Middle Ages, it was disseminated by the religious structure, which was normative and restrictive and which, in Southeastern Europe, had an Orthodox and Byzantine extraction. A book that was printed or copied in manuscript form in a number of copies used to circulate through this collective reading from one province to another, or even from country to country, while its translator, copyist, and reader was often one and the same. The designation, popular book, was given to this type of literature. As the category itself was obviously heterogeneous, in so far as theme and functions were concerned, such a book was more likely to be a metaphorical label attempting to bring together a large cultural diversity. Attempts at theme- or contents-related classifications are scanty, because such writing is necessarily multifunctional and embodies a whole set of values. Its message cannot be univocal, but multidirectional.

In our view, popular books, with the meaning of "widely circulated books", assimilated by the folk group and receiving scientific credit from the folk community, could include books on astrology and divination, books on weather, and books of riddles. These books circulated in princely courts (for instance, Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu instructed John the Romanian to compile foreign calendars containing this kind of information), but also among the literati of the time. Even as early as the Sixteenth Century, Romanian manuscript copies of books on divination and weather forecasting as well as zodiacs and astrological calendars began to be circulated in the Romanian territories.

Chronographs, those "universal histories from the beginning of the world", which first followed Biblical chronology and then presented the history of Byzantium and of the Ottoman Empire, also started to circulate in manuscript form in the Sixteenth Century. They were translations from Slavonic of certain Byzantine variants. The Seventeenth Century witnessed the translation and the widespread copying of neo-Greek chronographs, most of which were derived from the *Chronograph* by Monembassy Dorotheus or from that by Cigalas. Legends derived from the Bible about ancient or contemporary heroes were circulated through such writings, along with other legends disseminated through large-circulation popular novels in the Middle Ages about the fall of Troy, Jerusalem, and Byzantium; the Seven Children of Ephesus, Alexander the Great, etc. Chronographs continued to exist until the Nineteenth Century, being reproduced or interpolated in court or boyars' chronicles.

The most comprehensive category of popular books consisted of popular novels by anonymous or known authors. These novels were: pseudo-historical (*The History of Troad*), pseudo-historical and biographical (*Alexandria*), picaresque-sagacious (*Varlaam and Ioasaf*, *Archirie and Anadan*), sapiential-anecdotal (*Till Eulenspiegel*, *Bertoldo's Life*), picaresque

(*Skinder's History*), chivalrous (*Erotocrytus, Imbery, and Margarone*; *Philerot and Antusa*) and "chain" novels (*Sindipa; Halima*).

The features of an ample narrative, like that of the popular novel, could change. The narratives about Alexander started as history, continued as legend, and ended up as novel fiction. Factual historicity fades out and gives way to the fabulous, received as such by the readers or the listeners. The transition from one category to another, by a change in the informational function, in the quality of information, in the credibility, in the degree of verisimilitude, and in the educational-formative quality is linked to and is determined by the historical age when the narrative appears, is taken over, and is reassessed. But there can be no segmentation of sets of fixed theme categories accurately delimited. Each novel can affiliate with several categories at the same time. It is up to the researcher to choose one aspect with a predominant weight for his or her study.

Among the apocryphal texts, chronographic literature, and popular novels, permanent exchanges, motif and theme migrations, and creative take-overs occurred which, given the religious moment when they took place, worked as religious, historical, and even scientific truths. The cycle is restored by the insertion of folk extraction models which, in their turn, materialize by taking over the substance circulated through these books.

Specialized literature has always analyzed popular books in the close vicinity of writings known as apocryphal texts, the scope of which, although confusing for literary historians, seems quite clear from the theological angle.

Assessing the material under scrutiny with the eyes of a literary historian who has read a great deal in adjacent fields, Nicolae Cartojan (1938, p. 115) offers the following definition of apocryphal literature:

> books about which nothing is said until then (until the moment of their appearance, in the first centuries of the Christian age...) and which appeared all of a sudden from various regions of the Christian world, under the glorious names of Old or New Testament personalities and claiming to possess the new teachings of a prophet or an apostle.

While not necessarily covering all the theological possibilities and quite wide in terms of contents, this definition appeared to be good enough to be adopted by the history of literature and by cultural personalities. The notion ought to be re-discussed from a theological angle so as to harmonize the contents with what is theologically accepted, for within a unitary culture, terminological meanings need to be very accurate and concise whenever they are to be given technical value.

From the point of view adopted in this study, until a competent analysis is made of apocrypha according to their correct, theological acceptation as well as according to their role in culture and implicitly in terms of folk culture, any comment or assertion in this field has to be taken with a grain of salt. Certainly, this category will not be integrated into the sphere of folk

books because, irrespective of their theological status, they are much too close to the sacred texts and to their theological meanings to be changed into goods which exist in incidences of uncontrolled variability and individual innovations. Moreover, the contents of their themes, which can have certain folkloristic affinities, as well as the functional perspectives of apocrypha, hagiographies, and apocalypses serve the sacred and either support the canonical view or specifically the attitude of various heresies toward this view. These books are linked to the rite and serve the cult in various circumstances.

To establish the extent to which popular books are or are not folklore is a blunt approach to the matter. In order to find out to what extent they belong to folklore or to authorial literature, one needs a detailed analysis of each and every section in regard to all the previously mentioned parameters. These parameters have been analyzed and discussed by folklorists rather than by literary theorists or historians.

Folklorists took over categories, genres, and species, which proved to be imperfect and unsatisfactory as the result of close analyses carried out by specialists, as shown at the beginning of this study. Such a revision represents a very difficult task, for it must eliminate all the deadwood consisting of routine, the large quantity of material that has been collected empirically and studied according to norms that are considered classic, and the lack of theoretical unity of the various folkloristic schools and trends. Those experts who placed popular books in a category of literary creation placed in the transition area between folk and authorial literature took the right step. Such transition areas, in which specific spheres start shaping their profiles until borders begin to melt away, can be found in all types of phenomena, not only cultural phenomena, but biological phenomena as well.

The decision by which a certain phenomenon or creation is attributed to one specific category has an obvious historical implication. A product can or cannot be folklore in a certain stage of development of the social group consuming it. In their turn, the components of the product need to be seen in a different perspective. It can happen that the structuring of the motifs, the episodes, and the genres and species can belong to folk literature, while the product belongs to authorial literature. Enactors also comply with historical laws and are either sacred characters, legendary or civilizing heroes, or mere heroes created by an act of fiction typical of tales. From the correlation of an enacting complex with the plausible to the miraculous, factually different species are affiliated to folk, authorial, or colportage literature, as well as to popular books.

The distinctions operating in literary history and, generally speaking, in all the cultural fields are useful in terms of study and systematization. Objectively, one thinks that the literary phenomenon should be viewed as a continuum, the elements of which are complementary and can only be separated by conventional barriers.

The whole corpus of legends in a given culture makes up "an alphabet of ideas". A popular science encyclopedia is preserved in oral eschatological

legends, in historical legends, in legends about supernatural beings and powers, and in religious legends on gods and heroes. A group of "tale-legends" about God and St. Peter, also found in international typologies, the components and affiliation of which should be reanalyzed and refocused, given the presence of certain characters the sacred nature of whom is a reality for a large portion of the world population. A thorough analysis might very well reveal a common origin for most of these texts having contents that are highly unitary in Europe, an origin linked to the same Middle Ages that have been evoked several times before, in this study.

The next few pages will raise certain points about the terms "religion" and "religious", which have frequently been confused with "Christian". Sometimes, indeed, academic literature uses the term, religion, to designate a category of legends.

In Latin, *religionis* had the following older meaning: fear, scruple, and mainly, religious scruple. Cicero uses the phrase "*religionem alicui injicere*", meaning to instil a sentiment of fear, a scruple, into somebody. From this meaning, two further meanings developed: on the one hand that of religion, on the other, that of rite or ceremony. It was again Cicero who stated that "justice to the gods (toward the gods) is religion": "*Justitia erga deos religio dicitur*". By the phrase, "*religione templum liberare*", Titus Livius meant "to purge a temple through a ceremony". The word also means holiness, deity, oracle, (soldierly) honour, thorough care and delicacy, as can be inferred from Cicero's text: "*Religio officii*" = holiness in doing one's duty; "*Religio vitae*" = holiness of life, etc. *Religiose* used to mean piously, scrupulously, with holiness. *Religiosum, -a, -um*, had an old meaning of "superstitious" and only later started to mean "religious, holy, hallowed". (I. Nădejde, n.d., p. 572). Initially, the term used for "religious" was *religeia*. Even from these brief quotations, it is easy to observe the way in which the fundamental meaning and its derivatives were preserved in the language of that time and how far they have evolved from the acceptance given by folklorists to the term, "religious", with the restricted meaning of "Christian". There are even fewer grounds for the existence of religious legends as a category, as the legend relies on a whole religious system which has to be unitary, coherent, and specific to the community.

Many experts mention the existence of a religious feeling, given by the vision of religion. Religion as a notion is complex and contains a number of forms: the religious doctrine or dogma (the outlook or the idea we have about God and about our relationship with Him); religious discipline and morality (the life and organizational rules of a religious society, deriving from the respective dogma); and the religious cult (the forms through which the community expresses or tries to achieve its link to the Divine). In any religion, there is a close link between the religious outlook or idea, the doctrine or the dogma, and the cult as an expressive means for the religious feeling. Such interdependencies entail a multitude of cultural rites and ceremonies attested in various religions, the diversity of which is determined by the diversity of the ideas people have or have had about

divinity throughout the years. Even within the limits of one and the same religion, like the forms of Christianity, for example, each confession has its specific cultural forms, a *modus operandi* of its own, matching the respective dogma and spirit which actually inspire it. The great historical branches of Christianity (Orthodoxy, Roman-Catholicism, and Protestantism of different nuances) are different from one another, not only through their beliefs and doctrinal teachings as well as through their organization, but also through their cults, which assume various forms, and therefore, in their turn, bear a confessional stamp.

Theologians distinguish between an internal cult, that is subjective or theological, with an individual and spiritual (hidden, invisible) character, and an external cult, expressed through visible forms, religious acts, and rites. The cult is therefore ritual through its very existence, having a collective and social nature. The two forms of existence of the cult have to live together in harmony and continuity in order to avoid ritualism, formalism, bigotry, or other pseudo-religious forms which risk turning into mechanical practices.

It would be useful to reanalyse almost all the allegedly traditional, folkloric, and ancient rituals, for which recent research has discovered an exclusively Pagan, pre-Christian origin, and to see whether or not they encode those initial forms of the Christian Holy Tradition that were so specific to the Byzantine rite Orthodox Church in the area. There are expressive forms of the Orthodox cult, known to Byzantine hymnography, as "a true versified theological encyclopedia, or a popularized theology under the guise of hymns and poetry" preserved through the Holy Tradition in its popular forms (Ene Branişte, 1985, pp. 56-57).

As William A. Lessa and Evon A. Vogt (1965) have stated in their Reader in Comparative Religion,

> Three things appear to distinguish man from all other living creatures: the systematic making of tools, the use of abstract language, and religion.... All religions also represent a response to the wonder and the terror of the ineluctable processes of nature. Even the Communists, as it has often been said, have their secular religions. While they repudiate the supernatural, they give allegiance in feeling as well as in thought to a body of doctrine that purports to provide life with a fairly immediate meaning. Nor is Communism without its ritual and ceremonial sides.

This same volume, that assembles a diverse set of hypotheses about the origins of religious symbolism and about the dynamics and methodological prospects used in religious research, also includes a lucid and temperate remark to the effect that: the origins of religion can only be speculated upon and never discovered. Theories relying on impressive demonstrations and using subtle imaginative models can only persuade readers temporarily and make them believe that they have found the answer to the problems that have been raised. Lucid and thorough reflections on the results of research can only lead to the conclusion that these are mere

assumptions made by researchers. This conclusion does not mean to imply that specialists should give up their investigations. They ought to merely see them as hypotheses able to make the understanding of religious phenomena somewhat easier.

From a secular perspective, Emile Durkheim's definition of religion is satisfactory (*in*, Lessa and Vogt, 1965, p. 59):

> A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden, beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them.

Religion is, therefore, a collective phenomenon par excellence. From a dynamic perspective, Robert N. Bellah, a highly regarded researcher, proposes the subdivision of religious activity into five ideal typical stages: primitive, archaic, historical, early modern, and modern. Throughout these stages, religious systems have evolved from a compact to a complex structure. For what he calls limited purposes, Bellah defines religion as "a set of symbolic forms and acts which relate man to the ultimate conditions of his existence" (*in*, Lessa and Vogt, 1965, p. 73). If animals or pre-religious man could passively endure the limits and sufferings enforced by existence, primitive religious man could, to a certain extent, transcend and control these situations owing to his symbolizing capacity, therefore acquiring a relative freedom from the environment.

Archaic religion tends to draw up a vast cosmology with a specific place for all things, divine and natural (non-divine) alike. All religions evolving in the historical period are comparatively recent. They can be found in more or less literate societies and are subsumed within the incidence of history rather than of archaeology or ethnography. All historical religions are, to a certain sense, transcendental. Early modern religion is characterized, in Bellah's view, by a "collapse" of the hierarchical structure of the two worlds: this one and the netherworld. Modern religion represents a stage of religious development which is radically different in many respects from historical religion. The center of change is the collapse of precisely that dualism which used to be the focal point of historic religion.

Although this periodic division of religious manifestations in society is as artificial as any abstract, scientific constructs, drawn up for the use of scientific analysis and less related to empirical complexity and reality, the author's point should be borne in mind, for it is useful that such a schematic presentation of the stages of religious evolution enable one to notice, as one stage gives way to the next, the way in which the emancipation of the human personality and of society increases in relation to the surrounding environment and circumstances. This remark assists one in understanding the role of legend in religious society, to see to what extent it represents a release for an individual who, although uneducated, is a believer and practices an "official" religion, respecting the dogmatic truth, without always understanding it in its full complexity and depth.

If we take Bellah's systematization into account, Orthodoxy ranks as one of the great monotheistic religions. Legend, with all its subcategories, can appear during the later stages, only after the first centuries of the existence of the Christian religion have freed its manifestation, *i.e.*, after the patristic period. For this reason, the apocryphal element is present and often marks texts of legends.

From a theological, Christian, and Orthodox perspective, religion is "Man's conscious relationship with the supernatural and its expression through visible forms and gestures", or "the perfect synthesis of the highest functions of the soul, in the service of two ideas: that of God and that of man's relationship with Him" (I. G. Savin and I. Mihălcescu, n.d., pp. 42-43).

Not even this definition limits religion to Christianity. Thus, one fails to see why it is necessary to delimit a category of "religious" legends and thus forcibly imply that only those legends the contents of which are linked to Christian dogma or theology are truly religious legends. Instead, it is preferable to accept the idea that the legend is predominantly a narrative species which relies on a religious system and has to inform the community about allegedly true facts and phenomena, not from the angle of science, but rather from a vision that accepts other coordinates of truth, from which the miraculous is far from absent. Such a religious system must be predominant for a given community, as it provides living norms and information communication methods, which means it must be known to everybody, thus becoming the "official religion" to which Heda Jason (1978) refers.

Since it is actually a folk material, like all products of this type, the legend can collect information from different historical stages and from various sources that must, however, be subordinated to the "official religion" in order to receive authority and credibility. From such an angle, one can observe that legend as a whole is religious, and only the strictly historical informational narratives, describing events that are totally detached from the miraculous, can be considered historical legends and can include a number of toponymic or onomastic narratives linked to events considered to be real in the lives of certain characters with a real, historically attested, existence. In this way, the legend can recapture its initial meaning and, as is only natural, the best preserved meaning precisely in those narrative categories which explain phenomena and events from a religious perspective. In addition to being a reading material for the religious service or for meals, the legend again becomes a narrative allegedly based on facts and incorporating traditional materials told about persons, places, incidents, etc.

On the other hand, the various narratives about King Solomon or about the creation of the earth and of those who inhabit it are also legends based on Christian information in the Bible or the deuterocanonical books, in popular books, in parables, or in words like those mentioned above. Not even the other thematic subdivisions of the legend – mythical or

mythological, etiological, and eschatological - are able to support the coherence and individuality of the true legend.

Indeed, it is possible to argue that mythology has not been able to function, at least in European societies, when the Christian faith was predominant and official. One cannot consider the mythological roots of certain representations or the presence of various motifs or themes in ancient literature to be in the Christian age. Myth is a text which accompanies the rite and belongs to a religious system. It is only when what is called mythology (*i.e.*, another manifestation of religion which is not part of the modern or contemporary religions currently known as great and active monotheistic or polytheistic religions practiced in the so-called civilized world) works as an official religion that one can truly say that one is confronted with a mythological legend, meaning a legend based on the respective community, one that is usually described as primitive.

In an attempt to de-Christianize Romanian culture, the period from 1947 to 1989 witnessed the publication of several works of Romanian mythology. They were representative of several efforts to systematize certain popular forms and representations which the authors of the books in question considered to be "non-Christian" merely because they did not cite God and the saints by name and probably also because of the total lack of theological education and information on the part of the authors. They overlooked the existence of possible affiliations, meanings, symbols, and even representations of Christian extraction upon which these popular forms relied or still rely.

If the texts from which the so-called mythological representations detached themselves had been carefully analyzed, it would have been a simple matter to discover the Christian affiliation which led to the changes in their initial significance and meaning at least fifteen hundred years ago. The incorporation of the old pre-Christian meanings into all the images evoked in written texts and in Christian iconographic painting is not denied, but the meanings in question underwent truly critical changes when they were used by Christian theologians. Thus, to overlook precisely those meanings which were used culturally during the last millennium-and-a-half, is a serious deviation from the principles of scientific, objective analysis and interpretation. For this reason, it is important to summarize the situation of Eastern rite and Byzantine extraction Christianity and its relationship with other forms of cultural manifestation, implicitly with the frequently mentioned mythological representations which would give substance to various legend texts labelled as mythological.

According to the order of universal creation, Christian theology first established the genesis of "the unseen world", inhabited by angels in several groups and finding themselves in different hierarchical positions. They are "serving spirits – "*duh*", the Romanian term for "spirit", translated from the Hebrew, "*ruah*", meaning "breath" or "wind". Among them, one can also identify their chieftains, the archangels. But one of them is the haughty angel who revolts, for he wants to be like God. Archangel Michael and his angels are then sent against him, and the dark angel, with his

supporters, are thrown from Heaven into the abyss. This dark angel is Satan, the spiritual being manifesting itself as the agent of evil throughout the world. The fallen angels turn into dark demons working against God and the people whom He wants to redeem. To cause the people to perish, the fallen angel changes into an "angel of light", while his numerous servants assume "the face of servants of justice". These evil spirits are omnipresent in the verses of the Holy Book and act in a variety of ways. They make up a veritable "legion" of devils, a *legheon*, to quote the term in the Gospels according to St. Luke and St. Mark. From this source, one can identify all the evil forms in the world that were assimilated into the six thousand manifestation forms covered by the word, "legion", in Latin. Each one can be easily identified in the various so-called "mythological" representations in the Southeastern European folk tradition.

In fact, all folk community members would consider such representations as ghosts, phantoms, pixies, the Thursday hag, or St. Theodore's horses as devilish representations, satanic images sent out into the world to haunt and to overwhelm man with wickedness and suffering. It is easy to prove that these images of the demoniac forces haunting the human world, these evil spirits, are familiar to Christian art, that dogmatists and theologians are aware of the presence and the objective reality of such malevolent manifestations, and that they fight against them through various prayers and liturgical practices, in order to protect God's work and creation.

The Gospels and the Deeds of the Apostles mention many cases in which "bedevilled" people, *i.e.*, sick persons inhabited by evil spirits, were cured.

During the early centuries of Christianity, adults were christened. They were considered to be people who were sufficiently mature to understand the significance of this great mystery. In the order preceding Holy Baptism, first come the so-called abjurations or ridding. The first one of these begins with the following imprecation: "Rebuke yourself, you Devil…, be afraid, get out and away from this work and never return to hide in it, oppose it, or work against it day or night, morning or noon". Notably, all the important moments in the day are mentioned when various devilish forms can act – the devil and "all his forces working together", "the sly and evil spirit, the spirit of deceit, the spirit of cunning, the spirit of [idolatrous] serving and of all the greed, the spirit of lying and of all uncleanness" (*Agiasmatar…*, 1965, p. 25). These abjurations which precede the act of christening contain specific forms for ridding the future Christian of Satan, all his things, all his servants, and all his or her haughtiness, which not only means all the serious sins instilled by the devil into man's soul, but also all the forms in which the devil could appear to man, material embodiments through which man is assaulted, frightened, intimidated, and tempted to stray from "the right path".

When writing his teachings about Holy Baptism, Simeon Archbishop of Salonika drew attention to the critical importance of abjurations:

It is the duty of the priest to thoroughly read the holy prayers and to recite them clearly and with moderation, so as to make himself well heard. For those who are frightened by ghosts are often prone to suffer, because the priests who christened them did not carefully recite the devil-ridding prayers and all the other prayers (*Aghiasmatar...*, 1965, p. 25).

Therefore, the existence in the world of those evil forces that were perceived as devilish and satanic images was never denied or neglected by the Church.

Old deities along with their manifestation forms, their images, and various actions associated with subservient rituals became expressions of the demoniac (the devilish) in the Christian theological sense. The power of the saints and the martyrs to face moments of torture and attempts to force them to abjure and to reconvert to old religions was interpreted as resistance to Satan's efforts to cause their souls to perish and to deny their redemption. "The lying Gods", the ancient idols, and the myths linked to their lives and deaths became the substance needed to prove the infinity of forms through which the devil acted upon man all over the world. The image of this "popular" demonology is nothing but a manifested form of the satanic in the world, which Christians consider as such and against which the servants of the Church fight with such weapons as faith and the texts in the Christian cult books.

The most significant of the texts which cause one to comprehend the complexity of the image of this "*legheon*" against which the body and soul of mankind need to be protected during earthly life is included in the prayers of St. Basil the Great for those who suffer from the work of the devil and from all helplessness. These prayers are to be read on St. Basil's day, that is, on New Year's Day or on the day of "the circumcision of Our Lord Jesus Christ". While in the Old Testament circumcision is "a sign of God's pledge to Abraham" and is called "the circumcision vow", the New Testament brings up a metaphorical meaning to this expression; it is a "circumcision of the heart, in the spirit rather than in the letter". For Christians, this circumcision is an inner "real circumcision", the full work of the faith and conversion to the belief in Christ, valid for the entire human race, as this faith works "for the deeds of Christian love, the fruit of grace, faith, and the efforts of the faithful together".

The same meaning ought to be ascribed to the Christian New Year, when Our Lord's circumcision is celebrated. St. Basil's prayers, read in the Orthodox Church on this occasion, during the first day of the year and corresponding to this spiritual baptism, are a ridding of all devilish powers, performed by the whole community embodied by the people gathered in the church. In addition to the sacred image of God's power, this text describes the multitude of shapes that can be assumed by the devil's dark power, while these images can be easily identified in the many "mythological representations" put together by folklorists, like, for instance, the evil spirits haunting a world undergoing the work of the

wicked after giving in to original sin. For this reason, all the narratives the function of which is to explain many of the phenomena of weather, human suffering, topographic mutations, miraculous forms and structures, or the aggressive actions of certain obscure forces, which make up the substance of traditional legends, are in fact linked to the religious and even specifically to the Christian religion.

Along with a wide variety of information obtained in response to a questionnaire conceived and circulated by Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu, it is possible to substantiate what has been said so far with some significant data. Thus, the dark angel turned into the devil "was once God's angel. As he sinned before God, he was thrown into an abyss, into hell, where he established another kingdom". He is "a wicked, evil spirit", "a being that cannot be seen", "an evil-breeding apparition", "a sort of ghost", "a breath, a fume which takes the shape of various beings", but is at the same time "man's worst enemy" (Ion Muşlea and Ovidiu Bîrlea, 1970, pp. 163-175).

It is interesting to notice the appearance, in certain traditions of precisely this specifically Christian idea of the creation, in the first place, of the unseen world to which this angel, who was thrown into hell because of his haughtiness, belongs. "They were angels" (the devils...) or, "He was once God's angel. As he sinned before God, he was thrown into an abyss, into hell, where he established another kingdom". Devils are made "out of angels who did not respect God's will, were thrown into the abyss; their skin turned black, and they grew horns and tails"; "In the beginning, when there was nothing on the earth, there was only God and the devil..."; "He is left by God and not made of beings who live on the earth..." (Muşlea and Bîrlea, 1970, pp. 185-189).

If one carefully peruses the observations appearing in the volume which sums up the answers to B. P. Hasdeu's questionnaire about the devil's full image, made up of the forms he assumes, the place where he lives or acts, the actions he takes against people and their belongings, one can discover that he is a veritable synthesis of the image of evil in the world and of the consequences of evil actions upon the human race. All these representations that folklorists and ethnographers include in what they call "mythological representations" are particular manifestation forms of the diabolical and satanic image in the world. They are forms of the six thousand embodiments assumed by the devilish "legheon". Thus, the Elf, who "is also called the Devil", is "an evil, wicked spirit, a bad and supernatural being, the devil's face, with a devilish power", taking the face of the various animals the devil also turns into and "having the power to be near man without being seen and to take something from him without being felt". When he serves man, "he has a deal with the master to choose one soul he will like"; "he who has an elf is sold to the devil", "rids himself of the law", "never goes to church"; "none of those in the house says prayers or crosses himself", while "after death the master goes to the devil, who takes control of his soul and body" (Muşlea and Bîrlea, 1970, pp. 189-194).

Dragons are sometimes confused with many-headed snakes or with goblins. They are considered to be "big devils, with tails and wings, turned

into snakes", *i.e.*, demoniacal beings, but can also be in the service of St. Ilie, helping him fight the devils and flying through the air: "first the dragon's lightning, then the saint's thunder". They are linked to flashing light. Often enough they are considered "gales or storms" and they "come out to the evil spirit of men who die during heavy rains or tempests, while their spirit goes up in the clouds, where they fight it until they break it". The many-headed dragon is "a big snake fallen from the clouds, from the sky". Like the plain dragon, he is associated with flight, water, and storms: "he flies through the air and the clouds". The place where he lives is quite close to that of the devil: in the mountains, near waters and wells, in swamps, rivers, lakes, or "on the islets". Controlled by and subordinated to the wizard, he becomes frightened and runs away when he hears church bells ringing, just like the devil.

The goblin, who is sometimes mixed up with the dragon, is "a face, an apparition, or the ghost of a lover", "a hallucination", or a fear-crazed being who renders ill and kills all the people around him. Like other hallucinations, he is also linked to flight, darkness, and light.

Among the feminine embodiments of a demoniac extraction one can find the Forest Hag, who is "a spirit, a phantom, or a ghost with the face of a woman", a shadow, "a being with devilish skills, of an evil or wicked spirit", and who can assume a number of identities, being, for instance, a "nightly fright" who stays hidden during the day and can sometimes be seen at the skirt of the forest or at the crossroads. All these devilish apparitions or images are to be found at the crossroads or at the boundaries. In order to prevent the evil actions caused by such embodiments, Southeastern Europeans, until a few decades ago, used to protect such exposed spaces by means of crosses or triptychs.

The Thursday Hag is also "an imaginary being", "an ugly fright" who cannot be seen, and who is able "to turn into fog, a bull, a dog, or a rolling wheel". The most complex feminine devilish embodiments are the pixies, beautiful spirits linked to the idea of flight and floating through the air, who are seen as fantastic, supernatural, evil-doing, and evil beings, "sorts of devils", wicked spirits of diabolical origin who "have wings and fly", dressed in white robes, who wear crowns, are invisible (bodiless), but become visible at night. Similar to other devilish representations, pixies can also be found living in the air, in the sky, in the woods, in caves, or on various rocks, in the mountains, near waters, or at crossroads. They are highly detrimental to people when they meet them, but can also seduce them and force them to become their servants or slaves.

It is very difficult to draw up an exhaustive list of the forms through which traditional culture designates demoniacal images and their way of acting against people. Only a few examples have been cited. Alongside these examples, one should also consider traditions and beliefs linked to the animal and vegetal kingdoms, the images related to cosmology, meteorology, etc., and all the information about the concepts of life and death which actually make up the philosophical and religious basis of all popular legends. Thus it is necessary to revise the latest "mythological"

systems that have been so generously assembled by certain experts who appeal only to information about ancient ages and some comparative grounds provided by archaic societies, while completely overlooking European medieval culture.

In a chapter in a book of prayers for all sorts of needs one finds prayers "for the house that is troubled by evil spirits" and "for the house or the place troubled by spells or exorcisms". Such "haunted" spaces gave substance to many legends included in various theme chapters of the species and which upon close analysis proved to have an obviously religious content. The legend, in question, still appears to derive from a sacred and at the same time truthful sphere, if viewed from a religious angle.

Christian theology is highly profound. Its understanding requires complex and systematic instruction of a kind not very accessible to ordinary people. Since, in a general sense, theology is "teaching about God", it offered marks of understanding to all its practitioners, so that in the medieval age, not only the clergy, but many cultivated, instructed, and refined laymen, capable of sophisticated thinking, could prove to be good theologians. Thus, among the participants in the 1437 Ferrara Synod, where never-ending debates took place on the question of the union of the churches, there were lay delegates, such as Neagoe Bassarab, who represented Moldavia, along with the Metropolitan Bishop, Damian, and the *Protopope*, Constantine, and a lay delegate of high social status, who represented Georgia along with the Metropolitan Bishop Gregory.

Obviously, the large mass of believers was not excepted to thoroughly and subtly analyse dogma-related issues, but on the other hand, one cannot afford to consider these persons as an amorphous mass which only imitated – without understanding - the message of the enactors and practiced an empty ritual, unable to derive any valid explanations to its main existential problems. For this reason, the basis for these numerous attempts to explain surrounding phenomena, which make up the substance of any kind of legends, would normally consist of the predominant religious outlook of the given age and of the specific geographic region.

Returning to the prayers that are read "for those who suffer because of the devil and for all helplessness" (*Aghiasmatar...*, l965), it is easy to identify, from their very contents, the large thematic spheres which can provide narrative substance to various categories of popular legends and, even if it seems paradoxical to some researchers, to all the material linked to magical practices, exorcism, and spells. Although this view is controversial and may appear to be analyzed in a relatively far-fetched manner to this day, it appears this way because in-between certain thematic spheres of legends, of family life cycle rituals, of carol singing, and of certain calendar cycles and exorcism rituals, there are close links which go beyond the strict sphere of myth and legend, fitting into an ample theological structure which in its turn is articulated at all the levels of individual and collective existence and find expression in folk genres.

In the center, as Lauri Honko (l989, l996) inferred and Heda Jason (1977, 1978), proved through its definition, lies the legend, the popular science which, when functioning as a legend, needs to provide real information, as is only natural, within the religious system which generates the existence of the group. The legend can be given this name partly from the angle of research, yet not from the researcher's viewpoint, for in research the term is used within the strategic terminology of a discipline, not from the viewpoint of the community under scrutiny. Often enough, experts overlooked precisely this critical aspect: what a community thinks about the information it helps to circulate, to what extent this information is or is not considered true, therefore to what extent a narrative is or is not a legend for a given community.

Consequently, a legend is a prose or (more rarely) a verse narrative which belongs to a "scientific" information system in a given community, according to the religion that the respective community practices. The narrative is considered true by both the performer and the listener, and it puts the human being, together with his or her living space and time, into contact with the numina. In terms of contents, legends subdivide into packages of theme units. Among the latter, narratives linked to events involving places and persons having a relatively known historical identity, where there is no direct involvement of the numina, make up a separate legend category, the historical legend as such.

Historical legend should be the topic of a special study conducted from a truly scientific perspective, able to do away with the mediocre and amateurish approach of so many poor works, lacking critical spirit in the truest sense of the word.

It is interesting to trace the ideas revealed by an analysis of the previously mentioned prayer texts, for it is possible to extract from these ideas the Christian Orthodox vision of the origin and manifestation forms of the devilish power evoked above, the places in which devils live, the specific times when they can act, as well as the vision of the heavenly forces fighting against them, the origins of the latter, and their manifestation forms. Thus, it is possible to witness the appearance of the "fire cohorts", bodiless powers manifesting themselves as creations of God, who "made the seen and the unseen being", and fought the devilish forces which were thrown "into the deepest darkness of hell" for insubordination. These devilish representations are "faceless", but also "seen for shame", "unseen for hypocrisy", or can turn out to be "like he who writhes, like the snake or the beast, like man or woman, like a fright or a bird, like one who talks at night, like one who is deaf or mute", as well as one who "frightens when invading", "tears apart, bursts into laughter or brings tears of comfort, being debauched or foul-smelling". Devilish powers can "change with the moon" and can come in the morning, at noon, at midnight, but also at the break of dawn, by sheer hazard, or be sent by someone. The place from which they come can be the sea, a river, the earth, a well, ruins, a hole in the ground, a swamp, from among reeds, from mud, from the land, from river meadows, from trees, from a bird, from thunder, from "the

bathing cover", from the wash, and from the "idolatrous tomb". They can be "known or unknown", "from where we know or we know not", "from the crossroads", "from the paths", "in the yards", etc. (*Aghiasmatar*, 1965, p. 298).

It is easy to identify all the places inhabited by evil embodiments who do their work in the Christian narratives included in the category of the so-called "mythological" legends. Among them, one can find ghosts, phantoms, and werewolves (or wolf-men) who periodically eat up the sun and the moon, as well as all sorts of feminine representations, such as the Forest Hag, the pixies, or the lake fairies, who have their local – Bulgarian, Romanian, Albanian, or Greek – variants. Prayer texts also speak of "undevout giants" who were drowned for their sins and to whom folk legends allocate a whole theme category including, among other motifs, the building of a fortress – a remembrance of the Biblical tower near which God mixed up the tongues of the earth – and the flood. Another remarkable fact is the frequent link of these forms to the idea of flight or floating, to the bodiless and even to light and lightning, even though it is not the "true" light, but one which is lying, deceiving, and bringing about unrest and discord (the light given off by the dragon, the roll of light under which the goblin creeps into the house, the light of burning treasures, etc.).

D. CONCLUSION

It has not been the aim of this study to carry out an analysis of each thematic category or of the topics included in the various categories of folk legends. One can, however, be reasonably certain that folk legends integrate into a religious system which, leaving aside the fact that it can no longer represent those ancient pre-Christian religious structures, each one with its own origin and specificity, is a Christian system with a coherence that needs to be decoded through a careful and close scrutiny of each manifestation form. For each of these forms it is necessary to identify pre-Christian roots and ways in which they grew richer and changed their identity and specificity owing to their contact with the new meanings provided by Christianity. Other things to be taken into account are the Byzantine print of the Christianity of Southeastern Europe, the Eastern elements of which merged into the Byzantine Christian structures, and the honouring particularities to be found in the Orthodox cult, in which the veneration of angels and saints, as well as the cult of the Mother of God, are very closely linked to the system of traditional folk legends.

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VI. Varieties of Nationalism and National Ideas in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe

GHEORGHE ZBUCHEA

A. FEATURES – INTERFERENCES - CONFRONTATIONS

In recent years, there has been a good deal of discussion, mainly in the media, about nationalism and its outburst, as opposed to trends favouring European integration. One of the most common assumptions is that the collapse of the communist totalitarian régimes, along with a substantial change in the European and the world balance of power, has led to the expansion of a new nationalist wave. The example of the Balkan area, namely of former Yugoslavia, which has turned into a region of violence and bloodshed and, to a large extent, uncontrollable ethnic conflicts, provides a strong argument for experts currently studying one of the major problems in the contemporary world. What these experts aim to do is to answer a critical question: will the Europe of tomorrow still be composed of nations and nation-states or will it become completely supranational?

Whatever the forms it may take, nationalism was and still is strongly condemned. For Adam Michnik, it is nothing but "communism's final and harmful inheritance", while according to Vladimir Tismăneanu (1997, p. 251):

> Nationalism means a stressed form of paranoia, collective and individual at the same time... . Collective paranoia is the sum of all individual paranoias. A tragic illustration of the turbulent post-communist period is the violence, which has accompanied Yugoslavia's collapse... . Yugoslavia ceased to exist because of the way in which local élites craving for power hysterically manipulated nationalist fervour.

The common element of such views is the opposition between nationalist and European, which also means the opposition between modernization and traditionalism or between the progressive and the retrograde. The result has been a firm (and, often enough, exclusionist) distinction between national and European, which has generated quite a number of intense arguments.

Regarding the case of Romania, Laurențiu Ulici made the following comment that is also suitable to other European areas:

> The problem of our European identity is anthropologically solved since Macedo-Romanians clearly belong to the European cultural

model. When defining the meaning of being European, the national element plays the part of the specific difference, which is to say, you cannot pose as a European without a previous national self-knowledge (*in*, Gabriel Andreescu, 1996, p. 75).

But many theoretical and methodological aspects of nationalism, rather than the nation as a concept, exist. Professor Alexandru Zub thinks that the situation is highly unclear in regard to conceptualization:

Being a product of the standardization introduced by the modern state (I. Wallerstein), a cultural and pathological artefact (B. Anderson) or even a source for the nation where there was no actual nation before (E. Gellner), nationalism proves to be a labile and complex phenomenon, eluding any complete definition.... There are analysts who even blame the nation for being too large to solve local or regional problems, but, at the same time, too small as far as economic and global strategies are concerned.... As all complex phenomena, manifesting themselves on culturally large areas, diverse in terms of traditions and attitudes, nationalism has to be plurally approached as the expression of specific and endlessly varied realities (*in*, Guy Hermet, 1997, p. 7).

It is currently claimed that, in terms of world history, nation building and the development of national consciousness were historical processes, which started during the Renaissance, thus preceding the assertion and the spread of the Enlightenment. Moreover, this period was one during which differences in historical evolution and other features in various European regions became increasingly profound, resulting in, among other things, an ever widening gap between the Western and the Eastern or Southeastern areas of the continent.

During the Eighteenth Century, the grounds were laid in Western Europe for two ideas about nations as forms of human community. In France, a nation was thought to be a community made up of people who shared common values and had a natural desire to live together. East of the Rhine, Germans came to think that the basis of a national community consisted of birth, language, and affiliation to a common popular culture. Two outlooks were thus identified that later made themselves known throughout the Nineteenth Century, fuelling in most European regions various claims made by peoples willing to live in their own political and state bodies.

A number of centralized states had begun to appear in the Middle Ages: France, England, Spain, etc. In these cases, the formation of centralized states preceded the formation of both the nation and of its image of itself – in other words, national consciousness. At the same time, at the beginning of modern times, a large part of Europe found itself in a different situation. Italians and Germans lived in the Central European region in a variety of large or small state entities and only managed to become united halfway through the Nineteenth Century. In vast continental areas, empires existed

that included various ethnic groups. In such cases, nation building and the development of national awareness preceded the nation-state.

In the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the decisions made by the Great Powers during the Congress of Vienna, which – personal interests aside – relied chiefly on legitimacy and even on religious principles, drew a new European political map. For more than a century, between 1815 and 1920, a series of national movements got started and gave rise to a process intended to construct a Europe of nations, that is, of nation-states. This age, also known as the "century of nationalities", lasted until the end of the First World War, when the continental European empires collapsed and national states were granted official recognition.

The post-war years witnessed a clash between supporters of the principle of nationalities as a fundamental right of humankind, the expression of which was a series of legitimate national states, and certain leaders of revisionist and expansionist states, who wanted to change the very borders making up the new European political map. The Second World War did, to a certain extent, change these borders and was followed by a European split produced by the communist takeover and the start of the Cold War. During the post-war years, Western European countries chose to integrate into a variety of forms, thus aiming at a type of unity that went beyond national structures and borders. This trend expanded and became possible in Eastern and Southeastern Europe after the collapse of the totalitarian régimes in 1989-1990. From a national perspective, this phenomenon was accompanied by the disbanding of the last multi-ethnic structures left on the continent, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Yugoslav Federation.

In Southeastern Europe, the current situation is quite tense. Five new states (including a reduced Yugoslavia) came into being as the result of the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation. Their more-or-less common feature is an obvious lack of homogeneity in terms of ethnic composition. In addition to the somewhat particular case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the three ethnic components are almost equally numerous, there is the case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. With a surface area of 25,713 square kilometers, its population was 2,033,964 according to the 1991 census. The ethnic distribution of this population was as follows: 65.3 percent Macedonians, 21.7 percent Albanians, 3.8 percent Turks, 2.5 percent Gypsies, 2.17 percent Serbs, 0.3 percent Vlachs, and 4.3 percent other ethnic groups. One can usefully compare these figures with those of the 1953 census, when the ethnic percentages of Macedonia were as follows, to a population with 1,304,514 inhabitants: 65.98 percent Macedonians, 12.42 percent Albanians, 15.63 percent Turks, 2.69 percent Serbs, 1.57 percent Gypsies, 0.66 percent Vlachs, and 1.01 percent other ethnic groups.

The ethnic and therefore the national composition of Southeastern Europe is the result of a long historical evolution having a number of

common traits, but at the same time a series of specific features as compared to ethnic and political developments in other parts of Europe.

At the beginning of the Middle Ages, this area witnessed what came to be known as the phenomenon of Balkan ethnogenesis. The survivors from ancient times were the Greeks and the Illyrians, who later on became Albanians. As a consequence of the migration of Slavic tribes from the North, an important part of Eastern Romanity, the substratum of which consisted of Thracian-Illyrians, mingled with the newcomers and thus made possible the existence of new peoples belonging to the South Slav group, *i.e.*, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, and Bulgarians (the last-mentioned also having a Turanian element in their inception as a distinct ethnic group).

At the same time, another part of Eastern Romanity, lying from the Maramureş region to the Pindus Mountains and existing in more or less compact masses, survived in its turn and gave birth to the Romanian people with its two large branches: the North-Danubian Romanians and the Balkan Romanians.

Throughout the second millennium, as the result of a number of complex factors, population mutations occurred almost incessantly (albeit at various levels of intensity) in the Balkan region. Thus, certain ethnic groups moved from their initial habitats and newcomers belonging to different peoples took their places. Thus, during Byzantine times, Hellenism recovered part of the Southern and central areas of the Balkan Peninsula that had been previously occupied by Slavs. Several centuries were required for certain Serbian communities to move from the South (from so-called Old Serbia, including Kosovo) to the North, toward the Danube and the Sava, and later on toward Voivodina and Banat. From the West (the Adriatic coast), Albanians surged toward the center of the Balkan Peninsula. Croats and Serbs mingled with the local populations existing in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Eastern Croatia. During the period of Ottoman rule, many Turks were either brought in from the outside or emerged through the assimilation of local people. They were later accompanied by Jews, Gypsies, and a number of Germanic elements in regions first controlled by the Holy Roman Empire and then taken over by the Habsburg Empire.

The Hungarian element, too, began to expand to the South, starting from Pannonia. These ethno-demographic changes continued throughout the Twentieth Century, when they sometimes assumed the magnitude of a so-called "ethnic cleansing". Events of this sort occurred during the Second World War in Croatia, where most of the Serbs (many of whom had settled there after 1918) were expelled, or at the start of Tito's régime, when the German ethnic group was all but removed from the country. Similar realities could also be observed in recent years in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

The political realities of Southeastern Europe over the last centuries have been very complex. Throughout the ages, starting with the final years of antiquity, through to the opening years of the Twentieth Century,

several imperial forms existed: the Byzantine, the Ottoman, and the Habsburg Empires. For limited periods of time, but over large areas, history witnessed the existence of state forms created by local populations, like, for instance, the First and the Second (Asenid) Bulgarian Czardoms, and the Serbian Empire. These political and state realities, that were not ethnically unitary, did not survive. They disappeared for internal and external reasons, but left behind historical memories which often enough were turned into myths serving as important components of national and nationalist ideologies, especially in the Twentieth Century.

When the Turks began their systematic, rapid, and successful expansion toward and into the South-Danubian region, this region was characterized by a great degree of political division. At the time of the Battle of Kosovo (20 June 1389), twenty-three state forms were in existence in Southeastern Europe, plus the territories claimed by Hungary, by Venice, and by the Ottoman Empires.

It took the Ottoman Turks about two centuries to establish unity in almost all of Southeastern Europe, except for a small area conquered by the Habsburgs, when the Hungarian crown was badly shaken following the Battle of Mohács, in 1526. A century and a half later, the situation began to change. After the siege of Vienna, the Habsburgs began their own expansion into the Balkan region, occupying ever expanding territories inhabited by various Yugoslav peoples. Starting in the Eighteenth Century, an expansionist competition became apparent when the Romanov Dynasty of Russia (especially during the reign of Catherine the Great) strove to conquer Constantinople and as many Balkan territories as possible.

Given these conditions, it would be the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires that would experience the first national emancipation movements attempted by the various peoples living in the area. These national revolutions, that took place throughout the Nineteenth Century, after 1804, had generally ended by 1918, when imperial structures were replaced by the new realities of self-proclaimed national states.

B. NATIONAL CASE STUDIES

1. The Case of Greece

In the Balkan area, Greek nationalism came into existence before that of other peoples. It was influenced by a number of factors (some of them specific to the Greeks, others common to other ethnic groups in the region, but being activated later than in the case of the Greeks) that contributed to this situation. The first stirrings of Hellenic revival came into being as early as the final century of Byzantium. The idea of Hellenity then began to separate itself from the Byzantine imperial idea, while later on, in the Eighteenth Century, it went through a new phase, separating itself, to a certain extent, even from Orthodoxy.

During the period of Ottoman rule, the Greek element in many cases benefited from a particular situation. The Sultans granted to the

(overwhelmingly Greek) Orthodox clergy a series of repeatedly renewed privileges and thus a special status, according to which its responsibilities were not only religious, but also related to the local representation of the people. As of the Fifteenth Century, many Greeks, while preserving their identity and faith, went to work for their conquerors, especially in the administrative structures. They were appointed to important offices in the Constantinople central apparatus, as well as in the North-Danubian region. Here they ruled over the Romanian Principalities during the so-called Phanariot epoch. At the same time, the Greeks moved about a great deal more and further than did members of the other Balkan nationalities. They could be found from Alexandria to Venice and from Vienna to Odessa, becoming involved in commerce, banking, and even intellectual activities. These same Greeks, who, while belonging to the Ottoman Empire, were the first Balkan subjects to make contact with Western ideas – the works of the French Enlightenment, followed by the principles and the ideas proclaimed and disseminated by the French Revolution. Greeks also created the first cultural and then political associations in the region.

In the Eighteenth Century, the Greeks were the supreme authority regarding all religious and cultural issues for the whole Christian population in the Ottoman Empire. Part of the Greek aristocracy, the Phanariots,[1] hoped, at a certain point, for a reform from within as a result of the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. This hope was accompanied by the secret aim of taking control, seizing power from the Ottoman authorities, and thus re-establishing the Byzantine Empire, which, in their view, was a Greek Empire.

Another trend of ideas among the Phanariots was stimulated by actions of, but chiefly by plans made in, St. Petersburg. For a while, the persons involved hoped for a Czarist restoration according to the "Greek Project" of Catherine the Great, which would have meant the establishment of the Phanariot political power in a Christian empire incorporating the Balkan region and having its capital in Constantinople. The initial (Russian-related) form of this idea was abandoned, but not altogether forgotten.

In a certain way, the first central promoters of the national Greek idea were Adamantios Koraïs (1748-1833) and Velestinlis Rigas (1757-1798). Koraïs lived in (and was influenced by) France and promoted the ideas of the French Revolution, believing that supporting it could bring freedom to his countrymen. Among other possibilities, he relied on the 19 November 1792 Decree issued by the Convention, stipulating that French

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[1] The term, Phanariot, designates the ethnically Greek and Orthodox élite in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire. The name is derived from that of the neighbourhood in Constantinople, close to the Oecumenical Patriarchate, traditionally inhabited by Greeks. The Phanariots played an essential role in the neo-Greek Renaissance that began in the late Eighteenth Century and in the creation of the modern Greek state. Some of their leaders had a role in stimulating nationalism among other non-Turkish, Christian, inhabitants of Southeastern Europe. In Romanian history, the term designates a group of high officials of Greek origin who, between 1711 and 1716, on the one hand, and 1821, on the other, were appointed by the Ottoman Empire to rule the Romanian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia. The effects of their period of rule are still being debated by Romanian historians.

revolutionary armies would support all peoples willing to overthrow their tyrants.

Rigas's activity was also tremendously important. He mapped out the armed insurrection and even wrote the famous *Turios* [The Battle March]. He also conceived a bill of human rights as well as a sketch for a new state. In his vision, this state was to include, within a republican system, the Balkan and the Middle Eastern peoples, with a special role for the Greeks. Thus, Rigas can be considered a forerunner of the idea of Southeastern European federalization, which was taken up again in the mid-Nineteenth Century and later on between the two World Wars, when it was marked by an obvious communist ideology.

The year 1814 witnessed the setting up of the secret association, *Hetairia Philiké*, the first aim of which was to win freedom for the Greeks, but also to bring the Balkan peoples together into a larger alliance, obviously under Greek domination. After the *Hetairist* interlude in the Principalities, when Alexander Ypsilanti (1792-1828) escaped and his supporters were defeated, a revolutionary war burst out in Greece, lasting for nine years, and ending with the establishment of the first Southeastern European national independent state, recognized as such by the European community. As early as 15 June 1822, a Declaration of Independence (with a constitutional character) was adopted, its inspiration taken from French and American sources. The young Greek state went from a republican to a monarchic régime, when Otto I of Bavaria was proclaimed king.

Following some domestic struggles, a constitutional régime was formally established and a national political doctrine was formulated, with the aim of attracting and uniting all Greeks both within the independent state and from the Diaspora, for the vast majority of Greeks lived outside the borders of this new independent Greece. The new political doctrine stated the liberating mission of free Greece thus making possible the appearance of the "great idea" (*megali ideia*), which not only confirmed the objective of freeing all the Greeks, but was also linked to an idea of state expansion in the regions of Europe and of Asia Minor, previously or currently inhabited by Greeks. According to this political idea, the so-called Greek state was expected to include territories which were also targeted by non-Greeks living either in Southeastern Europe or in the Near East.

In light of this political agenda, political action throughout the Nineteenth Century was directed either toward the islands (especially Crete and the Aegean islands) or toward Thessaly and Epirus, but principally toward Macedonia and Thrace, including Constantinople. These plans involved the Greeks in a number of (even military) conflicts with Ottoman Turkey, until the Balkan Wars and even after them. In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, Greek rulers (irrespective of their political coloration) set out to expand the borders of Greece as much as possible and turned this decision into a fundamental objective. Thus, in exchange for siding with the Entente, Greek Prime-Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos, was promised, on behalf of the Entente, that Greece would be able to incorporate

important territories in Asia Minor, especially around the city of Smyrna. This commitment is what actually caused Greece to undertake a war against the new Kemalist Turkey. The war ended in 1922, when, in addition to the defeat of the Greeks, almost two million of them chose (or were forced) to leave the new Turkey and to settle primarily in Thrace and in Macedonia, where they modified the old ethnic realities of these regions to a very great extent.

Thus, the Greeks were prevented from fulfilling their plans that were derived from the "great idea", that generated (and continues to generate) further tensions with their neighbours. Some Greek political circles are still unhappy about the current political borders of Greece. According to them, Southern Albania, the borders of which were established as a result of the Treaty of Florence in 1913, is Northern Epirus and therefore part of the Greek national heritage. There still exist plans concerning the Macedonian region. The Greek government went so far as to question the legitimacy of the name, "Macedonia", given to the state born after the collapse of Yugoslavia, the capital city of which is Skopje. Similarly, there are periodic tensions between Athens and Ankara over their mutual questioning of borders in the Aegean region.

2. The Case of Bulgaria

By the end of the Fourteenth Century, the Bulgarian Târnovo and Vidin Czardoms had been conquered by the Ottoman Turks who introduced their own system of government all over the regions inhabited by the Bulgarian ethnic group. Since most Bulgarians were peasants, they had to endure a foreign domination and had no state forms of their own. No Bulgarian state existed until 1878, and full independence was only proclaimed in 1908.

Following the Ottoman conquest, the Bulgarian Church was first subordinated to the Constantinople Patriarchate and then to the Ohrid Archbishopric. There were certain anti-Ottoman uprisings in the Bulgarian region, but nothing spectacular came of them. Outlaws were the main representatives of the resistance, which means that no ideology based upon national and political elements was produced. The memory of the old czarist imperial tradition did exist, but its image was not very clear or vivid. During the struggle of Michael the Brave[2] against the Ottomans, a revolt burst out in Târnovo. Although the rebels went so far as to crown Sisman III as their Czar, the episode did not have any important consequences.

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[2] Mihai Viteazul, in Romanian, ruler of Walachia between 1593 and 1601. He led a victorious struggle against the Ottoman Empire for Wallachian independence. He is credited with being the first Romanian ruler to unite the three Romanian Principalities: first, Walachia with Transylvania, in November 1599, and then both with Moldavia, in May 1600. Thus, for a short period, Michael the Brave was the ruler of a state incorporating most of the Romanian people.

During the period of conquest, partly unlike what happened in the Greek territories, but similar to what happened in the Yugoslav lands, the new Ottoman rulers eliminated the local political class, so that, for many centuries Bulgarian peasant society would have no genuine élite. In the Bulgarian region (like in other Balkan areas), urban life was very restricted. Most townspeople did not belong to the ethnic group that included the inhabitants of neighbouring villages. Spirituality was dominated by tradition. Modest elements of a certain cultural activity could only be preserved in the monastic field, a situation that explains the circulation of a number of predominantly religious writings.

Given the multiple changes the Ottoman Empire underwent in the Eighteenth Century, the Bulgarian people entered a new development phase called the "rebirth" (*vazrajdane*). One of its basic tenets was the development of a national ideology able to focus on the freeing of Bulgaria from Ottoman domination. The beginning of national programmes is related to the life and work of the monk, Paisij Hilandarski, who spent many years in the Athonite Monastery of Hilandar. He wrote *Slavjano-bălgarska istorija* [History of the Bulgarian People] that he completed in 1762. Paisij Hilandarski's work, a compilation of various historical novellas, was intended for all people whom he considered to be of Bulgarian origin and who lived in a Bulgarian homeland.

According to Paisij Hilandarski, history proved that Bulgarians were equal (if not superior) to the other peoples living in the Balkans. Addressing his fellowmen, he wrote:

> Why be ashamed of calling yourself a Bulgarian and why not read and write in your own tongue? Didn't Bulgarians have their own state and empire...? Of the whole large family of the Slavs, Bulgarians were the most glorious; they were the first who crowned a czar and had a patriarch; they were the first who became Christians and conquered the land more than all the other Slav peoples. They were the strongest and the most respected; indeed, the first Slav saints were of Bulgarian origin and spoke Bulgarian (republished, 1963).

In addition to arguing in favour of the primordial position and the superiority of Bulgarians, Paisij Hilandarski also traced the boundaries of the territories inhabited by Bulgarians, that, in his vision, were not restricted to the Balkan region, but also included "the whole of Thrace, Macedonia, and part of Illyricum".

Paisij Hilandarski's work remained in manuscript form for many years. His ideas were continued by – among others – Sofronie of Vratsa, who actually prepared the ground for the first printing press in Bulgaria. But several decades were needed until a coherent political programme could evolve by which to continue the efforts already made from the perspective of education, training, and direct anti-Ottoman action, particularly, in the latter case, on the occasion of the Russo-Turkish Wars.

Important efforts were made, in the late 1860s, to separate a Bulgarian national church from the Oecumenical (in fact, Greek) Patriarchate. Thus, in 1870, the Bulgarian Exarchate was established as a distinct church and along with it, by the Constantinople authorities, recognition of the Bulgarian nationality (religious institutions and schools included).

This period was also that of the life and work of Georgi Sava Rakovski (1821-1867) who chose armed struggle, knowing that he could rely for support on the Serbs and the Romanians. In 1858, in Odessa, Rakovski drew up a plan for the liberation of Bulgaria. It included the following passage:

> Bulgarians were deprived of their freedom by the sword and it is by the sword they will have to reconquer it, because no one will set them free except themselves and no right will be granted if they don't earn it with their own blood. Rise in arms, Bulgarians. The time has come to set yourselves free and to fill your beloved Bulgarian souls with glory (*in*, Nicolai Todorov, 1975, p. 56).

Other Bulgarian nationalists, Vasil Levsky (1837-1873), Luben Karavelov (1834-1879), and Hristo Botev (1848-1876) conducted a large part of their work from inside the young Romanian state. They modified the tactics, trying to move the focus of the fight for freedom into Bulgarian territory and eventually aiming to establish an independent, democratic, and republican state. They also created the first organizational forms (for instance, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee), which were supposed to be the embryo of the future structure of the state. In April 1876, a general uprising burst out in Bulgaria, but, as it was poorly prepared and lacked external support, it was suppressed. Cruel reprisals ensued.

Among other responses, this uprising triggered a wave of sympathy all over Europe and a favourable attitude to the solution of the Bulgarian national issue, further stimulating Russian preparations for war. Russia actually started the Russo-Turkish War on 24 April 1877 and concluded an armistice with Turkey on 31 January 1878. In addition to the Russian, Romanian, Serbian, and Montenegrin armies, a large number of Bulgarian volunteers took part in this war, either in separate units, or integrated into Russian units.

At San Stefano, near Constantinople, Russia and Turkey, to the exclusion of the other participants in the war, negotiated the new political situation to be established in the Balkan region. The status of the Bulgarians was one of the main topics of the debate. The truth of the matter is that even at the December 1876 international conference held in Constantinople, the great powers had suggested the formation of two Bulgarian states, South and North of the Balkan region, granting both of them autonomy, governors, assemblies, and militias. But on 23 December 1876, the Constitution of Mihat Pasha was proclaimed, so that further diplomatic action for a peaceful solution to the Balkan situation apparently became superfluous.

According to the Treaty of San Stefano of 3 March 1878, Russia forced Turkey to accept the existence of a Bulgarian Principality that would be massively controlled by Russia. Article VI of the Treaty virtually established the borders of the new political reality in the Balkans. These borders, in addition to including the Bulgarian ethnic area (incorporated into the borders of Bulgaria to this day), also included an important part of Macedonia and even some of what would be Serbian territory latter on, a part of Thrace extending Southward, to the Aegean Sea, some land belonging to present-day Albania, and a part of Dobrudja. A Russian army would be stationed in Bulgaria. The new state was to enjoy full internal independence. Its relationship to the Ottoman Empire would be restricted to the payment of tribute.

The establishment of this large Bulgarian Principality, the territorial limits of which included many ethnic groups, was a great source of dissatisfaction both for the other Balkan peoples and for the great powers, especially Great Britain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For this reason, they called the Congress of Berlin, the debates of which ended with a treaty signed between 1 and 13 July 1878. Of the sixty-four articles making up the Treaty of Berlin, twenty-two dealt with the situation of the Bulgarians, bringing important changes not only to their status, but also to the borders previously established at San Stefano. Thus, there were to be two different political realities having two types of relationship with the Ottoman Empire.

The Bulgarian Principality was established between the Danube and the Balkan Mountains. It benefited from full domestic independence, but was formally under the authority of the Sultan and had to pay him a tribute. As for the Bulgarian territories South of the Balkan Mountains, they were organized into a structure to be known as Eastern Rumelia, the capital of which was Philippopolis (Plovdiv). The province was to enjoy administrative autonomy under a Christian governor, but also remain under the surveillance of the Sultan. The territories that the Treaty of San Stefano had taken from Thrace, Rodope, and Macedonia were unconditionally returned to the Ottoman Empire; however, Northern Dobrudja was ceded to the Romanian state.

Because the Treaty of San Stefano and its territorial provisions were annulled, a Bulgarian state, as distinct from what would be known as Greater Bulgaria, was on the verge of being established. Several years later, in 1885, in complex circumstances, Eastern Rumelia and the Bulgarian Principality united under the authority of Sofia. The event came to be known in the history of Bulgaria as the "Union". (To a certain extent, a parallel can be drawn with the Union of the Romanian Principalities under Alexandru Ioan Cuza, except that the status of each of the two Romanian principalities, unlike in the case of Bulgaria, was identical.)

The 1877-1878 events provided a clear basis for a new Bulgarian political ideology which has continued – one way or another – to this very day. The idea of Greater Bulgaria, namely the San Stefano Bulgaria, has been strongly supported by Bulgarians.

According to Bulgarian politicians and ideologists, their South-Danubian state was the direct successor (in a new historical phase) of the First and the Second Bulgarian Czardoms, both of which had included important territories South of the Danube. All these territories were claimed as a Bulgarian inheritance that had to be incorporated within the borders of the new state. Thus, the major national objective on the political agenda of that time was to bring home to the "national state" all the Bulgarian patrimony (assets), which meant the whole of Macedonia, Thrace, and Dobrudja, up to the Danube. These regions were the constant concern of Bulgarian politicians, who spared no efforts to prepare and then to achieve their political ideal. All the means of the state were used to promote it: education at all levels, the media, allegedly academic journals, as well as ample propaganda abroad. At the same time, preparations were made and military actions were taken with the same purpose in view.

An essential element in this particular form of nationalism was the approach to the Macedonian issue. According to Sofia, the whole Slavophone population in Macedonia consisted (and still consists) of Bulgarians, therefore belonging to the Bulgarian people, without yet being part of its state. For this reason, for many decades, the claims of Sofia were focused chiefly on the Macedonian region, even though there were other important objectives to be attained. This case being what it was, after 1878 and mainly after 1913, Bulgarian nationalist ideology turned the country into the major unsettling factor in the region. At the same time, what could then be called Bulgarian revisionism prevented any *rapprochement* among the Balkan states, even for questions of security and neighbourly co-operation. (Obviously, one cannot ignore the extremely important – sometimes even decisive – role of the great powers that periodically intervened to promote their own interests in these highly sensitive regions.)

Three times during the Twentieth Century: 1912-1913, 1915-1918, and 1941-1944, the Bulgarian government involved the country in wars meant to implement an imperialistic and chauvinistic policy. On other occasions, the Bulgarian authorities initiated or supported terrorist acts and even the formation of armed groups of *komitadgies*, ready to fight for the same expansionist plans.

Throughout the years, however, various Bulgarian democratic groups denounced the dream of a "San Stefano Bulgaria", as a "cancerous tumor". In spite of the catastrophic consequences of the expansionist initiatives, and also in spite of the generally democratic European spirit, Bulgarian expansionists did not give up their objectives. These were upheld not only during the fascist régime existing before and during the Second World War, but also during the period of Sovietization, when Bulgaria experienced a form of national communism which, among other things, aimed at educating Bulgarian society to fulfill "the national ideal" and to remedy all previous injustices allegedly committed when Bulgaria "lost" Macedonia, Thrace, and Dobrudja.

Such ideas continue to exist and even to inspire practical action in the new Bulgaria that emerged after the fall of Todor Zhivkov's régime.

3. The Case of Albania

From the beginning of the Fifteenth Century until the outburst of the First World War, that is, for about five centuries, Albanians were under Ottoman rule. There was a brief interlude, between 1443 and 1468, on the territory of present-day Albania, when Albanians established a state after winning ephemeral liberation from the Ottoman yoke. The founder of this state and the mastermind behind some successful actions against the Ottoman armies was Georgi Kastriot Skanderbeg, who, later on, became a legendary hero, a symbol, and a myth of Albanian popular and, afterwards, political thinking.

Throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule, the Albanian and the Montenegrin ethno-linguistic groups represented the most backward peoples in the Balkan-Ottoman region, for a number of reasons. As in neighbouring Montenegro), strong tribal traditions were preserved in an all-rural society consisting of peasants and shepherds, the latter frequently improving their (very low) living standards by attacking the sedentary and somewhat wealthier populations surrounding them.

A certain reality developed during the period of Ottoman rule the consequences of which lasted until the Twentieth Century. Coastal Albanians were converted to Catholicism, coming under the religious authority of Rome and maintaining contacts with a significant Albanian diaspora which had been living in Southern Italy for centuries. Part of the Albanian population (mainly the inhabitants of the mountainous regions) stuck to the Orthodox faith, while the relative majority opted for Islam. Unlike the cases of the later great multinational empires in the region – the Habsburg and the Russian Empires – Ottoman rule proved to be relatively tolerant and only incidentally resorted to forced Islamization in the Balkans, in special cases and over limited geographical areas. Thus, the fact that an important part of the Albanian population, as well as a number of Serbs and Croats living in neighbouring Bosnia, chose to embrace Islam was the result of freely made decisions.

Being a Muslim resulted in a reduction of one's tax obligations toward the Ottoman state and, in addition, begot a number of benefits and perspectives. Unlike most medieval and pre-modern European societies, the Ottoman world lacked any estates or orders, so that an individual could rely on his skills and good fortune to be promoted to important offices, including that of *Grand Vizier* (*Vezir*), which ranked second in the hierarchy (after the Sultan) and was far more important than the *Padishah*. For this reason, many Albanians chose the army or various administrative positions and, along with Arabs and Bosnians, were significant presences in Ottoman institutional structures. One result of the Islamization of the Albanians is that it led to their being scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire, from the Romanian Principalities to

Egypt. Some Albanians settled in towns and started their own businesses, just as Jews, Armenians, and Vlachs also did. In such places, they abandoned their mother tongue or used it in parallel with Turkish.

The previously mentioned poor structures and circumstances, as well as other difficulties, permitted only modest Albanian involvement in a few random and unimportant anti-Ottoman uprisings. Thus, Albanian national awareness and elements of national ideology appeared later than in the cases of the other Balkan peoples. Indeed, some Albanians (as well as Balkan Romanians) firmly believed, until the eve of the First World War, in the possibility of remaining part of an evolving Ottoman world. Albanians were loyal subjects of the Sultan for a long period. They hoped for inner regeneration through reforms (that is, modernization) that would be accompanied by the granting of minimal national rights, like, for instance, the use of the Albanian language in educational systems and in the structures of local autonomy.

At the start of their movement, this outlook was also shared by the "Young Turks", a political organization born at the end of the Nineteenth Century in the Ottoman Empire and including quite a number of Albanians who took part in its actions. After the "Young Turks" were successful in Constantinople and took power in 1909, starting a long-term programme of "Turkification" and "Ottomanization", the frail Albanian élite, on the one hand, and the rural elements, on the other hand, began to take action in establishing a national state.

As in other Balkan countries, this state-focused action had obviously been preceded by culture-focused efforts. The mid-Nineteenth Century witnessed the printing of the first Albanian books, in the North-Danubian Romanian region, among which a primer. Enjoying some support from the same region, the first Albanian language journal was printed, while the first Albanian schools opened close to the Adriatic Sea. For the Albanian nationalist movement, as in the case of other Balkan movements, Romania proved to be a major center of support until the eve of the First World War.

Given the Eastern European crisis that occurred from 1875 to 1878, political actions took place aiming at fulfilling certain national desiderata. After the San Stefano Peace Treaty was signed, Albanians wrote a complaint to the British government and asked, on behalf of two million people (1,000,000 Muslims, 750,000 Orthodox, and 250,000 Roman Catholics), that they be permitted to sever relationships with Turkey and that Albanians be received "among the great European families where they actually belong, by race and origins". The so-called "Prizren League" was founded in June 1878 with a twofold purpose: to make Albanians and their wishes better known by European public opinion and to change the status of the Ottoman Empire Albanians by creating a type of autonomy that observed the principle of nationalities.

The idea of autonomy had a huge impact among Albanians, but the European decision-makers of the time did not take it into account and all but refused to discuss the matter. In 1880, the Prizren League formed a provisional government and started military actions, turning Kosovo into

its resistance stronghold. But the movement failed after the Ottoman army intervened without any hindrance from the great powers.

At the end of the Nineteenth Century, Albanian political action was reflected, among other things, in a number of complaints in the writing of which the Frasheri brothers played an important role. This political action had the following short-term objectives: to bring together, under one administrative structure, all territories inhabited by Albanians (who were scattered in a number of *vilayets*), to obtain local autonomy according to national principles, and to establish a democratic régime capable of implementing modernization reforms. Both before and after 1908, some Albanians took part in anti-Ottoman actions, along with representatives of other Balkan ethnic groups. During the Ottoman internal crisis brought about by the Turkish-Italian War and by the Balkan peoples' preparations, which predicted an impending conflict, an armed rebellion gradually became general in the Albanian area.

Delegates appointed by various Albanian communities joined a group of militants led by Ismail Kemal, who had come to Albania from Bucharest, Romania. On 28 November 1912, a national assembly meeting in Vlora proclaimed the independence of Albania and formed a provisional government. Formal international recognition of Albanian independence was granted through the 30 May 1913 Treaty of London, according to the terms of which the Ottoman Empire gave up all its rights in Albania and withdrew its remaining troops from the country.

In parallel with internal political troubles largely provoked by tribal rivalries, Albanians made great efforts in several European capitals (especially during the Conference of Florence of 1913) to have changes made in the borders of the country, so as to include as much Albanian-occupied territory as possible. Both then and later, Albania had to face complex problems which sprang from two sources: on the one hand, from similar Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian tendencies to grab as much as they could from Albania, even to the point of wanting to divide it up among themselves, and on the other hand, from the desire of Italy to impose a protectorate status on Albania, which in fact would have meant Italian control over Albania. At that point, Albanian political circles contacted the great powers, submitting a written complaint accompanied by a map and claiming a series of territories that were inhabited by Albanians (the numbers and the percentages were and still are questionable) and had been incorporated by neighbouring Greece and Serbia and Montenegro) (later Yugoslavia). The message conveyed by this Albanian policy statement was that the Albanian national territory was far more extensive than the 28,000 square kilometers granted by the Florence agreement of 1913 and renewed before the outbreak of the First World War.

One can therefore conclude that, during the inter-war years, as well as during Enver Hoxha's communist régime and under his successor Ramiz Alia, the idea of a Greater Albania remained the central objective of Albanian nationalists. To a great extent, albeit irrespective of the political will of Albanians, this objective was temporarily and partly achieved

between 1941 and 1943, when Italian-occupied Albania was given a number of Yugoslav territories, including the Kosovo region, which in their turn had been a gift from Hitler to Mussolini's Italy, after the 1941 German invasion and dissolution of Yugoslavia.

During the post-Second World War years, the strongly anti-Yugoslav national communism promoted by Enver Hoxha was accompanied by the denial of national rights to minorities, even in the education system (while the practice of religion was strictly forbidden), and also by a highly autarchic and xenophobic state policy. The Tirana authorities were behind all the Kosovo crises that began in the 1980s and got off to a fresh start after 1990, with two distinct programmes: a minimal one, aiming at a separate Albanian republic in Kosovo, the capital city of which would be Priština, after a full "cleansing" of all Serbian elements, and a maximal one, aiming at the setting up of a so-called Greater Albania, which would mean that the Tirana authorities would control a population and a territory twice as large as is currently the case.

4. The Case of the Balkan Romanians

South of the Danube River, extending to the Pindus Mountains, and from Thrace to the Adriatic Sea, a Romanian ethnic group crystallized during the last century of the first millennium. The group was identical to the Romanians living North of the Danube, in terms of nationality and language. According to the dialectical features of their spoken language, these people were divided into Istro-Romanians, living in the immediate neighbourhood of the Adriatic Sea, Megleno-Romanians, and Aromanians (Macedo-Romanians), who inhabited the Southern and central region of the Balkan Peninsula. During the Middle Ages they had been more numerous than in the Nineteenth Century. Many communities had petered out and had vanished, absorbed by the Slavic or Greek surrounding masses. Next came the Romanians belonging to the Daco-Romanian group, who were called Timocians and who lived near the right bank of the Danube and mainly on both sides of the Timoc river which, by 1833, had come to be viewed as a natural border. These Romanians spread from near Belgrade and the Morava Valley to Vidin and, further East, to the Black Sea. They descended from an Eastern Romanity which had managed to preserve the memory of Rome in their very name and tongue, so that they were officially recognized as Romanians throughout the years, in contemporary documents, in official Byzantine and Ottoman papers, in the writings of medieval chroniclers, and later on, in the works of certain Western travellers and humanists.

Since the Aromanians were shepherds, merchants, and craftsmen, these people largely left their rural areas and became the most active and educated ethno-linguistic group in the Balkans. Part of them were scattered in a diaspora which included the Habsburg Empire and the Romanian Principalities, where they also had an important role to play.

Their history witnessed a national awakening and assertion movement, which was – in its way – a different form of rebirth.

The first national rebirth of the Aromanian people took place in the very heart of the Balkan Peninsula, in the urban center of Moscopolis, where a multiple studies academic institution functioned for a certain period. It was at this point that Romanians began to speak of a language and of an ethnic group of their own, along with a historical background that distinguished them from the other Balkan inhabitants. These ideas, that were expressed by the first exponents of what could be called the Moscopolean School, were further promoted at a higher level within the Vienna and Budapest Aromanian communities. Under Habsburg rule, Aromanian actions were first perceived as being an appendix to the so-called Transylvanian School of Romanian awareness and later came to overlap its work. The fundamental ideas expressed by Constantine George Roja, Constantine Ucuta, Mihail G. Boiagi, and by continuators of their work, such as Andrei Şaguna and others, concerned with the Romanian nature of the Vlachs and their language, the need to develop a Romanian-language school system, and the need to organize religious life along Romanian lines, using the language that devout Romanians used when speaking.

Obviously, there were important differences (coming from equally different states of existence) between the Transylvanian School representatives who came from Transylvania and other Romanians whose roots could be found South of the Danube. In fact, the basic difference was that of a compact mass of Romanians found in the intra-Carpathian area and under the rule of the Habsburg Emperor, and that of scattered Romanian minority communities throughout the Balkans during the period of Ottoman rule. Indeed, it is in the latter area that one should seek the political characteristics of the second Aromanian rebirth.

This second rebirth was somewhat different from the first, yet it moved along the same lines and at a higher level. It began in Bucharest, during the rule of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza. The 1848 generation "discovered" its South-Danubian brothers and integrated them into a Romanian national vision. From that time on, the official view held in Bucharest was that, in addition to the attention directed at the Romanians in Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Transylvania, equal attention should be devoted to the Balkan Romanians, also known as European Turkish Romanians (until the 10 August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest), Macedonian Romanians, or simply Balkan Romanians, since they lived scattered across the Balkan area.

Both the inhabitants of the Romanian state and the overwhelming majority of the Balkan Romanians cherished the same basic ideas: their affiliation with the Romanian bloc; the Romanian nature of all their spoken dialects, and the need to preserve and promote their own ethnic (and therefore national) traits. On the other hand, both the Bucharest circles and the incipient Romanian élite in the Balkans took account of all existing realities. In most of the Balkan regions, Romanians were

scattered, while non-Romanians surrounded the urban or rural communities in which they lived. Therefore, there was no suggestion of creating a distinct Romanian state organization outside the Pindus area, for obviously such a project would not have been feasible. Also, the huge distance, often a question of hundreds of kilometres from the border of the Romanian State, would have prevented the (partial or total) incorporation of these hundreds or thousands of Romanians inside Romanian borders. (It is true, however, that during the inter-war period, steps were taken to ensure a massive immigration of these Romanians into Romania, where many of them colonized the region of Dobrudja known as the Quadrilateral, only to be forced to leave after the 1940 Craiova Treaty returned the area to Bulgaria.)

The circumstances permitting, Romanian schools and churches opened in the Balkans as early as 1864. Their construction and good functioning were supported both from the state budget allocated by the Romanian government on a yearly basis and from (very often substantial) contributions made by all Romanians, but especially by South-Danubian Romanians. On the eve of the First World War, a network of primary and secondary schools existed, having over 110 units, as well as several dozens of churches in which Romanian priests were permitted to conduct religious services in their own language. In 1878, a number of authorized representatives of Balkan Romanians, empowered by their local communities, demanded official recognition of the Romanian language in schools and in the existing administrative bodies, that meant, in fact, given the prevailing conditions, the formal recognition of the Romanian nationality. A decade later, a special effort was made to bring about the recognition of a metropolitan bishop elected from among Aromanians and able to represent them. Because of a number of factors, and mainly because of the opposition of the Oecumenical Patriarchate acting on behalf of Hellenism, these attempts ultimately failed.

The recognition of the Romanian nation within the Ottoman Empire only took place in 1905, after common actions taken by many local politicians and by the Bucharest authorities persuaded the Sultan to issue an *irade* which was in fact a true constitutional charter. Romanians were granted the right to have their own language, schools, and churches, and also to enjoy proportional representation and participation in the local administration. The *irade* was both a result and a recognition of the stance taken by the Romanians, for they were among the few inhabitants of the Ottoman Balkans who were loyal to the Porte and favoured the preservation of the Empire rather than its destruction. In those days, Romanians believed that the young Balkan states that were pursuing their own national objectives (*i.e.*, the political elimination of Ottoman authority South of the Danube) were proving to be intolerant as the result of their nationalism and therefore posed a threat to the very future of Romanianism. The developments in the Pindus, but mainly those in Ottoman Macedonia, seemed to provide solid evidence that such fears were justified. For several decades, between 1878 and the outburst of the First

World War, many well-armed groups, *komitadgies*, raided Macedonia (with frequent support from the surrounding capitals: Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade) and made victims of Romanians, killing many of them and stealing their goods.

Balkan Romanians actively supported the actions of the Young Turks, believing that they provided good opportunities for modernization and perhaps guarantees regarding their future. The most important representative of the national Romanian movement at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, Nicolae Batzaria, belonged to the leadership of the new Young Turk régime and was a member of both the Young Turk Party and of the Constantinople Senate and Government. But the actions of the Young Turks did not move in the direction Romanians had anticipated. They introduced, for the first time in the Ottoman experience, an official and large-scale denationalization and assimilation programme which would negatively affect many Romanians.

The events related to the first Balkan War, *i.e.*, the Ottoman catastrophe that lasted for several weeks, gave rise to a search for new political solutions. Within the Society for Macedo-Romanian Culture, the leading Aromanian body in Macedonia, a new policy was shaped in a report written by George Murnu. A proposal was made to establish an independent or autonomous Macedonia, structured on multinational criteria according to the Swiss model. Another possibility was to annex as many Romanian settlements as possible to an incipient Albania and to grant them a cantonal or even a federal régime (in other words, an Albanian-Romanian state). A delegation of Macedo-Romanians visited the major European capitals and submitted certain demands to the great powers, which, at least officially, were not part of the political agenda of the Titu Maiorescu government. The Romanian lobby failed as it would fail once again, later on, when the same George Murnu expressed similar demands at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, that put an end to the First World War.

In the summer of 1913, as a result of the Treaty of Bucharest of 10 August, the splitting of the Balkan Peninsula was completed, distributing the Romanian people into four different states. The Serbian and Greek prime-ministers, as well as the head of the Bulgarian delegation, signed official letters promising to grant Romanians educational and religious rights and – obviously – to recognize their nationality. But the three states along with Albania failed to fulfil the terms of these promises. The vast majority of Romanian schools and churches in the Balkans were closed; however, the speed with which these actions occurred (unlike the purpose) varied from case to case.

There came to be a direct or implicit denial of the existence of a Romanian minority in the Balkans and also of the right of Romanian communities in the region to have legitimate relationships with the North-Danubian Romanians. In the complex circumstances of the two World Wars, first in 1917, then in 1941, Romanian cantons were officially established in the Pindus area, but their existence was quite ephemeral.

The Timoc area experienced a number of specific political realities. Persecutions and denationalization efforts were stronger and more numerous here than elsewhere. During the Balkan Wars, Timoc Romanians wrote their first protestations claiming basic national rights in school and church. Neither of these demands, nor those submitted at the end of the First World War, had any positive effects, because, among other reasons, the various Romanian governments failed in lending an ear to public opinion and refrained from getting involved in the process.

In 1918, when Greater Romania was established, a national committee of Timoc Romanians proclaimed their union with the Romanian state according to their perceived right to self-determination. The desire to achieve the union of the Timocian population with the Romanian state on the left bank of the Danube was also expressed through popular rallies and thousands of signatures in 1941, when Yugoslavia was first dismembered. During the totalitarian régime following the Second World War, the condition of the Romanians who had been separated from the rest only by the Danube River continued to be bad, nor were there any fundamental changes concerning them, after 1990, in Bulgaria or in Serbia. All the Romanian organizations established in these countries aimed at obtaining recognition of their members as Romanians and at being granted minimal cultural rights, according to the European principles on minorities.

One final point to be made is that, during the last decades, given the lack of interest of the Bucharest authorities in the fate of Balkan Romanianism, a new political idea has emerged. Part of the Romanian diaspora (including the Balkan Aromanians) began to view themselves as a separate ethnic group, with their own Aromanian language, which had developed and existed in parallel with the Romanian language. Assuming this new dimension as a separate people, apart from the Romanian nation, the Balkan Romanian Diaspora approached a number of national and international authorities and even the European Parliament. The latter adopted Resolution 1333/1997, intended to grant a degree of recognition of that quality and to request the support of all European countries. As the political movement of the Balkan Romanians was divided and lacked the necessary means, it could not (and cannot) prevent the attrition of the Romanian element on the right bank of the Danube. The Romanians in that area are undergoing a massive process of assimilation and alienation, for the authorities of the Balkan states, almost completely, deny the existence of a Romanian ethnicity on their territories and all the rights that would devolve from recognition.

5. The Case of Yugoslavia

Currently, the phrase, Yugoslav peoples, includes Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and several types of Bosnians: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Former Yugoslavia also incorporated a Republic of Montenegro (Črna Gora), formerly the little kingdom of Montenegro, the rulers of which were

members of the Petrović Njegos Dynasty. From an ethnic point of view, the inhabitants of Montenegro are, for the most part, Serbs. Attempts were made, during the Second World War and then sporadically in recent years, to theorize about the existence of a distinctly Montenegrin Slavic ethnic group, but these ideas have failed to win acceptance.

The Bosnian problem is far more complicated. In the heart of former Yugoslavia, Slavs belonging to the Croat ethnic group mingled with Slavs belonging to the Serbian ethnic group. The two groups were primarily distinguished by their affiliation with two different forms of Christianity (Catholic and Orthodox) and therefore with two separate cultural areas: Western and Byzantine. At the same time, there were frequent changes in terms of state and political realities, so that turns to rule were taken by either Serbian or Croat monarchs, or foreign rulers such as the Byzantine Emperor, Hungarian kings, or (to a lesser extent) the Republic of Venice. Ottoman rule brought further changes. A part of the Serbian population migrated from the South and East, mingling with the Croats or replacing some of them who chose to take refuge in the North, in the Habsburg Empire. In parallel, part of the remaining population took up the religion of the new rulers, converting to Islam and thus acquiring certain features that distinguished them from the Christians alongside whom they lived. Yet, their Slavic nature was preserved, and for a long period these supporters of Mohammed were considered either Muslim Serbs or Muslim Croats.

In the context of the internal and administrative-territorial organization of the Ottoman world, present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into several units with no separate organization. On the background of the Habsburg expansionist tendencies and of the 1875-1878 Eastern crisis, a need developed to establish a so-called province of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Central-Western Balkan Peninsula, to be a neighbour of the older Habsburg possessions in Dalmatia. Its borders were artificially established on the map of the Ottoman Empire and, in keeping with a previous Russian-Austrian agreement, the new territory thus delimited was transferred to Austro-Hungarian administration. Until 1908, the Ottoman Sultan retained a theoretical right of suzerainty, but later on, the province was fully annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Habsburg rule over Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased in 1918. The national authorities in what became Yugoslavia conceded that the land was equally inhabited by Serbs and Croats, a reality that was further recognized by the 1 December 1918 official establishment of Yugoslavia. For a short period before that date, the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina had belonged to the so-called Serbian-Croat-Slovenian state established on the Yugoslav territories formally part of the Habsburg Empire. This entity had been governed, for a short period, by a national body based in Zagreb. In the aftermath of the Second World War, as part of the plan to implement a Soviet-inspired federalization scheme for future Yugoslavia, Tito and his henchmen aimed at establishing six republics, one of which was to be Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav Constitution, adopted in 1945, officially sanctioned this political reality. Statistics relative to the first post-war decade indicate that the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was inhabited by Serbs, Croats, and other ethnic groups, the respective percentages of which were insignificant. After 1958, official censuses also included a new category – Muslims – which designated an ethnic group rather than members of a religion. Until the proclamation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state, these Muslims were one of its ethnic components, along with the Croats and the Serbs. According to the 1981 census (which worked as reference statistics inside and outside Yugoslavia over a substantial period), Muslims made up 39.5 percent, Serbs, 32 percent, and Croats, 18 percent of the total population. According to the 1991 census, the Muslim population had reached 44 percent, while both Serbs and Croats had lost one percentage point.

The situation being what it is, one can conclude that the idea of establishing a separate state, called the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, did not exist prior to 1970. Yet, there were disputes – between the two World Wars, during Tito's régime, and chiefly after Tito's death – about the control and the practical division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Zagreb and Belgrade - between Serbs and Croats.

The year 1970 witnessed the appearance of a text entitled *The Islamic Declaration*, the author of which glorified Islam and suggested a series of necessary steps, among which the de-secularization and the re-Islamization of all Muslims who had strayed from the faith, as well as the gradual expansion of Islam. The author of the text was a Bosnian Muslim who wanted, among other things, to turn Bosnia into the first Muslim state in Europe. His name was Alia Izetbegović, none other than the current President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the leader of a fundamentalist party, supported by certain Middle Eastern countries including Iran and Iraq, and known to be guided by the slogan, *Ot Stambula do Triesta da ne nada Kresta* (Stamboul to Trieste across, we don't need any cross). Part of Izetbegović's programme was also assumed by the Kosovo Albanians, particularly after part of the programme was implemented in some areas in Bosnia, following the tragic conflicts starting in 1992.

Thus a new political idea has begun to propagate across contemporary Europe: Islamic fundamentalism.

The situation of Macedonia is completely different. Historical Macedonia does not coincide with the territorial limits of the homonymous state. In the context of the last phase of the Eastern problem, ranging from the Berlin Treaty to the First World War, Macedonia became the main stake and a bone of contention not only among the great powers, but also among Balkan Peninsula states which – in the open or with a hidden agenda – hoped to meet their national expansionist objectives.

A number of ethno-demographic processes – migrations, colonizations, immigrations, and assimilation – took place in Macedonia throughout the centuries and created a veritable population mosaic. This diversity of

ethnic elements went hand in hand with a generalized interpenetration, which meant there was no ethnic group living on its own, without close neighbours of a different ethno-linguistic group. None of the ethnic elements in the region outweighed the others. Both in towns and in villages there were Turks and Albanians, Greeks and Romanians, and Jews and Gypsies who lived together, as well as so-called Macedonians, a Slavic people distinct from other Southern-Slav peoples such as Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, etc.

As in the case of the Balkan Romanians, but to a much larger extent, Macedonians have been (and still are) denied certain of their basic national features, especially by their Greek and Bulgarian neighbours. Thus, a whole "issue" came into being in regard to this Slavic population living in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula. The issue in question actually sprang from political interests and was then "documented" by so-called scientific evidence. This situation appeared toward the end of the Nineteenth Century when Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria tried to become masters of the game in the region, waging a propaganda war against one another and sending armed raiding parties (*komitadgies*) into Macedonia. Great efforts have been made (and their consequences are visible to this day) to question the historical reality of the existence of a distinct Macedonian people and to prove that Macedonians were a mere component of one of the surrounding Slavic language-speaking peoples: Serbs, but particularly Bulgarians, because of the similarity in language in the latter case. The issue was and undoubtedly still is complex. It was raised and amplified by the policies of the various countries in the region and by their mutual relationships, in a crisis which started before the outburst of the Balkan Wars and persisted long after they came to an end. History seems to bring sufficient evidence in support of the undisputed existence (together with other ethnic groups) of a distinct Macedonian people of Slavic origin, with its own historical fate and occasionally sharing a common destiny with other peoples, under certain circumstances.

This distinct ethnic existence, as well as the presence of other ethnic groups living together, determined a number of historians at the beginning of the century to write many works (with fully opposed statistical tables and arguments) on the organization and perspectives of Macedonia. This spate of interest provided a good opportunity for a wide variety of suggested solutions: to grant autonomy and even independence to Macedonia, to annex it to one of the Balkan successor states (this idea was very popular among Bulgarians), or to divide it up among its neighbours, as actually happened after the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, by which Greece got 52 percent, Serbia, 37 percent, and Bulgaria, 11 percent. The share assigned to Serbia is the present-day independent Macedonia.

The proper solution might have been (as many of the numerous Macedonians and Romanians living in the region would have preferred) to create a distinct Macedonia which could have been either autonomous (and under international control, if needed), or independent. The idea was repeated obsessively during these years and then in a later period.

Serbs and Croats are descendants of Slavs who migrated to the Balkan region during the Sixth and Seventh Centuries. Their common origin was not initially questioned. Only recently an Iranian descent has been suggested alongside the Slavic origin as well as another affiliation with the Western Slav branch, including Czechs, Slovaks, and Slovenes. One thing is certain. Around the year 1000, the historical destiny of the Slavophones living in the future territory of Croatia became increasingly separated from that of the inhabitants of future Serbia.

The Croats managed to create their own forms of organized political life before the Serbs did. These included a kingdom the legitimacy of which was recognized by the Pope, thus setting the basis for a tradition often recalled throughout the centuries and up to this day. The independent Croatian state did not last very long. Most of Dalmatia fell into the hands of Venice around the year 1000 and was then successively ruled by the Ottomans, the French, and the Habsburgs. In 1102, according to a written agreement, Croatia was included in the territories belonging to the Crown of St. Stephen (Hungary) and remained under Hungarian domination until the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Croatian feudal class preserved its privileged status, even though it often had to cope with the rival Hungarian nobility, while Croatia enjoyed a genuinely autonomous régime which continued in the Croat territories taken over by the Habsburgs after the second Battle of Mohács (1687).

As a result of Austrian expansion after the 1683 siege of Vienna, new Croat-inhabited territories were integrated into the Habsburg Empire, *i.e.,* into a political system and a way of life typical of Central Europe. At the same time, Croat Christians found themselves under the jurisdiction of Rome from the very beginning and became a part of the Roman-Catholic world after the great schism, a fact that brought them close to Central and Western European developments. This western Christian link enabled the Croats, on the model of the Italians, to undergo Renaissance and reform. Indeed, the Sixteenth Century witnessed the emergence of the cultural and political idea of Slovenianism, according to which all Southern Slavs were one people who spoke only one language. Slovenianism, as an ideology, was later replaced by Illyrism, which had almost the same political connotations in the historical circumstances of the Eighteenth Century.

In pre-modern times, a certain unity of views existed with regard to the language spoken by the Croats and the Serbs. Yet, except for the countless local variants, a solid reality existed of three dialects, two of which would give birth – owing to scholarly endeavours – to one single language called Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian.

The first awakening of Serbian national awareness took place in the same Habsburg circles in which the representatives of all the Yugoslav ethnic groups mingled. In Vienna, in Voivodina, chiefly in Karlowitz (Novi Sad), and in other areas, significant efforts were made by Dositej Obradović and Vuk Karadjić, the founders of Serbian rebirth. In a way, they were the forerunners of the 1804-1815 Serbian Revolution led by George Petrovich who founded the Karageorgevich Dynasty, and Milosh

Obrenovich, in the aftermath of which – for the first time after many centuries – a distinct Serbian political life emerged within a state enjoying limited (and later enlarged) autonomy. This autonomy was recognized by the Ottoman Empire and guaranteed by Russia, which gradually became the principal ally of Serbia, from the standpoint of its expansionist policy in the Balkans. Although slightly influenced by certain innovating Western trends, the Serbian Revolution, at the end of the previous century, was by and large the work of the rural masses who were unable, for quite some time, to draw up distinct and specific political programmes.

At almost the same time as the emergence of the Croatian national programme within the so-called Illyric movement, Serbia witnessed the emergence of the *nacertanie* (the "project"), the idea of Ilia Garasanin, a political personality who played an important role in the Serbian Kingdom. Starting from the perceived need to preserve the independence of the Serbian statal structures, Garasani designated a national objective to be achieved in two phases. The first phase called for the freeing and the uniting of all Serbs living both in the Habsburg and in the Ottoman Empires. The second phase called for the uniting of all the Yugoslavs, by the freeing of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the integration of Montenegro, and a massive expansion toward the Adriatic Sea, which meant – among other things – that the so-called Greater Serbia could at last be established and that Austria would become the principal opponent of the Serbian national idea.

Garasanin's ideas dominated the Serbian political outlook until the start of the First World War. They were genuinely fleshed out between the two world wars and were partially taken up again after 1990. At the same time, Garasani established a network of agents able to act, for and on behalf of Belgrade, in various areas of the Yugoslav territory. Later on, in keeping with different ways of tackling the methods, priorities, and opportunities for bringing such a plan to fruition in Serbian public life, and on the background of a rather weak parliamentary system, a number of political parties came into existence with the aim of accomplishing this national ideal.

Roughly during the same period, Croat South Slavism followed a German model and preached the spiritual unity of all Yugoslavs based on a common culture and a common language. In a sense, this movement could be interpreted as a reaction against the Magyarization that had been imposed before 1848. L. Gaj and I. Strossmayer spoke of a common race and an almost identical language, actually outlining a project which was to be later called Greater Croatia. Strossmayer went so far as to establish a party which came to be known as the Croat Right Party and which later denied the status of distinct national entities to both Serbs and Slovenes. Even earlier, S. Starcević had pleaded for the total liberation of the Yugoslav peoples from Austro-Hungarian rule and for their unification, the latter aim obviously detrimental to aspirations for Serbian supremacy. In Starcević's view, Croat supremacy was intended to oppose pan-Slavism (which he thought to be pan-Russianism), that he viewed as being as

much a threat to the Croat national identity, as the Magyarism of Budapest and the Germanism of Vienna. Starcević had a very important influence upon the masses and especially upon the poor and the less educated. Unanimously perceived as the father of modern Croat nationalism, he later became a symbol in himself and was glorified in many ways by the Croat ustashes. His contemptuous and insulting attitude toward the Serbs gave rise to fierce, lasting, and ever deepening disputes.

On Starcević's death in 1917, attorney at law Ante Pavelić became the new leader of the Croat Right Party. At the start, he followed the policy of his predecessor, favouring the establishment of a large Croat state within a federally organized Austria-Hungary. Later on, this state was to be conceived as an independent Yugoslav federation, clearly distinct from Serbia. It was supposed to include all the Yugoslav peoples who had previously belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and to be organized along Swiss or American lines. This political agenda was promoted until the end of the First World War.

In the complex circumstances of the generalized conflict at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, a number of political programmes were adopted. At the end of 1914, the Serbian *Skupstina*, which had taken refuge in Niš, voted for a declaration in which the final objective of the struggle of Serbia was to free and unite all the Yugoslav peoples, in other words, to establish the Greater Serbia under the authority of Belgrade. In 1917, on the island of Corfu, representatives of the Pasić government and of the Yugoslav emigration in the Austro-Hungarian Empire signed a declaration stating that at the end of the First World War, a multinational Serbo-Croato-Slovenian state would be born and organized according to federal and egalitarian principles.

At the end of 1918, Yugoslavs were united in what was known for a decade as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. After almost three years of political confrontation, Serbian circles painfully imposed a constitution ensuring the supremacy of Serbian elements and of the Karageorgevich Dynasty in the new state. The history of Yugoslavia between the two World Wars consisted to a great extent of the confrontation between centralism and federalism in a state the fundamental institutions of which were totally or massively dominated by Serbs. National aspirations and decentralizing tendencies were neglected by both the partly parliamentary régime and the totalitarian monarchic régime established in 1929, following a coup. Serbian supremacy triggered a strong opposition on the part of the Croats, who had, for a long period, grouped around the Croat Peasants' Party.

The Ustashes, a right-wing Croatian party led by Ante Pavelić made its appearance in 1931. It was attracted to the totalitarian ideas inspired by the Italian and the German model and was closely linked to Horthyist elements in Hungary and to Macedonian terrorists. Its incentive for existence was an exacerbated Croat nationalism which aimed at eliminating Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies and actually began to implement

these ideas as soon as they could take power within the so-called Croat independent State proclaimed in April 1941 under the authority of Hitlerite Germany.

In the Yugoslav region, the Second World War determined many things, among which a mutual extermination of Serbs and Croats on orders from their respective leaders, A. Pavelić, D. Mihailović, and B. Nedić. At this moment, the new doctrine promoted by Josip Broz Tito and his communist movement began to function.

Throughout the post-First World War years, Yugoslav Communists had taken orders from Comintern agents and had made great efforts to bring about the collapse of Yugoslavia and to fight against what was known as Veliko-Serbianism. After the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the summer of 1942, the Communists drew up a new political programme that was implemented over the following years. They recognized the existence of several peoples on an equal basis, the ethnic affiliation of which had been questioned for a long time, as all of them had been formally perceived as mere Yugoslavs. The new Yugoslavia was to be organized according to the equality of all its citizens who belonged to distinct nations or nationalities and were divided into six republics, of which Serbia was to include two autonomous regions: Voivodina in the North and Kosovo in the South. The new federal state was to have collective leadership, for Tito took care to surround himself with faithful people from all the Yugoslav ethnic groups. Thus, the Croato-Slovenian Josip Broz Tito tried – and even succeeded over a certain number of years - to moderate Serbian supremacy. At the same time, he introduced a number of changes in terms of political structures and property systems.

In this early period, Titoism was nothing but a variant, indeed a faithful copy, of Stalinism. As in other fields, the Soviet model of the time was adapted to the Yugoslav region and preserved in spite of the 1948 "schism" between Moscow and Belgrade.

With many difficulties and the need for constant adjustments, the Yugoslav state system lasted until Tito's death in 1980 and even survived for one more decade. Internal contradictions over development and living standards among the Yugoslav peoples, as well as the whole impact of an allegedly democratic, but actually totalitarian régime, gave rise to the 1990 explosion following which "socialist" Yugoslavia (and its Soviet model) ceased to exist.

The former Yugoslav state was converted into four new states, which declared themselves to be organized along national and democratic principles, plus rump-Yugoslavia that included Serbia and its two autonomous regions and Montenegro). The dissolution of Federal Yugoslavia generated a true war among its successor states, as well as various forms of external intervention, among which the efforts of NATO and the United Nations.

This recent history is extremely complex and highly controversial. It will be up to future historians to write and speak about it, being fully informed, as objectively as possible, and *sine ira et studio*.

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VII. Civil Society and the Breakdown of the Totalitarian Régimes in Eastern Europe: Case Studies

ADRIAN POP

A. CONCEPTS

1. Dictatorship

Dictatorship can be defined as a power-exerting political system in which a person or a group of persons assumes and monopolizes power, exerting it without any constraints or obstacles.

Roman dictatorship, before that of Sulla (83-79), was magistracy, a temporary mandate to deal with exceptional situations, not a political system. During their mandates, Roman dictators enjoyed discretionary powers. Yet, they could not change laws, and any confiscations effectuated during their mandates had to be returned when their periods of authority came to a close.

Machiavelli put forward a resurrection of the idea of dictatorship. He perceived it as an institution, but one having an ancient primary meaning. The institutional touch would be further reinforced by the predominance of the model of monarchical absolutism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Europe.

The relationship between monarchy and dictatorship follows certain conventions. An absolute monarch can be considered a dictator from the standpoint of his or her exercise of power, but not from the standpoint of the legitimacy of that power. Monarchical rule is deemed legitimate if access to power observes the rules of heredity or of elections and is accepted as a normal governing form. A monarch who accedes to power by means of a *coup d'état* can be considered an illegitimate usurper (a tyrant), but may rid him- or herself of this stigma if he or she manages to formally articulate the succession of his or her descendants. On the other hand, a monarch who gains power lawfully may turn into a dictator (tyrant) by means of what he or she actually does.

Such terms as *dictator*, *tyrant*, and *despot* can be taken as quasi-synonymous. Tyranny designates any governing system the origins or activities of which are tainted by unconstitutional practices, while despotism is usually related to ancient oriental dictatorship.

One can identify and describe three types of dictatorship: *i)* simple dictatorship, *ii)* caesarist dictatorship (*Caesarism*), and *iii)* totalitarian dictatorship.

In the case of a simple dictatorship, power is exerted through absolute control with the use of all the traditional means of coercion (army, police, administration, system of justice). There is no need for extended forms of control. This type of dictatorship is found in those countries in which the masses lack a true political consciousness, and policy concerns small cliques, which compete with one another to gain the favours of the dictator.

In the case of a caesarist dictatorship, one finds all the features of plain dictatorship, plus mass support for access to (or exercise of) power. Such a dictatorship usually develops when the masses tend to become politically articulate. Examples of caesarist dictators include Spartan kings Agis IV (244 B.C.) and Cleomenes III (238 B.C.), Pisistratus of Athens (560–527 B.C.), Gaius Julius Caesar, Octavian Augustus, Cola di Rienzi (Fourteenth Century Rome), Girolamo Savonarola, Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon I Bonaparte, Louis Napoleon, Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, and Juan Domingo Perón. In fact, the idea of a legitimate appeal to the masses in order to gain access to power is a modern idea that was thoroughly exploited for the first time during the French Revolution, when the concept of popular sovereignty (J.-J. Rousseau) matured.

A totalitarian dictatorship is characterized by a state of police, rather than by a state of law. Power is concentrated, instead of being diffused. A state party monopolizes the political arena. Totalitarian forms of social control come into existence that cause society and the state to merge so that distinctions between them can no longer be made. Use is made of terror. The techniques by means of which control over society is wielded in a totalitarian dictatorship are the following: the leadership principle, by which governing and responsibility belong exclusively to the high political echelons of the state; the "synchronization" of all social organizations, so as to serve the state; the atomization and isolation of the individual by the breaking or the weakening of all social units based on hereditary links, tradition, religion, working and leisure relationships, and their replacement by all-encompassing and non-differentiated mass organizations. Culture is turned into propaganda.

2. Democratization and Liberalization

A former dictatorship has completed a democratic transition and can be considered to be a strengthened democracy only if consensus has been reached about the political methods to be used for establishing an elected government; the government accedes to power through free general elections and exerts a *de facto* authority needed to implement new policies; and the executive, legislative, and legal powers refrain from any *de jure* sharing of power with other political entities.

Democratization should be distinguished from liberalization. The concept of liberalization refers to a basket of social and political steps that aim at diminishing censorship, increasing the autonomy of the masses, introducing civil rights (including *habeas corpus*), releasing (most of the)

political prisoners, making possible the return of political émigrés, in some cases at improving the distribution of incomes, and at toleration of an opposition.

Democratization is liberalization plus free elections. A democracy exists when none of the significant political groups tries to overthrow the democratic régime or to secede from the state (the behaviourist point of view). Even when confronted with major political and economic crises, most of the people believe that all future political changes must observe the parameters of democratic formulae (the attitudinal point of view). All the players on the political stage agree that political disputes are to be solved according to pre-established norms, and any infringement of these norms will prove to be ineffective and costly (the constitutional point of view). Several subtypes belong to strengthened democracy.

The minimal defining conditions for the existence of a strengthened democratic régime include the following: a state which works and a free and active civil society, a relatively autonomous political society, a state apparatus which can be used by the new democratic government, and a blooming economy.

Within a strengthened democracy, one can speak of interaction and constant mediation that link civil society, political society, and the economy. None of these can work without the support of the others. Civil society requires a state of law to guarantee the right to freely associate and to enforce legal penalties against any attempts to limit or to suppress this right. Political society elaborates the Constitution and the laws, manages the state apparatus, and produces the framework of a healthy economic society. In its turn, the blooming economy is a basic prerequisite for civic and political activity.

The "third wave" of democratization, as Samuel P. Huntington (1991) calls it, started to manifest itself in Southern Europe - Greece, Portugal, and Spain - in the mid-1970s, in the Southern Latin American cone (with the exception of Chile) - Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay - in the early 1980s, and in Eastern Europe - in the late 1980s.

3. Civil Society

Current political models, that make use of the concept of civil society, are frequently contradictory and deficient in regard to categories, while their connections with the conceptual traditions described above are indistinct and somewhat blurred.

Aristotle is the inventor of a concept known as *politike koinonia* (political society/community), the Latin version of which was *societas civilis*. Such a community was a public ethical and political community consisting of free and equal citizens in a system of government that was well defined from a legal point of view. The law in itself was perceived as the expression of an ethos, a common set of norms and values to define not only political procedures, but also a life form based on virtues and patterns of interaction.

Aristotelian thinking did not allow for any distinction between state and society. *Politike koinonia* was a mere *koinonia* among others, a category including all forms of human association (even *oikos, i.e.*, all the people who lived under the same roof, in the same house), irrespective of the solidarity, intimacy, or level of intensity of the interaction. At the same time, it was the social system as a whole, a body consisting of several parts, all viewed as outsiders. The Aristotelian notion was influential in shaping the understanding of civil society up until the beginning of the modern period.

St. Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas tended to limit *societas civilis* to the level of the medieval city-state (as being the closest equivalent of the ancient *polis*). But since the Greek notion also assumed a considerable degree of sovereignty, which only the Italian city-states tried to obtain, this conception could not be preserved for a long period.

Concomitantly, the feudal order, based on fragmented sovereign units, began to be described in various medieval texts as *societas civilis res publica*. This use imperceptibly added a pluralist dimension to the general meaning of the concept.

The growth of monarchical power in relation to the corporate entities which had previously enjoyed an almost exclusive use of power led to the introduction of a dual element. Civil or political society came to reflect a duality of state organization (*Ständestaat*), with the Prince (the monarch), on the one hand, and the People or the Nation (the privileged estates), on the other hand.

The evolution toward monarchical absolutism represented the turning point in the transition from the traditional to the modern meanings of the concept.

The transition to a state-society duality was also favoured by the emergence in North America of certain autonomous religious groups, which were tolerated by the secular state, and in England, of new forms of private economic activity, placed outside the policies of the mercantile state.

Before the absolutist state could unsettle its corporate rivals by taking advantage of their common status – *i.e.*, subjects of the state – "society" resorted, at the same time, to a counter-movement which enabled it to reorganize itself against the state through associations and forms of public life. Even if the latter derived their strength from the independence of the estates, religious dissidence, and economic entrepreneurship, they were already embodying new egalitarian and secular organizational principles.

The Eighteenth Century witnesed not only the rapid outrunning of the illuminist outlook in John Locke and Charles Louis Montesquieu, but also the traditional identification of political society with the state, as in Jean-Jacques Rousseau and later in Immanuel Kant. In France, civil society was viewed as being opposed to the state, while the components of the latter were conceived as autonomous and formally equal individuals – the only holders of rights. In England, the separation of society and government, as advocated by Locke, witnessed a rapid erosion. What was now understood

by "society" was actually a state in which the Parliament and the executive were experiencing gradual merging. The word "society", as distinguished from the word, "state", started to be used only for the high ranking political class which acted as a depository of good manners, without any involvement in political projects. But, generally speaking, the term, civil society, retained its traditional identification with political society and the state.

A new component was added to this identification by the thinkers belonging to the so-called Scottish Enlightenment (Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Adam Smith, etc.), who began to consider material organization the basic feature of civil or "civilized" society. At this point, one can therefore begin to speak of a new identification (or reduction), namely that between civil society and economic society, as opposed to the ancient Aristotelian exclusion of economic life from the *politike koinonia*.

A universalist connotation was added to the concept by I. Kant, who viewed civil society as relying on the universal rights of mankind. In the Kantian philosophy of history, universal civil society, founded on the rule of law, was assumed to be the *telos* of human development.

In Johann Gottlieb Fichte's view, society was completely distinguished from the state and was understood both in individualist and universalist terms.

G. W. Friedrich Hegel was the author of the first modern theory of civil society. In formulating his theory, he attempted to put together, in a prescriptive and at the same time descriptive scheme, the old idea of the ethos and the modern conception of the freedom of the individual, reconciling the ancient dimension of a homogeneous and unified political society with the plurality of autonomous medieval entities. The ancient republican component of this outlook (Aristotle, etc.) relies on the pillars of ethical life and public freedom. The post-medieval component (Charles Montesquieu and a number of German sources) implies a renewed stress laid on intermediate entities. The modern component consists of three major features: the universalist definition of the individual as a bearer of rights and as an agent of moral consciousness (Kant), the generalization of the illuminist distinction between state and civil society, also allowing for (and involving) their interpenetration, and the underlining of the economic dimension of civil society as a repository and carrier of material civilization (Scottish Enlightenment). Ethical life in itself is differentiated in a way which combines the two dualities – *oikos/polis* and state/society – in a tripartite structure: family, civil society, and state.

Inspired by the way public affairs were dealt with at the communal level in the United States of America, Alexis de Tocqueville (1954) developed a concept of civil society that was firmly committed to the idea of administrative decentralization.

According to Antonio Gramsci's vision of civil society (1971), it is first necessary to conquer cultural hegemony before attempting to conquer political power. Such an outlook emphasizes the cultural resources of civil society as opposed to the administrative resources used by the state.

According to Gramsci (1971), associational forms, cultural institutions, and the values of civil society, even though they are autonomous, are the most adequate means by which to reproduce bourgeois hegemony and to forge social consensus. In consequence, this version of civil society is best destroyed and replaced by alternative forms of association, intellectual life, and cultural values capable of replacing current bourgeois forms.

The outlook of Talcott Parsons regarding societal community as being distinguished in terms of economy, political organization, and culture, represents a synthesis of the liberal concept of civil society and a partial and willing return to the Hegelian theory of civil society.

According to Parsons, societal community is the integrative subsystem of society. Its function is to integrate a social system which is differentiated through the institutionalization of cultural values. The differentiation of societal community from economic, political, and cultural subsystems is therefore achieved by means of three revolutions – industrial, democratic, and educational – each of which stands for a step toward its being rid of the other subsystems.

In Parsons's view, an association represents a corporatist ensemble the members of which are in a relationship of solidarity, one with the other, in the sense that they have a consensual relationship in regard to a common normative structure. Parsons believes that this consensus (generally based upon prestige and reputation) is the source of the "identity" of the association. The associational principle also implies a different determination of collective action. The main decisions come from the organization itself, which does more than simply implement them, as in the case of the bureaucratic principle. For Parsons, all organized frameworks have associational components, but one can only speak of a genuine association when these components are predominant.

Other valuable contributions to the critical redefinition of the concept of civil society can be found in the works of Norberto Bobbio, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Reinhard Koselleck, Michael Foucault, Niklas Luhmann, Jürgen Habermas (1991), and Andrew Arato (1992a, 1992b). These contributions are relevant to the Eastern European transitions.

4. The Concept of Crisis: A Systemic Approach

When adopting a systemic approach, one speaks of a crisis when the structure of a social system allows for fewer problem-solving possibilities than are necessary for system perpetuation. Thus, crises are viewed as persistent disturbances of the integrative capacity of the system. Social systems can alter their systemic elements, their values, or both, in order to secure a new control level. When a system changes both its borders and its structural continuity, it is not always easy to determine whether or not a new system has come into being or if simply the old system has been regenerated. It is only possible to think of a crisis when the members of a society experiment with critical structural changes meant to perpetuate this society and then come to feel that social identity is threatened. The

disturbances occurring in the integrative capacity of the system only threaten its perpetuation to the extent to which they give rise to the questioning of social integration, that is, to a situation whereby the consensual basis of normative structures is so weakened that society becomes anomic. When this situation arises, the resulting crisis is reflected in the disintegration of social institutions.

From a historical perspective, a social system is perceived to have lost its identity when succeeding generations are no longer part of the constituted tradition.

Jürgen Habermas (1991) distinguishes between social and systemic integration. With him, social integration refers to institutional systems in which subjects are socially related. Social systems here are viewed as life-worlds (worlds that are lived) that are symbolically structured. Systemic integration has to do with the guiding capacities of a self-controlling system. According to Habermas's conception (1991), social systems are viewed in terms of their capacity to preserve their borders and their existence through the way in which they control the complexity of a changing environment.

From a social perspective, emphasis is laid on the normative structure (values and institutions) of a society and on the extent to which events depend on the function of social integration.

From a systemic perspective, the focus lies on the guiding capacities of a society and the contingency action area, while events are analyzed in terms of their dependence on the functions of systemic integration.

According to Habermas (1991), this twofold perspective permits one to postulate the limits of tolerance within which the goal-values of the system can vary without threatening its perpetuation. These limits manifest themselves as limits of historical continuity.

The formation of a society is determined by a fundamental organizing principle which delimits, in the abstract, the possibilities for the alteration of social estates. Organizational principles are abstract rules which define the range of possibilities and limit the capacity of a society to learn without losing its identity. According to this definition, guiding problems can only have crisis effects when they cannot be solved within the area of possibilities circumscribed by the organizational principle of society. Organizational principles begin by establishing which subsystem - economic, political, or socio-cultural – can assume functional pre-eminence in society and hence guide social evolution.

Systemic crises are fundamental to a clear understanding of revolutions (yet, cases exist of systemic changes that are more dramatic than those usually called revolutions).

Generally speaking, crises manifest themselves over three dimensions: *dysfunction*, that is, economic crisis; *rationality crisis*, that is, a social process that generates elements that contradict the rationality of the system; and *administrative crisis*, that is, a situation arising when the bureaucratic apparatus triggers off a competition among its exponents and hinders its good functioning.

A systemic crisis implies both the gathering of certain systemic dysfunctions and the existence of a number of players able to question the régime by their very actions. In a theoretical perspective, the concept of crisis is especially useful whenever there is an attempt to answer a difficult and complex question; *i.e.*: *Why did communism collapse in 1989?*

5. Revolution

Revolutions were facilitated once the idea of natural and social inequality began to be questioned on a regular basis. Although the prerequisites to this questioning can be found in John Locke and Adam Smith, its origins lie in America, for the new continent was the place in which the rich and the poor first enjoyed a certain equality. This spirit infused all subsequent revolutions. Yet, there is a fundamental difference between the ancient idea of equality (people are unequal since the day they are born, which is why they need an institution, the *polis*, to make them equal) and the modern idea (people are born equal and became unequal because of social and political conditions).

As pointed out by Hannah Arendt (1985), freedom and a new beginning are crucial elements for comprehending revolutions. Revolution, as a modern concept, implying the need to intervene in the course of history, is a product of those revolutions that took place at the end of the Eighteenth Century. Viewed from this vantage point, a symptomatic action was the elaboration of a new calendar during the French Revolution, the first year of which marked the execution of the King and the proclamation of the Republic. By this action, the birth of the Republic coincided with a whole (Biblical and Roman) tradition according to which the dawn of human history was tainted by murder: the killing of Abel by Cain and of Remus by Romulus. Revolutions are the only political phenomena that must directly and unavoidably face the issue of the beginning.

In its first meaning, the term, revolution, described the regular, recurrent, and cyclical movement of stars, according to certain specific laws. One example of the residual acceptation of the term is in the designation, Glorious Revolution, that marked the restoration of monarchic power to its former greatness. This meaning is very important in the sense that revolution actually meant restoration. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century revolutions were meant to be restorations. The French and the American Revolutions were carried out by people who thought they were restoring a previous state which had been violated by the despotism of an absolute monarch or by the abuses of a colonial government. Thomas Paine went so far as to suggest that the two revolutions should actually be called "counter-revolutions".

The second analogy with astronomy regarding revolution is that revolutions must occur regularly, the same way in which the rotation of the stars follows a pattern that is predetermined and free of any human influence. It seems that this meaning of the term was first used in July 1789, in reference to the fall of the Bastille. The notion was conceptualized

in the Nineteenth Century and transformed into the idea of historical necessity from which the Marxist interpretation drew its inspiration.

According to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, revolutions are agents of historical change based upon social class affiliation. They are violent, ineluctable, and bring about radical economic, social, and political transformations, opening new stages in the development of mankind.

For Lenin, revolutions take place when people will no longer tolerate the old régime and the latter is no longer capable of ruling in the old way.

The Marxist notion of the inevitability of violence in the carrying out of revolutions influenced non-Marxist thinking at different levels, and to different extents, the outlooks of some of the most influential theories of revolution.

If Karl Marx stirred a trend of thought that views revolution as progressive and beneficial, Alexis de Tocqueville inspired caution, pointing to the fact that revolution leads to the strengthening of state power. Carrying this point further at a later date, Max Weber suggested that the revolutionary levelling described by de Tocqueville (1954) would lead to increased bureaucratization.

The metaphorical approach to the definition of revolution is best exemplified by Crane Brinton and Mark N. Katz (1999). Whereas the former compares the course of revolution to the course of fever, the latter prefers murder as the metaphor.

The psychological approach is, perhaps, most salient in Ted Robert Gurr's theory of relative deprivation (1971) that focuses on motive. Gurr tries to explain why revolutions occur, not in the poorest nations, but in those undergoing modernization, where significant economic development has already occurred. In accordance with his theory, the citizens of the former have extremely low expectations with regard to their government and thus do not seek to overthrow it. By contrast, the expectations of citizens in the latter grow more rapidly than government can satisfy them, creating a sense of relative deprivation that can lead to revolution.

In his attempt to explain why secessionist movements have been occurring and multiplying in the post-Cold War environment, M. N. Katz (1999) has applied T. R. Gurr's basically economics-oriented theory (1971) to the political realm arguing that "secessionist revolution" results from a sense of relative political deprivation. Similarly, the same author has tried to apply the concept of *ressentiment* (resentment) as developed by Liah Greenfeld in relation to nationalism, to the sphere of international relations, examining "how successful revolutionaries and revolutionary régimes have been achieving their *ressentiment*-based international goals, as well as how their sense of *ressentiment* tends to evolve over time".

Whereas Gurr's theory (1971) and Katz's interpretation (1999) concentrate on the motive for revolution, Theda Skocpol's theory of revolution (1979) focuses on opportunity, taking as case studies the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. For Skocpol (1979), the opportunity for revolution arises as a result of a state breakdown which occurs when the interests of the ruling class and the state diverge sharply, thus allowing the oppressed

classes to rise up and overthrow their rulers. Accordingly, revolutions are to be viewed as "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below".

Samuel P. Huntington (1996) proposes a more comprehensive definition of revolution that, however, preserves the traditional "rapid-violent theoretical framework". A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies". Huntington's main point is that a crucial aspect of modernization is the demand for increased participation in politics. When certain groups do not have access to political power, their claims for it may lead to revolution.

By contrast, Charles Tilly's definition (1993) of a revolution "as a state of multiple sovereignty" is more circumscribed. According to him, a revolution "begins when a government previously under the control of a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually exclusive claims from two or more separate polities", and it "ends when a single polity - by no means necessarily the same one - regains control over the government". Although reducing the concept to its strictly political dimension - the replacement of a group of power holders by another group - Tilly (1993) implicitly admits the possibility of non-violent revolutions. By doing so, he makes a major contribution to the understanding of the specific features of some of the Eastern European revolutions.

To Hannah Arendt (1985) too, revolutions are chiefly political events. But unlike Tilly, Arendt posits as revolution only the violent change of government. From Arendt's point of view (1985), one can only speak of a revolution when such a thing as the pathos of novelty is linked to the idea of freedom, and only then when changes are made in the sense of "a new beginning", and violence is used "at least to institute freedom" and a totally new form of government.

In general, however, modern theories of revolution allow for both violent and non-violent forms of revolutionary upheaval. This duality is underscored, for instance, by Karl-Dieter Opp's definition of revolution as the "replacement of the élite and the introduction of a new political and economic order after (violent or non-violent) protests by the population.

B. THE 1989 EASTERN EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS

The revolutionary year, 1989, can only be understood in terms of the previous attempts at challenging the state-party and questioning the post-war *status quo*: the East German workers' uprising (1953), the Hungarian anti-communist revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the Polish crisis (1980-1981).

These four moments reflect three different, but at the same time, complementary strategies of political change: the "revolution from below"

(the 1953 and 1956 events), the "reform from above" (the 1968 events), and the "self-limiting revolution from below" (the 1980-1981 events).

1. The Role of Civil Society

Thus, the rediscovery of civil society in Poland took place after the double failure of the "revolution from below" (the German Democratic Republic, 1953, and Hungary, 1956) and of the "reform from above" (Czechoslovakia, 1968). The Polish project for political change brought together two elements. The agent of change was to be society organized at the grass-roots level, while its target was to be civil society rather than the state, within a self-limiting process.

Later on, the Polish project was extended into Hungary and the Soviet Union. When the reconstitution of civil society was started in the Soviet Union as an intrinsic element of reform from above, the intention was to circumscribe it to well-defined limits. But before long, these associations, that had only been meant to exert an economic pressure, began to expand their concerns into the social and the political fields. Facing such a situation, Soviet power had to cope with the following (theoretically, more general) dilemma. If movements making up civil society can be easily stopped, they cannot be instrumental in breaking resistance to reform; if they are too strong, they become unpredictable and can no longer be controlled. And this uncontrolability is what actually developed in the long run.

The Hungarian opposition rewrote the Polish programme, insisting that changes within society had to be suitably (but less radically) accompanied by changes in the sphere of the state-party. In 1987, this idea (in the elaboration of which an important role was played by the philosopher, János Kis) took the form of the so-called Social Contract, which stipulated the restoration of civil society in all its dimensions and the reform of the political system (the preservation of the Communist Party, but in a constitutionally legal framework, as well as the introduction of certain democratic elements).

In terms of the traditions of classic revolution, "the new evolutionism" (Adam Michnik, 1985), "the power of the powerless" (Václav Havel, 1989), or the "anti-politics" (György Konrád and Iván Szelényi, 1979) represented real theoretical breaches with practical implications. It is true that the great revolutions (French, Bolshevik, and Chinese) not only demobilized the social forces on the support of which they initially depended, but they also took dictatorial steps intended to stop the re-emergence of those forces for as long as possible. The "self-limiting revolution" proposed by Eastern Europeans had quite an opposite goal, *i.e.*, to establish, bottom up, an organized and autonomous civil society.

Despite certain critics who have a different view, the concept of the self-limiting revolution is viable for the realities of post-communist transition as well. Avoiding the danger of the total annihilation of the opposition, which would only be a new form of totalitarianism (although a "soft" form,

dressed in "democratic garb"), such a concept provides the framework the presence of which removes the major risk of denying the means of self-organization and of self-defense to society. Only very recently has civil society in Eastern Europe taken on a new objective – that of combating those tendencies toward corruption and clientelism that tend to be inherent to liberal democracy. Questioning all forms of monism (even liberal monism), which has always been a critical task of civism, remains a major task in the post-communist era.

2. Transition Paths

Although fully validated throughout 1989, Henry Kissinger's domino theory was of little help in predicting both the order in which the East European dominoes would fall, one after the other, and the different ways in which these countries would emerge from communism. From this point of view, one can say that the success of negotiations in Poland showed the Hungarians what might be the "right" way for a political change in their country. This change, in its turn, stimulated protest rallies in East German streets. The collapse of the German Democratic Republic sped up the fall of the totalitarian régime in Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, the events in Czechoslovakia completed the isolation of the ultra-conservative régimes in Bulgaria and Romania, and the breakdown of the latter precipitated the fall of its counterpart in Albania.

3. Transition through Negotiation: The Cases of Poland and Hungary

The transition of Spain from dictatorship to democracy is a stellar example of the negotiated transition model. Experts unanimously consider this transition to have been one of the most successful changes of régime out of twenty such changes which took place between 1974 and 1988.

In Spain, the transition from authoritarianism to democracy was accomplished neither by a radical break with the past, nor by a self-transformation of the political régime itself, but rather as the result of a number of pacts in which several political actors were key players in a process of negotiated reform, followed by a negotiated rupture. This reality is described in Spanish by such terms as *reforma pactada* and *ruptura pactada*. While the first term encapsulates the element of continuity related to the Francoist régime, the second envisages the very break with it. What had actually started as reform ended up being a radical change.

Similarly, the common ground of the Polish and Hungarian cases has to do precisely with the existence of certain groups – within the power élite, but also within the opposition – the members of which understood the need for compromise. In both cases, reforming communists negotiated agreements with the opposition, sitting at the same Round Table and thus leading the way out of communism. In both countries, state-party leaders attempted the economic reform solution at the beginning of the transition period but did not do away with the political institutions of the old régime.

What specifically distinguishes the Hungarian from the Polish case is mainly the fact that both the reformists and the opposition members were too weak to implement the compromises on which they had agreed. The reformists were too weak to speak on behalf of the régime, while the opposition was too weak to speak on behalf of the whole of society.

From this vantage point, although both transitions were negotiated ones, the Polish and the Hungarian cases vary in terms of the institutional results they obtained at the end of the first stage of transition. In Poland, the fact that the opposition was perceived as being strong led to a compromise, institutional arrangements combining aspects of liberal democracy with aspects of state-party government. The result of this compromise was a presidential parliamentary system, one different from the classical type. In Hungary, the fact that the régime in power perceived the opposition as being weak led to the establishment of a parliamentary system that did not rely on a previously negotiated arrangement. Faced with a weaker opposition than that of Solidarity in Poland, as well as with a different organizational identity and institutional configuration, Hungarian communist reformers chose direct electoral competition as a means of power stabilization, even if it lacked contractual guarantees.

a. POLAND

The 1970s led to the breakdown of the last hopes of leftist Polish intellectuals for the reform of the communist régime from within. In March 1968, the communist government purged the main institutions of the state of reformist elements and, in December 1970, a workers' strike ended in bloodshed.

In these circumstances, a new oppositional strategy known as "the new evolutionism", which has similarities with Antonio Gramsci's revolutionary theory (1971), began to be promoted by prominent ex-Marxist revisionists such as Leszek Kołakowski, Jacek Kuroń, and Adam Michnik (1997). Focused on reconstituting societal bonds and the deliberate neglect of the state-party, the new strategy was implemented in June 1976, after another round of violent suppression of worker protests, when the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) was set up by a group of fourteen intellectuals led by Kuroń and Michnik (1997). Owing to the pragmatic character of its actions organized in support of the workers, KOR would become the embryo from which the independent trade union, *Solidarność* (Solidarity), would evolve.

Against the background of an alarming economic situation and a new wave of strikes, the signing of the Gdansk agreements on 31 August 1980 implied the introduction of a new contractual relationship between the state and civil society in Poland. This change in relationship was due to the fact that although the strikes constituted a collective action by members of a specific industry and workplace, the demands of the Gdansk Inter-factory Strike Committee, led by Lech Wałęsa, concerned Polish society at large.

Unfortunately, the experiment was put to an end with the imposition of martial law on 13 December 1981. Yet, by that time, Solidarity had expanded its membership to around ten million, becoming an alternative form of social organization, cohesion, and understanding.

Although outlawed and driven underground, the Solidarity movement continued to enjoy the support of the population at large.

Eventually, with the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, a new era of political relaxation began in Poland, too. In 1986, the state granted amnesty to almost all the remaining political prisoners; the censorship was partly removed; and the observance of the right of association was improved. Moreover, the economic legislation was revised so as to allow the existence of a small private sector in industry.

Yet, the possibility for an authentic dialogue between the communist establishment and the opposition only matured when the deepening of the economic and social crisis threatened to make Polish society ungovernable. The timid opening gestures made by the régime became insufficient, given the strike waves shaking Poland (April and August 1988).

Both the government and the opposition came to understand that they could only take the country out of the deadlock in which it found itself if they negotiated at a Round Table. Negotiations began in February 1989, and the result was the signing of protocols listing agreements and disagreements between the government and the opposition. It should be noted that these negotiations took place outside the legal framework of Poland. On the one hand, the governing institutions of the state-party did not delegate authority to the government negotiating team. On the other hand, their interlocutors were not officially representing the rest of society. Indeed, during the period of negotiations, Solidarity remained an illegal organization.

The political agreement reached on 5 April 1989 gave back legal status to Solidarity and other components of Polish civil society. The institutional framework was revised by the establishment of a new presidency, with important prerogatives concerning foreign policy and security, a parliamentary upper chamber – the Senate – elected by a free vote, and a lower chamber - the *Sejm* – in which the opposition was given 35 percent of the seats, and the coalition led by the Communists, 65 percent. Electoral arrangements gave the government the opportunity to put up a National List composed of thirty-five persons closely linked to the régime, including participants in the Round Table negotiations, who were to run for election without any kind of opposition. The Communists kept control of the key ministries (defense and internal affairs), while the opposition was allowed to publish its own materials and to have limited access to government-controlled audio-visual communication channels.

In the June 1989 elections, the opposition won 99 seats out of 100 in the Senate. No communist-led coalition candidate was elected for office in the *Sejm*, while 33 out of the 35 candidates on the National List did not receive the majority they needed. The electoral law did not allow for a second round of voting for the National List candidates. At this point,

Solidarity intervened, declaring that it would comply with the negotiated ratio of the *Sejm* seats and would support a change in the electoral law (in the midst of an electoral process!), so that in the second round the government coalition would be able to fill the 33 seats lost on the National List. One month later, during the presidential elections (19 July), when certain deputies of the so-called party coalition were no longer willing to automatically vote for General Wojciech Jaruzelski, certain prominent Solidarity deputies waited for the vote count and then deliberately invalidated their own votes, simply to make sure that Jaruzelski would be elected.

In August 1989, A. Michnik's *bon mot* (1985), "your president, our prime-minister" (in fact, the title of an essay published in the *Gazeta Wyborcza* [Electoral Gazette - the Solidarity daily newspaper]) was realized. Jaruzelski's and Wałęsa's choice for the office of Prime Minister was Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a reformist Catholic intellectual and former Solidarity adviser. The decision was allegedly preceded by a telephone call from Gorbachev to the Polish communist leader, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, expressing Moscow's approval of a Solidarity government with a communist minority. Thus, on 12 September 1989 Mazowiecki became the first non-communist Prime Minister in a Warsaw Pact country.

Apart from the breakdown of the communist régime, perhaps the most important consequence of the Round Table negotiations for Polish society was the fact that, by the relative *rapprochement* of the two sides through the sharing of common experiences and efforts to reach negotiated experiences, solid bases were laid for the future post-communist political class.

b. Hungary

Between the final months of 1956 and May 1988, the János Kádár régime went through basically four different phases. After a period of utter dependence on Khrushchev's support and on that of the Stalinist cadres he had inherited from the Rákosi régime (1956-1963), Kádár embarked on an ambitious programme of reform, the main pillar of which was the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism (1963-1971). The consumerism it embodied and the low-key steering of public affairs by the régime paid off politically, Kádár being largely perceived as a benevolent national leader (1972-1980). Eventually, the growing burden of policy-making responsibilities, the diminishing range of ideologically-correct economic and political choices available to him, and arguably, his declining health, made Kádár's legitimating strategy less effective (1981-1988).

Once János Kádár had been removed from the Party leadership in May 1988, several identifiable factions emerged within its structures. The conservative group, led by the new first secretary, Károly Grósz, favoured a weakening of the role played by the Party apparatus, a relaxation of censorship, and an increasing role for the Party satellite organizations (unions, professional structures, etc.). Reformers led by Imre Pozsgay

favoured a larger role for the autonomous organizations in relation to the state-party, stressing dialogue with civil society.

Fears that the economic situation in Hungary would bring about a social and political crisis similar to that of 1956 caused the leaders of the régime to seek a compromise with the organized forces in society. On the other hand, the lesson of the 1956 Soviet intervention determined the leaders of the incipient social and political groups to seek a compromise with the régime rather than question its legitimacy.

The confrontational strategy of the Party hard-liners was the element that eventually determined the communist reformers and the democratic opposition to replace the strategy of institutional compromise with that of a free electoral competition. This confrontational strategy arose from the assumption that a multiparty system could be created by the Party itself by allowing political institutions to engage in "consultations with society". According to this view, the remedy for any social crisis was thought to be the limited liberalization of society rather than a full democratization of the state. The actual aim of such an initiative was to keep the fundamental political institutions of the new order intact. The core of this strategy was confrontation in a large variety of forms: frontal attacks, attempts at institutional incorporation based on the practice of *divide et impera*, etc.

By the end of 1988 and at the beginning of 1989, this strategy was replaced with another one, focused on an attempt to neutralize the opposition. The first effort in this direction was to draft a law on associations, which, if passed by Parliament, would have given the state-party full control over the ways in which independent organizations might come into being. Later, another proposition called for the Parliament (in which the percentage of Party members was 75 percent) to adopt a new Constitution that would only permit the existence of organizations accepting "socialism". Moreover, a special Constitutional Court, the members of which were to be appointed by the Party, would have to decide which of the existing political organizations could be officially registered.

Along with the weakening and the marginalization of the opposition, a further attempt was made to divide it by opening bilateral negotiations with various independent organizations that had just begun to establish themselves as political parties.

When even these tactics failed, the next step was to try to turn the organizations of civil society into Party satellites in order to preserve the "historic" role of the Party. Thus, at the end of March 1989, the Central Committee called for a Round Table to begin discussions on 8 April, with the participation of all important political and social organizations. Within this paternalistic strategy, the stress laid on negotiations was nothing more than an attempt to elaborate upon the claims of the Party to "stand for" the whole of society. The opposition rejected this proposal. Thus, formal negotiations between the Party and an umbrella-federation would only begin on 13 June 1989.

In the meantime, reformers secured support from the forces in the régime for a new outlook on the future of the Party. Questioning the old

paternalistic view of Party representativity, these reformers instituted a Round Table-type negotiation framework that was much closer to the civic principles of electoral competition.

At the end of 1988, the most important political organizations of the opposition were the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Federation of Young Democrats. The first and more moderate of these, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, was the expression of national, Christian, and rural traditions in Hungary. The other two, that were more radical, stood for the liberal, urban, and secular wing of the opposition.

The opposition began to radicalize its outlook in September, 1988, when a group of environmentalists protested in front of the Parliament building against the construction of the Nagymaros-Gabcikovo dam on the Danube River, and obtained support from major independent organizations. This demonstration was followed by parallel demonstrations celebrating the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (beginning on 15 March). Eight days later, eight independent organizations joined hands under an umbrella-federation: the Opposition Round Table. In the meantime, after thirty-one years, the secret burial place of Imre Nagy, the hero of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, was revealed. A huge crowd (200,000 to 250,000 people) was reported to be present at his official reburial.

Feeling politically vulnerable when faced with the new situation that had begun to evolve as of the end of March 1989, local Party leaders began to send messages to the center, advising it to give up its policy of elimination and switch, instead, to one of competition. Active as early as the end of 1988, these local reforming circles gradually gained ascendancy over the conservative Party leadership.

Beginning on 13 June 1989, Round Table negotiations – formally tripartite negotiations (Party, satellite organizations, opposition), but in reality, bilateral (because one party could not block any decision reached by the other two parties) – were carried out in twelve committees and ended in September 1989, when an agreement was signed regarding a series of drafts and important constitutional amendments.

The most determinedly anti-communist organizations refused to sign the agreement. Thus new tension developed among the opposition parties, namely between the Free Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic Forum led by Jósef Antal.

On 23 October 1989, the new (no longer "Peoples'") Hungarian Republic was proclaimed.

After a referendum by means of which the free democrats managed to delay the holding of presidential elections until after the parliamentary elections, most of the votes in the March–April 1990 electoral campaign went to the Hungarian Democratic Forum (43 percent).

Thus, the rapid reconfiguration of the political arena, followed by a free electoral competition and the creation of a classic parliamentary system, made the Hungarian transition case somewhat different from that of Poland.

Communist reformers were forced to take action by an opposition that was well organized and that, provoked in its turn by the Party "hard-liners", replaced the initial strategy based on compromise with a different one, focused on mobilization and the denial of a will to compromise. The mobilization and confrontation strategy chosen by the opposition triggered a polarization of forces and hurried the ascension of reformers within the régime. In its turn, the anticipation of the electoral weaknesses of the opposition made reformers give up the confrontational policy and focus instead on a free electoral competition. From this point of view, it is possible to conclude that the Hungarian case is the first example proving that it is possible to use free elections to replace communism.

4. Transition through Capitulation: The Cases of East Germany and Czechoslovakia

The two cases of the collapse of communist dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia have one thing in common, namely, the manner in which certain key players from the top of both communist leaderships simply surrendered to the pressures coming from below. Unlike the two other Central European situations, these were not negotiated transitions, even though an element of negotiation was present in different degrees and at various points in time, in both cases.

a. THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

In 1971, Walter Ulbricht, the leader of the Socialist Unity Party, was removed and replaced by Erich Honecker, one of his closest associates. Honecker combined a policy of systematic political repression with large material concessions to the masses at large. He was able to do so by expanding economic relations with the West. In 1972, a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic was signed, normalizing the political relations between the two states. As a result, trade between them expanded exponentially. At the end of the decade, 30 percent of East German foreign trade was conducted with the West. The German Democratic Republic received from the government of the Federal Republic technical assistance, huge loans, and millions of German Marks in cash in transit duties and for purchasing the freedom of political prisoners. Close personal contacts were formed between the two governments, and regular consultations were arranged. On this basis, living standards in East Germany increased rapidly. In the course of the 1970s, income expanded by a third, savings doubled, and retail trade rose by 56 percent. Forty percent of all households had a car; 84 percent were equipped with a washing machine; and 88 percent, with a television set.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, owing to the ability of the régime to pursue its programme of economic development, many Western analysts concluded that socialism really worked in the German Democratic Republic. Yet, this perception did not take into account the impressive number of East German citizens who, legally and illegally, desperately fled

the country for the West, who served prison sentences, or who were expelled because of their political convictions. Between October 1949, when the German Democratic Republic was set up, and 1961, when the Berlin Wall was erected, 2.69 million refugees moved to the West. Furthermore, starting in 1961, through 1984, another 245,888 East Germans left the country as legal emigrants and 176,714, as illegal emigrants. Moreover, 177 were killed while attempting to cross the border, and 17,000 or so served prison terms for attempting to leave or for related political offenses.

Eventually, the economic changes occurring in the world economy in the 1980s completely undermined the German Democratic Republic and led to its eventual dissolution. Unable to keep pace with the expansion of labour productivity, the outcome of the introduction of computer technology into every aspect of production, the German Democratic Republic fell far behind in international competition. Its world market share of engineering exports fell from 3.9 percent in 1973 to 0.9 percent in 1986. The prospect of being able to finance credits and imported goods through increased exports was shattered.

By the end of the 1980s, the conservatism of the Party leadership and the repressive activities of the state increased, even further, the pressure on East Germans to leave if they could. The police attacked informal clubs and organizations and subjected their members to frequent interrogations and imprisonment.

Understanding that the introduction of *perestroika* (restructuring) into the German Democratic Republic would seal the fate of the régime, Erich Honecker opposed it. Even certain Soviet publications, like the popular *Sputnik* magazine, were banned.

By spring 1989, the political atmosphere in the German Democratic Republic was characterized by generalized frustration. Despite the hopes for reform nurtured by the churches and by society, the local elections of 7 May 1989 turned out to be yet another means for reinforcing the mobilization strategy of the régime, with 98.85 percent of the vote going to the National Front. The support given by the Party leadership to the Chinese crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square enhanced the general sense of despair and paralysis.

When on 2 May 1889 the first two-hundred yards of the Iron Curtain were removed on the Hungarian-Austrian border, young East Germans took advantage of the new opportunity the situation offered. They were followed, in July and August, by thousands of other citizens of the German Democratic Republic.

The situation deteriorated when East German tourists invaded the West Germany Embassies in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw, and the Permanent Representation of Bonn in East Berlin demanding that they be permitted to go on to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Eventually, starting on 10 September 1989, East German "tourists" in Hungary were permitted, by the Hungarian government, to freely and legally cross the Hungarian-Austrian border.

Erich Honecker was deeply embarrassed by the widespread publicity of the situation in the West German embassies, and on 1 October, he personally authorized the exit of some 7,000 citizens of the German Democratic Republic who had been in the West German Embassy in Prague and in the West German Permanent Representation in East Berlin. These actions, however, did not prevent thousands of other East Germans from making use of visa-free travel to Czechoslovakia to make their way to the West.

In the meantime, the gap between the Party and the people widened. On 10 September, a new political movement, named The New Forum, came into being. Along with other opposition groups, including Democracy Now and the United Left, its activists demanded a critical examination of the path to socialism that had been taken by the country.

Wishing to celebrate the Fortieth Anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic of 7 October 1949 without the embarrassing coverage by the international media of East Germans camping out in West German embassies, Honecker authorized the transport to the West of Germans from Warsaw and Prague. The news spread rapidly, and in their attempt to flee the country, thousands of East Germans stormed the stations through which the special train from Prague rolled on its way to the West.

On 7 October 1989, in the midst of mass demonstrations, Gorbachev arrived in the German Democratic Republic to take part in its Fortieth Anniversary celebration. In his speech, he made clear that he would not back Erich Honecker. His words, in turn, provoked a shift in the line of the Party leadership so far as *its* backing of Honecker was concerned.

After a series of demonstrations that triggered riots and violent clashes with the police throughout the first two weeks of October in Leipzig, Dresden, East Berlin, and Magdeburg, under the pressure of the Forum, Party leader Honecker was sacked by his own people in the Politburo, on 18 October 1889, and replaced by Egon Krenz, who tried to calm down the demonstrations through public dialogue. Thousands participated in political debates on public squares. But the demonstrations grew larger. On 23 October, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in Leipzig and urgently demanded democratic changes (legal status for the democratic opposition and independent unions, distinct responsibilities for the Party and the state, etc.).

On 4 November 1989, one of the largest demonstrations in German history took place in East Berlin in support of freedom of speech, free elections, the ending of the leading role of the Party, and the disbanding of the secret police, STASI. On 7 November, the Politburo resigned and Hans Modrow, known to be a Gorbachev supporter, was appointed Party leader. On 9 November, the Berlin Wall, the very symbol of the Cold War, was breached. Thousands of people climbed on it, and millions travelled on visits to West Germany. After the borders had been opened and the Stalinist diehards expelled from the Party, a Central Committee plenum took place that reached the decision that the Party would organize free

elections, secure freedom of association, the separation of the Party from the state, parliamentary control over the secret police, and implement a vibrant market economy and a more liberal press law.

What followed was a time of political effervescence. On 13 November, the new Party leader, Hans Modrow, also became Prime Minister. On 20 November 1989, the first demonstrations for a reunited Germany took place. On 3 December 1989, under the impact of revelations about the luxury in which the *nomenclatura* lived, all the Poliburo members tendered their resignations. Two weeks later, an extraordinary Party congress changed the official name of the Party that would now be known as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the new leader of which, Gregor Gysi, was, paradoxically, a former defender of the New Forum.

Thus the fall of the Berlin Wall put an end not only to the communist régime in the Eastern German lands, but also to an artificial state entity that had come into existence only as a result of Cold War logic and of the political split that had divided the European continent.

b. Czechoslovakia

In contrast to the situations in Poland and Hungary, but similar to that in the German Democratic Republic, in 1989, Czechoslovakia, had not undergone gradual political liberalization or any economic reform. The beginning of the end of communism was marked by the reconsideration of the Prague Spring in the socialist camp and by the discarding of the Brezhnev doctrine. Alexander Dubček's public appearances (the interview given in January 1988 to the Italian Communist newspaper, *L'Unità*, and the radio and television interview shown on Hungarian National Television in April 1989) triggered irritation in Prague, where the central authorities attempted to portray him as a carpetbagger and a political renegade.

The growing awareness of economic stagnation and impending ecological disaster, because of the planned Nagymaros-Gabcikovo Dam on the Danube River, fuelled the opposition. Visible as early as January 1989, during the memorial of the self-immolated Czech student, Jan Palach, the radicalization of the opposition led to a petition written in June 1989 demanding democratization. Unlike the Polish and the Hungarian cases, there was no reform group within the Czechoslovak Communist Party in a position to start negotiations with the opposition.

On 17 November 1989, the government used violence to put an end to a student demonstration, an action that gave rise to nationwide protests. Two days later, on 19 November, Václav Havel laid the basis for the Civic Forum which brought together twelve independent movements, among which the Charter '77 movement. Almost at the same time, a similar movement, known as the Public Against Violence, came into being in Slovakia.

On 23 November 1989, Alexander Dubček, the hero of 1968, returned to Prague. On the following day, 300,000 people gathered to cheer for him and for Václav Havel, who had addressed the crowds for the first time two

days earlier. On 27 November, a general strike paralyzed the whole country, while two days later, the Federal Assembly abrogated the constitutional clause guaranteeing the leading role of the Party. On 1 December, the communist leadership officially denounced the Soviet intervention of 1968, followed, two days later, on 3 December, by the formation of a new government with five non-communist ministers and the voluntary disarming of the Peoples' Militia. Eventually, on 5 December, the 500,000 people expelled from the Party after the Prague Spring were rehabilitated. A coalition government with a non-communist majority was formed on 10 December. Hence, in order to secure control over all key political and military levers of power, there was a growing emphasis on the need to replace President Gustáv Husák with a non-communist president. Confronted with the nationwide demand for Havel to accede to the office of President, the communists reluctantly agreed to concede their last remaining power lever. Consequently, on 29 December, Václav Havel was elected President of the Republic, a day after Alexander Dubček was nominated to the Federal Assembly and simultaneously sworn in as its Chairman.

The somehow chaotic process of political change, with no direct sense, on anyone's part, of political strategy, its "gentle" character, as well as the fact that the régime practically collapsed when confronted with the pressure of the masses, makes the Czechoslovak case one of transition through capitulation, popularly described, with a catchy term, as the "Velvet Revolution".

5. Transition through Coup d'Etat and Liberalization: The Case of Bulgaria

Throughout his thirty-five years in power, the strategy embraced by Todor Zhivkov relied on such elements as an egalitarian wage structure, a paternalistic attitude toward the intelligentsia, nationalism (assimilation of the Turkish minority, opposition to the claim of Macedonians to be a separate nation), and full loyalty and obedience to the Soviet Union.

However, by the end of the 1980s, a number of adverse factors were contributing to the overall undermining of the legitimacy of the régime. First, the disintegration of the traditional Eastern European and Soviet markets of Bulgaria along with an increasing shortage of labour owing to a rapid process of aging (second in intensity to similar processes in the German Democratic Republic and in Hungary) plunged Bulgaria into a severe economic crisis. Second, the attitude of Zhivkov's régime toward the Turkish minority bred serious discontent, not only in Bulgaria, but also abroad, given that the Turks at that time made up 10 percent of the population of the country. Initiated in 1956, the long-term policy of gradual and uneven infringements of the cultural autonomy of the Turkish minority had reached a new momentum throughout the second half of the 1980s. After launching, over the winter of 1984-1985, a forceful, and often violent, mass renaming of the Turkish Muslim population with Slavic Bulgarian names (accompanied by measures against Islamic traditions

and the use of the Turkish language), the régime caused the out-migration of about 300,000 ethnic Turks. Third, precisely because of its ethnic policy, Bulgaria experienced increasing international isolation after 1985, when *perestroika* only accelerated.

Completely faithful to the Kremlin, Zhivkov, after 1987, copied all the forms of *perestroika* in order to preserve his power and to disarm the reformist opposition within the Communist Party. *Perestroika* implied, among other things, his giving up of the cult of personality both for himself and for his family. A Politburo decision taken in August 1988 called for the removal of Zhivkov's portrait from public places and the destruction of his statue in his native town of Pravets. At the same time, beginning in March 1989, cultural institutions named after his daughter, Ludmila Zhivkova, reverted to their former names. The dictates of *perestroika* also called for public statements about reforming the political system (like the statement made during the December 1988 Central Committee Plenum).

The removal of reformist prime-minister, Georgi Atanasov, on 1 February 1989, seemed to confirm the success of Zhivkov's strategy. But the intensifying tensions between the Party establishment, the army and security apparatus, along with the increasing number of new civic organizations, also known by the apparently harmless designation of discussion clubs, changed things altogether. One of the most active among them was the Club for Glasnost and Democracy, which proved to be a training ground for some of the new leaders of the Bulgarian transition.

On 3 November 1989, the Ecoglasnost opposition movement organized its first demonstration. About half a million people came together in front of the National Assembly in Sofia to protest pollution, questioning the capacity of the Party to manage the national economy. Party reformers secured army support and took advantage of the huge mass pressure to oust Zhivkov on 10 November 1989. His successor, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, paved the way for a new reformist course in the Party. The law forbidding unauthorized political activity was annulled, and control over the masses, relaxed, actions which in their turn, only increased the pressure from below. In Sofia and in other cities, there were increasing numbers of street rallies in favour of a multiparty system. During the first days of December 1989, opposition groups got together under an umbrella-organization called the Union of Democratic Forces, the elected president of the Coordination Committee of which was the philosopher, Zheliu Zhelev. Expelled from the Party for his critical attitude during the 1960s, Zhelev had been one of the founders of the Club for Glasnost and Democracy. The Union included many other Marxists whom Zhivkov had excluded from the Party during his decades in power.

On 13 December 1989, following press reports of his abuses and excesses, the Party Central Committee decided to expel Zhivkov from its ranks as a token gesture intended to underline the break with the past. At the same time, the Party issued an official announcement to the effect that it was giving up its monopoly of power. When, however, the new government and the Party Central Committee issued a second official

statement on 29 December repudiating the anti-Turkish policies, there was an instant and irritated reaction from nationalist forces which set up a National Interest Defense Committee, specifically intended to prevent the accession of Turkish minority representatives to Parliament.

After Zhivkov had been placed under house arrest in January 1990, the Party Congress of 30 January–2 February 1990 appointed a new Party leader, Alexander Lilov, who also became Chairman of the Supreme Council (the equivalent of Secretary General of the Central Committee). Former Party ideologist and close friend of Ludmila Zhivkova, Lilov had "resigned" after her death in 1983 and had been removed from the Central Committee, withdrawing also from the headship of the Institute for Current Social Theories. Later, he re-entered the political scene as an unconditional supporter and admirer of Mikhail Gorbachev. Under street pressures – one of the many demonstrations that began to take place in Nevski Cathedral Square as of November 1989 – the Supreme Council, led by Lilov, decided to hold a referendum on changing the Party name to that of Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The "new party" aimed at giving up the *nomenclatura* principle and at developing a democratic structure.

In the period prior to the 10 and 17 June 1990 elections for the Grand National Assembly, the two major contenders, the recently renamed Bulgarian Socialist Party (SP), and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) - a coalition of sixteen political parties and organizations - came out with what were almost identical programmes, despite the mutually excluding rhetoric behind them. The electoral victory of the Socialist Party (52.75 percent of the vote, as compared to 36 percent for the UDF) hardly came as a surprise in a country with egalitarian social traditions, in which communist rule was not identified with a foreign power, and the communist era was associated with rising living standards. Nevertheless, owing to revelations that a member of the leadership of the Socialist Party, the acting President, Petăr Mladenov, had proposed the use of tanks against the demonstrators in December 1989, the latter was forced to resign, being replaced in August 1990 by UDG leader, Zheliu Zhelev. Eventually, a new constitution took effect on 13 July 1991, and Zhivkov was convicted for corruption and abuse of power, in September 1992.

Thus, what started as a show run by the reformist wing of the former Bulgarian Communist Party, which first initiated the exit from communism with the help of a *coup d'état*, and then managed to secure power in the democratic environment through elections, ended up in a sort of *ad hoc* relative balance between the main political forces in which no party or leader would be able to dictate.

6. Transition through Popular Uprising and Coup d'Etat: The Case of Romania

Historians and political analysts and scientists agree that both the collapse of Nicolae Ceauşescu's régime and the transition following this collapse were a special case in the context of the 1989 Eastern European revolutions. This observation is a fair one in that Romania was the only

Eastern European country in which the end of the old régime and the transition to the new society were marked by violence, while the change in government (through the accession to power of the anti-communist opposition) only occurred for the first time seven years after the December 1989 events.

Several sets of circumstances, however, mitigated against a Round Table negotiated transition. The decisive element was the special kind of communist political régime the country had had to contend with from 1965 to 1989.

At the Ninth Romanian Communist Party Congress (1965), when Nicolae Ceauşescu actually came to power, Romania was in a position to make a choice between two ways of building communism: the Yugoslav way (de-Stalinization, political and ideological liberalization) and the Albanian way (the strengthening of totalitarian control by the Communist Party and its political police over society, the promotion of a nationalist ideology which combined ethnocentrism with communist Orthodoxy). Interestingly enough, Romania successively chose both ways. Thus it has been almost commonplace to say that the so-called Ceauşescu epoch had two distinct stages, the chronological turning point of which was the year 1971.

To be sure, between 1965 and 1971, however, Ceauşescu opted for a brief interlude of controlled liberalization of Romanian society, aiming to seize political credit for himself and to legitimate his own communist régime. Certain elements characterized this short period: official, albeit sham, references to the principles of collective leadership, the political rehabilitation of certain victims of Stalinist oppression (April 1968), opposition to Soviet integrationist plans promoted through the Mutual Economic Aid Council (COMECON), a more reserved attitude toward participation in Warsaw Pact actions, a limited autonomy for Romanian foreign policy (*i.e.*, the position of Romania during the 1967 Middle East crisis, the neutral stance taken during the Chinese-Soviet conflict, etc.), and a relative ideological relaxation. These stances culminated in the Romanian public castigation of and refusal to take part in the intervention of Warsaw Pact troops to suppress the Prague Spring, in what was believed to be a direct challenge to the Soviet interpretation of socialist internationalism. In addition to the degree of internal support, even from an important segment of Romanian intellectuals (with a sudden increase in Party membership), the attitude adopted in 1968 established Ceauşescu's foreign reputation (to a large extent undeserved) as a Trojan horse inside the communist world. These actions gave rise to the myth of Romanian exceptionalism which would nourish, for many years, the benevolent attitude of Western leaders in regard to the Bucharest régime.

Having gotten rid of the ghosts of potential competitors by the time the July theses were made public (Ioan Gheorghe Maurer, who was the prime minister of Romania until 1974, posed no threat in this respect), Ceauşescu started to consolidate his power, gradually introducing a personal dictatorship that did not permit any opposition. In March 1974,

when Ceauşescu had set up and at the same time had assumed the high office of President of the Republic, which combined responsibilities previously divided between the President of the State Council and the Prime Minister, the coast was clear for his assumption of discretionary powers. When almost simultaneously (still in 1974) Elena Ceauşescu, his wife, became a member of the Executive Political Committee (the Politburo) and was appointed Secretary for Organizational and Cadre Problems in the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, while at the same time, other members of the Ceauşescu family were given important Party and state offices, the basis was laid for a variant of dynastic socialism.

From that moment on, neither the Executive Political Committee, nor the Party Central Committee, or the Grand National Assembly would be able to question decisions made by a leader who had already become Party ruler, Head of State and Government, and Supreme Commander of the Army.

The high degree of merging of the private and the public spheres, the extreme personalization of power, corruption, and the cliental character of an institutional bureaucracy that was typical of the Ceauşescu régime made certain analysts, such as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1995), define it as a sultanistic régime, in other words, as an extreme form of what Max Weber called a "patrimonialist political régime". Analogies suggested by certain modern authors for Ceauşescu's rule in Romania include the régimes of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in North Korea, of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina in the Dominican Republic, of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti, of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, the rule of the Somoza family in Nicaragua, the latter stages of both Pahlavi rulers in Iran, the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines after the latter's declaration of martial law in 1972, Manuel Noriega's dictatorship in Panama, as well as the personal dictatorships of Jean-Bédel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaïre, of Francisco Macías Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, and of Idi Amin Dada in Uganda.

From the point of view of economics, during the 1970s, while, in neighbouring Hungary, János Kádár inaugurated a set of reforms meant to improve the living standard of the population (so-called goulash-communism), a personal and primitive interpretation of the Stalinist model moved Ceauşescu to choose recentralization and a rapid and superinflated development of heavy industry. The negative consequences of this economic policy would be multiplied during the 1980s by the carrying out of a series of inefficient, costly projects (the completion of the Danube-Black Sea Canal, construction of the People's House in Bucharest, the systematization of rural areas, etc.), as well as by Ceauşescu's ambition – realized at the expense of the population – to pay off all foreign debts at a time when Poland and Hungary, that were much more indebted than Romania, were still resorting to foreign loans.

If externally Ceauşescu played the national-communist card, he used the scapegoat technique in his relationships with ethnic minorities, thus turning his régime into one that was heavily xenophobic. So far as

propaganda was concerned, in his unhealthy need for popular support and legitimacy, he adopted the Asian model, giving a narcissistic direction to his cult of personality.

At the same time, under the constant pressure of the Party and the *Securitate* (secret police), Romanian society underwent a powerful process of atomization. The total lack of dialogue between the authorities and society, on the one hand, and the impossibility of having any real cores of civil society, on the other (except for a few isolated voices), resulted in an incapacity to articulate a genuine anti-communist resistance during the 1970s and the 1980s. While the Central European countries underwent a resurrection of powerful alternative groups able to form a national opposition structure before a transfer of power actually took place, the fragile and reduced Romanian intellectual dissidence was either forced to emigrate (Paul Goma, Vlad Georgescu, Dorin Tudoran, Mihai Botez, etc.), or was temporarily silenced (if not irrevocably, as in the case of engineer Gheorghe Ursu), or even put under strict *Securitate* surveillance (Radu Filipescu, Mircea Dinescu, Dan Petrescu, Ana Blandiana, Dan Deşliu, Gabriel Andreescu, etc.).

Mass opposition to and actions against the communist régime were not altogether absent. It included the Jiu Valley (summer of 1977) and Motru Valley (October 1981) miners' strikes and in particular the popular demonstration in Braşov (15 November 1987), perceived as a prelude to the December 1989 Revolution. But all attempts to develop an independent Solidarity-like union movement, such as the 1979 Free Romanian Worker's Union (SLOMR), ultimately failed.

Since the higher echelons of power were manned with obedient people who lacked personality and owed their careers to the dictator and to his wife, there was no room for any burgeoning of a reforming faction inside the Romanian *nomenclatura*, as had already occurred in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The anti-Ceauşescu putsch, that was supposed to take place during a visit of the presidential couple to West Germany in 1984, was easily thwarted following the death of one of its main supporters, former Defense minister Ion Ioniţă. Likewise, the very-late-to-appear "Letter of the Six" (signed by Constantin Pîrvulescu, Alexandru Bîrlădeanu, Gheorghe Apostol, Corneliu Mănescu, Grigore Răceanu, and Silviu Brucan), written in March 1989, was hardly the expression of any genuine internal opposition on the part of Party hard-liners. What it actually reflected was the helplessness of a certain segment of Ceauşescu's *nomenclatura*, as well as the frustrations of certain old Stalinist Party hacks (the youngest of whom was older than Ceauşescu, while the oldest was 94) whom the dictator had been side-tracking for many years.

Perestroika provided a new opportunity for a coup against Ceauşescu. In keeping with support offered by the Kremlin, a trip that Silviu Brucan made to Moscow in November 1988, after a lecture tour in the United Kingdom and the United States and before getting back to Romania, takes on special significance. At this time, a secret meeting took place between

Brucan and Gorbachev at which several matters were discussed, including the removal of Ceauşescu.

The total isolation of Ceauşescu's régime, even among the Warsaw Pact countries, became even more obvious when the United Nations Human Rights Committee set up a special commission to investigate the situation in Romania (9 March 1989). For the first time, the Soviet Union failed to vote in support of a Warsaw Pact member, namely Romania. At that same time (March 1989) there were other provocations directed at the régime that were intensively covered by international media: Liviu Babeş's protests and self-immolation on the Poiana-Braşov ski track, the letter of the six, and the interview of the poet, Mircea Dinescu, with the French newspaper, *Libération.*

The irreversible cooling of the Soviet-Romanian relationship was confirmed during the Fourteenth Romanian Communist Party Congress when, to the surprise of the audience, Ceauşescu denounced the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 and called for the "liquidation" of its still-in-place consequences. Later, during the final Ceauşescu-Gorbachev summit in Moscow (4 December 1989), the Kremlin leader was reluctant to endorse the idea of organizing a conference of all communist and workers' parties and criticized the long delay in the modernization processes in certain socialist countries.

Scheduled to take place on Ceauşescu's very birthday (26 January 1990), the planned putsch was overtaken by the start of the popular uprising in Timişoara (16 December 1989) which had been sparked by advance disclosure of the impending arrest of the agitator, Pastor László Tökés. Consequently, security forces opened fire on anti-government demonstrators, and Ceauşescu declared a state of emergency as protests spread to other cities. After their shock waves had reached Bucharest (21– 22 December 1989), the main authors of the coup added their actions against Ceauşescu to the flow of revolutionary activities. After army units joined the rebellion on 22 December 1989, fierce fighting took place between the army and forces loyal to Ceauşescu. Deriving its inspiration from the Committee of Public Safety of the French Revolution, and very keen to establish *ad-hoc* legitimacy, the new power structure raised on the ruins of Ceauşescu's régime derived its name from that of a group that had been active for six months (and was known to have issued manifestos) when the revolution started: the Council of the National Salvation Front (FSN). Eventually, Ceauşescu and his wife, who had fled from Bucharest by helicopter, were captured, and following an *ad hoc* trial in which they were found guilty of genocide, were executed on Christmas Day, 1989.

One thing is certain in regard to the still obscure turn of events in December 1989: Romania lacked any basic conditions for a negotiated transition. And since the alternative to negotiations and compromises have always been and always will be sheer violence (which in its turn is nothing but an instrument for a so-called confrontational policy), a degree of violence was the overall background of political change in Romania. Against this background one should place the events that took place before

and after 22 December 1989 (when Ceauşescu, trying to avoid the "movement of rage" against him, hurriedly left Bucharest), on 28–29 January 1990, and on 18–19 February 1990 (when violent clashes occurred between the National Salvation Front (FSN) and opposition supporters), on 19–21 March 1990 (the inter-ethnic violence in Târgu Mureş), and on 13–15 June 1990 (the police showdown at University Square in Bucharest, immediately followed by the first violent action of the miners - and, arguably, disguised former *Securitate* agents - against members of the opposition in Bucharest), as well as the September 1991 events (the second arrival of the miners in Bucharest, with the immediate result being the fall of the pro-reform Petre Roman government).

Another important feature that gave the Romanian transition a certain specificity was the fact that the opposition, that had an important role to play in the post-December 1989 political arena, was not born during the last phase of the communist régime, as in Hungary and in Poland, but came together during the days of the revolution around the survivors of parties disbanded by the communists: the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party (the former National Peasant Party), the National Liberal Party, and the Social Democratic Party - or activists of new political movements with ecological and ethnic outlooks - the Ecological Movement Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, respectively. Yet, the representatives of the "historical" parties shared power with the National Salvation Front from the formation of a provisional parliament in late February 1990, until the 20 May 1990 elections, which resulted in a landslide victory for President Ion Iliescu (85 percent of the vote) and a considerable parliamentary majority (two-thirds of the seats) for the Front. Eventually, a new constitution providing for a multiparty system took effect on 8 December 1991.

Having the aspect of a putsch pushed along by the spontaneous manifestations of popular dissatisfaction, the December 1989 Romanian events can be defined as the combination of a revolution and a *coup d'état*. However, a paradox is noticeable: Even though in Romania the Communist Party was disbanded by decree, the régime that emerged after the December 1989 events proved to be the most acceptable of the successor régimes, from the point of view of the Kremlin.

Lacking the possibility of a genuine power transfer in December 1989, because there were no grounds for a negotiated transition, Romania only carried out this transfer seven years later through elections (November 1996), when the former communists were swept from power, under radically different internal and international conditions, in keeping with the political maturation of Romanian society.

7. Transition through Liberalization and Collapse: The Case of Albania

Albania was the last of the red dominos in Central and Eastern Europe to fall. Various circumstances that had marked the evolution of the Albanian state throughout its existence led to this historical gap in regard to the

other Central and Eastern European countries that had also lived through the totalitarian experience.

From its very emergence as an independent state (28 November 1912), Albania was a political entity in continuous crisis. With the exception of the short-lived experiment with a parliamentary system in the early 1920s, Albania never experienced a genuinely democratic régime. Moreover, its existence has always depended to a large extent upon the changing attitudes of its neighbours (Greece, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro)), a feature that has left a heavy imprint upon its political setting.

Established on 8 November 1941, the Albanian Communist Party was the creation of two Serbian envoys sent by Josip Broz Tito. They remained in Albania throughout the war and acted as true Party leaders, one in the political context (Milidin Popović), the other in the military context (Dúśan Mugośa). Even after the Albanian Communist Party had taken power (and had changed its official name, in 1944, to the Albanian Workers' Party), Titoist patronage continued to be very strong. Under the surveillance of one of the envoys who was selected to join the Central Committee, the Albanian authorities agreed to the co-ordination of the economic programmes of the two countries. A customs union was established, the Albanian army was reorganized by a Yugoslav military mission, and Serbo-Croatian became the compulsory languge taught in Albanian schools. These steps, the ultimate purpose of which was to turn Albania into the seventh republic of the Yugoslav Federation, determined the Albanian break with Tito in 1948. Nikita Khrushchev's later attempt to mediate the restoration of the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship only resulted in another break-up, this time between Tirana and Moscow (10 December 1961), while the development of the (communist) Chinese-American relationship determined a cooling between Albania and China (1978). By the end of the 1970s, Albania found itself in almost total diplomatic, political, and economic isolation.

Internally, Enver Hoxha's communist régime proved to be highly conservative and repressive. Its efficiency relied on the overwhelming strength and omnipresence of the secret police (*Sigurimi*), the linking of any social or career promotion to absolute loyalty to the state-party, a strong cult of personality surrounding the supreme leader, and political consistency in regard to ridding the higher echelons of troublemakers and intruders (Koçi Xoxe, 1949; Mehmet Shehu, 1981).

In an attempt to pull Albania out of its deep systemic crisis, Hoxha's appointed successor, Ramiz Alia (Party First Secretary as of 1 April 1985) began a Gorbachev–inspired reform and restructuring programme. Although under his leadership Albania experienced a breakdown of some of the many ideological taboos inherited from Hoxha, its economy continued to be undermined by systemic adverse factors such as over-centralization, perverse incentives, waste of resources, distorted prices, endemic corruption, and widespread shortages of basic goods. Consequently, the Albanian standard of living, already the lowest in Europe, fell further. Moreover, the régime continued to pursue its violation

of basic human rights as well as its traditional isolation. While restrictions on foreign travel for Albanians and for foreigners visiting Albania were kept high, political and economic interactions with "the outside world" were kept low. Each of the reforms Ramiz Alia carried out gave rise to even stronger pressures for a more determined liberalization and restructuring of the system.

Eventually, the failure of the APL leadership to implement badly needed daring economic and political reforms, along with the impact of the Eastern European revolutions and the emergence of non-communist political formations in the predominantly Albanian-inhabited province of Kosovo, in neighbouring Yugoslavia, triggered off the final collapse of the communist régime in Albania. Albanians avidly followed the Eastern European revolutionary events as they unfolded by tuning in to foreign radio broadcasts. But no event in the region had a greater impact on both the Albanian establishment and population than the revolution in Romania. The widely perceived similarities between the Romanian and Albanian communist régimes led the latter to openly attack the former dictator and to quickly recognize the new post-revolutionary Romanian government in a last-ditch effort to distance itself from any identification with the Ceauşescu régime.

Following the events in Romania, the Albanian communist leadership came under increased foreign and domestic pressures to make additional changes. Furthermore, the ethnically-driven developments in the Kosovo Autonomous Region in Yugoslavia had a direct impact upon the political circumstances in Albania. Confronted by the systematic infringements of its cultural autonomy in Kosovo by the Slobodan Milošević régime, the Albanian majority organized itself around several non-communist political parties, which, besides advocating full-blown autonomy and a republican status for Kosovo, asked for a multiparty system and a free market economy, thus setting the political agenda for similar developments in Albania.

The Central Committee meeting in January 1990 attempted to halt such developments by shrewdly linking the theme of the APL monopoly of power with that of preserving the independence and stability of the country. However, in order to release some of the societal tension, it announced a wary programme of reforms, which meant, among other things, a greater say for local authorities and enterprises in decision-making processes, a better correlation between wages and production, the introduction of alternative candidates in the elections for Party cadres, and limits on their terms in office. Further political changes intended to improve the human rights record of the régime were announced on the occasion of the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee, in April 1990. Albanians were granted the right to travel abroad; the ban on religious activity was lifted, the death penalty for defectors was abolished; and lawyers for the defense in court and in the Ministry of Justice were reintroduced.

A striking break with the past, at least so far as the traditional isolationist policy of Albania was concerned, occurred when, in the spring of 1990, the régime expressed its desire to normalize its relations with Washington and with Moscow, to be admitted as a full member of the CSCE, and to promote foreign investment in Albania. But none of these concessions, nor the ones announced later at a meeting with intellectuals in August - an increased role for elected bodies, including the People's Assembly, the separation of Party and state, the loosening of communist control over mass organizations, and the improvement of the appointment mechanism for cadres - were sufficient to satisfy the prominent intellectuals of the country, including the writer, Ismail Kadare, the cardiologist, Sali Berisha, the scientist, Ylli Popa, the economist, Gamoz Pashko, and such writers and journalists as Neshat Tozaj and Besnik Mustafaj, who intensified their push for far-reaching changes.

On 4 July 1990, the increasing pressures for radical change found a new expression when an impressive number of Albanian citizens invaded the main Western embassies in Tirana and, eventually, emigrated. The incident was highly indicative of the growing gap separating the Party bureaucrats from the population. As Ramiz Alia wanted to preserve the leading role of the Party in the liberalization process, he attempted to get rid of some of the members of the conservative faction of the Politburo, including the Minister of the Interior, Simon Stefani. But in late October, 1990, at a moment when the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries were gathered in Tirana, his image as a reformer was dealt a heavy blow when writer Ismail Kadare announced that he was requesting political asylum in France, as an expression of deep disenchantment with the slow pace of change of the régime.

The first days of December 1990 witnessed the first major student rally in Tirana against the government. Apparently generated by the deteriorating economic situation, the demonstrations soon embraced political demands. Although certain voices in the political establishment pleaded for a "Chinese solution" (alluding to the Tiananmen Square episode), Alia chose to compromise with the student representatives. This action laid the basis for the setting up of the first opposition party, namely the Democratic Party. In the next four months, other parties were set up, including the Republican Ecological, Agrarian, National Unity, and Social Democratic parties, as well as the Independent Trade Union. The surrender by the APL of its monopoly of power instantly ignited anti-communist demonstrations in several major Albanian cities, a situation leading to violent clashes with the police and with army troops. As a result of the heightened sense of insecurity, some fifteen thousand Albanians took refuge in Greece.

In a desperate attempt to arrest its sharp decline in popularity, the APL leadership attempted to distance itself from its Stalinist legacy, removing Nexhmije Hoxha, Enver Hoxha's wife, from her position as Head of the Democratic Front, and announcing, at an extraordinary national Party conference in late December 1990, daring economic reforms targeting the

introduction of market mechanisms. Yet the APL came under increasing pressure from more radical elements, reluctant to accept any end result short of the total repudiation of communism. When, on 20 February 1990, the student demand to remove the name of Enver Hoxha from the University of Tirana was met by a refusal on the part of the government, more than 100,000 people gathered in the central square of Tirana and tore down the dictator's statue. If Alia's response was the setting up of a new government led by economist Fatos Nano and of a presidential council that assumed control of the country, the response of the communist fundamentalists was the formation of a Union of Volunteers for Enver Hoxha that organized massive pro-Hoxha gatherings. It assailed Democratic Party supporters and restored the former communist leader's statues in several places. As a consequence of increased political tension, another wave of some twenty thousand Albanian refugees fled to Italy.

Using a set of tactics closely resembling those of the National Salvation Front (FSN) in Romania (and taking advantage of the very a short period allowed to the opposition to organize itself, the ability to take advantage of general confusion and lack of information, a monopoly of the media, and efforts to intimidate the opposition), Ramiz Alia's party won a comfortable two-thirds majority in the new Albanian Parliament in the first free elections in the history of modern Albania, which took place on 31 March 1991. The Parliament electing Alia President for a five-year term, he resigned as the APL First Secretary and as a member of its Central Committee. Fatos Nano was confirmed as the Prime Minister of Albania. Again, in a way similar to what had happened in Romania, elections were immediately followed by acts of violence, when, on 2 April 1991, *Sigurimi* agents killed four opposition leaders in Shkodër and wounded fifty-eight other people when Democratic Party supporters protested alleged voting fraud by the APL. On 4 June 1991, when a new "national salvation" government was formed, Albania plunged into a new period of political and economic instability. Eventually, amidst economic collapse and social unrest, the former communists were routed in the March 1992 elections. Sali Berisha was elected to be the first non-communist president since the Second World War. Later, public protest over the breakdown of popular pyramidal investment schemes in January 1997 led to a dramatic economic and political crisis, armed rebellion and anarchy, and the near collapse of the Albanian state.

8. Transition through Liberalization and Implosion: The Cases of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of Yugoslavia

a. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, the Soviet state was already in a seriously weakened condition. The Soviet Union had experienced not only years of political and economic stagnation but also an

annoying absence of able and stable leadership in the first half of the

1980s. Weakness at the center had enabled the local ethnic and regional mafias within the regional state-party apparatus in the periphery to enhance their power. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was internationally isolated, over-involved in a draining war in Afghanistan, and facing a renewed tough stance on the part of the United States.

An analysis of the developments that triggered the utter collapse of the Soviet Union between March 1985 and December 1991 should take two theoretical distinctions into account: the Orwellian distinction between the "inner party", *i.e.*, the Soviet élite (the Politburo, the Central Committee, the KGB, the army, the state apparatus, and the leaders of the military-industrial complex), and the "outer party" (advisers, reporters, consultants, speech writers, and social science experts), and an analogous distinction between the "inner empire" (republics belonging to the Soviet Union) and the "outer empire" (the Soviet Bloc countries).

Future *perestroika* experts were formed in the "outer party". During Gorbachev's period, they gradually penetrated the "inner party".

The first stage of Gorbachev's rule, the so-called speeding-up period (March 1985–1987), could be defined as a rejection of Brezhnevism through hopes for a rejuvenation of the system after a return to allegedly primary Bolshevik values, to the tolerant pluralism of the New Economic Policy (NEP), and to de-Stalinization.

Following the modest campaigns against alcoholism and for greater labour discipline and productivity, Gorbachev decided, in February 1986, on the occasion of the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Soviet Union Communist Party, to attack "the administrative command system".

The *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) policy was born out of a correct understanding of the need to involve the masses in the processes of change and of the simple truth that a successful economic reform would first require political reforms. Its prerequisites could be recognized even before Gorbachev's ascension to power in the perestroika *avant la lettre* project submitted by Lavrenti Beria, immediately after Stalin's death (March 1953), the reform suggested by Nikolai Rizhkov (June 1983), when he was the head of the Party economics department and Vice-President of GOSPLAN, and the "artistic freedom" mentioned by the Soviet leader, Konstantin Chernenko, during a speech given in 1984 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the first Writers' Union Congress.

Eclectic, the new thinking kept on being restricted to a social engineering project. For instance, the "*Perestroika*" Club founded in 1987 under the authority of the Mathematical Economics Institute, protected by the District Party Committee, and guided from the side by the KGB, aimed at "elaborating social and political techniques for the non-violent solution of social conflicts".

Becoming increasingly numerous, *perestroika* support organizations underwent a first split in February 1987 between experts who favoured the strict circumscription of their actions to the institutional framework (the so-called governmentals) and other experts who wanted to go beyond this

framework. One of the expressions of these new theoretical efforts was the oxymoronic phrase, "socialist state of law", first used in an academic small-circulation magazine, *Soviet Law and State* (September 1987).

At the same time, the nationalities issue, that had been neglected by Gorbachev during his first two presidential years, came to hold an increasingly important place in the Soviet political agenda.

Since the summer of 1987, the "inner empire" had begun to show signs of restlessness. After demonstrations in Moscow, the representatives of the Crimean Tartars were received at the Kremlin to present their requests (July 1987), the Baltic States demanded the denunciation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 (23 August 1987), an ethnically-oriented cultural club was founded in Kiev (September 1987), and victims of Stalinist terror were commemorated in Minsk (November 1987). But the first ethnically-driven mass protest that could not be contained within Gorbachev's limited vision, and the first major crisis that precipitated the disentanglement of central Soviet authority came, starting in February 1998, from Nagorno-Karabagh, an Armenian enclave in the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the Karabagh was a clear symptom of the deficiencies of the Soviet constitutional order and the mounting need for the use of armed force to maintain the federation - a tendency that would be fully confirmed on the occasion of the ethnic strife in Baku, in January 1990.

Beginning in the summer of 1988, national movements known as popular fronts began to develop in the main union republics. In the Baltic republics, the initiative for their creation was taken by writers, but their expansion was encouraged by the local communist parties. There were situations (in the Ukraine, for instance) in which the KGB seemed to have had a finger in the processes whereby these movements were born and evolved. On 11–12 June 1988, representatives of six non-Russian national movements (Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, and Georgia) set up a Coordination Committee for USSR Peoples' Patriotic Movements.

In the meantime, the *glasnost* wave came to affect official history. The Memorial Group, founded at the start of 1988 with discreet KGB support and intended to reveal the horrors of Stalinist times, had to focus, according to Gorbachev's logic, on three questions: *i)* defusing the "delayed bombs" of the past; *ii)* channelling all the passions aroused by Stalinist disclosures toward an anti-Stalinist and anti-*nomenclatura* kind of ethos; *iii)* elaboration of a fresh basis for rapprochement between the Russian people and the other USSR peoples, given their common sufferings during Stalinism.

The turning point came with the decision taken at the Nineteenth Party Conference (July 1988) for a transition to a presidential régime and a return to the Leninist formula of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies. The multi-candidate national, and later, local elections, spelled the death of the monopoly held by the Communist Party on political power. The December 1988 electoral campaign and the semi-competitive elections of 26 March 1990 for the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies gave the final

touch to this process. Among other things, the Spring 1989 elections gave Boris Yeltsin the chance to resurrect his political career, shattered after he had been sacked by Gorbachev from the post of First Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party in 1987. Calling the Party leadership corrupt and promising to roll back the privileges of the Party ruling élite, Yeltsin conducted a populist, anti-establishment campaign that made him the focal point of the anti-Soviet opposition in 1989. But winning only a small number of seats in the new Soviet parliament, Yeltsin and his new allies from the so-called informal movement focused instead on the upcoming elections for the Russian Congress of People's Deputies and the city councils throughout Russia. Yeltsin's strategy was to seize control of political institutions from below as a means to undermine Gorbachev's power from above. This strategy proved to be a winning one, and anti-communist forces took over almost a third of the seats in the Russian Congress in the 1990 elections. With additional votes from Russian nationalists, Yeltsin then won his election as Chairman of the legislative body. Eventually, it was the Russian Congress, along with the Moscow City Council - institutions never before prominent in Soviet politics - that would erode the legitimacy and authority of Kremlin power.

In February 1990, under the pressure of revolutionary developments in the "outer empire", one of the fundamental Leninist dogmas – the leading role of the Party – was discarded. This step, in turn, determined three critical processes.

First, the disappearance of the vertical structure that had supported the Soviet order brought about an atomization of authority at the lower levels (republics, regions, cities and towns, districts, villages, enterprises, *kolkhozes*). From this perspective, the 1989–1990 independence and sovereignty statements made by the union republics only represented a specific case in this higher scope phenomenon.

Second, the Yeltsin-Gorbachev competition for the redefinition of the center of power began. While Yeltsin called on the Russian people to consider the Russian Congress, rather than the Soviet Congress, the highest political organ in the land, and following the Leninist pattern, tried to turn Russia into the new center of a Union set up, this time, "from bottom to top" through bilateral treaties between the Russian Republic and other Union republics, Gorbachev stubbornly clung to the old idea of a center represented by the Kremlin. Consequently, a protracted struggle for sovereignty between the Soviet state and the Russian government ensued, and Russia once again experienced dual power as just before the start of its Soviet history.

Third, the rush for inheriting the Communist Party assets started. As of the spring of 1990, Party funds were transferred into Western banks. Party villas were sold at preferential rates to *apparatchiks* (following an October 1990 Politburo decision), and there was a general self-liberation process among *nomenclatura* members who rushed to start their own businesses.

In the meantime, mass nationalist outbursts had occurred, first in Transcaucasia and soon after in the Baltic republics. In November 1988,

Estonia declared itself a sovereign republic. A few other declarations of sovereignty and the establishment of official languages in the republics followed in 1988-1989. But it was the year, 1990, that witnessed a series of declarations of both sovereignty and independence, starting with the Lithuanian declaration of independence in March. In the summer of 1990, in one of their first acts as the newly elected representatives of the Russian people, the Russian Congress declared Russia an independent state. By the end of 1990, all the union republics and most of the autonomous republics had reacted to the rapid weakening of the central state and to the examples set by the former Eastern European satellites, declaring themselves sovereign, in some cases, independent states.

Gorbachev's authoritarian response to the radicalization of this centrifugal tendency in the inner empire (the brutal intervention in Vilnius on 12–13 January 1991, as well as the mobilization of the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior against "delinquency" and "economic sabotage" at the end of the same month), together with the scandal of the guided missiles delivered by the Soviet Union to the El Salvador rebels (March 1991), seriously damaged the international image of the Soviet régime. At the same time, the unpopular Stalinist measures taken by the Government only consolidated the impression that Gorbachev was unable to take a firm stance in the clash between the Party and the KGB old guard and the "democrats". To be sure, by the time of the March 1991 referendum on the question of establishing a union of sovereign republics (the outcome indicating considerable support for this idea), a stalemate had already been reached between the left, the right, and the center represented by Gorbachev. But in June 1991, taking advantage of the new opportunity sanctioned by the March referendum to introduce the elective office of President of Russia, Yeltsin won a landslide victory to become the first elected president of Russia, a result that returned momentum to the anti-communist forces.

The immediate reflection of the political cleavage was the attempted August 1991 putsch. Viewing the scheduled 20 August 1991 signing of a new Union Treaty as the first step toward the total disintegration of the Soviet Union, the conservative forces, in a pre-emptive power-seizing move, reunited in the so-called State Committee for the State of Emergency, announced on 19 August that it had assumed responsibility for governing the country.

The attempt was a new proof of the close link between Party and state in the Soviet system, indicating that the elimination of the Party as the single actor in the political arena would quickly result in the dissolution of the type of state upon which it had relied.

After the coup, the course of events moved forward rapidly. On 22 August, the statue of the founder of the Soviet secret police, Felix Dzerzhinsky, was demolished. The next day, Boris Yeltsin outlawed the Communist Party in Russia. One day later, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned from his office of Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while on 27 August, he declared that he would also give up his

presidential office if the Soviet Union ceased to exist. On 5 September, the Congress of the Soviet Union was disbanded, and on 8 December 1991, the presidents of the three Slav republics - Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Shushkevich - met in Belarus and officially announced that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had ceased to exist and that a Commonwealth had been set up by the three republics that other states were invited to join. Once the Central Asian republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova had agreed to join the Commonwealth, Mikhail Gorbachev officially resigned, on 25 December 1991, as president of the already defunct seventy-four-year-old federal entity.

If one pictures the former Soviet Union as a federation with basically two layers of Federal bodies: one comprising fifteen republics, and the other encompassing within Russia another sixteen autonomous republics, one could conclude, in retrospect, that what collapsed in 1991 was only the first layer. Whilst all the former first layer Federal bodies became independent (leaving aside the case of Belarus that voluntarily agreed to eventually surrender its initial nominally independent status), a second layer of Federal bodies are still in the process of struggling to gain independence. As a result, as in the case of former Yugoslavia, ethnically motivated strife has continued, as an ongoing process, following the collapse of communism.

What started as a revolution from above, ended up as a series of nationalist revolutions from below. The development of civil society and restless nations within the Soviet Union unavoidably transformed Gorbachev's efforts at state-building into an intended process of state-dismantling and, indeed, of imperial collapse.

b. Yugoslavia

A country with approximately 24 million inhabitants, twenty-four ethnic groups of which eight were dominant, three major religions (Christian-Orthodox, Roman-Catholic, and Muslim), two alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic), divided into six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro)) and two autonomous regions (Voivodina and Kosovo attached to Serbia) - this conglomerate was the communist Yugoslav state.

Under Josip Broz Tito, the nationalities issue generated a number of disputes regarding the structure and the composition of the Yugoslav Federation. Tito's increasing orientation toward centralism, obvious since 1944, and the revival of the inter-war Yugoslav ideology and practice that emphasized the blending together of the South Slavic nationalities into a single Yugoslav supernational entity, brought him into conflict with the regional Croat and Macedonian communist leaders. After several hesitations, realizing that his federal system was threatened by Serbian hegemony, Tito, a Croat, sided with the reforming faction within the Party so far as the nationalities issue was concerned. The new course adopted by Tito in this domain during the 1960s and 1970s implied a return to ideas

previously broached in the 1940s: a rotating presidency for both state and Party, time limits for office-holding, and formal harmonization, through legislation, of the interests of the federal units. Decentralization was sanctioned under the 1974 Constitution, which increased the autonomy of the republics and the autonomous regions, thus encouraging a considerable bureaucratic expansion at regional level. Intended equally to reassert national equality and to impose Party control over developing national movements, the 1974 Constitution did not solve the latent tension between the Serbs and the other nationalities. For the former, Yugoslavia was a partitioned country, lacking a legitimate center. For the non-Serbian nationalities, it relied on the old-time pretence that the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes constituted a single Yugoslav people as well as on excessive centralism.

Tito's death in 1980 rekindled nationalist passions. Well-publicized cases of nationalist provocations involving both Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo took place in 1982 and 1985. The issue of Kosovo elicited a response by the Serbian élite that was synthesized in the 1986 "Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences". The central idea of the document was that, because of the political and economic discrimination to which Serbs had been subjected within Yugoslavia, Serbia – and the Serb people as a nation – had the right to determine their own national interests. Soon enough, after May 1986, when the Communist Party of Serbia came to be run by Slobodan Milošević, this stance was to become the programme of the Serbian communists.

Milošević's political ascension was closely linked to the nationalist-populist instrumentalization of the Kosovo issue. To better understand the emotional involvement of the Serbs, one should remember that the Battle of Kosovo of 1389, by which a Christian coalition attempted to halt the advance of the Ottoman Turks, had led to the ending of the powerful Serbian Kingdom of the Fourteenth Century. Inhabited by approximately 1.7 million Albanians, this very heart of the Serbian medieval state was viewed as a sort of Serbian Palestine in the eyes and souls of Serbian nationalists.

One of Milošević's first manifestations of a positive attitude toward Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins occurred on the night of 24 to 25 April 1987. He delivered an inflammatory speech to a huge number of Serbs and Montenegrins who had gathered on the site of the legendary battle. Occurring in the background of an earlier incident involving the predominantly Albanian police force of Kosovo, the event marked the beginning of a policy favouring the Serbian and Montenegrin ethnic minorities in the province. This policy led to military occupation, police reprisals, and Party cleansing.

By rejuvenating the old nationalist myths of Serbia and also the dream of a Greater Serbia that would include most of Yugoslavia, Milošević changed the Yugoslav League of Communists (Communist Party) into the instrument of a pan-Serbian nationalist movement.

Taking full advantage of Serbian nationalist feelings, Milošević succeeded in ending the autonomist leadership in Voivodina (October 1988) and the Titoist leadership in Montenegro) (January 1989). Anti-autonomist attacks continued in March 1989, when the direct authority of the Republic of Serbia was extended to both Kosovo and Voivodina and also, in July 1989, when Milošević disbanded the Kosovo regional Parliament, most of the Albanian press, and the Priština Television broadcasts. In the meantime, in May 1989, Milošević became the President of Serbia.

Milošević's attempts to destabilize Yugoslavia were not opposed by the Federal government, the army (one of the fundamental pillars of the Titoist order), or the Party. Only Slovenian and Croat communists made some timid attempts in this direction.

The unforeseen consequence of these developments was political pluralism. In the spring and summer of 1989, a plethora of new political parties appeared in both Slovenia and Croatia. They were legalized by the communists toward the end of the same year.

The strained relationship between Serbia and Slovenia (the latter making up 8 percent of the population was responsible for 20 percent of the GDP of Yugoslavia and one-third of its Western exports) reached the boiling point in the winter of 1989. Confronted by Slovenian reforming communists led by Milan Kučan, Milošević attempted to get rid of them by means of the ruse of an explanatory meeting on Serbian policy in Kosovo. When the Slovenes refused to take part in the meeting scheduled for 1 December of that year, the date of the celebration of the unification of Yugoslavia, the Serbs and their Montenegrin allies organized caravans with thousands of people intended to "educate" the Ljubljana Slovenian population. Fearing that these maneuvers might degenerate into street fighting and even a coup, the Slovenian police blocked all access to Ljubljana. In response, the Serbs broke off all relationships with Slovenia and instituted a boycott of Slovenian goods. Both Serbs and Slovenes decided to annul all debts existing between enterprises in the two republics.

On this background, the January 1990 Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party turned out to be a failure and was actually the last congress held at federal level. After the Slovenes had departed, the Croats followed suite. National center-right groups won multiparty elections in Slovenia (April 1990) and in Croatia (May 1990). The new Slovenian government was made up chiefly of members of the DEMOS coalition movement (an acronym for the elected Democratic Opposition consisting of 5 parties) and an elected president, Milan Kučan. In December 1990, the Slovenes held a referendum by which they voted for the full independence of their state in association with Yugoslavia.

The winner of elections in Croatia was the Croat National Union, the leader of which, the former general and dissident, Franjo Tudjman, was elected President. Both Croatia and Slovenia took important steps toward democratization and the implementation of market economies. Unfortunately,

these efforts were somewhat hindered by the amateurism and populism of the new political élite, especially in the case of Croatia.

The November 1990 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia also gave proof of the force of national parties. The electoral race, taking place one month later in Serbia and Montenegro), although disappointing, overall, to the non-communists, nevertheless proved that Milošević was not a very successful candidate in ethnically mixed areas (Voivodina and Sandjak) and one who lacked popularity in Belgrade and in other urban areas.

Eventually, all the plans for a weak confederation, the model for which would have been the European Community, failed. In June 1991, the Slovenian and Croat parliaments proclaimed the total independence of the two republics, whereas the new "little" Yugoslavia entered down its rocky road toward democracy while undergoing a new experiment in authoritarianism and ethnic cleansing under Milošević.

C. CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union witnessed, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, basically six transition paths to democracy and market economy. They included transition through negotiation (Poland and Hungary), transition through capitulation (the former German Democratic Republic and the former Czechoslovakia), transition through *coup d'état* and liberalization (Bulgaria), transition through popular uprising and *coup d'état* (Romania), transition through liberalization and collapse (Albania), and transition through liberalization and implosion (the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia).

Political change in Poland was a negotiated transition process. Although unconstitutional, it was led by the élite and resulted in the replacement of military-bureaucratic authoritarianism by democracy.

In Hungary, political change was also the result of a transition, but it included a promulgated reform and a referendum, thus involving the masses in addition to the élites.

In the German Democratic Republic, the road to democracy did not take the form of negotiation, in spite of the fact that the Round Table element was present throughout the process. Under pressure from people who had taken to the streets, the government could only negotiate its own surrender, thus the process took the form of sheer capitulation.

Popular pressure from below was instrumental in Czechoslovakia as well, leading to the capitulation of the old totalitarian régime. Consequently, political change assumed the form of a peaceful – or, as it was called, "velvet" – revolution.

In Bulgaria, what had started as a *coup d'état*, exclusively involving the élite of the dictatorial régime, led to a change of régime through liberalization involving both the "new-old" élite and the masses.

In Romania, the change of régime assumed the form of a violent revolution combined with a coup. It was unconstitutional, not negotiated,

and involved not only the masses, but also some of the lower echelons of the élite of the former régime.

In Albania, transition was accomplished through the gradual liberalization of the old régime and the near collapse of the post-totalitarian régime.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the end of the totalitarian régime came at the conjuncture of simultaneous attempts to dismantle the command economy and totalitarian political practices and to construct a democratic multinational federation. What had started as a process of economic and political liberalization through "top to bottom" reforms, ended up as an implosion of the multinational federal state.

Last but not least, in the case of former Yugoslavia, an incomplete liberalization of the old régime was followed by an implosion of the former multinational federal structure having as a result a dramatic ethnically driven crisis and an incomplete democratization.

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