

MODERN AGE

A Quarterly Review



Beyond the one world

The Place of the Nation

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I

AS FAR AS my memory reaches back, the problem of the nation and of its place in our time has troubled me. When I was a seventeen-year-old student at the University of Goettingen almost half a century ago I delivered a paper for a student club on Friedrich Meinecke's book, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, which was then starting to be widely read. While preparing my speech I had come across an essay by Max Rümelin, Chancellor of the University of Tuebingen, who had written a passage which I have never forgotten and which may well serve as a sort of motto for the present article.¹ Rümelin speaks of the concept of the nation in the Middle

Ages, and then he says: "Supposing we had asked a man of that time, 'who are you?' and 'where do you belong?' his first answer would probably have been 'I am a Christian' and then he might have added 'I am the liegeman or vassal of Count X or of the Abbot Y.' Religion was the widest, most general bond and then came the smallest and nearest of local relations—these were the principal reasons for people's grouping themselves in society; in the wide field between there was nothing."

I know today how sweeping that statement was. But I do not doubt that it contains an important kernel of truth. When I encountered it more than fifty years ago I could not foresee that, in later years, I would spend the greater part of my life in

a country—Switzerland—which, in a curious way, has still preserved a good deal of the medieval concept of the people as between the smallest and the largest community and which, precisely for that reason, encounters such difficulties in finding a way to adapt itself to what is called “European Integration.” This non-medieval, if not downright Jacobin or Saint-Simonistic character of “Integration” I have tried to explain in *Modern Age* on an earlier occasion.² Switzerland has largely remained a nation where the emphasis on the small sub-national communities (Swiss nationality, e.g., presupposes that you are first a citizen of a village or town and then of the corresponding canton) and on the sentiments connected with them all combined with other sentiments that are connected with universal ties, of which the Red Cross is the best known example. It is the concord between the smallest and the widest sphere which was praised by the unknown author of the inscription to be found on the tomb of Ignatius of Loyola in the church III Gesù in Rome. It reads like this: *Non coerceri maximo, contineri tamen a minimo devinum est.*³

In quoting this Latin sentence without offering a translation I am bold enough to assume that, in spite of the uninterrupted warfare against the humanities, there still remains a residue of a certain community of the Occident which consists in an elementary knowledge of Latin as the spiritual expression of the *Repubblica Christiana* and of that supranationality for which we strive today as for something ultra modern. But while pointing to Latin as the world language of a truly international group of the past I am also alluding to certain paradoxes of our own time. Among other things, let us consider that the only institution left over from the spiritual supranationality of former centuries, i.e. the Catholic Church, has been empowered by

the present Council to cut the linguistic bond of universality presented by the Latin liturgy and to replace what has been international by what is national.

Perhaps we are entitled to regard this development as a symbol of a general process of our time: to internationalization in one sense a strong “nationalization” runs parallel in another. Nor may we be wrong in connecting this with the progressive democratization of the contemporary period which is necessarily linked up with the national tendencies inherent in the democratic tradition. Such reflections ought to remind us how carefully we have to proceed in analyzing the national or international tendencies of the present age. In particular they should put us on our guard against simplistic ideas like that of “one world” which, until quite recently, appeared to many minds as the direct and almost inevitable result of modern trends.

II

IF I MAY continue this autobiographical approach with which I began I would like to report what happened to my ideas on the place of the nation after those humble and tentative beginnings. When I turned from Law to Economics the problem did not cease to be foremost in my mind—as, I suppose, it was in the minds of most of my student contemporaries. I did not have to wait very long before I realized that, in analyzing the importance of the nation, I had entered a field where political economy, law, and political science come together. I tried to indicate on several occasions how a cooperation of these disciplines might be envisaged, especially in a series of lectures I gave, in 1954, at the Hague Academy of International Law on “Economic Order and International Law.”⁴

Let me state, at once and in a concrete

way, what seems to me a salient point. We teach our students that international trade can be explained on the basis of certain theories of strict economics of which the law of comparative costs is still the most important. We ought to tell them, however, that there is a higher truth, and that is the fact that, in the last resort, international trade rests on an international community, i.e. on those moral and legal principles which are respected in a civilized society. *Pacta sunt servanda*—treaties are to be kept—where that fundamental rule is no longer valid, international trade too must be affected. *Proprium est aestimandum*—once the nations begin to flout the institution of property and add this right to the list of so-called human rights, free and voluntary international movements of capital are bound to become solemn exceptions. And what that means, will, let us hope, be explained to the students from all the professorial desks of the free world, at least outside the underdeveloped countries.

There we come to a crucial point. It need not be emphasized how desperate the general situation is today with regard to those meta-economic conditions of international trade. But it is less widely realized that, under this aspect, the contemporary world is split in a way which was formerly unknown. One might be tempted to say that the international order of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the secularized *Republica Christiana* which existed from the Congress of Vienna to the shots at Sarajewo—has been completely destroyed. But this is not quite true. What has actually disappeared is an international order as a global whole. An order still exists in one sector which, geographically restricted as it is, is still economically predominant: it exists in that group of countries which have preserved at least some remnant of that once universal order as

part of the great patrimony of the occidental world.

Within this part of the world, which covers Europe and the overseas countries of European settlement with the exception of Soviet Russia but including Japan, we can still count on the continuing influence of the tradition of what we understand by international law. Beyond this orbit, however, lies the enormous field of the debris of international order. The fact that this area is so largely identical with the group of the underdeveloped countries, or the greater part of them, constitutes the actual problem of these countries.

Let us take a concrete example. As long as the Congo was connected with the international order of the West through Belgium the guarantee offered by the Belgian government made it possible to raise the enormous sums needed for the economic development and modernization of the Congo largely on the free capital markets by way of the usual loans bearing a normal rate of interest. We in Switzerland, for instance, eagerly responded to the invitation to subscribe to such loans at an interest rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. And today? Since the Congo, by an ill-considered and panicky act of “decolonization,” has been severed from the international order of the West there is simply no rate of interest conceivable at which people in the Western countries might be persuaded to lend their money voluntarily to that country any more than they would to India, Egypt, or Indonesia. Belgium, however, in spite of the loss of the Congo, goes on, with an unimpaired credit, to raise loans under the usual conditions because it does not occur to us to doubt for a moment her willingness and her ability to live up to her promises.⁵

The disintegration of the international order makes it all the more important that the Western powers, still standing for what

remains of it, should be watchful with regard to the danger spots of the channels of world trade. It is all the more dangerous to give ground in such places. From this point of view, it was most unfortunate that the United States, after a reckless Oriental despot seized the Suez Canal in cynical disregard of law and international treaties, turned against the two other Western powers, Great Britain and France, who had made a desperate effort to secure this great highway of the world economy. But today, when the same problem turns up in the case of the Panama Canal, Washington seems to understand how vital it is to keep its control over such an artery of international traffic. Let us hope that in spite of suicidal ideologies and crusading urges, sober reason will prevail if not only Singapore and Aden, but also Simons-town—which gains in importance the more the other two harbors are threatened—have to be defended as vital outposts of international order of the West. It is not easy to listen to the ingenuous people who tell us that the United Nations Organization is the nucleus of a new international order which will replace the crumbling old one. It is obvious that, on the contrary, the UN has become more and more an instrument by which governments and tendencies that are most active in destroying an international order try to impose their own arbitrary rule. They successfully exploit, in this effort, the willingness of Western states to submit, in weak passivity or even with genuine conviction, to the tyranny of so-called “progressive world opinion” and thus to abandon the advantage of their economic and military superiority. The final result of this we have seen in the Congo where UN troops, white and colored, have committed untold atrocities in order to impose upon this ill-starred country a “progressive” political structure and to crush an African states-

man who had the misfortune to be a devoted friend of the West.

III

THIS is a paradoxical world. On the one hand, the fact stares us in the face that this time, taken as a whole, is marked by a disintegration of an international order on a colossal scale. This is happening in the name of a nationalism which seems to know no bounds and no moderation and which reduces the idea of “one world” to a mere farce. This nationalism thrives in a climate of arbitrariness from which we may expect almost anything, including heads of states committing acts which, up to now, had been thought to be the attributes of gangsterdom, such as murder or kidnapping. But on the other hand, we are asked to believe that only hopelessly old-fashioned people can take the concept of the “sovereign nation” seriously any longer. From all sides we are told that the age of the “nation” is finally coming to an end.

But is that notion really wrong? On the whole, yes. It is, however, part of the immense paradox of our time that it is not entirely wrong. There is, in spite of the excesses of nationalism today, a grain of truth in it, with this qualification, however, that “the end of nationalism” refers only or almost exclusively to *geographically restricted* efforts to overcome national sovereignty by some supranational organization. These regional attempts can be understood as a sort of desperate answer to the universal disintegration which unchained nationalism has brought about. That is one way to get at the deeper meaning of all these organizations like the EEC (European Economic Community) or the EFTA (European Free Trade Association). But what are the prospects of these regional efforts to supersede the nation? The least we can say is that we must be

very careful and sober in our judgments if we do not want to run the risk of falling for more or less ideological speculations.

Since I have covered very much the same ground in my article published in *Modern Age* almost two years ago ("European Economic Integration and its Problems," Summer 1964) I can be brief now on this point and emphasize merely the most essential aspects of the problem. I would like to begin by repeating some sentences which I published two years ago in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* on "The Contradictions of the EEC." "It is becoming evident," I wrote, "how ill considered it was to underestimate the extraordinary and socially indispensable vitality of the nation, and to try immediately to replace this stage of political organization by a 'European State.' Turning from one extreme to another, many people believed that the sins of a destructive nationalism could be washed away in the milk of a pious Europeanism. They failed to see that this meant merely substituting one ideology for another, whereas the sound reality lies in the middle. In the struggle between the European ideology of the EEC and the self-assertion of its ruling group on the one hand, and the will to life and individuality of the resisting national states on the other, tensions have arisen which not many people had anticipated. Rarely in the course of history has the world been offered such a spectacle, and just as rarely has the outcome been as certain. If the United States of Europe is ever to come into being it will most certainly not come into being in this way. A common interest in the price of milk, a decision to increase the price of rice and of oranges in favor of some marginal group of producers, the common surveillance of cartels—such activities have never been state-forming elements capable of making the hearts of men beat higher."

"It is also certain," so I went on, "that the unification of the currencies of the EEC countries, constantly demanded in some quarters, would be bound to fail. Those who demand it do not understand that a European currency system in our time in which money and credit policy is inseparably meshed with the rest of the economic and financial policy of a state, presupposes a genuine European state, a state which neither exists nor appears likely for the near future. . . . It will be interesting to see whether the natural vitality of the individual nations involved will eventually be tamed by that provision of the EEC treaty which says that after a period of transition unanimity among the member states will not always be required. Will a state, in a matter considered vital by its parliament or its voters, be willing to submit to a majority? That such a possibility has been provided for at all can be understood only when the tremendous confusion is recalled in which the nations suffering from the consequences of a hateful nationalism found themselves a decade ago. Will the juridical mechanism prove strong enough in the event of a showdown? That remains to be seen."

These statements seem to have been borne out by the recent development started last summer when France refused to accept the authority of the European Economic Commission in Brussels. It now has become unlikely—to say the least—that the EEC will achieve something which always had seemed extraordinary and unrealistic: that it will bring about a supranational union (which is nothing short of miraculous under any circumstances) by way of a previous economic union, i.e. the "lowest" stage of integration. At any rate, it would be the first time in history that sovereign states entered a genuine federation by way of the backdoor of economic integration. As I attempted to show in my previous article,

neither the example of the German *Zollverein* nor that of the United States of America nor that of Switzerland disprove this statement. The rule has been hitherto that, on the national level, political integration has been the prerequisite and not the consequence of economic integration, and we are entitled to expect the most incontrovertible reasoning to explain why in the case of the EEC, where this process was expected to work on an international level, the exception to the rule would make its appearance. Needless to say, the case has never been made, nor can it be in view of the hard fact that the difficulties of a political and economic union of states are bound to become gigantic if the units to be merged are genuine nations and veritable national economies.

IV

IN ORDER to see the situation clearly, we must study the nature of the nation on the one hand and that of an international society on the other. To this end, we may start with the optimism with which even a man like Friedrich List—who most certainly was no cosmopolitan—looked at our problem, one hundred and twenty-five years ago, in his famous work, *The National System of Political Economy* (1841).⁶ Obviously influenced by Saint-Simon who had developed similar ideas, and still reflecting the ingenuousness of the Enlightenment, List had presented the end of national sovereignty as the simple continuation of the historical process which has led mankind from a primitive prehistory to clans, towns, and confederations and then the present congeries of nations.

The way from an international union of states to a superstate appears to List as a mere step on a continuously ascending staircase. Few, however, in our time will share this view. Most of us recognize that it is pre-

cisely this last step beyond the nation which is not only the most difficult of all but is also one of a special *kind*; like the nation itself something *sui generis*. Perhaps no one has grasped that more clearly than Henri Bergson when he says in his classic book, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*:

Between the nation, however large it may be, and humanity, there is all the distance from the finite to the infinite, from the closed to the open. People like to say that the apprenticeship to civic virtues is formed in the family and that in order to cherish one's country one must be prepared to love the human race. Our sympathy thus would expand by way of a continual progress, would grow while it remained the same and would end by embracing all humanity. This is *a priori* reasoning, a result of a purely intellectualist conception of the soul . . . But between the society where we live and humanity in general there is, we repeat, the contrast between the closed and the open; the difference between the two objects is one of nature and not of degree.⁷

It seems to be impossible to deny the truth of this statement. To ignore it is certainly the fundamental error inherent in so many *idées généreuses* in this field which, unfortunately, are as wrong as they are dangerous. It is the glaring mistake of all those who are filled with enthusiasm for "one world" and of all others who regard a supranational government, in Europe or elsewhere, as a practical objective.

It is equally the fault of those who do not see the essential difference between efforts like the European Common Market and the German *Zollverein* of the nineteenth century and who believe the former to be nothing more than an imitation of the latter made on a higher geographical level.⁸ It is a stubborn fact no less overlooked by those who propose an international central bank, either for Europe or for the whole world,

without giving thought to the question whether that does not presuppose an international government or whether indeed such a bank is feasible at all.

If, however, a supranation should come into existence, on whatever geographical level, it would have to be more than a customs union, an international cartel board, or an international milk office. It must be rooted in that deeply moral and intellectual ground which Ernest Renan, in his famous essay, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" (1882), had referred to when he said that "un Zollverein n'est pas une patrie" and when he added that a nation is "un plébiscite de tous les jours." Renan was also right in his observation that you cannot improvise a nation, but nevertheless the belief that precisely that is possible is characteristic of our age, which is wont to apply to society mechanical notions and to indulge in political rationalism. Such ideas were behind the congenital defect of a state like Czechoslovakia, and the loose thinking that produced that synthetic "nation" is being repeated by those who think that you can make South Africa a genuine nation to which the whites, the Bantu, and the Indians of that country all belong with equal rights.⁹ For the same reason, it is highly doubtful whether the new states which are now emerging in Africa as the more or less accidental results of Western colonization and which are promptly equipped with all the accoutrements of normal states—parliaments, universal suffrage, ambassadors and what not—can be expected to become, in any foreseeable future, genuine nations held together by any stronger and more legitimate ties than the will of unmitigated dictators.

It is not without significance that Ernest Renan, in his reflections on the nature of the nation, emphasized the example of Switzerland. We ought to remember this today as we see how deeply the Swiss still believe

in the vitality of the nation. They are not ashamed to be patriots and as such are as unwilling as any other nation—France for example—to give up their national independence for the sake of some synthetic supranational government. The Germans, however, who, after the greatest catastrophe of their history and after seeing their country cut into two fragments following entirely different political destinies, seem to be utterly shattered in their feeling of national identity, and in their confusion seek salvation in some sort of utopian Europe. That is one of the reasons why so many Germans—unfortunately including most of their own political leaders with the exception of those who are wrongly called "Gaulists"—find it difficult to come to a profound understanding with the French and why they are so reluctant to admit the realities behind the crisis of the Common Market.

The example of Switzerland ought to be sufficient to dispose of the popular notion that this realistic attitude vis-à-vis the nation and the recognition of its insuperable vitality means no more than what is indignantly called "nationalism." But it is absurd to accuse in this fashion a people whose international-mindedness has produced the Red Cross and has been manifested over and over again. It is simply not true that in the matter of the right place of the nation, the issue is between a utopian supranationalism and a sort of cannibalistic nationalism. In stressing the enormous difficulties of superseding the nation by some supranational government, we do not defend, of course, nationalism in this opprobrious sense. What I have in mind is a national government which, obeying the rules of international law and the community of civilized nations, limits its sovereignty by the duties imposed by that community, by international treaties, and by observing the first principle of international law which

declares: *pacta sunt servanda*.

All the weaker, then, appears the position of the "supranationalists." While they are prone to call the nationalists retrograde they forget several matters which damage their own cause morally and intellectually. No one with an eye on the real world can believe any longer in a "world government." In Europe the only practical issue is whether an international government could possibly be achieved, at least in the small part of the world which is our continent or, at any rate, among the fraction of that part composed of the six countries of the Common Market. The Common Market is not the first attempt made in that direction. Napoleon tried it before, and so did Hitler who even used the same term, *Grossraum*, which we hear today from our Common-Market Europeans. If all that is not very creditable it should also be realized that the best our "supranationalists" could hope for would be a new and larger "fatherland," i.e. an entity that would result from the union of several of the present national "fatherlands." The moral and intellectual advantage of such a "greater fatherland" over our actual national *patries* is not clear. On the contrary, there are good reasons to fear that it would be immensely more dangerous than any single fatherland since it would be a *Grossraum* which could afford to be much more ruthless than a smaller, merely national country.

We have already had a foretaste of that in the Common Market, whose tendency toward discrimination against third countries, toward putting pressure to bear upon weaker European outsiders, and toward autarky—especially in the field of agriculture—has been alarming. We continually hear the virtues of "integration" praised, but rarely are we told that the other side of the picture is the "disintegration" outside the "integrated" group. Is not a system of national governments whose sovereignty is kept in

bounds by the commands of international laws, by the rules of civilized intercourse, and by the obligations of international treaties, to be preferred to the "supranationalism" of a bloc of countries which have been welded together and whose congeries have more power than they can be trusted with?

It is, therefore, superficial to contrast national sovereignty with the virtues of an international state because the latter still leaves us with the same problem of sovereignty, only on a wider geographical scale. The question is the use we make of the sovereignty of the political unit. A national sovereign government may prefer "open" frontiers and a liberal commercial policy or it may decide for narrow economic nationalism, exchange control, autarky, and arbitrariness. So may a sovereign *Grossraum*, but the point is that in this latter case the temptation is all the stronger to follow the illiberal course. To be for or against national sovereignty is immeasurably less important than to be for or against ideas and policies likely to emphasize or to diminish the practical importance of sovereignty. But if we cannot in any event count on a use of sovereignty which furthers an international "open society," there is little sense in merely making the sovereign unit larger by uniting several national governments in an international government.

What needs to be done is not to shift the seat of sovereignty geographically but to decrease its importance and, as far as it is possible, to abolish it. That, however, presupposes that we favor an economic order which diminishes the sovereignty of the political unit and that we oppose the order which enhances it to the *n*th power. The economic order which we should choose is none other than the market economy combined with a genuine international monetary order.¹¹ The economic order which we should reject, if we are really averse to the

abuse of sovereignty, is none other than collectivism of all grades and colors combined with monetary nationalism and its paraphernalia of disequilibria of balances of payments, exchange controls, and discrimination in the field of international payments. It is, however, one of the ironies of our time that so many of those who congratulate themselves on their progressiveness in inveighing against what they call "nationalism" are the same who are in favor of collectivism and monetary nationalism.

V

IF ALL that seems to be true for the Free World, what about the Communist countries? It should be interesting to explore how far among them national sovereignty and international economic integration come into conflict with each other. We might assume that the power of resistance of national sovereignty would be much weaker among Communist countries than in the non-Communist world, not so much because socialist ideology demands such a view—few can be left today who do not know how wide is the gulf between socialist ideology and practice—but because of the naked domination of the weaker countries, the "satellites," by the ruling power.

But in reality, it is precisely in the Communist sector of the world that the gap is widest between the sovereign national government—Poland for example—and the requirements of an international economic integration. The reason for this is not far to seek. We have only to remember that, in contrast to the relations between market economy countries, international integration of socialist national economies demands a genuine centralization of the direction of the international economy which, since socialism means the thorough "politicalization" of the economic process, must be

throughout political. That, however, would mean a degree of "denationalization" of national governments which goes far beyond anything that the EEC would require. To be more precise: In the case of a real integration of national economies which, being socialist, depend entirely on a sovereign political direction, the countries concerned would have to be so thoroughly united politically that the union would be tantamount to annexation by the leading power, i.e. Soviet Russia. Consequently, such integration has been successful only when, as in the case of the hapless Baltic countries (the Communist parallel to the National Socialist *Anschluss* of Austria), national sovereignty has been literally annihilated by force, i.e. by the act of annexation.

To integrate the economies of socialist countries into a *Grossraum* which also comprises the union of their monetary systems,¹² presupposes therefore that the nation as an essentially sovereign political unit really has to be wiped out. It is the thoroughly political nature of their economic order which makes this imperative. Now since nations rarely commit political suicide and since even when they seem to commit it, as in the case of Austria in 1937, we suspect murder rather than suicide, the wiping out of a nation commonly happens by way of that kind of political assassination which we call annexation. That is: it presupposes violence or, at least, a mixture of violence and paralyzing the will of the victim which the collectivist-totalitarian governments of our time, whether brown or red, have learned to do well.

Short of annexation, however, the Communist countries (as was formerly true of the satellites of Nazi Germany) retain, in spite of their *Gleichschaltung*, that minimum of national identity which makes impossible an economic and monetary integration between them and the leading power which could even remotely be com-

pared with the natural international integration of market economy countries. Any higher form of international economic integration such as the EEC and the EFTA aspire to is impossible for the Communist bloc. Both the former National Socialist example and the present experience of the "common market" of the Communist countries—known as COMECON¹³—amply demonstrate what is bound to be the result in such cases: an amorphous and incoherent congeries of more or less badly functioning clearing agreements combined with monetary disintegration brought about by strict exchange control, arbitrary and therefore "wrong" exchange rates, and distorted price-cost relationships.

International economic and monetary integration which comprises not only complete freedom of the exchange of commodities, labor, and capital but also common monetary and fiscal management and complete coordination of economic policies is hardly conceivable without a corresponding sacrifice of national sovereignty. This, however, is the less likely the more ambitious the goals of integration become and the more the economic order of the countries concerned requires the politicalization of the economic and monetary direction. That is why the "planification" which the Economic Commission for Europe at Brussels would like to carry through within the Common Market is unrealistic unless a degree of supranational government of the Six is envisaged, and this seems out of the question if only because France at least would not permit it. Since the present head of the German government, Dr. Erhard, has always proclaimed his opposition to the planning ambitions of the Brussels commission, he ought to be grateful to President de Gaulle for having stopped them. It is hard to understand why he does not use this essential agreement of principle to improve his relations with France.

If such difficulties arise in the mild case of this "planning without tears," how immensely greater they appear in the case of collectivist countries. Compared with the non-Communist world, the Communist sector has the "advantage" that here one powerful and ruthlessly dominating country, i.e. Soviet Russia, calls the tune. But experience proves that even then the coercive power of the imperialist center is insufficient to bring about the national self-effacement indispensable for the integration of collectivist countries. The suzerain in Moscow would have to develop such tremendous power of political absorption that what it achieved would be equivalent to annexation, and that, at any rate after Stalin, seems to be out of the question. The case is incomparably worse, of course, for the relations among the satellite countries themselves. In concrete terms the fact that, within the Communist Imperium, the ruble, the zloty, the Ostmark, or the forint continue to be the basis of national currency systems is of the greatest importance. Even in the relations between the Communist states, this reveals a tenacity of the nation and of its attributes which has the most serious consequences for their economic integration. That is the profound reason why the COMECON can hardly be said to work at all.

VI

AFTER THIS excursion into the strange world of communism, let me return to the main subject in order to summarize my findings. It seems to be impossible to escape the conclusion that, in defiance of all the *idées généreuses* of our world reformers, the nation remains one of the "stubborn and irreducible facts," and all efforts to dislodge it in our time have been unable to change that fact. Moreover, there is a special reason why it is ill-advised to disre-

gard or to belittle the nation and that is its primary socially integrating force.

We make every effort to awaken in man the sense of responsibility and self-sacrifice for the sake of the community, to admonish him to tame his tigerish instincts and his egotistic appetites and to teach him to set bounds to his individualism. Only to the extent that we succeed in this effort is a free society possible. But when we make this appeal to the public spirit and to *civic* virtue—what kind of *civitas* have we in mind? Certainly, there are local or regional societies, i.e. *subnational* communities which, on the level of their affairs, claim our loyalty. On the other hand, it is most desirable that there exist a *civitas* of a supranational character to which we feel morally bound, from Europe or the Occident to mankind as a whole. Human solidarity becomes a moving fact whenever a natural catastrophe or some other manifestation of our common lot mobilizes what is best in man. But can there be any serious doubt that the *normal* form of the *civitas* which integrates men is still the nation?

It is only when the claims of this *civitas* become absolute that we rise in revolt. The extreme case of such absolute nationalism is the totalitarian state. At this point we have to state most forcefully—if, we are

still allowed to say it—that there are other and higher values than the nation and its state, that religion, family, natural communities, science, and art do not exist for the sake of the nation and its government but are pre-statal, or even supra-statal.

But this by no means signifies that the nation, the national government, and national law have to make way for a Supernation, whether European or Atlantic. In no way does it imply that those would have to obey the political claims of a supranational character which cannot but be tied up with a Superstate. On the contrary, it means that the nation as well as any eventual supranation are to be severely limited, and the latter even more so than the former because it is likely to be more powerful and therefore the more to be dreaded in its power. Such forces have to be kept in bounds by what is beyond politics, and beyond the state, by what is humane, by what is the free appurtenance of man and his culture, by the respect for the highest and indisputable values. That is what gives rank, depth, and dignity to international law, the *ius gentium*, far above every supranationality in the sense of international states, organizations, institutions, charters, commissions, High Authorities, boards, and conferences.

¹Max Rümelin, *Kanzlerreden*, Tübingen: 1907, pp. 86-87.

²Wilhelm Röpke, "European Economic Integration and its Problems", *Modern Age*, Summer 1964, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 231-44.

³Cf. my book *A Humane Economy*, Chicago: 1960, pp. 233-34 and 299.

⁴*Recueil des Cours de l'Académie du Droit International*, Leyden: 1955, pp. 201-73.

⁵I have developed these ideas further in my papers "Defekte der Weltwirtschaft," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, no. 2546 of the 27th and no. 2555 of the 28th July, 1960; and on "Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft heute," *Universitas*, September 1964.

⁶Friedrich List, *Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie*, 1841, pp. 189-90. Cf. my study "Le Zollverein et le Marché commun européen," *Mélanges d'histoire économique et sociale en hom-*

mage au professeur Antony Babel, vol. II, Geneva: 1963, pp. 449-57. On the previous idea of Saint-Simon: *Doctrine de Saint-Simon, exposition, première année 1828-1829*, 2nd edition, Paris: 1830, pp. 108-109.

⁷Henri Bergson, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*, 3rd edition, Paris: 1932, pp. 27-28.

⁸Cf. my study on "European Economic Integration and its Problems" (n. 3 above).

⁹Cf. my paper on "Südafrika in der Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik," in the symposium *Afrika und seine Probleme*, Albert Hunold ed., Schweizerisches Institut für Auslandsforschung: Erlenbach-Zürich and Stuttgart, 1965, pp. 125-58.

¹⁰See my Hague lectures (n. 4 above), pp. 246-50.

¹¹I refer to my book *International Order and Economic Integration*, Dordrecht (Holland): 1959, pp. 69-129.

¹²Some of the problems which here arise have been dealt with by Robert A. Mundell "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas," *American Economic Review*, 1961, and especially by Hans Willgerodt, "Wirtschaftsraum und Währungsraum," *Wirtschaftspolitische Chronik* (Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Köln), No. 3, 1964.

¹³The best and most documented analysis of the COMECON is by I. Agoston, *Le marché commun communiste, principes et pratique du Comecon*, Geneva: 1964.