|
Coming to terms with
Sistani
By Sami Moubayed
DAMASCUS - The Grand Ayatollah of Iraq, Ali
al-Sistani, is probably one of the most influential,
controversial and interesting figures in
the new Middle East. At first glance he greatly resembles
the late ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of
the Islamic Revolution of Iran, who terrorized the
West during his 10-year  tenure in Tehran
(1979-89) and who become an icon for evil in
Hollywood. Khomeini died in 1989, but comparisons
linger: both as elderly Shi'ites, both bearded,
wearing large turbans and black robes. This,
however, is where the similarities end.
Yet to the average Westerner, both
are mullahs, both advocates of an Islamic state,
and both resemble Osama bin Laden in faith and
appearance. The average American must wonder: Is
this what American soldiers fought and died for in
Iraq, an Islamic republic like Iran, run by
another ayatolla?. They are asking: Did American
mothers send their children to the Iraq war in
order to liberate men like these from
dictatorship?
In the post-September 11 world,
the image of Sistani is not greatly welcomed
by the West. Yet nobody in the West, especially
the average American, knows who Ali al-Sistani
really is. Will this man attack the US Embassy
in Baghdad and take hostages, as Khomeini's
followers did in Iran in November 1979? Will
he go to war with neighboring countries that oppose
his pro-American program, like Syria? Or will
he live up to his reputation of being a wise, patriotic
and moderate leader for post-Saddam Hussein
Iraq? While most of the Western media, influenced
by the United States, picture him as one of the
most cooperative and patriotic leaders in modern
Iraq, his Sunni opponents criticize him in secret,
accusing him of unjustifiable cooperation with the
Americans.
Differences with
Khomeini
Sistani was born in Mashhad,
Iran, in 1929 to a family of religious scholars.
He studied at the hands of the grand ayatollah
Abdul-Qasim Khoei. Sistani rose in religious rank
to be named a marje (religious reference)
in 1960 during the heyday of the secular military
dictatorship of president Abd al-Karim Qasim. He
embraced religion when Arab, rather than Islamic,
nationalism was the popular ideology in Iraq, and
when the number of theology students was dropping
by the thousands. In 1918, for example,  6,000
students studied at the theology schools of
Sistani's Najaf, while by 1957 it had dropped to
1,954, of whom only 326 were Iraqis.
Many
of those enrolled, according to historian Hanna
Batatu, did so only in name in order to secure
exemption from otherwise compulsory service in the
Iraqi army. Sistani supported separation of
religion from the state, under the influence of
Khoei, and this spared him persecution by the
military dictators of the 1960s and 1970s. In
theory, he had no problem with the officers
keeping the clergy away from political life in
Iraq. Sistani stayed away from politics, leading a
monastic life, and attracted millions of
supporters throughout Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria
and Pakistan.
In theory, he supported the
Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, but he grew
disenchanted by Khomeini's theocracy. Sistani
believed that government should be run by
politicians, not clergymen, whose duty would be to
maintain law and order and to run economic
affairs, day-to-day politics and foreign
relations. The clergy should not become
politicians, he stressed, because this would
corrupt them and distort their religious message.
Instead, they should limit themselves to spiritual
and religious matters in which the politicians
cannot pass sound judgment.
Khomeinism, on the other hand, gave
complete political control and responsibility to
the clergymen. Khomeini advocated a system called
vilayet-e-faqih (guardianship of the
jurisprudent); clerical rule in political affairs,
while Sistani called for it only in social issues.
Khomeini established a cult personality for
himself in Iran, much to the horror of the US,
which he famously labeled "The Great Satan".
Sistani opposed that an ayatollah like
Khomeini would involve himself in such a war of
words - something that should be handled by the
politicians, not the clergy. Even today, with US
forces in Iraq, Sistani has refrained from ever
criticizing the US, urging his men not to take up
arms against the Americans, yet refusing to meet
with any US official on Iraqi soil. He
acknowledges that they are invaders, but it is not
his duty to fight them out of Baghdad. He welcomed
the war on Saddam, with no mandate from the United
Nations, yet insisted on having UN inspectors at
the elections of January 30.
While
Khomeini's team, and not necessarily Khomeini
himself, was influenced by the methods of Arab
dictators, such as immortalizing the leader and
one-party rule, Sistani was a democrat at heart
who believed in the people's right to choose. This
explains why he embraced the January elections in
Iraq, calling on Shi'ites, who make up 60% of
Iraq's 27 million people, to vote, claiming that
this was a religious duty.
Sistani knows that when the Shi'ites boycotted the
elections of 1922, objecting to Sunni hegemony,
they were totally left out of political
decision-making, not only under monarchial Iraq, but for the
rest of the 20th century. In 1933, the Sunni
King Faysal I wrote, "The Shi'ite ulama
have no connection with the government and are at
present estranged from it, particularly in as much
as they see the Sunni ulama in possession
of funds and properties of which they are
deprived, and envy, notably among the religious
classes, is something well known."
That
is precisely why Sistani insisted that every
Iraqi Shi'ite must vote - even a woman whose
husband forbade her from voting could defy his orders
and go to the ballots. The Shi'ites in 1922
had objected to holding elections under
occupation (just as the Sunnis are doing today), and
suffered tremendously for their stance. What did
they get? A British-written constitution,
something that would have likely been repeated by
the Americans had the Shi'ites refrained from
voting in 2005. Sistani sees it as his duty never
to let the Shi'ites commit such a blunder
again.
Becoming a
leader
Sistani's mentor, Khoei, died in
1992 and named him successor. Saddam dreaded
Sistani's influence, especially since the Shi'ite
cleric had endorsed a US-backed Shi'ite rebellion
against him in 1991. As much as he wished, Saddam
could not murder Sistani because this would have
created civil war in Iraq. Having just been
ejected from Kuwait, defeated at the hands of the
US Army, facing a rebellion in southern Iraq, and
brought under UN sanctions, Saddam could not
jeopardize his regime by going to war with the
Shi'ites.
Nor could Saddam make Sistani
vanish, as Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had done
with Lebanese Shi'ite leader Musa al-Sadr in 1978.
Years later, when having re-enforced
|
Q&A with Sistani
Q: What
does the Koran say about suicide?
A: Islam
does not allow it in any circumstance.
Q:
Is it permissible to use gold or silver
cufflinks, pins or tie pins?
A: It is
forbidden for a man to use gold ornaments.
Q: Which
part of a male stranger's body can a woman look
at? Is it allowed to look at his breasts? On the
television in the Western countries, men often
show their bodies bare from the belly
up.
A: For a
woman to look at a stranger's (ajnabi)
body is forbidden, if it is with lust and fear
of falling into sin. It is not even permissible
to look without that (lust and fear) except for
the parts of the body which normally a man does
not cover, ie, head, hand and ankles,
which a woman can look at if it is without lust
and without fear of falling into sin.
Q:
Is one allowed to consume alcohol for medicinal
purposes or consume drugs for medicinal
purposes?
A: It is
permissible in just the amount needed for
treatment.
(Excerpts from www.sistani.org) | his
power in 1999, Saddam murdered Mohammad Sadeq
al-Sadr, another famous cleric, without blinking,
but in 1991, he had too much on his hands and
could not do the same with Sistani.
Instead, he put Sistani under house
arrest, shut down his mosque and forbade him from
preaching. The Shi'ite leader remained in
seclusion until Saddam was toppled in 2003. He has
since reinforced his authority over Shi'ites
throughout the region, sending emissaries to Iran
to meet with the clergy, and relying on
state-of-the-art technology to market his
leadership through the Internet. This is mainly
done through a multi-language website called
www.sistani.org, which attracts millions of
visitors from Iran alone every month. Sistani
receives hundreds of visitors at his home in Najaf
every day, but does not go out, does not give
interviews, nor does he like his photograph taken.
His office is Internet-wired and his aides are
often on the Internet, surfing to brief him on the
latest updates taking place around the world.
Challenges
Despite his
popularity, Sistani does face several challenges
in Iraq. First, many Shi'ites in the country do
not want to cooperate with the Americans,
remembering only too well how the US triggered
them to rise against Saddam in 1991, then let the
Iraqi dictator butcher them without lifting a
finger to stop him.
The Gandhian
methods of Sistani have aroused the anger of young
radical and militant leaders of the Shi'ite
community, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of a militia called
the Mehdi Army, who is 42 years Sistani's junior.
Although he does not match him in religious
legitimacy, Muqtada is popular among the youth,
and has a particular power base among the urban
poor, whereas Sistani's influence is paramount
among the urban middle and higher-class of the
Shi'ite community. Some have interpreted Sistani's
increased involvement in political affairs since
2003 as a direct response to the popularity of
Muqtada, fearing that he would outflank him. This
is far-fetched and very difficult to believe since
Sistani is a confident man who intensified his
political dealings only because he was the highest
religious authority for the Shi'ites in Iraq and
felt responsible for them, and Iraq as a whole,
due to the turmoil that took place after the fall
of Saddam and the terrible economic conditions of
all Iraqis.
Last April, Muqtada went to
war against the Americans in Najaf, inspiring
thousands of militant Shi'ites. Sistani ordered a
ceasefire, which went into effect in May, but in
August he was rushed to London for medical
reasons, and before he had reached Heathrow Airport,
fighting had broken out again in Najaf. Some
speculated that he left Iraq on purpose, to give
the Americans an easy assault on Muqtada. By
physically absenting himself from Najaf, he was
distancing himself completely from Muqtada.
The fact that he could have
been treated in Iraq, in nearby Iran or in Lebanon,
since all he needed was minor surgery, also colored
him as too pro-West in the eyes of
some conservatives. On August 15, The Sunday Times quoted
US commander Major David Holahan on
Sistani's departure: "A lot of people think it is the
green light for us to do what we have to do."
Sistani remained abroad for three weeks, returning to
Iraq while fighting was still raging in Najaf.
Using his towering influence, he once
again brokered a ceasefire between the US and
Muqtada. According to Milan Rai in an article
titled "The Sistani puzzle", many young Iraqi
Shi'ites began to lose faith in Sistani's
leadership as a result of his exodus during
Muqtada's fighting with the US. Some even began to
tear down his photos, claiming that he had escaped
and not saved their city. One said, "Sistani
escaped from Najaf. There are more hospitals in
Baghdad to treat the same disease but he escaped
to save himself." Another agreed: "Sistani escaped
from Iraq because he was afraid. There are
hospitals [in Iraq] that can treat him. At the end
he is a coward."
Both of the angry
Shi'ites were in the mid-20s. Yet Sistani
re-intervened at the excellent moment, when
Muqtada and his men were surrounded by US tanks,
ready to be mowed down. They had no choice but to
obey him, and the Americans, too, had no choice
but to let him handle the messy situation. The
Americans understood how unwise it would be to
cross Sistani, and being always in need of
legitimate leaders to work with them, they cannot
afford losing someone with his influence in the
Shi'ite community. When then US administrator L
Paul Bremer tried to push for a constitution
penned by US-appointed officials, Sistani
objected, claiming that the constitutional
assembly should be voted for directly by the
people themselves. Rather than hold by his views,
Bremer immediately backed down.
Sistani
has a clear agenda: to achieve democracy,
safeguard the rights of the Shi'ites and set up an
Islam-friendly regime in Baghdad, ruled by
politicians yet supervised in religious affairs by
the clergy. He sees himself as Iraq's guardian and
not as the political puppet master, as some accuse
him of wanting to become. He has read his history
correctly and remembers only too well how the
Shi'ites had suffered from one Sunni-dominated
regime to the next, starting off with the Ottoman
sultans in the 1500s to Saddam.
He also wants them to remain devoted to Shi'ite
Islam, inasmuch as they are devoted to Iraq, to remain
united against everyone, the Sunnis, the
Americans, the Kurds, etc. Sistani has the power
today to make Iraq a democracy. It would be
difficult, but the keys to success are in his
hands more so than in men like former exiles Ahmad
Chalabi or Iyad Allawi, the latter now premier.
The Americans must take Sistani very
seriously. His cooperation in Iraq is what
prevents them from striking at the Shi'ite regime
in Iran, despite its nuclear program, or the
Shi'ite militia of Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite
its continued war with Israel. Sistani would hear
nothing of both scenarios. If the Americans
foolishly decide to side step him, he could
unleash hell in the Fertile Crescent. He is the
best ayatollah in Iraq and they have to accept
that his vision of democracy for post-Saddam Iraq
is very different from what they had in mind.
Dr Sami Moubayed is a Syrian
political analyst.
(Copyright 2005
Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
