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State Policies Towards
Muslim Minorities

Sweden, Great Britain
and Germany

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edition**PARABOLIS**

**Project financed by the
European Commission**
Directorate General
Employment and Social Affairs



The information expressed in this work does not
reflect necessarily the view of the European Commission.

Anwar, Muhammad/Blaschke, Jochen/Sander, Åke:
State Policies Towards Muslim Minorities.
Sweden, Great Britain and Germany

Published by:
Edition Parabolis
Verlagsabteilung im
Europäischen Migrationszentrum (EMZ)
Schliemannstr. 23
D-10437 Berlin



Phone: + 49 30 - 44 65 10 65
Fax: + 49 30 - 444 10 85
E-mail: info@emz-berlin.de
Internet: www.editionparabolis.de

Cover design: Keil:Scheiffele
Print: AZ-Druck, Kempten

ISBN 3-88402-336-5

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Introduction

As a result of immigration during the last decades, Islam has become the second largest religion in Europe. Most European states have their own policies to promote the integration of Muslim minorities into their societies, but these processes are complicated and not without difficulties – especially in the light of the local and global changes during the last decade. Muslims are often the victims of stereotyping and discrimination from the outside – a fact even more obvious in the aftermath of the terror attack against the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. In its encounter with Islam, modern Europe has to rediscover the Christian Occident. In addition to their official secularist or pluralist self-definition, European countries have a deep-rooted structural component – a Christian Heritage – manifesting itself in political programmes as well as in the structures, norms and routines of everyday life. The integration of minorities who do not share this heritage demands special efforts from all parts involved.

The aim of this project¹ was to analyse the state policies directed towards Muslim minorities in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, to investigate the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and to compare how these correspond with the goals formulated by the Muslim communities themselves. The objective was to provide a systematic comparative portrayal of the situation in the three coun-

tries, with policy recommendations for how the integration of Muslim minorities can be promoted.

Main Questions and Methodology

The study was designed to analyse the policies directed towards Muslims in Sweden, Germany and United Kingdom, and in particular to investigate the following:

- the issues and concerns of Muslim minorities about the policies (especially social policies) towards Islam and Muslims,
- the response within public, voluntary and private sectors in addressing these issues, including examples of good practice,
- the gap between the existing policy and practices within the public, voluntary and private sectors on the one hand and the aspiration of the Muslim communities on the other; what further actions are to be recommended.

To address these issues, the following questions were formulated:

- How do laws and codices, in most European countries based on Western traditions, effect Muslim minorities?
- How do the different actors conceive of religion and its role in society?
- To what extent is religion expected to be relevant for social institutions and everyday social practices – and to what extent is it seen merely as a private matter of the individual?
- Are Muslims parts of the policies of the communities they live in?

- To what extent do Muslims have equal opportunities compared with other groups in the areas of e.g. education, labour market, social services, economy, culture, media, politics, and when it comes to establishing institutions?
- What formal and informal structures of exclusion are Muslims confronted with in e.g. the labour market or in cultural and political arenas?
- Does the existence of special Muslim networks lead to exclusionist tendencies?
- How can exclusion be prevented and Muslims and their organisations be equal parts of society?
- What possibilities are there for religious teaching for Muslims in the European school systems?
- Who is to educate imams, Muslim teachers and functionaries?
- How are Muslims organising themselves in Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom?
- What problems do they encounter in their attempts of self-organisation, e.g. when it comes to establishing mosques, schools or cemeteries?
- What are their possibilities for participating in Muslim activities such as festivals and prayers and do they have access to *halal* food?
- What is the relation between the first and further generations of immigrant Muslims?
- How can state policies help young Muslims to live the life and lifestyles of their choice?

Each partner organisation in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom conducted interviews with experts and representatives from state authorities, Churches, NGOs, QUANGOs, Muslim associations and institutions.

The information gathered from the interviews were debated in round table discussions in each country, with expert participants from state authorities, churches, NGOs, QUANGOs, Muslim associations and institutions.

On the basis of the outcome of the interviews and round table discussions, reports on the situation of each of the participating countries were drawn up. Each country report intends to give an overview on state policies, instruments and programs concerning Muslims and how the parties involved interpret these.

The country reports were then discussed at a European conference held in Brussels on the 5-9th December 2001. The results from the three countries were debated and analysed comparatively, leading to the development of methods and tools for preventing the exclusion of Muslim minorities at a final conference in Warwick, England, on the 2-3 March 2002.

The methods used in the project were

- literature studies, especially about the historical and legal issues
- interviews
- round table conferences in each country
- survey investigation (Sweden)
- a final conference with the participation of all the three partner countries.

The history of Muslim immigration and the development of the legal framework regulating the presence of Muslims in the society were studied in each partner country. Analysis and review of secondary research findings, government commissioned reports, policies and procedures was also carried out. The findings, summarised in the project

reports, were used as background for designing the interview schemes.

First, an interview schedule was prepared, for common use for the three partner countries, to ensure comparability of the results.

In each participant country about 20–25 interviews were carried out with persons who would have views about, and awareness of issues and concerns, policies, practices and perceived gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Central and local Government officers, teachers, social workers, health workers, and specialist NGOs were interviewed.

In selecting the interviewees, we tried to find representatives for the following institutions and areas:

- Central Government: members of the Cabinet Office and other key central government departments and agencies as well as various institutions run by these departments, dealing with legislation guidance, directives, instructions and macro-policy issues
- Judiciary and Criminal Justice Systems and Institutions: Police, Courts/Tribunals, and Prison Service
- Local Government and community management committees e.g. local politicians councillors, persons responsible within the areas of education, health and social care, housing, etc.
- Other institutions and agencies, e.g. Socio-political institutions, Anti-discrimination institutions
- NGOs, QUANGOs, various welfare and other interest organisations, trustees regardless of their ethnicity or religion
- Specialist NGOs and Muslim organisations, e.g. Muslim College, Union of Muslim Organisations, Muslim

Burial Trust, members of mosques, cultural, youth and women's associations, etc.

- Professionals dealing with the delivery of various services to the local communities in the field of education, health and social care: teachers, social workers, health workers, educational psychologists, regardless of their ethnicity or religious affiliation.

Efforts were made, in particular, to identify people who would represent the following perspectives: youth, elderly, male/female, and a cross-section of Muslims, religious and non-religious, from different areas of origin.

Not all the participants were necessarily qualified to answer all the questions. However, it is important to note that those workers who were involved in equality, diversity, social inclusion and particularly race equality work did possess knowledge about wide-ranging issues and also those who were involved in the voluntary sectors were aware of relevant issues.

In all three countries, there were problems to find Muslims leaders and interviewees representing the opinions of the whole spectrum of the Muslim community, i.e. problems with representativity. This was especially the case regarding the non-religious Muslims. Although this is a general problem, not unique for this project, it is necessary to bear in mind. Another problem was related to the fact that it was, in general, difficult to find representatives of the higher levels of the State willing to participate as informants for the project. Due to the Swedish political structure, it was also difficult to find NGOs in Sweden, which focus on 'Muslim issues'.

A survey investigation by way of a questionnaire was designed and conducted among parts of the Muslim population in Gothenburg in order to assess if and to what

extent they experienced a change of attitudes towards Islam and Muslims after the terror attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001. About 400 questionnaires have been distributed in mosques and different cultural associations. The answers are being analysed at the time of writing. This survey investigation was carried out by the Swedish part only.

Round table conferences, based thematically on the outcome of the interviews, have been held with representatives of different authorities, administrations, Muslim minorities, NGOs, etc. Most participants were persons who had been interviewed before the conference.

Three round table meetings were organised in Sweden (two in Stockholm and one in Gothenburg), two in England and three in Germany.

At the EuroFor Annual Conference 2001, *Immigration and Refugee Protection Politics in Europe* held in Brussels 5-9 December 2001, the results from the three countries were debated and analysed comparatively, aiming at the development of methods and tools for preventing the exclusion of Muslim minorities.

At a final conference in Warwick, England, in March 2002, the results were summarised and recommendations based on the findings of the project were discussed.

Main results

All three countries have considerable Muslim minorities, and they all have unsolved issues concerning the relationship between the majority society and the relatively newcomer Muslim groups. The state and different majority institutions in all three countries are trying to advocate policies of integration and multiculturalism, but their laws and

policies, deeply rooted in a Western, Christian culture, are to a large extent not designed to cope with the presence of other cultural and religious traditions, with their, in certain respects profoundly different, life styles. Negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are widespread among many majority groups, and vice versa: many Muslims feel scepticism towards institutions of the majority society. Furthermore: there does not exist any clear consensus on how the goals of integration and multiculturalism, which are set up, should be analysed and defined. This is the case in the individual countries internally as well as between them.

From a historical point of view, the Muslim minority is the result of relatively recent immigration in all three countries. There are, however, differences in the history, size and origin of the Muslim minorities. A common feature is that after a period of an open door policy, due mainly to the need for cheap labour force, immigration laws have become more and more restrictive and finally were reduced to the acceptance of family reunification migrants and refugees only.

In Sweden, Muslims (at present roughly 350,000) arrived in the 1960s and 1970s as an immigrant labour force and their families, and from the mid-1980s mostly as political refugees. Many have become Swedish citizens. Today they constitute a very heterogeneous group – they have, for example, their roots in different countries (Iran, Bosnia Iraq, Turkey Lebanon, Somalia, Ethiopia etc.) talk different languages, belong to different ethnic and theological branches of Islam, not to forget the large group of secularised, non-practising Muslims.

Similarly, most of Germany's roughly three million Muslims have moved into the country during the last forty years. Most of them were recruited as cheap labour force from Turkey, a country Germany has had historical ties

with. They were considered as “guest workers”, since the DBR insisted that it is not a country of immigration, which also meant severe restrictions on obtaining West German citizenship. Today the Muslim population of Germany consist of roughly two thirds of people with Turkish background.

During the 1980s and 1990s, substantial group of Muslim refugees immigrated to West Germany. The structure of the Muslim population and communities in Germany is now representing a variety of institutionalised belief systems and organisations. Until the nineties, Muslims in Germany were seen as Turks, Algerians, Moroccans or Tunisians. Nationality was the self-evident way of identification, but later on the focus changed from the national background towards more cultural, religious or lifestyle-oriented definitions.

In the early 1960s the recruitment of foreign workers became a state monopoly regulated by the federal government. But policies towards the Muslim minority are complicated by the federal structure of the German political system.

In Britain, a high percentage of the Muslim minority (at present close to 2 millions) has its background in the countries of the Commonwealth, mainly Pakistan, India and the West Indies. This means that many of them had had contacts with Britain, the British way of life and the English language before arriving to Europe, as opposed to most of the Muslim immigrants in Sweden and Germany who often had very little, if any, previous knowledge about the culture and language of their country of immigration. The immigration to Britain from the Commonwealth was practically free until 1962 and immigrants were entitled to immediate naturalisation. This rule does no longer exist. Today almost 60 percent of the Muslim population is

British born, and therefore British citizens. It is also a very young population: almost 60 percent are under 25 years of age.

Another main question is that of the representation and the position of the Muslim communities and individuals within the social and political system of the country and what legal questions emerge in this context.

When discussing these issues, we have to keep in mind that there are historical differences between Great Britain, Germany and Sweden that should be considered before comparing the results. For example, unlike Sweden and the United Kingdom, Germany is a federative State, with relatively independent policies for issues investigated in this project. German history is deeply rooted in its experiences from the Second World War and its Nazi regime. Great Britain is clearly influenced by its colonial history and contacts with the Muslim world. Even though Germany has had some early contacts with the Ottoman Empire, these contacts were few, at least in comparison to Britain. Sweden has throughout her history been dominated by a strong political tradition promoting homogeneity and unity among the Swedes. Swedes had relatively few contacts with the Muslim world before the Second World War.

The German state and its institutions are clearly saturated by both Protestant *and* Catholic Christianity, whereas Great Britain and Sweden are dominated by one religious tradition each: the Anglican Church and the Lutheran Church of Sweden respectively. In Sweden, religion is considered to be a private matter to a higher extent than in Britain and Germany.

Since the mid-1970s, Sweden has a policy of integration based on the principles of "equality, freedom of choice and co-operation". There is, however, in practice hardly any ambition to adjust the realisation of these principles

to the specific needs of each immigrant group, emerging e.g. from their religion and cultural background. Swedish authorities, in a traditionally “paternalistic” manner, offer only the same general, uniform solutions to problems for all groups. There are, following this, no specific policies with regard to the Muslim minorities as such, either on national or on local level. The Swedish immigration policies are directed to immigrants in general, with no specific adaptations to, or recognition of, any special groups. There are no special bodies within the Swedish government and its institutions - health and social care, education, employment, housing, police, armed forces, criminal justice system etc. - addressing the specific needs of Muslims. The heterogeneity of the Muslim minority in Sweden is an extra challenge for the Swedish centralist political culture. In Germany, the Church is regarded as a kind of foundation of the modern constitutional state. State institutions are therefore considered as part of the Christian heritage. The state officially takes a “neutral” position towards religious issues, but the Catholic dioceses, Protestant churches and the Jewish community have a special status as “publicly recognised corporations”, and are in close co-operation with the state within the areas of education, health care and welfare institutions. The personnel at many schools, hospitals and other state funded institutions are appointed by the three recognised corporations, favouring their own members.

The Muslim community has in principle the possibility for organising different welfare activities under the laws of association, and has indeed established mosques and several Muslim organisations. But they cannot compete with the recognised corporations.

In Sweden, just like in Germany, the freedom of religion is guaranteed in the constitution. The law forbids dis-

crimination of religious and ethnic minorities. However, regarding various demands put forward by Muslim leaders for specific (legal, exemption, assistance, etc.) rights for Muslims as a group, the response from the Swedish authorities is that it is only individuals who can have rights in Sweden, not groups. They cannot have rights "as Muslims".

In Britain, the Race Relations Act deals with racial discrimination, but it does not cover religious discrimination. The first Race Relations Act in Britain was passed in 1965 and is now being extended to include some public bodies and government functions, which were so far not included in the scope of the Act.

Many Muslims feel that the criminal justice system is in some way discriminatory, either against Muslims specifically or members of ethnic minorities generally. Muslims are said to have a great respect for law and order as a reflection of the Islamic way of life; however, faith in the British criminal justice system is not high.

The problem of defining "religion" is one of the major dilemmas and has an impact on many aspects of the relationship between Muslims and their majority societies. Freedom of religion is guaranteed by the law (in the Swedish constitution only since 1951), but there seems to be little consensus between the authorities and Muslim groups as for what issues and practices are to be defined as religious. In Europe, the definition of religion is heavily coloured by a Christian notion.

Religion and religious practices are by the legislators seen as part of the private sphere whereas for a great part of the Muslim minority religion provides the guideline for their everyday conduct (food, clothing etc) and for their social relations. Muslims feel that their religious rights should be observed at schools, hospitals, work life etc., but

their demands are not always taken into serious consideration.

What should fall within the function- and competence areas of religion – and therefore under the freedom of religion act – is a subject of constant debate.

Among the questions of the investigation, the question concerning the attitude towards Islam and Muslims drew the greatest response – reflecting the centrality of this issue to Muslims. Representatives of Muslim organisations complain about ignorance among the majority institutions concerning Islam and Muslims and about attitudes of intolerance from the majority society.

Many Muslims experience in their daily lives religious prejudice, islamophobia, discrimination and even violence by non-Muslims, not only by the majority group but also by other minorities.

In Sweden, although many incidents of discriminatory actions towards Muslims have been reported, no perpetrator has yet been convicted in court. Many complaints about the discrepancy between the way in which the laws are written and the ways in which they are implemented are brought forth.

In Germany, muslimophobia has been increasing and intensified during the nineties, when the national/cultural definition of the immigrant groups changed towards a religious one.

The Muslim youth, especially in Britain, are becoming more aware of their rights compared with their migrant parents, who often tolerated racial disadvantage and religious discrimination as a price for settlement in the host country and in an increasing extent they claim the full rights as full citizens.

Muslims, and also others dealing with the issues of multiculturalism, often accuse the media for giving what

they consider biased, stereotyped and wrong pictures of Islam and Muslims. Family patterns, child rising and the situation of women are pointed out as areas where the lack of understanding and intolerance for alternatives are the most prominent. Our survey of the literature within media research indicates that the presentation of Islam and Muslims in the media is indeed often stereotyped, wrong and biased.

In general, the contact between Muslims and the authorities shows a tendency of improvement. In some cases, NGOs and other organisations are collaborating with Muslim institutions, supporting them in their encounters with majority institutions. But there are still some basic problems to solve.

- The fact that Muslims are not a homogenous group makes it difficult to find persons who could represent “the Muslims” in general in dialogues with the authorities. Muslims in Britain, Germany and to some extent in Sweden, in response to their religio-cultural needs, have established community facilities, particularly for worship and religious instruction. In order to organise these facilities, a large number of organisations and associations at local, regional and national levels have been formed. In Britain for instance it is now estimated that there are over 1200 local Muslim organisations and almost 1000 mosques. During the last decades there have emerged specific “Muslim questions” especially in connection with the building of mosques, the issue of circumcision, establishing Muslim private schools etc. In such cases, authorities often have been complaining that there are no Muslim leaders who could act as “centralised” counterparts, representing “the whole Muslim community” (“the Muslims”) *vis à vis* the authorities.

- Another, but closely related basic problem in this respect, reported most articulately from Sweden, is that, even if Muslims were able to produce such “centralised” representatives, they would not find any unified, “centralised” body of specialists within Swedish authorities specially designed to deal with “the Muslims” and their questions, to whom they could turn to with their problems. They would be in the same position *vis á vis* the complaining Swedish authorities as they claim to be *vis á vis* the Muslims. In sum, there seem to be no clear links between the heterogeneous Muslim groups on the one side, and the heterogeneous Swedish authorities on the other.

One reason is that in agreement with the (Swedish) state policies, authorities and institutions tend to conceive of immigrants in a “colour blind” way, i.e. independently of their ethnic, cultural and religious characteristics. They are, in general, dealing with them as “immigrants” or “refugees” only. When various demands are put forward by Muslim leaders for specific (legal, exemption, assistance, etc.) rights for Muslims as a group, the response from the authorities is that it is only individuals who can have rights in the country, not religious groups. The authorities do not admit the need for expertise in Islam and Muslim issues, since religious affiliation is not supposed to have an impact on their work.

To give voice to the Muslims on the national, European and international arenas, several co-ordinating organisations, such as the Islamic Council of Europe (ICE), have been created. Their role is to provide links between Muslim organisations in various European countries and to assist with the necessary support for their activities. ICE was very active in the 1970s and 1980s but more recently

its activities have diminished significantly, partly due to funding problems. The Union of Muslim Organisations in the United Kingdom and Eire (UMO) is one example of the number of national co-ordinating bodies now existing. Another newly formed national group, the Muslim Council of Britain (MBC) was launched in November 1997 claiming a membership of 300 Muslim organisations. Some of the other important organisations with religio-educational roles at national level include the United Kingdom Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation, the Muslim Education Trust, the National Muslim Education Council of the UK, and the Council of Mosques.

In Sweden Muslims have in similar manner founded several national and local organisations, such as Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige (FIFS), Islamiska Akademin, Islamiska Centerunionen, Islamiska Riksförbundet, Islamiska Samarbetsrådet, Svenska Muslimska Förbundet (SmuF), Sveriges Muslimska Råd, Sveriges Unga Muslimer, etc.

Specific issues

In all three countries there have been initiatives by Muslims to organise teaching for their children, beside or instead of the official school system. In Britain, the few Muslim schools that exist are considered to maintain high academic standards. In Sweden, the number of Muslim private schools has been rising in the last decades. Due to the educational system that guarantees state “school money” to all approved schools (even to private, non-municipal schools) per enrolled pupil, 80% of all government-supported Muslim private schools within the European Union are in Sweden. In Germany – where most state funded

schools are run by the Protestant and Catholic Churches, traditionally providing Christian upbringing to children – a large number of independent, mosque-related Qur'an schools have been established to give religious education to (mostly) Turkish children. These Qur'an schools have for various reasons been controversial and raised debates among Germans as well as different Turkish groups.

The investigation has revealed several problems for Muslims in the educational systems of their host countries.

The first and most important question to solve is the status of Islam in the curriculum, or more specifically, the religious education of Muslim children.

At Swedish schools, Islam, as well as other religions, is part of the curriculum of religious studies, but no “confessional education” is given to the pupils. Islamic religious instruction has to be solved within frames outside the “regular” schools, on the initiative of Muslim communities.

Also in Germany one of the main problem seems to be how to provide Islamic religious education to schoolchildren. The majority of Muslims are from Turkey; therefore religious studies were initially connected to complementary mother-tongue teaching, usually carried out by teachers invited from Turkey. Besides, a great number of independent Qur'an schools emerged. When these for different political reasons became controversial, the states have tried various methods to incorporate Islamic religious instruction into the regular curriculum. All Muslim groups are, however, not in support of these methods.

A major issue in connection with religious instruction (and with relevance for many other topics in the present investigation) is the possibility for and organisation of the education of imams within the system of higher education.

Imams “imported” from Muslim countries, however well merited, are as a rule not familiar with the life, language and culture Muslim families and young Muslims in Western countries are living in. This, in many cases, makes them unsuitable to help the members of their congregation in their attempts to develop an Islamic way of life that can be integrated in a functional way in a European society. On the other hand, many Muslims – especially from the older generation – are sceptical to the idea of imams trained in a predominantly Christian country as well as of ideas of developing a “European Islam”.

Another issue is the stereotyping of Muslims within schools. In Sweden, although the curriculums as well as textbooks have been improving as for the presentation of Islam and Muslim countries and cultures, Muslims are still complaining on the way Islam and Muslims are portrayed in schools and their textbooks.

An additional problem is the low achievement of Muslim children at school. The educational achievement levels of Muslim children – in Britain the Pakistani and Bangladeshi boys in particular – are generally lower than the average. In Sweden, a high percentage of Muslims live in socially disadvantaged areas, their children attend schools struggling with a series of social, financial and other problems. At least partly due to this situation, Muslim children have school results below the average also in Sweden. The education system is seen as failing Muslim pupils.

Although some problems have been recognised, and some improvements have been made, Muslims are still complaining of certain aspects of social and health care institutions as regards food, place and time for prayer, observing dress-code rules, gender rules, etc. The services on offer in these respects often fail to fully meet the needs of Muslim users. But there is a tendency of improvement.

One reason for this might be the increasing representation of Muslims as staff in this field.

The care of elderly Muslims is an unsolved problem. There is a need for homes and institutions for the ageing Muslim population.

Muslim inmates in Britain are reported to lack facilities for the practice of religion, in spite of the high (and increasing) number of Muslims in British prisons.

A majority of the respondents felt that housing was an area of serious concern for Muslims. Housing segregation for some groups is a fact of life, and is not always a result of their own choice. In Sweden, a high percentage of the Muslims – like many other immigrants – live in and around the major cities: Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, in highly segregated suburban housing-project areas. Muslims in Britain also complain about bad housing and poor living conditions on council estates where overcrowding and ghettoisation is quite usual.

Discrimination and exclusion of Muslims at the labour market seem to be a fact. Muslims have higher unemployment rate than other immigrants of comparable education and work experience. For example in Britain the unemployment rate for 16-24 year old Pakistanis was almost 36 percent, for Bangladeshis 26 percent while for young people of the majority group it was only 14.6 percent. In Sweden, visible signs of religion/Islam, mainly clothing, (turban, shawl), especially in combination with dark skin colour, seem to be clear obstacles for getting a job. The Muslims in Sweden, depending on their origin, have 4 to 10 times higher unemployment rates than non-immigrated Swedes.

Research also shows that even in well-respected professions such as medicine, engineering and teaching, Muslims and other ethnic minorities are facing disadvantage

and discrimination thus affecting their proper integration in employment and thereby in society at large. This is a particularly serious issue: if Muslims are disadvantaged in the workplace, they are disadvantaged both economically and socially in societies that define status largely by reference to employment.

Problems connected with religious practices – clothing, religious holidays, *halal* food, and breaks for praying – have been reported from work places. There are examples of both improvement and of plain racism in these matters. Muslims in general seem to be underrepresented in majority institutions: political parties, central and local government, police, armed forces, trade unions, etc.

Political participation is a good measure of the integration. The investigation in Britain showed that Muslims lacked a sufficient voice in the political process, both in terms of the impact of Muslims on the national policies, and in terms of the relationship between the Muslim communities and the country they are living in: Groups without a political voice are out of the mainstream of national life. Similar tendencies are found in Sweden.

Most British Muslims have a right to vote and stand for elections. The concentration of Muslims in certain areas, in combination with the British voting system, means that in statistical terms they are in a position to influence the political and electoral process in the areas of their settlement. Their participation in the electoral process has increased in the last 20 years but their representation has made slow progress. There are only two MPs out of 659 in the House of Commons and 4 members of Muslim origin in the House of Lords. There is one Muslim MEP (Member of European Parliament) from Britain. The problem appears to be that parties did not put forward Muslims for safe seats.

Local government is an area where Muslims are better represented though there is a shortage of Muslims chairing “key committees at local authority level”.

In Sweden the low and decreasing participation rate of immigrants in elections is a problem. Immigrants, even without Swedish citizenship, have the right to vote in local elections. There have been initiatives at different municipalities to persuade immigrants to vote, but the results are not satisfactory. Due to the voting system in Sweden, immigrants/Muslims, in contrast to Britain, cannot even make a political impact in areas where they are in a majority. The Muslim representation in national and local governments in Sweden and Germany are as poor as in Britain.

It was generally felt that Muslims were under-represented in the armed forces. In Britain, besides political considerations, racist culture within the forces and the lack of facilities for practice of religion keep Muslims from joining the armed forces.

There is no specific program in Sweden to raise the very low participation of Muslims in the police (or, for that matter, in the armed forces). Recruiting Muslims in the police would have several advantages. The risk of Muslims being treated with bias by the police is not negligible and Muslims have brought claims to that effect forward.

In Britain the majority of respondents felt that the relationship between the police and Muslims was problematic and that there had been a breakdown in trust between Muslims and the police, due largely to racist practices by the police both in policing and recruitment. However, it was felt by some that useful work had been done through dialogue between the police and Muslim community organisations.

Problems in connection with Muslim religious practices – clothing, religious holidays, *halal* food, and breaks for praying – are reported from several areas. There are examples of both improvement and of plain racism in these matters. The difficulties are partly attitudinal, partly practical. A substantial part of the non-Muslim population disapproves of the presence of religious symbols “intruding” into various arenas of everyday life: mosques and minarets in the city, girls and women wearing shawls and traditional clothing at schools, work places as well as in the streets, school children refusing to take part in gymnastics and music lessons etc.

The questions of (especially female) circumcision and honour crimes have for example been debated fervently in the Swedish media for several years, not rarely with anti-Islamic overtones. The traditions in question, (besides not being Islamic) are not compatible with the Swedish law or public opinion. Female circumcision is illegal in Sweden, but the practice is still going on. The circumcision of boys is allowed, but has to follow certain rules – not accepted by all Muslim groups.

Seen from the Muslim side, most of these problems appear to be mainly of practical nature: Muslims at the work place and at different institutions (hospitals, prisons) have not always access to *halal* food, places and breaks for prayer, work-free days for religious holidays. In Sweden, there are far too few mosques and imams and cemeteries.

Besides the religious practices, certain phenomena pertaining to what is generally understood as a “Muslim life style” is often meet with disapproval by the majority society. These questions are almost always about the situation of women within the family. There are debates about husbands keeping their wives locked up in their homes, forced marriages of girls (many under age), girls who must

wear *hijab* in school and are not allowed to participate in school excursions, teenage girls who are forbidden to join their classmates in activities and entertainment's. Muslims, on the other hand, complain about the lack of religious freedom and what they see as the "immoral" life style of the Western youth. These conflicts are not only between Muslims and the majority society but also between different groups and generations of Muslims.

Some of these questions, at least in Sweden, have become a major dilemma for the authorities and for the legislation. On the one hand, the official policy wants to support multiculturalism, on the other hand, the law has to provide protection for children, Muslim or not, against e.g. forced marriages, forced interruption of studies etc.

There are, however, tendencies pointing towards the development of a life style that combines the "Muslim" and the "Western" way of life, tendencies towards a "Swedish Islam", an Islam (more) compatible with Sweden and the Swedes. Similar developments are seen in Britain and Germany.

Problems and glaring gaps

Under this heading we summarise some of the most important problems and perceived gaps between needs and reality in policy and practice concerning the situation of Muslim minorities in Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom.

According to our results, Muslims in the three countries have to cope, albeit on different level and in different ways, with problems due to

- the often lenient way laws and regulations against religious discrimination and harassment are implemented; in specific cases there is a demand for sharpening the laws and to explicitly make religious discrimination illegal (concerns mainly the United Kingdom)
- ignorance and prejudice in Western societies about Islam and Muslims and vice versa, often stirred up by the media on both sides
- lack of consensus about how religion and religious freedom is to be defined, and, as a consequence, lack of sensitivity among the majority for Muslim needs in what they regard as religious issues and practices
- the lack of understanding in the majority society for the fact that some people take their religion seriously and want to live according to their religion, not only in the privacy of their homes but they as a total way of life (concerns mainly Sweden)
- the lack of prerequisites for the long-term presence and development of Islam in the Western countries: research and education about Islam, education of imams, building of mosques and establishing other social institutions, etc.
- the low number of Muslims in front line services such as politics, civil service, police, prison service, armed forces, etc.
- the lack of qualified leadership in the Muslim communities in general and low grade of political and organisational awareness amongst Muslims.

Comparative Results

Islam and Muslims are now permanent parts of a multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-faith Europe. None of the

three countries of the project can claim, however, that Muslims are an integrated part of their society. In what ways and to what extent they are (or rather: are not) integrated differs somewhat in the three countries.

Sweden, compared to Germany and the UK, is an officially highly secularised country: religion is in most cases not considered as a relevant factor for policy making. Accordingly, Muslims are not, as a rule, singled out as a particular group among immigrants, since religious affiliation is not considered to be a significant issue. The main characteristics of the Swedish state policies towards Muslim minorities are, therefore, what can be called a “non-policy”, i.e. there is no part of the Swedish immigration policies that target the Muslim group and their situation and problems specifically. Furthermore: the Swedish immigration policies and legislation, as the religious liberty legislation, concerns the relationship between the state and the individual only. Cultural, ethnic or religious groups have no rights *qua* groups in any Swedish legislation.

In Germany there is the close relationship between state agencies and (Christian) Churches. The Muslim associations therefore feel rather lonely and in a defensive situation towards state institutions on the local, regional and national level. The political demands Muslims and non-government institutions have formulated over the last decades with regard to a so-called new European Islam are hardly ever discussed on the level of experts in administrative agencies.

In Britain, religious organisations play an important role in civil society and provide substantial support for their members. There are multi-faith organisations set up by the government such as the Inner Cities Religious Council and guidance on involving them in regeneration programmes has been issued. But except for the Anglican

Church, all churches and religions are excluded from both legal and symbolic connections between Church and state. In particular, the Act of Settlement 1701, the Marriage Acts 1949-96 and the Prison Act 1952 are widely felt to privilege Anglicans in England over other denominations and faiths. Also there are customs related to civic religion such as daily prayers at Westminster and various religious ceremonies, for example, Memorial events, the law of blasphemy and the Coronation oath exclude other religious groups.

Religious freedom is recognised in all three countries. Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam provides a legal basis for the European Union to take action against discrimination on religion or belief in addition to racial or ethnic origin. In Britain there is also recognition of this in the Human Rights Act (1998), the Scotland Act (1998) and the Greater London Authority Act (1999). However, very few participants were aware of these developments.

Legislation in Britain against racial discrimination has been in operation since 1965. The Race Relations Act 1976 does not fully protect Muslims because religious discrimination, in spite of Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, is still not unlawful in Britain. Muslims feel that they need to be protected by law as Sikhs and Jews are protected from religious discrimination as a result of case law.

In Sweden there are several laws covering various forms of discrimination – for example, discrimination due to gender, disability, sexual preference, ethnicity and race – in the work life as well as in other areas of society. The government has recently appointed a commission to investigate whether the various laws covering discrimination on different grounds and in different areas of society can be united into one single and comprehensive legislation and, in that case, to what extent the grounds for discrimina-

tion covered by the law should be extended to explicitly include for example religion or conviction, disability and age.

Comprehensive and effective legislation is, however, at best a necessary condition for a successful prevention of discrimination. Equally important is the existence of necessary authorities that effectively see to it that the legislation is effectively applied and implemented.

Given that there seems to be rather widespread racial and religious discrimination against Muslims (as well as other ethnic minorities) in all three countries, especially in the areas of employment and housing, the legislation and/or its implementation seems to be insufficient and in need of improvement.

In Sweden and Germany neither state institutions nor Muslim groups have succeeded in appointing officials who could act as communicative links between the two parties. In Sweden, the heterogeneity of Muslims on the one hand and the reluctance of the state to deal with questions raised by Muslims e.g. about food, education, clothing etc. as *religious* issues are perhaps the most apparent obstacles for a dialogue.

In Germany, the relation between state agencies and churches is used as the basis of interpreting the needs of Muslim associations and institutions.

The opportunities for contact between Muslims and state institutions are diminished by the fact that there is a serious under-representation of Muslims in the national and local level decision making process and in key agencies such as government, the civil service, public appointments, the media, the police and the judiciary, the health service, education service etc.

Hostility towards Islam and Muslims and intolerance towards Muslim symbols occur in all the three countries.

The media is especially accused of partiality against Muslims.

In Sweden, there are signs for a beginning of the recognition of specific Muslim religious needs in public institutions. Most schools, work places, hospitals prisons are trying to ensure that Muslims have access to *halal* food, possibilities for prayer and for wearing traditional clothing. Clothing is perhaps the most controversial issue.

In Germany the recognition of Muslim symbols in everyday life is one of the central areas of conflicts.

In Britain, research has shown that there is general hostility towards Islam and Muslims by services, in the media and by the general public. Racism and religious discrimination against Muslims, in the workplace, in schools, on council estates is widespread. The public services have in the main failed to meet the specific needs of Muslims in terms of prayer facilities, *halal* food, religious holidays and so on.

In particular, since the terror attack on the 11th September 2001, the hostility and assaults against Muslims, both verbal and physical have increased. There have been numerous press reports about violent assaults and attacks on individuals and property such as mosques. Generally, there seem to be an increase in islamophobia.

With the significant demographic change which has taken place within the Muslim communities in the three countries, namely a shift from first generation migrants towards second and third generation Swedish-, German-, British-born citizens the question of identity is now part of an on-going discussion within the Muslim communities. It is relevant to community facilities, and the responses of relevant authorities to the long-term needs of Muslims in the areas of their settlement.

In education, Muslim children in Britain are facing disadvantage in terms of poor educational achievements and lack of facilities for the teaching of their religion and culture in schools. Muslim parents are generally concerned that their children are not able to learn about their religion in formal educational institutions. Although, Muslim organisations provide such teaching facilities in mosques and community centres these activities are not enough.

In Sweden, many basic prerequisites for the long-term survival of Islam are still lacking. For example, no imams are being trained in the country, very few proper mosques have been built. The Islamic and Muslim institutional “infrastructure” is in general fairly weak.

The situation is similar in Germany. Not many Muslim institutions have developed and the education of Muslims is a much-debated problem.

Note

- ¹ The Swedish part of the project was carried out at the University of Göteborg, *Centre for the Study of Cultural Contacts and International Migration (KIM)*/Department of Work Science, the UK part at the University of Warwick, *Centre for Research of Ethnic Relations*, and the German part at the *Berliner Institute für Vergleichende Sozialforschung*.

JOCHEN BLASCHKE

Tolerated but Marginalised – Muslims in Germany¹

Introduction

During the last 30 years or so, Islam has been established in Europe as a new religion. Muslims from all over the world are now living in the Federal Republic of Germany and have established their own world of beliefs. With them, religious infrastructure has been developed, such as mosque, madrassas, Koran schools, seminars, etc. with their functionaries and leaderships. Due to the German Constitution, the new religion has the same rights as other religions, but these are embedded in a state in which laicism does not mean a clear division between state and religion. Islam is confronted with a state in which its roots are deeply planted in more than a thousand years of nation-state building and through the ups and down of an ecclesiastic religious system.

This does not mean that there are no experiences with Muslims in Germany, but rather that these did not influ-

¹ Persons responsible for the single chapters of this study are: Jochen Blaschke (Introduction); William Hiscott (A Complicated History in Terms of Religion, Nation and State), Çiçek Bacik and William Hiscott (Islam and Muslims in Germany), Andrea Hötzel and Emma Shepherdson (New Features of Islam), Çiçek Bacik (Muslim Institutions in Germany), Guillermo Ruiz (Muslims in the Polity), Irina Meyer (Muslims in German Society), Amy Clarke (Xenophobia, Anti-Muslim and Islamophobia), Shannon Pfohman (Current Political Issues), Bastian Vollmer (Islam: An Immigrated Religion to Europe). Nathalia Delgado, Jan-Peter Lehnart and Caroline Thon aided in the production of this study.

ence the close relationship between state and religion. Therefore, it might be of interest to understand the development of relationship between the German state, which is defined as the body politics, i.e. the set of institutions, by which the society and economy of Germany is governed and presented in the international system of sovereign states.

The nation-state is a secularised political system by definition. Even countries such as Ireland, with its wide-ranging dependency on the Catholic Church, or Great Britain, with a Queen who is the head of the Anglican Church, the nation-state is in general well on its way towards secularism. The idea is that a people in a certain territory forms the nation; this is the population of political citizens, or 'Staatsbürger'. The nation-state is based on the utopia of a homogenised, 'national' cultural entity. Its political citizens are understood to be belonging to a family. This belief legitimises the fundamentals of the modern nation-state. Nevertheless, there are other legitimising patterns and functions of a modern nation-state such as, for example, the guarantee of social security, the function of freedom, which guarantees the physical security by the state's monopoly on the use of force, and the guarantee of the citizen's right to live in a democracy and under the rule of law. Furthermore, there is the function of territorial integration and security towards internal and external threats against the sovereignty of the state. The modern state is the political result of peace in external conflicts regarding power, influence, religion and about trade. Most importantly, the modern nation-state developed out of internal conflicts concerning religion and it still follows the political guidelines of an ecclesiastic order. The modern nation-state, therefore, is a state which was born of the politics of secularisation, of tolerance and respect towards religious

and cultural minorities – always in collaboration with the Christian churches.

The idea that one people or one nation have the right to their own state and that such a state should be a homogenised cultural entity is based on the idea of nationalism which is indeed the follow-up to the legitimisation of states by transcendental belief systems. Deep into the 19th and 20th century, the state was still related to a hierarchy of aristocrats and monarchs who argued that their political positions and functions were related to the mercy of God and to the double functions of the monarch as the head of an aristocratic family, on the one side, and as the transcendental-based incarnation of state power, on the other. This belief in the close relationship in the monarchy and God is contrary to the modern idea of nationality and democracy. Indeed, nationalism and democracy are the new orientations of political action. However, it has to be understood that this is still a long on-going fight with extended periods of accommodation and conflict.

Until today, the Christian churches and their clerical staff have been the basic actors in all formations of social communities in Europe, although the average person in Europe is born into a secular family, since only a minority of people has close relations to religious institutions, believes and personal. As passages of life are celebrated, however, the churches play their part in the ritualization of such. The churches are, so to speak, still the ritualising and symbolic marker of the changes in personal biographies. They are very much an integrated part of what is called identity formation (Erickson:1966). Furthermore, there are still many areas in Europe and Germany where the church plays an important institutional role in communal social, economic and political life. The church as a building represents not only the symbol of a community, but more so it

also plays a role in community festivals and celebrations, as well as in the social memory of the people. Religion and religious infrastructures are still important for most institutional completion processes of social communities, despite the fact that the number of believers has been reduced to a small part of the population. Religious activities are tolerated and are placed under the protection of the state; finally, they are not allowed to be overtly criticised. There is also the articulating activities of the clergy and theologians. In the western European tradition religion developed towards a system of abstract ideas, based on rationalist discourse. Indeed, rationalism was more important in various later medieval belief systems than the formation of ideas. Modern theology was a breakthrough, but only on the level of relations towards modern technology and natural sciences. It is important to take into consideration that theology was included into the network of the university rationalist infrastructure of discourse and analysis nearly 700 years ago. More so, the modern theology is a reflection of religious history. It is the rational idea of restructuring not only what one might call the transcendental history of religion, but also the imminent, historiographic history of religion. Theology is still part of the university system. It is an academic institution that went through a disciplinary evolution with identifying the modern arts and sciences and being disciplined by state intervention.

The large churches and the states in Europe were accommodated by both sides. The churches defended their place in society and the political system divided its principles from the church activities. Most important here is the development of the Catholic church as an international sovereign body. In Germany, this was even more intrinsic in helping the churches become part of the corporate state. Churches as public corporations are actors in the stately

framework. Since they are religious corporations, they are also secure against state intervention. But, they have still the power resources even though they have turned from being direct political interveners and political power players towards, for example, playing the 'monopoly in ethics' card. Churches play their power card through advice and by taking part in the parliamentary decision-making system. They also play their roles as contributing to the welfare system of the state by having their own kindergartens, hospitals, etc.

The churches defend their material interests, their beliefs and their idea of rational acknowledgement. Especially in Germany they have been and still are an important part of the polity. This is very similar to what the Muslims have experienced since the first Caliph. Their most important influence in society is their role in celebrating passages of life as well. Their activities in the villages and the urban quarters contribute to communal completeness. Backbones of their power are: the integration of their belief systems into the local traditions, the accommodation of the Muslim clergy with the state, their educational system and their role as an international corporate body.

However, there are differences especially in exile. Here, the Islamic belief system still plays a role for the Muslim population, but without the regional social consciousness. They contribute to the socialization of people and their life cycles as well as to the completeness of immigrant communities, but the religion is not 'at home'. The religious contribution is transferred from somewhere else. Religion still gives the people concerned the idea of being rooted in traditions, be they transcendental or not, but this idea is not very deeply rooted in the surrounding social structure.

The Muslim functionaries and clergy play their role in advice and decision-making. They even try to adapt their activities to the new social environment of immigrant communities. There are, though, wide-ranging differences to their positions in the countries from which they come. First of all, there is the problem of the clergy who were educated in traditional Muslim states in a very complicated system of acknowledged religious schools (madrassas); they have had various functions, from acting as a judge to being the prayer in the mosque. As in various Christian churches and sects, however, in Islam there is the idea that everybody is even before God which, as a result, makes the clergy not necessary for holding prayers and organising the mosques. In the beginning phases of 'European Islam', this was a central problem.

It has also been difficult to develop a discipline-oriented, academic discourse concerning what Islam is and can be in Europe. The situation in Germany has changed over the years due to the influence of the official religious administration in Turkey. With the various immigrations from other countries of the world, new functionaries had a reasonably acceptable academic education. But there are still gaps in recruiting religious leaders. More so, some of them were and are coming from backgrounds with extremist ideas of what Islam might be and of living in exile. Therefore, it will be of most interest to see how Islam in Germany will be represented. In the last years, more laicistic groups are fighting against religious functionaries for new positions.

On the other hand, the state is still very restrictive to the integration of Muslim functionaries and representatives as well as to the various religious institutions. In the following pages, this has been outlined. Furthermore, the relationships between state and Islam are described. New

spaces for new Muslim activities are needed by the Muslim population, for example, corporated status, the possibility of fulfilling the obligations in Islam, etc. The situation of Muslims in various institutions close to the government are presented. Here, in both areas the state and Islam are still beginning to develop a system of cooperation. There is still the dominance of the Christian churches in German society, which will be lost by lifting all the restrictions toward Muslims. There might be a constitutional change in future, possibly based on a further step in European integration so that the evenness of religions are constitutionally guaranteed, despite the Weimarian corporate traditions in Germany.

A Complicated History in Terms of Religion, Nation and State

A short introduction to German history and the central elements at hand – religion, nation and state – is not a simple undertaking. The historical developments in the hundreds of German political entities after the end of the Middle Ages cannot be seen any differently than as fragmentary and often antagonistic in comparison to one another. These developments were also laden with conflict – both political and religious. Often, such conflicts were resolved through military altercations. This is especially the case when looking at the history of religious conflicts in the German lands. From the beginning of the Christian reformation in 1517 to the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, and again during the Thirty Years War between 1618 and 1648, such religious conflicts between Catholicism and Protestantism were coupled with secular interests and concerned not only the

situation in the German lands, but also continental Europe as a whole.

In addition, the European expansion phases of the Ottoman Empire led to two sieges of Vienna, the first in 1529 and the second in 1683. These marked the zeniths of conflict between the Christian and Muslim political and cultural worlds of the late Middle Ages and early modern times. These waves of expansion led to a new formation of attitudes towards the Orient in general and, more specifically, towards the 'Turks' or Muslims.

After the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War, the period of open and bloody conflict regarding religious and secular control in the German-speaking lands of central Europe came to an end. Religious differences between Catholicism and Protestantism (later: Lutheran and Calvinist-Reform) were no longer central to the subsequent power struggles, although they clearly remained an important and latent element in German politics (Buschmann: 2001, 333-337). The individual churches continued to play an important political role, and their power in society remained fairly high (Wehler: 1996, 269), the change being that the Catholic and Protestant churches no longer openly attempted to destroy or fight one-another through political and worldly power. There were some attempts to decisively change the religious character through expulsion, but these remained local and isolated (Wehler: 1996, 270).

Especially after the rise of German nationalism in the early 18th century, the paradigm of power struggles shifted away from religious differences towards outright political and economic ones. This can be seen as starting with the developments in the German lands after the French Revolution in 1789 and the conquests of Napoleon, the "secularisation shock" in 1803/1815 (Wehler: 1996,

270), the struggles for democracy and unification between the July Revolution in France in 1830, as well as the Europe-wide uprisings in 1848, the Bismarckian unification of 'small' Germany in 1871 and the rising of the working class and its political structures.

Irregardless of the relative peace in inner-Christian concerns after the end of the Thirty Years War, antagonisms between the Christian majority and the Jewish minority – as the largest non-Christian minority in the German lands up until the Shoah and the subsequent influx of immigrants of the Muslim faith beginning in the 1950s – remained strong. The Jews experienced persecution throughout the Middle Ages and into modern times. This persecution was coupled with lower statuses regarding their rights and duties as subjects; they were barred from most professions and were generally excluded from mainstream society (Grab: 1991, 9-38). In this regard, the treatment of the Jewish minority in Germany and its precursor polities is important to note when looking at the modern religious Muslim minority and the current German policy towards Islam.

German Nationalism and Religion

With the uneasy religious and political peace in 1648, a period of particularisation and antagonism in the German lands began again, much the same as after the Religion Peace of Augsburg in 1555 (Wehler: 1996, 48-50). Officially, much of central Europe was unified under the Habsburg Monarchs as the Kaisers of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. This was a relict of the Middle Ages and, over a period of 150 years, it lost more and more of its political importance. Especially with the founding of the Kingdom of Prussia in 1701 and the subsequent wars

between Prussia and the Habsburg Monarchy, the last pretense of a unified central Europe under Roman Catholic predominance was greatly weakened. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, the rise of Napoleon and his enthronisation as a French Emperor and the secularisation shock, the last Habsburg Kaiser abdicated the crown in 1806. Thus ended the last of the long political struggles concerning the unity of worldly and religious power.

With the beginning of the enlightenment in Germany around 1750, the first major secularisation processes began to develop. These processes were first of intellectual nature, beginning with theological discussions between Lutheran orthodox and Calvinist theologians, liberal reformers such as the free-thinkers, and theological natural law theorists who adhered to the natural philosophy of Christian Wolff. On the one hand, the German enlightenment was rather state-friendly, and the influence of religion in political and moral affairs was greatly accepted by the enlightenment thinkers. On the other hand, though, the theological basis for Christianity was criticised, disregarded and deprecated (Wehler: 1996, 274). Immanuel Kant, the foremost enlightenment thinker in Germany, even provided the arguments for a critique of pure reason, that is against the objective proofs of the existence of God. After this long period of enlightenment anti-religious critique, many German intellectual circles separated themselves from inherent and strong religious belief.

Here, the Prussian state, for example, attempted to fight against the secularisation. The Religion Edict of 1788 attempted to bring an end to the secularisation debates through binding the churches more strictly onto the state and also through other hindrances such as extremely restrictive censorship. This form of state neo-dogmatism was reverted towards the end of the century, but retained cer-

tain elements and regained strength after the restoration of 1815. In this sense, the strong Protestant state church in Prussia after 1815 was a reaction against secularisation tendencies (Wehler: 1996, 276).

The year 1803 was an important date in the secularisation of the Germany, because in this year the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluß* (imperial delegation resolution) was passed. This decision secularised almost all of the church-controlled states and bishopric lands and changed the political structure in the Holy Roman Empire significantly. In addition, the church-controlled property was disposed by all states, Catholic as well as Protestant. Prussia followed suit in 1810 (Wehler: 1996, 365). This marked the end of the direct sovereign influence of the Christian confessions and the beginning of the creation of the policy that made church employees to be state employees. When looking at today, this also marked the beginning of the tax and funding connections between the German state and the religious bodies in Germany as well (Wehler: 1996, 366). In this sense, the secularisation also caused a more direct connection between church and state.

1806 marked not only the end of the Holy Roman Empire, but also the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon. The Napoleonic continental system was set in place with this defeat when looking at the German lands. They consisted of a new kingdom of Westphalia under Jerome Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother, a conglomeration of western and southern German states under the predominance of the Napoleonic Empire, a weakened and neutralised Prussia as well as a weakened Habsburg Monarchy, and diverse other smaller states with varying degrees of sovereignty and political alliance. This attempt on the part of Napoleon to unite central Europe (and in many regards, Europe as a whole) failed, though. In 1815 the Napoleonic system was

reversed by the restoration imposed through the Congress of Vienna.

During the years 1806 and 1815, the signs of German nationalism became clear. The rise of German nationalism developed as an attempt to unify the politically and religiously fragmented German lands and as a reaction against Napoleon. The religious fragmentation as a hindrance to political unification was questioned under the guise of national identity. One good example of this tendency was the short-lived, but influential *Deutsch-Christliche Tischgesellschaft* (German-Christian Dining Club), through which the German intellectual and political prominence gathered in Berlin in 1811 to discuss and promote the young nationalist movement. Its central motive was to reduce the political importance of the different Christian denominations and to strengthen the newly-formed ideology of one unified German nation under a comprehensive understanding of Christianity as a category that includes all Christian denominations.

This tendency, that is the removal of the political importance of the Christian denominations in favour of national Christian unity, had already been practised in Prussia in the 18th century, albeit with one major difference: Prussian unity was not intended to be based on national unity, but rather on a unified political state. Thus, the subjects of Prussia were – at least in the first instance – political, and not national subjects. They, themselves, were Roman Catholic and different variations of Protestant, Polish and German, and – after the Hardenberg Proclamation in 1812 – Jews were also granted almost all the rights that the other subjects of Prussia had.

The promotion of the concept of national unity by members of the Dining Club, such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Clemens Bretano and Ernst Moritz Arndt, was

clearly based on a conglomeration of German nationalism and Christian religion. Jews – as the only non-Christian religious minority present in the German lands during the 18th and 19th century – were not to belong to this unified German nation, as was clearly stated by the members, statutes and rituals of the Dining Club. This marks, therefore, not only the first major starting point of the rise of German nationalism, but also, at the same time, the first disqualification of a non-Christian religious minority under the nationalist movement (Brumlik: 2000).

As already stated, especially Prussia – as a state with different ‘ethnic’ and religious groups – practised a tradition of religious tolerance, beginning with the different Protestant groups in the 17th century. In the 18th century, with the conquest of Silesia, Frederick II extended this religious tolerance to the Catholic population. Jews were also increasingly tolerated in Prussian society, although a legal emancipation was first achieved in 1812.

After the restoration of 1815, the old feudal system of German states and principalities was established once again, albeit in an altered form. In the course of the next five and a half decades, until the unification of Germany in 1871, a process of gradual unification occurred. Different forms of confederations were developed and implemented. On the whole, though, the old political system regained its lost power. One of the changes that took place was an abandonment of the religious tolerance regarding Jews in many of the reestablished German states and principalities, mostly in those regions in which Napoleon himself had ordered religious emancipation. In other areas, the religious tolerance and emancipation remained in force. Prussia, for example, did not revert the Hardenberg emancipation.

In the years between 1815 and 1871 and beyond, the social relations in the German lands became more and more

secularised. This process began most definitely with the war against Napoleon (Echternkamp: 2001, 167). Denominational differences among Protestants were more and more of less importance, and even the differences in the so-called Roman Catholic 'universalism' and the Protestant 'nationalism' became more difficult to interpret as factors in everyday and political life. Nonetheless, differences remained between the confessional systems and outlooks of the members and political structures of the Christian churches.

Furthermore, Jews and the Jewish religion underwent layered processes of both secularisation and multifariousness. As early as the late 18th century, different areas of conflict arose inside the Jewish religion which led to a diversification within the religion itself. Throughout the 19th century, the different 'modern' forms of the Jewish religion were established: orthodox, conservative, reform and liberal. In addition, the notion of the secular Jew became more or less accepted within and outside of the Jewish religion, as well as Jews who entered into German-Christian society through (pro forma) baptism. This was, as the German-Jewish writer Heinrich Heine noted, the '*entre billet*' for Jews into German bourgeois society of the mid-19th century. In this sense, the minority, non-Christian religion in the German lands became more fragmentized, irregardless of the often brachial attempts on part of the German political structures to create a unified political structure for all of the Jews living in the German lands, as the example of Prussia clearly shows.

The tendency among the Prussian nomenclature was to form a unified Protestant church in order to better be able to control the activities and political structure of the church organisation. This was only partly successful, but the concept of the *Einheitskirche* (Unified Church) remained a goal

of the Prussian government. In the course of the next decades, this concept played a large role in religious policy, not only in Prussia, but also in Germany as well.

For the study at hand, the tendency of the German states towards attempting to unify and politically organise the different Protestant denominations and Jewish communities can be seen in the same tendency regarding the different Muslim currents. Whether this tendency can be as successful as the attempts of the Prussian state in the 19th century, remains to be seen.

From the 'Kulturkampf' to the End of the German Empire

In 1871 the 'small' German nation-state was formed. This nation-state excluded most prominently the Habsburg Monarchy and its German-speaking subjects and the vast number of German speaking people living outside the new political territory. The state was born out of the wars between Prussia and Habsburg and then finally Prussia (and its allies) and France. This process of unification was seen by the Roman Catholic infrastructure in the German lands as a Protestant project - especially during the war in 1866 against the Catholic Habsburg Monarchy leading up to the unification. A Prussian victory was quite simply interpreted as a victory for Protestantism. Nonetheless, the unification of Germany was not only supported by the Protestant majority, but also by wide numbers of the Catholic minority (Becker: 2001, 390-392).

The Protestant dominance in the German Empire - stemming from the population numbers in the bourgeoisie, as well as overall from the structural predominance of the Prussian state, as well as from the exclusion of the Catholic Vienna - should not be ignored, however. This dominance

led to the formation of a Catholic political party, the '*Zentrum*' (Centre), which institutionalised the Roman Catholic religion in 1870 within the political landscape of the German Empire. Although Catholic groups had already sat in the previous parliaments in the different German lands, the formation of the *Zentrum* was seen as necessary to combat the Protestant and Prussian domination in the new Empire. After the elections in 1871, the *Zentrum* was the second-largest party in parliament – and the party would remain strong until the end of the Empire and even until the end of the Weimar Republic.

This concentration of political power of a Christian denomination was seen as a problem by the Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. The so-called '*Kulturkampf*' (cultural war) grew out of Bismarck's presupposition that the Catholic group completely opposed the new Empire and its Protestant Kaiser. He was worried that the Catholic political power, as well as the Catholic population in the Empire, could side with the Catholic powers of Habsburg and France against the Empire. Also, the problems that were created by the fact that the Catholic structures were both responsible towards the German Empire and the Vatican played a major role in the *Kulturkampf* (Wehler: 1995, 893). Bismarck began to use the state's power in order to reduce the structural power of the Catholic Church: the Church's influence in schools and in cultural affairs (such as extending marriage licenses), the priests' ability to preach in a political manner, the banning of the Jesuits and the denial of all state money for Catholic organisations and institutions were all part of this state offensive against the Catholic Church. For a period of time, around one-quarter of all positions in Catholic churches and institutions were not filled due to these measures (Wehler: 1995, 894-896).

This period of repression against the Catholic Church lasted through the parliamentary elections in 1874. In these elections, though, the *Zentrum* nearly doubled its number of mandates, which led to the *de facto* end of the *Kulturkampf*, although the repression lasted until 1887, when the newly elected Pope, Leo XIII, and Bismarck agreed to end the conflicts. Here, it can be seen that the Catholic minority (which was, of course, a large minority) could force the Protestant-dominated state into lifting its sanctions and repressions, but only through a long defense, through foreign support by means of the Pope and through creating a strong political lobby in the state itself (Wehler: 1995, 898).

After the end of the *Kulturkampf*, the Prussian state was forced to arrange itself with the political Catholicism. This arrangement led to a strengthening of the Empire, especially since the political opposition in the Empire changed greatly towards the end of the century. For example, the *Zentrum* voted with the Bismarck forces in parliament to ban the Social Democratic party, starting in 1880, during the *Kulturkampf* itself. The rise of the social democrats and socialists led to a convergence of the Christian religious forces, especially since the secularisation (that is, the nationalisation and the militarisation) of the German population became more and more a factor in politics and in the social structure of the Empire in comparison to religion.

During the time up through the end of the Empire, the Jewish minority also experienced a change in political, social and cultural acceptance. Throughout the 19th century, the acceptance of Jews in German society experienced waves of more acceptance and waves of discrimination and repression. A wave of anti-Semitism began, for example, with the beginning of the German Empire - most clearly seen by the so-called '*Antisemitismus-Streit*' (anti-Semitism argument), led by the German-national historian

Heinrich von Treitschke in the 1870s. This general wave of anti-Semitism was countered by the growing acceptance of Jews in the bourgeoisie society towards the turn of the century; however, as is clearly documented in German history, relations in the German Empire regarding its largest non-Christian minority were not good – and only worsened after the rise and coming into power of the National Socialists in 1933.

In general, the price that emancipation brought for the Jews was very high. First and foremost, they felt great pressure throughout the 19th century to assimilate into German mainstream society. They were also forced to give up the pretense of collective rights for the autonomous Jewish communities that were in place up until the emancipation in the 19th century. The emancipation and the assimilationist tendencies in the 19th century brought about new forms of organisation of the Jewish communities. Some Jewish organisations, such as the *Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens* (Central Organisation German Citizens of the Jewish Faith), worked towards an integration of Jews into German society. Other organisations or movements worked towards the newly-formed Zionist principles.

Church and State in the Weimar Republic

With the end of the monarchy, the Protestant churches, which had been organised in so-called *Landeskirchen* (state-wide churches), regained their political and organisational independence from the political structures of the Empire. The end of this '*Summepiskopat*' brought about a change in the structural loyalty of the Protestant churches to the state: whereas the Catholic Church had its organisational

and political centre in Rome, the Protestant churches had been, but were no longer, firmly attached to the state. Some of the *Landeskirchen*, for example in Prussia, Bavaria and Baden, remained nonetheless, unified and in a predominant position. However, the power of the *Landeskirchen* as state churches was definitely broken through the end of the monarchy and transfer to a revolutionary government and afterwards as a republic with separation of church and state as a founding principle (Wehler: 1995, 436-439).

This change was just the beginning of the newly-developed separation of church and state in the Weimar Republic. Although the revolutionary government in 1918 placed itself firmly against the amalgamation of church and state, the societal forces did not allow this anti-church course to be established in the constitution of 1919. This constitution, however, designed by Hugo Preuß, did separate the churches and the state a great deal; more importantly, it established a common understanding of religion and state that used the term *Religionsgesellschaften* (religious corporations) partly in order to fully include the Christian denominations as well as the Jewish faith. Article 10 of the Weimar Constitution states that the government can determine through law the “rights and duties of the religious corporations”. Section III of the constitution outlines the relationship between religious corporations and state in more detail. Article 135 states: “All Reich inhabitants enjoy full freedom of liberty and conscience...”; article 136 guarantees the civil rights of all citizens, independent of their faith: “Civil and civic rights and obligations are neither conditioned nor limited by the exercise of freedom of religion. The exercise of civil or civic rights, the admittance to public offices are independent of religious confession.” Most importantly in regards to the Protestant state during the Empire, article 137 states: “there is no state church.”

Article 137, though, also outlines the compromise made between the anti-clerical forces and the churches (and their political counterparts): churches, that were already 'public corporations', remained so, although new church corporations were also possible. This incomplete separation of church and state, spelled out in article 138 as well, allowed for the continuing raising of taxes for the churches, and gave the churches a corporative status in German society. Thus, the churches remained an accepted part of the corporative state in Weimar. The Catholic party, the *Zentrum*, was also one of the major democratic parties in the Weimar system, and provided for a stabilising element in the otherwise turbulent political atmosphere of the 1920s in Germany.

The constitution provided complete emancipation in relation to the largest non-Christian religious minority in Weimar, the Jews. This emancipation led to a further establishment of Jews in the cultural and societal structures in Germany. Indeed, the Weimar Republic allowed for immense cultural developments in German-Jewish cultural fields; many of the great cultural, political, scientific and social actors during this time period in German history were Jewish, even though most of these were non-religious, cultural Jews (Grab: 1991, 36-38).

Religion and the Third Reich

In the beginning of the coming to power of the National Socialists in 1933, Hitler made an attempt to bring the Protestant church structure, a structure that historically played an important role in the German state, under his control. With the support of an avid group of so-called 'German Christians' - who purported an anti-Semitic and folkish

Christianity – and many Lutheran pastors and laymen as well as the small Methodist congregations, Hitler and his party attempted to take over the Protestant structure, first through democratic means inside of the structure of the provincial churches and afterwards through repression. They did succeed in uniting the different provincial churches under one church organisation, but did not necessarily succeed in bringing this organisation under his control. These attempts caused in many regards a sort of *Kulturkampf* which, as in the previous *Kulturkampf* in the 1870s, ended without a clear winner. The large number of supporters of Hitler in the Protestant church caused a split in the church, with some of those against Hitler forming the *Bekennende Kirche* (confessing church) (Wehler: 1995, 796-809). Among these was Dietrich Bonhoeffer, an oppositional leader who was executed in 1945. This church was formed around the principle that Christ alone led the way for Christians and the church, and not National Socialists or their ideals.

After 1935, the active measures to bring the Protestant church and its structures under the control of the National Socialists were brought to an end. This truce did not include those who were in active opposition to the politics of the Nazi state and by 1935, the power and influence of the Nazi state and party had grown so significantly that it was seen as no longer necessary on part of the National Socialist nomenclature to directly take over the church infrastructure. During the Second World War, the vast majority of Protestant churches rapidly placed themselves on the side of the German state and Hitler, and ignored the Holocaust (Wehler: 1995, 808-809).

When looking at the Roman Catholic church and infrastructure and the period of National Socialist rule in Germany, the situation is in many regards more complex than

the situation regarding the Protestant church. After the dissolution of the Catholic political parties and organisations in 1933 and the '*Reichskonkordat*' between the new German state and the Vatican, the organised resistance against the National Socialists by means of the Catholic Church and its infrastructure came nearly to an end. The Vatican's politics made the further development of low intensity conflicts against the local and regional Catholic structures and organisations possible, as can be seen, for example, in their youth and worker organisations or concerning their educational politics. Opposition to the National Socialists was difficult, and hundreds of priests and laypersons were persecuted throughout the Nazi Regime. In the end, though, much of the leadership of the Catholic church including first and foremost the two Popes during the Nazi regime and, especially after the beginning of the Second World War, the vast majority of Catholics went along and even supported the politics of the National Socialists as did the vast majority of Protestants (Wehler: 1995, 809-818).

A well-known and catastrophic chapter in German history is the persecution of the Jews as a religious minority, and according to the National Socialist construction, a 'racial' minority. The Jews were persecuted from the beginning of 1933 and were subsequently stripped of all their rights, property and privileges. With the onset of the Holocaust, an organised mass imprisonment and murdering of the Jews occurred. By the end of the Second World War, the German Nazi regime was responsible for murdering around six million Jews.

Looking at the history of West Germany after the end of the national socialist regime, it is important to first analyse the new beginnings of the relationship between religion and state in accordance with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. The *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) clearly states in paragraph four the “freedom of faith and of conscience” and that the “undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed”. In paragraph 9, the “freedom of association” is guaranteed as well, which allows for the association or forming of religious bodies.

These freedoms of conscience and of association outline the basic understanding of religion and state in German law. However, paragraph 140 of the Basic Law complicates this basic understanding somewhat. Paragraph 140 states that the “provisions of Articles 136, 137, 138, 139 and 141 of the German Constitution of August 1, 1919, are an integral part of this Basic Law.” In this sense, the same legal provisions in the Weimar Constitution, as discussed in the last section, were taken over by the German Basic law. Thus, there is no state church, but certain religious bodies can be accepted as “Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts” (public corporations) under German law.

These public corporations, when looking at religious bodies, are the large Christian churches (Protestant and Roman Catholic) and the central Jewish community organisations as well as other smaller Christian religious bodies. These public corporations enjoy a number of special rights, for example the right to levy taxes through the state tax offices, special tax privileges and other special corporative benefits, the right to take part in public life such as radio privileges and youth services (Rohe: 2001).

With the status of religious bodies as public corporations, it is clear that the Christian and Jewish religions have been incorporated into the state structures to an extent in which the separation between church and state is not completed. However, the public corporations do not have political functions, and especially since individuals received the right to leave their respective religious bodies, these have been relegated to voluntary associations that, although they have certain rights and privileges in accordance with the Basic Law, do not exercise direct power in the state or within its state structures. More importantly, the state is required to be neutral when dealing with religious matters. As is has been shown, though, the German state has never been a laical state, as we have in the idea of the Republic of France.

When looking at the relationship between religion and the German state and concentrating on the Muslim faith, it becomes clear relatively quickly that some discrepancies exist. The main discrepancy involves the fact that no Muslim denominations or organisations make up public corporations. Neither the Sunni nor die Shia Muslim organisations have been given this right, nor have the Alawi or Ahmadiyya organisations as well. In accordance with the right of self-definition when dealing with religion, the theological discussions concerning the different Muslim denominations are, for the German state, unimportant. This means also that the different Muslim denominations are themselves responsible to decide upon their own legal status, according to German constitutional law. The state cannot create Muslim religious bodies, nor can it work towards this goal with Muslim partners (Rohe: 2001).

Until now, the most attractive legal status for Muslim organisations has been the 'eingetragenen Verein' (registered association). This legal status, which is found in

German Civil Law (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), allows the Muslim associations to organise themselves into a legal non-profit body. This body can work according to the laws regulating registered associations, among which the special interests for religious and cultural groups can be structurally developed. Also, registered associations can take in donations, is free from taxes and can possess property. Especially when looking at mosques, Muslim cultural centres and other type of Muslim facilities, the status as a registered association is often used (Rohe: 2001).

Islam and Muslims in Germany

Muslims in German History until 1945

With the exception of the Muslims that came into contact with Europe in the Middle Ages, the first historically noted Muslims came to the German lands in the 18th century in connection with the first diplomatic, military and economic relations between Prussia and the Ottoman Empire. These Muslims were mainly part of the diplomatic corps and merchants. It would take around another 100 years, also in a period of expansion of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the German Empire, until more and more Muslims came to Berlin and other cities throughout the Empire. Growing military ties were the reasons for this.

The military was one area in which Muslims were present. As early as under Prussian King Frederick William I (from 1713 to 1740), twenty Muslim soldiers served in the Prussian military. In 1745, a unit of Muslims was established in the Prussian army under Frederick II, called the 'Muslim Riders' and consisting mainly of Bosniaks, Albanians and Tatars. In 1760, a so-called 'Bosniakcorps' was

established out of Muslim deserters from the Russian army, numbering 1,000 men. Among these men was an Imam Osman with the rank of Lieutenant. This regiment took part in a number of battles in the Seven Years War, and later in 1778 in the short War of Bavarian Succession. Other regiments were formed out of the Tatars from the newly-conquered region of West Prussia in the period leading up to the Napoleonic Wars. Muslim soldiers fought for Prussia against Napoleon as well (Abdullah: 1987, 18-23).

In 1798, a cemetery for Muslims was established in Berlin. This cemetery was the last resting place for the Muslims who died in Prussia, and in 1866 it was moved. This 'Turkish Cemetery' still exists today and is the background for the most impressive new mosque in Berlin. Towards the end of the 18th and throughout the 19th century, an interest was developed in Oriental studies in Germany. One of the most famous documents regarding this interest is Goethe's 'West-Östliche Divan'.

In 1898, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II declared his friendship to the Muslim population. This friendship was, as was most of the history of Muslims in Germany, based on military ties, in this sense with the Ottoman Empire. But in doing so, the Kaiser also declared his toleration of the Muslim religion (Abdullah: 1987, 27).

During World War I, around 15,000 Muslim prisoners of war were interned in Germany, mainly in Berlin. It was here that the first mosque in Germany was established in 1915, although it was removed fifteen years later. After the war and the end of the Ottoman Empire (the so-called Turkish trauma), a small number of Muslims remained in Berlin, even after the ties between the Weimar Republic and the newly-founded Turkish state cooled (Abdullah: 1987, 27).

In the 1920s, a small but active Muslim community existed in Berlin, mainly students and intellectuals. The 'El-Djamah ul-Islamye' (Islamic Community Berlin) was founded in 1922, for example (Abdullah: 1987, 29). In 1924, the first mosque outside of the mosque in the prisoner of war camp was built in Berlin. This mosque was built for the first organised Muslim community in Germany, established by the Indian Imam Maulana Sadr-ud-Din (Abdullah: 1987, 30). In 1927, the Central Institute Islam Archive in Germany was founded, which received legal status in 1942. Finally, in 1932, two further institutes were founded in Berlin: the German section of the Islamic World Congress and the Islam Colloquium, the first Muslim educational institution for children. During this period of time, around 3,000 Muslims lived in Germany, around 300 of whom were of German descent.

Nonetheless, as Hamideh Mohagheghi, Iranian lawyer and theologian, states:

A picture of Islam was formed [in Germany in the 1920s] that was based more on fairy tales and stories related to harems than on grounded knowledge of Islam (Mohagheghi: 1999, 42).

During the Third Reich, a few Muslims, mainly those who came from the British and French colonial regions, came to Germany and had positive opinions of the National Socialists. There were a number of organisations in Nazi Germany, for example, the Islamic Community in Berlin, the Sufi Organisation and the Ahmadiyya Mission. The last organisation was decidedly pro-Nazi Germany.

During the Second World War, a number of Muslims from southeastern and eastern Europe as well as from central Asia served in the German military and the SS.

German orientalists developed curricula for the education of Imams and other Muslim functionaries (Abdullah: 1987, 56). The Central Institute Islam Archive in Germany was also used for propaganda reasons from the National Socialists. As with other population groups and organisations in Germany, the Muslims and members of this organisation had a wide spectrum of opinions toward the Nazis (Faruk: s.a., 7).

Nonetheless, Muslims in Germany were observed by the Nazis and in some regions, such as the Muslim areas in Bosnia, they were persecuted. The so-called 'White Gypsies' in Bosnia were in part imprisoned and murdered (Faruk: s.a., 8). Regarding the persecution of Muslim Roma, it is unclear how many were imprisoned and murdered; however, it is obvious that Muslim Roma were under the Roma in general who were persecuted by the Nazis.

In principle, though, Muslims did not play a large role in Germany until the end of the 1950s. At the end of the Second World War, there were only a few hundred Muslims living in Germany at all.

Believers and Non-Believers

As is in all modern religious formations, a differentiation must be made between the number of active members of religious congregations, believers in the religious interpretations of the world, users of religious institutions for celebrating passages of life, people inaugurated into a religion, and men and women counted to a certain religion, since such a belief system is part of the cultural formations in which they are understood to belong to. The number of Muslims living in the Federal Republic of Germany are currently estimated as between 2.8 and 3.2 million.

a) Number of Muslims in the FRG (1987 - Census)	
total:	1,650,952
Turkish citizens	1,324,875
German citizens	47,966
b) Number of Foreigners from Countries that have a Majority	
of Muslim Citizens (1999) [in Millions]	
total:	approx. 2.8
of these: Muslims	between 2.5 and 2.7
c) German Muslims (Converted)	
Estimates from the Zentrum für Türkeistudium	100.000
Total Number of Muslims in the FRG [in Millions]	
Estimates (from a, b, and c)	between 2.8 and 3.2

*Table 1: Estimate of the Number of Muslims in the FRG (2000)
Source: Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die große
Anfrage zum Islam in Deutschland vom 08.11.2000*

These numbers, though, do not reflect the actual number of believers. The number of them seems to be rather small, especially when activists are counted. Around 20,000 Muslims were mobilised regularly for demonstrations, such as the activities on Jerusalem day, Afghanistan day, etc. More people show their existence at celebrations of Islam festivals. These might be as many believers who have a connection to a Muslim institution such as a mosque or a madrasa.

Gerdien Jonker from the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies has determined that around ten percent of the Muslims in Germany are active in the religious community and another thirty percent hold themselves to the fasting regulations and the religious holidays. Jonker writes, "As with Christians, there are amongst the Muslims also cultural (secular) Muslims, traditional Muslims and those who search for an individual form of religion" (Jonker: 1999, 21). Even this data, however, seems to be underestimated. Nevertheless, it seems to be that most Muslims use religious environments in order to ritualise their passages of life, for example, in such customs as circumcision, marriage and death. And there seems to be a tendency that is obviously accelerating: using the Muslim tradition to restrict women to the internal world of family households.

The differentiation between active and latent Muslims seems to be even more important when we take into consideration that their majority arrived from Turkey, a place in which Islamic activism was not very attractive in the 1960s and 1970s. Such religious activism was even a hindrance in private and public life. Turkey has been slowly re-Islamised over the last decades (Bruinessen; Blaschke: 1995).

One should begin to differentiate between the believers and non-believers, when looking at the Muslim diaspora in Germany. If one takes Jonker's statement to be correct, then the number of latent Muslims in Germany is much higher than the number of religious Muslims. With these estimates at hand, it must also be clear that the number of Islamic fundamentalists or radical Islamists in Germany is rather small in comparison to the total number of persons who have immigrated from countries with majority Muslim populations.

Another important statistical element should be noted. The migration of persons from countries with majority Muslim populations (including second and third generations) to Germany is dominated by Turkish immigrants (almost 2 million), which is the most secularised national society of the Middle East. The rest of the population stems from a large number of states, as the following table shows.

nationality / origin	total
Albania	11,630
Turkey	1,912,169
Bosnia and Herzegowina	163,807
Iran, Islamic Rep.	88,711
Morocco	79,838
Afghanistan	69,016
Lebanon	47,827
Iraq	60,913 ¹⁾
Pakistan	34,937
Tunesia	24,243
Syria	25,982 ¹⁾
Algeria	17,308
Egypt	14,025 ¹⁾
Jordan	10,922 ¹⁾
Indonesia	11,207 ¹⁾
Eritrea	4,121 ¹⁾
Bangladesh	6,042 ¹⁾
Sudan	4,289 ¹⁾
Libyan	2,791 ¹⁾
Yemen	1,751 ¹⁾
Saudi Arabia	773 ¹⁾
others ²⁾	1,080 ¹⁾
total ³⁾	2,449,486
...including the naturalized persons	3,130,415

1) at 12-31-2001

2) Bahrain, Brunei, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, U.A. Emirates

3) Data partly based on the stand of the residential population of 12-31-2001.

The number of Palestinians in Germany is estimated at about 100,000.

*Table 2: Foreign population from states with a majority of muslims
(at 12-31-2002)*

*Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; Institut für Entwicklungsforschung,
Wirtschafts- und Sozialplanung; own calculations*

The Muslims of Germany

Nearly 100,000 Germans have converted to the Islam especially due to the binational marriages (Zentrum für Türkeistudien: 1999, 113). They are often organised in Muslim associations established by German Muslims. One of these is the German Muslim-League (Deutsche Muslim-Liga, e.V.) It is one of the oldest Muslim organisations in Germany and was founded in 1952 in Hamburg. Since its establishment, the German Muslim League considers itself to be a bridge between Germany and the Islamic world and between Germans and the new Muslim immigrants. The German Muslim League is one of the founding members of Central Council of the Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime) which was established in 1994. Furthermore, the German Muslim League has committed itself to the inter-religious dialogue and represents primarily the interests of Muslims of German origin. It also accepts Muslim members who do not have German citizenship. However, only German citizens are able to assume higher functions within the German Muslim League. As most Muslims of other Muslim associations do not have the German citizenship, the German Muslim League helps them to solve their problems with the German authorities. This association feels itself responsible for providing contact persons for the German state and its administrative bodies as well as for other groups of society (Deutsche Muslim-Liga, e.V.: s.a., 1). It holds contact to different Islamic organisations and persons in order to cooperate with them in different ranges. Many members of the German League are also members of the Christian Islamic society ("Christlich-Islamische Gesellschaft e.V.") and of the 'World Congress for Religion' and Peace. Since 1987 German Muslim League is

the Islamic co-organisator of the Standing Conference of European Jews, Christians and Muslims (JCM).

The main religious activities of Muslims in Germany started in the 1960s, when Turkish guest workers and other immigrants from northern Africa moved to Germany. Due to Germany's demand for labourers in the years following the Second World War, migrants were recruited to help rebuild devastated post-war Germany. Recruitment agreements with Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), and Tunisia (1965) were made, accessing foreigners from these countries into Germany on a temporary basis, known as *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers). By the end of 2001, there were 7.3 million foreigners living in Germany, 8% of the total population. From this number, the largest religious minority made up of Muslims ensued. According to estimates of the Ministry of Interior, about 3.2 million persons of Muslim extraction were living in Germany by the end of 2000, most of whom originated from Turkey. 480,000 possessed German citizenship, yet only 12,000 Muslims were of German descent (*Berliner Zeitung*, 26 August 2003). German state policy towards Muslims has a general tendency to group Muslims as a unanimous and homogenous religious group, when they are in fact a collection of diverse communities with different goals. This social view is echoed in state policy towards Muslims in Germany, not always considering different needs of the various communities. Few articles and media releases distinguish between the differences in the Islamic community (unless it is in reference to the specific article topic) and they often use the terms 'Turkish' and 'Muslim' interchangeably. Both internal conflicts within the communities and ideological differences make cooperation in regard to Muslim issues within Germany difficult.

Many of the Muslims interviewed expressed problems for the entire Muslim community to work together as one group in all areas of Muslim life, as evidenced in attempts to carry out religious education, associations and institutions that should represent the entire Muslim community (further: interview with Ria Nolden, Interkulturellen Rates der Stadt Köln, 24 November 2002).

The Muslim community in Germany is divided mainly by language and, therefore, often by national origin, and also by religious order. For example, Turkish Sunnis and Arabic Sunnis both have their own mosques and cultural centres and they nearly never cooperate on joint issues together. Arabic Wahhabis, however, are an integrated part of the Wahhabi community in Germany, most of whom are Turkish members (interview with Ali Kilinc, DITIB, 8 May 2001).

The Muslim community in Germany today includes the majority Sunni Islam (which is divided between national groups); Wahhabism, Alawism, Iranian Shiism, Iraqi Shiism and a very small Ismaili community; Sufism; Ahmadiyya and various other small sub-groups. Although all these orders within Islam are based on the Koran, Sharia law, Sunnah and the Hadith, they have different interpretations and different cultural influences. The main ideological differences within the orders of Islam are, first, in regard to religious leadership – the difference between Shiites and Sunnis. Other differences, such as the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, are ethnic-based. Liberal Bosnian interpretations of Islam often lead to its rejection from the orthodox Muslim community in Germany. These represent the complex situations that are imported to Germany, causing division within the Muslim community.

These differences within the religion have often been the cause for wars and persecution, from which many believers have fled, including, for example, the Ahmadi

Muslims who fled persecution from the orthodox Pakistani Sunnis, or the Iranian Shia and Iraqi Sunnis, who both fled as war refugees during the Iran-Iraq War. The relationship between the Turkish Islamic community and that of the newer Islamic communities is often one of resentment. Many Muslims feel they are "living in the shadows of the Turkish community", unable to compete with the Turkish influence in Germany, where the Turkish community is overwhelmingly larger in number and also better established and acknowledged by the greater German society (Schmidt-Fink: 2001). Next to the influential and relatively well-established Turkish community, the minority Islamic groups feel disadvantaged and under-represented. Collective Islamic projects, such as the building of mosques and community centres in various German cities have encountered problems with the diversity of the Islamic religious sectors present in Germany. There are over 700 mosque communities registered with the Central Council of Muslims (Hammer: s.a.). In Berlin, talks were organised by Barbara John, the Foreign Representative for the Senate in Berlin, in 1996/1997 regarding the building of a common, 'open' mosque for all Muslims, such as the one in Mannheim. The Mannheim 'open mosque', which has space for 2,500 believers, is seen as a model project for the cooperation of the diverse Muslim community and with the greater German community (Mannheim Tourismus: s.a.). Representatives from all Islamic communities and organisations were invited to form the basis of a cooperative advisory council, but the discussion was halted due to unresolved disagreements. As yet no such board has been developed (interview with Burhan Kesici, Islamic Federation in Berlin, 4 May 2001). In another interview it became clear that the same problem appeared in Cologne regarding the building of a central mosque.

New features of Islam

Suddenly, it seems that Islam is everywhere. It is at the centre of world politics and international discussion. Words such as 'Sharia', 'Jihad', and 'Ramadan' have become part of everyday language in the Western world. Until two decades ago, fairly little was known about the world's second largest religion due to a mixture of ignorance and indifference, but a flood of new research and interest in the area has begun to slowly change this image. Recognition of Islam as a world religion has finally reached an international level.

This resurgence and resulting recognition has been attributed to a few major international events revolving around the religion. The first of these events was the Iranian Revolution, highlighting to the international world that religion could be a powerful vehicle for change, and in this case, accenting fundamental elements of Islam that were in opposition to many of the contemporary 'Western' ideals. In the case of the Iranian revolution, it also showed the divisions that existed within the religion and influenced Shia and other minority Islamic movements. Since the revolution, the movements have influenced the international Islamic scene, appealing both to the Ummah and to individual Muslim identities and emotions in a time when these things are being threatened.

These international events and conflicts have led to a rise in the number of refugees entering Germany. These new migrants' relationship to Germany was totally different to that of the labour migrants, who at this time represented the dominant migrant group. Asylum seeking migrants almost exclusively represent first and sometimes second generation migrants, unlike the labour migrants who are often third and fourth generation migrants (UNHCR: 1998).

Among these new migrants were many Muslims, from the Balkan region, northern Africa and the Middle East, who brought with them their own brand of Islam, adding as well new cultural and ideological diversities to the already existing German Islamic community. Additional features, interpretations and conflicts have arisen as a result of this new migration; approximately one third of the Islamic community in Germany stems from origins other than Turkish. The new features of the changing nature of Islam in Germany and detail diversities incorporated within will be addressed in this section. It is important to discuss the minority groups within the Muslim community of Germany. Due to the overwhelming majority of Turks within the German Islamic community, the meaning in terminology of the words: 'Islam' and 'Turkish' have become intermingled. 'Islamic' organisations may hold their meetings and events in the Turkish language (interview with Ali Kilinc, DITIB, 8 May 2001), or only open their doors to a certain doctrine within Islam, thereby, excluding members of the greater Muslim community.

This is not to say that the already established and relatively well settled Turkish Muslim community is without division. The often considered 'unanimous' community is made up of a majority of Sunni Muslims, as well as Alawis, Sufis or Kurdish nationalist believers.

Sufism is the mystic or spiritual order of Islam. It is based on the Koran, Sunnah and Sharia law but is not easily defined as a religion or as a doctrine. Sufis believe in oneness and coexistence with God, possible by reaching a trance-like state of meditation. The Sufis are by no means a totally homogenous group, and vary between provinces as well as in their theological and cultural differences. There are various sheikhs for the varying branches of Sufism, both in the country of origin and in Germany. Mystic in-

terpretations of Islam are much more popular for conversions of the local populations in the West, especially in the USA.

Sufis are often persecuted by orthodox Muslims who believe their beliefs are un-Islamic and blasphemous, and many flee to countries, such as Germany, where they are free to practice their faith (Gülen: s.a.). There are, however, various directions of belief. Some are most esoteric, while others mix orientations with orthodoxy, and still others follow the Islamic laws more than other believers. The Naqshbandiyya, for example, is one of the most numerous and global Sufi orders, but also the most orthodox in its beliefs. The Naqshbandiyya seems to represent the most influential group of believers and functionaries in German Islam today.

Muslim Refugees from Turkey

The largest number of people seeking asylum in Germany are from Turkey, who are fleeing from persecution. The majority of whom are Kurds or Sufi Muslims, who are fleeing from religious persecution by orthodox Sunni Muslims, who are in disagreement with the views of the fleeing refugees', or as in the Kurdish case, the secular state policies have outlawed the use of the Kurdish language and suppressed Kurdish culture in the name of secular national unity.

The Turkish community in Germany is not unanimous and ideological differences within the community are known to cause tension between the majority Sunni population and the minorities, such as Alawis (an order of Shiite Islam), Sufis or Kurds. The Turkish communities in Germany have not been immune to the new phenomenon

of refugee migration. Refugees and political asylum seekers from Turkey often find their way to Germany.

When comparing the Alawis of today and those from twenty years ago, the difference is striking (Kehl-Bodrogi: 2002). Where there were almost no initiatives to formally organise Alawis earlier and identification with the religion was low, the Alawi groups now represent some of the most active Islamic groups in Germany. After the brutal attacks that began in 1978², ending with hundreds of Alawi deaths and followed by ensuing riots and prejudice targeted at Alawis in Turkey, the Alawis started to identify with their religion in the face of all this hostility. They began to form exclusive groups in 1979 in all the major cities in Germany. Despite their late start, there are now approximately 20,000 members in various Alawi Islamic groups across Germany, ranging in population from around 500,000 to 700,000. Many of the prejudices targeted at them accompanied them along to Germany, where they are present there today in the Turkish community as well. Alawis are thought to be immoral by many orthodox Muslims and hostility between the Alawis and Sunni Turks in Germany is still apparent (Shindeldecker: s.a.). About half of the world's Kurdish population lives in Turkey, in eleven provinces in the south-eastern part of the country. There are approximately 500,000 Kurds in Germany, stemming from Turkey as well as Iraq and other nations. Although the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, they are not often found in

² The Alawi minority was the victim of brutal, ethnically based attacks in 1978 (in Malatya and Kahramanmaras), 1979 (in Sivas), 1980 (in Corum) and the most bloody, in 1993 in Sivas again, where 37 people were killed. In 1995, there were riots and attacks on Alawis in Istanbul (Federation of the Alawi Community in Germany) www.alevi.com, accessed 26.03.2004.

the Turkish-majority mosques and are largely rejected by the greater Sunni population – not on religious grounds, but due to ethnic tension between the national groupings and the terrorism of the Kurdish Workers Party, the PKK, of which there are illegal German branches as well (Rel-News: s.a). A considerable minority of Kurds are Alawi Muslims and are members of Alawi communities in Germany. Overlapping between the two groups is common, especially considering the late organisation of the Alawi Muslims. Many Kurds have fled from Turkey as well as Iraq, Iran and numerous other countries due to persecution. There are some separate Kurdish mosques around Germany, two in the Berlin district of Kreuzberg alone.

The Afghan Diaspora in Germany

With the invasion of the soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979, the exodus of millions of Afghan men, women and children began. Due to continuous political unrest and civil war in Afghanistan, Afghans became the largest refugee group in the Middle and Near East in the following decades. Between the years 1979 and 1992, more than a fifth of Afghanistan's population – over six million people – were driven from the country in search of safety. The majority of Afghan refugees – approx. 2.5 to 3 million people – fled to eastern neighbouring-state Pakistan, and another 2 million turned to Iran. More than 2 million Afghans became internally displaced within Afghanistan after fleeing their homes. Others fled to Europe and to the USA, seeking asylum. According to UNHCR, the total number of asylum applications made by Afghans in European countries between 1989 and 1998 was 99,350. Of these, the total number

who were recognised as refugees under the 1951 Convention or granted humanitarian status was 39,436.

Germany and the Netherlands have received the largest number of applications in Europe. Well-established diplomatic German-Afghan relations date back to 1926, when Germany officially recognised Afghanistan as an independent sovereign state. The establishment of German schools in Kabul, along with the introduction of German as a language in which the lessons were conducted already started in 1924 by reformist King Amanullah in the Amani school. The educational exchange and cultural relations between Germany and Afghanistan intensified also in the university sector in the next decades. This included partnership-agreements, which recognised the scientific transfer between the University of Kabul and the two universities in Heidelberg and Cologne. Germany supported the establishment of technical schools in Kabul and trade schools in Khost, Kandahar and Kundus. The economic aid of the Federal Republic of Germany in Afghanistan began in the 1950s, but was relatively low compared to the engagement of the USSR and the USA. However, the various forms of institutional and personal exchange between the Federal Republic of Germany and Afghanistan played a significant role for the many refugees and labour migrants in influencing their decision to flee to Germany during the political unrest in their home country. Especially members of the intellectual elite, coming from Kabul and Kandahar, as well as businessmen, tended to choose Germany due to the traditionally well-established cultural and economic collaborative efforts that were already in existence. Additionally, a good chance existed for the Afghans to be granted asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany during the end of the 1970s. Compared to France or the UK, Germany was also considered an attractive place for Afghan refu-

gees as there were better possibilities for migrants as well as family members already living there.




Figure 1: Afghans in Germany
Source: Federal statistical office

As shown above in the diagram, the number of Afghans fleeing to Germany steadily increased, reaching its peak in 2001/2002. According to the latest statistical sources from 2002 and up-dated in January 2004, there were 69,016 Afghans living in Germany at this time. 60,616 of these Afghans were born abroad and 8,400 were born in Germany. The German Afghan Diaspora is the largest Afghan Diaspora in Europe. Since the fall of the Taliban and the re-democratisation process in Afghanistan, the refugee flow of Afghans coming to Germany broke off due to both improvements in the situation in the country as well as to more limited chances of receiving asylum in Germany during this time. Based on the information of the Federal Republic for the Recognition of Foreigners, the number of applications by Afghan refugees declined from 5,837 applications in 2001 to 2,772 applications in 2002. Due to the variations of transferred political loyalties, controversial issues, such as the radicalisation of organisations, in particular, the founding of new radical Islamic organisations,

mechanisms of exclusion along religious and ethnic lines, or an increasing importance of mosques with a special religious ethnic perspective reflected by an increasing draw have been heatedly discussed. According to opinions of the majority of Afghan representatives in Germany, tendencies of radicalisation are a single phenomena. Afghanistan is a country with a growing majority of Sunnite Muslims, with approximately 10 percent Shiites and very small and insignificant religious groups, ranging from Sikhs living in Kabul to the Indian Punjab and Hindus. Most of the remaining few Jews left Afghanistan in the last decade. Based on data from our Afghan interview partners, religion is not such an important issue; although most of the Afghans in exile are Muslims, many of them do not practice their confession. Fundamentalists are seen as a small minority in the communities.

Muslims from Pakistan

During the last two decades since the Iranian revolution, Pakistan has been directly affected by its Ummah politics and by new features of international Islam. Pakistan was founded as a religious nation state. Language, culture and a concept of a shared past were later brought into its nationalist discourse. Although Pakistan gained independence in the name of Islam, many tensions that have since arisen are due to different interpretations of the religion.

Mariam Abou Zahab discusses the rise of the Shia-Sunni conflict in her article, "The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan" (Zahab: 2002). In the earlier years after its foundation, relations among the various Muslim communities in Pakistan were 'normal' and Pakistan was thought to be a relatively liberal and open Muslim society.

It was not until the Iranian Revolution that tension between the Sunni majority and Shia minority began to flare. The Shia resistance movement began in the early 1980s, influenced not only by the Iranian Revolution, but also by the Iran-Iraq War, which was interpreted in Pakistan as a Shia-Sunni War. Due to the majority Sunni Population and the military regime of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan supported Iraq.

During this time, pan-Islamism was introduced into Shia mosques and Shia madrassas were built with Iranian funding. Shiism began to form a separate religious entity in Pakistan, which was supported by Iran. The international conflicts and movements in the international world were played out in Pakistan, a proxy war for the Middle East. Iran supported the Shia movement in Pakistan, while Wahhabi Saudi Arabia competed for influence over the Sunni majority and tried to mobilise Pakistani Sunnis against Iran. An effective tool was to induct anti-Shiism.

At the same time, the military regime of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq was in power from 1977 to 1988, enforcing a policy of 'Islamisation'. Though this policy was based on Sunni fundamentalism, it angered the newly formed Shia movement. The tensions between Shia and Sunni became politically indicative during this time (Zahab: 2002).

Pakistan's support of the fundamentalist regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan since 1994 can be explained based on two reasons: first, due to the geo-political proximity and, secondly, due to religious and ideological connections taught in the madrassas. The Taliban movement began out of a mix of socialisation in the refugee camps and through the teachings in the madrassas in Pakistan during the last twenty years or so. The madrassas were heavily funded by the Zakat (the payment of ritual alms) during Zia's regime.

Sometimes, the rise of militant religious conservatism in Pakistan is linked to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (Ganguly: 2002). Pakistan also feared a return of the friendly relationship between India and Afghanistan, which had been downgraded since the rise of the Taliban. Radical and terrorist religious ideals are not new to Pakistan. They have been one of the reasons of the Islamisation of the Kashmir conflict. Through the terrorism and ideological civil war in Kashmir, the concept of Jihad has been especially promulgated (Ganguly: 2002).

Despite the fact that the population of Pakistan is overwhelmingly Muslim, sectarian conflicts still arise. These have been aggravated by the international situation, as discussed above, and also by Zia's policy of 'Islamisation', which brought differences within the community to the surface.

The return of political openness and democracy came about with the death of Zia in 1988, yet ethnic and provincial tensions impeded national integration. The largest group affected by these growing tensions were the Ahmadiyya minority.

Indonesian Muslims

Indonesia has the world's largest Muslim population, consisting of over 80 percent of some 200 million people. They maintain a secular Islamic state, with a female president, and were until recently, a symbol of the successful development of a nation-state with a variety of cultural minorities. Ethnic tensions and separatist movements, suppressed under Suharto's regime, have come to the surface in recent years. Since the mid-1990s Indonesia has been racked with

ethno-religious conflicts and separatist movements such as those in Irian Jaya, East Timor, Aceh and Ambon.

Until the events of 1998, Indonesia stood out as one of the most successful nationalistic and linguistically plural nations of the world (Errington: 1999, 16). President Suharto received praise for the seemingly peaceful coexistence between Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists. In Indonesia there are five recognised religions and 669 recognised languages. The national language, Bahasa Indonesia, is a language created specifically for the purpose of uniting Indonesia, and is a dialect of Malay with some local dialects mixed in. While the majority of people can speak Bahasa Indonesia, it is spoken by relatively few people as the native language, as local dialects tend to be the primary language spoken.

The descent into bloody unrest has come about due to a combination of political uncertainty, economic recession in Southeast Asia, and also the growing international awareness of Islamic identity. Yatun Sastramidjaja discusses this change in the Indonesian image in "Indonesian Youth and Islamic Revival" (Sastramidjaja: 2002). In 1998, Suharto was ousted by student protests and, thus, the world saw a new revolutionary force in Indonesia. Since then this revolutionary feeling has turned into anti-American sentiments, and has been described as more like "fiery campaigners for a Jihad" (Sastramidjaja: 2002), than call for domestic change. The number of participants involved in protests in recent years has been much lower than that in 1998, but the impact on international and domestic politics and regarding the international image of Indonesia has been almost as great. This new Islamism in Indonesia has changed from the old image of an open, tolerant society, with youth who were "fostered by their role in upsetting an aged regime,

as progressive harbingers of change and modernity”, to a more fundamentalist image (Sastramidjaja: 2002).

Though the majority of Indonesians are not involved in fundamentalist activities, this smaller minority tends to attract more attention, especially from the international world. Dozens of Indonesian radicals joined Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and had training camps throughout Indonesian land. Frightening images broadcast to the world, depicting young fundamentalists in Indonesia transforming Osama Bin Laden into a cult hero.

Although just a minority group, it has managed to attract a broad revival of Islam in Indonesia, especially among the youth of Indonesia. Islam is being chosen by the youth as a solution to life in the modern world. It can be seen as a moral choice after witnessing so many years of corrupt rule, as a choice derived from the frustration aimed at the government, due to the constant depravity in their country and the international situation of Indonesia.

The majority of the Indonesian population in Germany consists of students and youth, the same groups most affected by the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia. Current information about the Indonesian population in Germany is difficult to obtain, but there have been no large extremist movements within it. The community consists of 11,207 people, however, it only has one official ‘Indonesian’ mosque, located in Tiergarten in Berlin. Many Indonesian Muslims visit non-national specific mosques.

Muslim Refugees from the Balkans

Not surprisingly, a resurgence of Islam has resulted since the end of communism in the Balkan region due to the loosening of religious freedom. The new ethnic and reli-

gious freedoms, suppressed in the name of Yugoslavian unity, were welcomed with euphoric energy. There were a great number of new places of worship and a revival in Islam. After being suppressed for so many years Islam also acquired a mystic and desirable element to it (Popovic: 1997).

With the new found freedoms and due to the fact that many young Muslims studying abroad in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Islamic nations, where they discover new ideas of the Ummah, increased religious fervour and the international resurgence of Islam have abounded. As these Muslim students learned about certain international events, they brought new features of Islam back to the Balkans (Popovic: 1997).

The unrest and wars have developed from the overlapping and conflicting ethnic and religious communities in five or six countries. Albanian nationalism, which broke out in the 1990s, often has strong ties to religion. It was this nationalism that flowed into Kosovo, resulting in the Kosovo War of 1999.

The Bosnian civil war marked the first major time that ethnic and religious tensions rose up in the Balkans. Croatian and Serbian populations were opposed to what they thought would become an Islamic nation in their midst (Popovic: 1997), which effected the way Bosniaks (the term used for a Bosnian Muslim) operated in society and, ultimately, resulted in thousands of Bosniak refugees, almost half of whom initially ended up in Germany.

The largest group of refugees arriving in Germany in the 1990s was made up of those fleeing from war in the Balkan region as Yugoslavia began to disintegrate. These refugees consisted of many persecuted Muslims, stemming from Albania (70% of the population was Muslim), Kosovo (90% of the population was Albanian), Macedonia

(approximately 30% were Muslim), and especially from Bosnia-Herzegovina (approximately 50% were Bosnian Muslim or Bosniak). The majority of the refugees that fled to Germany represented persecuted Muslims. The definite number of fleeing Muslims is difficult to obtain. It must be estimated from the country of origin and based on the national percentage of Muslims who has lived there.

There are also complications regarding the definition of Balkan Muslims as there are no specific numbers determining which of the Balkan refugees is Muslim, as many have been counted as Yugoslavian migrants. Furthermore, the area has changed so much in the last decade that it has effected refugee numbers and statistics.

Between 1992 and 1996, Germany granted refugee protection from war to around 320,000 to 350,000 Bosnians, nearly half of the total number of Bosnians seeking protection in Western Europe (World Refugee Survey 2003: Germany). At the time of the Dayton Peace Agreement, there were 360,000 Bosnian refugees living in Germany. Almost half have since been returned, while many are still planned to be returned, both voluntarily and forcibly.

The German policy towards war refugees in recent years has allowed a great number of asylum seekers to enter the country during the actual time of the crisis situation, but refugee repatriation begins almost directly after the conflict has subsided. This was the case following both Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, causing Germany to come under great criticism from the international community, as a result.

In 1997/1998, almost 60% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's housing was destroyed in the war. The political system was still new, however. Germany was criticised for deporting traumatised refugees back to Bosnia-Herzegovina and later to Kosovo. For many Bosnians the home they once

knew had disappeared, and many had suffered trauma and shock and had fear of return (Al-Ali, et al.: 2001).

Bosnian and Albanian Islam (practised by Kosovar Albanians) are seen as relatively liberal. The women generally do not wear hijab and there is much less separation between men and women within the religion. They are, therefore, rejected by many Muslims of other nationalities (Rel-News: s.a.).

There were about 160,000 Kosovars in Germany at the end of the war. Once again, Germany introduced a return benefit program and deported by force those who did not leave voluntarily.

The community today still lives a non-integrated existence. The lives of many Bosnian and Balkan refugees are still unsure, and the majority that live in Germany at the moment have only temporary refugee status. Many live in fear of deportation by the German government. As a result, the refugees do not have a well-established community in Germany (Bodiroga-Vukobrat: 1999). There are about 12 Bosnian mosques in cities around Germany, built by those Bosnian Muslims who migrated as labour migrants before the war as well as by the refugees.

There were 591,500 migrants from Yugoslavia in Germany in 2002, but only a small Muslim population existed within the community. There is one major Yugoslavian mosque in Germany, in Hamburg.

The Arabic Speaking Communities

A great number of nations from northern Africa and the Middle East are implied under the title of being Arabic. In 2002, the German Arabic population was approximately 290,000. Many Palestinian refugees enter Germany under

the 'stateless' title (17,203 for the entire German migrant community) or as official refugees from neighbouring nations, making the definite number of Palestinians in Germany difficult to collect. They may hold a passport or travel documents from another state such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt or even Israel and, therefore, be counted as a refugee from one of these nations instead.

Morocco	79,838
Lebanon	47,827
Iraq	60,913
Syria	25,982
Tunisia	24,243
Algeria	17,308
Egypt	14,025
Jordan	10,922
Sudan	4,289
Libya	2,791
Yemen	1,751
Saudi Arabia	773
Other (Qatar, Bahrain, U.A.E., Kuwait, Oman, Brunei)	1,080
Total	291,742

*Table 3: Migrants Originating from Arabic Countries in Germany
(31.12.2002)*

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland: 2003

Moroccan and Tunisian migrants are the most established of the Arabic community, as most came to Germany in combination with the recruitment for labour migrants between 1963 and 1965.

Beyond this specific group of labour migrants, many of the other Arab migrants in Germany arrived as refugees, asylum seekers or for various other political reasons (Schmidt-Fink: 2001). After the Arab Israeli War of 1948 and the Six Day War of 1967, many Palestinians (between 300,000 to 750,000) fled to neighbouring Arabic countries, many to Lebanon. When the civil war in Lebanon broke out (from 1976 to 1990), the Palestinian refugees were forced to flee further, mostly to European nations (Larzillère: 2003). In this time more than 50,000 Lebanese and 20,000 Palestinian asylum seekers arrived in Germany (Schmidt-Fink: 2001). In the 1990s, many more Palestinians refugees arrived due to the conflict between the Palestine and the State of Israel, and because of the occupation of Southern Lebanon by Israel. The United Palestinian Community of Berlin-Brandenburg claims that 60,000 Palestinians live in Germany today (Larzillère: 2003).

Algerians began to migrate to Germany in the 1960s during the War of Independence, many of whom returned to Algeria after independence. Since 1990, the critical political situation in Algeria has caused a new flood of refugees to flee to neighbouring Europe. The number of asylum seekers increased again from 1991 to 2001 and the number of Algerians almost doubled to 17,200, including a great increase of Algerians (7,386) residing in Germany in 1990 to 14,373 in 1992 (World Refugee Survey 2003: Germany).

In the 1990s, the number of Iraqi refugees steadily climbed. Most of the Iraqi asylum claims were recognised by the German government at this time. Many of Germany's 51,200 Iraqis came as refugees due to the dictatorship and political situation in Iraq, as persecuted minorities or as war refugees. Politically and economically motivated asylum has been sought by nationals from Sudan and Yemen in Germany since the outbreak of the civil wars in

both countries. Based on conflicts in Sudan in 1983, 4,697 Sudanese were located in Germany in 2001, and due to the conflict in Yemen in the mid-1990s, 1,586 Yemenis were residing in Germany in 2001. The percentage of Algerians recognised as refugees and given asylum in Germany is less than 0.5% recognition compared to 3% recognition for refugees in general (World Refugee Survey 2003: Germany) This is due to problems of Algerian fundamentalist groups and terrorism. These are the groups persecuted by the militant government and because of this, many Algerian political asylum claims are rejected. Algeria does not accept citizens who have had their asylum claim rejected in Europe.

The Arabic community has its own Arabic-language mosques in various German cities as well as various Islamic organisations. The Arabic community is an example of a language-based community rather than just a simple national group.

Muslim Institutions in Germany

More than three million Muslims moved to Germany during the last forty years. Before the start of the labour migration in the 1950s, only some hundred Muslims lived in Germany. This small group was composed of German and foreign Moslems. Only a few Mosques were established before the increase of the Muslim population. As noted earlier, a tradition of Islam studies existed before this time period.

The life in the Diaspora made the practice of Islam difficult because no religious infrastructure was available similar to that in the Islamic countries. At the beginning of the labour migration, Turkish guest workers wanted to earn

as much money as quickly as possible in order to return to their home country and to establish their own existence there. In the 1960s, they lived predominantly in special camps or dormitory accommodations. Some of them lived in shabby apartments, situated in the proximity of their work places. They practised their religion privately in their homes or they prepared rooms in these dwellings where they could have the opportunity to pray together. These kind of prayer centres might be called indoor mosques, used by family members, relatives and local networks. Initially, laymen able to recite the Koran and groups of Muslim students took over the articulation of religious guidance of the Turkish immigrants.

In this time, Germany represented a kind of bridgehead for the exile of Islamic radicals. From various new states - and from Turkey as well - members of persecuted religious organizations found a place of retreat in Germany and established religious community life. These groups recruited the first Muslim functionaries for the guest worker population. As a result, the Moslem population in Germany has been strongly affected by radical Muslim thinking. Muslim organisations from Egypt became active very early in Germany. A group of Algerian and Syrian Muslims created the Islamic Centre Aachen in 1964 as well.

While the Turkish population only numbered 27,500 persons in 1963. Compared to other nationalities, the numbers of Turks were less than those from Italy, Yugoslavia, Spain and Greece. By 1973, it represented the largest foreign group in Germany, with 615,837 persons (Abadan-Unat: 2002, 230).

The majority of Turkish guest workers noticed relatively quickly that it was very difficult to accumulate enough money for making investments in Turkey. At the same time, the bad economic situation in Turkey made a

return to Turkey even more difficult. Eventually, the Turkish population began to prepare themselves for a longer stay in Germany and brought their families to the host country. The increasing number of children and woman in the environment required a stronger institutionalisation concerning religion. They began to establish an organised Islam in Germany in order to fulfill their own religious needs and also to ensure the religious education of their children in the foreign environment. Therefore, several so-called 'backyard mosques' were established during this time. These activities were organised by mosque associations. With self-initiative, but without large material support, the believers - mainly workers - founded prayer centres throughout Germany in former factory buildings, office buildings and other places.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Islam in Germany evolved from the bottom up. Among the believers, some had already been members of religious organisations in Turkey. In their home country they had operated in associations and in Islamic political parties, some of which were illegal. The most important of these organisations were the brotherhoods of the Süleymancilar and the Nurchus which were forbidden in Turkey. These sects, of Nakshibandi background, attempted not only to educate Muslims and to radicalise their beliefs in Germany, but also aspired to reach the Muslims throughout all of Europe. In the first phase of the labour migration in the 1960s the Nurchus and the Süleymanlis assumed for the most part the religious care in Germany. The Nurchus had already sent representatives to Germany in the 1950s, whereas the Süleymanlis began their work later (Blaschke: 1985, 296). In this time some Islamic intellectuals also tried to form an unified community.

Furthermore, many of the believers were members of the Islamic party of Necmettin Erbakan, which had been repeatedly forbidden in Turkey only to reconstruct itself again under other names. Furthermore, the National Action Party led by Alpaslan Türkeş changed from its ideological assumptions of representing a Shamanist Turkish variation of Islam to a most radical and fundamentalist Sunni position, and influenced various Mosque associations.

All these organisations - including those which had been forbidden in Turkey - began establishing their institutions in Germany anew. The bases of these revitalisation processes were mosque associations which were the legal bodies representing the religious institutions. This principle of organisation was a compromise between the tradition of foundations being the form of local Muslim infrastructures, German legal frameworks, and interests of the religious factions and groups involved.

Only in the 1980s, as Turkey become aware of the danger of radical Islam's presence in Germany, did the Turkish State try to influence Muslim believers by establishing moderate Muslim institutions, one of which was the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği - DİTİB).

The history of Turkish Islam in Germany is divided into two phases. From the beginning of the 1970s to the mid-1980s, large conflicts regarding the establishment and organisation of mosques took place in Germany. Discussions among several communities as to which organisations they should belong permeated the air. Dramatic conflicts ensued regarding mosques as some groups changed its internal majorities, as there was a splitting of communities and even a recapturing of mosques that had fallen in the hands of other organisations (Schiffauer: 2000, 18).

Starting from the mid-1980s, the situation stabilised itself. From this point onwards, almost all mosques had been integrated into one organisation or the other.

As the different denominations of Islam are not recognised as public corporations in Germany, in contrast to the Christian Church and the Jewish organisations, Muslims could only benefit from the legal possibility provided by 'registered associations' (eingetragene Vereine - e.V.), in order to establish their prayer centres. The Muslims in Germany have not usually received any support for the building of mosques and cultural centres, neither from the German government nor from, for example, the Turkish government. Only in Berlin have some of the Muslim religious organisations benefited from state supports. But, after it came out that these cooperate with radical Islamic groups from their home countries, the government cancelled the aid payments.

The small number of German Muslims played important roles in the establishment of Islamic institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Often, they placed their infrastructure at the disposal of Turkish groups. The German Muslims are divided into different groupings. Turkish groups have hardly accepted their offers, but close connections between the Turkish articulation elite and German Muslims were the result of these encounters.

The immigrant environment in Germany has changed due to the family reunification process in the 1970s. In the beginning of the decade, the first Islamic associations which operated as so-called Cultural and Solidarity Associations (Kultur- und Solidaritätsvereine) were founded by the Turkish believers. Milli Görüs founded Islamic federations whose members began to organise demonstrations and larger meetings for Islamic festivities.

Conflict within Turkish Islam

Islam was the official religion of the Ottoman Empire, even though the empire consisted of many religious minorities. If one of the religious communities living in the Ottoman Empire strived for independence, they were brutally suppressed. Atatürk abolished the Sultanate in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924, whereas Islam was maintained as an official religion of Turkey. By establishing the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Atatürk put Islam under the control of the government. This Ministry was responsible for religious education in Turkey. But the highest interest of the Turkish state was the acceptance of the laic values introduced by Atatürk. Laicism became one of the columns of Atatürkism. The relations between religion and state were differently constructed in contrast with the German model: social religious activities were restricted, and the state controlled the religious and institutional infrastructure of Islam. Organizations that were not controllable were forbidden. Every religious tendency outside of the governed ones represented a danger for the Turkish government, such as the Muslim brotherhoods and the Sufi Orders. These were forbidden.

Up through 1946 only one party governed in Turkey. Starting from 1946, the Turkish government implemented the multi-party system. From this moment on, religious parties could be established. As early as the 1950s, Islam was the subject of socio-political propaganda in Turkey. Until the 1960s, they succeeded in setting the course for Islamic policy, thus playing a large role in the political scene of Turkey.

In the course of time, many Koran schools were established, first promoted by the Süleymancılık, and later by the Turkish government. Islam in Turkey was often used

as a weapon against the leftist movements, liberals, free masons and atheism. In some villages of western Turkey, it came to conflicts between the activists of the Koran school movement of the Süleymanlis and the teachers of the Kemalistic tradition. The government did not undertake anything against this incidents, because it indirectly supported the Islamic movement (Blaschke: 1985, 301).

In the 1970s and 1980s, many Nurcus and pupils of the Koran schools got together with the Islamic activists in order to broaden their anti-secularist activities. Universities were opened to graduates of the Koran schools, and the number of Koran schools increased. In fact, the increased number of these schools promoted the official influence of the Islamic cadres. But, at the same time, an Islamic intelligentsia was formed, which was against the secular policies of the government. As Islamic-oriented parties, such as the party of Necmettin Erbakan, were part of the Turkish government in the 1970s and 1980s, the political life in Turkey was more than ever split into a right-wing and left-wing political culture.

This Manichean duality between the right (as believers in Allah) and the left (as an anti-religious movement) was also seen in the Turkish immigrants in Germany. Islamic groups held all secular organisations to be communistic, and they tried to distance themselves from them. Non-Muslim groups regarded Muslims as fanatics and fascists. The military coups in Turkey caused the emigration from the radical left, right and Islamic movements from Turkey. The military intervention of 12 March 1972 wanted to eliminate the left-wing intellectuals and the Kurdish nationalists. Thereupon, many looked for refuge in Germany, but only few requested asylum status. The military coup of 12 September 1980 was very violent and brought long lasting measures. Many leftist and Kurdish nationalist groupings

fled to Germany after this coup as well. Also, radical Islamists and groups of the extreme right left the country and influenced Islamic life in Germany.

The 'Milli Görüs'

Milli Görüs as a religious movement has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt. Most functionaries have connections to the Naqshbandiyya. The name Milli Görüs means 'national point of view'. It pursued under its founder and leader Necmettin Erbakan one political goal, i.e. the abolition of the laic state system and the establishment of an Islamic Republic of Turkey. Necmettin Erbakan was an engineer who had been educated in Germany. He founded the Milli Görüs movement in 1967 and his Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) in 1969. His ideas were rather influential since he brought together the rigidity of a Muslim fundamentalist, reading and interpreting the Koran himself, the charisma of a Sufi family and the technological version of a better world in the national framework of the Turkish Republic. Indeed, he might have been interpreted as a Turkish populist politician. After the military putsch in 1971, many functionaries of the Erbakan network took refuge in Europe, especially in Germany. Milli Görüs took the chance to establish the first wide-ranging infrastructure for Muslims in Germany and other parts of Europe. In 1976 the Turkish Union in Europe was founded which extended its activities with the help of new articulators who had arrived as refugees after the military takeover in 1981.

Milli Görüs was not alone: After the 'Islamic Revolution' in Iran, an extremist wing under Cemalettin Kaplan grew in size and founded in 1984 the Federation of Islamic Association and Communities (ICCB). The Milli Görüs

movement established a new umbrella organization as the Union of New World Vision in Europe (AMGT) in 1985. After 1995, Milli Görüs in Europe was reformed again. For questions of belief the IGMG, the Islamic Federation Milli Görüs, became responsible, for issues of money and real estate the European Mosque Building and Aid Federation was established. During the Turkish parliamentary elections 1995 Erbakan's Saadet Party became strongest parliamentary group. His death was a changing point, because his successor, Mehmet Erbakan, tried to change the political line of the party towards a more integrative position and the movement separated itself from its extremist position, calling for the establishment of a so-called Islamic state and the absolute rule of the Sharia. Since 2001, another split changed Milli Görüs with the establishment of the AK Party (Party of Justice and Development) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan is now the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. The AK Party is now the most popular political force in Turkey and argues that it might be possible to establish a political party like the model of the Christian democratic parties of Europe.

If this is possible, the extremism of the IGMG movement will vanish. Milli Görüs – except some private initiatives – was the first Muslim organization in Germany which founded a network of mosques outside the homes of the Muslims. In addition to the establishment of the cultural centres established by the Süleymancılık, these mosques became a part of greater Muslim life in Germany. Today, the IGMG has 514 mosque communities in different European countries. The total number of the local entities amounts to 2,200. Around one-fourth of these mosque communities are in Germany. The IGMG has around 87,000 members and a entire community size of around 230,000 (according to the IGMG internet site: www.igmg.de). The

number of members in Germany is estimated to be around 27,000 (Der Spiegel, 24. September 2001, 32).

*The Development of the Radical
Kaplan Movement in Germany*

Cemalettin Kaplan is the founder of the so-called 'Caliph State' movement. He completed his studies of theology at the University in Ankara in 1966 and worked until 1971 in Adana as a *mufti*. After the military coup in Turkey in 1980 and following the closing of Erbakan's Islamic Party of National Salvation, Kaplan fled to Germany, where he received political asylum. After being active in the radical wing of the 'Milli-Görüs' organisation for three years and basically working in the Irsad (spiritual and ethnic leadership) and giving Fatwa (legal commands), he left the organisation and founded the 'Refah-Party' in Turkey. Mainly inspired by the Islamic revolution in Iran, Kaplan opposed Erbakan's idea of political parties and participation in democratic institutions in the Turkish political system. In contrast to Erbakan, Kaplan developed a radical extra-parliamentary basis organisation, known as the *İslamî Cemiyetler ve Cemaatler Birliği* (ICCB) (Federation of Islamic Association and Communities). The aim of this radical organisation was to achieve a political transformation in Turkey similar to that in Iran. Pushing forward the Iranian Revolution as a successful example of political change, the association had in its best times approximately 7,000 members in Germany. Kaplan was known for his aggressive verbal diatribes. He publicly argued his goals, namely the abolition of the democratic and secular order in Turkey, and he proclaimed the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state in Turkey. Due to these radical positions, the Ger-

man government prohibited Kaplan's political activities. Despite this attempt to control Kaplan's political activities, his ability to influence his followers was not easily curbed as evidenced in his 'death Fatwa' against the writer Salman Rushdie, which was imposed by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Moreover, Kaplan confessed the aim of having the Koran as a world-wide constitution and Islam as the overall power in international relations and world politics.

At the end of the 1980s, the Kaplan movement was in a crisis, however. Kaplan reacted by restructuring the organisation from a relatively open egalitarian organisation to a closed sect organisation with hierarchical structures and an elitist claim. This organisational change was accompanied by a dissociation from the Iranian Revolution and various extreme Islamic positions which reached its peak in Kaplan's proclamation as Caliph. Moreover, at the end of 1991, Kaplan asked his supporters to wage a holy war against Turkey. Despite a prohibition against this, he proclaimed himself to be the Emir ruler and proclaimed the '*Anadolu Federal Islami Devleti*' (AFID) (Islamic Federal State of Anatolia) in April 1992 in Cologne. Beginning in 1994, he named his association the '*Caliph state*' ('*Hilafet Devleti*').

The Caliph state movement, a follow up organisation of Kaplan's first organisation, is one of the most radical Islamic organisations in Germany, at least verbally. Kaplan's main interest was the re-construction of the Caliph state. The supporters of the Caliph state disassociated themselves from the non-believing German society and also remained quite isolated in the Muslim Turkish community in Germany. Moreover, Kaplan's declaration of himself as Caliph and Emir led to the separation of many supporters and placed the organisation in an isolated position among the Islamic spectrum in Germany. Additionally, many

supporters of the Caliph state were annoyed by Kaplan's attempt to transfer the association's property of local ICCB associations to the foundation 'Dinaar aan Islam', founded in 1990 in Rotterdam. Only Kaplan and a few intimate friends had insight into the financial activities of this foundation.

Considering the members and supporters of the Kaplan movement, the restructuring of the organisation also effected a change in the profile of the members. While the association and Kaplan's role as a simple preacher attracted migrants from the first generation, coming from rural areas with little educational background, the new elitist cadre organisation attracted mostly migrants of the second and third generations with a high educational background. Kaplan's new public image as Caliph and his media rhetoric as an 'Islamic fundamentalist' led many members to leave the association. The German media named Kaplan 'the Caliph of Cologne'.

The influence and number of members of the association declined after the death of Kaplan in May 1995, although his son, Metin Kaplan, continued his political activities. With the death of the main integration figure, the appeal of the organisation disappeared for many of its supporters. The Caliph state was forbidden as an anti-constitutional organisation on 8 December 2001 and Metin Kaplan was arrested. Although the organisation is as an anti-parliamentary institution, which has been prohibited and is currently relatively weak, its activities continue. The newspaper 'Beklenen sr-i Saadet' succeeded the former publication 'Ümmet-i Muhammed', and since 2002, the German magazine 'Der Islam als Alternative' (Islam as an Alternative) are being distributed, both of which have clear tendencies toward the Caliph state.

Regarding the international relevance of the Kaplan movement, these organisations do not have contact to Al Qaida, but to FIS and Hamas.

Federation of the Islamic Cultural Centers (Verband der der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V.) – Süleymancilik

This is the oldest Islamic organisation in the Federal Republic of Germany. This organisation was founded because of the necessity of religious care for Turkish guest-workers. For a long time, this necessity was neglected by the official authorities.

The precursor of this organisation was the 'Turkish Union' which was established in 1967. This organisation changed its name to 'Islamic Cultural Centres' in 1973. In 1980, the communities of the Islamic cultural centers were unified under the 'Federation of the Islamic Cultural Centers'.

This federation is today the third biggest Islamic organisation in Germany. 250 mosque associations belong to this federation which include approximately 20,000 members (Zentrum für Türkeistudien (ed.): 1994, 383). The members of this federation are also called 'Süleymancilar'. Süleyman was an Islamic preacher (1888-1959) of Nakshibandi background who was convinced to resist against the laic reforms of Atatürk after the abolishment of the Caliph organization in 1924. Although he was not allowed to practise his activities as preacher because of his anti-republican speeches, he was allowed to establish Koran schools in Turkey.

The Islamic cultural centers were established in order to teach the Turkish children to read the Koran. In Germany, they also provide for everyday social commodities and services such as barber shops, libraries, retail stores, etc.

In addition, the federation has established dialogues with other religious communities and political circles in the FRG.

The Community of the Light/Nurcus

Nurcus were the second offshoot of the Nakshibandi background. The Jamaat un-Nur (Community of the Light), whose adepts in Turkey were called 'Nurcular' was established by the religious scholar, Said Nusi (1873-1960). His writing 'Risale i Risale-i-Nur' is located in the center of this movement. Here, Said Nursi offers a present-day interpretation of the Koran, in which he tries to harmonize the individual Suren of the Koran with the modern technology and science (Abdullah: 1993, 40). This organisation, working illegally in Turkey, was officially established in 1979 in Cologne. It developed 120 madrasas at universities and in the districts where the Turkish Immigrants began to settle. It is supposed that the Nurcus have about some thousands of members (Lemmen: 2000). This Islamic community is very important in developing secular relationships between the municipal governments and the state. This community feels itself especially connected with the German social-democracy and the trade unions (Akbulut: 2003, 72).

Türk-Islam Kültür Dernekleri Birliği – TIKDP (Union of the Turkish Islamic Culture Associations in Europe)

The Union of the Turkish Islamic Cultural Associations in Europe (TIKDP) was created in 1987 after the splitting off from the 'Federation of Turkish-Islamic Idealist As-

sociations in Europe (Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu - ADÜTDF). These associations followed the Party of the National Movement (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), the political wing of an extremist national movement founded by Alparslan Türkeş. This movement preached a laical Turkish nationalism in Turkey in the early 1960s. Later, though, they tried to use the political dynamics of the Islamist movement in order to expand their sphere of interests. This party was rather successful in dominating some mosque associations in Germany. ADÜTDF was the European branch of the Party of the National Movement. Under the name 'Grey Wolves', this organisation represented the Turkish right-wing extremist scene FRG. The ADÜTDF was, for a long time, the only opposition to Milli Görüş. TIKDP has 200 mosque associations in Germany and around 10,000 members (Lemmen: 2000).

This organisation introduced themselves as a purely Islamic and unpolitical organisation. However, large skepticism prevails in relation to the credibility of the TIKDB under the Islamic organisations (Akbulut: 2003, 73).

Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği – DITIB
(Turkish High Office for Islam)

The Turkish High Office for Islam (DITIB) was established in 1985 in Cologne under the special direction of the highest religious authority Turkish Diyanet İşleri Bakanlığı (DİB) (Directorate for Religious Affairs) and works together with Turkish ambassadorial and consular agencies. DITIB represents the official Islam in Turkey, under the control of the state. It rejects the Sharia. DITIB holds itself

to the laical principles and a strict separation from church and state.

The main motive for the establishment of the DITIB by the Turkish government was to create an alternative to other Muslim organisations which were hostile to the laicism of the Turkish state. One of the main objectives is also the protection of the Turkish Moslems from the influence of radical Islamic tendencies in Germany and the stabilisation of their national consciousness (Önen: 1997, 138).

DITIB is an umbrella organisation including 830 mosque associations. About 70 percent of the Muslims in Germany are found under in the sphere of influence of the DITIB (Interkultureller Dialog mit DITIB: 2000). The number of the members is difficult to determine, but according to the statements of DITIB, the number amounts approximately to 110,000 (REMIN. Religionswissenschaftlicher Medien- und Informationsdienst: 2002). The Imams for the DITIB mosques are trained in Turkey for their tasks in Germany. In this training they learn German and are made familiar with the problems of Turkish Muslims in Germany. After the training, they are sent to Germany for three to five years. Through the unpolitical method of working, DITIB tries to reach as many Turkish Muslims as possible. Although other religious organisations have existed longer, they have lost many adherents to DITIB. Thus, DITIB is the most influential religious organisation among the Turks in Germany. As DITIB is understood by most believers to unpolitical and moderate, it is regarded as a serious contact partner for German public institutions.

Except the religious spiritual welfare, DITIB offers assistance for all areas of life. The activities if DITIB consist of the establishment of prayer centres, Koran courses and religious instruction of children. In addition, DITIB organ-

ises pilgrimages to Mecca and offers funeral services for Turkish Muslims.

Islam Council for the Federal Republic of Germany
(*Islamrat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*)

The Islam Council for the Federal Republic of Germany was established in Berlin in 1986 by the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres, the *Jama'at un-Nur Köln e.V.*, the Sufi community *Les amis de L'islam e.V.* (Friends of Islam) and by the *Islamischer Weltkongreß/Deutsche Sektion e.V.* (Islamic World Congress/German Section). The Islam Council is closely connected with the Islam Archives Germany in Soest, which took over its administration. Because of internal differences, The Islamic Cultural Centres left the Islam Council after two years. As the Milli Görüs movement entered into the Islam council, it gained significance again.

The Islam Council strives for recognition as a public corporation and for the introduction of Islamic education as a school subject.

This umbrella organisation considers both Islamic teaching based on the Koran and the democratic constitutional structure of Germany as bases of its activities. In addition, this association disposes of a so-called clergyman administration with Sheikh ul-Islam apart from the executive committee and assembly of members. At present, the Islam Council claims to have around 30 members, but a detailed analysis shows that this institution is dominated by the members of the Milli Görüs movement.

Function of the Mosques

At the beginning of the labour migration, the guest workers lived isolated in homes in the proximity of their places of employment. Because of the fact that the workers should stay one or two years according to the rotation regulation, the employees accommodated them in specific homes, where they could not come in touch with the German population. Contrary to the other labour migrants coming from European countries, the Turkish workers were not allowed to bring their families to Germany until the 1970s. Therefore, they lived in a double isolation well into the 1970s. According to a questionnaire in 1973, half of the citizens of Berlin expressed that they did have any contact with Turks and each seventh wished for separate housing areas for Turks. (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 30. July 1973, 27). The landlords of better residential areas often refused to rent their apartments to Turks. For this reason, they were forced to live in unhygienic, small and dirty apartments which were often one hundred years old and situated in peripheral areas. The systematic isolation of Turks from the German population represent a starting point for the formation of religious identities living mainly in the peripheral areas.

As Duran Akbulut states, Islam facilitated the life of the Turkish migrants living predominantly in ghetto situations. Through the establishment of prayer areas and assembly places the workers could meaningfully bring their spare time (Akbulut: 2003, 59). The Islamic organisations which appeared during this time developed numerous important social functions for the Turks which had an stabilising effect. The mosques were, at the same time, a place of refuge and a meeting place. The formation of mosques (in the form of preaching rooms) constituted also a search

for self-help and cooperation for those isolated people who were left alone to their fate.

Everyday Islam

Many Muslims in Germany profess themselves to Islam, but only some of them practice daily religious duties. By maintaining some religious obligations such as Ramadan, the consumption of halal food, Islamic forms of weddings, circumcision or a wearing the head scarf, the majority of the Muslim population in Germany considers itself to be Muslim. Compared with their parents, young people exercise religious practices less frequently and interpret Islam more individually (Bundesministerium des Innern: 2003, 145). As a study of the Ministry of the Interior states, religious celebrations play an important role for 60 percent of the second generation. For half of the young Muslim generation, it is very important to marry a partner of the same religion. If it is considered that only 4.6 percent of young immigrants are members in religious-cultural establishments, one can see the shrinking influence of Islam in Germany (Bundesministerium des Innern: 2003, 145).

Muslims in the polity

Political participation of the Muslim population in the German Party System

As mentioned, most Muslims are immigrants or have an immigrant background, coming mostly from Turkey. Because of the restrictive legislation imposed against aliens and issues of naturalisation, the majority of Muslims have

not acquired German citizenship. This fact restricts the political participation of Muslims and marginalises them from parliamentary politics. Among the Muslim voters in Germany, most are naturalized immigrants or persons with immigrant backgrounds. The following table illustrates the low participation degree of Turkish people in political parties in Germany.

	No. of respondents	In %			
		Yes	No	No comment	Sum
Total	1,003	3.4	96.5	0.1	100.0
Men	548	4.8	95.1	0.2	100.0
Women	455	1.8	98.2	-	100.0

*Table 4: Membership of Turks in parties/political unions according to gender
Are you a member of a political union or party in Germany?*

Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung: Situation der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Repräsentativuntersuchung 2001

For a long time, a discussion ranged about who the Muslim community actually voted for. The idea persisted that Muslims, mostly with Turkish backgrounds, voted for the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) (Social Democratic Party). An idea emerged that since the Muslims tend to be migrant workers, the resulting implication was therefore that they voted for a worker's party. Later study results showed that there was an increasing preference within the Turkish Muslim community to vote for the conservative Christian Democrats. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the preferences of Muslim people for conservative parties have little relevance.

It is not possible to make a final assessment on the political preferences of Muslims in Germany. There are no representative studies providing evidence on this topic. When considering the political preferences of immigrant groups or German citizens having immigrant backgrounds, studies and statistics are typically not referenced based on the person's religious beliefs; instead only ethnic origins of the target group tends to be considered. The Muslim ethnic groups in question generally consist of those from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. In the last case, it can not be identified, for example, how many people are of Muslim belief among this group. Therefore, only political preferences within the Turkish communities can be considered. According to a study, about 30 percent of persons with Turkish backgrounds have an invested interest in politics. Over 70 percent of the interviewed of Turkish background indicated not having a particular political preference, and only about 22 percent admitted to having one. About 70 percent of those with a Turkish background voted for the Social Democratic Party (SPD), about 10 percent for the conservative parties (CDU/CSU), about 2 percent for the liberals, and about 18 percent for the Green Party. This study also showed that these political preferences are moderated (Diehl; Urban: 1998; Wüst: 2003).

Although it is not possible to make a final statement on political preferences within the Muslim communities on the basis of this study, focusing primarily on Turkish groups, it could be assumed that these tendencies remain the same within all Muslim communities. One can assume truth in these tendencies because most of the Muslims have immigration backgrounds and the Social Democratic and Green Parties have a more liberal programme regarding issues of integration and citizenship than the liberal and conservative parties. In the last years, Germany's foreign

policy toward countries with Muslim populations (such as Afghanistan, Irak and the Palestinian Authority) have also influenced the political preferences of citizens of Muslim background.

It is more difficult to talk about the participation of Muslims in political parties. There are not any statistics providing information on their membership in political parties. The majority of Muslims in political parties have immigration backgrounds, but statistics on membership are not generally conducted on the basis of ethnic background or religious belief. There are a few politicians with Muslim backgrounds who are well-known. This, unfortunately, does not provide us the necessary information to make a final assessment on the participation of Muslims in political parties in Germany. The majority of persons with Muslim immigration backgrounds are organised in parties or unions related to their country of origin, as can be seen in the following table concerning the political organisation of people with a Turkish background.

	Turks
no. of respondents	34
<i>In %</i>	
... a party/political organisation of the country of origin	75.2
... a German party	28.0

*Table 5: Membership of Turks in parties/political organisations
Are you a member of a political union or party? If so, which?
- multiple choice*

Source: Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Situation der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Repräsentativuntersuchung 2001

The increasing number of national naturalisations has led the political parties to turn to groups with immigration backgrounds, also to the Turkish Muslim communities, in order to win voters. In areas with a high percentage of citizens with immigration backgrounds there are election posters and flyers in the languages of the immigrant groups. Candidates visit mosques and Islamic culture centres. Organisations of members with ethnic backgrounds have been established within or are integrated into the parties. For example, the *Deutsch-Türkische Forum* (German-Turkish Forum) in the conservative CDU party was created in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1997. Another group active within a party and with members having Muslim backgrounds includes the *Liberale Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung* (German-Turkish Liberal Association), in combination with the liberal FDP party. This association was founded in 1993 (Santel: 2002).

Since the 1990s, growing participation in political parties among citizens with Muslim backgrounds can be observed. Despite the absence in the conservative parties, representatives with Muslim backgrounds can be found in the Social Democratic and Green parties as well in the left-wing Party of Democratic Socialists (PDS). The most active groups with immigrant backgrounds within political parties are of Turkish background. These groups intend to influence the political lines of their parties particularly in regard to migration and integration issues. There are some political parties within the government with members belonging to a Turkish background. The SPD and the Green Party, for example, try to influence both their own parties and foreign policies in Germany to focus on issues important to the Turkish state. A trend has also been observed that religious people with a Turkish background

have been actively engaged in the conservative parties in Germany.

Experts have mentioned that the Islamic organisation *Milli Görüs* tried, yet without success, to establish institutional links to the conservative party CDU during the 1990s. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that not only religious persons are members of conservative parties. Experts have also observed that a strong competition between religious and secular groups of persons with Turkish backgrounds and belonging to conservative parties is rampant.

In summary, it can be said that the participation of persons having Muslim backgrounds involved in German political parties has been increasing since the 1990s. Although there are even politicians with Muslim backgrounds in high levels of the political parties, they have yet to decisively influence the political interests of the Muslim communities on the party platforms. This lack can be seen concerning the restrictive legislation in issues of integration and citizenship that continue to prevail, as these issues are of utmost importance for the Muslim communities in Germany.

Participation of Muslims in corporative institutions

The participation of Muslims in trade unions and professional associations is wider because immigrants are granted complete rights in this realm of political participation. Nevertheless, it should be said that because of the high unemployment rates and low education levels among members of ethnic minorities, there are not many Muslim people who have access to this kind of political participation. Nevertheless, Muslims are not under-represented in trade unions and professional associations. A high involvement

of Muslims in trade unions and professional associations can be observed, which is connected with the fact that most of the Muslims are immigrants and tend to need a higher level of protection. Another factor is that most Muslims do not have German citizenship and their participation in trade unions and professional associations is the only way to fight for their civil and social rights (Diehl; Urban: 1998).

Concerning the participation of Muslim people in trade unions and professional associations, the same problem exists in determining the degree of participation of Muslims. Statistics tend to be ethnic-oriented and do not consider the belief of the members active in trade unions and professional associations. Only an assessment on the participation of Turkish people can be made. According to studies, the participation of Turkish people in trade unions has decreased from around 51.4 percent in 1985 to 26.8 in 2001 (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung: 2002). For Germans, this percentage ranges around 21 percent (Diehl; Urban: 1998). This decrease in the degree of participation of Turkish people can be explained due to the high level of unemployment among those with immigration backgrounds. Nevertheless, the fact that workers of Muslim faith, mostly with a Turkish background, have a high participation level and commonly hold the leadership positions in trade unions is clear. Unfortunately, there are not studies that prove this empirical observation.

	2001	1995	1985	1980
Total				
<i>no. of respondents</i>	467	*	*	*
member of a labour union	26.8	30.5	51.4	*
no membership	71.6	65.6	48.6	*
no comment	1.6	3.9	*	*
total	100	100	100	100
Men				
<i>no. of respondents</i>	382	*	*	*
member of a labour union	29.5	34.4	61.4	57.7
no membership	69.1	62.2	38.6	42.3
no comment	1.5	3.4	*	*
total	100	100	100	100
Women				
<i>no. of respondents</i>	85	*	*	*
member of a labour union	14.9	20.0	36.5	32.4
no membership	83.2	74.9	63.5	67.6
no comment	2.0	5.2	*	*
total	100	100	100	100

Table 6: Membership of Turkish employees in German labour union according to gender 1980, 1985, 1995 and 2001 -responses of employees and trainees only

Source: Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung: Situation der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Repräsentativuntersuchung 2001

Participation in associations or clubs related to the country of origin remains to be the most important form of social articulation among the Muslim people. The growing diversity of the immigrant communities since the 1990s has led to an increase of associational life in the Muslim

communities. More associations and clubs have been established in countries with Muslim populations, such as Afghanistan, Iran or Lebanon. Unfortunately, there are only surveys, but not representative statistical data providing information on the levels of participation among the Muslim population in associations or clubs that have to do with their countries of origin. According to a survey of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, there are more Turkish people organised in associations or parties in Germany than there are in the countries of origin; around 13 percent of the Turkish people are organised in German associations or clubs, while around 30 percent participate in associations or clubs in Turkey (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung: 2002).

*Participation of Muslims in the fields
of work of human and civil rights*

A further development pertaining to political participation among Muslims in Germany since the 1990s is the increase in participation in the fields of human and civil rights, integration, anti-discrimination and anti-racism work. Traditional organisations run by Muslim immigrants, such as the *Türkischer Bund Berlin* (TBB) (Turkish Federation of Berlin), have been conducting projects in the fields of integration and anti-discrimination. New groups or associations have been created as the *Föderation der Immigrantenvereine aus der Türkei* (Federation of the Associations of Immigrants from Turkey) or the *Föderation sozialdemokratischer Volksvereine der Türkei in Europa* (Federation of Social Democratic People Associations from Turkey in Europe). These groups have strong links to the country of origin. This may be due to the low numbers of second generation Muslims belong-

ing to such associations. People of the second generation participate mostly in associations that do not have links to Turkey. Here, the group *Die Unmündigen*, from Mannheim should be mentioned as it has been working in the field of integration and anti-discrimination for several years.

Although the rise of confessional associations has been the most visible phenomenon since the 1990s concerning patterns of political participation among Muslims in Germany, it can not be denied that other trends have also been taking place within the Muslim communities. There has been an increasing involvement of Muslims, mostly among young Muslims from the second generation that are not oriented toward their parents' countries of origin, in the field of human and civil rights as problems related to discrimination and integration issues in Germany are being addressed. There has also been a growing interest among German political parties to strengthen their links to groups of immigration background as well as there has been an increasing participation of people of Muslim immigration background in parties, even in leading positions. Despite of the increasing participation of Muslim people in the German political parties, this type of political articulation remains marginal. Because of the restrictive German legislation on citizenship and naturalisation, most Muslim people do not have the German citizenship and is excluded from the German political parties system. Therefore, is absolutely necessary to pass liberal laws concerning citizenship that could promote the participation of Muslim people in German political institutions. The liberalisation of the citizenship legislation by the government of Schröder represents a progress in this direction, but it is necessary to introduce deeper reforms which allow Muslim people of immigration background to participate actively in the German and European political parties systems.

Muslims in German Society

The total number of Muslims in Germany is estimated to be between 2.8 and 3.3 Million (Deutscher Bundestag: 2000) and the majority of them come from a Turkish migrant background (approximately 2 Million). Correspondingly, most available statistical information and research results refer to the first and second generation of Turkish migrants. In reality, the configuration of Muslims as a group in the German society is quite diverse. When talking about their social situation, this diversity has to be considered, for example, by including the situation of refugees and asylum seekers, many of whom are Muslims.

Employment

As it is almost always the case with statistical information on Muslim population in Germany, it is impossible to provide detailed and reliable statistics on the employment situation of Muslims. Religious background is not registered in employment statistics and the nation of origin for non-nationals does not provide sufficient information to draw conclusions on religious affiliation. The majority of figures available are based on estimations and place a strong emphasis on Turkish employees.

Currently, the general unemployment rate in Germany is about 10,5 percent. Within all migrant populations, the rate is approximately 19 percent, and for people of Turkish background, the figure is higher again at 23 percent. The majority of first generation labour migrants were employed in the steel and mining industries where there have been large scale cutbacks in recent years. Jobs in the service sector traditionally taken up by Turkish migrants

such as garbage collection have become increasingly attractive for German employees due to a general lack of employment opportunities in Germany. It is expected that the unemployment rate within Muslims will rise because of the acute lack of vocational training places. In some federal states, the unemployment rate within juvenile Muslim populations is estimated to be up to 30 percent.

Migrants with Muslim backgrounds in Germany face the same disadvantages regarding access to the labour market as migrants in general, resulting from discrimination due to their ethnic background and insecure residence status. The most extreme examples are asylum seekers and undocumented migrants who are completely excluded from the labour market. Until recently, asylum seekers were generally forbidden to work. This strict legal regulation was slightly improved in 2000, when asylum seekers were given the opportunity to receive work permits after a waiting period of one year. In practice, this has not led to a marked improvement of the employment situation of refugees as German and EU national job seekers are still given priority.

The existing national and local measures aimed at improving the employment situation for Muslim migrants are mainly directed towards offering more and better vocational training as well as towards an improvement of the educational standards for this group in general. Similarly, the promotion of self-employment as an opportunity for migrant populations has been intensified.

Self-Employment

The establishment of enterprises by persons of migrant background and members of ethnic minorities in Ger-

many has a long tradition. It began in the 1960s and 1970s due to a growing demand for certain goods and services by labour migrants and their families. Moreover, when facing the growing uncertainty of the labour market, the foundation of independent enterprises was seen by some as an option to ensure ongoing financial security. In recent years, an increasing number of entrepreneurs of foreign origin conduct business in the German market, many of them in the restaurant and retailing business, but increasingly also in the service sector. While the major share of entrepreneurs with Muslim backgrounds is represented by first and second generation Turkish migrants, the tendency to build up small businesses also applies to other groups of Muslim migrants, for example from Morocco and former Yugoslavia.

There are around 60.000 Turkish business firms in Germany according to the Centre for Studies on Turkey (Zentrum für Türkeistudien). They estimate a total investment capital of 2.6 Billion Euros and an annual business volume of 6.5 Billion Euros. Problems sometimes occur within these enterprises, due to insufficient knowledge of business management and commercial markets, as well as due to shortcomings in administrative skills in the German context.

Several counselling measures have been initiated to respond to these problems. Various organisations have been established by Muslim entrepreneurs to better represent their interests. One of the most influential is the Association of Independent Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (MÜSIAD) which was founded in 1993 in Cologne. Following the incorporation of similar associations in Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, Mannheim and Stuttgart, the Federation of Independent Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Germany (MÜSIAD GERMANY) was established in 1998. The mem-

bers of MÜSIAD are religiously-oriented tradespeople and entrepreneurs. In recent years, contact has been developed with German chambers of commerce and industrial matters and other economic institutions. An important objective of MÜSIAD is to promote the integration of German-Turkish business into the German economy. Moreover, in order to improve the vocational training situation of young people, the organisation cooperates closely with educational institutions.

Housing

The aforementioned remarks on the difficulties to provide statistical information on Muslims in Germany also apply to their housing situation. A recent representative study issued by the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung: 2002), provides information, for example, on the choice of domicile or on the size of migrants' apartments, but a strong emphasis is placed on Turkish and Yugoslav migrants - religious background is not separately recorded.

Generally, the migrant population in Germany has settled according to respective labour market requirements. The spatial distribution of migrants varies, but the majority are concentrated in western German metropolitan areas and in Berlin. As is the case in Berlin, characteristically, a high concentration of former 'guest workers' and their families live in inner city districts in old, un-renovated buildings. Labour migrants were welcomed as 'interim users' of these old buildings in the inner city since their arrival in the 1960s when their stay was expected to be temporary. In the case of Berlin, the concentration of Muslim populations can be seen in the placement of most mosques

within the western inner city districts. As opposed to migrants of the 1960s and 1970s, those who came later in the 1980s (for example Arab refugees) did not establish such visible “ethnic quarters”, not least because many of them were only granted limited residence status (Kapphan: 1999).

In recent years, the overall material living situation of people of migrant background has improved, but it is clear that they still face disadvantages in the housing market. This is demonstrated by the fact the households from migrant background, when compared to German nationals, occupy smaller and more run-down apartments. Further, within increasing competition for affordable housing, persons of migrant background still experience discrimination in the housing market (Zwick: 2003).

Muslim refugees, as long as they are asylum seekers, fall under the general regulations applied to all asylum seekers in Germany. They are initially accommodated in central reception centres, then dispersed throughout the country. The standard of living in these asylum centres is quite poor and there are not yet general guidelines guaranteeing minimum standards for accommodation. For asylum seekers, freedom of movement is geographically restricted – they are only allowed to move within the boundaries of the local district to which they have been assigned.

Health Care

The specific needs of Muslims related to their religious and cultural background create specific demands for their health treatment both in and outpatient. In order to guarantee professional medical care, issues such as language barriers, the sex of medical staff, nutritional regulations

and opportunities to practice religion have to be taken into account. In practice, and compared to German patients, there is a difference in the self-perception, description and treatment of diseases of Muslims, grounded in cultural differences. These differences are most obvious in the communication between Muslim patients and physicians and other medical staff. Among other problems, language barriers can result in a phenomenon called “polypragmasy”, a kind of misdiagnosis whereby certain medicines or medical treatments are prescribed before an accurate diagnosis has been made (Blaschke/Sabanovic: 2000). To overcome this, some attempts have been made to provide multilingual information for patients related to their diseases and the health care system in Germany.

In general, there is a tendency towards changes in the medical treatment of Muslims in Germany in favour of a more culturally sensitive approach. It has been acknowledged that there exists culturally specific concepts of illness and physical or psychological syndromes that have to be considered, which may be contrary to the bio-medical approach to illness and health in Germany (Wesselmann: 2002). In the late-1990s, the German Red Cross initiated a campaign targeted at an improved treatment of Muslim patients in accordance with their special needs. One of the results was the publication of a practical guide directed towards medical staff on how to deal with death and grief for Muslims in German hospitals (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz: 1998). Also included was a consideration of gender-specific hygiene measures (respect of intimate space, aspects of physical touch) and the specific emotional and religious behaviour of both patients and visitors (different perception of pain; number and frequency of visitors), as well as the provision of food in accordance with Islamic law.

In practice, however, there are still large gaps in awareness of these specific requirements. An Adequate training of staff in this regard is not yet a rule across the board in medical services. Proper training of staff, as well as the aforementioned deficiencies in information provision for Muslim patients regarding their medical treatment, are urgent issues the German health system needs to address in the near future.

Elderly Muslims

As in all western European countries, the proportion of elderly persons in Germany, both within the general and migrant population will grow steadily in near future. It is estimated that by 2010 the number of migrants older than 60 years will reach 1.3 million. It is to be expected therefore, that the number of Muslims in senior citizens' homes and in care facilities for the aged will grow as well. A large share of first generation migrants, in particular those with Turkish backgrounds, will spend their time as pensioners in Germany as they have obtained rights to a pension and are members of legal health insurance funds. The main German welfare associations have partially responded by providing special measures targeted at elderly migrants, many of whom are Muslims.

Contrary to the German seniors, elderly migrants are more often affected by physical illness and handicaps. Turkish labour migrants of the first generation, for example, often held a low economic status and generally had a low education level. This resulted in higher rates of unemployment and poorer housing conditions. Employment that was attained was usually limited to physical labour, often involving detrimental exposure to noise, extreme

temperatures and chemicals, as well as physical strain (Bacik: 2003). German care institutions are challenged to provide more adequate responses to the specific needs of elderly Muslims. Whereas the situation regarding counselling provisions for elderly migrants, especially those from Turkey, has improved recently, the situation of institutional elderly care has only changed partially. This is mostly due to the relatively recent acknowledgement by care institutions that elderly migrants constitute a new clientele group within geriatric care and the time it takes to transfer such acknowledgements into practice. Existing facilities and services for elderly care are predominantly aimed at German seniors. For example, the need for prayer rooms or specific requirements relating to Muslim nutritional regulations has hardly been considered in senior citizens homes.

In 2001, the Foreigners Representative of the German government, in co-operation with the Red Cross, the Workers' Welfare Organisation, and several local offices, developed an information campaign called 'growing old in Germany' ('Älter werden in Deutschland'). The aims of this project were to inform migrant seniors about the possibilities and services in aged care, to overcome barriers in elderly migrants' contact with German services and institutions and to further identify issues of concern to elderly migrants and what could be done to alleviate them. As migrants of the first generation have been the most neglected in many aspects of integration, these developments in aged care represent some long overdue acknowledgement of their difference and belonging.

Muslims and Criminality

The German "Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik - PKS" (criminal statistics of the police) are not sufficient to draw conclusions on the religious background of either offenders or victims. There also is no distinction made between German or non-German nationality. The only conclusions that may be drawn could be from the nationality of foreign crime suspects, but again, these figures do not consider religious background.

A recently published study (Brettfeld/Wetzels: 2003) has dealt with the interaction between religious orientation and incidence of criminality or violent behaviour based on a series of interviews with pupils in Germany. Eight percent of the interviewees indicated Islam as their religious affiliation - within this group, socio-economic status as well as educational level and language competencies were significantly lower compared to German youths. In general, Muslim juveniles were shown in this survey to be the most disadvantaged social group. Further, many of them had experienced violence within their own socialisation. The study found that it was the combination of these factors that led to a higher incidence of criminality, and not the religious affiliation as Muslims. A similar result was reflected in the outcome of other studies (Heitmeyer: 1997).

In recent years, the debate in Germany around the phenomenon of immigrant crime has been conducted on a more or less ideological level, especially in the media. This was related primarily to the political situation - namely, the elections in the federal states and at the national level. Representatives of almost all the political parties drew attention to aspects of security to attract potential voters. The image of the 'criminal foreigner' served in particular

to stoke public fears and promote demands for more restrictive foreigner and asylum policies.

Regarding Muslim offenders, the topic of juvenile crime was given particular attention. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of juvenile offenders hold just one or two criminal convictions, press coverage focussed on a small number of Turkish and Arab youth who were multiple offenders. Here a recent study on the representation of 'foreigner criminality' in the media, the central theme of which was the interaction between discourses on immigration and criminality, shall be referred to (Jäger et. al: 2002). The question was raised by this study, on whether the media reported differently about criminal offences committed by non-Germans as opposed to those committed by Germans.

To this end, several German newspapers and magazines were analysed. It was found that media analysis tended to assign multiple crimes to foreign perpetrators and that strikingly frequent references were made to 'organised crime'. Such coverage encourages a common opinion within the German population that 'foreigners' or migrant populations pose a particular threat to German society. This heightens the debate on internal security and results in demands for increased power for expulsion regulations.

Recent occurrences such as the murder of sixteen people by a 19 year old German ex-pupil of a school in Thuringia served to intensify public debate about causes and prevention of juvenile violence in general. The results of the 'PISA study' on the quality of education, in which Germany ranked very low, drew attention to the social disadvantages faced by a large group of juveniles of migrant backgrounds or ethnic minorities.

As a consequence of the intense media debate on juvenile crime, several programs both on the national and Federal level have been initiated in the last few years. Since the incidents of 11 September 2001 in New York, media concentration shifted towards the representation of a more diffused external threat from religiously motivated violence. However it is too early to draw conclusions about the effects of current public debate on the concepts behind established programs and measures in the field of crime prevention (Meyer: 2003).

A final aspect to be mentioned concerns criminal offences committed by Islamic extremist or fundamentalist organisations directed towards Muslims living in Germany. Several members of the Caliph State have been convicted in the past due to their membership of a criminal organisation, public order offences and due to criminal offences, such as the killing, bodily harm or threatening of 'disloyals'. In 1996, an arson attack committed by the 'Front of Islamic Warriors' was directed towards a Turkish cultural centre. Moreover, various fights between the members of the Lebanese 'Hizballah' and the Iraqi DA'WA-party or the Islamic Union of Iraqi Students (IUIS) took place.

Police officers with Muslim Backgrounds

As is the case with other sectors, it has been acknowledged within the police that the employment of staff with migrant backgrounds is indispensable to effective strategies for crime prevention. Both the 'role model effect' and language competency have been shown to be valuable preconditions for gaining access to violent or potentially deviant non-German offenders. With regard to preventing juvenile crime within Muslims, for example, most exist-

ing prevention measures run on a voluntary basis. It was found that the employment of police officers with Turkish and Arab backgrounds could remarkably improve the willingness of youth to participate in projects. A problem remains in recruiting sufficient qualified staff with non-German or migrant backgrounds (Meyer: 2003).

According to estimates, less than one percent of all police officers in Germany have non-German backgrounds (Türkischer Bund Berlin-Brandenburg – TBB). More detailed data or reference to ethnic and religious affiliation is not available both at the national and regional level. Such a low representation within this sector of public service is due in part to the prerequisite of German citizenship for employment in the civil service. Moreover, there is no statistical registration of the ethnic background of civil servant police officers. The only figures allowing some kind of inference is the ethnic background of police students. In Berlin in 2002, for example, less than 0.5 percent of police students had Turkish background (TBB). Based on consultations with the Turkish Federation of Berlin and Brandenburg, the Berlin police are currently attempting to promote an increased share of Turkish youths within the police training applicants with information campaigns. It was observed, however, that the minimal percentage of applicants who have Turkish background is mainly do to their German language deficits. To overcome this, proposals such as introductory language instructions have been made.

Muslims in German Prisons

The administration of issues related to the penal system lies in the responsibility of the individual German federal

states which also applies for the provision of statistics on prisoners. There is some information available on current numbers of imprisoned persons at the regional level but without delivering a breakdown of religious affiliation.

As stated in its 2001 annual report on security, the Federal Criminal Office (BKA), in 1999, 18 percent of prisoners in German prisons were non-Germans, which means persons without German citizenship. In the same report, this is described as a specific challenge for the staff first of all due to language problems. Moreover, non-Germans specific requirements appear in everyday interaction,

in particular when they come from countries where the customs, habits and religious beliefs and practices as well as nutritional regulations are very different from those in Germany... apart from ethnic political and religious tensions within these groups... (Bundekriminalamt: 2001, 35).

According to the German Penal System Law (Strafvollzugsgesetz – StVollzG), each prisoner has the right to admission of religious care through a religious caretaker (Seelsorger) of his/her religious community (see §§53-55 and 157 StVollzG). In the reply to a parliamentary question, the German government has stated that this “as a matter of course applies for Muslims” (Deutscher Bundestag: 2000, 48). In the individual federal states, however, this rule is applied differently. In Bavaria, for example, voluntary staff is used to take over the task of pastoral care for Muslims. In Berlin, there are several Imams who regularly visit prisons and pre-trial confinement prisons. In other federal states, religious care is only partially provided. According to the information as contained in the reply to the parliamentary question, however, there seems to be a ten-

dency of increasing willingness to improve the situation by employing more spiritual guidance staff for Muslims.

Muslims in the German military forces

Due to the recent German citizenship law, the share of soldiers with migrant backgrounds in the armed forces will grow in the future. Statistical projections estimate the number in basic military service will rise by up to 12,000 each year. There is no detailed data on Muslim soldiers available. At the moment, several hundred Muslims serve in the German armed forces (Zentrum Innere Führung: 2002). But information on their situation is not yet available. In the annual report of the Ombudsman for the Armed Forces, soldiers and persons liable for military service with Muslim backgrounds only appear as victims of verbal violence related to right-wing extremism (Deutscher Bundestag: 2004).

Due to the current lack of junior staff, the German military (Bundeswehr) actively promotes the recruitment of soldiers from various backgrounds. On a homepage specifically designed for young people (www.treff.bundeswehr.de/data/01_soldat/24_verpflegung/), for example, it is announced that in the Bundeswehr, food is even provided for Muslims in accordance to their nutritional regulations. In order to provide officers and sergeants with information on Islam and to make them more sensitive to the specific needs of Muslim soldiers, the 'Zentrum Innere Führung' of the Bundeswehr (Center for Inner Leadership) has produced a working paper on the topic of Muslims in the armed forces. Among other things, it focussed on how to accommodate religious rights within the principles of everyday military life. In this paper, Muslims are treated first

of all as 'German citizens in uniform' with the appropriate rights and duties. The German military has taken on the responsibility to promote the integration of Muslims and to avoid discrimination.

According to the German Soldiers Law of 19 March 1956 (§36), each soldier serving in the German armed forces has the right to spiritual guidance and to unhindered practice of his/her religion. The participation in religious services is voluntary.

The legal framework theoretically allows the employment of staff responsible for Muslim military spiritual guidance. In practice, Muslims in the Bundeswehr are not yet offered this service. This is explained by their currently low representation in the armed forces and by the lack of available staff. In the case that Muslims are in need of such services, attempts are made to fill these gaps with the use of Catholic or Protestant pastoral care.

Contrary to the aforementioned integrating and anti-discrimination principles towards Muslim soldiers, there are still various forms of unequal treatment in the Bundeswehr. To date, there is no obligation to provide Muslims with their own prayer rooms. In the guidelines contained in the paper published by the Centre for Inner Leadership, however, it is stated that in practice "it should not cause any problems to fulfil such wishes". Moreover, German holiday regulations apply to all soldiers and it is solely a question of the respective superior's leniency whether a Muslim soldier is granted leave for important Islam celebrations.

In response to a parliamentary question posed by the conservative parties (Deutscher Bundestag: 2000), the German government has reported on the status of Muslim soldiers and persons liable for military service being on duty in foreign countries. Altogether, 20 soldiers have served at

this time, for example, in the SFOR and KFOR. With regard to the Muslim background of the population at the places of operation, some German Muslim soldiers were transferred to special tasks, for example, as interpreters.

Muslims in Administration

The number of Muslims employed in the German federal administration is not known. According to §6 of the Finanz- und Personalstatistikgesetz (Law on Finance and Staff Statistics), the religious affiliation of employees is not registered. The majority of state employees are employed by the federal states. But here, the same problems occur. Due to the payment of church taxes, it is possible to differentiate between the protestant or catholic background of the employee but not to identify any other religion. (Deutscher Bundestag: 2000). Statistical information on the practices of employers toward Muslim employees regarding their right to practice their religion during working hours is also not available.

For Muslim civil servants as well as administration employees, no extra provisions are made with regard to holidays. This is because the German federal legislation on Sundays and holidays does not consider Islam celebrations. Important celebrations of the Muslim religion are considered in individual cases insofar as Muslim employees take their legally guaranteed holidays as leave for religious purposes.

Xenophobia, Anti-Muslim and Islamophobia

The existence of anti-Islam and anti-Muslim tendencies in Germany is set against a religious background of bi-denominational monopoly (Baumann: 1999), a cultural background of xenophobia, power structures that control majority/minority relations, and a post-Cold War discourse on the 'clash of civilisations'. As can be seen in the discussions on the status and concerns of Muslims in Germany elsewhere in this report, Islamophobia plays an active role in the enactment, interpretation and portrayal of debates over the place of Islam in Europe. All too often, Islam and its adherents are conceptualised as a threat to Western values or even occidental civilisation, seen as incompatible with European life.

While the term 'Islamophobia' is useful as a coin-phrase referring to ignorance and sometimes panic by elements of Western Christian-based society about the faith and adherents of Islam, it is important to clarify that it is not simply a matter of religious conflict. Tariq Modood defines it as a new kind of cultural racism, in that the Muslims' are identified 'in terms of their non-European descent, in terms of their not being white, and in terms of their perceived culture' (Modood: 1997, 4). In Germany, 'the Muslims' are identified in different contexts as immigrants, or more often 'foreigners', Turks, fundamentalists, terrorists, unemployed, criminal and uncivilised aliens. This 'new racism' combines elements of race, nationhood, religion, history and culture (Vertovec; Peach: 1997).

Fred Halliday, while not denying its existence, notes some problems with the term 'Islamophobia'. The first is that the term misconstrues exactly what is being attacked. Differing from historical attacks on Islam such as in the crusades,

[Islam] is not the enemy now: Islam is not threatening to win large segments of western European society to its faith, as communism did, nor is the polemic, in press, media or political statement, against the Islamic faith ... The attack now is not against *Islam* as faith but *Muslims* as people, the latter grouping together all, especially immigrants, who might be covered by the term (Halliday: 1999, 11-12).

Secondly, the term reproduces the idea that there is a singular 'Islam', a definable and bounded entity, that can be attacked or feared. Therefore, in attempts to dispel Islamophobia, there is talk of opening a dialogue again between the *two sides* in an effort to better understand the other and, therefore, not be afraid of it, rather than a critical engagement around how different faiths treat their members, the role of nationalism, contemporary conflicts, or human rights violations (1999, 13). Halliday suggests that it is perhaps more useful to talk about anti-Muslimism.

There are three ways in which anti-Muslim tendencies are easily demonstrated in Germany: in a xenophobic background and structural discrimination; in responses to terror attacks and the use of anti-Muslim sentiments as political leverage; and in the exclusion of Islam from public space. As some of these topics have been covered in other parts of this report, they will not be addressed in great detail here but just touched on as far as they relate to the overall debate.

Migrants form the largest part of the Muslim population in Germany, beginning with Turkish labour migrants from the 1950s and 1960s and then later refugees, etc. Therefore, a lot of the concerns faced by Muslims in Germany, are the same as those experienced by other migrants. As is the case for many 'foreigners' in Germany, one can see disadvantages Muslims face, compared to the majority German

population, by not having the right 'capital' (Bourdieu) to access education, language skills, employment and housing. This is a result of a delayed and minimal response by German institutions to cater to the needs of migrant populations and their descendants with different cultural, socio-economic and linguistic backgrounds.

Awareness of xenophobia in Germany grew with increasing discussion of immigration flows since the 1980s. A 2002 study conducted by Kohlbacher and Reeger compared xenophobic attitudes of urban Germans and Austrians by measuring their response to statements about: rights to political participation for migrants; inter-ethnic marriage; the need for migrants to 'adapt individual lifestyles'; and that unemployed foreigners should 'go back' (to their country of origin). The study found that 21% of German respondents expressed 'extremely negative' attitudes towards foreigners, with 8% *rating themselves* as 'very racist'. (Kohlbacher and Reeger: 2002, 112-114) While the implications of this study are limited, it is useful to keep such figures in mind when discussing discrimination and anti-Muslimism in Germany.

It is clear that the need to exclude 'the foreigners' drives a lot of policies and attitudes of conservative factions within Germany. As Franz Schonhuber, leader of the right-wing party *Republikaner* declared, 'Never will the green flag of Islam fly over Germany' (cited in Vertovec; Peach: 1997, 5). Similarly it is clear that the German government's attitude of 'neutrality' towards religion is applicable only to the 'indigenous Germans' when they award citizenship rights to 'ethnic' Germans 'returning' from the East but not to 'guest workers' that have lived in Germany for two or three generations (Nielsen: 1997, 269).

The exclusion of Muslims and other migrants from contribution and participation in the socio-economic, cultural

and political milieu of Europe has necessitated different forms of self-organisation - religious groups, refugee assistance, political organisations. Interestingly, the political mobilisation of Muslims around a demand for rights or religious freedom has been interpreted, not as individuals acting within Western democracy but as the 'amassing anti-modernist enemy within' (Vertovec; Peach: 1997, 6).

Debates over the halal slaughtering of animals reveal another aspect of xenophobic, anti-Muslim feeling in Germany. Some critics equated the permitting of this method of slaughter to an undermining of the 'advance in civilisation which [has] characterised the country, the people, and the state up to now' (cited in Leggewie: 2004, 4, my emphasis). In other words, the laws and practices of Islam are viewed by some as primitive and barbaric, threatening to undermine German society and the German legal institutions should not allow this to happen. One is reminded of the myths of sacrifice and blood rituals directed at different times in history towards Jews, Catholics or witches and used to justify persecution, murder and torture.

Is it important to note that the terms Muslim, Turkish and migrant are not interchangeable. It is true that a large proportion of the Muslim population in Germany are Turkish migrants, but this does not give a full picture. It is a problem for research in this area when state bodies interchange the terms Turkish and Muslim - inaccurate figures are gathered and a false impression is given about how the Muslims, as a homogenous entity, can be represented and by whom. The fact though, that such terms are seen as interchangeable by German authorities, and also by the German public, is perhaps indicative of current attitudes. There is a sense that the specifics of the group being discussed do not really matter (foreign, Muslim, migrant, etc.) - what matters is that they are different, they are other.

Terror and Political Leverage

Terrorist attacks by Muslim extremist groups have sparked new outbreaks of anti-Muslim behaviour in Germany. Following terrorist attacks the head of the CDU for Niedersachsen, Christian Wulff, called for video surveillance in mosques to combat the terrorist threat in Germany. Without hesitation, a direct link is made here between terrorists and the people that by name only, share the same faith and are living in Germany.

Prominent Muslims have come forward in response both to the terrorist attacks and to these alarmist responses. Nadeem Elyas of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany made several statements in the press in an effort to dispel some of the misconceptions perpetuated by the press and politicians. It was necessary for him to insist that the Islam associated with terrorists is a misuse of religion; they represent the very periphery of not only Islam but of society and have nothing to do with the beliefs and faith of the core of Muslims (translated and paraphrased from www.dradio.de, 17.03.2004). He added that since the Madrid attacks, 80 mosques and 1,000 apartments and offices have been searched in Germany, but nothing found. Elyas argues that actions like this and the requests for video surveillance in mosques do not offer protection from terrorism, but intensify conflict by further segregating the Muslim people, making them feel alienated and under suspicion. Elyas sees a danger in the governments' current responses – they are introducing aggressive sanctions against Muslim communities to fight the threat of terrorism but not doing anything to build trust or cooperation. He argues that more needs to be done to integrate the core Muslim population.

The threat of terrorism and anti-Islam sentiments have been used by conservative politicians in Germany as political leverage in relation to different issues. Edmund Stoiber, head of the CSU, has said that their agreement to immigration law which the CSU sees as being too liberal depends on the tightening of security measures. They have blocked this immigration law for some time, but can now utilise panic over terrorism to support their position. Similarly, in a fairly stark display of xenophobic and anti-Islam attitudes, the CDU/CSU has objected to Turkey's accession to the EU on the grounds that as a majority Muslim country, Turkey simply does not fit into European society. Fear of an influx of illegal labour migrants is combined with a rigid definition of Europe as Christian territory.

Exclusion of Islam from Public Space

While objections to the building and placement of mosques and the call to prayer of the muezzin have taken the form of practical objections (noise pollution, traffic flow, parking problems, etc.), it is clear that these are other underlying concerns. In disputes on building a mosque in Mannheim in the 1990s, for example, the main issues surrounded whether a mosque could occupy a site in the centre of the city and how big the minaret could be. Eventually, it was decided that the mosque could be erected in the city centre, but only with a minaret half the height of the neighbouring Catholic Church tower (Baumann: 1999, 4). Similarly, while an agreement between Berlin public authorities and Muslim representatives upheld the right of Muslims to run mosques and madrassas, limits were maintained on the call to prayers from a muezzin. Neighbours could no longer object to building permits for mosques provided

they complied with local building regulations, but the call to prayer from a muezzin was not accorded the same rights as the ringing of bells from Christian churches (Robbers: 2000, 149).

Such social conflicts over the public and visible presence of Islam in Germany bring into light the 'unspoken hierarchy of legitimacy to claim space in the public domain' (Baumann: 1999, 1) and reflect a relevantly recent shift to religious plurality. Public space that is needed for the practice and expression of religion is not neutral, rather, 'a normative space, bitterly defended by its dominant groups' (Baumann: 1999, 5) and access to it is controlled by legislation. In Germany the Protestant and Catholic churches are the dominant groups and Muslims must fight against this for recognition. However, as Baumann argues, such debates can actually contribute in the long term to a religion being publicly incorporated and acknowledged - it's invisibility is removed (1999, 3-4).

Unavoidable Anti-Muslimism

The differential or hierarchical allocation of rights to public space reflects a major resistance to the open expression of Islam in Germany. The use of anti-Muslim sentiments as a political tool to justify increased surveillance of populations or tighter immigration controls encourages and reflects pre-existing xenophobic, mono-cultural tendencies in Germany. On a grand scale, academics, politicians and public debate have suggested that Islam provides a new enemy of scapegoat for social and economic problems. As Nielsen observes, 'the collapse of the Communist empire could easily come to be regarded as the trigger for new mass migration, from the East in which the 'peril' is not

yellow or red but Muslim' (1997, 272). The dangerous reality is that, far from being an abstract concept, such attitudes promote acts of violence and discrimination and are used to justify the denial of rights and civil liberties. And as Halliday (1999) rightly acknowledged, the definition of the problem in such biblical proportions, even the use of the word 'Islamophobia' itself can remove responsibility for such acts from politicians, the media, or members of the general public, and create an impression that a change in attitudes is not possible, that this dichotomy of 'them and us' is unavoidable.

Current Political Issues

Islamic Christian Relations

Starting in the 1960s and continuing on into the present, the large number of Muslims living in Germany, a country whose population is overwhelmingly Christian, has led to the realisation that a need for tolerance and intercultural dialogue is necessary. This has become especially evident as the image of Islam as a social and political force among Muslim immigrant groups expands, leaving Germans - the dominant cultural group - to be confronted with myriad social challenges.

In the last years, through intercultural exchanges and inter-religious dialogue, the German government has been focussing intensively on the question of how to create a more balanced relationship between the Christian and Muslim communities. It was recognised that measures towards integrating the Muslim community in Germany are necessary and can best be observed through the recent attempts toward Islam-oriented initiatives that engage

in furthering communication and understanding among confessions. The *Christian-Islamische Begegnung Ruhr* (CIB) (Christian-Islamic Encounters in Ruhr), based in Essen, offers one example of an organisation that has been active in organising such initiatives as it continuously seeks an exchange with various confessions. This is evidenced in its many activities: in organising discussion groups, slide shows and presentations as well as arranging visits to the local Christian and Islamic communities. Other such organisations have recently begun dealing with controversial issues in order to raise attention to not only the differences, but also the similarities among the various confessions in Germany. In discussing topics, such as the public religious corporation status, burial facilities, religion education, religious clothing traditions in public spaces, the building of mosques, etc., an attempt is made to gain additional insight and understanding into the problems relating to the various religious practices, while focussing on the Islamic perspective.

Based on research compiled by Zusanna Krysztofik of BIVS, Islam in Germany is dominated by Turkish groups, with origins in German Islam or with exiled Islamic sects who were persecuted in the Republic of Turkey. The immigrants coming from a more or less secular background were commonly guided by Muslim students and refugees. "The majority of these religious students had emigrated from anti-secular milieus and belonged to religious associations in exile. They created a public space for Muslim immigrants' religious activities" (Krysztofik: s.a.). As a result, the students effectively developed a network of Islamic worship in many West German university cities and in West Berlin.

As such, political Islam offers social protection within the difficult and disconcerting process of migration and

cultural integration. Since an increasing number of immigrants believe their countries of origin can no longer legitimately represent them, formal and informal Muslim organisations have assumed a crucial role in achieving both collective and individual recognition within the European cultural mainstream. As immigrants seek and adopt German citizenship, Islamic networks and affiliations have gained in popularity, often serving as intermediary structures representing the unique educational and doctrinal interests of many diverse Muslim communities. In 2002, for example, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany took a stance on this issue by publishing an Islamic Charter, hereby, examining the fine line between constitutional and religious commitment. "Advocates of the Charter considered the declaration to be a milestone on the road to integration" (Kryzstofik: s.a.). According to the Chairman of the Central Council, Nadeem Elyas, this Charter is supposedly the first document within Europe that strives for a societal and inter-religious dialogue. While German political party representatives and the Christian church have responded positively to the Charter, several Islam experts have criticised it, though the Islamic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany supports it.

Prior to the September 11th terror attack in the USA, attention had already been drawn to the topic of Islamic Christian relations. Initial inter-religious dialogues began as early as the 1980s. In 1982, for instance, the Christian Islamic Society in North Rhine-Westphalia (CIG) was established in Iserlohn. The CIG has meanwhile (since 1990) become a national federation, consisting of over 100 members, within and outside of the country, who are active in both local dialogue and as acting members in their faith communities. Both Catholic and Protestant Christians are listed under its membership. Those without religious con-

viction are not denied membership, but they do not represent the target group of participants. The CIG is considered to be an open federation of Christians and Muslims of various different confessions and professions of faith, who are loyal to their own faith, but, likewise, are tolerant to the beliefs of others. The CIG acts independently of political parties, encouraging the level of understanding and communication between Christians and Muslims as well as the Christian church and Islamic community. Necessary for such inter-religious dialogues is the prerequisite that religious statements or opinions about Judaism, Christianity and Islam are not voiced. Tolerance and openness are necessary elements for a common exchange and for securing a safe environment in which to do so.

The *Kölnische Gesellschaft für Christlich-Jüdische Zusammenarbeit* (Cologne Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation) has also participated in several ecumenical events, such as the *Trialogtagung* (conference) in Cologne, which was concerned with promoting unity among churches or religions. At the communal level, the *Christlich-Islamische Arbeitsgemeinschaft Marl* (Christian-Islamic Working Community in Marl) has also been active since 1984 in North Rhine-Westphalia. This working community, likewise, aims to facilitate encounters between the religious communities and their members in effort to achieve intercultural learning and living, cooperating together in schools, youth centres, networking projects and spreading publicity to the cause, among other things. Many of these organisations also work further in counselling and the collaboration with communal political topics that are relevant to religious and inter-religious activities, such as mosque building, burial facilities, sanctuaries in hospitals, etc. (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 116).

Other ecumenical groups in Germany or those focussing specifically on Christian Islamic relations exist in Stutt-

gart, Pforzheim and in Franconia, among others. In Westphalia, for example, an inter-religious organisation, known as INTR^oA, founded in 1989, aims to work towards a better understanding between religions. Additional local initiatives intended to advance ecumenical exchange can be further witnessed through the seminars hosted by the *Islamische Bund Dortmund* (Islamic Federation of Dortmund), as it has a working group that concentrates on the topic of inter-religious dialogue. Additional organisations cooperating on this common goal are led by the Anti-Racism Forum of Dortmund, “Pax an!” together with the Catholic Forum of Dortmund. The German church academies are eager to initiate religious community group discussions. The Protestant academy in both Iserlohn and Loccum, for example, have also been particularly dedicated to this topic. Education teachers, theologians and others working in the culturally dominant confessions have been encouraged to participate in training seminars that have adopted highlights on various aspects of Islam. Furthermore, many books and other forms of publications, including speeches and presentations relating to the topic have been disseminated and publicised. In 1997, mosques also began the action of ‘Tag der offenen Tür’, meaning: day of open doors, or effectively: open house, in an effort to invite people and engage them, especially those unfamiliar with Islam to join in dialogue. This ‘officially’ takes place in Germany every October 3rd. A variety of other organisations interested in promoting similar activities are mentioned below:

- Christlich-Islamische Begegnung - Dokumentationsstelle (CIBEDO) (Christian-Islamic Encounters - Documentation Office), located in Frankfurt am Main;
- the foundation *Apfelbaum* (Apple Tree) hosts a learning project for coevolution and integration in Cologne;

- the European Network of Buddhist-Christian Studies, of the Benedictine Abby in St. Ottilien near Munich;
- the European Association for World Religions in Education (EAWRE) in Hamburg;
- the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) in Stuttgart;
- the Catholic Academy in Schwerte;
- the Protestant Academy in Iserlohn;
- the Islam Institute for German and Turkish Integration Studies and Intercultural Work in Mannheim;
- the Comenius Institute hosts a Protestant work site for education in Münster;
- the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* in Bonn posts articles relating to the topic online;
- the University of Dortmund offers Protestant Theology courses on the topic of society, science, philosophy and theology;
- the Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena teaches religion classes; and
- the *Arbeitsstelle Interreligiöses Lernen* (AiL) works in association with Protestant Theology classes at the University of Duisburg/Essen.

Recognition as a Religious Corporation

In order to be recognised as a public religious corporation, necessary agreements of a public legal character, leading to the fulfilment of common responsibilities, organised by its members and to a social entity as a substrate of the legal body are required. Some commonly recognised state organised public corporations include those that deal with regional authorities, personal associations, such as a chamber of trade, or bar associations, and special purpose

associations, such as communal alliances. These state organised corporations are comparable to religious associations as far as the role the members play in their development and implementation. In the scope of Art. 137 WRV, the freedom of religious choice and assembly is explicitly protected. In combination with the warranty for the right of self-determination, the character of a public corporation implies that the scope of religious societies be respected. Only as long as the state legal system is affected, will the character of a public corporation assert the associated state legal supervisions.

The Federal Ministry of Interior is responsible within the federal government for matters concerning *Staatskirchenrecht* (state church rights) and questions regarding the relations to the church, religious communities and *Weltanschauungsgemeinschaften* (worldview communities). The Federal Ministry of Interior is excluded from such responsibility concerning matters associated with the new religious groups and ideological communities or psychological groups. Instead the *Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend* (Federal Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women and Youth) are supposed to deal with these latter named groups.

Once an organisation gains the status as a public corporation, then certain advantages will be gained and specified responsibilities demanded. The recognition of a legal status as a religious corporation allows groups to tax their members, for instance. If the Islamic religious community could gain this status, then it could collect *Kirchensteuer* (church taxes - or in this regard, Muslim corporation taxes). The specific mandates required of a corporation include: the verification as an ongoing justified association; fulfilment of one of the minimum standards certifying an organisational structure; and a stake within the scope of

basic law that the purpose for establishing the association is affirmed in its basic intent. In other words, the Islamic community would need to certify that its purpose for establishing a public religious corporation be based in its goal of celebrating a common religion.

With this accomplished, certain rights would then be connected to the recognised status of a public religious corporation, though these rights differentiate between religious organisations and *Hochschulen* (university level institutions), social insurance, chamber of trades, etc. For instance, state funding can be awarded to schools and charitable and social activities so that they can be established and led. The right to establish a kindergarten is also permitted. Public corporations are further acknowledged the right to receive direct and indirect state grants and they are granted special taxation rights, including exemptions or reductions in paying certain fees and taxes (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 107). For religious organisations, however, the role of controlling the corporation does not come under state power, as they are protected under Art. 4 in the constitutional law from state interference (Art. 137 Abs. 6 WRV, Grundgesetz).

The German government attempts to achieve a solid and cooperative partnership with the church and religious communities in Germany, as well as with other social organisations and associations. After all, the government promotes the social engagement and charitable work of its citizens, encouraging their active participation in maintaining democratic standards. This can be observed in the recognition granted the two main Christian confessions as they continue to plan an important role socially and politically in Germany. The government repeatedly turns to them, valuing their stance on a number of political issues, mainly those of ethnic and social concerns, such as

questions of genetic cloning, asylum and refugee policies, among other things. The two main Christian confessions, however, are the only two that have successfully acquired recognition as a public corporation in Germany, though the Jewish Community, the Greek Orthodox Church and the New Apostolic Church have benefited from certain advantages that such a public corporate status would bring. Islamic organisations, on the other hand, have been fruitlessly attempting for some time now to gain this recognised status, but to no avail.

Though recognition as a public corporation is officially open to all religious communities as long as they fulfil specific laid out requirements, the reality of achieving this feat is not so easy. In Germany, Islamic umbrella organisations typically have the status as an incorporated association, yet continuously struggle to acquire recognition as a public corporation. Despite the many applications they have submitted since the 1970s in an effort to gain the status of a public corporation, these umbrella organisations either receive only rejections or no results at all. This is attributed to the fact that there is no safeguard in assuring the continual number of members, the lack of historical relevance of the association in Germany, the lack of just one binding contact person or leader, the reality of the various subgroups detracting from the overall common goal necessary for the recognition of a public corporation, etc. Gerhard Robbers suggests another reason for this and stresses its subtlety, "Constitutional requirements for public corporate status for religious groups presume a structure of organisation easily compatible with, and in reality springing from, the very tradition of Christian life" (Robbers: 2000, 151). As such, the dominant German culture does not recognise the social and religious structures of Islam which do not have the official hierarchical structure of the Christian churches.

Again this seems indicative of Germany's relatively recent experience of religious plurality. The question remains as to whether the Islamic umbrella organisations have any hope of eventually becoming recognised as public corporations, enabling them the same advantages as Catholic and Protestant umbrella organisations in Germany. Robbers predicts that legal positions will change the longer Muslims live in Germany and as their numbers increase.

It would be particularly interesting for the Islamic community to obtain the recognised status of a public corporation, as they would then benefit from a variety of legal rights that would be to their advantage. For instance, according to § 9 Para. 2 P. 1 Nr. 8 of the GJS legal code, this and similar rights to participation would grant the Muslim community a wealth of possibilities to become more involved in participating in processes of interest to the entire society and as such to become more integrated. Based on § 19 I of the *Bundessozialhilfegesetz* (BSGH), since churches and religious organisations are simultaneously considered to be responsible bodies for the welfare of its organisations under public law, this would enable the Muslim community the assurance that it no longer needs to apply to be recognised as a body responsible for running a charitable Islamic organisation. Even more important would be their ability, according to § 1 Para. 5 P. 2 Nr. 6 of the legal building codes, to build and establish their own mosques and sanctuaries, taking into special account the need for parking spaces on Fridays and Muslim religious holidays. Along with this would be their ability to establish Islamic organisations, including Islamic burial grounds and funeral homes. They would be able to influence and share responsibility in devising the lesson plan and monitoring the regular attendance of religious education in public schools, which would, likewise, affect the training of reli-

gious education teachers. Gaining recognition as a public corporation would bring many advantages to the Islamic organisations, similar to the benefits gleaned from the two confessions organised in Germany already recognised as public corporations. Although there is not an inalienable religious need for the Islamic associations to become recognised public corporations, they would, nevertheless, be gaining not unimportant benefits connected with this status.

According to the *Zentralrat der Muslimen* (Central Council of the Muslims in Germany), it is without doubt that Islam represents a religion within the context of Art. 4 GG. Just as much as Christianity does, the religion of Islam consists of a religious community (Cavdar: 1998). According to legal standards, only those members submitting an application for recognition as a public corporation should be included as members of the religious community, rather than applying to all of the Muslims in Germany. Yet, the argument prevails that there are too many subgroups of Muslims, thus, preventing the recognition of Islam as just one religious community. Further arguments have been used to explain why Islamic umbrella organisations are consistently denied the status as a public corporation. These consist of:

- the notion that Islam in its collective is not organised;
- the Islamic community does not consist of a personal association, but instead as an *anstaltsähnliche Erscheinung* (seeming like an institute);
- the Islamic community does not have a specific, different from other Islamic communities religious profession of faith; and
- there is lack of instances that bind a decision in issues of faith (certified) (Cavdar: 1998).

Ibrahim Cavdar, General Secretary of the *Zentralrat der Muslime* (Central Council of the Muslims in Germany), explained that the fears expressed regarding the divisions between Muslims or even internal Islamic contentions are ill-founded, further highlighting the fact that Muslims have a different relationship to their religion than do the Christians and so should not be compared on the same basis.

While realising that the recognised status of Islamic organisations as public corporations alone will not automatically lead to the relinquishing of fears regarding the Islamic community, nor will this group suddenly encounter respect and recognition through this status, nonetheless, Cavdar maintains that the recognition as a public corporation is significant and should be striven towards. Through this acknowledgement, a more comprehensive balance for the Islamic community would result in their achieving equal opportunities as far as confirming a political status among the other recognised public corporate religious communities. In addition, the Islamic community could benefit from being fully included in the state religion subsidies and, finally, the participation and the formation of an integration politics with significant effects may eventually unfold (Cavdar: 1998).

Islamic Burial Facilities in Germany

According to Islamic traditions, the corpse of a Muslim tends to be washed according to long-withstanding ritual and then wrapped in white shrouds. Members of the Muslim community carry out this ritual treatment as soon as possible after the death. The length of material for the shroud varies depending on whether the person is a Sunni

or Alawite. The shroud length is usually 10 metres for a Sunni and 40 metres for an Alawite. The shroud in which a corpse is wrapped is symbolic of the manner in which a new born child is Muslim wrapped. After death, Muslims are naked when wrapped in the shroud, which has no pockets, symbolising that a person does not take any possessions along in the afterlife. In most Islamic countries, no coffin is used in the burial – considering the amount of material used, the thinnest Muslim, wrapped in the shroud, would barely fit in a coffin. In this sense, exceptions from the typical German burial standards are made for the Muslim community only in regard to carrying out a burial without the coffin. Every other type of burial practised in Germany according to Islamic tradition is considered an exception to the rule and is only permitted in emergency situations, such as when dangers of contagion exist, the earth is too muddy, or there is risk of flooding.

According to Islamic tradition, the burial should follow in adherence to Islam provisions shortly after the washing of the corpse. In the world of Islam, this should happen within 24 hours after the passing. These, regulations, however, do not coincide with the provisions in Germany, though the waiting period can sometimes be altered in Germany in order to incorporate Islamic tradition. Because it is usually so warm in the native countries, this 24 hour period is very important to maintain. In Germany, however, with cooling houses, etc., the time limit is less significant, which is problematic to the Muslim community who wants to maintain its burial traditions.

Following the washing and wrapping of the corpse, an Imam says the prayer and the men carry the corpse to the grave, followed by the rest of the Muslim community. Only seldom are women prevented from attending the burial. Usually everyone, including children are allowed

to attend. The wrapped corpse is then lowered and covered with dirt. Sometimes a gravestone is placed with an inscription of the person's name and date of birth and death, sometimes also with a verse. But since the grave sites should not represent the luxury of life, simple graves and anonymity are encouraged. Because Muslim cemeteries are supposed to be sanctuaries of the afterlife or hereafter, the Muslim cemetery should be a quiet area, separated from other municipal graves. In their own cemeteries, the Muslim graves need to adhere to spatially separate graves, meaning they are divided from the other graves, not belonging to their faith. The individual graves should be arranged so that the corpse is facing the direction of Mecca. There is no differentiation according to gender.

Carrying out traditional Islamic burials in Germany, however, has seldom transpired in the past as many submitted applications for a burial according to Muslim custom have been denied since the municipal cemeteries are commonly intended for Christians only. Based on statistics from July 2003, around 230,000 Muslims were living in Berlin and around 3.2 million Muslims were living in Germany (*Die Tageszeitung*, 18.11.03). 90% of the Muslims who die in Germany are transported back to their native countries to be buried, although they would actually prefer to be buried in Germany. However, based on a variety of studies, only a small number of Muslims could imagine finding eternal peace when buried in Germany (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23.07.03). According to empirical data collected, Muslim migrants living in Germany would actually prefer to bury the deceased here in Germany, if only there was compliance with the traditional Islamic requirements. Based on gathered statistics by the Centre for Turkish Studies, of the 2000 Muslims interviewed, 5% could imagine being buried in Germany. Yet 68% expressed the

desire to have their own cemeteries (according to Islamic customs) established and 11% would be satisfied simply with the possibility of being buried in municipal cemeteries that are in accordance with Islamic burial traditions. Of the Muslims interested in being buried in Turkey, 19% would not even consider being buried in Germany, while 71% prefer having their own Islamic burial facilities and 8% would be prepared to undergo an alternative burial ceremony (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 111).

Most Muslims would not even consider being buried in a grave site in a Christian or atheist cemetery and this is one reason why many Muslims return to their countries of origin to bury the deceased.

Thomas Lemmen, theologian and Islam-specialist in the *Christlich-Islamischen Gesellschaft* (Christian-Islamic Society) has named several additional reasons why Muslims end up being buried in their native countries. The first generation of migrants want to return home at least to be buried as they often fail to do so prior to their death. Beyond this, the transportation and the burial of the corpse is still less expensive than if the corpse were to be buried in Germany. While a funeral in Germany may cost up to 5,000, a transfer to the native country may only cost between 2,500 to 2,800 (*Scheinschlag*, 09/03). Furthermore, the Islamic organisations earn well on the business of transporting corpses. The transport itself is difficult as it the corpse must be facing the direction of Mecca, which is not easy to arrange, yet many family members of the deceased prefer this option to having their loved one buried in Germany according to German burial customs. Currently, around 80% of the Muslim deceased are being transferred back to their countries of origin. This has decreased slightly in the last ten years, as it was around 95% then (*Die Tageszeitung*, 18,11.03).

Generally speaking, the Muslim communities in Germany are eager to implement Islamic burial facilities in Germany, but according to their traditions. Volkan Coskun, manager of the Islamic section of the Ahorn-Grieneisen Cemetery in Germany, argued that more Muslims would have been willing to have their loved ones buried in German cemeteries, such as that in Gatow had their citizenship rights been granted earlier than they were; they would have felt more rooted and connected to Germany and as such been willing to be buried here (*Die Tageszeitung*, 18,11.03). For this reason, it is no surprise that the majority of Muslims who are buried in Germany tend to be younger, second and third generation migrants; or those receiving social welfare and can not afford to be flown home. The state commonly assumes the costs of burying those receiving social welfare. Though the Administrative Court of Berlin decided in 1992 that "social security funds would have to pay for the costs of the ritual washing of a dead body of a Muslim if their Muslim relatives wanted it washed on religious grounds", the court has refused to cover the costs of transporting the body back into the native country (Ferrari; Bradney: 2000).

As groups become more active in asserting their desire to be buried according to Islamic tradition, initiatives are spreading, primarily led by local mosque associations to achieve this. For instance, the majority of bigger Islamic umbrella organisations have established a fund for sponsoring burials in accordance with Islamic tradition by transporting the deceased back to their homelands to be buried. These organisations have agreed to pay annual fees that are collected and then later used for the transfer of the corpse and the organisation of the burial in the native country. Additionally, these groups have been forming a more expressive lobby group in Germany, calling attention

to their burial needs and attempting to expand the number of independent Islamic burial facilities. Mohammed Herzog, Imam and member of the German speaking Muslim community in Berlin, who has been running an Islamic burial facility in Germany for 19 years already, argues that God made the whole world and it should not matter where one is buried, whether in Germany or Turkey, as long as one can be buried according to his beliefs (*Die Tageszeitung*, 18.11.03).

Other than the two Islamic cemeteries in Berlin there are few other exceptions of there being independent Islamic burial facilities in Germany. One cemetery is on Columbiadamm in Templehof and the other is located in the Landschaftsfriedhof Gatow. At Columbiadamm, however, burials have not been permitted for the last century. At Gatow near Spandau, the *Türkisch-Islamische-Union* (DIT-IB) was permitted a small plot in 1988 for Islamic burials, facing in the direction of Mecca. Despite its separate Muslim section and washrooms, only one fifth of the Muslims living in Berlin have been buried here. Already the third plot of this designated area is nearly half full.

Although the Muslim community has been attempting to increase the capacities of the municipal cemeteries in Germany to permit burials in accordance to Islamic rituals, having still not acquired the right to be recognised as a public corporation, many Muslims in Germany are prevented from executing such burial traditions. The city and community object to the notion of Muslims running their own independent burial facility based in Islamic tradition since within the realm of constitutional law, and burial and cemetery laws, only those confessions that have been granted the status of a public corporation should be permitted to act as a body responsible for managing a cemetery (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23.07.03). Nadeem Elyas, the

Chairman of the Central Consistory of Muslims, explained that the number of applications that had been submitted to acquire plots for Muslim burials had been denied as the city did not perceive them as durable responsible bodies. This has been met with much consternation by the Muslim community as they criticise the meagre attempt towards integration.

The embedding of a corpse in just a shroud, minus a coffin is only tolerated in a few areas in Germany. As Muslims are fearful of not being properly buried in the German cemeteries, especially with respect to assuring eternal rest according to Islamic customs, an attempt to place more pressure on implementing possibilities, allowing Islamic burial traditions has been made. The majority of facilities, however, prescribe burial in a coffin, although, burial in just a shroud is permitted in both Essen and Aachen (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 111). Further German cemeteries that either have a separate section for Muslim grave sites or are in the planning include, in addition to Berlin, Marburg, Karlsruhe, Krefeld-Elfrath, Lübeck, Paderborn and Saarbrücken, while Islamic funeral homes are in Berlin, Bielefeld, Dortmund, Düsseldorf, Essen, Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg, Cologne, and Paderborn (www.muslimmarkt.de). As is common in Germany after a certain period of time, graves will be levelled, allowing the space to be used for other purposes, such as for schools, parking houses or factories. This routine act led to a conflict in Cologne a few years ago as the Muslim community argued that the eternal rest of those buried was being disturbed, thus, going against Islamic tradition. The compromising resolution was to allow the Muslim family members of the deceased to pay additional fees in order to retain the grave site in their undisturbed form. Apparently, however, only one person acted on this offer, thus, leaving the impression

among the dominant populace that little need exists for a special Muslim cemetery.

The new burial law for North Rhine-Westphalia, going into effect in September 2002, responded to the need among the Muslim community to respect Islamic burial traditions. This new law allowed for Muslims to be buried without a coffin and incorporated protections to assure eternal rest after burial (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 23.07.03). By recognising the interests of the Muslim community, despite the wishes of the German funeral directors, the North Rhine-Westphalia government sent a message that it was at least attempting to respond to the interests of the Islamic community, which is an important first step in integration. In another attempt to respond to this need, the city of Hamburg also agreed to permit burials without a coffin for those groups whose worldview or religion requires this. By 2002, there were 70 burial grounds belonging to municipal cemeteries designated to Muslims (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 111). Although these examples can be perceived as small steps forward to accepting the Islamic community in Germany, until they obtain power to run their own cemeteries and celebrate eternal peace according to Muslim tradition, then these small steps on behalf of the German government can only be interpreted as symbolic gestures, merely attempting to pacify the Muslim community, rather than truly meeting its members' needs.

Islamic Religious Education

While the implementation of Islamic school classes in the Netherlands and Great Britain has long been enforced by Muslim minority communities, the question of offering Islamic religion classes in public schools in Germany

continues to be strongly debated, while fears of extremist Islamic teachings in the private schools in Germany are rampant. Disaccords abound in Germany regarding 'which Islam' should be instructed as well as 'how' to teach this. Although religious education in state schools is a constitutional right in Germany, a hesitancy still exists as far as implementing these courses.

As a response to this, various organisations in Germany have become active in pursuing and implementing religious Islamic education classes. The most active consist of the following two associations: the laical oriented Turkish Federation and the religious oriented Islamic Federation Berlin (IFB), an organisation dominated by Milli Görüs (s.a).

The discussion pertaining to the implementation of Islamic religion classes in German schools extends back to the 1980s. Throughout the different federal states in Germany and within the realm of the *Mutterspachliche Ergänzungsunterricht* (MEU) (native tongue complimentary courses), religious instruction has been offered to children of the Islamic faith (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 95). The facilitation of these MEU courses were often motivated and supported by agreements between the countries of origin of the migrants living in Germany and the individual federal states (for example, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein and Bremen). Participation in these courses as well as the implementation of teaching material from the country of origins continues to be offered on a voluntary basis.

Currently, the state is obliged to pay for the religious education class that is set within the school curriculum as long as there is a certain number of pupils of any one denomination within the same school. The content of this religion lesson should adhere to the state breeding and educational goals as well as the composition of the respective

religious communities. Both Protestant and Catholic religious communities, the only two religions recognised as public corporations, act as powerful instruments that, likewise, influence political and social structures in Germany; these religions tend to be more easily incorporated in the school lessons and are, thus, perceived as the traditional religions implied in basic law. Though religious freedom should be guaranteed under the constitution, it has been argued in the past that this guarantee applies only to the Christian religions or “to the religions traditionally present within western Europe, thus, excluding Islam” (Robbers: 2000, 148). In this sense, the question of Islam as an equally recognised religion has instigated years of debate, especially as far as its implementation in public religious education classes. Because very few Islamic religion classes have thus far been imposed in the public schools in Germany (which is also dependent on the ruling of each particular federal state), controversial debates relating to this topic have been abundant and highly publicised through the media in recent years. This is in part due to the increasing tendency of Muslim migrants becoming German citizens, who still want to maintain their cultural and religious traditions.

Focussing on Berlin, a nearly twenty year debate between the federation and the responsible authorities and politicians on whether to authorise the teaching of Islamic religion classes or not has prevailed. According to Art. 7 Para. 3, “there is a right for pupils and their parents as well as for religious communities to have religious education within public schools as an ordinary subject” (Robbers: 2000, 151). With this guarantee, the *Islamische Föderation Berlin* (IFB) (Islamic Federation in Berlin) submitted the first application with the *Senatsschulverwaltung* (Senate School Administration) in 1980 in effort to obtain this permission to teach about Islam. Had the application

been accepted, the IFB would have been responsible for the entire organisation of teaching Islamic religion classes (including the preparation of curriculum and the appointment of teaching staff), which is based on Art. 141 GG, and is necessary for special regulations for the organisation of religion classes in Berlin (as well as in Bremen, Hamburg und Brandenburg). With this, it was declared that the aforementioned federal states were not required to adhere to the organisation of religion classes in public schools. Instead, it was decided that religion classes be offered by the respective churches or religious communities as soon as there was a minimum number of pupils belonging to the same confession. Based on this, the state authorities became responsible for the testing and admittance of lesson plans as well as for the partial financing of the teaching staff, but not for the content of the religious lessons.

Based on the high number of Muslim children living in Germany, it is certain that Islamic groups do indeed have the right to Muslim religious lessons within public schools just as the two other dominant confessions in Germany do. Based on collected statistics, 7% of the 850,000 Muslim children and adolescents in Germany attend Koran schools. Nearly all Muslim parents (97%) welcome Islamic religious instruction in state schools. Yet, the lack of Islamic religious education in the schools is often attributed to the fact that state authorities are unable to “find any official representatives of Muslim religious communities to set the religious content of the curriculum and to recommend appropriate teachers” (Robbers: 2000, 152). Furthermore, dissent among the various Islamic religious groups on what exactly should be taught has also prevented their implementation.

After the IFB submitted its application to organise the Islamic religion courses, the rejection was attributed to

the fact that it had no religious community in accordance with § 23 of the Berlin School Law, but instead represented a 'political' and 'cultural' group. Following an appeal to this decision, the *Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin* (Higher Administrative Court in Berlin) granted the IFB in November 1997 the recognised status of a religious community. An administrative appeal by the Senate School Administration extended the legal debate until the judgement ensued on 23 February 2000. With this, the IFB was adjudicated the right to issue religion classes (*Das Parlament*, 17.03.2000). The skeleton framework that the IFB needed to submit in order to gain authorisation was rejected three times by the Senate School Administration in the ensuing years, however, as it was criticised, especially for its lack in emphasising the equal positioning between men and women or of highlighting religious freedom in the learning concept (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 03.09.2001).

In the middle of August 2001, the IFB submitted a speedy application for the issuance and permission to teach in effort to implement the religion courses by the start of the school year 2001/2002 (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30.08.2001). The Administrative Court in Berlin granted the IFB the right on 29 August 2001 to begin teaching according to plan (*Berliner Zeitung*, 30.08.2001). Prior to this result, the IFB had threatened School Senator with a fine of 100,000 in case the decision was further delayed (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 02.08.2001).

Despite accusations by the authorities, it could not be proven in the end that the critiques of the skeleton framework were attributed to the fact that the responsible politician of the SPD party wanted to gain time (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 29.11.2000). The IFB has been accused by a variety of groups (the Turkish Federation Berlin-Brandenburg (TBB) and the Cultural Centre for Anatolischer Alawites

(AAKM) and various representatives of the Berlin SPD, CDU, and the Green Parties as well as by the Union for Education and Science (GEW) to have connections to the Islamic organisation Milli Görüs (IGMG). The IFB, however, has been observed by the protection of the constitution and as such stands behind, as an example, the association *Islam Kolleg Berlin e.V.* (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 09.12.2001). The latter, responsible for a private Islamic elementary school since 1995, has been considered, following the judgement of the Berlin District Court as a “tarn organisation for Milli Görüs”. In the proceedings of the Islam Kolleg Berlin e.V., the outcome was decided against the *Tageszeitung* (daily paper). The IFB has been classified by the *Bundesverfassungsgericht* (Federal Constitutional Court) to be an extremist group, which again stands under observation (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 06.09.2001). This highlights another reason perceived as to why delays in the implementation of Islamic religion education courses in the public schools have transpired.

According to Gerhard Robbers, “There is an [...] urgent need for religious education within public schools, since there is great concern that if religious education is not provided within state schools, pupils will only be taught religious matters in private schools which may teach an Islam in which is extremist and fundamentalist” (Robbers: 2000, 152).

This legal account and the particular reputation of the *Islamische Föderation in Berlin* (IFB) (Islamic Federation in Berlin) highlight some of the concerns surrounding the teaching of Islam in public schools in Germany, especially considering the role the IFB has played in steering the notion of introducing Islamic religious education classes in German schools. Since the IFB is only recognised as the regional umbrella organisation by a small part of the Mus-

lms in the Berlin region, many Muslim groups themselves further question the legitimacy of the IFB (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 96). Meanwhile, individual federal states have begun to develop new models of teaching religion classes, though these vary greatly from one another.

The question of language instruction has also led to a controversies. While many argue that these courses must be taught in German, a greater number of Muslims, especially the Turkish among them, prefer having these religion classes instructed in the student's native language. A model pilot project was implemented in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1999/2000 to teach such religion classes in German. By 2003/2004, Islamic religion classes were also implemented in German in Baden-Wuerttemberg (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 96). Based on statistics from the Islamic Federation for the 2003/04 school year, Islamic religion lessons are offered by thirty schools in Berlin. The majority of which are located in Kreuzberg (12), followed by Wedding (8). In Neukölln, there are five schools, four in Schoeneberg four, and one in Spandau. Further efforts were made in Bavaria and in Hamburg as well. In Hamburg, the development of introducing religion classes attempted to widen the curriculum to include a 'religion for everyone'. By creating an inter-religious religion class, members of different confessions and professions of faith were targeted in effort to create more understanding and tolerance among the participants, while at the same time, strengthening their already existing religious values and beliefs (Sen; Aydin: 2002, 95).

In order to introduce and implement religion classes, the teachers naturally need to be qualified and proficient in the subject matter, which relates to another difficulty surrounding this issue. A lack in the number of teachers having a deeper knowledge of Islamic teachings has been

evidenced. Furthermore, when an aim is to offer classes such as the one described above in Hamburg, much is demanded of the teacher who should have a grasp on at least Islamic, Christian and Jewish theology and religious teaching, in addition to any other applicable confessions. This has been recognised as another obstacle that needs to be resolved in order to ensure quality religious education classes.

Wearing the Headscarf

The headscarf conflict and the debate linked to the concept of secularisation has demonstrated the sensitivity of immigrated religious symbolism. It signifies a frequent crux in the debates on religious freedom and secularism in Germany.

The first German 'headscarf dispute' arose in 1985 in Berlin. A Turkish woman wearing a headscarf applied for a trainee position as a kindergarten teacher. She clarified in the beginning that she would not remove the headscarf during work hours. Consequently, the relevant municipal council blocked her employment, arguing the headscarf would contravene valid educational goals. Media coverage of the incident encouraged a heated debate and spread to other topics, such as integration, culture, as well as Muslim identity.

The debate appeared once more in 1991 as the *Arbeitsgericht* (Local Labour Court) in Frankfurt ruled against the dismissal of a Muslim employee who had worn a headscarf for religious reasons. The court ruled that there was not sufficient proof of definite complaints from customers and that the employer had not established a formal dress code for his company. The court also referred to the re-

sponsibility of employers to respect the religious needs of their employees and further argued that, "intolerance, fear and lack of understanding by the consumers" (BverfG Beschluss vom 30.7.2003 / Aktenzeichen: 1 BvR 792/03) is not a sufficient reason for dismissing an employee. A very similar judgement (Urt.v. 3.196, Az.: 19 Ca 141/95) was given by a Local Labour Court in Hamburg, when a Sikh wore a turban instead of wearing the required paper that he was expected to wear as part of his uniform.

The recent debate on the headscarf began by the plaintiff Fereshta Ludin, by referring to conflicts in the law regarding religious freedom, on the one hand, and neutrality of the state, on the other. Her case referred to article 4 § 1 and 2 of the *Grundgesetz* (constitutional law) which guarantees the right to practice religion undisturbed, and to Art. 33, which prescribes an unlimited admission to civil services, irrespective of faith. The obligation of the state towards neutrality led to the removal of all symbols of faith from public institutions: the Constitutional Court in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg ruled that Ludin's wearing a headscarf as a teacher, which is considered a Muslim symbol, contradicted the state law banning all religious symbols in schools.

Fereshta Ludin, previously a teacher at a private Muslim school in Kreuzberg in Berlin, was rejected in a job application to a public school in Stuttgart in 1998 because of her need to cover her head, despite successfully completing an internship there. In response, the Minister of Education, Annette Schavan, argued that the headscarf was a political symbol and "could be understood as a symbol of the exclusion of woman from civil and cultural society", which is contradictory to the neutrality of state and the German democratic basic principle of separation of state and religion. In 2000, a highschool in Stuttgart again de-

nied Ludin a position in school services, a decision, which was then challenged by Ludin in a lower court in Stuttgart. The court then argued that although Ludin was suitably qualified for the job, she could be refused because of her need to wear “a religiously motivated head covering”. Further, the court ruled that as soon as the headscarf is worn for religious reasons, it represents a visible symbol of Islamic religion and is incompatible with the requirement for neutrality by the German state.

In response, Fereshta Ludin argued that the decision infringed upon her right to the freedom to practice a religion and her right to an unlimited access to public office, as guaranteed in the German Constitution. The case was taken to the Federal Constitutional Court in Berlin in 2002. The Federal court acknowledged that Ludin’s religious practice was protected by German Fundamental Law, but the judges also stated that civil servants must appear neutral in matters of religion, and that pupils also enjoy the right to freedom of religion. In practice, this meant that Ludin’s pupils at the state school had the right to declare that they did not want to be exposed to the influence of a foreign religion, including its expression in the form of religious symbols.

In June 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the court would have to decide if the headscarf was an article of clothing, a religious symbol or a refusal to integrate. Fereshta Ludin defended her position that the religion and her religious beliefs were part of her identity and that these do not present a threat to Western values. Further, she underlined that her belief does not constitute a contradiction to the values of freedom and democracy and felt it necessary to signal a compromise, that if the conflict continued to expand, she would be prepared to remove her headscarf.

... Germany has become a thoroughly secular country, since for most Germans affiliation to a Christian church is more a traditional relic than it is a question of lived faith. As a consequence, the Muslim faith held by immigrants from Turkey is, thus, often questioned. This occurs not so much because it challenges the Christian monopoly, but because religion per se plays such a large role in the lives of many immigrants (Özdemir: 2001).

In the broad context of public discussion about the permanent residence of Turks in German society, the 'headscarf affair' became the issue through which Germans of all political stripes judged the viability of extending the definition of German cultural identity to include people of Turkish descent. Marieluise Beck, the Federal Government's Commissioner on Immigration, Refugees and Integration, who has been a vocal supporter of Fereshta Ludin's case, argues that the task at hand should be directed towards 'naturalising' Islam, since it is already part of everyday life in Germany, and Islam itself would also change its character within the pluralistic German society.

Meanwhile, beyond just Fereshta Ludin, many other Muslim women frequently have problems with discrimination attributed to their religion:

... She had problems with discrimination at a previous job where a colleague would ask her 'ridiculous questions about Ramadan'. This colleague would also come up to her on a regular basis and make comments about her make-up or clothing... Student X did not do any work while studying. Yet she had experienced discrimination during a previous job search. When she attempted to get a job at a temporary agency, they recommended that she take off of her headscarf if she wanted to be hired. In another instance, a friend of hers recommended her

for a cleaning job. During the interview at the cleaning company, the woman was asked, in a tone of disbelief, whether she wanted to clean while wearing a headscarf. The interviewee did not obtain either of the two jobs. In the last instance, the participant contacted the press and the incident was published in one of the larger Berlin tabloids (Blaschke; Sanela: 2000, 84-85).

Most analysts believe that one important measure of the extent of immigrants' social integration is how far they are able to practice their religious beliefs in the public sphere, and the extent to which they succeed in anchoring their religious community in institutions. In Germany, Muslim immigrants' struggle to introduce Islamic religious education in state schools has been part of this process of institutionalisation, while the headscarf issue has gained public attention in this arena.

Halal Slaughter

Until 1995, the slaughtering of warm-blooded animals without the use of anaesthesia was not allowed in Germany based on the applicable *Tierschutzgesetz* (animal protection law). In 1995, rules regarding the slaughtering of animals were questioned by the Administrative High Court of Hamburg, however, who, after hearing evidence from several Muslim authorities, and under pressure from animal rights activists deemed that there was no compulsion in Islamic rule for animal slaughter according to the Muslim tradition. This law varies locally across Germany. (Robbers, 2000: 149). As such, Muslims were eventually granted the right to slaughter animals according to Islamic

tradition, based on the exceptional clause § 4 a Para. 2 Nr. 2 of the animal protection law:

(2) Anomalous from paragraph 1, there is no need for anaesthesia when ... 2. the appropriate authority issues a certificate of exemption for slaughtering without anaesthesia (kosher butchering); they can grant this certificate of exemption only as far as required by the religious community, in compliance within the scope of the law, and compelled to adhere to the regulations of their religion, stipulating the need for kosher butchering or banning the consumption of meat that has not been butchered according to kosher standards.

This clause refers to a change in law that goes back to August 1986. Until this date, each county could determine for itself whether to apply or tolerate the practice of using anaesthesia when slaughtering. This form of butchering is evidenced especially in a historical context. Until the end of World War II, a general prohibition of kosher butchering was carried out. This was due to the discrimination and economic disadvantages targeting the Jewish people, enforced by the National Socialists on 21 April 1933.

The accumulation of news regarding the implementation of kosher butchering by Turkish Gastarbeiter (guest workers) in private homes in the 1970s led to a new discussion about kosher butchering and eventually, to the effective revision of the animal protection law. On 11 May 1988, a new process went into effect as the Hicret GmbH, an operating company for the sale of groceries and meat at the central mosque in Hamburg, applied for an exception to the rule in order to meet the needs of its customers in the hopes of conducting kosher butchering. This application, however, was rejected by the *Hamburger Gesundheitsbehörde* (Hamburg Health Authorities) with the reasoning that the

“applicant could not prove the necessity for an imperative religious regulation for carrying out slaughterings without the use of anaesthesia”. This case was eventually transferred to the *Bundesverwaltungsgericht* (Federal Administrative Court), who decided on 15 June 1995 that Muslim religious communities have no right to claim a certificate of exemption in order to carry out kosher butchering. § 4 a Para. 2 Nr. 2 TierSchG (of the animal protection law). According to Fatwas and explanations from – among others – the Al-Azhar University in Cairo and the Turkish Consulate in Bonn, the use of electrical means to anaesthetise an animal intended for butchering is supposedly compatible to the laws of Islam. A person’s individual conviction of faith is not sufficient for acquiring an exemption from such a prohibition. In addition, since the ritual of conducting kosher sacrificial slaughter in occasion of certain celebrations is not the point being evaluated; in fact, the right of religious freedom (Art. 4 Para. 2 GG) (constitutional law) is irrelevant for this case. To this effect, further certificates of exemption for the practice of Muslim butchering were denied. In contrast, the Jewish religious community was granted this permission to carry out kosher butchering at this time.

In reaction to this, many complaints from the Muslim population were submitted as a consequence. An example of such a case is evidenced by the developments in the region of Hessen. The following account describes the legal procedure of a complaint filed by the *Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen* (Islamic Religious Community in Hessen) (B IRH) as well as a complaint filed by one of its board members with the *Verwaltungsgericht Darmstadt* (Administrative Court of Darmstadt).

In 1996, an application for a certificate of exemption for the purpose of conducting a kosher sacrificial slaughter for the

Muslim festival (Kurban Bayrami) was filed by the Islamic Working Group in Hessen (B IAK-Hessen). Until this day, there has still not been an answer or decision made regarding this request. In the ensuing years in Hessen (1997/98/99), private persons resumed submitting applications to the responsible *Veterinärsämtern* (veterinary authorities) in order to gain approval to slaughter animals for this Muslim festival, yet each application was rejected. Even the subsequent legal proceedings, countering these application outcomes were decided negatively for the applicant.

On 30 September 1998, the *Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen* (Islamic Religious Community of Hessen) (B IRH) submitted an affirmative action for a right to the Administrative Court in Darmstadt. With this, it was intended that a certificate of exemption for carrying out the ritual sacrificial slaughter, in accordance with stipulated regulations for a Muslim festival, go into effect by 1999. The Islamic Religious Community of Hessen (B IRH), which was founded on 15 November 1997, had through its *Fiqh-Rat* (Fiqh Council) adopted a Fatwa (1/98) six months previously for the practice of correct, ritual kosher butchering: according to members of the IRH, the sacrificial slaughter for a festival is an imperative, compulsory activity that may only be carried out without the use of anaesthesia.

On one hand, this Fatwa was supposed to confirm the criteria imposed through imperative regulations for slaughters without the use of anaesthesia, while on the other hand, affirm the criteria imposed by the religious community. The complaint submitted by the IRH with the Administrative Court of Darmstadt was dealt with in two different court hearings. In one procedure, the IRH filed the application as an institute (Az.: 3 E 916 / 99 (3) IRH vs. the region of Hessen), while in the second procedure, a board member of the IRH filed as a private person (Az.: 3

E 952 / 99 (3) Özcan vs. the region of Hessen). The application was rejected in both cases: though the IRH proved the necessity of conducting sacrificial slaughters for festivals without the use of anaesthesia, it was not able to verify whether a ritual sacrificial slaughter for a festival was considered a necessary requirement for becoming a member. As a result, in May 1999, the *Fiqh-Rat* (Fiqh-Council) of the *Islamischen Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen* (Islamic Religious Community of Hessen) declared a Fatwa (1/99) that stated, "Victims of a sacrificial animal slaughter are necessary for a festival and is considered a religious responsibility of all IRH members". In 1999, this affirmative action for a right was hence continued. On 9 September 1999, the *VerwG Darmstadt* granted an appeal brought against the complaint of IRH member, Özcan, and issued the certificate of exemption. In the legal case between IRH versus the region of Hessen, the proceeding filed by the IRH was laid to rest on 18 February 2000, since the judgement from 9 September 1999, filed by the responsible veterinary authorities for the revision of the Federal Administrative Court had in the meantime been presented. On 23 November 2000, the Federal Administrative Court annulled the judgement of the Administrative Court of Darmstadt regarding the situation of Özcan versus the region of Hessen. According to judgement BVerwG 3 C 40.99, belonging to a comprising Islamic regional association (indicative of an Islam inclusive of all the various religious denominations) was not deemed justified to issue a certificate of exemption. The IRH was not recognised as a religious community in terms of § 4 a TierSchG (animal protection laws). In this regard, a specific religious profile was lacking. Their ordinance refers to them as "a representation of interested Muslims consisting of members with various directions of faith, having a residence in Hessen". Through the procuration

of a following of various denominations under the Islamic faith, no imperative precept for slaughtering without the use of anaesthesia could be demanded.

In order to acquire the certificate of exemption for sacrificial slaughtering at the festival in 2000, the IRH sued for a rushed proceeding with the Administrative Court in Darmstadt, who granted the application on 10 March 2000, analogous with the judgement VG 3E952/99 (3) from 9 September 1999 (Az.: 3 G 585/00 (3)). The region of Hessen appealed anew a revision with the *Hessischen Verwaltungsgerichtshof Kassel* (Hessen Administrative Court in Kassel) (Az.: 11 TG 990/00). The court, however, doubted "whether the IRH was in the position to impose imperative requirements upon its members" and cancelled the issuance of authorisation. On 25 April 2000, the IRH submitted an appeal with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decision of the Administrative Court in Kassel. Here, the complaint was rejected on 20 September 2000 with the reasoning that the legal process had not yet been fully utilised by means of a continued complaint and as such, the requirements of exception had also not yet been fulfilled. Both proceedings of the IRH, or the board members respectively, were continued to be dealt with by the Administrative Court of Darmstadt, as a result.

In the meantime, the complaint of the Muslim butcher, Rüstem Altinküpe, reached its course with the Federal Constitutional Court. With regard to the judgement BverwG of 1995, Altinküpe's butcher shop was no longer granted permission to carry out slaughtering according to kosher tradition. His complaint in relation to this was denied by the Administrative Court in Giessen on 2 December 1997 and with the Administrative Court of Hessen on 9 September 1999 - 11 UZ 37/98). The Federal Constitutional Court abolished the decisions from the lower instances in

its judgement from 15 January 2002, explaining that there is a general possibility for Muslims to apply for a certificate of exemption. Significant for this decision was the reference made on behalf of the plaintiff regarding limitations to his professional freedom brought upon through the judgement made by the Federal Administrative Court on 15 June 1995. In this case, the practice of kosher butchering was not just considered to be part of a religious custom, but also partly related to the practice of carrying out one's job. As a result, it was decided that a general prohibition of the Muslim tradition of slaughtering without the use of anaesthesia unacceptably limits the rights of the person who needs to carry out the practice for his job. With this, the Federal Constitutional Court emphasised that the fulfilment of the criteria of the religious community in § 4 a TierSchG Para. 2 Nr. 2 is sufficient when the applicant belongs to a group of people who are connected by a common profession of faith.

Furthermore, the religious community itself should be responsible for establishing any other 'imperative regulations' necessary. On the whole, Islam, or the Sunni or Shiite institutions of faith were not considered to be significant in regard to this question. In case the community applies for a certificate of exemption for slaughtering, it should be 'substantiated and comprehensible', an imperative regulation for carrying out slaughtering of an animal without the use of anaesthesia must be presented. Whether this attribute is fulfilled or not, should then be scrutinised by the corresponding authorities and in legal proceedings, by the court.

Hence, following these changes in legislation allowing for Muslims to slaughter animals according to the Koran, discussions have continued to range regarding the effect this legislation has had on the integration of Muslims.

While some argued that this led to their successful integration into German society, critics equated this legislation to an undermining of the “*advance in civilisation* which [has] characterised the country, the people, and the state up to now” (cited in Leggewie, 2004: 4, my emphasis). As such, the laws and practices of Islam are often still viewed by some as being somewhat primitive. Often those holding this view tend not to fear voicing these notions. Objections like this represent an unspoken perspective that the German law is there, not as a neutral institution, but as an institution that ought to uphold and maintain the ways of the Germans.

Mosque Building

Starting in the 1970s, Muslims living in Berlin began their attempt to build their own sacred places of prayer. With the intention of diminishing and substituting Islamic fundamentalism for more traditional forms of prayer at mosques and cultural centres, social workers and secular migrant groups originally strategised for the building of mosques in Berlin. This attempt, however, fell flat. Ensuing attempts in the 1980s to build mosques were continued, but not always without difficulty.

For instance, in 1983, the Islam organisation Vakfi initiated its own charitable association and aimed to develop cultural centres in the Berlin neighbourhoods in which the majority of its members were living. Funded mainly through the donations of its members, this association expanded its activities well beyond just the religious aspects of the Islam, initiating activities to curb drug use, for example (Konzeption Fatih-Kulturhaus, Berlin, May 2003). With the development of its social and cultural activities,

the association also planned to build mosques in which to celebrate and carry out their religious beliefs as well. The Fatih Mosque has been in existence in Berlin since 1989 in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. During this time, many other religious organisations expressed interest in building mosques in Germany, assuming the role to systematically build places of prayer in cultural centres and acting as host to Koran teachings, youth work and family gatherings. While some were successful, encountering few setbacks, many plans were delayed, usually due to building permit regulations and concerns of neighbours. Due to this, many of the organisations began at this time to actively work towards altering the image of Islam in Berlin.

The topic of building mosques in Germany has gained much attention from both the Islamic communities interested in their development as well as from members of the dominant German Christian community, who oppose the trend of mosque building and the call to prayer from being practised in Germany. Those in opposition to the building and placement of mosques and the call to prayer of the muezzin have taken the form of practical objections, complaining of noise pollution, traffic flow, parking problems, etc. Yet, other underlying concerns appear evident. Such social conflicts over the public and visible presence of Islam bring into light the “unspoken hierarchy of legitimacy to claim space in the public domain” (Baumann: 1999, 1) and reflect a relevantly recent shift to religious plurality in Germany. However, as Baumann argues, such debates actually contribute in the long term to a religion being publicly incorporated and acknowledged – its invisibility is removed (Baumann: 1999, 3-4).

In legal terms, there is no objection to the building of mosques in Germany – restrictions, however, remain. The biggest mosque in Germany was built in Mannheim in the

early 1990s following lengthy and heated public debates over whether the mosque deserved pride of place in the centre of town and over how big (i.e. how visible) the minaret could be (Baumann, 1999: 4). Eventually it was decided that the Yavuz Sultan Selim mosque could be built in the city centre, but only with a minaret half the height of the neighbouring Catholic Church tower (ibid.). Similarly, while an agreement between Berlin public authorities and Muslim representatives upheld the right of Muslims to run mosques and madrassas, limits were maintained on the call to prayers from a muezzin. Neighbours could no longer object to building permits for mosques provided they complied with local building regulations but the call to prayer from a muezzin was not accorded the same rights as the ringing of bells from Christian churches (Robbers, 2000: 149). Clearly, public space that is needed for the practice and expression of religion is not neutral, rather, "a normative space, bitterly defended by its dominant groups" (Baumann, 1999: 5) and access to it is controlled by legislation.

Despite opposition, there are already plans to build five mosques in Kreuzberg and Neukölln, the biggest of which, the Sethilic mosque, associated with the DITIB, was nearly completed in September 2003, however, the construction was halted by the city and the group was fined €10,000 because they broke the building permit by building the minarets too high.

The following is a compiled list of some of the mosques already existing in Germany, based on data gathered from 2003. An exact compilation of the number of mosques in Germany is difficult to obtain as the number consistently varies based on the source, in part because many mosques are not represented in the statistics due to their hidden presence. Based on information from the Central Islam In-

stitute in Soest, there are 77 mosque associations which are clearly represented in Germany, some of whose mosques are more than two hundred years old, while another 123 are currently in the building or planning stages. Many of the existing mosques are located in garages, factory buildings, or warehouses. Generally, Muslims tend to gather in the 2,300 prayer houses and cultural centres (Krysztofik: s.a.).

According to the IGDMB (<http://www.igdmb.de/moschee/moschee.php>), the following mosques exist in Germany: Bilal Mosque in Aachen; Ditib Selimiye Camii e.v. in Bamberg; Ensar Camii in Berlin-Charlottenburg; Osman Gazi Mosque in Berlin-Charlottenburg; Süleymaniye Mosque in Berlin-Charlottenburg; Hasan Basri Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg; Mevlana Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg; Fatih Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg; Vakif Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg; Merkez Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg; Orhan Gazi Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg; Abdülmecid Mosque in Berlin-Kreuzberg; Sehitlik Camii in Berlin-Neukölln (also offers visits and tours through the mosque and cemetery); Gazi Osman Pasa Camii in Berlin-Neukölln; Muradiye Mosque in Berlin-Neukölln; Sehzade Mosque in Berlin-Neukölln; Bedir Mosque in Berlin-Neukölln; Hermannplatz Mosque in Berlin-Neukölln; Neukölln Mosque in Berlin-Neukölln; Lübars Mosque in Berlin-Reinickendorf; Emir Sultan Camii in Berlin-Schöneberg; Anadolu Mosque in Berlin-Schöneberg; Koca Tepe Mosque in Berlin-Siemensstadt; Yeni Camii in Berlin-Spandau; Spandau Büyük Mosque in Berlin-Spandau; Valide-i-Sultan Mosque in Berlin-Steglitz; Selimiye Mosque in Berlin-Tegel; Ayasofya Mosque in Berlin-Tiergarten; Moabit Mosque in Berlin-Tiergarten; Haci Bayram Camii in Berlin-Wedding; Yunus Emre Mosque in Berlin-Wedding; Mescidi Aksa Mosque in Berlin-Wedding; Aksemsettin Mosque in Berlin-Wedding; Beyazit Mosque in Berlin-Wedding; Ar-rahmen in

Mönchengladbach/Rheydt; and Mesdzidus-Sahabe in Stuttgart Zuffenhausen.

Meanwhile, many other mosques or Islamic cultural centres are planned to be built or are currently under construction. The *Islamische Verein für Wohltätige Projekte* (IVWP) (Islamic Association for Charitable Projects), an independent organisation, is hopeful to build a combination cultural centre, sacral site and shopping mall in Berlin, near Görlitzer Bahnhof, which will be called the 'Maschari Centre'. The Islamic Federation Berlin (IFB) has been trying for years to receive a building permit to construct a Mevlana Mosque near Kottbussor Tor in Kreuzberg; meanwhile, a plot of land for another mosque was purchased not so far from this same location in the Falkenstein street and a cultural centre (with rooms for conferences, school classes, sports, women and youth activities, a swimming pool, media and information centre, a library, cafe, restaurant, administrative offices, apartments, and a mosque with minarets) in Pflüger Street in Neukölln is also planned to be built. In the plethora of activities offered the Muslim community, these organisations hope to meet the needs of their members as well as organise methods that promote their integration in the greater German society. Beyond this and the fact that each of these projects aims to build a mosque, they otherwise have little in common. While the IVWP has Lebanese origins and is considered theologically 'liberal', the IFB stems from the political Islam of the Turkish exile opposition, and the DITIB represents the Turkish state Islam, whose Imams are civil servants in Turkey (*Scheinschlag*, 09/03). The differences in ideology among these groups is often attributed as the reason why Muslim organisations have not been granted status as a public corporation. Meanwhile many neighbours, clearly misunderstanding the differences among the Muslim communities, question

why the Muslims can not just build “one big mosque” and cultural centre that caters to the needs of all of the Muslims in the city (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 29.03.03).

Though building plans have been made, the construction of many of these sites has not yet begun or has resumed with complications. Despite the accepted or at least tolerated Turkish stores, headscarves, cafe houses, etc. so prominent in certain areas throughout Berlin (or elsewhere in Germany), when it comes to building mosques in the neighbourhood, many German neighbours object. Fears of having connections to Islamic fundamentalist groups, mistreating females, acting as organising rings for terrorist activities, among other reasons have been named for opposition to the building of mosques in Germany. Such sentiments have been antagonised and intensified since terrorist attacks and political rhetoric, often associating Muslims automatically as terrorists or criminals, have abounded. Whether these reasons have an influence or can be attributed to difficulties for the Muslim communities to gain building permits for building their mosques in certain areas should be further explored in another realm.

Islam: An Immigrated Religion to Europe

The 11th of September and Radical Muslim Platforms

A broad consensus among experts states that September 11th commenced a new era of terrorism, a symbolic form of force and aggression. The attacks serve as a symbolic message to spread fear, horror and insecurity. It also had the intention of causing massive bloodshed. In the 1980s, Marxist and ethnic-national terrorists were actively debated. The instigators of the attacks on September 11th ex-

plained their terrorist actions with a video tape. This was in contrast to today's religious-political motivated terrorists, who rarely comment on their actions. This was doubtless an attack against a so-called institutionalised Western value system, symbolically represented by the economic and hegemonic power of the United States through the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Oversimplified: Muslim values versus Western values. Samuel Huntington's paradigm seemed to be confirmed on the surface, since the attacks supplied perfect propaganda for his hard-headed thinking, based on a simplistic inclusive-exclusive construction of a world society.

The debate on an internationally and not globally organised terror network involves the issues of Islam as an immigrated religion in Germany and its implications of inner security as well as its public image. In the first place, various radical Muslim platforms or groups will be presented briefly in the following sections.

After September 11th, security policies have been become tighter and more restrictive; security checks can be ordered without even having definite suspicions. Hence, discrimination of Muslims increased sharply on various bases. This marginalisation of a certain cultural group, which started decades ago, led to a radical formation within the group – Muslims in this case, which has significantly transpired throughout the last 70 years.

Originally, the radical Islam or Islamism was founded by Hassan al Banna in Egypt in 1928. He founded the 'Muslim Brotherhood', which was propagated through social work activities, such as the establishment of hospitals and schools. However, within these social institutions, the Islamic Law was applied in its strictest interpretation led by Sajjid Qutb. During the 1950s, he was the ideological leader of radical Islam, prophesying Islam as a world

power and aiding the corresponding means to achieve this aim. Like him, all other ideological leaders of radical Islam were Egyptian, such as Ajman al Sawahiri, other than the Pakistani Abdul 'Ala al Maududi.

In Germany, one of the leading radical Islamic groups of Sunni Arabs is the Muslim brethren, whose two largest European centres are in Munich and Aachen. The centre in Munich houses the headquarters of the Egyptian branch and Aachen is influenced by the Syrian branch. Although there are only little differences in their ideological thinking, they are distinguished through subsidies and influenced by these two separate branches. Members of the Muslim brethren have until now not been involved in violence outside of their native countries. However, their activities in Europe are not confined to just carrying out Friday prayers or monthly meetings; they are also engaged in offering training courses, and an annual congress, which is attended by radical Islamic clerics from abroad. The Muslim brethren distribute publications calling for radicalism and incitement, thus, drawing attention to the political conditions in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia and Algeria – as well as among the Palestinians.

In 1982, members of the Muslim brethren founded the Islamic Federation of Palestine (IFP), which is the representative voice of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) in Europe. The IFP carries out extensive propaganda, circulating Hamas declarations and staging large-scale demonstrations in support of their cause.

The Muslim brethren's centres serve as contact points for all other regional branches of the group, such as Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, al-Quaida, Hizballah, al-Tawhid and others. These centres operate Muslim charity funds which act as a money transferring channel for radical Islamic terror groups in Germany.

As the investigation of the September 11th terrorist attacks in the USA widened, authorities in European countries began arresting a number of people suspected with links to Islamic radical groups. German officials proclaimed fears that their country may have been a hub for the terrorist cells that carried out the attacks in New York and Washington, DC. A German regional security minister argued that some 100 undercover militants, trained in camps in Afghanistan, might be waiting in Germany, ready and waiting to participate in new attacks.

The first arrests directly related to the September 11th attacks took place in Germany in November 2001. The Hamburg police arrested a 27 year old Moroccan student, Mounir el Motassadeq, who moved large amounts of money for a terrorist cell led by key hijacker Mohammed Atta, and who may have visited an al-Quaida terrorist camp in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000. Motassadeq's power of attorney over a bank account in the name of Marwan Al-Shehhi, another former Hamburg student who hijacked the second plane that struck the World Trade Center, gave the final basis for his arrest.

Hamburg was, therefore, a central base of operations for the associates and for at least three of the hijackers as they planned the attacks. German intelligence agencies were devastated as a result, since the long-term organisation had taken place in Germany.

The Public Image

Some leaders of the so-called western societies unfortunately reacted in accordance with Huntington's paradigm. The image of the Muslims in Europe as it was had reached a point that seemed close to legitimising the fight, by using

force against force. The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, stated that “we have to realise the supremacy of our civilisation and our value system that delivered all countries [...] welfare, respect of human rights and religious freedom. This respect does certainly not exist in these islamic countries. [...] Due to the supremacy of this value system, which conquered these people as it occurred in the former communist countries and a part of the Islamic world, unfortunately, a part of 1,400 years still remained. Hence, we have to realise the power and force of our civilisation” (*Le Monde*, 28 September 2001 [ath. trans.]).

Other persons, such as the conservative Austrian Bishop, Kurt Krenn, argued with clerical authority that “Islam has to be scrutinised”, since the religion is stamped by fanaticism and nationalism which disrespect human rights, while “Christians have much more human dignity” (*Le Monde*, 2 October 2001 [ath. trans.]).

In Germany, the image of Muslims likewise changed due to the medial spread of the notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’. For instance, the annual Anti-Israel Demonstration (the ‘Al-Quds’ day, which is the Arabic name for Jerusalem) organised by Islamic groups was criticised and heatedly debated for the first time whether it would have been prohibited. The Iranian demonstration, originally initiated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979, aims to express the so-called Muslim will towards the liberation of Jerusalem. Since 1995, certain radical Muslim demonstrations have taken place in Berlin carrying signs stating ‘Sharon – Child Murderer’, ‘Kill the US’ or ‘Death to Israel’. Such demonstrations, expressing anti-Semitic and explicit aggressive content are not acceptable, as Özcan Mutlu, a member of the Green Party in Germany, has stated. This is not a reaction against Muslims in general, says Anetta Kahane, a member of the Jewish community and chair of

the Amadeu Antonio Foundation in Berlin; instead, existing democratic Muslims should be supported in their attempts to form an effective working opposition. Cem Özdemir, a former member of parliament for the Green Party, planned a contra-demonstration to underline the position that Muslims do not all have anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli attitudes (*Der Tagesspiegel*, Berlin: 14.11.2003). Ursula Spuler-Stegemann, an Islamologist at the University of Marburg has argued strongly in favour of a prohibition of this demonstration. She stated that such massive anti-Semitic proclamations can not be accepted; at least the public must be informed that this demonstration is based on the ideologies of extreme Islamic forces. She expected a clear position from members of the German government as well as from representatives for foreigners in Germany regarding the boundaries of Islamic aspirations in the public discourse (*Die Tageszeitung*, Berlin: 22./23. November 2003 [ath. trans.]).

Furthermore, Yehuda Bauer, an Emiritus Professor of the University of Jerusalem, argues that terrorism is not the only a factor of danger; however, in the long-run, radical Muslims sow the seeds of anti-Semitic thinking, which might be also be backed by Muslim groups who are more moderate. This is another issue that must be combatted on a long-term basis, especially in light of the Israel conflict.

Generally, public opinion as part of an effective counter-terrorist strategy is important among those affected by terrorism. Here, the key will be to establish a learning process concerning the motivations and the long and short-term interests of the terrorist organisations. This can give rise to psychological and practical recommendations for daily life.

Education drives public opinion, which in turn might drive national policy. Proper public education and aware-

ness in conjunction with multiple levels of counter-terrorism policies, strategies and tactics play a major role in helping a country, such as Germany maintain the integrity and conviction needed in order not to be swayed by the threats of terror.

While all experts agree that terrorism is psychological warfare and that its effectiveness is dependent upon the morale and the psychological damage it causes, national institutions have done little so far to counter the psychological impact of terrorism in Germany.

Muslims as a Security Issue

Security officials estimate that approximately 3,500 Arab militants live in Germany and that they raise significant sums of money for Islamic organizations, including Osama bin Laden's 'al-Qaida' and the Palestinian group 'Hamas'. There are also a number of networks providing counterfeit documents and safe haven for militants.

The German government established a series of anti-terror measures after the September 11th attacks (Act for the Fight Against Terrorism: Modification of the Ausländergesetz [Foreigner Act], the Asylverfahrensgesetz [Asylum Procedure Act], the Act about the Ausländerzentralregister [Central Register Act Regarding Foreigners] as well as modification of three foreign-law decrees). Through modifications of the Foreigner Law (Article 11-16), measures have been enacted intended to facilitate control over the identities of foreigners. Likewise, the number of special reasons for rejecting applications for residence permits have been extended. The regulation regarding the foreigner's removal or the removal of a person seeking asylum restricted the clauses based on the Geneva Convention. It

ensured, though, that the need for protection of the person of concern will be weighted upon (Bericht des Innenausschuss, Bundesdrucksache 14/7864).

Researchers, such as Christina Boswell (2001), have argued that the internal security of any given country will not be greatly improved through adopting strategies of tight migration control. Such provisions were passed, though, and the debate still continues on the new Immigration Law in Germany regarding the attempts to be able to expel immigrants from the country due to security reasons.

In this context, persons who give incorrect details regarding security inquiries during visa procedures or at face-to-face interviews with the Foreign Office could potentially be expelled from the country. The central index of foreigners will be considerably extended with the goal to establish a central visa data base. This data base is intended to serve police officers and security services.

It was agreed that some of the security measures adopted should apply only for a five year period, after which they would be subject to further parliamentary review. A controversial proposal to allow federal police to investigate individuals and carry out investigations without a court warrant was dropped.

The following are some of the measures included in the new package:

1. digital 'fingerprints' may be printed in German passports to thwart counterfeiters;
2. refugees given asylum in Germany may have their status withdrawn if it is proven that they represent "a serious risk to internal security" or were guilty of crimes against humanity in their own countries;

3. police have more power to check the identity and background of applicants for visas or asylum, and to expel anyone trying to mislead them;
4. federal officials may outlaw any religious organisations in Germany that abuses their status by engaging in criminal activities;
5. sentences will be reduced for principal witnesses in return for cooperation with police in terrorism cases; and
6. armed 'sky marshals' may be placed on airliners to prevent hijackings.

The package follows previous anti-terrorism measures adopted on 19 September 2001. Among the measures then approved was the launching of investigations into members of foreign extremist organisations. The government pledged to spend 1.4 billion Euros toward a crackdown on terror groups.

These measures, plans and methods, geared toward scrutinising and controlling citizens in order to attempt to provide them a secure and fearless life, raises questions regarding the massive restriction of freedom for citizens. Barrington Moore Jr. explained in 1978 the duty of security as being fundamental within the structure of the state and as being based on a reciprocal relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Both sides are liable to each other. The state must act as a safeguard while the people owe their loyalty, military duty, obedience and taxes to the state. The identification with the established system can only be reached through a perception of justice (Moore: 1978). Applying this social-psychological explanation to increased security measurements, hereby reducing freedom considerably, it can be questioned whether the perception of justice still exists as it did previously.

The fears of an Orwellian state system might be justified by taking legislative acts by the United States into account. Regarding the so-called Patriot Act (Provide Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), passed on 26 October 2001, the US Visit Programme or the Sarkozy Law and Perben II Law, all challenge the principle of habeus corpus or explicitly restrict individual freedom. Keeping this insight in mind, intelligence services, whose task it is to obtain information and thwart attempts of Islamic groups, are supposed to work more closely and cooperate more intensively with each other. Such cooperative efforts have uncovered secret organisations and, in many cases, resulted in the prosecution and sentencing of operatives.

An exemplifying case, which was wide-spread in public debate, was the extradition of the Muslim Metin Kaplan, also called the *Kalif von Köln* (Caliph of Cologne). After the death of the prophet Mohammed, his follower led the Islam community under the title 'caliph'; however, in the 7th century the Islam community disintegrated into several groups. Henceforth, there could no longer be one leadership, one 'caliph'. Officially, 'caliphism' was abolished in 1924 by the Republic of Turkey.

The original 'Caliph from Cologne' was Cemaleddin Kaplan, who proclaimed together with his *Föderativen Islamstaat Anatolien* (Federal Islamic State of Anatolia), founded in April 1992, the 'caliph state' in Cologne. He died in 1995 and appointed his son, Metin Kaplan, as the new 'Caliph of Cologne'. The 'Federal Islamic State of Anatolia' split and Ibrahim Sofu from Berlin appointed himself to be the 'Anti-Caliph'. Ibrahim Sofu gained power in the community, and Metin Kaplan subsequently imposed two 'fatwas', a kind of Islamic judicial sentence on Ibrahim Sofu. In April 1997, Sofu was shot in Berlin and the of-

fender has yet to be caught. Kaplan was arrested in 1999 and was sentenced to four years of imprisonment on the 15 November 2000 due to encouragements of the murder of his rival as well as due to anti-Semitic statements. During this time, he consolidated his position and was increasingly seen as a martyr among his followers.

As a political reaction to this, the Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily, abolished the right of the religious privilege for associations, which triggered a debate between left-wing and right-wing politicians concerning the possible discrimination of Islam in general. In addition, Schily amended the law for associations in such a way that it can be facilitated to prohibit extreme groups in general. Both of these measures took force in the beginning of December 2001. Kaplan's organisation and several other organisations, which had been in contact with or involved in any form of cooperation with Metin Kaplan were prohibited at the end of 2001. Next, Schily attempted to expel Kaplan to Turkey. However, the Administrative Court in Cologne alluded to the need to check all files on Kaplan and decided that he could not be expelled immediately. On the 19th of August 2002, Turkey demanded the extradition of Kaplan. A debate began as to what degree Kaplan would be tortured or whether even sentenced to death. Amnesty International argued that torture still was in practice in Turkey and that even an agreement between Germany and Turkey would not be a sufficient measure to allow for extradition. They pointed towards a decision by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1993 that declares that even though a state guarantees the person from any kind of torture, such a statement is not sufficient to expel this person (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 18 December 2001). On the 28th of May 2003, Kaplan was released after a the High Regional Court in Düsseldorf decided against his extradition, arguing that

he would not receive an unbiased and fair trial in Turkey. Finally, the Highest Administration Court in Cologne decided that Kaplan cannot be expelled, though it was also agreed that he is not eligible for the right to asylum, since such an expulsion would break the European Convention of Human Rights due to a lack of guarantees of a fair trial under the rule of law in Turkey (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 28 November 2003).

Proposals for the new Immigration Law currently include a legal amendment to allow the possibility to expel persons such as Kaplan when such acts are in the interest of German security policy (*Die Tageszeitung*, 28 May 2003). This case exemplifies the sensitivity of such decisions, which are being heatedly debated in Germany due to the issue of internal security in light of the present scare regarding terrorism. Conservative voices, such as Günther Beckstein for the Christian Social Union, called the prevention of Kaplan's extradition 'scandalous' and argued that specific arrangements allowing for such extraditions must be achieved in the near future.

Formations of new Generations and European Islam

Parts of the Muslim population in Germany are now in the third and fourth generations. The majority of these groups speak German as their native tongue and were educated in the German school system. These younger Muslims know of their parents' countries of origin only as a myth and as a place for holidays, and not as a homeland. The younger generations approach their religion in new ways.

The problems of the first generation were more infrastructural - that is, they dealt with problems such as mosque building, the availability of halal food, learning

German and coming to terms with their new environment. More recent demands of the younger generations of Muslims are socially-based, such as employment matters, equality issues, political representation and the way that history is taught in schools (*Frankfurter Rundschau*, 28 November 2003).

The new generations are somewhat distanced from their parents' approach to Islam, which is strongly based on cultural elements and which does not apply to their more integrated German lifestyles. Young Muslims complain that they are not a part of their 'own' cultures in Germany nor in the countries of their parents. They often feel, for example, "too Turkish to be German and too German to be Turkish" (Mandel: 1990). As a result, many young Muslims are beginning to redefine their identity.

The formation of this new identity has arisen from the simple fact that they have been, as a result of their environment, asked either to accept or to refuse Islam. Due to the nature of the non-Muslim state, this question automatically arises and the outcome can be one of two. This concept is discussed by a leading Islamic sociologist, Tariq Ramadan, in his book, 'To be a European Muslim' (Ramadan: 1998). The first alternative is to refuse Islam, to refuse the culture handed down from their parents and to instead focus on their 'German' identity and the situation around them. The second alternative is to accept Islam, albeit in varying degrees. To accept Islam totally causes problems when faced with the German social environment.

The second approach to Islam has caused the resurgence of religion amongst the younger generations. Younger Muslims are returning to the mosques in large numbers. An interesting new trend is starting to occur around Germany that can be linked to the resurgence of Islam in the last few decades: there is a growing tendency

among young Turkish Sunni Muslims in Germany to visit Arabic mosques. There, they can be seen praying, albeit separately, with the Arabic community. One such mosque is the Abu-Bakr Mosque in Bremen. This tendency is due to a growing desire among younger Muslims in Germany to discover their religion that now plays such a large part in international relations and world events. Arabic Islam and the Arabic language is seen to be authentic in contrast to Turkish secular Islam or the culturally drenched Islam of their parents. Young Muslims are joining Islamic organisations and are using the new technology available to them through the internet to chat and meet with other young Muslims in Germany. Some are even joining fundamentalist organisations.

As a compromise between the two, many younger Muslims are now turning to the ideals of a new phenomenon rising in Europe, namely 'Euro-Islam', as a more practical way to redefine their identities in a German environment. Muslims living in Europe before this movement waited for direction from the Muslim world; now, they often use their own initiatives and reinterpretation of their religion in their new setting (Ramadan: 1998).

The debate on the integration of Muslims into a German society has, in recent years, taken a new path influenced by German political changes and by actions taken by the Muslim communities themselves. Muslim communities have become less reluctant to integrate themselves and more active in the greater society.

This active process is demonstrated by the rise of independent German-Islamic organisations taking root across Germany. Although Muslims often remain in their national groupings, in the last decade, Germany has seen a rise in the number of specifically 'Islamic' groups and organizations, rather than groups organised along national

lines. These include the *Islamisches Konzil* (Islamic Council), which mainly works in the academic field, the *Islamische Föderation in Berlin* (Islamic Federation of Berlin) and the *Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland* (Central Council of the Muslims in Germany) which has the most respectability and political authority of all the Muslim bodies. The Central Council of the Muslims in Germany drafted a new “Islamic Charter” in February 2000 that laid down the basic principles for relations between German Muslims and the German state and community. It emphasizes that there is no contradiction between the German state and Islamic teachings.

There are also groups that focus on the religion in a German context, for example, the “German-speaking Muslim Circle” or German Islamic publications such as *Islamische Zeitung* and many websites including *Enfal*, *Islam.de*, *Haus des Islam* and *Muslimische Jugend*.

In some federal states the struggle to receive Islamic instruction at schools has been won and probationary courses have begun. The Islamic instruction, taught in German, encourages more Muslim parents to send their children to state schools where they will be able to interact with German children, reducing exclusion of Muslims. Nadeem Elyas, President of the Central Council believes that Islamic instruction is one of the most important integration tools for German government (Elyas: 2004). It helps to make Muslims feel accepted in society, gives them the idea that their religion is of equal importance to the Christian religion in Germany and helps them to think that it is possible to be both a German and a Muslim.

These initiatives in German society that focus on the Islamic basis of their formation, rather than the national basis are often seen as positive steps to combatting issues of Muslim integration. By addressing Muslim identity issues,

migrants feel that they can integrate themselves into German society without fearing the total loss of their culture. As these initiatives have arisen from the German Muslim community themselves, they are all the more effective when combined with state policies.

Some believe that these are signs of the new phenomenon that is beginning in Europe called 'Euro-Islam' (*Time Europe*, July 29, 2002). This term was coined by Bassam Tibi, a Middle East political science specialist at Göttingen University, to express the new implications of Islam and modernity. This signifies a new trend among Muslims born in Europe who have grown up in a Western society, but who still hold their Islamic beliefs as being important to them. 'Euro-Islam' involves a mixture of the fundamentals of the Islamic faith - including submission to God, peace, community, family, adhering to dietary laws such as the avoidance of alcohol and eating *halal* food - with 'Western' ideals of democracy and civil liberties and the European way of life. 'Euro-Islam' becomes the bridge for second and third generation Muslims between their heritage and their present home.

Tibi believes that 'Euro-Islam' is the only other alternative to the 'ghettoisation' of minorities living in ethnic enclaves in European cities. Islam becomes a way of defining oneself in the European society and is a strong tool for integration without assimilation. One of Tibi's main issues is the integration of Muslims into European society. However, he looks specifically towards what Muslims themselves can do to integrate themselves into society and less towards the role of the state in this area (Holub: s.a.).

Tariq Ramadan is another leading Islamic intellectual in Europe who believes in the concept of a European brand of Islam. By creating an indigenous European Islamic identity away from former cultural ties, Muslims in Eu-

rope can clarify their identity and feel that they belong to and have something to offer their societies. Ramadan also agrees with Tibi's argument that the Muslim themselves must play a large part in integration and that a European Islam is an effective vehicle for this integration (Ramadan: 1998).

Many intellectuals represent the new mentality arising in the German Muslim community that the Muslims themselves are responsible for integration and are responsible for their position in German society as well. For the first time this year, the call from the Central Council came, stating, "Muslims themselves have a duty to integrate themselves into German society" (*Migration News*, 03/02).

Muslims have been more active in society through politics and naturalisation and more assertive in their needs and wishes through the newly developed mediums of German-Islamic bodies (both political and cultural), publications and websites. This kind of self-definition can be achieved by the German Muslims themselves and is useful as a tool for integration and for establishing their position in German society.

ÅKE SANDER

Muslims in Sweden

Introduction

Swedes today generally believe, and often proudly claim, that Sweden is a globally aware, free, open, secularised and unprejudiced society with progressive and generous immigration policies; that they are living in one of the most open, democratic, egalitarian and just societies in the world. This picture is also largely accepted outside Sweden. Fortunately this is also to a high extent true. But this does not mean that this claim is not in need of discussion, debate and analysis. It could even be claimed that it is this kind of discussions that constitute the backbone of an open and democratic society. A key area in our discussion will be that of religious liberty, a liberty which the Swedes was formally granted in the Religious Liberty Act of 1951, which took effect on 1 January 1952.¹

Even though it is true today that hardly anyone, as Robert Bellah expresses it, “would fail to list religious freedom and religious pluralism among those obvious good things that any enlightened society would want to defend,” it is as true that “through most of the history of Western civilization neither religious freedom nor religious pluralism were obvious goods. They were in fact quite consciously rejected” (1982:33). Both of these statements fit Sweden as almost perfectly.

A glance back at the Swedish history shows all too clear that religious liberty, as well as human rights in general,

have been rare phenomenon. It could even be said that the very concept of human rights – the idea that humans should have special rights just because they are humans, and not because they had other properties, like a specific social position – did not appear until fairly late in history. One problem in all discussions of religious liberty that has to be mentioned at an early stage, is that “religious liberty” can mean many things and that it often is taken to mean different things to different people. It can, for example, be interpreted to mean any or all of the following: “freedom from discrimination based on one’s belonging or adhering to a religious tradition in general or to a specific religious tradition or variety of such tradition”, “freedom to hold religious beliefs, attitudes and values”, “freedom to be able to act and live according to one’s religious beliefs in private as well as in public”, “freedom to organise and belong to religious institutions” and “freedom not to have to belong to a religion, to be religious or to have to take part in religious activities”. To this can be added the freedom to be able to define what should be understood by “religion”, as well as what its area of function and competence should be from within one’s own religious tradition and self understanding. The last is a point not rarely pressed by Muslim minorities in Western societies. Furthermore, religious liberty may be understood mainly as a collective or as an individual phenomenon, understandings that has a tendency to come in conflict with each other. We will make it clear here already, that the constitutional protection of liberty in Sweden, as most other liberties, has been understood as that of the individual, and as none other.

Many of the problems the Muslims in Sweden face can be largely attributed to the notion, nature, position and place of religion in our society, which includes the notion that it should not be allowed to affect behavior outside the

very private sphere. To allow religious considerations to affect your public life is considered both irrational and wrong. Society, its institutions and representatives should be impartial, rational and objective, i.e. secularised. This ideal has saturated the general consciousness of the Swedes to a high extent during the 20th century. The result is that religion has disappeared almost totally as a factor in our way of seeing and understanding other people and their ways of thinking and acting, including the ways we see and understand immigration. Religious aspects of immigration have been almost completely neglected in Sweden until very recently.² Immigrants have been seen as people without religion, or, at best, with a religion as secularised and privatised as we have in our modern era. Until quite recently, immigrants have also almost exclusively been viewed in terms of secular labels such as nationality, language, ethnicity, political opinion or socioeconomic class, and their identities and loyalties have been considered to be almost exclusively tied up with one or a combination of the just mentioned categories. It has been largely ignored that "religion" from the Islamic horizon means something different than from the Western-Christian horizon. It has also been ignored that Islam is for many Muslims a very important factor in how they think, what they do and why they do it, in many cases perhaps the most essential aspect of their identity and "cognitive universe". When Muslims have pointed out and insisted upon the fact that they are Muslims first and foremost, this has normally been met without understanding or with negative attitudes.

Muslims in Sweden – Background

Sweden – A Land of Unity

The history of religious freedom in Sweden

With few exceptions up until the last decades, the history of Sweden can be described as the history of an ethnically, culturally, religiously and socially isolated and homogeneous society. One of the reasons for this isolation is that until fairly recently, Sweden, largely owing to its relatively low level of “academic”, economic and industrial development, its geographical position and its climate, was not a very attractive target for immigration and therefore remained relatively untouched by Europe’s various population movements. Moreover, Sweden has never been colonised or been a colonial power itself, even if it had its own regional empire in northern Europe during the 17th century.

On the whole, Sweden can be said consciously to have tried to protect itself from foreign influence since the end of the sixteenth century – and in the minds of the legislators, thereby from the risk of domestic disruption and lack of consensus – with the aid of a highly restrictive legislation, particularly on religion. The formula on which Sweden was to be built and governed was: “One nation, One people, One religion.”

The starting point for the so-called Lutheran unity society is normally set at the time of the synod that was summoned to Uppsala in 1593 (Uppsala möte) where its delegates of Lutheran clergy declared the Evangelical Lutheran Church to be the national church of Sweden (Alwall: 1998, 147; Cnattingius: 1943, 66–76 and 97).³ It was, for example, decided that Sweden and the whole of Swedish social life

were to be based on an Evangelical Lutheran foundation. No exemptions should be tolerated. The unity in faith was seen as the foundation for the stable society. The Lutheran religious ideology was supposed to be the social cement that held the nation together.

This principle of religious unity, according to which all Swedes should adhere to the same Lutheran faith, was from this time on forcefully imposed for the next 300 years. The first paragraph of the 1634 Instrument of Government, for example, states that: "...unity in religion and the right divine service is the strongest foundation for a rightful, unanimous and lasting government."⁴ Religious unity was seen as an absolute presupposition for the prosperity of the people and for a good royal government. Other religious systems were considered a threat to religious unity and thereby to the nation. In the Constitutional Act of 1665 the practising of every other religion than the version of Evangelical Lutheranism officially accepted in Sweden was prohibited, and made punishable with severe penalties. This meant that it was necessary to be a member of the officially recognised Swedish State church to be able to be a Swedish citizen. Every dissident from the "Right Faith" was, by definition, no longer Swedish and could, after other penalties, be expelled from the country (Karlsson & Svanberg: 1997).

All so-called foreign religious adherents (i.e., non-Lutherans) were subject to harsh circumstances during the 17th and most of 18th century, including forced conversions and Christian baptisms. Roman Catholics, Jews and Muslims experienced this fate during the 17th century. Forced christenings for Muslims were arranged in, for example, 1672 and 1695 (Alwall: 1994, 89; Alwall: 1998, 149). The 18th century the state, mostly due to economic necessities, started to take a more pragmatic view on some foreign religious adherents. But it should be emphasised

that Jews and Catholics were still generally prohibited to settle in Sweden. Catholics and Jews were given restricted religious liberty in the Tolerance edict from 1781 and the so-called Jewish regulations from 1782 (Karlsson & Svanberg: 1997).

As this was the period of the industrialization of Sweden, during the 19th century the importance of these pragmatic motives of the state grew. One example of this liberalization is the 1809 Instrument for Government which, in the sixteenth paragraph, claims that the king should protect the liberty of religion and not force anyone to follow a certain religious tradition as long as it is not harmful to society. Although it was a long way to the 'modern' religious liberty this was an important step.

Despite the writings in the 1809 Instrument for Government it was not until 1860 that the prohibition for Swedish citizens to leave the Swedish Lutheran State Church was lifted, however, only after teaching, exhortation and warnings by a state church priest. Furthermore, if they were to change their confession to another accepted Christian faith/church (Karlsson & Svanberg: 1997 and Alwall: 1998, 151-152.)⁵

So far in history the debate about religious liberty had only concerned one kind, the "positive", of what are nowadays considered to be two equally important kinds of liberty. No serious debate of the "negative" kind, that is, freedom from religion, took place in Sweden until the 20th century. That the process from a limited and restricted positive religious liberty to a more unrestricted and unconditioned religious liberty of a both positive and negative kind was long and painstaking can be seen from the fact that, as we have seen, it took almost another hundred years, or until 1951, for the Swedes to be formally granted their Freedom of Religion Act.

In 1974, religious liberty was included in the Swedish constitution (Instrument of Government, Chapter 2).⁶ Several opinions on this topic have even claimed this piece of legislation to be among the most important amendments to the constitution during the 20th century. In yet another amendment in 1976 – the same year the Sweden ratified the UN Declaration on Civil and Political Rights from 1966 – the constitutional status of religious liberty was further strengthened by being proclaimed to be an “absolute right”, which means that this right, at least *prima facie*, should not be restricted by other laws and regulations. In reality, however, this protection has for various reasons proved itself rather weak. Religious liberty in Sweden was further strengthened when the European Convention on Human Rights was integrated in the Swedish legislation 1995.⁷

Lutheran Christianity has exercised throughout history a tremendous influence on Swedish culture and the Swedes’ manners and customs, norms and value systems, as well as their ways of thinking in general. The notion of a common culture and religion, including common manners, norms and value system, as well as a common way of thinking in general, implemented by the state in cooperation with the church, in a strong assimilation policy.

Regardless of what many Swedes like to think today, it is a misconception to think that these old ideas about religious and other homogeneity should not, to a large extent, still exert their influence today. Even if the Swedes from the late 19th century have become free from overt religious oppression, this does not mean that the idea of the “unity society” (*enhetsamhälle*) was dropped. It was mainly that religion was dropped as the main tool for its achievement.

‘Folkhemmet’

During the 1920s and 1930s Sweden was, in the wake of strong national romantic ideas, one of the leading nations in Europe in so-called “racial-biological research”. In 1921, for example, the Swedish parliament decided to found a special institute for racialbiological research in Uppsala (Svanberg & Tydén 1992). This type of thinking was also propagated by what can be considered the chief ideologists within the social democratic party at the time, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal.⁸ According to them a major goal for Swedish politics should be the creation of a strong and healthy “Swedish race” which was “Nordic to its essence” and which had strong capabilities for survival and for defending the Swedish *lebensraum*, and the like (see for example Myrdal: 1934). The result of all this was that leading Swedish politicians, under the guise of science, could argue that the pure Swedish race was superior to other races which, subsequently, based on their physiognomic characteristics, were considered to be in varying degree inferior (Broberg & Tydén: 1991). The time during which these ideas were peaking was also the time of the birth and development of the ideology of the Folkhem as well as of the Folkhem itself.

The *Folkhemsideologi* was an unique attempt to create a middle way between capitalism and fullblown socialism/communism, to create an all-embracing, all-encompassing welfare state in which the securities of the lost agrarian society, and traditional ties of family and community, should be substituted by the security of the government. It can be said to be an attempt to make society a large family world, a village organization world on a large scale. During this period, the foundation of society was during this period interpreted, not as liberal or civic contract between indi-

viduals or voluntary interest, and other groups of individuals, a *Gesellschaft*, but as a community, an organic unit of human beings united through shared characteristics of origin, race, culture, ethnicity and religious tradition, a *Gemeinschaft*. This can be said to be Sweden's second attempt to, through social engineering, create a "unity society" (see for example Larsson: 1994; Rojas: 1998). This ideology, according to them, centrally included the idea of the social necessity of social equality, a common culture, elimination of inequalities and one and the same social order for all individuals and social groups. It also included social uniformization, homogenization and standardization in combination with an attempt to achieve, by way of education and social reforms, as equal an outcome as possible for all citizens on as many socioeconomic dimensions as possible. According to them, a centerpiece of their concept would be the existence of a special class of politicians and civil servants of the state who were experts with superior knowledge about what is "good" or "best" for its citizens, experts on "the good life" and "the good society", that is, the existence of a special class of "moral technocrats" (cf. Thorseth: 1999). What this in reality boils down to is, of course, a version of the old idea of the existence of an enlightened elite, which in their wisdom and benevolence by social engineering should design and organise the good life for the less enlightened mob (Rothstein: 1994).

As long as the country, generally speaking, in most respect was very homogeneous this policy can be said to have been something basically positive for the country and its people. During the first half of the twentieth century Sweden, for example, had the highest economic growth rate in the Western world.

The "trouble" began when Sweden from the late 1970s started to become an ethnically, culturally and religiously

plural society and, despite the official formulation in the immigration policies, tried to solve the various “problems” that arose in the wake of this pluralization by applying the old strategies from the Folkhemsideology: Swedish experts should decide what was best for the immigrants. Applied to people and groups of people with backgrounds in cultures, religions, and other characteristics that were rather different from Sweden and not rarely with colonial experiences, this, from the immigrants’ point of view, very easily was perceived as being patronizing and ethnocentric. Our interviews confirm that this way of looking at the Swedish integration efforts is common among immigrants.

We are not claiming that this analysis presented by various critical “immigrants spokespersons” is the correct one.⁹ We are only arguing that they very well might have pointed to one of the explanations for why many Swedes, and particularly representatives of the official society, have such a tendency to say “integration” but mean “assimilation”. We also believe this roughly sketched general way of thinking also might be one of the reasons behind the fact that the term “tolerance” has been so much more frequent in the discussions of the relationship between Swedes and immigrants than the term “respect”. Tolerance is, in our ears, an attitude you have towards something you believe to be wrong or inferior in some ways or towards something you generally do not like, but that you for the sake of some other principle or value are prepared to accept, while respect is an attitude you manifest towards something you experience as equal or better than what you yourself have; something you even think you might or can have something to learn from.

Muslims in Sweden – The Facts

The definition of Muslims

In discussions about the number of Muslims in Sweden, both in the past and in the present, two things must be mentioned.¹⁰ One is empirical: no official statistics exist since the 1930s which tell us what ethnic or religious groups immigrants belonged to on arrival or what religious groups they belong to in Sweden. All statistics used here are based on nationality or country of origin. The other is theoretical: what is the definition of “Muslim”? Obviously it is difficult to get any accurate measure of anything until we know what we are going to count or measure.

Let us begin with the latter question. To solve this problem in a relatively simple way we will stipulate four different definitions of “Muslim”, which also have difference in scope. We will, for want of a better term, call the first, and widest, an ethnic definition, the second, and somewhat narrower, a cultural definition, the third, and still narrower, a religious definition and the last, and narrowest, a political definition. Here the first and the third are the focus of attention.

We define ethnic Muslim as anyone born in an environment dominated by a Muslim tradition, belonging to a Muslim people, of Muslim origin, with a name that belongs in a Muslim tradition and/or who identifies her or himself with, or considers her or himself to belong to this environment and tradition. This definition is independent of cultural competence, attitudes toward Islam as a cultural, political or religious system and its various representatives and leaders, religious beliefs and whether or not the individual actively practices Islam as a religious system.

We designate as cultural Muslim anyone who is socialised into, and has to some extent internalised, the Muslim cultural tradition – the Muslim “cognitive universe” (Berger & Luckmann’s phrase)¹¹ – and who has a Muslim cultural competence. In this sense someone is a Muslim if the “Islamic cognitive universe” functions as her or his “frame of reference” or “pattern of thought, life and communication” and thereby as that which gives her or his world and its objects, words, situations, behaviors, etc. their meaning and sense. In other words: if the Islamic cognitive universe is the phenomenon “through” which the individual constitute and experiences her/himself and her/his life-world. Cultural Muslims can have very different norm and value systems, very different political opinions, very different attitudes towards Islam as a religion and very different degrees as well as ways of practicing religion from one another. But, and this is what is important, they all have a certain common knowledge, in the wide sense of the term, owing to which they can use the same terms, the same religious, political, and other words of prestige and abuse, the same metaphors, allegories, proverbs, symbols, pictures and jokes, with the same meaning in relevant respects. Stated differently, when they hear a word or a phrase, see an object, picture, gesture or human behavior, they get the same associations in relevant respects. In other words, they understand each other, in both direct and indirect means of communication.

We define someone as a religious Muslim if (s)he professes specific beliefs, participation in religious services and other religious practices, personal piety and other elements of personal life style. In other words, if (s)he “measures positive” on a set of criteria designed to measure religiosity.

Finally, we define someone as Muslim in the political sense if (s)he has specific ideas about the place, role and function of religion (Islam) in society. A person is a political Muslim if (s)he claims that Islam in its essence or primarily is (ought to be) a political and social phenomenon. In other words, if (s)he in an integristic¹² way underscores and claims the 'dogma', 'belief' or idea of unity under, or oneness of, God (tawhid) and the exclusive transcendental sovereignty (hakimiyya) of God as the most central and important characteristics of Islam; i.e. if (s)he – usually in the spirit of people like al-Maududi or Sayyed Qutb – sees Islam as a total way of life for the individual as well as for society at large. (cf. Choueiri: 1990; Esposito: 1992, 1997, 2001; Esposito & Voll: 2001).

The definition that, explicitly or implicitly, is the most commonly used in statistics about the number of Muslims in the world or in Sweden is the first and widest one: the ethnic definition. This is also the one we use in our attempt to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the number of Muslims in Sweden.

When trying to answer this question we face the empirical problem just mentioned: how to find what we want to count when the only available statistics are based on nationality, which, for at least some national groups, admittedly is a poor indicator of which religious tradition people from there belong to, even in the ethnic sense? Here the only feasible method – given a reasonable amount of money and work – we can see is to start out from the number of people with foreign backgrounds from countries we know have sizable Muslim populations and adjust that with what we know from other sources about these countries, their populations, the structure of immigration from the various countries and so on. The obvious fact that this procedure of estimating the number of Muslims in Sweden is

open to criticism in many respects and that its results will be afflicted with a considerable uncertainty and a large margin of error – the populations in most countries are, just to mention one problem, made up of several different ethnic and religious groups – is something we have to put up with, at least until we find an alternative procedure that is feasible and practicable.

The most essential factor to adjust for is what we know about the percentage of ethnic Muslims in the various countries of origin. However, when trying to do this we again run into the problem of a lack of reliable figures. Various sources give different, sometimes very different, figures for the percentage of Muslims in a country. Generally speaking it seems that what we can call ‘Muslim sources’ on the whole give higher figures for the percentage of Muslims in a country than do what we can call ‘western sources’.¹³

How many of this total of roughly 300,000 – 350,000 ethnic Muslims can be said to be Muslims in a religious sense, according to a religious definition? Not surprisingly the answer to this question depends on one’s definition of ‘religious Muslim’.

We count anyone a Muslim in the religious sense who:

- i) accepts (claims to accept) the words of the Islamic declaration of faith (the shahadah) that there is no god but Allah and that Mohammed is his last messenger, ii) believes and has faith in Allah as the highest authority, iii) believe and have faith in his Angels, his books, his prophets, the day of judgment and the final resurrection and, as a consequence of i - iii, iv) claims to have as her/his, at least long term, goal in life to try, to the best of her/his ability, to realise the commands and intentions of the Quran and the example of Mohammed (the sunna) (as (s)he understands it) in her/his life, and v) that because (s)he, independently of how (s)he

at the moment de facto is living his/her life right now, seriously believes (claims to believe) that it is a life in accordance with the Quran, and so on, as (s)he understands it, that constitutes the meaningful, the right, the good, the correct or the most valuable life. Included in this goal in life should be, among other things, that (s)he, to the best of her/his ability, shall perform the daily prayers (salat), visit the mosque with reasonable regularity, fast (sawm) during Ramadan, perform the pilgrimage (Hajj) and follow the basic rules of Islam in matters of food, dress, ethics, family relations, etiquette and so on as (s)he understands them.¹⁴

With a starting "definition" of the kind just mentioned and by means of a set of criteria developed from it,¹⁵ involving both "attitudinal" and "behavioral" aspects, we concluded in a study, using both survey questionnaires and counts of visitors to local mosques and prayer-halls in the early 1990s (Sander 1993) that 40-50% of the ethnic Muslims in Sweden could reasonably be considered to be religious. Given what we know about changes in the Muslim population since then - for example, that the Iranian group, then the largest and by far the least religious group, today makes up a smaller part of the total Muslim population, and that Muslims from some of the 'newer' groups, such as those from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Ethiopia, manifest a relatively high adherence to Islam and Islamic practices - it seems reasonable to conclude that the relative proportion of religious Muslims should not be less today than in the early 1990s.

A special problem here is the second generation Muslims born and raised in Sweden. We have no idea how many of these that can be considered, or consider themselves Muslims in a religious sense. From discussions and interviews with Muslim leaders, among others, it does not seem that the percentage they consider to be religious

Muslims in a more qualified sense exceeds fifteen percent, or perhaps even less. However, the group whose first choice of religious tradition, if they were to “turn to religion”, would most likely be Islam is, however, considerable and growing. There are also indications that during recent years these youngsters, to an increasing degree, have started to identify themselves as Muslims. On the basis of considerations such as those just mentioned, we do not think it unreasonable to put the figure of religious Muslims in Sweden at the time of writing at close to 150,000.

Starting from a somewhat different and more exclusive way of defining “religious Muslim”,¹⁶ mainly based on membership and participation in the activities of “recognised” religious congregations, the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (SST) in 2000 arrived at 100,000 for the number of people “served” by the Swedish Muslim congregations. Given a) that the estimates of the SST tend to be on the conservative side, b) that not all Muslim congregations are members of SST, either because of their own choice or because they do not live up to the standards for membership and thus fall outside this figure, and c) that their criteria for “religious Muslim” is more exclusive than those we used, it seems reasonable, by including second-generation Muslims also, to accept the above mentioned figure of close to 150,000 religious Muslims in Sweden.

The Muslim population in Sweden

Today Sweden might have one of the most heterogeneous Muslim populations of all countries in Western Europe. They have different cultural, ethnic, political, economic, religious, linguistic or educational backgrounds. They come

from over forty different countries in "Arabic" and "Black" Africa; in "Persian", "Ottoman" and "Arabic" Asia and in Europe. They come from Islamic states such as Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, from secular states such as Turkey and from (former) socialistic states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and several of the new states formerly belonging to Soviet Union. They have migrated or fled for many different reasons. They have very different opinions in political matters as well as many different attitudes and ways of relating to Islam as a cultural, social, political and religious system. That this heterogeneity makes any statements about Islam and the Muslims in Sweden as a group more or less meaningless should be clear. Therefore, we will be as fair as possible in order to avoid making generalizing statements about them such as that they, as a group, possess a specific characteristic; that 'the Muslims' can be characterized in this or that way when it comes to integration; attitudes to Sweden and the Swedes; when it comes to religiosity, attitudes to women, and so on. And if we do, we will urge the reader to regard such statements with skepticism.

If we keep the Swedish situation of heterogeneity in mind we think the advantages, at least in an overview like this, of describing the Muslims in Sweden in terms of a few different groups outweigh the disadvantages. So, on organizational as well as on other¹⁷ grounds we think it reasonable to speak of them as roughly constituting seven different sub-groups:¹⁸ the Turkish Muslims, the "Arab" Muslims, the Iranian Muslims, the African Muslims, the Pakistani Muslims, the Balkan Muslims, and others.¹⁹ Turkish Muslims²⁰ were, as just mentioned, the first sizeable Muslim group to come to Sweden. Up until approximately 1980 they were by far the largest single Muslim community. For a long time they were even larger than

all the other groups together. This has given them a rather special position (Sander: 1990). For many Swedes, both individuals and authorities, they were The Muslims. They represented the Muslims in both official and unofficial contexts, their opinions were heard, they received, or at least directed, almost all financial or other "help" to minorities of Muslim background, and so on. This was no problem as long as they made up the largest group.

But by 1985 the relative size of this group was down to roughly thirty-three percent of all the Muslims, around 1990 to about sixteen percent and today they constitute less than ten percent of the total Muslim population. This, in combination with the fact that they succeeded for a long time in retaining their status as The Muslims, created certain problems. What kept these problems relatively small was the fact that the Muslims have realised that unity in itself has a high "lobbying" value for such a relatively small and weak group.

The Arabic-speaking group includes people from almost twenty countries covering a large geographical area.²¹ The largest sub-group here is the Iraqi. They constitute, with a little more than 52,000 members in 2000, almost half of this whole group. Among the Iraqi Muslims roughly one third are Kurds. The Iraqis started to come to Sweden in relatively larger numbers in the late 1970s. Most of them are refugees due to the Iran-Iraq war or due to Sadam Hussein's "policies" when it comes to internal affairs, particularly with regards to the Kurds. During the 1980s, this group together with the Iranians, was the fastest growing Muslim group in Sweden. The relatively large influx of Iraqis continued during the 1990s.

The second largest sub-group here is the Lebanese group, with its roughly 21,000 members. Included in the Arab group are also people from among other countries ,

including Morocco, Syria and Tunisia as well as Palestinians of various nationalities. All together, this group - with its roughly 90,000 members - make up roughly one third/one quarter of the Swedish Muslims.

The Iranian group is the second single largest group of ethnic Muslims in Sweden with almost 52,000 individuals. They themselves make up one sixth of the country's total number of ethnic Muslims. Most of them arrived in Sweden after 1984-85. In 1984, for example, the total number of Iranians was around 7,500 (of which 1,500 were born in Sweden), in 1985 it was around 8,500. The absolute majority of them were refugees with the intention of "returning home" if the situation in Iran should change in what they consider a favorable way. For many years, their existence in Sweden was, in many respects, characterised by (a consciousness of) temporariness, as well as of being focused on Iran. Many of them have extremely negative attitudes towards Islam (as a religion), and often in a crude way identify Islam (as a religion) with "Khomeini Islam". In spite of this many of them regard "the Persian culture and way of life" very highly, and as in very many areas and ways superior to the Western/Swedish way, about which many of them furthermore in many respects have negative opinions. The picture of them as on the whole strongly anti-Islamic has to a large extent also been taken over by the Swedish public opinion. In reality the picture is not that simple, though. There is a significant number that practice Islam as a religion in the sense that they, as far as it is practically possible in Sweden, follow Islamic religious rules and regulations, pray, fast at Ramadan, and so on. We would estimate that the group of in this sense religious Iranians in Sweden is about one sixth to one fifth of the total group.²² The way they are religious is, for various reasons, rather secularised and privatised, however. They

rarely participate in mosque or other official public Islamic activities.

As a result of various political activities in North-East Africa, during the second half of the 1980s Sweden saw a fair number of refugees from that region. Today, the number of people from that region is around 16,000 Somalis and around 12,000 Ethiopians. Other African Muslims have arrived from, for example, Eritrea, Ghana, Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and East Africa. Together their number can be estimated to around 5,000. These groups, especially the former, have manifested a strong Islamic identity and sense of belonging, but, compared to most other groups, a low level of integration.

The Pakistani group in Sweden is, compared to, for example, groups in Denmark and Norway, relatively small. They are a little over 3,000, or around one percent of the total number of Muslims in Sweden. Up to twenty-five percent of them could be Ahmadyyans.

The Balkan Muslims can be divided into three separate groups: those from ex-Yugoslavia, those from Bosnia-Herzegovina and those from Kosovo-Albania. The number of people from ex-Yugoslavia in Sweden at the end of 1988 was around 76,000. How many of those that are or consider themselves Muslims is very uncertain. Among Yugoslavians that had come to Sweden, mainly as labor and family-reunion migration before the latest civil war, the estimate of the proportion of Muslims were around twenty percent. This is higher than the estimated proportion of Muslims in Yugoslavia during the 1970s and 1980s. The main reason for this is that the migration community consists of proportionally more members from the poorer areas of Yugoslavia which, to a large extent, were coexistent with its "Muslim areas", for example Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo-Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, areas which in the beginning

of the 1980s had estimated Muslim populations of fifty-one percent, eighty-five percent, thirty-one percent and twenty-six percent, respectively (Kettani: 1986). As the number of migrants from Yugoslavia in Sweden in 1988 was a little over 50,000, the number of Yugoslavian Muslims in Sweden at around 10,000 at the time. That number today is, if at all, probably only slightly larger as people from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo-Albania have been separately treated in the statistics since the latest war. Relevant to note is that the development in the Balkans during the last decade, according to Muslim leaders, has had the effect that to a large extent, the Yugoslavian Muslims in Sweden have increased their interest in attending Muslim religious organizations.

In the wake of the civil war in Yugoslavia a relatively large number of refugees came to Sweden. Between 1990 and 1993 around 150,000 people from former Yugoslavia applied for asylum in Sweden. Many of them were from Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the end of 1998 the number of people from Bosnia-Herzegovina that had been granted asylum and were living in Sweden was around 54,000. In surveys we have conducted among this group, seventy-five to eighty percent of the Bosnians have reported Islam as their religious tradition. That would set their number to a little over 40,000. This group has shown remarkable activity and capacity when it comes to building institutions.

Aside from Muslims with these origins, in Sweden there are presently Muslims from virtually all parts of the world. Their exact numbers are most difficult to estimate. We doubt, however, that it between 10,000 to 15,000. Most of the Swedish Muslims are Sunnis. The number of Shias was at the end of the 1990s estimated to slightly over 60,000 (Thurfjell: 1999). Other groups, like the Ahmadiyya, the Alevites, the Ismaelites, probably do not exceed 1,000

individuals, and the number of converts, mainly women married to Muslim men, is probably no more than 5,000.

This most likely puts the total number of ethnic Muslims in Sweden from the groups mentioned above somewhere between 250,000 – 260,000.

A group of increasing importance is Muslims born in Sweden, so-called second-generation Muslims, a group which, due to the way statistics are organised, are largely not included in figure above. The size of this group is for various reasons hard to estimate. A rough estimate of its size, however, puts it at close to 100,000. The total number of “foreign born” immigrants and their children is, as we have seen, close to 2 million. Of those, around 700,000 have been born in Sweden. Given that somewhere between twenty and twenty-five percent of the “foreign born” immigrants are ethnic Muslims and that the various immigrant groups has roughly the same nativity rates, the number of “Muslim children” should be around 150,000. However, in the light of other facts about this group – which cannot be dealt with here – we do not believe that they exceed 100,000 individuals.

All in all this will bring the total Muslim population of ethnic Muslims in Sweden in the end of year 2000 to a total of 300,000 – 350,000.

*The process of Muslim institutionalization in Sweden*²³

In discussions of the process of institutionalization of the Muslims in Sweden and elsewhere, it is useful to make a distinction between Muslim and Islamic institutions. Islamic institutions are institutions that are considered, by the Islamic authorities, absolutely necessary for people to be able to practice Islam as a religion in a correct way, and

thus for them to live a life as real, true or good Muslims. The absence of these institutions makes it impossible, or at least difficult, for Muslims to fulfill what shari'a (the Quran and the Sunna) prescribe as necessary duties for a correct religious life. Examples of institutions in this category include: mosques, prayer halls (musalla) and the essential conditions for the proper performance of salat, sawm, zakat, hajj, slaughter, circumcision, weddings, funerals, and so on, according to Islamic Law and ritual as well as the necessary conditions for the availability of religious leaders (mullas, imams, khojas, molvis) and possibilities for them to operate and exercise their duties as they are supposed to.

Muslim institutions are institutions of a much wider nature than Islamic ones. They are institutions which (at least traditionally) constitute important parts of life in Muslim societies at the same time as their existence cannot be derived from the obligations of shari'a - they cannot be said to be either wajib or mandub. These are institutions that have their origin in various local, regional or national, sometimes even pre-Islamic, historical traditions and cultures. These kinds of institutions would be more correctly called Moroccan, Turkish, Persian, Pakistani, and others, than Islamic. They include a number of customs and practices concerning the position, behavior, dress, and so on, of women, as well as customs and practices in connection with birth, circumcision, name giving, weddings, sickness, funerals and of other rites of passage.

It goes without saying that the distinction is not sharp, and that opinion is divided among the 'ulama within the Islamic world about what falls more exactly within one or the other category, as does the fact that Islam, as we have argued, is a far from uniform and homogeneous phenomenon.

In spite of this, the Islamic/Muslim distinction is an important one, and this is true for non-Muslims trying to understand Islam as well as for the Muslim communities themselves. The distinction is also frequently used in various policy-making discussions among Swedish Muslims, although not in exactly our terms, especially among the increasing number who argue for a unification of all (Swedish) Muslims under various versions of the appeal of "Back to pure non-culturalised Islam", "Back to the Sources", "Back to the Revelation (the Quran and the (early) Sunna)" and the like. These groups and individuals advocate, in other words, a "going beyond" the differences in Islam grounded in cultural and national differences, as well as often a "going beyond" the madhahib and their various systems of fiqh.²⁴

Those who argue for a "reformation" of Islam along these lines seem to do so with the intention of being able to achieve (at least) two things simultaneously. On the one hand they hope to liberate the Diaspora Muslims from their religious (and even other) ties with their different "home-countries", and liberate them from their "home-countries" attempts to control the form as well as content of their religious life. In doing so, they hope to break down the religious (and other) differences between the Diaspora Muslims that hamper the unification of all Muslims. On the other, they hope that they will be able to get Islamic (religious) legitimation for their policies from important religious leaders as well as from international or "pan-Islamic" organizations such as The Muslim World League in Mecca, the London-based Islamic Council of Europe and others, using the basically "fundamentalist" ideology of going back to a traditional understanding of Islam. And as far as we can see, they are right: Firstly in the view that they need to succeed with both of these aims to be able to

create something that can become a “self-propelled” variety of Western European Islam (among the other forms of Islam in the world), and secondly in the opinion that if they fail with the first, the long term future of Islam in Sweden will look more bleak.

During the first phase of Muslim immigration to Sweden the process of institutionalization was very slow and provisional – despite the fact that the establishment of associations, including religious ones, is relatively easy within Swedish law. The “meeting places” of the Muslim immigrants during this early phase was almost invariably a room in somebody’s flat or shop, or some small premises rented for the purpose, that were “converted” into a “house mosque”.

It was not until the mid 1970s, when many Muslims started to realise that their time in Sweden was going to be much longer than they first had expected, and as a result thereof, the presence of women and children in the Muslim community was growing, that the activities aimed at creating cultural and religious institutions started to be attempted in any more serious way.

A major problem with the earlier institutions was that an unreasonable amount of the time and effort on the part of their leadership was devoted to various internal disputes over facilities, influence, power, money, political and religious aims, goals and strategies which, given the situation, are of secondary importance. This not only led to neglect of the organizations’ primary goals and functions but also to organizational splits and a growing alienation of the members from the organizations and leadership.²⁵

From the end of the 1970s this situation started to change. Not only did the number of Muslims, as well as their heterogeneity increase, but also the number of “congregations” with “mosques” or musallas, as well as

the number of people attending them. Some figures: the first Swedish national Muslim organization or federation, Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige (FIFS), was created in 1973. In 1977 it organised eight local organizations or 'congregations'. There was also one Ahmadiyya congregation in Göteborg that, until the mid-1970s, shared facilities with the other Muslim organisations. In 1976 they opened their own purpose-built mosque, which was the first of its kind in Sweden.²⁶ Altogether these eight congregations claimed to represent 16,000 registered members.

All reference to 'registered members' should be taken with caution. The numbers quoted are, first of all, based on figures reported to the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities by the "congregations" themselves. Secondly, Muslim "congregations" do not seem to be very "statistically minded". Some of them also have an explicit aversion against membership registration, and they give both religious political and ideological reasons for their stance, including fear that the "authorities" could use it against them in various ways, and/or that Islam is not Christianity and mosques are not churches that have congregations with members. Of course, there might also in some cases be what can be called cultural reasons. Many of the people belonging to these "congregations", including their leaders, come from a cultural background where there was no tradition for religious (or other) organizations to collect and systematise this kind of information about themselves. On the other hand, it is also a fact that they receive financial and other forms of assistance partly based on numbers of members, it is not in their interest to report too few "registered members".²⁷

In 1982 a second national federation, Svenska Muslimska Förbundet (SmuF) was created after a split within FIFS. At the time, together they claimed to organise 23 lo-

cal congregations and claimed 22,000 registered members. Two years later in 1984, a third national federation, Islamiska Centerunionen (ICU) came into being after another split within FIFS. ICU was accepted as eligible for state grants in 1987.²⁸ In 1988 they together claimed to organise a total of 38 local congregations with 63,000 registered members. All three have joint representation within SST under the name of Islamiska Samarbetsrådet (IS). In 2001 FIFS claimed to organise 41 local congregations, SMuF 48 and IKUS 28, some of which are also claimed to have religious activities in "external branch offices". Besides this, the Ahmadiyya have, as we have seen, one "real" mosque, built for the purpose, and report "branch offices" in five other cities. There are also a number of places where smaller groups of Muslims - including Ismailis, Sufis, and so on meet to pray, etc. on a more or less regular basis.

In 1986 FIFS and SMuF created a joint organization called Stiftelsen Islamiska informationsbyrån, since 1988 Islamiska informationsföreningen (IIF), in order to inform Swedes and Muslims about Islam by publishing information as well as giving lectures in schools and other locations. IIF also publishes the first major Islamic periodical in Sweden, *Salaam*, which was originally started in 1986.²⁹ Today IIF has branch offices in Stockholm, Göteborg and Lund and is in the process of opening new branch offices in four more locations. During the year 2000 Svenska Islamiska Akademin (SIA) was created on the initiative of well-known Muslims in Sweden, among others the retired Swedish ambassador Mohammed Bernström, the latest translator of the Koran into Swedish (Larsson 1999). Among the goals of the Academy is supporting education and research in and on Islam and working for the establishment of an Islamic university in Sweden that, among other things, should be responsible for the education of Imams.

The Academy also publishes the periodical *Minaret*, which first came out in February 2001.³⁰

FIFS and SMuF also co-operate in Sveriges Muslimska Råd (SMR), created in 1990 as an organization to concentrate and centralise power and to demonstrate a more united front with respect to the various authorities as well as to Swedish society in general.

In 1990 the by now large and very active youth organization Sveriges Muslimska Ungdomsförbund (SMUF (today SUM)) was created. In 1998 they were functioning as umbrella organization for thirty local youth organizations.³¹

There is also the umbrella organization Islamiska Rådet i Sverige (IRIS), centered on IKUS and a few other smaller organizations, for example Islamiska Kvinnoförbundet i Sverige (IKF), Islamiska Ungdomsförbundet i Sverige (IUF) and Sveriges Imamråd (SIR). Apart from their 26 purely religious congregations, they organise a number of local branches of IKF and IUF.

The increased proliferation and heterogenization of Islamic groups during the 1990s have resulted in the creation of a further number of Islamic national and local organizations. For example, the growing number of Shiites has led to the creation of Islamiska Shiasamfunden i Sverige (ISS) in 1992/93, which claims to organise twelve congregations. Two years later, in 1995, the growing number of congregations formed by Bosnian refugees created their own national organization, Bosnien–Hercegovinas Islamiska Riksförbund, which in 1999 claimed to organise nineteen local congregations. The latest national federation, Islamiska Riksförbundet (IRFS), that started in 1995, claims to organise sixteen. None of the last three mentioned national federations are yet “officially recognised” and accepted as being entitled to state funding.

The various Muslim national organizations in Sweden today claim to organise around 200 local organizations, of which around 150 have, as their main function, being a place of worship. Of these congregations six (including the Ahmadiyya) have what can be considered proper mosques (purpose-built or extensively rebuilt separate houses): Göteborg (Ahmadiyya), Malmö, Trollhättan (Shi'a), Uppsala, Västerås and Stockholm. In another half dozen locations congregations have obtained building permits and are more or less well on the road towards having real mosques. The rest of the congregations have facilities more or less rebuilt and suited for their new purposes. Many of those are in basements, which often are in poor condition and ill suited for their purpose.

All in all, the three "recognised" national organizations reported in 2001 to SST to have the equivalent of 146,75 full time posts or positions as imams connected to their at the time 153 reported congregations (FIFS: 42, SMuF: 71.75 and ICUS: 32 imams). Of these they claim to pay the salaries for 41.75 positions themselves, 20.5 are reported to be paid for "by others", including foreign sources (for example the Turkish Diyanet) and unemployment allowances, and 84.5 are working on a voluntary basis. That these figures, for various reasons, must be taken with a grain of salt should be obvious. For example: for the total number of imams reported to be paid by the congregations themselves (41.75) they report a total salary cost of 4,334,820 SEK (\approx €465,000 or \approx €11,100/person/year), which would seem somewhat too little to live on. Some other data of relevancy when it comes to the imam situation among these congregations are: of the total number of congregations affiliated with the three "recognised" national organizations 35 had imams paid for by the congregation (of which 3 were only part time), 15 had imams paid for by external sources, only five

had part-time paid imams, 39 had only imams working on voluntary basis, and 27 were reported to be without an imam altogether. Only judging from these figures it is obvious that the imam-situation is far from satisfactory.

When it comes to what is perhaps the most significant long-run question regarding imams, namely their level of education and competence, we unfortunately have not been able to get too much reliable data. From what we have understood in our conversations with spokespersons for both national and local Islamic organizations we, however, do not think we need to hesitate to claim that it is in dire need of improvement. The number of imams with “a reasonable” amount of education in Islamic theology, law, and so on, and a degree from a madrasah – connected with the congregations- is much too small. Of the “formally educated” imams in Sweden today seven to eight seem to be sent out and paid for by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) in Ankara which, since 1979, has been sending imams to serve among Turkish immigrants in Western Europe.

One other issue raised by Muslims in connection with the supply of imam is the problem for them to obtain residence and work permits in Sweden. To get a work permit as a “priest” in Sweden you have, among other things, to have a degree from a university/theological faculty/seminar accepted by the Swedish authorities. And many Islamic madrasah, it is claimed by the Muslims, do not qualify as such according to the Swedish authorities. The ones with degrees from one of the Turkish Ilahiat faculties sent out by the Diyanet do. Besides Turkey, no other state seems to have sent any officially sanctioned imams to Sweden on more permanent basis. During Ramadan some “congregations” have, however, had visits from various “state sponsored” “guest imams”.

We have seen how the Islamic institutionalization in Sweden, from a slow start in the 1960s and 1970s during the past few years has begun to move into more of a consolidation phase. By this we mean that Muslims have now achieved a rudimentary “institutional completeness”, in the sense that many of the most essential Islamic and Muslim institutions – mosques, musallas, Muslim periodicals, Muslim burial grounds, pre-schools, schools, shops, and others – now exist, although not yet in adequate numbers. They have now started to come to a point in their institutionalization, and in manifesting a physical and ideological presence, in which more and more Swedes are beginning to consider them an integral part of Swedish domestic religious life, as Swedish Muslims.

Even from the brief account given above it should be clear that the Muslim community in Sweden has undergone important changes during the 1990s. One such change is, again, that the Muslim population has become more and more heterogeneous, both in the sense that it now consists of a relatively large number of groups with different cultural, linguistic, etc. backgrounds, of which none can claim dominance, and in the sense that Muslims have been in Sweden for varying lengths of time. Another change is a noticeable alternation of generations. Up to ten years ago, the community was almost totally dominated by members of “the first generation”, people born and raised in countries dominated by a Muslim tradition. Now a generation of Muslims who was born and raised in Sweden, including converts, is increasingly starting to make their voices heard and presence known, not in the least on the Internet (Larsson: 2002). These changes have affected the institutionalization process of Muslims in Sweden in important ways.

To the extent it is at all possible to talk about a “general pattern” in the history of the Islamic organizational process in Sweden, it seems to have been that the organizational start in most places was under the heading of “all the Muslims in one congregation”, with the Turks as the natural leaders, mainly owing to their numbers and their relatively long stay in Sweden. As their relative number and position has successively been reduced, they have subsequently seen their position of power threatened. Conflicts have arisen, usually with the result that the non-Turks have moved out and opened their own congregation. Sometimes there has been further splits: on the one hand among the Turks along ideological, political or religious lines or owing to individual disagreements of other kinds, and on the other hand, among the other groups along the lines of sunni-shia, of “Arabs”, Persians and others. Another part of this “general pattern” has been that the representatives of most of the various congregations or groups of congregations we have spoken to have claimed a) that they represent (the true) Islam, b) that they do not make any distinctions, at least not in any “negative way”, between various groups of Muslims or between the various madhahib. Each and every Muslim is equally welcome. Most of them have also claimed c) that they are working to achieve one united and thereby strong Muslim umma in Sweden and d) that it is the others’ fault that there is fighting and division within the group.

Yet another part of the reason for the growth of the number of congregations, but also for the growth of the number of national federations, is the probably unique relationship among the state and the religious communities in Sweden. As stated above, the Evangelic-Lutheran Church of Sweden was between the sixteenth century and year 2000 a state church, funded by a church tax. And it

was in principle mandatory for every Swede to belong to it up to 1873, when the right to belong to other Christian denominations began to be introduced. But it took, as we saw, almost another 100 years, until 1951, until the Swedes were formally granted their full freedom of religion, including the right not to belong to any religion.

During the 1950s and 1960s the role and position of the state vis à vis the various non-state churches and religious communities were discussed, not rarely in a heated manner. During these two decades the view developed that the state should welcome and support differences in religious view, lifestyle and organisation – all within fundamentally agreed limits. The general idea behind this was that the state should be impartial towards the various religious communities.

As a result of this debate, and as an attempt to establish this “impartiality” even on the economic level, the Council of Swedish Free Churches was created in 1972. This council was later (1980) reestablished as the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities (SST). In the Commission members of the various non-state churches and denominations were represented. Its main task was to provide economic support to the various free churches and their congregations, granted that they qualified for such support. To qualify, besides having a certain number of members and a qualified religious leadership of a certain number in relation to the number of members, a free church had to fulfill certain organizational and bureaucratic requirements such as, for example, having a certain organizational structure with membership lists and specific processes for appointing their leaders. Each congregation also had to be able to pay at least thirty-three percent of their total expenses themselves to be eligible for support.

Another way of putting this, which is not rarely the way it is experienced from the Muslim horizon, is to say that to qualify for support, a religious collective, for all practical purposes, has to accept at least functionally becoming a “free” church/religion in the traditional Swedish sense of the term. This has, as can easily be seen, put the Muslims in a delicate position. In general terms, the issue is: can Islam conform to the Swedish form for church organization, i.e. functionally become a Swedish free church, without losing its own specific nature? Can Islam adapt functionally to Swedish Christianity in its organizational form without also, at least in the long run, doing so in the area of belief/faith and religious practice? Can the people remain (true) Muslims and at the same time adapt to the Swedish society; i.e. is it possible to develop a form of Swedish (European) Islam which, on the one hand, can be legitimised from an Islamic point of view (and thereby accepted within dar al-Islam) and, on the other, be accepted by the Swedish legal, bureaucratic and other structures? Many Muslim leaders on both national and local level in Sweden to whom we have spoken seem to consider this a problematic and difficult task.³² A common line of complaint is that they feel “stuck between a rock and a hard place”. No matter how much they try to be good or true Muslims they are discriminated against from one or both of the following sides: they have difficulties in getting “their ways” legitimised from many important quarters within dar al-Islam just because they are living in, and are adapting to, dar al-Harb, and at the same time they feel that no matter how hard they try to become good Swedish Muslims, they are discriminated against in Sweden, both individually and institutionally, for not adapting, integrating enough, for not becoming Swedish enough. Another problem with the financial assistance is, as Imam Abd al Haqq Kielan claimed in our

interview with him, that it turns Muslim groups into “lazy producers” (see Stark: 1997).³³

The financial assistance distributed by the Commission is distributed through the denominational national federations (one of which a local congregation has to belong to be eligible for the state support), and is thought to parallel the church-state co-operation in, for example, the church tax. A free religious community can apply for support for basically three types of activities: 1) for running regular religious activities proper, including salaries for religious functionaries, for example imams (organisationsbidrag), 2) to build, renovate and pay rent for localities for religious activities (projektbidrag) and 3) for arranging and giving religious/theological education as well as for giving spiritual care in hospitals (verksamhetsbidrag).³⁴ Only the first of these was intended to be paid out to a congregation on a regular long-term basis. The other two were supposed to be paid out only in case of special needs and applications.³⁵

The financial assistance for the first of these activities is made up of two parts: on the one hand, a fixed sum that every congregation that has at least three thousand “members” is entitled to. In addition they are entitled to a small amount for every member. All in all this meant at least two things: on the one hand that the local Muslim communities in Sweden, comparatively speaking, can be said to have, and have had reasonably good financial circumstances when it comes to public money, and, on the other, that in many cases it has been financially advantageous to break up national federations as well as local organizations when they have reached a certain “critical” size.

From the year 2000, and the formal separation of the Swedish Church from the state, the “free churches” have received access to yet another financial source. Even after

the state-church separation, “the state” still collects the “church tax” from all its members on the behalf of the church. They have, however, from the year 2000 extended this service to include the members of all “recognised” churches, granted that the church in question so wishes, that it fulfill certain bureaucratic requirements, and applies to have the service performed for them.

Problems for Muslims to organise themselves in Sweden

By way of summary there can be said to be four main factors that, working together, are responsible for the way the Muslim community in Sweden has developed institutionally:

1) The relatively large heterogeneity of the Swedish Muslim population and the successive “waves” in which the various groups have arrived in Sweden over time. 2) That the Muslim population in Sweden, compared with most other Western European Muslim populations, on the whole must be said to be relatively poorly educated and to have a poor cultural - including linguistic - competence of the majority culture. 3) The strong assimilation, distribution and “mixing up” policies that - all in the name of “no ghettos” - have been characteristic of the Swedish immigration policy, and 4) the economic support system for free religious organizations that have made it not only possible, but sometimes even advantageous, to create several small rather than one large organization as well as to split organizations when they reached a certain size. These four factors are also important parts of the explanation of why Muslims in Göteborg, as we have seen, as well as in other places, have not yet succeeded in creating such

a complex organization as a purpose-built mosque. One other important part of the explanation is that the Swedish society is, relatively speaking, strongly saturated with bureaucratic and administrative routines that are very hard to penetrate.

We believe it is, at least in a schematic overview, legitimate to divide the problems and obstacles the Muslims in Sweden are facing in their attempts to institutionalise themselves into the two commonly used categories "dominant society-bound" and "minority group-bound". It is also legitimate to divide those categories into structural (and long-term) and non-structural (and short-term) obstacles, and at least the former, into the two commonly used categories "formal" and "informal" obstacles.³⁶

The main dominant-society-bound obstacles

Given the way in which the Swedish policies on immigration, freedom of religion legislations and other policies are officially formulated,³⁷ one would not expect to find too many structural dominant-society-bound obstacles to the Muslim process of institutionalization, at least not of a formal nature. As we have tried to indicate above, we nonetheless think that there are reasons to consider the historic ideals of unity and homogeneity, deeply rooted in the consciousness of most Swedes, as an important barrier of this kind. Even if these barriers are not officially formulated as part of existing legislation, they are clearly part and parcel of the way in which the legislation is normally implemented. Reformulated in terms of a formal/informal distinction, the barriers that Muslims face, even if not strictly of a formal kind, in reality – that is, in implementation – work to a very large extent work

as if they were formal(ised). This is mainly due to the way the legislation and policies interact with informal factors, such as prevailing deeply-rooted (positive) images among the Swedes of what Swedish culture, institutional life and religion is (ought to be) and of the corresponding deeply-rooted (negative) images of Islam, Muslims and Muslim cultures. Many writers prefer to call these barriers “institutional discrimination” (see Karmendal: 2000). This was also a topic raised during our round tables.

One factor making this kind of “institutional discrimination” possible is the vagueness with which the policies are formulated. Nonetheless, the way many representatives of various Swedish political, bureaucratic and administrative institutions and agencies, when creating difficulties for, or saying “no” to various Muslim demands and institutionalization projects such as preschools, schools and mosques, often do so with reference to “existing laws and regulations”, that is, with purely formal arguments. Much of the debate around, and the Swedish authorities’ reactions to the various mosque projects in Sweden stand as good examples of this way of transforming informal barriers into formal ones (Karlsson & Svanberg: 1995).

The formula on the basis of which most of Swedish society and its political authorities and agencies work seems, as we have argued, to a high extent to be as follows: as long as a religious (or any other) movement, group or organization fits in with, accepts and sustains the Swedish ideals and patterns of what Swedish culture, and the way that Swedish institutions (ideally) function, how they should be organised, what they should claim in the name of religion, society is willing to support it with a relatively wide range of official privileges, both economic and others. But faced with alternative religious, ideas and practices, ideas which, it might be feared, were not compatible with basic

Swedish manners and customs, norms and values, society reacts with bureaucratic rigidity, ad hoc administrative sanctions and difficulties, as well as with negativity and distrust in general.

The “Muslim problem” must also be seen in a wider perspective. This includes the realization that the various political, and other agencies representing the Swedish state, on both national and local levels, have, as we have seen, a long history as bodies of state social control. The general functions for which they were intended, therefore, had little to do with religion, and even less with Muslims, but were of a much more general nature. They were intended to be objective, impartial and non-religious administrative agencies to safeguard the Swedish unity and homogeneity by marginalizing, limiting and solving all kinds of controversies in society, in the best interest of society at large. That the Muslims now happen to be their main target should therefore not be seen primarily as a more or less conscious intention to suppress Islam and Muslims, but mainly as an “indirect” effect of the contingent fact that today the Muslims are the main “deviant” group in Sweden and that they are viewed to a large extent as a threat (at least potentially) to the traditional Swedish notion of Sweden; Muslims, as we have argued, to a large extent are seen as problem people with problem cultures. The intention of the bureaucrats is, in other words, not primarily to discriminate against people with any particular religion or culture, but rather (only) to try to minimise disputes and conflicts in society. Safeguarding and upholding the (traditional) unity and homogeneity is considered to be the basis of a good and prosperous society.

Our claim, made above, that the historic Swedish ideals of unity and homogeneity can be seen as structural obstacles, obstacles that have to be made explicit and changed

before we can achieve a (truly) multicultural Sweden needs to be understood against this background.

When it comes to this kind of deeply rooted obstacle to Muslim integration and institutionalization it seems clear to us that Sweden, compared with many other countries in Western of Europe, is lagging behind. From what we have learned of the situation in Britain, for example, it is (has become) now possible for the Muslims, as well as other immigrants, to do things that are still not possible to do in Sweden. Whereas we are still seriously debating as questions of principle, whether or not to allow the Muslims to build a mosque, have their own Muslim schools, be able to wear a turban when driving a tram, wear hijab as conferencier on TV³⁸ etc., – as well as whether it would be a threat to Sweden and its culture, if we granted them this – the situation in Britain seems to have moved to the level of practicality. In Britain the discussion seems to revolve more around whether a particular solution is practically possible, and if it will work, rather than, as in Sweden, around whether or not the underlying principles and the motives of the Muslims are acceptable from a traditional Swedish point of view, or whether or not their motives are compatible with traditional Swedish manners and customs, norms and values.

Another problem of this kind Muslims often brought up, including in our interviews and round tables, is the dominant view among the majority of society on what religion, and its area of competence and function as well as its place and role in society is and ought to be. The general idea of this view in Sweden is that religion and its expressions should not be displayed or lived out in public everyday life, but should be confined to places explicitly defined as religious (churches, mosques, and so on) or to the strictly private sphere which is a very limited sphere

in a strong welfare state of the Swedish type. The rest of society should be secularised and free from expressions of religion and religiosity. For many Muslims it is, however, impossible to separate religion and society in this way. Issues of, for example, dress and food are integral and constituting part of them as Muslims, of their identity. Many of our informants with immigrant background, and not only Muslims, have argued that Sweden, according to their experiences, is an exceptionally negative and intolerant country when it comes to religious expressions in the public sphere.³⁹

Yet another problem claimed by many Muslims is the serious lack of knowledge about Islam and Muslims and their ways of thinking and living within virtually all Swedish institutions, including governmental ones.⁴⁰ Despite the fact that it seems that the level of awareness of the Muslims as a group with specific demands and needs as well as to some extent the knowledge about them have improved over the years, this lack of knowledge is still experienced as severe by most Muslims and their representatives. This opinion of Muslims is to quite a high extent also verified in our fieldwork. Even though the relationship between knowledge and understanding in this case can be debated, most Muslims seem to believe that an increase in the former would make their lives in Sweden easier and that it, at least potentially, could have the effect of reducing the islamophobia, xenophobia and racism many of them claim to be faced with on a more or less daily basis.

Yet another problem often mentioned by representatives for Swedish authorities as well as by Muslim representatives is the lack of functioning “interfaces” between the two groups, that is, places and channels for the two groups to meet and communicate. One aspect of this problem is the problem of representation. One complaint

from the side of the Swedish authorities and institutions has been that they do not know who represents “the Muslims”, and thereby whom they should listen to and with whom they should engage in dialogue, as well as who they should turn to if and when they experience some Islam/Muslim related ‘problem’ or question. This lack of a clearly defined and authorised point of reference among the Swedish institutions, has also been frequently given as a reason why Muslims have run into so many problems with Swedish society and its various representatives when it comes to negotiations about various “demands” they have raised vis a vis Swedish society, as well as when it comes to more concrete issues like permits for building mosques, and so on (Larsson & Sander: 2001).⁴¹

That this problem, at least to some extent, has to do with the previously discussed lack of knowledge of Islam among the Swedes seems clear. In this case the lack of knowledge about the fact that Islam is not, as has also been discussed above, “another kind of Christianity”, hierarchically organised with an officially-recognised bishop at the top who can speak for the whole organization and everybody within it.

Interestingly enough, in our various discussions with representatives of Islamic organizations we have been presented with the same problem – but the other way around. They, in other words, also complain about the fact that they, when they try to approach various Swedish authorities, not least on the governmental level, have great trouble finding some specific office or person who feels confident in representing the authorities, for example the government, and acting as a point of reference for them. In the whole of “official Sweden” there does not seem to exist any “centralised” unit that has the responsibility and competence in dealing with Islam in all its complexity.⁴²

An example of this is that we ourselves have had great trouble in finding people at the government ministries who have been willing to act as our informants within this project. Our requests for interviews have generally been met with the same response as many Muslim leader reports have been met with, namely: "this is not my table", and "who's table it is" has, as a rule, not been possible to find out. To some extent, but only to some, this, of course, is a result of the specific Swedish view of religion, as discussed above. If you want to discuss halal-questions you get referred to the ministry of agriculture where they, as soon as it becomes clear that it has to do with Islam, become very uncomfortable, claiming no knowledge of Islam or of religion more generally (see Gunner: 1999). The same goes for most other issues raised by Muslims.

The main minority group-bound obstacles

Before turning to the topic in the title of this section, we would like to mention a general problem with any attempt to present a short summary of a minority problem (of integration and institutionalization). Every attempt to separate and isolate "their problems" into some kind of "catalogue", although always necessary for analytical purposes, does violence to reality in several ways. Such listing, for example, easily gives rise to the idea that the problems singled out are independent, separate, or isolated phenomena that can be treated, and perhaps even solved, in isolation, independent of one another. In reality, however, it is necessary to realise that they often constitute one highly interconnected web of problems in which different, but strongly interrelated, aspects for analytical purposes can be singled out for individual discussion. Any serious at-

tempt to solve them presupposes that the totality be taken into account.

With this in mind, we think that the main minority-bound problem for the Swedish Muslims can be said to be their size in combination with their cultural, national, linguistic, religious/theological and political heterogeneity and the consequent intra- and inter-community rivalry and split.

The small size of the group

Even though, as we have seen, the group has grown significantly during the last decade or so, their number is, except for possibly in the Stockholm area, in combination with the fact that they at the local level in most areas are geographically spread out, still a considerable problem. Not least because it largely prevents them from achieving the institutional framework (completeness) needed to defend themselves from the onslaught of the majority society with its thought and life patterns – particularly its social morality: the freedom and self determination of youth; feminism; tolerance for different sexual orientations; dress codes for women; its “decadent” night life; tolerance of alcohol and “promiscuous” sexual relationships. The problem of institutional completeness is, in other words, not only a problem of poor access to mosques, musallas, Muslim schools, religious and other Islamic socialization agents, halal food, and Islamic media, but, and in the long run probably more important, the lack of a Muslim neighborhood as “safeguard” of Islamic thought and life patterns, and specifically its morality (particularly as regards women). Independently of how most Swedes happen to think of and value Muslim thought and life patterns with their norm-

and value systems, this problem can probably be said to constitute one of the major threats to the very foundation of the future of the Swedish Muslim religious community, as many Muslims conceive of such an entity.

The heterogeneity of the group

The Swedish Muslim community is, as we have seen, characterised by a large and increasing cultural, linguistic, religious and political heterogeneity. As we have speculated above there have lately been signs that we might soon see the peak of this development, at least in the strictly religious field, due to increased activities, especially from young Muslims, with the aim of developing a so-called European, Swedish or "Blue-and-yellow Islam" (Larsson: 2001; Sander & Larsson: 2002). These "counter development" movements have so far mainly taken place on the theoretical/theological level, but there are, and this is more important, signs that it has also begun to find acceptance and be legitimated with organizations representing "official" Swedish Islam. If, as we believe, this development is going to continue, it will soon also start to be more visible in practice. It should particularly be mentioned that Swedish converts to Islam have played and play a significant role in this process, not the least on the Internet (Larsson: 2002).

Lack of knowledge and competence

Another problem of importance is that the group – including many of its leaders – still can be said to suffer from a lack of knowledge and competence. This is true both in

a general way – the first generation Muslims, especially those arriving before the mid 1980s, tended to have a relatively low level of (formal) education often in combination with a conservative and provincial, country of origin oriented view on most matters, including Islam – and also in more specific ways. Above all, they often had deficient knowledge of Islam in general, and what they did have was often heavily colored by their local cultural, political and religious traditions. Added to this, they often also had, and not rarely still have, poor knowledge about and competence in the Swedish language and culture.⁴³

Even though this situation has improved, and converts during the last decade have played important roles in the building of Swedish Islam, they have for obvious reasons not been able to fully compensate for the lack of “real” Muslim/Islamic intellectuals.

That the Muslim minority in Sweden when it comes to knowledge and competence in the majority culture was in many respects much worse off than their brothers and sisters in countries like for example Great Britain, France and the Netherlands should be obvious. Just to mention a few things: many Muslim immigrants to these countries came from their former colonies and could already speak their language. A fair number of them also had experiences of the countries’ educational system, as well as of other social institutions and their way of working. There was even a non-neglectable number who had gone through higher education in, or at least in the school system of, the country in which they now were immigrants.

Since many of the Islamic and Muslim leaders in Sweden still belong to the first generation, this has, in several cases resulted in that they and the (other first generation) “members” of their “institutions” have shown a tendency to isolate themselves from the surrounding society. In some

cases this isolation has also led to conflicts of various kinds with what they are trying to isolate and defend themselves from. And this, unfortunately, also includes conflicts with young dynamic Muslims who try to take an active part in the activities of the organization, or in mosques, in order to “reinterpret” or “redefine” Islam and what it is to be a Muslim to fit the new Swedish situation.

This is especially problematic as i) young people are as a rule better educated and have gone through the Swedish educational system, have better Swedish cultural competence than their parents, and also often better than their teachers in Islam and “home culture”. At the same time they ii) realise that they are Swedes and have to live in Sweden. They cannot, and do not want to, become “little Turks” for example, which is to often what their parents and religious leaders at least appear to want. The young Muslims realise that, if they want to become and continue to be Muslims in more than ethnic respects, they must find ways to become Swedish Muslims. Most of the people in the second and further generations who are involved in religious Islamic activities also seem to try to find formulas through which they can create both an Islamically acceptable or legitimated, and, to use Goffman’s term, “passable” form of Islam for Sweden. In this process in many cases, the older generation loses (or experiences that that it loses) its authority over the second generation. The older generation blames this on the young, as being Westernised and secularised, and becomes even more conservative and “stuck in its ways”. In short: the generation gap grows (see Larsson: 2002; Rogers & Vertovec: 1998).⁴⁴

The problem of leadership

A final minority-bound obstacle is the problem of leadership. Many “congregations” today, as indicated, lack both religious and other leaders who have the necessary double knowledge of and competence in Islam and the Swedish language and the way Swedish society and culture function. Some “congregations” even seem to lack leaders with sufficient knowledge and competence in both of the two areas. This lack of good leadership is also one main reason why many “ordinary Muslims” have lost interest and confidence in the “congregations”. That this problem can be solved by “importing” a “real” imam, as is still believed in many “congregations”, seems, however, to be a misconception from various cases we know of where it has been tried.

This is true for several reasons. One reason is that the “imported” imams, because they lack competence in Swedish and Swedish culture can at best only fulfill one of the functions expected and needed of a “congregation’s” leader. Another is that these imams normally see their roles too much as “guardians of the true faith”, which, among other things, includes the aim of purging the members of their “congregation” from syncretism, instilling on them the concept of Islam as a complete code of life, and preventing them from becoming secularised. In short: they usually work on the basis of the assumption that a purified Muslim community is a strong community able to expand, and that, conversely, the reason Muslims are weak is that they do not know and practice “true Islam” and are therefore “corrupt” in their faith. One of the main tasks these imams normally set for themselves is also to educate their “congregations” in “true Islam” in order for them to observe Islam correctly.⁴⁵ And this is in most cases not

conducive to integration or the development of a “Swedish Islam” (Landmann: 1999).

In doing this⁴⁶ the imams, however, normally misjudge, or misunderstand, the effect this will have on the “members” of their “congregation”, who live and keep their faith outside the context of a living (traditional) Muslim community, separated from the context which normally mediates their faith and the various ways in which it is expressed. As Geertz, among others, has noted (1968, 104-107) the crisis facing Muslim communities in the modern world – and thereby notoriously the Muslims in the Diaspora in Western Europe – is not so much one of knowing what to believe, as how to believe. When the context of a (traditional) Muslim society/community with its traditions is no longer available or powerful, the way people believe, or are Muslims, including the way they express their Islam/faith, must, as we have argued, be modified or replaced if religious faith is to survive at all (Sander: 2002). These are some of the reasons that the solutions the “imported” imams often propose for solving the problems in the Swedish Muslim communities tend to be counterproductive or dysfunctional. The effects of their teaching may thus be different from what they intend, and it is not unusual for such imams to create more problems than they solve.

Muslims in Sweden – The Results of the Project

Muslims as seen by the Swedes

The results presented in this part on the situation of the Muslims in Sweden, are based to a large extent on fieldwork: conversations and interviews with a range of individuals and groups of Muslims and opinions put

forward by their representatives at the round table discussions. We would like to emphasise that what is presented here as the opinions, ideas and feelings of Muslims, are in fact our interpretations, reconstructions and reformulations of what they, often in different words, have told us in conversation.

Swedish Muslims now for the first time can, roughly 25 years after the foundation of the first Muslim national federation in Sweden, be said to have reached something that could be described as a consolidation phase.

This stage in their establishment, organization and institutionalization process also allows them to turn away from the most immediate, practical issues (and for an outsider often futile internal squabbles), and instead turn to the larger and more strategic issues and problems concerning their presence, role and future in Sweden. The issues they now seem to focus on can be described as political, in the broad sense of the term. The issues they now are formulating can roughly be summarised as: 1) What kind of (multicultural and multireligious) Sweden do we, as Muslims, want to have in the future; 2) What kind of multicultural and multireligious society do we think is necessary to safeguard the long term survival of the Muslims as a cultural, ethnic and religious minority group in Sweden; and 3) What can (ought) we as Muslims do to bring that about.

By beginning to address questions about multiculturalism and multireligiosity, or, in other words questions about a minority group's rights to recognition, respect, representation, power, and existence, they, of course, step right into center of the politically, as well as scientifically, both problematic and controversial field, with all its many dimensions, that we have touched upon earlier.

This "religio-political awakening" is not specific of Swedish Muslims.⁴⁷ All over the world, in recent years, one

has witnessed a resurgence of cultural, ethnic and religious demands by minority populations who do not control the power of their states; and the movements wielding such demands, moreover, have proven increasingly militant. As Stavenhagen put it already in 1990:

From the Australian Aborigines to the Welsh, from the Armenians to the Tamils, from the Ainu to the Yanomami, ethnies around the world are mobilizing and engaging in political action, sometimes in violent conflict and confrontation, to establish their identities, to defend their rights or privileges, to present their grievances, and to ensure their survival (157).

That an analogous process of ethno-religious mobilization is under way to some extent, at least among certain Muslim groups, even in Sweden, has been clearly demonstrated by our fieldwork. An equally clear finding is that this ethno-religious mobilization process among the Swedish Muslims should be understood essentially as a local defense strategy and not (as seems to be believed by many caught up in the present media stereotypes of "the Islamic peril" and the like) as part of a world wide offensive move masterminded by some global Islamic fundamentalist movement. They do not mobilise in order to Islamise Sweden and the Swedes, they mobilise to achieve recognition, power and influence, to establish their identity and to ensure their survival as a distinct ethno-religious group, something which they see as jeopardised by Swedish "difference blindness" or, as one Muslim expressed it, "equality fascistic", immigration policies. Yet this mobilization process, as should be clear from above said, directly defies fundamental principles on which the Swedish nation-state has been built, and therefore presents

a serious challenge to our political policy makers as well as social scientists.

Since our task is to describe the situation in Sweden we will, without much references to the rest of the world, only try to describe and articulate the attitudes and developments within the Muslim community in Sweden and the reactions from the majority society towards this process. From the point of view of the latter, this change in attitude – from that of the French enlightenment and British liberalism which focus on universal individual equal worth and rights, to demands that the state shall recognise ethnic and religious groups as groups and accept that they have rights and worth as groups – as it gets realised – is creating conceptual and theoretical, and not least, political consternation.

As this “religio-political awakening” among the Muslims in Sweden to a large extent, and particularly so in the post 11 September 2001 period, has coincided with an increased popular awareness within the general Swedish population of increasing similar activities of Islam and Muslims in the world in general, this has put the Muslims in Sweden in a somewhat problematic position (Otterbeck: 2000c). In Sweden, as well as in many other Western countries, one of the main topics of discussion in media during the last decade has been the, from a Western point of view, dramatic increase of religio-political activities of so called fundamentatlisic or Islamistic groups in the world (Esposito: 1997, 2000; Esposito & Voll: 2001; Hedin: 2001; Kepel: 1994, 2002). The media have, to quote Edward Said, “por-trayed it, characterised it, analyzed it, given instant courses on it, and consequently they have made it ‘known’” (1985, xi). No Swede has, for example, been able to open his daily paper during the last 15 years without meeting words like Ayatollah, Caliph, Chadoor, imam, jihad, mosque, mujahi-

din, mulla, Quran, Ramadan, salat, Shari'a, Shia and Sunni. And most of what has been written and said has not been from a positive point of view (Larsson: 2003; Sander :2003), so it is not strange that an increasingly large number of the media consumers do not seem to like what they read.

These presentations of Islam and Muslims in the Swedish media and debate, as well as the Swedes' responses to it, can, on the whole, be said to have been from a rather one-sided, ethnocentric, sensationalist, exoticistic, emotional and negative point of view. It can to a large extent be said to have created and confirmed stereotypes, prejudices and clichés rather than to have put them in question. It has in a way more covered than uncovered Islam.⁴⁸ And this negative tendency can be said to have escalated in stages in connection with, just to repeat the most obvious examples,⁴⁹ the "oil crises" of 1973 and 1976, the revolution in Iran 1978/79, the "Rushdie affair" 1988/89, the Gulf war in 1991, the Talibans taking power in Afghanistan, and, of course, the various terror attacks around the world attributed to Islamists, with the ones in New York and Washington in September of 2001 as the most outstanding (Sander: 2003). Even though the picture of Islam and Muslims in the media has changed and fluctuated over time, the confrontational perspective seems to be the dominating trend. We think it can be rather safely said that the "Islamic peril" to a large extent has become accepted as an implicit and rarely questioned backdrop in too much of what is written and said about Islam and Muslims.

That Muslims, partly due to the way they are presented in the media, are an exposed and vulnerable group in Sweden, as well as in the rest of Europe, has been very clearly demonstrated in the wake of the terror attack of 11 September 2001 and the following "war against terrorism" (Allen & Nielsen: 2002). Despite the fact that the large majority of

Muslims have denounced the terror attacks, they have, as a group, to a large extent been pointed out as responsible. The question of guilt has often been made into a question of religion. It is "the Muslims" that are the guilty, and through some form of "xenophobic logic" the Muslims as a collective have been set apart as terrorists and potential threats to society. The results of this "logic" can clearly be seen in the many anti-Islamic reactions in the Western societies after 11 September. Acts of violence and aggression, both physical and verbal, has been reported from most countries.⁵⁰ But the Muslims had long before this been victims of stigmatization, islamophobia, muslimophobia and social exclusion on the labor market, housing market, and so on. Within these markets it is obvious that Muslims in general are not experienced and accepted as belonging to "us Swedes/us Europeans". They are to a large extent not considered to belong to same sphere of solidarity, loyalty and justice as other Swedes/Europeans. The concept of who belongs to the sphere of solidarity, loyalty and justice, of who belongs to "us", is for many Swedes/Europeans still strongly determined by old standards: the ideas of a common history, a common language and a common religion. Muslims are to a high extent still considered foreign and possibly dangerous elements in our societies. And this not only by explicitly racist persons and institutions.

During the last decade, the general idea that Islam and Muslims should pose a threat to Sweden and the Swedish culture in general, as well as to our basic Swedish principles of democracy and to our views of the status of women and children has been brought forward in the public debate even by so-called established people. The voices in the debate that question the credibility of the claims that a group as small, as divided along linguistic, ethnic, religious, political, and other lines and as socially, economically and

politically weak and marginalised as the Muslim group in Sweden should constitute a serious threat to basic elements of Swedish culture are, on the other hand, few and far between. Any serious assessment would, we believe, reveal that their controversial nature in the debate strongly exceeds their real powers and influence. Despite the fact that all arguments, as far as we can see, that credit the Muslims in Sweden with the power to influence prevailing basic Swedish political, religious or moral norms, values and attitudes in the direction of Islam must be considered very far-fetched, an increasing amount of Swedes, nonetheless, seem to take the "Islamic peril" seriously. This reaction to Islam and the Muslims is of interest, despite its irrationality, as it highlights important facts about our society and its way of controlling religious (and other) deviations.

Exactly how seriously the Swedes in general perceive this threat is, however, hard to say as there has been very little research directed to the question. Some example of research that supports our claim that this negativity is extremely strong can, however, be given.

One indicator of the strength of this negativity we get from a study of the "image of Islam" in Swedish media (Hvitfelt: 1991, 1998) carried out at the department of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Göteborg. Part of the project was a study of attitudes among Swedes towards Islam and Muslims. The attitude measurements were done by a questionnaire sent out to 2,500 randomly selected Swedes. One of the questions read: "Which attitude do you personally have to Islam as a religion?" The respondents had five options in their answers: "very positive", "rather positive", "do not know", "rather negative" and "very negative". Sixty-five per cent claimed to be very or rather negative while only two per cent claimed to be very or rather positive! Another ques-

tion asked if they thought immigration of Muslims to Sweden should be restricted. Fifty-three per cent considered this a rather or very good suggestion and sixteen per cent considered it a rather or very bad suggestion. Yet another question concerned their attitudes to the suggestion that Sweden – in accordance with the goals and ambitions of its own official immigration policies – should “Increase the support to the Muslim immigrants to make it possible for them to retain their own culture”. Here seventy seven per cent answered that they considered this suggestion rather or very bad, while four per cent considered it rather or very good. In the same investigation eighty-eight percent were of the opinion that Islam is not compatible with a democratic society of the Swedish type, and twenty five percent had the opinion that Muslims should not be granted the same religious rights and freedoms as adherents to other religious traditions.

To put these figures into perspective let us add the following: During the many years in which the Department of Journalism has carried out attitude surveys, the investigators had never come across any issue towards which the attitudes had been even close to this negative, as towards Islam and Muslims. They were by far the most univocal results the investigators ever had received on any question.

Another indicator is the public reaction to Muslims' attempts to institutionalise themselves, particularly when it comes to building mosques. Here we have, on the one hand, results from a few opinion polls carried out by national institutes of public opinions regarding the opinions of the Swedes towards the Muslims building mosques⁵¹ and, on the other, some studies of how various Swedish authorities and decision makers have handled their applications for building permits and the like (Karlsson & Svan-

berg: 1995). To that we can add some results from studies of the reactions from local residents when they learned that a mosque was planned to be built in their neighborhood.

When it comes to the first of these, there is the complicating factor that the questions have been phrased somewhat differently in different investigations, which makes comparative interpretation difficult. The general picture is, however, rather easy to summarise: the number of negative respondents have varied from three quarters to half and the number of positive from five to almost fifty percent. No really clear verdict can be given about how these attitudes have developed over time. The scientifically soundest conclusion is probably: they seem to fluctuate. The conclusion of Sander (1995) was that the attitudes towards Muslims and 'phenomena' associated with Islam and Muslims tends to vary in relation to, on the one hand, the general economic level in the country and, on the other, the extent to which immigrants in general, and Islam and Muslims in particular, are discussed in the media, which in its turn is partly related to, among other things, Islamic activities in the world.⁵² It is, however also possible to argue on the basis of the 1990, 1992 and 1995 surveys, given the assumption that they measure the same thing, that there was a turn towards the better in terms of popular attitudes towards the Muslims building mosques between 1990 and 1992, and that the 1995 survey confirms this trend (Sander: 1995). Even if this positive trend is true, most of the positive respondents seem to condition their positive response in the traditional way: "Of course the Muslims should be allowed to build a mosque, but not on my back yard". We do not know of any mosque project, including a present one in the North-East in Göteborg (GP: 2002), that has not evoked strong negative reactions from the neighbors in the area where it has been planned to be built.

The only exemption to this is the mosque built in Göteborg by the Ahmaddiyans in 1976, which was the first purpose built mosque in Sweden. At this time Islam and Muslims were still a rather unknown, rarely discussed and uncontroversial subject in Sweden. The building of their mosque was therefore greeted by almost complete silence in media as well as from neighbors (Karlsson & Svanberg : 1995, 37–38; Sander: 1991). Newspapers shortly mentioned it “at the bottom of the fifth page” when it was inaugurated and some neighbors did complain a little about its color, which was pink. That was all. When “the other” Muslims, twelve years later in 1988, during which time Islam and Muslims had received much more media attention, started to make serious plans to build a mosque the scene had changed (Karlsson & Svanberg: 1995, 58–64; Sander: 1991). The media now wrote page after page in a seemingly never ending stream about it, the neighborhood went up in arms against it, local politicians and clergymen joined in the public outcry, etc. A political party with the main aim to prevent the Islamization of Göteborg was even formed. It even succeeded for some time in becoming the largest party in a local election for a select vestry.⁵³

Since then we have seen similar reactions in more or less all other places in Sweden where Muslims have tried to obtain permission to build a Mosque, an Islamic Center or the like: they were met with increasingly strong opposition from the local community, not rarely heralded by local Christian religious leaders, mainly from within the Pentecostal movement (Karlsson & Svanberg: 1995). The latter have in several cases reacted with a crusade-like lobbying against Islam and Muslims, and in several cases local politicians have jumped on the bandwagon. In these campaigns the public was warned that Islam and Muslims “in their true essence” represent an undemocratic, totalitarian,

anti-modern, militant and violent force with the long-term goal of turning Sweden into a theocratic Islamic state.

The arguments presented in support of their claims against the Muslims have been of basically three kinds. The first has been to use quotations from the Quran and hadith as well as from texts by Muslim ideologists like Abdul a'al Maududi and Said Qutb, which, at least on the surface and when read out of context by a Swede against the negative backdrop of Islam (see below), easily lend themselves to support such an interpretation.⁵⁴ The second has been to refer to how bad Christians are treated in Muslim countries. Some examples of this kind of arguments are: "They do not allow Christians to build churches in their countries". "They do not allow missionary activities in their countries. In fact there is a death penalty for conversion to Christianity", and "There is an increasing persecution of Christians in many Muslim countries". From these arguments they draw or imply the following type of conclusions: "They would do the same here if we give them the chance", and "when they are so intolerant in their countries, why should we be tolerant to them here? Of course we should not!"⁵⁵ The third argument has been to point to the role Islam and Muslims, according to their way of interpreting the history, have played and play in the world. This, according to them, shows clearly that Islam is a fanatical, fundamentalist, dangerous, violence prone and demonic power with megalomaniac ambitions. And in all these cases it is Islam (always in the singular!) that uncritically is pointed out as the source of the problem. That there are different kinds and forms of Islam and that many of the "problems" we in the West often associate with Islam, Muslims and Muslim countries often have very mundane causes like demographic conditions, poor economic condition, repressive military governments, a colonial history,

and so on, is never even hinted at. No, it is always, as is the case in “clash of civilizations” theories, a “mythical” Islam that is depicted as a danger.⁵⁶

It is, as far as we can see, clear that the structure of this argument has many features in common with the arguments that was raised against the Catholic Church during the 17th and 18th centuries, the Salvation Army in the late 19th century, the Jews in Europe during the 1930s, against the Communists in the USA, capitalism in the USSR during the 1950s, and “the West” in certain Muslim media. “The World Jewish or Communist conspiracy” is to a large extent only replaced by the Islamic or Muslim one.⁵⁷ The problem is that this type of argumentation, despite its history, still seems to work. That it does work can be seen from the fact that the Islamic and Muslim presence in Sweden clearly have developed during the period from the early 1970s and up to today from one among many oddities to a hot and serious political issue. Figuratively speaking, we think, as we will argue more later, it is correct to say that the Swedes’ “image of Islam” during the post war period has changed from a day-dream – as depicted in for example *Thousand and one Nights* and in *Sheik* movies – to a nightmare, to something that is considered a threat to our whole culture and way of life.

During the early 1990s, Islam and the Muslims did also develop into somewhat of a symbolic target not only for various xenophobic, nationalist and extreme right wing groups, but also – in the wake of, on the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in general and the following political need in the West for a new threatening picture and, on the other the economic recession Sweden went through at the time – for many unemployed and generally politically-economically dissatisfied young Swedes. The pre 11 September 2001 culmination of this

was the burning down of three existing purpose-built mosques in Sweden in August of 1993 by young nationalist right-wingers (Karlsson & Svanberg: 1995, 42–45). This was not, and that should be emphasised, a purely anti-Islamic deed, but the reason why it was just a mosque that was chosen for this “political manifestation” shows, we believe, a change in the Swedish social and political reality. Islam and Muslims had become an important pawn in the political game – despite the fact that they, given their size, and lack of political and economic power, hardly ought to have been noticed (Sander: 1995).

One result of the anti-Islamic lobbying was that Islam and Muslims, from the early 1990s, were brought up as an issue on the national political agenda to an extent that was exaggerated in relation to their real impact in Swedish society. And that in itself was something that magnified the problem as it gave rise to a general feeling that might be summarised as: “When everybody, including people within the government and the established political parties, are discussing ‘them’ so much, there must be something to the stereotype.” That this in turn was fertile soil for xenophobes and nationalists in general and for the anti-Islamic lobbying in particular should not be hard to see.

Another result was an increased polarization between native and immigrated Swedes, particularly those of non-European and Muslim origin. The xenophobic nationalist war cry “if it was not for them everything would be all right” was heard both more often and louder as result of “clash of civilization theories” and economic recession. The scapegoat syndrome was more and more clearly seen. Sweden’s historically old nationalist, national state ideal, discussed above, “one state, one people, one religion” did, we think, gain ideological momentum during this time. In this development it was especially Muslim immigrants that

were victimised, and doubly so: on the one hand they were, in the recession from 1992, the first to be unemployed and otherwise marginalised and, on the other, they themselves were getting the blame for the increasing unemployment. The Muslims were more and more subjected to this typical case of “blame the victim ideology”: On the one hand the native Swedes claimed that Muslims should integrate or assimilate to the Swedish culture and society, at least when it came to the public domain of society. At the same time the native Swedes, on the other hand, by (systematically) excluding and discriminating Muslims and by not giving them a fair chance on the labor market, housing market, and so on, prevented them from integrating into these markets. And finally the Swedes blamed Muslims’ failure to integrate, as well as many other problems in society, on Muslims’ unwillingness and inability to integrate.

This development gave, at least among some Muslim groups, raise to something that might be looked upon as a version of an old self-fulfilling prophesy: the more the Swedes claimed that “they” did not want to, and did not try to, integrate to the Swedish culture and society, the less interested in adapting “they”, especially the young people, become. Explained in terms of the metaphor of communicating vessels this phenomenon can be described as: the more exclusion and discrimination a group meets the more they tend to unite around, and fight back by making a resource out of, what they experience as being the cause of their discrimination – their ethnicity or their religion.

To some extent, this process also lead to the, from the Swedish point of view, somewhat paradoxical result that the ethnic and religious consciousness of the Muslims did increase, along with a “new” ethnic and religious “self esteem”, which in its turn did have the effect that immigrant groups in Sweden started to mobilise themselves more

and more along cultural, ethnical, religious lines. They and their organizations also became more and more successful in, so to speak, turning the tables, and turning their disadvantage – their religiosity, their ethnicity – into a political asset, or weapon if you like, into a factor for social and political mobilization. To some extent it can, we believe, be said that the main result of the anti-Muslim lobby in Sweden was that it was instrumental in creating, rather than preventing, the kind of Islam and Muslim they were warning about .

An example of this is that one of the Islamic national federations in 1993 felt strong enough to send an open letter to a number of the Swedish political parties promising them “the Muslim vote” if they in return promised to work for the realization of a set of specific Muslim demands on the Swedish society. Of course it would have been political suicide for any party to accept the offer, and the Muslims knew that (cf. Karlsson & Svanberg: 1995, 31).

If it is true, as is often claimed (Karlsson: 1994; 2002), that it is only a de-politicised, liberal and privatised Islam that can integrate in Sweden, and that the development of such an Islam presupposes economic and social integration of the Muslim community, then the Swedes’ way of relating to Islam and the Muslims in the country has so far not been the most conducive toward integration.

From the point of view of many Swedes, this whole process of increased ethnic and religious mobilization was, of course, mainly looked upon as something politically destabilizing, as something dangerous to ‘the national unity’ and the like. The Swedes did not want to accept people who do not, as it is called, “play by the rules”, in the political game. The Swedes have very little understanding for the fact that these rules are their rules and that they might not be experienced as appropriate by other groups of people.

It is, as we see it, paradoxical that the basic cause behind this development of “the Muslim problem”, was not, as most Swedes tend to believe, primarily that the Muslims are different and behave differently from the rest of the Swedes, but rather quite the opposite: that the majority society did not allow them, to a sufficient extent, to be, behave, organise themselves and live in a different way from the rest of the society. The “simple fact” that in a multicultural and multireligious society acceptance of diversity is the prerequisite for equality, not its antithesis was not understood by most Swedes.

The main cause of “the problem” as we see it was, in other words, that the Muslims subjectively experienced a threat towards their own identity (religion and ethnicity) and culture (way of constituting their life-world), and thereby a risk of religious, ethnic and cultural extinction. And if there is anything that can mobilise a religious, ethnic or cultural group and weld it together it is the threat of extinction. And this has to be understood: for most religious, ethnic and cultural groups in the world there is a strong metaphysical sentiment or value connected with the idea of a future existence of the group and its beliefs, language, norms, values, customs and ways of life.

This in a sense obvious fact is, we believe, a major reason why religious and ethnic groups in Sweden increasingly have been looking for protection and ways to defend themselves when they, rightly or wrongly, felt the basis for their existence threatened. It is also in situations like these that they start to ask for collective rights, as they experience the recognition of these rights to be the only way to preserve their ethnicity and religion and safeguard the reproduction of the group as a distinct entity with its own social organization and whatever else it deems necessary in terms of institutions (in the broadsense of the term) to

survive. Let us now turn to one of the main sources of most Swedes' views on Islam and Muslims: the Swedish media.

The role of the media

The way immigrants in general and Islam and Muslims in particular are pictured in the media has been the focus of some amount of research.⁵⁸ In terms of a short summary we believe it is accurate to say that the following characteristics are typical in much of the media as regards the way that Islam, the Arab, the Muslim and the like have been portrayed.

The first characteristic is that they are described in stereotypical⁵⁹ and mythical⁶⁰ ways, which, of course, make the descriptions in many respects wrong and untrue. The Arab and the Muslim are, for example, often uncritically associated with the type of hostile, fanatic, and aggressive policies of certain Muslim states, which is for many Swedes very frightening. Arabs/Muslim are in general is often and without nuances depicted as representative of our own stereotype picture of figures like Khomeini or Khadaffi and their policies. It is descriptions that often give strong associations to hostility to the West, terrorism, religious fanaticism, repression of women, and the like, pictures of something for us totally different, impenetrable and foreign. They depict them as people driven by forces that we in our modern, civilised society neither can accept nor understand. This makes the picture even more menacing, threatening and scary.

A second characteristic is that the descriptions are very ethnocentric. Non Western-Christian cultures with their religions and thought- and life patterns are described from within our domestic Swedish perspective. Our own

thought- and life pattern is uncritically presupposed as the only correct one and is as a matter of course used as normal and standard in all descriptions and judgments of other groups and individuals. This is, as we have argued, typically done in descriptions of other religions, which normally are described as “other kinds of Christianity” (Olsson :2000). The result of this is that other cultures and phenomena associated with them become misunderstood and stand out as incomprehensible, impenetrable and unreachable.

A third characteristic, partly a consequence of the second, is that the descriptions uncritically presuppose the so-called theory of modernization in combination with the so-called theory of evolution. The basic tenet of the first of these can roughly be summarised as: in order to be able to achieve economic and social well being, the “backward” cultures and countries and their people must change their traditional institutions, norms and values as well as ways of thinking and conform to the modern, Western model of market relationship, urbanization, secularization, industrial production and political bureaucracy. They must also shift their loyalties from village and tribe and religious community and ethnic group to the nation and the state and its institutions. One assumption or hypothesis connected with this “theory” is that ethnic and cultural differences, at least within the national state, will tend to lose importance and disappear over time or will be modernised and democratised away. Mainly for economic reasons and through modernization (above all modern education) and secularization we will get increasingly homogeneous national states, at least in the industrialised Western world, and at least in its public or official domain.

The other “theory” includes, among other things, the idea of history as a continuing qualitative process of

change towards increasing civilization: from the simple to the complex, from the crude to the refined, from the primitive to the civilised, from darkness to enlightenment. This “theory” also includes the assumption that the Western world has reached higher levels of development than (most of) the rest of the world, and that people with other cultural backgrounds, if and when they come to the Western world, would soon realise this and want to adopt the Western ways as much and as fast as possible. These ideas, and particularly the second, are central elements in “Western thinking” since the Enlightenment.

A fourth characteristic is exoticism. Most of the media descriptions of Islam and Muslims it is the strange and different, the foreign, the unfamiliar and obscure, the exotic that is focused upon. Muslims are rarely presented as something we can (or ought to) identify with and understand, but as something we, mingled with terror, should be fascinated by (Berg: 1998; Said: 1978).

A fifth characteristic is that Muslims and other people from “foreign cultures” often are described from a third person perspective. It is a perspective that focuses on individuals not as individual, concrete, multifaceted living people, as you and I, but rather as general, anonymous, exchangeable and one-dimensional types, functions or roles; as for example a fanatic, a terrorist or a slave under Allah. It is a perspective that focuses on and enlarges only specific characteristics of the individuals at the same time as it neglects or hides other.

Generally speaking it can be said that media to a large extent paints a picture of Islam and the Muslim, as well as of many other people from “foreign” cultures, which in many respects goes against the opinions and goals of the official Swedish immigration and integration policies. Rather than fostering an increased respectfulness and

openness towards immigrants and a will to listen to and learn about and from them – which are presuppositions for their integration into society – they create a strong *Verfremdungseffekt*.

According to Brune (2000; 2002) the “Muslim man” in the media is typically depicted as a “dupe of tradition and religion”, a tradition/religion which is often blamed for encouraging and legitimating violence against women. Part of this picture is also that “he is unable to control his sexual as well as violent impulses towards women”. He despises Swedish women, which he considers to be “whores”, and which he, furthermore, is prone to rape. The descriptions of his relationship to “Muslim women” is that “his honor ‘forces’ him to batter his wife, sisters or daughters as a means of social or domestic control”. And all of this is portrayed as being legitimised, or at least excused by his religion (Brune: 2002, 380).

That this way of describing Islam and Muslims has not improved in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, is the general view of our informants. In a questionnaire survey we made in Göteborg after the event, 43 percent answered, “Yes, the they have been much more negative” and 47 percent answered “Yes, the they have been somewhat more negative” to the question “Do you experience the reports in media (radio, TV, newspapers) about Islam and Muslims to have changed after 11 September?” (Larsson: 2003; Sander: 2003). Many of our informants in conversations described the post-11 September reporting with terms like “black-and-white”, “one eyed”, “sensationalist”, “stereotyping”, and “factually shaky”. They claim that the media in text, pictures and terminology painted a picture of Islam as barbaric, violence-prone, fanatic and uncivilised. According to them sensationalism become a cornerstone of the reporting which to an inappropriate and disproportionate

degree focused on extremist and militant elements in Muslim communities. Such images and stereotypes seemed, according to our sources, to have become almost necessary in the media coverage after 11 September. Since these views are supported in other sources as well (Ghersetti & Levin: 2002), the consequences of negativity and Islamophobia in the media ought not to be underestimated. Many of our informants claim that stereotypic images of fanaticism and violence are now so deeply embedded in the reporting of Islam and Muslims as to be considered almost necessary, unproblematic and natural parts of all such reporting. And there seems to be quite a lot of evidence that these informants are not totally victims of an illusion.

The general structure in the descriptions of 'the other' in much of our media is, despite the fact that it is often implicit and not always easy to detect for the untrained reader, according to many media researchers (Hvitfelt, Brune, Berg, and others) fairly simple: we represent the well-known, the rational, the orderly, the civilised, i.e. that they represent the deviant, the irrational, the unknown, the uncivilised, i.e. chaos. And who wants chaos? They are, according to this analysis, portrayed as representatives of evil (or in best of cases: misled and deceived), subversive and destructive chaos-forces that have to be regulated and controlled – if not combated. It is, in other words, a view that to a large extent maintains and transmits the pattern of the classical mythological picture of the foreigner: us against them (Berg: 1998; Said: 1978). It is also a view that puts all the blame for the various problems they might experience and have in their new home countries squarely on them. It is their fault that do not get jobs, and so on. It is because they have too little knowledge of Swedish, Swedish cultural and social competence, and too many customs from their culture of origin, including religion (Islam), their par-

ticular view of women, authority dependence, and others (Sander: 2001). The problem is, in short, that they have not become Swedish enough, that is, not assimilated enough.

It is, as writers on racism (for example Martin Barker) argue, not hard to draw the conclusion that what we see in media is the emergence of a “new racism” in which culturally acquired properties – for example being Muslim– have been taken over from “biological properties” (Barker: 1981; Gordon: 1986; Ansell: 1997; Merkl: 1998). The “new racism” is not as easy to detect as the “old racism”, but as it is structurally and functionally analogues to the old one it is every bit as dangerous (Sander: 1995).

Having said this, we must, to balance the picture somewhat, also say that the media in Europe in the post 11 September 2001 period, on the whole, displayed a much more balanced picture than seems to have been the case in the US where it seems that the general atmosphere could be summarised as follows: the Muslim world is inherently irrational, violent, anti-western and anti-Semitic, “their” views of and actions towards “us” are governed by a primitive hatred of the infidel and a resentment that the infidel now dominates the true believer instead of the other way around, that is, “that they hate us not for what we do but for what we are”, and that the only language “they” (the Muslims, particularly Arabs) therefore understand is force and that “they” will continue their global Islamic terrorism, jihad, towards “us” unless “they” are beaten mercilessly. This is a picture that not even all scholars seem to be able to free themselves from.⁶¹

General Problems

Political participation and representation


Sweden, as most European countries, has historically been characterised by attempting to prevent foreign nationals from becoming involved in its political life. This was true up to the 1960s when, despite opposition, the first proposal to extend the right to vote beyond that of Swedish nationals was made. When the Swedish parliament in 1976 legislated foreign nationals' right to vote in local elections the ideological climate had, however, changed radically. All political parties stood behind the decision. According to this reform, the suffrage and the right to run for public office – in municipal, county and church councils – was extended to include also non-Swedish nationals registered as residents of a municipality as of 1 November, three years prior to the election year in question (prop. 1975/76:23, bet. 1996/97:KU16, rskr 1996/97:177).

The 3-year rule, however, was to provide a reasonable guarantee that the voter would have a satisfactory knowledge of Swedish, that he/she would be familiar with and have an understanding of Swedish conditions, and have a natural interest in municipal affairs, not only those relating directly to his/her immediate concerns, but also to long-term issues of municipal interests (Citizenship Committee (*Medborgarskapskommittén*) SOU 1999:34).

The first occasion for foreign nationals to vote was in the municipal elections of 1976. In this election the voting rate of the total Swedish national population was ninety percent. The corresponding figure for foreign nationals was sixty percent. This was by most commentators seen

as surprisingly low and somewhat of a disappointment as there was expected to be a dammed up desire among immigrants to partake in the political process. The result, however, indicated that participation in politics is not simply synonymous with the formal right to vote. That it was not that simple has since then become even more clear as the participation rates, despite various efforts to the contrary, have kept on dropping election by election. In the election of 1998 the figure was down to thirty-five percent. For some areas and groups of voters the rates was even much lower. In the election of 2002 these figures did not, despite, at least in certain areas of the country, large efforts to improve them, change for the better. The general downward trend seems, however, to have been broken.

Dropping voting rates is, however, not only a immigrant phenomena. Voter participation in the rest of the population has also fallen, but while the curve for Swedish nationals points slowly downward, that of foreign nationals, as can be seen in the graph below, drops of sharply.



Voter participation among Swedish nationals and Foreign nationals in Swedish Federal and Municipal elections 1976 – 1998 (source: Sahlberg: 2001, 51).

To understand this development political scientists and others have tried to answer questions such as: what, if any, explanations are common to both voter categories? And, what if any, explanations may be specifically attributed to immigrants, and specifically to immigrants who continue to hold foreign citizenship? When it comes to the latter question, an important line of inquiry has been: are the main explanations to be sought in characteristics of the immigrant community or in characteristics of the majority society?

As can be expected, the explanations suggested are almost as many as the researchers providing them and they are reached by help of everything from large statistical surveys to in-depth interviews with focal groups and individual respondents. Here is not the place to review this research.⁶² If any short conclusion can be drawn from this research it seem to us to be that the causes for this development are complex and manifold and that every attempt to reduce this complexity to a small number of causes do violence to reality. In this section of our report we will only bring up and comment on suggestions that are in line with what we have heard from our own informants.

The question of the voting rights of non-citizens has continued to be debated in Swedish politics. One result of these debates has been that all citizens of a European Union state who are registered residents of Sweden, as of 1998, have the right to vote in municipal and county elections with no time condition. The same extended voting rights was also applied to Nordic nationals, from non-EU countries residing in Sweden. Another important result was that the Swedish Citizenship Committee of 1997 (*Medborgarskapskommittén*: 1997; SOU: 1999, 34) proposed that Sweden should accept dual citizenship without contention. The bill containing this proposal was accepted by

the parliament and entered into effect 1 July 2001. From that date on persons seeking citizenship in Sweden are, in other words, not required to renounce their former citizenship. The effect this might have on the political participation and voting behavior of immigrants has not yet been researched.

Obstacles to voting participation

The message that we have received most clearly in our interviews on why immigrants participate to such a low degree in elections is that Swedish society, by excluding them from almost all bodies of political power, clearly show that it is not interested in sharing any political power with them – so why should immigrants bother to vote? And it is not hard to find figures to support their claim. It is, for example, repeatedly pointed out that of 349 members of Parliament only three are Muslims. The immigrant population in general does not have a much better relative representation. Similar examples can easily be multiplied across the political landscape from the government to boards of local associations and trade unions. Even in the political councils in the immigrant-dense areas in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö earlier mentioned the immigrants themselves are very few and far apart. This is, according to them, the main reason why voter participation is much lower in the disadvantaged metropolitan areas than in other areas. In the Bergsjön and Gunnared electoral districts in Göteborg, voter participation by foreign nationals, for example, totaled 19.8 and 23.8 percent respectively in the 1998 election. As these averages hide marked differences such as national and cultural origin, reason for migration, time of domicile in Sweden, status

and standard of living of a particular area, gender, age, socio-economic status, and level of education, and as the composition of the different national groups varies along these dimensions, it is hard to draw any direct conclusions regarding voter participation and based on national background only. Despite these problems, it seems, particularly given the “softer data” available, fairly safe to claim that there is a relation between (experienced) social, political, and other exclusion and marginalization on the one hand and motivation to partake in the Swedish political process, including voting participation on the other. Even though we do not have access to any hard (statistical) data when it comes to voter participation, or to the level of political activity and participation in general, when it comes to Muslims specifically, we do not – given the just mentioned relationship between (experienced) marginalization and exclusion and political activity – believe it to be too daring to claim that immigrants with a Muslim background in general most likely would be found on the low end of the participation scale and immigrants with Scandinavian and Northwest European backgrounds would be found on the other end of the scale.

This assumption is also in line with most research on political participation in Western democracies, most of which suggest that social factors play an important part in voter participation. People who find themselves in less favorable social positions tend to vote less than people in better positions. One reason for this is that elected bodies do not only represent voters when it comes to opinions, but also in a wider social sense. If a group of voters feel that the people eligible for election do not represent them socially, ethnically, religiously, and so on, they tend to use their vote to a lesser extent than if they feel that they are represented. These assumptions are clearly in line with the

fact that people in disadvantaged areas vote to a significantly lower extent than people from non-disadvantaged areas.

Before we speculate further on why people in disadvantaged areas do not vote we would like to report somewhat more positive information.

People born abroad vote significantly less than the average Swede. But what happens to the political involvement of their children? Does the low political involvement of the parents get passed on to the next generation?

According to Adman & Strömblad (2000) the answer to this question is not what one might have expected. None of the forms of political involvement they measured for the children of immigrants indicated that they should be less active than the native Swedes. As a matter of fact, in several cases, as for instance when it comes to political contacts, political manifestations, political self-confidence and the power to appeal decisions, they seem to be more active. There is however one exception to this pattern - voting. Here the young immigrants show a lower degree of participation than children of native Swedes.

Why do people in disadvantaged areas fail to vote?

First it must be said that studies that explicitly target the reasons non-voters give for why they do not vote are rare, and therefore something we know very little about. From Dahlstedt's interviews with individuals and focus groups with foreign backgrounds who considered themselves politically active in a broad sense, about their own and other immigrants' experience and attitudes towards political activity in Sweden we can, however, get some insights regarding this question (Dahlstedt: 2000). That the people

interviewed are not themselves representative of the most marginalised in society should be clear.

One thing that stands out is that the main reason behind the non-voting behavior among immigrants does not seem to be a lack of political interest. The following reasons given are the most prominent:

Nice words but a different reality

According to the experience of the interviewees in Sweden there is in Sweden a strong discrepancy between the integration policies as they are formulated in theory and the way they are carried out in practice. This discrepancy is made very clear by the widespread exclusion and marginalization the immigrants are victims of the majority society. Most of them had a personal experience of marginalization and experienced discrimination from all spheres of society: the work place, the media, political parties, government authorities, schools and day cares, and the neighborhood where they lived. This exclusion has in turn given rise to strong feelings of, to phrase it mildly, uncertainty about whether or not they *really* are welcome in society and whether they really have been invited to partake in it on equal terms, and to a skepticism toward government authorities and politicians in general. In many respects the official policies regarding immigrants, if not the democratic society, are viewed as a rhetorical ones - many nice words but a very different reality. They are viewed as as something meant for the realm of the abstract political rhetoric of the political platform rather than for the realm of practical politics as part of social reality. A number of the informants even compared the Swedish democratic political system to the political systems of the dictatorships

that they had earlier fled from in terror. Many of our own informants have echoed those of Dahlstedt's.

Immigrants = problems

If you are identified as an "immigrant" you are automatically considered as someone of less value, as, at best, a second-class citizen. One of our informants, who converted to Islam, expressed it as:

When I converted to Islam and visibly became a Muslim I also became an 'immigrant' which, in turn, 'converted' me from a middle class Swede to a fourth-class citizen. The latter conversion meant in many respects a much more dramatic change for me than the first. Even though I had long experience of immigrants I was shocked by my experience of becoming an 'immigrant'.

If you are an immigrant you are stamped as a "problem". On the one hand this is so in the general sense that most problems the Swedes associate with immigration and immigrants in society are, as we have seen, squarely put on them: the causes of the problems are their culture or their religion, that is, their inability to integrate. But this is also, as both Dahlstedt's and our own informants tells us, true in the more specific sense that many more specific problems, like crime and other social problems, in several media are associated with immigrants. They are said to be overrepresented in the crime statistics, which gives the implicit message that if it would not be for them we would have less crime. It is also true in an even more specific sense: they are responsible for having brought new types of crimes and social problems to Sweden: terrorism, honor killings,

female circumcision, gang rape, wife bashing, and the like. Several informants claim to feel “branded as thugs and criminals” every time media brings out one of these stories. They feel that many Swedes start to look at them as, at least potential, “honor killers”, and that this is widening the gap between them and the majority. They feel that the acts of a very limited number of “bad individuals” are constantly generalised by the media as being representative of all immigrants, Arabs, or Muslims. If a Swede commit a crime it is never because (s)he is a Swede or a Christian. The blame never gets generalised to the whole group. It is always explained in terms of individual-oriented factors. When an Arab or a Muslim commits a crime it is always portrayed as being because (s)he is an Arab or a Muslim. Her/his culture or religion is described as the cause of the crime. This also, according to them, and especially for the marginalised young, has the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy: if we, no matter how hard we try to integrate, constantly are made out as problems and get treated as such, we might just as well live up to the stereotype. In the media there is a strong tendency to compare some kind of ideal picture of the Swedes, Christianity and so on, with the real behavior of a negative segment of Immigrants or Muslims.

Integration - A question of power

Many of the interviewees question whether the “theoretical” ideal of integration as a mutual process is true. Generally they do not believe that members of the majority who are in power of various societal institutions really are prepared to share that power, to relinquish some of their own privileges. Some of Dahlstedt’s as well as our informants are fully convinced that ‘the Swedes’ never will hand

over any power to immigrants voluntarily. The only way such a power share can be brought about is by way of political action by the immigrants, and that has to be done outside the traditional Swedish channels for such action, as the immigrants are systematically excluded from power there, too. It has, according to them, to be done through collective organization of various kinds by the immigrants themselves.

Another area of strong criticism of a similar nature, echoing our earlier mentioned "immigrant spokesmen", is directed against "the enormous multi-million machine" the Swedish state has created "to integrate those creatures (the immigrants) into Swedish society", a society which further is not rarely perceived as a bureaucratic, disciplinary and controlling society. This "huge machine" is often seen as having two main purposes. One is to control the immigrants. By making them dependent recipients of "the help-machine" they become both passive and grateful citizens. The other is to provide Swedes with employment in the "immigrant industry". This also, as icing on the cake, has the effect of perpetuating the image of "the good helping Swedish society" which spend so much time, money and efforts on helping "the poor, incompetent, disadvantaged, immigrants." According to them this Swedish system is more part of their problem than of a solution. Again, several informants claim it would be much better to spend these millions on "the Swedes" to help them integrate with the immigrants.

Politics too far from everyday life

One common complaint among informants is that the interest of the national politicians in immigrants seems

to be limited to the time they want their votes – during the election campaigns. Then they say a lot of nice words. But again: they, according to Dalhsedt's and our informants, say one thing and do another. They, for example, talk about the importance of including the immigrants in politics, but they, on the one hand, always stay with the top down perspective – we should fix the problems for the immigrants, and, on the other, always see to it that the few immigrants on the ballot-papers are put way below electable positions.

Particularly flagrant example of this exclusion of the immigrants and their perspectives are, according to our informants, the various metropolitan regeneration programs that have been run in disadvantaged areas. In all of them there has been much talk of the importance of immigrant participation and of getting the projects locally anchored. In reality, many interviewees claim, these have only been words. The projects has for all practical purposes been planned by Swedish civil servants and implemented by Swedes. If the “grassroots-immigrants” of the area in question, or any of their associations, take the initiative and come with suggestions they are only met by a number of objections and the only immigrants that have been incorporated in them are so basically only to do “grunt work” which the Swedes do not want to do, and they have normally only been engaged by way of various employment programs with almost no pay. From the point of view of many immigrants, the urban regeneration programs (*Storstadsarbetet*) mainly seem to be there for the sake of the Swedish civil servants, not the area residents and local associations. Again: “the system” is experienced more as part of the problem than of the solution.

Who represents whom?

We have argued that political representation is an important dimension with respect to power and thereby to integration. The political representation of persons of foreign decent, and particularly of persons of extra-European decent, is very poor in Sweden. And where it does exist, there is the thorny and much discussed problem of who represents whom. Can "one immigrant" represent the whole collective of immigrants? Can "one Muslim" represent the whole community of Muslims? Can a well-integrated (assimilated) member of some group who lived in Sweden for a long time represent new immigrants from the same group living segregated and marginalised lives in a disadvantaged area? The majority opinion of Dahlstedt's and our own informants seem to be that these are very problematic questions, but that the answer to them is "No". Aside from the most obvious reasons given for this "No" - problems with categorization of groups, that all the groups are heterogeneous, among others - many also pointed to the fact that for a person of foreign background, to rise to power first is to have to become "more Swedish than the Swedes", thereby making her/him unsuitable to represent the interests of *any* group of "real" immigrants.⁶³ To some extent we believe their criticism to reflect the political reality.

These and similar questions have given rise to a debate regarding the type of representation that is needed. One opinion brought forward with quite some force by several of our informants is that the type of representation used in the democratic Swedish system is not enough. It must, according to them, be complemented with some kind of presence of group representation. According to them such a system granting a political representation of Muslims

would also increase the political interest and activity of the Muslims of Sweden. It would also serve the important function of giving young Muslims functioning role models for their own lives. It would also help offset at least some of the negative perception of the majority population of Muslims as anti-democratic and help curb the stigmatization of them. At the same time, most of our informants did not believe the willingness of the present political power structure, the political parties, to be too high to accept the idea of such representation. Here we believe them to be right.

Marginalization also within political parties?

According to several of Dahlstedt's interviewees who were themselves active in politics, one serious problem for them is that they easily become "token immigrants". As it is "politically correct" to have "immigrant representation" in various political bodies, one or two are allowed in. But they are never allowed in a number, or allowed to fill positions in which they can exert any real influence. Furthermore, it is only immigrants - or other representatives of "deviant groups" - that are known to have ideas that are in line with the main stream ideas of the political body in question that are let in. They are, in other words, allowed to get in an act within political parties and the like only as long as they are deemed not to pose a threat to the existing order - and above all not to the party's power elite. And if they do, they find themselves out in the cold at the next election, if not sooner.

What has just been described is, of course, not a specific immigrant problem. The media all the time have reports of people in political parties who, by criticizing the party's policy, it's leadership or whatever, get considered "awk-

ward", "difficult" or "problem makers" and as a consequence at the next election find themselves in positions that hold little or no chance of getting them re-elected. But this "general principle" seems to work much more effectively *vis a vis* immigrants than "normal Swedes", and within the community of immigrants more effective *vis a vis* extra-European immigrants than others. Regarding the opinion held by many Muslims that the further away from being a "normal Swede" you are considered to be, the more effective the described principles of "structural discrimination" works to your disadvantage, we find no evidence to disbelieve.

Another problem cited by informants is that if you as an immigrant succeed in getting into a political body of some kind, there seem to be only one role for you to take, that of dealing with "the immigrant problem". You never get considered "a politician" but always "an immigrant politician". And if you are not prepared to be that and to represent, and be spokesperson for, the entire group, you end up in the cold. In some sense, the marginalization, culturalization and ethnification of immigrants in the larger society is mirrored within the political sub-society. And this is not going unnoticed by the general immigrant voters.

Several interviewees also ascribe the falling voter participation among immigrants, especially in the disadvantaged areas, as a reaction of the seeming institutionalisation of exclusion in society at large as well as in the political sub-society. Given this, it is difficult to feel any kind of solidarity with the society and its political system, which, in turn, leads to distrust and passivity or in some cases even to versions of conspiracy theories.

Once this view of society - to our minds not totally irrational - is established, an obvious strategy is, of course, to isolate yourself and work from within your "own" as-

sociations and institutions. Why should people who have systematically been excluded from society and its political system identify and work with the system that is shutting them out? And this particularly so when “the system” seems to be completely without self-awareness of its own way of operating *vis a vis* “deviant” people. Instead of being self critical when it comes to the question of why immigrants vote and participate less, its normal reaction, according to many of our informants, is to blame the victim. The reason why *they* do not succeed in society in general, as well as in the political sub-society, is because *they* are “deviant”, “lack what it takes” and in other respects have failed. They do not seem to realise, as one of our informants, quoting a famous management consultant, put it: “Every system is perfectly designed to give exactly the kind of results it gives.”

To the extent this is true – which we believe to quite a certain extent – what is needed are not primarily more projects in which civil servants and the like are going to help the immigrants to integrate, but a change of the system.

Labor market and Employment

The labour market, employment and occupation are the main areas of complaints of discrimination common to all member states. In addition to the number of complaints, the unemployment figures for immigrants and minorities can be indicators used to examine whether discrimination is occurring. The numbers for unemployment are in general much higher among immigrants and minorities than among nationals (EUMC *Diversity and equality for Europe. Annual Report: 2000*, 13).

The situation for immigrants on the labor market is in the Swedish debate one of the more often used indicators of their integration in society. Labor market integration might even be claimed, at least from the point of view of the government, to be seen as the most important indicator. To reduce the unemployment among the immigrants has repeatedly been claimed to be the most important measure when it comes to combating segregation and increase integration. In a report from the *Swedish Integration Board* (Integrationsverket) in 2001, it is stated that "The most important cause behind marginalization and outsidership is the lack of work and ability to support oneself ... The most important task for the policy of integration is to *create the necessary prerequisites for people to support themselves, ...* Employment is the principal lever for integration. A *place on the Swedish labor market* is the key for each individual to be able to build their own life project" (17).

The idea behind this so-called *arbetslinje* (the line of work) can be said to be that increased labor market integration will lead to increased integration in all other areas, just as unemployment will lead to increased segregation. In this model, the high unemployment rates among the immigrants are seen mainly as caused by their lack of knowledge and competence – particularly when it comes to the Swedish language. We will return to a discussion of this assumption later. Here we will only point out the obvious fact that the model is very focused on properties of the minority members, or, if you want, on the supply side, rather than of the majority society and its labor market, the demand side. The cause of the problem gets, in this model, put squarely on *them* and *their* lack of (relevant) knowledge and competence.⁶⁴

A fairly large amount of research regarding the position of immigrants on the Swedish labor market has been

carried out during the last decade (see for example Arai et al.: 1999; Behoui: 1999; Bevelander: 1995 and 2000; Bevelander et al.: 1997; Broomé et al.: 1996 and 1998; Ekberg & Gustafsson: 1995; Franzén: 1998; Månsson & Ekberg: 2000; SOU: 1996, 55 ch. 8). The main results from these and other studies can be summarised as follows: despite the political rhetoric and efforts to improve the situation of immigrants on the labor market, their situation has, with the possible exemption of the last few years, becomes worse since the late 1970s and during the 1990s, dramatically worse. From the time of economic recession 1992/1993 many researchers have described their position as catastrophic. According to Bevelander et al (1997, ch. 2) Sweden has not only in general failed to integrate their immigrants on its labor market. International comparisons with other industrial nations show that Sweden – together with Denmark and Norway – stands as a class by itself.

One way to illustrate this is by way of quotients. The quotient for the rate of labor market participation⁶⁵ among Swedish citizens and citizens of non-European Union countries are 1,28 for Sweden. The equivalent figures for Great Britain and Germany are 1.14 and 1.06 respectively. When it comes to unemployment we are speaking of a factor which is almost twice high as the rates for Nordic citizens, five times as high as for non-Nordic citizens and up to ten times as high as for certain non-European citizens. The average unemployment rate⁶⁶ in 1997 for individuals born in Sweden was 5.7 percent, compared with 17.5 percent for foreign-born individuals. There seem, furthermore, to be indications of a general pattern in the employment rates of immigrants: the more a person among the Swedes is associated with dark skin and with being a Muslim, the higher their unemployment rate and the lower their rate of participation on the labor market in general.⁶⁷ And this

seems to be true independently of their level of education. The Swedish labor market is, in other words, to a large extent segregated between natives and foreign-born on the one hand, and between different ethnic groups among the foreign-born on the other.

The weak position of the immigrants on the labor market is clearly seen in the following figures.

Origin/year	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Africa	16.1	15.5	16.6	16.2	15.5	18.5	21.0
Asia	18.0	18.4	18.6	18.2	18.4	19.6	21.4
Europe excl. Nordic countries	34.6	28.5	28.9	29.8	31.9	36.5	40.6
Sweden born	70.5	71.3	72.6	71.3	70.8	72.6	78.6

*Level of employed as a percentage of total population among 16 -64 year olds
Source: SCB Befolkningen 16+ år (RAMS) i riket efter sysselsättning, medborgarskapsland, ålder och kön. År 1993-1999*

It is also clear from these figures that the groups with origins in Africa and Asia have a disastrously low level of employment.

Even though an immigrant's length of domicile in Sweden correlates positively with his/her level of participation in the labor market, it is still true that the level of labor market participation is considerably lower even for those who arrived in Sweden during the 1970s and 1980s than for the average Swedish-born person.

This is remarkable for several reasons. One is that during the 1980s Sweden experienced a strong economic boom with a labor shortage in many sectors. Another one, which we will return to, is that many of the immigrants that ar-

rived in Sweden from the 1980s onward were relatively well-educated.⁶⁸ A third is that the Swedish economy, since at least the 1970s, has been going through a phase of internationalization and globalization, which ought to have had as a consequence that the (multi-) linguistic, cultural and other competences the immigrants possessed, and should have been a competitive advantage for them on the labor market. Despite this, their integration in the Swedish labor market has been very poor and declining. Since 2000 there have, however, been some signs that the trend has started to reverse and that the unemployment rates of immigrants has started to go down somewhat.


This situation of segregation is clearly shown in the case of the Iranians, a group that, on the one hand, has been in Sweden for quite some time now, and thus should have had time to establish themselves, and, on the other hand, has a relatively high level of education. In 1995 thirteen percentage of its members 25 to 64 years had a three years or more post-secondary education, as compared with twelve percent for the total Swedish born population. If you standardise the Iranian population for age this percentage increase from thirteen to fifteen percent. The situation is similar for Iraqis, although they at an average have been in Sweden a somewhat shorter time than the Iranians. On the other hand they have an even higher education level. Their average level of three or more years of post-secondary education is twenty-one percent. Despite this, the situation of these groups on the labor market is most serious, characterised as it is by an exceptionally high level of unemployment and low participation rate.⁶⁹ Other groups with similar patterns of high level of unemployment and low participation rate are Ethiopians, Turks, Syrians, Lebanese and Somalis. They, and particularly the Turks, however, do not have the high levels of education

as Iranians and Iraqis. Among Turks, for example, only around four percent have a three years or more post-secondary education, and over sixty percent do not even have a high school education.

It is, however, not only the case that immigrants with Muslim background have higher levels of unemployment and low participation rates, but it is also the case that those that have succeeded in getting a job to a high extent work in positions far below their levels of education and skills. Of all immigrants in Sweden from countries outside the European Union with three years or more of academic education, only thirty-nine percent (of those that had a job) had a job that corresponded with their level of education as compared to eighty-five percent for Swedish born people (Berggren & Omarsson: 2001). These averages hide significant differences between, on the one hand, types of education and, on the other hand, the background of different groups of immigrants. Of those with educations in nursing and social services fifty-three percent had jobs corresponding with their education, while the figure for those with education in natural sciences and technology was forty-four percent and for those with educations and pedagogy thirty-two percent. When it comes to variations on cultural backgrounds we have already noticed that the same principle applies: individuals that are associated by Swedish employers with black skin and with being Muslims have significantly lower rates than others. Of those who had employment below their level of education, a substantial number were employed in their area of education and training. For individuals with education in the natural sciences and technology this figure was thirty-three percent, and for those with education in nursing and social services it was fifty percent. Of those with an academic degree in humn or social sciences seventy percent (of those

who had a job) were working in unskilled service jobs. A common way to summarise this situation is that: 'Sweden has the best educated cleaners, taxi drivers and sub-way ticket collectors in the world'.⁷⁰


The following will illustrate this graphically:



Unemployment during some part of the year among people born in Sweden and immigrants born outside of Europe, 1990–1997.

(Unemployed SOU 2000:37, p. 32)

Although the unemployment did increase for all groups in Sweden during this period, it has done so much more for groups with a non-European origin.



Permanently employed during a whole year, non-European immigrants and people born in Sweden 1990 – 1997 (SOU 2000:37 p. 33)

There is no doubt that these data, at least to some extent, reflect forces of exclusion and discrimination operating in more or less subtle manner in the labor market. On the whole Nordic citizens appear to be accepted whereas non-European citizens, and particularly blacks and Muslims, encountering considerable difficulties in finding jobs. Generally it can be said that they are the last to get a job and, in times of economic recession, the first to lose them. One labor market researcher expressed it in a TV interview: "In times of economic boom 'they' get the jobs that the Swedes do not want to have, and in times of recession 'they' get the unemployment the Swedes do not want to have".

Even if the situation on the labor market for the second-generation immigrants, as one labor market researcher expressed it "is not completely dark" it is considerably worse than that of children with two Swedish parents. Immigrant youth who arrived in Sweden before the age of six years, and have succeeded in getting a job, are further

estimated to run a fifty percent higher risk of being laid off than youth in their own age cohort with two Swedish parents. The equivalent figure for youth born in Sweden with at least one parent born abroad is thirty percent. These figures have been arrived at after standardizing for education level, grade average, competence in the Swedish language, the socioeconomic position of their families, and the status of their housing area. According to figures reported on television (December 2002) these figures have changed for the worse during the last few years.

According to, among others, Aria (1999) this situation is particularly problematic as it creates and reinforces attitudes of "it does not matter how hard I try and work in school, and how good grades I get, I will still not get a decent job because I am a black or Muslim immigrant" in many Muslim youths (see also Rojas: 1995). Immigrants see one's, in many cases well-educated father and mother, getting their job applications constantly rejected. If they succeed in finding a job, it is most likely to be in an unskilled position in a factory, in a cleaning service or in the retail trade,⁷¹ something that is very demoralizing for study and work ethics of immigrant children. It is a situation that convinces many children of immigrants that for them education is not an advantage for getting a better life. Many researches, like Aria (1999), see a direct link between educated parents that cannot get a job or that work in unskilled jobs, and low school achievement and high unemployment levels for their children. Young immigrants seem to "inherit" their parents (un)employment status. Aria (1999) concludes that there are indications that the existing exclusion mechanisms in the Swedish society are creating a vicious circle that traps immigrants in a chain of low education and unemployment.

These, largely structural, problems are, according to our informants, frequently reinforced by the fact that many employers of Muslim workers are insensitive to Muslim religious needs and demands, such as a proper place to practice salat and time off work to do so, a few hours off work on Fridays to go to the mosque for salat al-Juma, leave to celebrate Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, halal food in the canteen, or are insensitive to women wearing hijab at work, and other problems along these lines.

This situation is particularly problematic, as it in turn tends to reinforce negative stereotypes and prejudiced views of immigrants as being unwilling to work and only wanting to benefit from the social welfare system (*Jihad i folkhemet*).

You do not need to be a true believer in deprivation theory to realise that this kind of development, among Muslims, speaks for a development of "ghetto-Islam" rather than for "Euro-Islam" (Karlsson: 1994 and 2002).

The situation described above, on the basis of research, is very clearly corroborated and strongly reinforced by our informants. There is, in principle, total agreement among our Muslim informants that Muslims are extremely victimised and excluded on the labor market. The very fact of being identified as Muslim is, according to them, a serious obstacle when it comes to finding employment. As one informant expressed it: "Many women say that a woman has to be twice as competent as a man to get a job. That might be true, but a Muslim has to be five times as competent to get that job." They also agree that attitudes towards Muslims held by gatekeepers in the Swedish society, some of which have been discussed in other parts of this report, play a major role for this situation. Most of our Muslim informants also underscore that their problems on the labor market are not confined to that of finding employment.

As employees they keep facing a whole sting of problems, some of which have already been touched upon, including everything from a lack of respect for their culture, religion and lifestyle to being suspected of being anti-modern, reactionary, fundamentalist, or of supporting such ideas. Several informants have expressed their view of the matter in ways like: "Sometimes they run horror stories in the Swedish media about the situation of Muslims on the labor market. The normal reaction from most Swedes to those is, 'It can't be this bad in Sweden, it must be some Muslim propaganda'. Even if most Muslims recognise themselves in most of these reports, their normal reaction is more like 'Even if the depicted reality is bad, the *real* reality is much worse'." Let us here, again, repeat the perhaps obvious fact that the important factor determining attitudes, including behaviors, of people is not how a particular reality is (if there is such a thing) but how the participants in the reality in question believe and experience it to be (Thomas: 1928, 572).

The extent to which immigrants participate in the labor market and are employed/unemployed is an important indicator of "labor market integration". It is, however, as we have seen, not the only one. Another important indicator is to what extent those who do find employment get jobs that correspond to their level of education and work experience, that is, the quality of their labor market integration. In this respect their integration is also very poor: only 39% of the immigrants with an academic education have a job corresponding to their education (Berggren & Omarsson: 2002). Yet another indicator is to what extent they receive equal outcomes (income, influence over their work situation, chances for promotion, etc.) from their participation that are comparable with the rest of the population. Here the figures also show poor and decreasing integration.⁷²

Another significant difference between Swedish-born and foreign-born is constituted by working conditions. The foreign-born more often have more physically strenuous and monotonous jobs, which leads to higher absence due to illness. This can be illustrated by number of days of sickness benefit paid. In 1990 the figures for foreign born citizens were as much as seventy percent higher than for Swedish citizens: 42 days/year for Swedes versus 27 days for immigrants (SOU: 1996, 55 and 106). The sickness rate of women was higher than the rate for men. This difference stays basically the same even at a more detailed level of analysis. For example: Swedish-born women employed in the cleaning sector had 36 days of sick leave per year compared with 59 days for foreign-born women in the same sector. Work accidents and work related illnesses are also more common among men and women of foreign background. The foreign-born, to a much larger extent than Swedish-born, have also been granted an early retirement pension.⁷³ Differences between nationalities were also found. Women who were born in southern Europe had, for example, the highest sick leave figures per year, 82 days. Swedish women had only 28 days. Another study on migrants residing in the area of Stockholm shows a similar tendency. Approximately 75 percent of Greek women between 50-64 years of age were receiving disability pensions or sickness allowance. For Yugoslavian women the figures were 60 percent and 35 percent for women from Turkey, compared to only 15 percent for Swedish women.

The Swedish labor market is to a large and seemingly increasing extent segregated, not only between men and women but also between natives and foreign-born. There are even noticeable tendencies towards segregation between different ethnic groups, with the dark-skinned and Muslims as the most segregated. In SOU (1996, 55 and

107) the situation of the immigrants on the labor market is summarised as being characterised by “high employment, overrepresentation in heavy, dirty and/or stressful jobs without career possibilities.”

Self-employment

According to researchers, another factor that can be seen as both a result and a cause of segregation and exclusion on the labor market is self-employment. Self-employment is seen by many, not so much as a free choice as the only alternative to being unemployed or working in a low low-status, low-paid profession.

In his study of self-employed Iranians in Gothenburg, Abbasian (2000: 104–106), for example, claims that self-employment is increasing the segregation among migrants. Self-employment among migrants, according to Abbasian, both conceals, strengthens and justifies the already existing discrimination in the labor market. This discriminatory aspect in particular concerns foreign-born academics, who do not obtain employment according to their skills and qualifications. Migrants rarely receive financial support from society compared to Swedish self-employed. They are also treated unfairly because of lack of references. Therefore, they have to establish themselves in non-sheltered branches of businesses and their businesses remain small enterprises. They also pay a high price in proportion to the results, as they have to work hard for a low turnover. This increases both physical and mental strain for self-employed migrants.

There are, however, also positive arguments for self-employment, such as that it is an opportunity for migrants who risk being unemployed to take part in society. Self-

employment is a way to break isolation, social exclusion and marginalization for migrants. In addition, it is a cheap alternative for society to create employment for unemployed migrants, as self-employed migrants do not require financial support from society. The self-employed migrants also create employment for other people who may be unemployed, mostly relatives. Migrant self-employment also opens up ethnic Swedes' eyes to other countries, thus contributing somewhat to the diversity of society.

Considering the pros and cons of self-employment, Abbasian concludes that self-employment is not a good measure of integration, but rather that it increases ethnic segregation in the labor market.

This is a conclusion supported by Ålund (2002) who calls self-employment among migrants "neo-slavery", as it constitutes the new economy's insecure and low-paid service-sector within a hierarchy of branches of professions. The main branches are restaurants, barbershops and dry-cleaners. According to Ålund, it is the fact that they are immigrants that forces them into self-employment within these low-paid sectors, which in its turn will add to the segregation of the economy. The ethnic self-employment is thus reflecting the advantages and disadvantages of the globalised world. In addition, Ålund states that we must realise that migrants do not automatically want to work in these branches of businesses, but that it is the only last alternative for many of them to avoid unemployment or be dependent on society for financial support. To run one's own business is mainly a way to escape unemployment.

Support for this opinion can be found in the fact that since the migrants' situation in the labor market greatly deteriorated in the beginning of the 1990s, the number of self-employed immigrants has tripled.⁷⁴ In 1999, every fifth business was established by a person of migrant back-

ground. Thirteen percent of these were born abroad and the rest were born in Sweden by parents of foreign origin, to a great extent of a non-European background. Most of these self-employed businesses run by migrants are rather small, aiming at local markets and rarely profitable. The main branches are small convenience stores, restaurants, cleaning services and barbershops.

In summary: the general picture we have gotten from the research we have consulted, as well as from what we have heard from our informants, indicates that the labor market integration on all these accounts is not only disastrously poor but that during the last decades it has gone from bad to worse.

What could be the reasons for this? To simplify extremely, we believe that the various cultural and structural explanations suggested in the literature can be rephrased in terms of two different ways of looking at immigrants and other minorities on the labor market (as well as within other areas of society). One is in terms of difficulties and problems and one is in terms of assets, possibilities and resources.

According to the first (and in Sweden so far strongly dominating) perspective, immigrants are lacking or have too few of certain properties – for example knowledge, skill and competence in the Swedish language and the Swedish culture. At the same time they are often also considered to have many other characteristics – mainly from their “culture of origin”, such as religion (mainly Islam), views on gender and dependence on an authority.⁷⁵

Upholders of this perspective take their point of departure in characteristics of the immigrants, the supply side of labor to the market. That’s where the problem lies. As soon as the problem is so identified, it is seen as resting among ‘them’, and the way to solve it also becomes obvious: ‘we’

have to integrate (adapt) “them” with the help of more courses, educations, social workers, and the like.

A second (and in Sweden so far not particularly prominent) perspective, focuses on what “they” have, that the majority population is lacking. They have, for example, language skills, cultural competences, and various knowledge of the political, judicial, economical and social situation of many markets of interest to Swedish businesses as well as knowledge and skills that make them suitable to deal with the increased market of consumers and clients with non-Swedish cultural backgrounds living in Sweden.

Advocates of this perspective take their point of departure in attitudinal and structural properties of the Swedish labor market and its various gatekeepers, that is, in of the demand side of the market. When the problem is so identified other solutions are the ones that look the most promising.

Even though the first perspective, as far as we can judge, still is the dominating one among the various gatekeepers in Sweden, during the last few years, there have been a number of positive signs indicating that there is a change going on. An example is a series of initiatives, statements and documents from The Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications in connection with a project initiated by the Minsitry in 1999, the *Diversity project*.⁷⁶

The project can be said to have been designed and carried out in the spirit of the so-called Managing Diversity Philosophy (Ansari: 1995; Carr-Ruffino: 1996; Cox: 1993, and 1997; Cross: 2000; Kirton: 2000; Kossek & Lobel: 1996; Thomas: 1991, 1996 and 1999; Wong: 2001). The Managing Diversity Philosophy can be said to have as one of its goals to make gatekeepers and others change – and not only in words – from, what was in our earlier terminology, a problem perspective to a possibility perspective in their view of diversity. It is in other words, as we have argued about

integration – a strategy to increase – rather than decrease – diversity in the various areas and institutions of society as well as in society at large.

Let us – given this resemblance between the basic idea behind the Managing Diversity Philosophy and the theory behind integration as we see it, and that we therefore believe such a discussion can have importance for many of the central issues regarding Muslims in Sweden – expand a bit on this comparison.⁷⁷

One of the main arguments forwarded for such a policy is functional (in a broad sense): it is, among other things, believed to unleash and increase creativity, flexibility, learning, organizational and individual growth as well as the ability to adjust to new and changing circumstances in the areas of society that become pluralised. These arguments are often summed up by advocates of for Managing Diversity policies by slogans such as: “The probability for intelligent and creative decisions stand in direct proportion to the number of different perspectives involved in the decision process” and “If two people in a deciding body are thinking in the same way, a least one of them is superfluous”, and “The most important factor for the long term survival of any group is its level of knowledge and competence diversity.”⁷⁸

Attempts to bring in people with different national, cultural, ethnical or religious backgrounds into an institution without being prepared to make significant changes in the organization of the institution and its “culture” will however, most often backfire and only bring about heightening tension, as well as an increased number of problems and conflicts which result in various processes that will hinder rather than increase the performance of the institution.

Integration and multiculturalism, according to here sketched way of thinking, do, in other words, go beyond a

mere increasing of the number of different national, ethnic, etc. groups in the institution. This is merely the first step. If not followed by a proper strategy for managing the new diversity it is, however, likely to backfire.

What a process of multiculturalization brings is not just individuals with “other” cultural, backgrounds, but a pluralization of perspectives, ways of thinking and doing things, norm and value systems, including approaches on how to look at and think about the function and goals of the institution itself as well as how one shall go about reaching its goals. The same is, *mutatis mutandis*, true on a societal level.

That is why the majority often experiences these people as challenging basic assumptions about how the organization (ought to) function, its goals and strategies, its operations, practices, priorities, and procedures.

In doing so they can, as we have argued, either be seen as creating problems and conflicts – a view that often set in motion a vicious circle – or (which is less common) be seen as providing fresh and interesting new approaches – a view that often can set in motion a virtuous circle.

They must realise that both Sweden and the world around us have changed, that it is most likely going to continue changing even more, and that these changes demand that they have to give up many cherished ideas and opinions, that they have to be prepared to change and think in new ways if they are going to be able to cope with this new and changing reality in an effective and profitable way.

Our claim that Sweden, Swedish institutions and the Swedes will have to change in the direction of a true acceptance of integration and multiculturality does not, however, include the claim that this will be easy or painless. It will not. It will, at least in the short term, bring with it costs in both social and economic terms. It is, however,

our strong belief that these short-term costs will turn out to be a long-term investment.⁷⁹

The future of the Swedish labor market

During the next 15 years there are two major changes that will affect immigrants' position in the labor market. One is that the Swedish population is aging. The other one is, as we have seen, that the proportion of people with foreign background will increase. In 2015 approximately two million, or more than one in five, Swedes will be 65 years of age and above (Näringsdepartementet Ds 2000:69). This implies a decrease in the labor force starting in 2008. In 2030 it is estimated that there will be 200,000 fewer people of working age in the population (DS 2000: 69, 29). In the period up to 2015 the number of non-immigrant Swedes will decrease in the work force. The estimated increase in the work force during this period of roughly 200,000 will almost totally be made up of men and women with a foreign background. To safeguard the social security and welfare of the increasing number of pensioners, Sweden will, as is more and more frequently argued (for example by Lindgren: 2002; Ekberg & Wallen: 2002) in the ongoing debate, need more, not fewer immigrants. The same arguments are, however, also coming from government sources (Ds 2000: 69; Scocco: 2002). Scocco argues that in order to stabilise the rate of economic growth: Sweden has to increase the number of labor migrants to approximately 45,000 persons every year until 2050. This is the same number of migrants that Sweden had in the 1970s. If Sweden wants to do more than stabilise its economic growth, even larger numbers of immigrants are needed (Svenskt Näringsliv: 2001). Since there will be a labor shortage within the whole

industrialised world, Scocco states that the only areas that can provide Europe with labor force is North and Sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia. However, since there are many unemployed migrants today in Sweden, he also suggests that it is necessary, to show social and political responsibility, that the employers already start to show that they can utilise the immigrated labor force already in existence in the country. At the recent conference *Labor supply and diversity – local to global* in Göteborg this fall (2002) these predictions were confirmed by every speaker.

Housing

From the trivial fact that an individuals' or a households' ability to choose their place (where and how) to live is closely connected with their solvency, in combination with the facts that, as we shall see, most immigrants, and especially those with background in Africa and Asia, are worse off on the labor market than the average Swede and the connected fact that their incomes, as we will see below, are lower, we can expect to find individuals and households from these groups over represented in areas of poorer living conditions, in so-called disadvantaged areas. The *Commission on Housing Policy* (Bostadspolitiska utredningen) defines this as:

Disadvantaged areas are areas in which a characteristically large portion of residents lack socioeconomic resources, are born abroad, and exhibit lower health standards than the average population as a whole. The areas concerned are for the most part those built during the time of the *Miljonprogram* [a housing program designed to create a million new homes] and are almost exclusively under the management of municipal housing corporations. ... The

large-scale aspect, anonymity, lack of security, low quality standards, lack of services and transit, etc., that are often features of these disadvantaged areas, contribute to further impair the area's living conditions and opportunities available to its inhabitants. Harsh living conditions combined with a sense of inability to influence one's own situation can lead to feelings of powerlessness and exclusion (SOU: 1996, 156).

If we look at how immigrants are distributed in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö this prediction is also clearly brought out in reality. Stockholm is divided into 18 administrative areas, Göteborg into 21 and Malmö into 10. Of these three to four in each city have a large part of their housing as part of so-called '*miljonprogrammshus*', a kind of public housing project built from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s, and consisting in huge houses built in pre-fabricated concrete elements in the city outskirts. Here is also where we find the immigrant households overrepresented. In 1990 around twenty-five percent of all the immigrant households lived in these areas, as compared with just over ten percent for Swedish households. From 1990 onward the social and economic situation of these specific areas deteriorated dramatically. Unemployment figures rose, employment in other programs fell, and dependence on public assistance increased sharply. An example of this development is Rosengården in Malmö, where the numbers of people in employment programs dropped from forty-eight percent to eight percent between 1990 and 1995. During the same period the number of welfare recipients increased to the extent that seventy-five percent were receiving public assistance. Similar developments were seen in other disadvantaged areas in Stockholm and Göteborg.

Parallel with this deterioration of the social and economic development in these areas the proportion of immi-

grants in them rose. Today close to a third of the immigrant households live in these areas. Just to give some examples: the immigrant population of the district of Rinkeby in Stockholm was sixty percent in 1993. Today it is seventy-five percent, mainly from Turkey, Somalia and Iraq. The equivalent figures for Tensta is fifty-three percent (1993) and sixty-five percent (2000), and for Kista thirty-three percent (1993) and forty-seven percent (2000). In Göteborg, the areas with highest proportion of immigrants are Bergsjön, Lärjedalen, Gunnared and Biskopsården with forty-eight percent, forty-five percent, forty-one percent and thirty-six percent respectively. As in Stockholm, these figures have increased during the 1990s, despite many verbal assurances from the both local and national politicians to turn the situation around. A similar development can be seen in Malmö where the proportion of immigrants in the most immigrant-dense area, Rosengården, has increased from fifty percent in 1993 to eighty-four percent in 2000. As in the rest of the areas mentioned the groups with the highest geographical concentration/segregation patterns are the groups with background in Africa (above all Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea) and Asia (above all Turkey, Iran and Iraq), which are also the main backgrounds of the Swedish Muslim population. We think it can fairly safely be claimed that almost all of the above mentioned increase in the population of immigrants in these areas is from areas dominated by Muslim culture and religious traditions.

Another way of showing the same thing is by looking at how large a percentage of a particular group that is living in the three most immigrant dense parts of a city. If we start by Stockholm we get the following results: Somalia, sixty-one percent; Turkey, fifty-seven percent; Iraq, fifty-one percent; Iran, forty-nine percent; Ethiopia, forty-nine percent. For Göteborg: Iraq, fifty-five percent; Somalia, fif-

ty-four percent; Ethiopia, thirty-eight percent; Iran, thirty-one percent; and for the Turks, if we substitute Gunnared for Biskopsgården, sixty-two percent. For Malmö: Iraq eighty-two percent; Turkey and Somalia, seventy-nine percent; and Ethiopia, fifty-nine seventy-nine percent. These figures are from 1993. Today's figure would be considerably higher with exemption of the Turks.

The population of these areas is also very transient. Approximately half of the 1990 population had moved to a different area by 1995. This mobility is, however, to a very high extent, mobility within the social hierarchy of the dense, disadvantaged areas of immigrants rather than away from them. As the Swedes moved out of the 'better parts' of these areas, the older immigrants took their places, and new immigrants filled the spaces left vacant. The socio-economic status and lack of recourses of these areas was thereby intensified.

Health care

Results from an investigation conducted by Socialstyrelsen 1997 showed that professional training in general does not prepare health care providers on an appropriate level for intercultural encounters. A volume *Mångkulturell sjukvård. En lärarhandledning för läkarutbildningen* (Multicultural Health Care. A Teachers' Guide for Medical Schools) was published in 1999, containing both a general orientation about relevant questions, primarily from a medical anthropological perspective, and some practical examples of cases where cultural differences play a role. The book offers a bibliography and addresses the institutions dealing with cultural diversity in health care, both in Sweden and abroad.

As in many other respects, Swedish authorities admit the cultural/ethnic diversity of patients within the national health care system as well as the necessity of taking such diversity into consideration, but the definition of different groups is seldom made in religious terms. References to “immigrants”, “intercultural encounters” or even different nationalities are usual, albeit with the reservation that each patient is an individual, with a specific background, experiences and needs. In this sense, all patients – both Swedes and immigrants – have to be approached in the same manner:

Socio-cultural identity is not exclusively the attribute of patients of non-Swedish heritage. Also the Swedish-born population has many different attitudes to health and illness. A higher level of consciousness about human beings as the products of their culture (*kulturella varelser*) is valuable in communication with any patient (SoS 1999: 13, 11).

Therefore, it is not easy to recognise measures addressing problems that are specifically related to Islam or Muslims. Nevertheless, the recognition of a diversity of patients’ needs can be relevant for the Muslim minority whenever they have expectations from the health system that are different from the majority. Some obvious examples are connected to food and to the gender of the health care providers.

There are basically two main areas where Muslim patients may have specific needs in their contact with health care intuitions. The first – mostly within the somatic part of health care – is related to the practical routines and rules of everyday life: food, clothing, contact between men and women, religious practices. The second – primarily within

the area psychiatry – is related to the presumptions of the role and functions of the individual and of the different social groups around him.

Let us start with the questions of practical routine and health care.

Food: According to our interviews, most hospitals in Sweden do take consideration of the patient's wishes concerning food – religious restrictions are not more problematic to follow than vegetarian and other diets. In extreme cases, such as when a patient refuses to eat food containing even a trace of forbidden ingredients, including certain preservative agents (there is an official list at *Konsumentverket* about these), then relatives are allowed to provide food.

The doctor we interviewed claims that in general the staff have an understanding attitude towards these wishes. However, one cannot be sure that problems related to food restrictions are completely eliminated. Our informant pointed out that a patient's refusal to eat can be attributed to poor appetite when in reality it is due to the patient's insecurity about the ingredients. Better knowledge about religious food restrictions is required to eliminate such oversights.

Clothing: Physical examination and certain treatments require that Muslim women take off their head-scarf, which might, in some cases, be met by unwillingness or refusal. Again, a well informed staff can avoid controversy by simple means, such as avoiding to have male persons in the room, or replacing the scarf with a surgical cap used by doctors. The same applies for gender relations: if possible, physical examinations are to be conducted by someone of the same sex.

Times for prayer do not seem to cause problems for Muslim patients. Several hospitals have a specific room for

prayer and meditation where people of any religious faith are welcome. If asked for, an imam is invited instead of the priest who is usually attached to larger hospitals.

Our interviews – and the literature – suggest that such demands by Muslim patients are not unknown within Swedish health care, although there is a need for further information in these matters.

These issues also lead to the question of whether it would be advisable to organise health care institutions – polyclinics, hospitals – specializing in Muslim patients. The question is controversial. Some informants claim that the individualised approach to patients will cover the needs of Muslim patients by definition as well- and that it would be better to ensure that the staff is well informed about possible critical issues for different religions. At the same time, we have heard of ideas or plans to start Muslim health centers, for example, attached to mosques.

Outlines of informal, ad hoc solutions are taking shape in our times, at least in the larger towns. The more doctors, dentists and so on, of Muslim background are starting their professional life in Sweden, the more possibilities there will be for Muslim patients to get medical help from persons who understand their specific claims. There are still some organisatory questions to address: from the doctors' part, being attached to the national health service, from the patient's part, the right to freely choose their doctors and hospitals.

Within the area of mental (psychiatric) health care, the issues are more complicated and more difficult to tackle. It is also more difficult for us, researchers within this project, to present the problems in their full complexity. The interviews and round table discussions have pointed to certain problems, but we have to make some reservations in reporting them, since we lack the professional knowledge

within the area of psychiatry. Therefore, our discussion here does not intend to go deeper than a general outline of some main questions (The discussion here relies heavily relying on our interview with Dr. Al Baldawi).

We have to emphasise – together with our informants – that the differences between patients from the Muslim minority and the Swedish majority are not related to Islam as a religion. The root of the problem of Muslim patients within Swedish psychiatric health care is a basic difference in the view of the individual. Whereas the Western culture has adopted a very strong (and in Sweden an extremely strong) individualistic view, most Muslim patients come from societies where an individual's identity is based on his/her belonging to a group. This group is primarily the family (often in a broader sense, i.e. not only the nuclear family), with further contacts into the ethnic and/or religious community. A person's identity is defined by his/her place, connections, rights and duties within the group.

As a consequence, the psychological difficulties of a person with an identity deeply rooted in a group cannot be treated on an individual basis. Not even if the problems – as sometimes is the case for Muslim youngsters who are torn between the two cultures they have to live with – are in a sense related to the group he/she is the member of. According to our informant, Swedish authorities, including welfare and nursing staff, are so deeply rooted in the Swedish (Western) individualistic ideals that they cannot offer adequate counseling in these cases. They attempt to help the patient by strengthening his/her autonomous individuality, often by cutting off his/her ties to their family and group. But for a person who is not equipped with the right strategies, independence leads to isolation and loneliness. At the same time the family (group) gets “mutilated”

by losing a member and often turns against the individual. The treatment causes more harm than good.

The actual depth of such problems are difficult to assess. Also, it is a question demanding deeper discussions whether the national health and social care of a country should or could be equipped with competence dealing with different *Weltanschauungs*, to adopt different views of what individual freedom and self-accomplishment should mean for persons from different backgrounds. In concrete cases, it is realistic to expect from a professional to help some (preferably Swedish-born) patients to more individual freedom and independence and at the same time help some other (preferably immigrant) patients to reconcile with their family and religious/ethnic group. In an ideal world, an individualised health and social care could probably cope with the problem and provide help to both those with a more individualistic and to those with a more group-oriented personal background. Again, special training and a greater diversity among the health care providers- in other words more doctors, social workers, and counselors with minority background- might be part of the solution.

Another question is whether some independence from Swedish institutions for such professionals would be advisable. Is there a realistic chance that a non-Swedish view of the individual could be applied within the frames of a Swedish institution. The issue is sometimes complicated by questions of feminist goals, women's rights, children's rights (strongly advocated by Swedish establishment and public opinion) on the one hand, and the right of the family (strongly advocated by Muslim and other religious groups), on the other.

In our investigations, we met one example of an independent, private psychiatric institute, led by a psychiatrist

with an immigrant background who also works within the public sector. His idea has been to create a Swedish institution that provides treatment to patients of primarily of non-Western origin and to “be a bridge” between immigrant patients and Swedish authorities. The institution is not getting any help from the state or the municipality, and their application to get attached to the National Health Service has been refused. Although religion is not a principle of selection for the clinic, many of the patients are Muslims, who hope to get more adequate help from a person who is familiar with their culture than from the regular Swedish institutions. Patients have to pay the full price, which represents a considerable hinderance.

The Police and Criminal Justice System


To combat racism and discrimination the Swedish police have initiated work to recruit people with foreign background into the police force. Even though this initiative so far has met with very moderate success, it is, at least according to the police themselves, moving in the right direction. During the last years the number of people with a foreign background who have applied to the police academy has been between 14 and 16 percent. How many of those that have had a “Muslim background”, we have not been able to determine. These low numbers are a problem as, accord to the academy, it is important for the force to represent the whole population and not only Swedes. According to the available statistical figures it is not possible to calculate the number of people with Muslim background working in the police force at the moment. According to spokespersons for the police, the number is, however, very low.⁸⁰

Like in so many other countries in the European union, there is often a strong distrust between the police and the Muslim community. To bridge this gap, the police and the Swedish Muslim council (*Sveriges Muslimska Råd*) have tried to educate and inform both policemen and Muslims. To do so they had a formal gathering in the central Mosque in Stockholm in 2001. Even though this is not enough, it was an important manifestation while showing that both sides are willing to combat distrust and bad attitudes against Muslims and policemen. According to Mahmoud Aldebe many Muslims distrust the police force, not so much because their experiences in Sweden, but because they have a background in countries and regions in which the police are, to a large extent, doing the errands of a corrupt regime rather than working for their people. This is an important issue that must be understood and addressed by the police if they want to improve their image and status among Muslims. At the same time many young Muslims born and raised in Sweden seem to be very sensitive to discrimination and racism. Unlike their parents at certain times, they are not willing to accept a secondary and inferior status or different treatment than Swedes. From this point of view it is essential for the police force to combat racism and discrimination within the force by, among other things, educating themselves in the areas of race-relations, intercultural communication and the like, as well as employing more Muslims. According to our informants, this problem is acknowledged at the police academy, but much work remains to be done before the goal is reached.

At the same time, during the three round table meetings, our discussions with both Muslims and educators from the police academy showed that the police had a fairly low level of multicultural knowledge and compe-

tence as well as of acceptance for Muslim demands. This was clearly illustrated by their reactions to the Muslim demand to be able to, for example, wear a headscarf in the field. According to the police this question has never even been raised at the academy. But if a person would like to become a police officer and use a headscarf this is, of course, an issue that has to be taken in to consideration. At the moment the problem is made impossible by the present regulations for the police uniform, which are not considered to easy to change. According to the police, this is, however, not a major issue at the moment. The real issue is to recruit new policemen and women from the Muslim community at all.

We have recently (2002) been given some preliminary data from ongoing research which indicates that the claims of Muslims, as well as of other "visible" minority groups, to be victims of "special" negative treatment by the police, as well as other instances of the judicial system, should be taken with some seriousness. An investigation made by the National Council for Crime Prevention (*Brottsförebyggande Rådet*) shows, for example, that individuals from immigrant groups are overrepresented to a high extent among people who are taken into custody or detained without being prosecuted or without being found guilty at their trials. Among the 1,850 individuals that since 2000 have been granted compensation payment for being wrongfully put into custody or detained, fifty three percent were of immigrant backgrounds. Among those who had spent more than 100 days in custody before being released, seventy five percent were of immigrant backgrounds.



Percent of immigrants wrongfully arrested

Given that the relative size of this group in the population as a whole is around 20 percent, these are high figures. These figures clearly indicate, according to Jerzy Sarnecki, professor of criminology, that this group is victim of discrimination.⁸¹

Preliminary results from another ongoing research project at the department of law of Stockholm University indicates that this negative special treatment seems to apply to the whole “judicial process”. Individuals from visible minorities seem to, everything else being equal, run a higher risk of being arrested and of being prosecuted and sentenced than non immigrants. It also seems that they run the risk of being sentenced on less strong evidence than non immigrants and to receive a more severe sanction or punishment in relation to a give crime than non immigrants.

Compared to Great Britain, for example, it is not possible to count the number of prisoners who have a Muslim background. This kind of statistical information is against the Swedish law. Thus, it is only possible to get a figure on citizenship.

Examples for the need for Imams in public social areas have been mentioned in our interviews in connection with prisons and hospitals. Both of these institutions have traditionally employed priests (chaplains). To employ imams on similar conditions, as far as we know, has not come into question. The Muslim clientele is not large enough for such a solution. Besides, due to the heterogeneity of the Muslim population in Sweden, it is more suitable to invite imams that match clients' ethnic and linguistic background. The common language is a problematic point, especially when the imam is not a permanent resident in Sweden and does not speak Swedish.

Immigrants, among them many from Muslim countries, are doing time in Swedish prisons. We have no data about how many of them are "religious" or "ethnic" Muslims, but among these prisoners "there is a great need of mental support (själavård), conversation about both existential and practical questions", says a representative from Caritas, Nino von Reisen. In his opinion, prison chaplains are not always appropriate for these contacts. Imams, preferably from the prisoners' home country should be available, with whom they share a common frame of reference. Expressions from a Christian discourse, like the crusade against drugs, for instance, can meet with strong disapproval.

During the last decade, the Prison and Probation Service has increased its knowledge about discrimination and

issues related to multiculturalism. Due to the fact that the number of prisoners with non-Swedish cultural or ethnic backgrounds has increased, it has become necessary to focus these issues. To combat discrimination active steps have been taken to make the staff more multicultural. At most prison institutions in Sweden it is possible to practice a religious life. Thus it is possible for Muslims to pray five times a day and halal food does not normally present a problem if it is wanted. However, it is often problematic to celebrate Ramadan because of the fact that the food is served at fixed hours. This, according to prison officials, is difficult to change because an alteration could have an impact on the security of the prison. Even though it is important to include imams in the pastoral care at Swedish prisons this is difficult according to the Prison and Probation Service, because it is difficult to get in contact with imams.

The material from the interviews and discussions suggests that groups working with social services within Christian congregations, (Swedish Church as well as Free Churches), who already have well-functioning routines and contacts with prisons, hospitals, schools and other institutions should develop better cooperation with Muslim communities in these matters. Such cooperation could open channels between Swedish institutions and imams.

The military

Sweden has a compulsory military service that means that all Swedish males are drafted if they are physically and mentally fit. Due to the general economical situation and changes in the local and international political climate the

number of drafted males is falling. This is the general trend for the last ten years.

The military sector is to our knowledge seldom, if ever, discussed in relation to the Muslim community and its male population even though the military service is often described as a rite of passage for a boy to become a man. To do one's service in the military could also be seen as an important aspect of the individual's loyalty toward so-called Swedish identity and nationalism. Thus the military service seems to fulfill an important function when it comes to the integration into society as it forms young men into Swedes.

Jörgen Kalmendal's research on the Swedish compulsory military service, however, shows that males with a "foreign background" or a "foreign" name are unlikely to be drafted at all. If your name is Larsson or Svensson, two typical Swedish last names, you are more likely to be drafted than if your last name is Anwar or Khan. Only every fourth male with a so-called "foreign background" is drafted as compared to every second young male born in Sweden with Swedish parents (Karmendal: 2000, 38). According to Kalmendal this result must be understood as a form of institutionalised discrimination. The negative process of selection and picking is from this perspective to the idea that the Swedish society should be open to all peoples no matter of ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious background. To our knowledge the Swedish Muslim community has so far not addressed this issue as a problem. Regardless of this, Karmendal's research illustrates the general impression that "foreigners" have more difficulties finding their place in the social system and its structures. According to Karmendal the military system is not open to diversity, and in order to be able to adapt to the modern multicultural society, the military system must change its

conception of the “Swedish soldier”. This critique goes as well for women taking part in the military system. Even though women have been accepted as officers for the last fifteen years, only 350 women are officers today, a figure that is low compared to the number of male officers. For Karmendal this figure could be explained by the fact that the military system holds strong mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination. People not following the unwritten norms of the military system, for example, women and young males with a foreign background, are therefore more likely to be targeted by discrimination (Karmendal: 2000, 38).

Specific Problems

Let us now move on to some of the problems individual Muslims report facing in their day-to-day life in Sweden.⁸² We limit these to a list of problems mentioned by a majority of our informants.

The problem almost always mentioned first is the lack of prayer halls (mosques and musallas). Particularly mentioned is the fact that many places with larger Muslim communities, like Göteborg, still do not have a “real” mosque. It is also fairly common that all, or at least most of, the blame for this shortcoming is placed on Sweden, its bureaucracy and its negative attitudes toward Islam. For anyone with insight into the now decade-long attempts to create “real” mosques in the Stockholm and Göteborg areas and others, it is obvious, however, that this is not the entire truth (Sander: 1991; Karlsson & Svanberg: 1995).

Cultural transmission of Islam among generations

To be able to “survive” as Muslims in the long term in a non-Muslim environment it is of absolute necessity to guarantee the transmission of Islamic knowledge and Muslim culture via mosques and other institutions. All in all this seems to be the most important question for all Muslims interviewed for this project, independently of their ideological or theological preferences. Despite this fact the Swedish Muslims are much lacking mosques and other platforms enabling the transmission of Islamic knowledge to the next generation of Muslims growing up in Sweden. Even though negative opinions of the majority society are one important explanation for the intellectual milieu, this development must also include the Muslim side. On several levels the Muslim community in Sweden, as we have seen, is divided along ethnic, cultural and theological lines, which makes it more difficult to mobilise support for the building of mosques and other vital institutions. Even though this problem most likely will be solved in time, it is necessary to guarantee a “safe” and “sound” transmission of the essential Islamic foundation for the next generation.

During both interviews and round table meetings, Muslims from all groups and factions have expressed a concern for this issue. One way of solving this problem, according to several voices articulated in this project, is to create facilities for education of Swedish Imams. This is, for example, the single most important goal for the Swedish Islamic Academy, and they have started to develop a curriculum for such an education. The most direct problem is to find a balance between Swedish academic norms and standards on the one hand and Islamic norms and values on the other. Without recognition and support from the

Swedish state⁸³ it will also be very difficult, but not impossible, to realise a Swedish educational program for Imams. But, as one of our informants expressed it: "if the Swedish state will not help finance it then, less acceptable countries, like Iran or Saudi Arabia will finance it instead and the Swedish Muslims should not need to turn to other countries" (Baksi). The danger of 'undesirable' influence via temporarily invited imams has been mentioned by several informants:

We more or less know that several imams who arrived here e.g. via Jordan have been trained to not only to propagate for (dawua) Islam. But also to recruit members for Islamic Jihad and Hamas [...] that's why the education of Imams in Sweden has met with opposition, not only for Swedes but even by Islamic groups who are afraid that it would threaten their own activities ... it is a delicate question which shows that we in the long run really need qualified 'home grown' imams in Sweden ... (von Reisen).

On the other hand, some of our Muslim informants are skeptical of imams trained within the Swedish system of higher education. Some Muslims, according to our informants, are suspicious that they would "represent the Swedish state", instead of representing the Muslim groups.

Nevertheless, the necessity of educating Swedish imams is obvious. There is also some competence in the country to start and run courses, and there are young Muslims who are interested. Integrationsverket (Integration Board) is interested in cooperating with the Högskoleverket (National Agency for Higher Education) and with the Kulturrådet (National Council for Cultural Affairs) to support the plans for starting higher education for imams.

Completing such a Swedish-based education abroad, in a Islamic madrasha, is an idea that have comes up in the

interviews.⁸⁴ Although some informants claim that there are young Muslims who show interest for studying to become an imam, representatives of the SST report that there is a “problem of recruitment in the communities for higher education abroad.” Only a handful has so far applied for grants for studies abroad, although there are financial resources for this purpose. There might be a number of reasons for this lack of interest. The situation may very well change if an accepted Swedish academic education was to be completed by a shorter study sojourn abroad.

Some practical questions in this connection that have been raised in the interviews are if there would be enough jobs for Swedish imams; how they would be financed; would the Swedish rules and regulations for higher education be observed in the admission procedures, that is, would women have the right to take the same courses and qualify for being imams (some are against the thought of female imams of “traditional” reasons, others could easily accept it).

Today the status of the imams are very complicated or even depressing according to most informants. The major part of the imams working in Sweden has a low level of theological and pastoral education, which make them poor producers of Islamic knowledge. Instead of helping the next generation to develop a platform for a so-called Swedish Islam – founded on both Islamic and Swedish norms and values – they create often both tensions between Muslims and the Swedish society on the one hand and tensions within the Muslim community on the other. Instead of importing persons transmitting Islamic knowledge from the “traditional” Muslim world it seems that many Muslims are looking for Islamic leaders who could give answers suitable for a Swedish context.

We Muslims in Sweden cannot live on answers to problems one has in Saudi Arabia or Cairo – we have our problems here that are not faced ... if an imam does not speak the language, if he is not familiar with the political construction of the country, then he probably cannot address the problems we have ... it can impress the older generation, but the Muslims born here – for example my own daughter – for her I wish a modern imam (Al-Baldawi).

This is of course a difficult process for the Muslim community, similar trends could be found among all Muslim communities living in the Western Diaspora in Europe and the United States. In this light, a few Muslims in Sweden are talking about the necessity of developing a so-called Blue- and- yellow Islam (an adjective alluding to the colors found in the Swedish flag). As already indicated, the Muslim community in Sweden is much divided on this issue (Larsson: 2002).

Even though the differences between first and second generation of Muslims living in Sweden should not be overtly exaggerated, there are vital differences. Generally it seems that the first generation who kept their religious way of life is more willing to accept Islamic norms while the second generation of Muslims are questioning the same key norms and values. The reason for this development is complicated and manifold. First of all the second generation is born and raised in Sweden and they have been educated in accordance with the Swedish school system, which pays attention to critical thinking. Secondly, they are children of their own time. Typical for the young generation is that they seem to put the individual more at the center, rather than collective norms and value systems. Thirdly, it seems that young Muslims are less willing to accept to live as second-class citizens as compared to

Swedes. As a result they find it necessary to question some of the basic tenets held by the first generation. They could drop Islam as a suitable way of life or develop a method of interpretation that they find more suitable for achieving their goals (Ramadan: 1999; 2001). This development shows clearly that the prevailing interpretations of Islam that could be found in Sweden must be viewed in the light of the Swedish context (Sander: 2002).

Even though the Swedish school system has improved their education and teaching on Islam and Muslim issues there are still many problems to solve. Schoolbooks, for example, still contain negative images and poor representation of Islamic faith and Muslim culture according to many Muslim pupils (Härenstam: 1993). Due to this fact, Muslims often experience that they are presented as stereotypes and therefore different from the Swedish society. Practical problems in relation to sexual education, sports, food and healthcare in the school are still difficult according to several Muslim leaders. One way of solving these problems argued by many Muslims is to start so-called Islamic free-schools. According to the Swedish State anybody is allowed to start free-schools as long as it follows and accepts the curriculum for the Swedish school system. During the last few years the number of free-schools has increased dramatically in Sweden.⁸⁵ As compared to the rest of Europe, Sweden has generally more free-schools than any other country in the European Union. This difference could be explained by the fact that the Swedish state has a generous economical system supporting the establishment of free-schools. As compared to the rest of Europe, Swedish free-schools are economically sponsored by the State, but the school staff runs the organization and pedagogical models. But this policy also is in line with the politics of the Swedish state, putting the individual and his/her choice in

focus. At the moment there is no higher education founded on an Islamic or ethnic (Arabic) curriculum. But regarding pre-schools there are approximately ten or at most fifteen schools started on an Islamic or Arabic curriculum.⁸⁶ There are several more schools that have been accepted but they have so far not started their activities.

That the question of cultural transmission between the generations is important for most Muslims was clearly indicated to us by two surveys in the Muslim communities, one made in 1991/92 and one in 1994.⁸⁷ One of the questions asked was: "How important is it for you that your children, here in Sweden, receive a proper Muslim upbringing – that they acquire, retain and live according to traditional Muslim rules, norms and values and become and continue to be good Muslims?" The results of the first investigation (n=385) were as follows:

Answer	Number	Percentage
No answer	22	5,7
Very important	206	53,5
Rather important	38	9,9
Not very important, as long as they become happy	17	4,4
It does not matter at all, as long as they become happy	40	10,4
It is important that they do not receive a Muslim upbringing	58	15,1
Do not know	4	1,0
Total	385	100,0

If we subtract the Iranians – for whom it was “very important” for only 9.4 percent and “Important that they did not

receive a Muslim upbringing” for 39.2 percent – from the statistics, we get an average of 77,9 percent who believe it is “very important”, with Iraqis at the low end with 26.4 percent. There is also a small gender difference. Not surprisingly women deem it more important (62.2 percent) than men (49.4 percent). Another expected result was that people that had children of their own deemed it significantly more important than those without. Among parents 69,8 percent considered it “very important” compared to 31,3 percent for non-parents. Even though there is an age-factor involved, it seems that acquiring a family of one’s own strongly determines attitudes towards the importance of Muslim norms and values and Muslim socialization. This fact is also brought out in our interviews; many people admit to having changed their opinions and attitudes towards Islam as a cultural and religious tradition in connection with family building.

In the second survey (n=200) the results was as follows:⁸⁸

Answer	Number	Percentage
No answer	19	9,5
Very important	138	69,0
Rather important	33	16,5
Not very important, as long as they become happy	4	2,0
It does not matter at all, as long as they become happy	2	1,0
It is important that they do not receive a Muslim upbringing	2	1,0
Do not know	2	1,0
Total	200	100,0

In connection to this survey, it is also worth mentioning that the combination of the growing exposure to, and participation in Swedish society in combination with a growing number of Muslim and Islamic organizations has forced the Muslim immigrants in general to become (more) aware of their identity as Muslims. This is true both on the individual and the collective level. We have, for example, been told by many informants that it was during this time in Sweden that they became really aware of themselves as Muslims for the first time, and that Islam (both as a culture and a religion) during this time was more or less forced on them as a topic of conversation – and this was true independently of whether or not they were religious (in the conventional sense), and independently of their attitudes to Islam. They had to take a position vis a vis Islam.⁸⁹ They were made increasingly conscious of their identity as Muslims from two sides. First, from ‘the outside’, from the Swedes and Swedish society. This was to a large extent done by defining them as “them”, as distinct and different from “us”, and, in the light of the Swedish ideal of homogeneity, attributing all the “problems” that arise when people from different cultures, with different norms and customs, have to share the same institutions (preschools, schools, working places, hospitals) with “them”. Islam and the Muslims were socially defined as “problems” – as, as we have seen, problem peoples from a problem culture – and were subsequently made the “objects” of political discussions by the experts as well as by laymen, in the media as well as on “the street”. As they were defined and experienced as the culturally inferior people, it was they who were supposed to change, adapt, integrate, and almost never Sweden as an institution. Racism and xenophobia became integrated parts of their social reality. Added to this they were at the bottom of society in terms of economic, and social status

and standards in a society they did not understand very well, and also to some extent experienced as both hostile and decadent. That this is not an (experienced) situation which is conducive to integration should be clear.

All in all, it is clear that the issue of cultural transmission is of high importance to the Swedish Muslims. From the point of view of most Muslims, the question does not seem to be so much "should we try to give our children a Muslim/Islamic upbringing" as it is, "which type of Muslim/Islamic upbringing should we give them?" Here it seems like different groups of Muslims give different answers. For some, like to a large extent for the Turkish Muslims, it seems important that their children be brought up in their specific Turkish form of Islamic cultural and religious tradition, whether or not this seems to be less important for many other groups. Especially among the better educated segments of the Muslim population, there seems to be an increasing openness toward the idea that their children must develop and acquire a form of Islamic cultural and religious tradition which can be 'functional' in Swedish society and which makes it possible for the Muslims to approach what is the goal of many, of becoming an umma in Sweden.

Special problems for young Muslim women

Even though the major bulk of the Muslim community takes a strong stance against violence towards women and children, Muslims and Islam have, in much of the public debate, not the least in the media, often been associated with, and described as a religious and cultural phenomena.⁹⁰ This way of describing Islamic/Muslim culture and the Muslim community in Sweden was high

lightened since the killing of Fatima Sahindal. She was a young woman of Kurdish origin who was murdered on 21 January 2002 by her own father in her sister's flat in Uppsala, north from Stockholm. The murder touched the whole Swedish nation – perhaps especially because it happened only a few months after the terror attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001. In the media he was in the media described as a “martyr of our time” (*Expressen* 2002-02-04). For weeks after her death her story was the single leading story in all Swedish media. The amount of articles published about her, her family situation, her father's background, interviews with her sisters, relatives and friends were enormous. Newspapers and TV-stations even sent reporters to visit and interview her relatives and other inhabitants of her family's Kurdish home village. In the weeks that followed major Swedish newspapers, *Dagens Nyheter*, *Svenska Dagbladet*, *Aftonbladet* and *Expressen*, followed up with article series of the more general question of migrant girls subject to patriarchal oppression. A general trend in most of these articles was that they made culture, and specifically Islamic culture, the cause of the crime. Phrases like, “she was the victim of the cruel tradition, hard as iron, which regulates the position of women all over the Muslim world” were a dime a dozen.

The killing of Fadime was, however, not the first case of its kind in Sweden. Prior to Fadime, at least two other cases are known. In 1999 another Kurdish girl living in Sweden, Pela Atroshi, was killed by her father and uncles when she visited her family in the Iraqi part of Kurdistan. Prior to Pela, a 15-year-old girl, Sara, was strangled by her brother and father in Umeå in 1996. All three murders were, after the Fadime case, labeled as “honor killing” and the girls were all described as “subjugated girls living in patriarchal families.” Even though the real reasons or mo-

tives behind these murders are only partly known, it seems that all three girls were killed, at least partly, because their male relatives wanted to control their lives. Their male family members wanted to prevent the girls from choosing a Swedish lifestyle, that is, a lifestyle not controlled by religion, culture or family values.

Despite the fact that nobody, according to *The National Council for Crime Prevention*, knows more exactly how many of all the (young) women with backgrounds in Muslim cultures that have problems with choosing their own life style, or worse problems, and that the only study we know about (*Låt oss tala om flickor. Integrationsverket. Rapport 2000:6*) claims that women with immigrant backgrounds generally do not “feel worse” than girls with Swedish back grounds. These stories were portrayed by the media as a general problem pertaining to girls with a Muslim background. The opinion that ninety percent of the girls with Middle Eastern origin living in Sweden have problems with their parents, voiced in several debate programs by lawyer and debater Elisabeth Fritz, was, for example, frequently quoted.

Another debate that started after the murder of Fadime concerned the question: What can we as Swedes accept in the name of multiculturalism? To right wing and populist parties, as well as to many debaters not obviously associated with such parties,⁹¹ the Fadime case showed that the Swedish policy of integration and multiculturalists was a failure. The murder case also, according to many of them, showed that it was necessary to draw the line and say no to all “foreign cultures” not corresponding with “Swedish values”. Even more moderate voices were noted for sending out a similar message. Even six months before the murder of Fadime, then at that moment, minister of Integration, said in an article:

In Sweden it is some values that you can either like or dislike, but they are prevailing here. I do not tolerate racists or homophobes, and I do not tolerate that multiculturalism is used as an argument for subjecting girls.⁹²

The discussion about the “honor crimes” that followed the killing of Fadime triggered, on the one hand, more or less racist and xenophobic opinions against all foreigners, but especially against Muslims and people from the Middle East. On the other hand, voices that stressed that it was important to look beyond “cultural explanations”, improve the integration processes, and protect innocent young girls, were also heard. A main line of argument among the latter was that the root of the problem was not the Kurdish or Muslim culture, but a general oppression of women – the patriarchal system – which exists basically all over the world, including Sweden, but which finds different expressions in different cultural traditions. According to them, it is structural and personal male violence against women that is the problem – not culturally specific expressions of this violence. In “reality” young Swedish girls in Sweden, according to many of them, have as little freedom of choice not to become “traditional Swedish girls” as young Kurdish girls in Kurdistan to become “traditional Kurdish girls”.

The whole integration debate after the World Trade Centre attack in the United States and the Fadime murder increasingly focused on the Muslim migrant group, and many debaters voiced the idea that Sweden had to increase the “demands” on them to submit to Swedish cultural norms and values.

In a TV-debate on honor killings only a few days after the murder of Fadime Sahindal, for example, the author and media worker Dilsa Demirbag-Sten voiced the opin-

ion which, on the one hand, is difficult to place on the xenophobic - liberal dimension and which, on the other became very important in the election campaign in the fall of 2002, that an immigrant should have to pass different tests in the Swedish language and Swedish norms and values before they could be granted Swedish citizenship. Others, like Elisabeth Fritz, wanted to go ever further and suggested that it should be possible to withdraw Swedish citizenship for already naturalised immigrants if they committed serious crimes, such as honor killings and deprivation of liberty.

During the election campaign in the fall 2002 several parties latched on to the argument that it was a good idea with such tests for citizenship applicants to show that they were "real" Swedes before they could receive a Swedish citizenship. This idea of "testing foreigners" was especially argued by the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet) and in the election the party experienced a landslide success. In the prior election 1988 they received 4.7 percent of the votes and in the 2002 election they received 13.3 percent. From this point of view it seems as if many Swedes must have approved of this idea. It should, however, be noted that the Liberal Party generally is pro immigration and integration and that they tried to set themselves strongly apart from the various xenophobic parties in Sweden.

For the Muslim leaders who took part in our research project it was hard to understand why they were associated with so-called honor crimes. First of all they declared that this way of behaving against one's offspring or women had nothing to do with a "true" understanding of Islam or Muslim culture. Secondly, they tried to do what was in their power to change and stop this kind of "culture of origin" behavior. Thirdly, most "honor crimes" were not even committed by believing/practicing Muslims, but by

atheists, secularists or Christians. Despite this, they experienced that all “honor crimes” were seen, by the Swedes, as a Muslim problem. If the Muslims became more like “normal” Swedes this problem could easily be solved, according to the critics. Even though this way of putting or analyzing the problem, that is, that some cultures must parish or change before they can be accepted, is hard to combine with the general and basic ideas of the multicultural society, it seems that most Swedes accepted this way of putting the argument. While this is a theoretical problem, a practical problem is also present in the debate, as pertains to the fact that Muslim leaders have repeatedly claimed that they do not accept fathers, husbands or relatives who kill or maltreat their children or women, as this is against the will of Allah, and therefore forbidden for all Muslims. From this point of view, it seems that the media debate that followed the murder of Fadime was not solving the problem. On the contrary, as most media stories did not voice the opinions of the Muslim leaders but rather repeated and reinforced the “cultural explanation”, they thereby created and widened the gap between “them” and “us”. This generalised and stereotypical picture does not contribute to or foster integration and co-existence.

Many Muslim leaders also argued, echoing Swedish debaters like Åsa Eldén (2002) and Jan Guillou (Svenska Dagbladet: 2002), that also Swedish women are killed, raped, maltreated, restricted in their freedom, and so on, for similar reasons as Fadime and the other “subject girls living in patriarchal families”, therefore why should the latter but not the former be explained with cultural explanations?

Against the background of the Swedish debate about what has become known as the problem of “subjugated girls” living in “patriarchal families” it is obvious that we are dealing with a theoretically as well as practically and

politically very difficult, multifaceted and emotionally hot problem were the debaters, which is very usual in this kind of cases, most often end up in a black-and-white war of trenches.

We cannot, of course, discuss all the aspects of the problem here. We would, however, like to point to the simple fact that when it come to explaining human behavior most social scientists claim that you have to bring in at least three different levels of explanation: the cultural, the societal/group, and the individual "intra-psychic" level.⁹³ To explain a specific action or behavior of a specific individual in a specific situation you have to look at all these levels. First the religio-cultural tradition in which the individual received his/her socialization, and thereby his/her "cognitive structures", "life- and world view", "pattern of interpretation" or "*Weltanschauung*". Secondly in which specific sub-culture or group (s)he was socialised. Thirdly, her general intra-psychic "makeup" at the time. Did (s)he, for example, due to whatever causes or reasons, suffer from some psychological or psychic illness, stress, abnormality or the like (which many immigrants, due to their pre- as well as post-migration experiences, often do (Apitzsich:1986; Arenas: 1997; Söderlind: 1984). To that should be added the various properties of the specific macro-, meso- and micro level of the context in which the behavior to be explained were taking place. Given the complexity just hinted at, it should be rather obvious that, in a mono causal way, making "honor killings" into a question of religion (Islam) is in almost all cases not only objectively wrong, but also very inappropriate. One reason for this is that the demonizing of Islam that follows from it will not cure the problem. On the contrary. It will most likely rather aggravate the already considerable marginalization of Muslim men in the society which, in its turn,

most likely will make the lifestyles of “their” women who find ways into the Swedish society even more threatening to them.

In connection with this, it might also be important to keep in mind that we are dealing with a generational as well as a gender problem. To come to Sweden from a Muslim culture normally means two different things for men and women. The loss of status, position, power, freedom, etc. is, for one thing, normally (experienced as) much larger for men than for women, who thereby not rarely become threatened, backward-looking and dependent on more or less “culture-of-origin”, conservative and male oriented exile groups organised around mosques or cultural associations. Women can, on the other hand, normally more easily see the new situation as a possibility to gain power, which, of course, makes them even more threatening. But living as an immigrated Muslim family in Sweden also means different things for different generations. Generally speaking, it seems that “the Swedish way of life” is experienced as being much more palatable from the perspective of the young than from their parents. If this is correct, it seems like the most important measure we can take to prevent the children from ending up in their fathers’ boat would be to break down their barriers when it comes to equal access to education, labor market, housing market and so on. To demonise them by “cultural explanations” because they are Muslims is to take quite the opposite road. Instead of breaking old thought- and life patterns, exclusionist attitudes from the majority society risks forcing them into a search for ethnically based identities and thereby re-creating and strengthening old life- and thought patterns.

Even though much of the media, as we have seen, in this case seems to be more a part of the problem than its solution, they have not been the only voice. Attempts to

give a more nuanced picture of the situation of first- and second generation migrant girls and their situation can be found in several publications, including: a report from the Department for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Göteborg University, *Bilden av 'den andra' - invandrarkvinnan i svensk dagspress 970701 - 980630* (The "picture of the other" - the immigrant woman in Swedish daily press 970701 - 980630), in Åsa Eldén's article, "Hedersmord i jämställdhetens paradiset" ("Honor killings in the paradise of equality"), in Cecilia Englund's article, "Medias ansvar i mångfaldsfrågor" (The responsibility of media in diversity issues), in the report from the Kurdish National association's project, "the Generation conflict, Vår röst är framtiden (Our voice is the future)", in the report from the Swedish Save the Children, "Överlevnadshandbok för flickor om frihet och heder" ("Survival handbook for girls on freedom and honor"), in the report from the Integration Board, "Låt oss tala om flickor" ("Let's talk about girls"), in the report from the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication, "The governments' work for subjugated girls in patriarchal families", and in the report, "Våld mot kvinnor i nära relationer. En kartläggning" (Violence towards women in close relationships. A mapping.), published by the Council for Crime Prevention (Rapport 2002: 4). To this could be added numerous projects of various lengths, organised by various NGO's on the subject.

Halal slaughter

Since 1937 the Muslim halal and Jewish kosher slaughter is forbidden according to the law of Sweden. Slaughter methods based on the prerequisite that the animal should be conscious when killed with a sharp object cutting the

throat is forbidden according to this law. The only exceptions are for hunting, and slaughter of poultry and rabbits. The following criteria's are raised in connection with the halal slaughter.

- The animal should be in good health and not injured.
- The animal should be treated with kindness and humanity.
- The slaughter should be performed by a trained Muslim.
- Both the animal and the person performing the slaughter should be turned towards qibla (i.e. in the direction of Mecca).
- Before the slaughter the Bismillah, Allahu Akbar should be recited.
- A sharp object – for example a knife – should be carried across the throat in a single motion.
- The gullet (esophagus), windpipe (trachea) and the jugular veins should be cut open without damages to the spinal marrow.
- All blood should be drained.
- An animal should not see another animal die.⁹⁴

In relation to jurisprudence it is important to notice that the law of 1937 was introduced during a period in European and Swedish history heavily influenced by anti-Semitic movements, a fact often raised by the Jewish community. After the end of the Second World War and the defeat of the Nazi regime in Germany all European countries, except Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, gave up this prohibition (Gunner: 1999, 40–42). The law of 1937 was however abolished, but replaced by a new law in 1988, which also indirectly stresses that animals should not be slaughtered in accordance with rabbinical or Islamic

laws.⁹⁵ The guiding principle is that animals should be protected from unnecessary suffering, pain and sickness. According to Swedish jurisprudence the question of how to slaughter animals is not a religious issue but a matter for laws dealing with animal rights and their protection. This interpretation illustrates in many ways the general view on religion, discussed above, and one which dominates in Sweden and which guides the Swedish state. The matter of how to slaughter an animal has nothing to do with religion according to the opinion of the State. However, according to both the Jewish and Muslim community, how to slaughter an animal is very much a question of religion. To Muslims it is a question of how to live your life in accordance with the law of God. Thus it is necessary to make a separation between things and activities described as *halal* (prescribed or allowed) and *haram* (prohibited). To eat meat that was not slaughtered in accordance to the law of God is to most Muslims clearly a case of *haram*. The boundary between the forbidden and lawful is often discussed in the Koran (sura 7: 30–34).⁹⁶ The Koran is also very clear on the issue that Muslims are not allowed to eat carrion, blood outpoured or the flesh of swine (sura: 2, 165–169; 6, 145–149 and 16, 115–119).⁹⁷ The importance of the “right” slaughter methods is also illustrated in the Koran:

Forbidden to you are carrion, blood, the flesh of swine, what has been hallowed to other than God, the beast strangled, the beast beaten down, the beast fallen to death, the beast gored, and that devoured by beasts of prey – excepting that you have sacrificed duly – as also things sacrificed to idols, and partition by the divining arrows; that is ungodliness (sura: 5, 3).⁹⁸

A problem with the prohibition against the above described slaughter methods is the fact that the Swedish state seems to argue indirectly that the rabbinical and Islamic laws are cruel and that Jews and Muslims treat animals badly. But according to Jews and Muslims their religions require strongly that they should treat animals with respect. The Koran gives, for example, abundant examples showing that Muslims are obliged to treat animals rightly since they are a part of God's creation (sura: 6, 38).⁹⁹ The fact that man is put to rule earth does not give him or her the right to exploit or treat animals or the nature contrary to the will of God.¹⁰⁰ Man is responsible to God since he has accepted this responsibility by becoming Gods khalifa on earth.

From a Muslim point of view it is also hard to see why the Islamic laws on slaughter should be grimmer to animals than "normal" western methods. According to Muslim and Jewish laws "their" slaughter methods are more human to animals than the western methods because it is not built on an idea of large industrial slaughterhouses (Gunner: 1999, 39 and 63-65).

In 1992 the Swedish State decided that the department of agriculture should investigate the problem and present alternatives on how to solve the question of slaughtering animals in accordance with rabbinical and Islamic laws. The results from this project were published in the report, "Slaughter without anaesthesia" ("Slakt av obedövade djur"). This report was severely criticised because it did not take the religious aspects of the question into consideration. Neither the Jewish nor the Muslim community was invited to give their opinion on the matter of how to slaughter animals (Gunner: 1999, 57-58). As a result the report came to the conclusion that it was not possible to accept the slaughter methods prescribed by Jews or Muslims

because these methods were held to be inhuman while it cause great stress to the animal.¹⁰¹ A second problem according to the report was that if halal and kosher slaughter was accepted as legal there was a great danger that meat from animal's slaughter in accordance to Rabbinical and Islamic laws were sold on the "regular" market. If so it was possible that non-Muslims and non-Jews by mistake bought halal or kosher meat even if they did not want to accept this kind of slaughter.¹⁰² This way of putting the argument is problematic for several reasons. For example, if we compare it to the "risk" that Jews and Muslims confront on an everyday basis. Jews and Muslims who want to follow the Rabbinical or Islamic laws by the book must today import their meat or become vegetarians. Another problem is the fact that a lot of food products today encloses gelatine produced from swine and other meat products.¹⁰³

Today the Swedish prohibition against halal and kosher seems to be a rather small practical problem to most Jews and Muslims but still it is a symbolically important question (Larsson and Sander: 2001, 22-23). To paraphrase two of our participants at one of our Round Tables:

The problems concerning halal and circumcision¹⁰⁴ are very important. The Swedes must understand this. Islam and Judaism, Muslims and Jews, will never feel integrated if those questions do not get a proper solution. We realise that it will take political will, leadership and courage to tackle and solve them, and that does not seem to be present today. All serious dialogue is, however, hopeless as long as such fundamental issues as our food and circumcision are being questioned. All real communication is cut off even before it has begun if one part takes as their point of departure that it is a non-negotiable condition that we should be denied these rights.

and

the problem with halal-butchering and circumcision must be solved! As long as they remain unsolved Muslims and Jews will never feel welcome in Sweden. And it is unthinkable that they will change their minds on these issues. If they are not made legal, we are forced to be criminals, and that is something that neither Muslims nor Jews like.

To many Muslims the prohibition is also an illustration of the fact that the 1951 Religious Liberty Act is not fulfilled or put into action. Even though it is easy and cheap to import halal meat it is a problem to many Muslims that the Swedish State does not accept the Islamic ways of slaughtering. The most obvious problem is of course the Swedish school system since all pupils have the right to get a full meal every day. Jonas Otterbeck who has dealt with several questions related to Muslims and the Swedish school system gives abundant examples of misconceptions and problems related to food. A general problem is that members of the school staff are often unaware of the Islamic laws and they think that they can serve any kind of meat to Muslims with the exception of pork. As illustrated above the problem is not very simple. If Muslims want to follow the rules for halal it is necessary that the meat also is slaughtered according to the norms of Islamic laws (Otterbeck: 2000b, 51–53). It is also a structural problem since Muslims – as the rest of the Swedish population – is bound to end up in hospitals, in jails or in other institutions run by the state. This problem is most likely going to grow in the near future since the Muslim population in Sweden becomes older. This fact makes it important to solve this problem as soon as possible if we want to avoid discrimination and cultural confrontations.

Burial facilities

One thing that virtually all practising Muslims in Europe fear is that they might become absorbed into a secular culture. However, when living in diaspora, religious rites often become all the more important. Rites, including death-related ones, serve a variety of functions. For example, they inform children of the collective customs from their religious and cultural background, rather than the sentiments of the host society (Andrews and Wolfe: 2000, 15).

Burials and death-related rites are central in all cultures because they play both religious and secular functions. From the perspective of Émile Durkheim, death has an effect on the whole society or community. Rites related to death create, among other things, a feeling of community and solidarity among the members in the community. But death is also something that threatens the unity and because of this it is of great importance to be able to handle death and burial rites according to the prescribed norms of the community. To be able to follow a certain practice is therefore of great importance for upholding and confirming the community and its values. It is not only important for the religious practice but also for the social stability and the continuity of the community.

The establishment of Muslim burial sites in Sweden, as for the rest of Europe, could be viewed as one of the indicators for measuring the success or failure of the integration of Muslims. If Muslims living in Sweden still choose to bury their family members and loved ones in their “original country” this is a clear indication that the process of integration has failed. For most Muslims who arrived in Sweden during the early phases of migration this was commonly the case. However, during the last decades it

has become easier to bury Muslims according to Muslim traditions and customs.¹⁰⁵ In 1997, the thirteen dioceses belonging to the Church of Sweden counted forty-two cities that facilitated special Muslim burial sites (*Muslimska grannar*: 1997, 107). Since 1997 the number has increased and today it is not too difficult to be able to bury a person according to Muslim prescribed rules. Even though the number of burial sites has gone up (the number of Muslim burial sites is today approximately fifty) it is impossible to give an exact number because neither the Church of Sweden, nor the Swedish State collect these kinds of statistics on a regular basis. It should also be stressed that the Muslim burial sites mentioned above are all located within the area or land of the “traditional” Christian cemeteries attached to the Church of Sweden. According to the office that deals with questions related to burials and cemeteries (*Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen*) this is not a problem for Muslims and no Muslim congregation has so far complained about this practice.¹⁰⁶ But it could be a problem for non-Muslims, that is, those who want to bury their relatives and loved ones within the realm of the “traditional” cemetery attached to the Church. On the basis of the previous discussion on secularization in Sweden, this seems to be a problem that has nothing or little to do with religion.¹⁰⁷

Since 1 January 2000 the law stipulates that it is the office that deals with questions related to burials and cemeteries (*Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen*) that is responsible for the planning and preparation for all burial sites regardless of religious affiliation.¹⁰⁸ Municipals lacking special burial sites for Muslims should, according to the law, prepare and plan for Muslim cemeteries. According to the statistics given by the Church of Sweden in the year 2000, a Muslim congregation could be found in approximately 111 municipals in Sweden. For the rest of the municipals (178) it is

recommended that one should prepare for special Muslim burial sites.¹⁰⁹

Irrespective of the fact that the number of Muslim burial sites has increased during the last decades, there are more practical problems to be solved. A first problem is the fact that it is not possible, due to the bureaucracy of the Swedish state, to bury a person within the stipulated time, most often 24 hours after the individual has died, according to Islamic and Muslim norms. A second problem is, as we have seen, the low number of imams working in Sweden. For Muslims who are living outside the three major cities of Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), this is important and practical problem. Because of the relatively low number of Imams and their economically poor situation it is very hard for the imams who are living in the major cities to conduct funeral sermons in the countryside. Travel costs and other expenses are very high for the imams. This problem is seldom understood or even accepted by fellow Muslims who are expecting that the imam should conduct this service or even pay for the funeral (especially for the shroud).¹¹⁰ A third problem is the fact that most Swedish cemeteries are not prepared for Muslim funerals and therefore are often lacking washing rooms or multi-faith rooms. To our knowledge there are no *janazgah* (funeral mosques) in Sweden. A fourth problem is the fact that according to the law of Sweden all people must be buried in a coffin. Although most Muslims living in Sweden seem to accept this fact, it is a problem, since the law of Islam stipulates that all believers should be wrapped in a shroud.¹¹¹ Similar problems are also related to the prohibition against autopsies and cremation. The reason for this is the Muslim belief that the whole body is going to be resurrected on the final day. A coffin, or even more an autopsy or a cremation will

hinder or prevent the individual to be resurrected. (Aneer: 1994,142-143; Stenberg: 1999, 123-124).

According to Ahmed Andrews and Michele Wolfe, Muslim graves in Sweden and the United Kingdom reflect how Muslims living in Diaspora are effected by picking up non-Muslim traditions. For example, most Muslim graves in Sweden are designed in accordance with Swedish design. But many graves are also designed according to traditions and norms found outside Sweden. They are, for example, decorated with Arabic script or include pictures of the dead person. Interestingly, Andrews' and Wolfe's work shows that Muslims living in Sweden are influenced by the celebration of the All Satins Day. Even though this is not a Muslim rite, Muslims living in Sweden are decorating their graves with flowers and light candles during this day. This is a clear illustration that Muslims are influenced by local traditions and habits, but it should not automatically be seen as a religious rite. Participation in the celebration of All Saints Day could also be viewed as a secular rite performed by "all Swedes". Andrew and Wolfe say:

...by participation in 'All Saints Day' rituals, it may be argued that Muslims in Sweden are also seeking ways to make statements regarding their sense of being Swedish as well as being a Bosnian or Turkish Muslim, and are hence participating in what might be termed 'Civil Religion' (Andrew and Wolfe: 2000, 15).

Even though practices related to death and mourning are often highlighted in the multicultural society (for example it is often said that non-Swedes are mourning more openly and more "dramatically" than Swedes), death and dying is a universal phenomena. All humans share this experience. From this point of view, death and dying could also bring

people together no matter of religious, ethnic or cultural background. This was clearly illustrated after the fire catastrophe in Göteborg (October 1998) in which 62 young persons died. The majority of the victims who died had a foreign background and several were Muslims. No matter of this difference the whole Swedish society mourned with the parents, relatives and friends of the victims. The fire catastrophe became even more horrible since the police investigation showed that it was arson. In order to pay homage to the dead children and show solidarity with the survivors, funerals were covered by the media. From this perspective the tragic death of 62 children seems to have bridged some of the gaps between the Muslim and Swedish community, so clearly illustrated in this report. Both ministers in the Swedish government and archbishops from the Church of Sweden participated in these funerals and memorial services held after the catastrophe (Andreasson and Sjögren: 1999, 22-23).

Islam and Christianity

From the perspective of the Church of Sweden there were few reasons to take part in the international debate between Muslims and Christians as long as almost no Muslims lived in Sweden. With the 1960s and 1970s the situation changes dramatically, due to the growing number of Muslims arriving to Sweden. One of the earliest examples of a growing interest within the Church of Sweden for dialogue and issues related to multiculturalism is a synod thesis dealing with the meeting of religions in 1986. The archbishop Olof Sundby requested a book about the matter and assistant professor Gudmar Aneer who also was ordained as a priest in the Church of Sweden wrote it

(Aneer: 1986, 5). When published by Verbum, a publishing house closely associated with the Church of Sweden, it was one in a kind.

In the middle of the 1990s the situation changed dramatically. At the 1995 synod it was decided that the Church of Sweden should initiate a project dealing with issues of how to educate the staff of the church and its members to make it easier for Muslims and Christians to meet. As a start the central administration in Uppsala sent out a survey to its 266 parishes and to 304 representatives working with questions dealing with mission. The goal was to cover the present situation in the parishes and to map how the Church of Sweden co-operated with its Muslim neighbors. On the basis of this survey it was possible to see what kind of education the staff of the church and its members asked for. More importantly, the survey showed that the local parishes were interested in Muslim Christian dialog. From the response the survey got (approximately 60% of the surveys were answered and returned to Uppsala) it was clear that the Church of Sweden was interested in this issue. The parishes that returned the survey asked for more knowledge about Islamic dogma and theology (61%), Islam values on mankind and society (68%), Islamic piety and popular beliefs (69%), the diversity within Islam (61%), the Koran (59%), Islam on ethics, law and right (73%) and, finally, on Islam and gender issues (69%). The need for more and better knowledge was very clear. Interfaith marriages between Muslims and Christians, a growing need for pastoral care and kindergarten activities have all showed that it has become more important to know something about Islam. But the project argues also that a growing number of Muslims are seeking knowledge or even conversion to Christianity and thus it is necessary for the Church of Sweden to be prepared for new demands (Ahlbäck: 1997,

13–16). The need for more and better knowledge seems primarily to be strong among parishes located in the major cities and especially for lay and social workers that work within the church.¹¹² This development is, however, not restricted or particular to Muslims alone.

Irrespective that the Church of Sweden has taken a stand for the development of multicultural society and the possibility to express religious points of view, it is also possible to find strong anti-Islamic feelings within the church. For example in the prolonged planning of a mosque in Gothenburg, the second city of Sweden, one of the vicars in the Church of Sweden played a vital role in stopping the building. The negative attitudes are also frequent among so-called Free-Churches and Oriental Churches (Karlsson and Svanberg: 1995, 78–80). Negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims are, however, not typical for the Church of Sweden in general. The present archbishop, K. G. Hammar has, for example, taken a strong stand for the Muslim community and its rights. In 1997 he declared that the growing number of Muslims in Sweden was a positive challenge and an opportunity for Christians to develop and express their belief. As compared to many Christians in Sweden, Muslims are not afraid to say “I am Muslim.” This is not a threat but a positive challenge for all Christians according to K. G. Hammar. Thus, it is necessary to combat anti-Islamic opinions and defend the 1951 Act of Religious Liberty (Hammar: 1997). But the Church of Sweden should not be too overprotective of the Muslim community and it is necessary to discuss essential differences (Kronholm: 1988).

Negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, as we have seen, have primarily flourished among followers of Pentecostal traditions. One of the most outspoken voices in relation to negative attitudes belongs to pastor Stanley

Sjöberg who among many things has debated with Muslim leaders and contested them as being dangerous for the Swedish society. He is also used in media debates when Islamic issues are debated. As compared to the Church of Sweden the so-called free-churches seem to be generally more hostile towards Islam and Muslims. After the September 11, 2001 the bishops in the Church of Sweden published a note supporting the Muslim community in Sweden. This letter's main purpose was to protect the Muslim community from being attacked by hostile Swedes who hold negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims. As compared to this action, the free-churches have so far not taken any stand for the Muslim community whatsoever.

Irrespective that the Church of Sweden has supported and developed its contacts with the Muslim community the project described above was put to an end and has not continued. In the near future the Church of Sweden is going to inaugurate a new project primarily focused on how to develop and nourish the contact between the church and the Muslim community.

Taking a Look at the Future

Given what has been said above about Islam and Muslims in Sweden, what can be said, or rather speculated, about the future?

Given the complexity of this task - predicting the future is, as we all know, associated with many difficulties and uncertainties - we believe that, given the space to our disposal, we have but two options: either to simplify or to oversimplify. Let us begin by the latter, and only indicate a process.

As we see it today, the most likely development among Muslims in Sweden in the foreseeable future – presuming that nothing extremely dramatic and unexpected is going to happen in the Muslim (domestic or international) world – is not that we are going to witness the gradual erosion and disappearance of Islam and the Muslim/Islamic identity, but rather (only) a transformation of them.

Our prediction that Islam and the Muslim identity/identities will change as a result of being re-planted in Sweden is not especially daring.¹¹³ It is how it is going to change that is the tough question. Before speculating further about the latter, let us say something about our reasons for why we believe it has to change.

One reason is the historical ‘fact’ that we do not seem to be able to find any human cultural phenomena – and religions are, independently of whatever they in addition to that might be, a human cultural phenomenon¹¹⁴ – that does not change over time. A second reason is that no human phenomenon exists in a cultural, societal, political, economic, etc. vacuum, but always in dynamic interplays with such environmental factors. This means, among other things, that when the cultural, political, social, economical, borders of a religious tradition are redrawn, when the interface between a religious tradition and its cultural boundaries and its environment changes, the religious tradition changes too.

Even though the first reason might seem too self-evident to even be stated, at least to a social scientist,¹¹⁵ we still believe it is worth doing so in this context. One reason is that there seems to be a rather strong trend, outside the circle of social scientists, towards reification of many social phenomena, not the least culture, ethnicity and religion. Religious traditions, for example, are not rarely viewed from within as if fixed in time, and objective entities, as

once and for all definable systems, are therefore seen as something that can be talked about in the singular.

To avoid this reified notion of “religion”, which we do not believe to be scientifically useful, we prefer to use Cantwell Smith’s (1963) idea of religions as cumulative traditions, or in the terminology of Hjärpe (1997), the religious basket. According to this view religions are seen as human constructs offered as means of making the dynamic flow of human history intelligible, and the terms refer to all the observable contents – temples, rituals, scriptures, myths, moral codes, social institutions, and so on – that are accumulated over time and then passed on to succeeding generations (Smith: 1963, 156-157). Unlike “religion”, which misleadingly suggests an unchanging essence, cumulative tradition and its specific variants – for example the Islamic tradition– we wish to make explicit the changing historical context that forms and sustains the content of the carriers of the tradition in the form of personal faith, as well as the myriad of forms in which it is outwardly expressed.

Religious traditions do not only change over time, they also adapt to and change in response to their local contexts. As it is a different, sometimes a very different, thing to be Muslim in, for example, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, Algeria, Sweden and the USA as well as to be Muslim in rural or urban are. Islam can, and normally does, receive different interpretations and forms of expressions as a response to these different locations/contexts. Given what is relevant for the individuals and their lives in these different contexts – and that different social realities always effect different needs and questions – different elements are picked out of ‘the Islamic basket’ to constitute an Islam which is deemed useful and practical for the individuals and their needs and purposes at hand. New realities always demand new ideas, concepts and strategies that reflect the reality

in question. Therefore, religions are dynamic, changeable and situational social phenomena, constantly created and recreated.

Historically this has occurred in each of the world's "great religious traditions". There is, in other words, nothing new in modifying meanings of, and within, Islam in relation to the socio-cultural, political and economic contexts in which Muslims have found themselves. One important mode of this kind of modification of meanings has always occurred through the particular kind of self-consciousness, which the condition of "borderland", "Diaspora" or minority status has stimulated. Clifford Geertz has, as we have already noticed, described one important part of this modification as "the primary question has shifted from 'What shall I believe' to 'How shall I believe it?'" According to Geertz, this shift is normally followed by another shift that can be characterised by "a distinction between 'religiousness' and 'religious-mindedness', between being held by religious convictions and holding them" (1968, 61). Religion, in other words, changes from being an external, compelling force to being an internal, voluntary "interest". That the Swedish context most certainly will stimulate such new modes of religious self-consciousness seems to us obvious.

The question or problem of religious change and innovation becomes, of course, particularly pertinent in situations of rapid change, as in the case of migration. This is especially the case when the migration can be characterised as being from "traditional" to "modern" societies and from a religious majority to minority situation. This situation makes especially fertile ground for individuals to engage in a process of "reassembling" components from the "Islamic basket" together with components arising out of the migration and re-settling experience into a new com-

plex whole which is deemed to function more successfully in the new Swedish modern, industrial and urban life. The fact that Islam is a universal religious tradition which, through a long history has proved itself very successful when it comes to integrating into new cultures would, to our minds, make it extremely surprising if it were not to follow the same path in Sweden.

If such immigrated individuals or groups wish to seek answers to their basic questions of, and strategies for "how to live their lives" (or, to revert to Geertz, for "how to be religious") in their religious tradition within the new context of a modern, secularised society, in which an institutional structure of their religious tradition has never existed, in which direction should they turn? Where does religious innovation come from? According to many today, the most important answer to this can be found in one of the salient socio-cultural processes of the contemporary world: globalization (Robertson and Garret: 1991; Robertson: 1992; Beyer: 1994).

Of course, cultural elements have always been transported across geographical distances, and incorporated among different groups than those who created them. The transformation in our time is therefore one of degree rather than kind. Yet, given the scope of contact and the rapidity with which influences are exerted, it is reasonable to see our own time as one of unprecedented globalization. The emergence of mass culture, the development of electronic media, the emergence of more efficient systems of distribution and the increased movement of people across national borders have resulted in larger-scale interaction between cultures than ever before.

Globalization, however, is not a single, well-defined entity but a common term for a set of processes. As Hammer points out (2000: 24ff.), useful distinctions in talking

about globalization entail distinguishing between the production, consumption and distribution of, in this case, religious elements.

The element of global distribution is linked to the objective transnational processes that constitute one of the central elements of the paradigm of globalization. Thus the rather successful marketing of Islamic literature, audio and videocassettes and homepages by some international Islamic organizations are salient facets of the global distribution of religious products. This is clearly seen among Muslim groups in Sweden.

The global consumption of cultural elements is partly related to a shift in *communitas*. Whereas older imagined communities (Andersen: 1991) were defined by geographical borders – the nation state would be a prime example – newer ones have become increasingly divorced from such geographically definable contexts. Thus, young Muslim immigrants in Sweden might feel a much stronger bond of sympathy with the young of another minority group among, for example, Farrakhan's Black Muslims than with older members of his fathers' Muslim congregation in Göteborg.

Here, however, we will focus on the production element in the facet of globalization, that is, on the global religious production of ideas and belief systems, including behavioral codes, whether written or expressed in another way. The globalization of religious production concerns the fact that today, religious ideas and belief systems make use of materials from a variety of historical epochs ("accumulated tradition") and cultural, religious, theological and political traditions (Hjärpe: 1977; Swidler: 1986). All these sources, singly or in combination, can, depending on what is deemed most useful in the situation, become "significant others" for individuals and groups in their identity

construction. The awareness and availability of the global varieties of "Islams", as well as the awareness that Islam is a dynamic, multifaceted, changing and adapting phenomenon, are central elements of globalization.

It should be noted that the appropriation of - relative to a given context - "foreign" Islamic elements (as well as of cultural elements in general) is a highly selective process of dis-embedding and re-embedding. It is selective mainly in that only those elements that are perceived as functionally significant, helpful or useful for an individual or group for their purposes at hand, including identity construction, are borrowed and transformed. Islam and what it is to be a Muslim is under constant negotiation and re-negotiation in the globalised world. When the cultural, political, social, etc. borders of Islam are redrawn, when the interface between Islam and its cultural environments change, then Islam and what it is to be a Muslim changes too. These "hybridization processes" (Bhabha: 1996) that we see following in the wake of globalization are, in other words, normally driven by very pragmatic motives, of which, of course the various individuals involved in the process may be more or less conscious. Moreover, elements lifted out of the context of a "foreign" culture and tradition are always to varying degrees colored (or, if one will, environmentally polluted) by, or reinterpreted to be functionally significant in, the local context into which they are being transplanted (Hjärpe: 1997; Robertson: 1992; 1995; Schmidt: 1998). Thus, it is not uncommon, especially among the young, for dis-embedding and re-embedding to produce an entire spectrum of creative and dynamic new cultural processes as well as "new ethnicities" (Hall: 1992). If, in a given context, the "traditional" or existing interpretation(s) of Islam and of what it is to be Muslim by Muslims is not experienced to be sufficient or functional enough to satisfy the individu-

al's various needs, then Muslims, especially young Muslims, will start searching for new and alternative ways to interpret Islam and what it is to be Muslim. Islam obtains new forms of expression and new functions when it has to legitimise and confirm new identities in the context of new social and societal situations and positions. From this point of view it is, as we have claimed, likely that Muslims living in Sweden, especially the young who are born and raised in Sweden, will be "polluted" in several ways by, among other things, Swedish norms, values and customs. They have, for instance, unlike their parents, been educated and socialised by the Swedish school system. Due to this fact and others it is plausible to argue, as is done in Svanberg and Westerlund (1999), that a "blue and yellow" way¹¹⁶ of being Muslim is slowly developing in Sweden, or even, as Westerlund argues (2001), that this way in the long run will become the principal way. By this we mean that especially the young Muslims are developing a more "modern", critical, individual, democratic and relativistic-skeptical approach to Islam and to life in general, in comparison to the first generation. However, if Muslims perceive that their opinions and "ways of life" are not accepted or supported by society at large, and that they continue to be targets of exclusion, discrimination and xenophobia, it is, we will argue, likely that alternative and more aggressive ways of being Muslim are developed instead. Thus it is likely that a so-called ghetto-Islam will emerge in Sweden, too (Karls-son: 1994; 2002). That Islam is changing by being planted in Swedish soil is, however clear. Which trend will be the dominant one is, however, as yet an open question.

These reinterpretations can, of course, take different forms. A rough analysis of the spectrum within which these various forms can manifest themselves can be illustrated by a structure/content dichotomy. At one end of

this spectrum we have content adaptation and structural preservation. Here the “contents” of the imported tradition, such as the meaning of various parts of the ideational and belief systems, verbal expressions, dress codes, body language and social norms accepted by the actor, might be adapted to local conditions, whereas at least some of the fundamental structures in which they are held and expressed are retained. An extreme version of this might be what Hargreaves describes as “affective identification with doctrinal detachment” (1995: 121). At the other end of the spectrum we have structural adaptation and content preservation. Here the content characteristics of the disembedded cultural/religious product are retained while the fundamental structures, such as the religious, ethnic, and gender codes, are adapted. An example is the way Islam in Sweden is considered by many to be becoming “structurally Christianised”, in the sense that Muslims in Sweden are apparently increasingly becoming religious, manifesting their religiosity and organizing their religious life in similar ways to those that Christians manifest and organise their religiosity and religious life.

To sum up, it is standard procedure today to claim that “we”, and particularly young people, are living in an environment characterised by secularization, globalization, hybridization and post-modernity, phenomena that can be characterised by the rapidity of social change along several parameters, for example, institutional differentiation, changing patterns of legitimization and authority, rationalization, privatization and individuation. That the re-contextualization of many varieties of “local”, “traditional” Islams to a multicultural and multireligious but secular modern welfare state like Sweden, which, due to, among other things, globalization, in itself is caught up in a process of serious social changes, some of which

were mentioned above, should not also affect Islam and the ways Muslim interpret and live their Islam, does not seem very likely. And this, we will underscore, is true independently of how well they will succeed in solving all the various problems we have listed earlier in this report, including the problems of a transformation of culture and creating institutional completeness.

The identity of the second and following generations of Muslims will be formed in contrast, and sometimes in opposition, to the surrounding majority society with its norms and values, manners and customs on the one side and the various local Islamic sub-societies of their parents on the other. And this goes for anyone that becomes identified "as Muslim" by either of the two sides, independent of the individuals' own personal relation to Islam as a cultural and/or religious system and her/his wishes to identified as such.¹¹⁷ Whatever their personal attitude to Islam as a culture and religion they are, to quite some extent, forced to be conscious of, and take some kind of conscious position vis a vis Islam as a culture and religion and thereby to be conscious of their identity as Muslims. Independently of what position Swedish Muslims take as response to this pressure, it seems- to the extent that has been argued above is reasonably correct- clear that they will be carriers of a new and different type of Islam than any which is dominant in the countries of origin of the Swedish Muslims. Again: that Islam and the Muslim identities will change in Sweden is not the question, how they are going to change is the question.

Notes

- ¹ Religious Liberty Act (Religionsfrihetslagen), Printed in Svensk författningssamling (SFS): för 1951: 680, Sec. 1, 1643–1646 (Stockholm 1952). Important documents regarding the Swedish legislation on religious liberty are also SFS: 1999, 932; SFS: 1998, 1593, Sec. 16; SFS: 1999, 974, Sec. 4 and SFS :1999, 974, Sec. 12.
- ² This is an opinion that many of our informants have emphasised with vigor.
- ³ The text from the synod was published under the title *Confessio fidei* (Swedish translation in 1993).
- ⁴ Regeringsformen: 1634, 6.
- ⁵ Regeringsformen: 1809, § 16 (Stockholm 1891: 156).
- ⁶ Here, religious liberty (religionsfrihet) is defined as “the freedom to practice one’s own religion either alone or in company with others.”
- ⁷ Lagen om den europeiska konventionen angående skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna och de grundläggande friheterna. Printed with English and French translation in Svensk författningssamling: 1994, nr. 1219, 2543–2649.
- ⁸ What has just been said shall not be interpreted such as that the Myrdals were racists. They were probably only, so to speak, children of their time. Even if they played an important role in the building of the Swedish welfare state and its thinking and attitudes, we do not believe it is reasonable to credit (or blame) individual people for the emergence of so complex phenomena as attitudes to ‘the other’, including racism.
- ⁹ This should not be understood as implying that we do not believe that they are basically on the right track in their analysis of the situation and the cause of the situation for the migrants in Sweden. We believe they are. We do not believe, however, in many of the very neo-liberal suggestions for solutions to ‘the problem’ they are arguing for.
- ¹⁰ These problems are discussed more at length in Sander: 1993.
- ¹¹ The Muslim cognitive universe includes, among other things, the cultural, political, religious, etc. history and tradition as it is seen and defined from a Muslim point of view as well as their literature, mythology, art, architecture and popular beliefs and customs.

- ¹² Or radical or activist or whatever term one prefers to use in place of the ambiguous and to some extent discredited term 'fundamentalist'.
- ¹³ Our primary sources have been Weeks: 1978; Kettani:1986; and Shaikh: 1992. We have also consulted several other 'minor' sources, like various area or country specific books. However, almost all sources give figures between Weeks (on the low end) and Kettani (on the high end).
- ¹⁴ More exactly, what 'empirical' forms this understanding takes in real life for a specific individual can vary with a number of factors (Sander: 1988; 1993). What is important, however, is not the exact empirical forms of manifestation, but what correspondence there is between what the individual seriously considers it to be for a Muslim to live a good or correct life according to Islam, on the one hand, and the life (s)he de facto is (thinks (s)he is) leading, on the other.
- ¹⁵ Sander: 1993, esp. § 8, 149-187 and part II.
- ¹⁶ These are discussed in Sander: 1993.
- ¹⁷ One being the fact that the Muslims themselves have a tendency to think, talk about and organise themselves in those terms. This does not mean that we are unaware of the fact that there is a considerable heterogeneity within the groups here distinguished and that differences of various kinds (for example, along the lines of politics, religion and gender) within the groups in question can sometimes be more important than differences between them.
- ¹⁸ The taxonomy given here is based on geographical criteria, not on ethnic or others. The taxonomy could, of course, be made on other criteria, be more refined. We believe the one presented here is sufficient for our purpose.
- ¹⁹ In more specific and detailed discussions, of course, it is necessary to make further specifications and distinguish among Sunni, Shia, the Alevi, the Kurds, the Isma'ilis, the Ahmadiyya, and so on, as separate groups.
- ²⁰ A 'Turkish Muslim' here means a person with background in the state of Turkey and who is ethnic Muslim. Of all the immigrants from the state of Turkey in Sweden roughly 60 - 70% are Muslims. The majority of the rest is Suryoyo, and in religious terms Christians (Orthodox). The large majority of the Turkish Muslims are also ethnic Turks, but the group also includes a few thousand Kurds. The total number of people in Sweden with background in the state of Turkey was, at the beginning of 2001, roughly 36,000. This should

- make the number of ethnic Muslims in the group in our sense to somewhere between 22,000 and 25,000.
- 21 For the reasonableness of speaking of all these people as one group, see, for example, Hamady: 1960; Laffin: 1975; and Patai: 1973.
- 22 See Sander: 1993
- 23 'Institution' is defined in this context as mutual and to some extent fixed and routine patterns (typifications) which mediate, regulate and determine the knowledge, values, norms, behaviors and activities of the members of a particular society (or group) vis a vis each other at the same time as they relate their knowledge, etc. to the larger context of meaning which constitutes the cultural framework of the societies (groups) in question. Institutions in this sense can be both ideal and real and have more or less rigid, concrete, or 'materialised' forms and structures etc. (This concept of institution is discussed in greater detail in Sander: 1985; 1988a.)
- 24 We will discuss this form of Islam in greater detail later under the headings of Euro-Islam and 'Blå-Gul Islam'.
- 25 The now for over twenty years drawn-out process of attempting to build a central mosque in Göteborg is an almost paradigmatic illustration of this (see Sander: 1991).
- 26 It can be, and has been, debated whether or not the Ahmadiyya movement is Islamic and their members (true) Muslims. We do not want to get involved in this dispute as the methodology of our research (so-called methodological agnosticism) bases itself on the individual's own account of her/his religiosity. We therefore count them as Muslims.
- 27 When it comes to the financial assistance distributed by the Commission for State Grants to Religious Communities, their own reported figures are, however, not accepted at face value, but with a very critical attitude.
- 28 In 1993 ICU changed its name to Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen i Sverige (IKUS). At the time of writing this, IKUS has, as a result of internal schisms, breakups, and so on, more or less ceased to exist.
- 29 An interesting feature of Salaam is that, throughout its history it has, for all practical purposes, been dominated and run by women, some key people among them being Swedish converts (Otterbeck: 2000).
- 30 <http://www.svenskaislamiska.org>
- 31 <http://www.ungamuslimer.nu> (+intervju Durani/Katlan)
- 32 This problem was for example clearly emphasised by Imam Abd al Haqq Kielan in an interview, 2001.04.06.

33 2001.04.06

34 The total amount distributed year 2000 was: organisationsbidrag 43,022,996SEK (≈ € 4,528,736); verksamhetsbidrag 6,300,000SEK (≈ 663,158) and projektbidrag 2,700,000SEK (≈ € 284,210). Of the organisationsbidrag the Muslim organizations/congregations received 3,865,000SEK (≈ € 406,840) for the year 2000.

35 The more detailed rules for the support can be found in the Year Books of SST.

36 In doing this we wish to emphasise that we do not claim that there are any clear boundaries between the categories, particularly not in the case of the formal/informal distinction. On the contrary, a little reflection soon reveals that there are a number of problems, and that on both the conceptual/theoretical and empirical levels. As long as we are aware of that, and do not consider what is being said as more than a highly schematic description, we do not think that such simplifications cause any harm.

37 As well as normally perceived to be implemented by the vast majority of non-immigrants.

38 The very negative attitudes from leading persons within the Swedish public TV-corporation that were voiced in October 2002 regarding the prohibition of a young woman to appear with hijab, and in a program about immigrants, is hard to understand. One of their arguments was that the viewer would react negatively. Whether or not this would be a good argument, it is dubious if true. According to the only nationwide survey in which the question "Do you believe that Muslim girls and women living in Sweden should have the right to use veil (hijab) in schools and on the labor market?" (or any equivalent question), 70 per cent of the respondents aged 15-59, and 78 percent of the respondents aged 15-19, answered 'yes' (DN-Temo, Dagens Nyheter, särtryck våren 1995, p. 32).

39 This view was strongly expressed by several of the participants, an not only Muslim, but also Jewish and Christian Orthodox participants, at our round table conferences.

40 This is also emphasised by for example the Church of Sweden in one of their research projects. <http://www.svenskakyrkan.se/svk/tromtro/islam/eng/httoc.htm>

41 In our opinion it would be wise to make a distinction between the two questions, "Who represents Islam?" and "Who represents Muslims?" This has, to our knowledge, not been done so far in Sweden.

- In the first case we believe that religious scholars have a legitimate claim to be the spokespersons, but not so in the second.
- 42 This was a problem especially addressed at our round table number three.
- 43 This was an issue brought up at all our round tables and in many of our interviews.
- 44 The problem we have sketched here has perhaps been most noticeable- at least most discussed in the media- in terms of the conflict between young second-, and other-generation women who do not want to accept the fact that their families (fathers) want them to become 'traditional' Kurdish girls, for example, or that they want to decide over their education, social life, who they should marry. They want to live an independent and free life. During the last decade there has also been a number of very serious such conflicts, including a few so-called 'murders of honor', which has resulted in much public debate. We will return to this issue.
- 45 And their ideas of 'true Islam' mostly seems to be some specific 'country Islam'.
- 46 Which, of course, is not wrong in itself.
- 47 There has been much written about the 'religio-political awakening' the last decades in the Islamic world. One of the best expositions is Kepel (2002).
- 48 Asp & Weibull: 1996; Berg: 1988; Berggren & Lindblad: 1998; Brune: 1996; 1998; 2000; Catomeris: 1998; Fröberg: 2000; Hafez: 1997; Hultén: 1993; Hvitfeldt: 1998; 2002; Karim: 2002; Karlsson: 1994 (esp. 11-50); Leth & Thurén: 2002; Löwander: 1997; 1998; Morge & Modh: 2002; Nordström: 2002; Quraishy: 2002; Shaheen: 2001; Wennergren: 2002; Zelizer: 2002.
- 49 For a more detailed account of these and other similar events see, for example, Boularés: 1990, Ch. 1. Here, as well as in Choueri: 1990 and Esposito: 1992; 1997; Esposito & Watson: 2000; Esposito & Voll: 2001; Haddad, Voll & Esposito: 1991, one also finds general discussions of the problem as to whether or not Islam constitutes a danger to the Western World. A popular but very detailed discussion can be found in Bergen: 2001.
- 50 The results of our own questionnaire study on the experiences of the Muslim population in Sweden after September 11, 2001, is presented in Sander: 2003 and in Larsson: 2003.
- 51 The main ones were carried out 1990, 1992 and 1995.

- 52 The Muslim experience of the discussions in the aftermath of the terror attack of the 11 September, 2001 is discussed in Sander: 2003 and Larsson: 2003.
- 53 A more detailed description of this process can be found in Sander: 1991.
- 54 Given the similarities of the sets of quotations given, and that most of the ones who use them most likely do not have any intimate first hand personal knowledge of Islamic texts, we give fairly high credibility to the rumors that claim that a 'secret' document exists with such quotations and arguments for use by the anti-Islamic lobbyists. If it exists, it is most likely a translation of some international source.
- 55 The fact that it, at least to us, seems to be a rather clear ethical inconsistency in claiming that what the Muslims do (what they accuse the Muslim of doing) towards Christians in the Muslim countries is ethically wrong, since, at the same time, they are claiming that we ought to do the same thing towards the Muslim minorities here, something that does not seem to bother them very much.
- 56 That there are apologetic Islamic leaders that claim various versions of the 'oneness-of-Islam-ideology' does not, of course, make things better.
- 57 Karlsson: 1994 on the yellow, red and green perils.
- 58 For example: AbuKhalil, A.: 2002; Andersson: 1995; Aneer: 1985; Asp: 1998; Asp & Weibull: 1996; Berg: 1988; Berggren & Lindblad: 1998; Brune: 1996; 1998; 2000; 2002; Catomeris: 1998; Fröberg: 2000; Gardell: 1985; Hafez: 1997; Harrie: 1999; Hultén: 1993; Hvitfeldt: 1998; 2002; Karim: 2000; 2002; Karlsson: 1994 (esp. 11-50); Leth & Thurén: 2002; Löwander: 1997; 1998; Modh: 1995; Morge & Modh: 2002; Nordström: 2002; Quraishy: 2002; Said: 1985; Shaheen: 2001; Weibull & warnebring: 1999; Wennergren:2002; Zelizer: 2002.
- 59 According to Lippman (1922), a stereotype is "the picture in our heads" we have of a phenomenon, a picture that guides our feelings and actions. A stereotyped picture is on the one hand in many respects wrong (over- and underdetermined) and mythical and, on the other fixed and unchangeable despite the fact that the world it relates to is itself changing.
- 60 The number of myths about immigrant groups, as for example, that they have pigs on their balconies, grow vegetables in their living rooms, is legio.

- ⁶¹ It seems, judging from some of the post- 11 September 2001 literature, that the scholarly world is almost as polarised as society at large when it comes to the issue of what, in many US publications, goes under the heading of 'Why they hate us'. Even though the majority of the scholars of the Middle Eastern and the Islamic world have insisted that there does exist a connection between US foreign policy and the event of 11 September, other known names have reiterated their anti-liberal stance by pointing an accusing finger at what they regard as their fellow academics' failure to warn the public about the inevitable threats that Islam and the Muslims are posing. Noteworthy among the latter are Martin Kramer, Daniel Pipes and their intellectual mentor Bernard Lewis (for example, Kramer: 2001; Pipes: 1996; Lewis: 1990). The main name in the other camp being, of course, John Esposito (for example 1992, 1997; 2000; 2001; 2002).
- ⁶² For a summary of some of the relevant research see Sahlberg: 2001.
- ⁶³ In our discussions of this problem with immigrants, we see a very strong structural similarity to the similar discussion among feminist about women in power representing other women. In general we believe that many of the points raised in discussions by feminists of their situation, and of life in a patriarchic society, as well as the strategies to redeem it, are relevant in discussion of the in many respects similar positions of immigrants/Muslims. If, for example, the Sweish state implemented only a small part of the legal and political measures taken in order to make the society more 'equal' between the genders vis a vis immigrants and Muslims, their situation would, we believe, in many respects improve dramatically.
- ⁶⁴ As we will see a little later, during the last years there have been clear signs of a shift in this focus from the point of view of the government.
- ⁶⁵ Individuals participating in the labour market are, by definition, those who have employment or are actively seeking employment. All others, for example housewives, students, pensioners, many people in employment measures and others who, for whatever reasons, do not actively seek employment, are not part of the figures for labor market participation.
- ⁶⁶ To be counted as unemployed, an individual first has to be counted as part of the labor force as defined above. Even though we do not have any 'hard evidence', it seems clear, from many sources, that the 'real' unemployment rates for many groups are much higher that the statistics indicate. Many individuals with African and Asian

- backgrounds simply seem to have 'given up' when it comes to finding a 'real' job and are supporting themselves in various 'gray' or 'black' sectors of the labor market. Others have turned into 'permanent' students or 'permanent' members of employment measures.
- 67 To take only one example: in 2000 only 38 percent of the Iraqi-born had an occupation and 27 percent were unemployed.
- 68 For example: the proportion of males with a three years or longer of post-secondary education was higher than the average for Swedish born males for immigrants from fifty-three different countries of origin. Equivalent figures are found for females of 44 nationalities.
- 69 In the case of Iranians, their situation on the Swedish labour market is often compared to their situation in the USA. The groups in the two countries are in most respects comparable: they arrived during similar periods, they have similar levels of education, their socioeconomic backgrounds are very similar, and so on. Despite this, their integration differs remarkably. In the USA they have lower unemployment and higher participation rates on the labor market than the average USA born individual, they have jobs that correspond to their high level of education, they have a high rate of income development, and so on. All in all, they have done much better than the average American born person. Their situation in Sweden is, as we have seen, the complete opposite. One conclusion drawn from this is that it is wrong to attribute their problems in Sweden to properties of the group itself. The cause of the problem ought rather to be sought in properties of the majority society, in the existence of more or less subtle mechanisms of exclusion. We believe the proponents of the latter diagnosis to be on the right track. Swedish society has, in international comparison, been extreme when it comes to wasting immigrated competence, and not only on the labour market. The same is, we will argue, true in universities.
- 70 For example: a study among taxi drivers in Malmö, Sweden's third largest city, showed that 44 percent of the immigrants among them had academic degrees, some of them several exams. Furthermore, some of them had degrees in areas which according to the employment office were in great demands in Sweden (City of Malmö 2001).
- 71 Which, given the levels of the welfare benefits, is not even always an economically rational choice.
- 72 In 1993 the average family income in households in which both adults were born outside Sweden and at least the man outside of

Europe was forty-two percent of the family income in families with both grown ups born in Sweden. After correction for various subsidies and benefits given to 'the poor', this figure is fifty-five percent (SOU: 1996/55, 98). To put these figures in perspective it must also be said that this income difference has increased rather than decreased over the years. For example, in 1974 migrant men had three percent less income than men born in Sweden. In 1981 the difference had increased to eight percent and in 1991 the difference was 14 percent, and the development on the labor market during the 1990s indicates this difference has continued, if not accelerated. These differences, furthermore, only measure the difference in income among people who have a job. If we include unemployed and people outside the work force, the differences become even greater. These differences are also striking concerning foreign-born academics, even when they hold Swedish diplomas (Skr. 2001/02:129). Again, these averages hide significant differences in terms of country of origin. And, again, they follow the same pattern we saw for labor market participation. In the bottom of the income list we have families with background in Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Somalia (SOU: 2000, 37, Ch. 7; Ds: 2000, 69; SOU: 2001, 54; Berggren & Omarsson: 2001).

⁷³ Integrationsverket, Rapport Integration: 2001, 104

⁷⁴ Integrationsverket. Rapport Integration: 2001, 105

⁷⁵ For a more complete list of characteristics and traits of Western cultures (which are the ones 'we' believe they are lacking) and of Muslim cultures (which are the ones 'we' experience 'they' have too many of), see Sitaram & Cogdell: 1976, 191.

⁷⁶ Most of the written material from the project, including debate articles by the ministers and other in the newspapers, can be found at www.naring.regeringen.se/mangfald/info.htm. The main results from the project are published in Ds: 2000, 69a and Ds: 2000, 69b.

⁷⁷ In the rest of this section we will speak about managing diversity, integration, and multiculturalism mainly on the institutional level, including in day care centers, schools and in the workplace. Similar considerations are, however, *mutatis mutandis*, relevant on the societal level, that is, for entire nations.

⁷⁸ These, and equivalent slogans, are based on results from creativity research which claims, among other things, that adaptability and flexibility are among the main characteristics of long term survival for individuals as well as groups. This in turn follows from an often-employed definition of "creative thought" as "the process whereby

one's cognitive structures are changed towards greater flexibility and adaptation through greater differentiation and integration." That similar thoughts can be used on the societal level should be argued later.

79 This chapter has, although in a schematic way, indicated and dealt with some aspects and problems of relevancy for a general theory of integration and multiculturality. There are, of course, many more.

80 Telephone interview with Staffan Kellerberg at the Rikspolisstyrelsen (informationsdirektör), 4 April, 2002.

81 Interview on Swedish radio 17 October, 2002.

82 As these problems are, to a very high extent, the same as the problems faced by Muslims in other Western European countries, and fairly well discussed by now, we do not go into any details here.

83 Such that the students can receive official university credits and degrees, can be eligible for student loans and grants, etc.

84 This is in parallel with the education of priests for the Swedish Church, who spend their first four years of study in the 'normal' state university but have to go through an additional year of confessional education which is run by the church itself.

85 In 2000 the total number of so-called free schools in Sweden was ca. 350. A bit over 70 were so-called confessional schools, i.e. religious free schools. Of those around 20 were Islamic. None of them gave education beyond ninth grade (junior high level).

86 http://www3.skolverket.se/FRI_CACHE/GO0E.htm

87 Sander: 1993; Sheikhmous: 1994.

88 Here we do not have access to the data broken down on gender, parenthood and age. Conversations with Sheikhmous, however confirms that what is said above about our own investigations would also hold true for his data.

89 This is a phenomenon which, according to our informants, have been much more pronounced after 11 September 2001 (Sander: 2003).

90 Expressen 2000-03-08; Expressen 2000-04-06; Expressen 2000-11-04 Expressen 2000-11-05; Expressen 2000-11-06; Expressen 2000-11-07 Other examples of making culture and religion the cause of crimes can be found in Dagens Nyheter 2000-02-11, 2000-02-18, 2000-02-21, Lunchekot, Sveriges Radio 2002-02-12, Dagens Eko, SR 2002-02-14; TV 4 Nyheterna 2002-02-05 (see <http://www.quickresponse.nu/articklar> 2000-02-23).

91 For example, the spokesperson for the organization Glöm inte Pela och Fadime, Sara Mohammad, lawyer Elisabeth Fritz, author Dilsa Demirbag-Sten and Dr. Mikael Kurkiala.

92 Quoted in *Expressen*, 22 August 2001.

93 Or in somewhat other terms: macro-, meso-, and micro - levels.

94 Gunner: 1999, 33.

95 Djurskyddslagen (SFS: 1988, 534).

96 English translation by Arberry: 1964, 146.

97 Arberry: 1964, 21–22; 138–139 and 271–272.

98 Arberry: 1964, 99.

99 Arberry: 1964, 125.

100 According to both, the numbers of articles dealing with the matter that were published in the Swedish Islamic journal *Salaam* and the research conducted by Pernilla Ouis it seems that nature plays an important role among Swedish Muslims. See, for example, Ouis: 1999, 235–248 and Otterbeck: 2000a, 148–149.

101 *Slakt av obedövade djur*: 1992, 5.

102 *Slakt av obedövade djur*: 1992, 6.

103 To help Muslims to avoid products containing gelatin and swine products the Swedish food and health institute produced an information leaflet (*Statens livsmedelsverk*:1993). This service is also given on many Swedish Muslim homepages.

104 Which we will return to.

105 Irrespective of local traditions and variations among Muslim groups, it is possible to find a basic consensus among most Muslims. An introduction and overview of Muslim ‘good practices’ in relation to death and burial is for example found in al-Kaysi: 1986, 175–184. According to guidelines given by the Swedish Muslim funeral committee a Muslim burial site in Sweden should be located in the direction of qibla, which is 148° South East. The burial site should also be separated from other burial sites (i.e. Christians) by a wall or a hedge. The grave should be located in a peaceful and calm place. The body should rest on its right side and the face should be turned towards qibla. It is recommended that the grave should be visible and therefore it should be elevated approximately 2,5 centimeters above ground to prevent people from accidentally stepping on the grave. These recommendations are given by imam Abd al-Haqq Kielan, printed in *Svenska kyrkan* 3/2000. Information från svenska kyrkans centralstyrelse och svenska kyrkans församlingsförbund, appendix 3.

- ¹⁰⁶ Svenska kyrkan 3/2000. Information från svenska kyrkans centralstyrelse och svenska kyrkans församlingsförbund, page three.
- ¹⁰⁷ This information was given by a spokesperson from Församlingsförbundet in Stockholm. (Telephone, 26/3 2002).
- ¹⁰⁸ Begravningslagen, 2 kap. 2 §. Cf. begravningsförordningen, printed in SFS: 1999, 882.
- ¹⁰⁹ Svenska kyrkan 3/2000. Information från svenska kyrkans centralstyrelse och svenska kyrkans församlingsförbund, appendix 2.
- ¹¹⁰ This problem was for example addressed by one of the Imams in Göteborg interviewed for this project.
- ¹¹¹ Leif Stenberg gives an example of how Muslims have questioned this law. To find a suitable answer to this problem the shia Muslim community in Trollhättan outside Göteborg asked a mujtahid in Iran if it was acceptable to bury a Muslim in a coffin. According to Aytatollah Khoi this custom was accepted if one accept the principle of ijtehad. Stenberg: 1999, 124.
- ¹¹² This development is for example illustrated in the publication '...inte längre gäster och främligar...
- ¹¹³ It is, of course, not only Islam that will change as a result of this. Sweden will as a result of this also change in many respects (Sander: 2002).
- ¹¹⁴ A more detailed account of how we see religion as a human phenomena can be found in Sander: 1985; 1988.
- ¹¹⁵ At least to those of us who are not too wrapped up in, for example, Geertz's (1963) descriptions of culture and ethnicity as something 'essential' and 'primordial'; as 'simply given', as 'ipso facto', as 'unaccountable', and as having an overpowering force on the individual 'in and of themselves' (p 109).
- ¹¹⁶ Blue and yellow are the colors of the Swedish flag.
- ¹¹⁷ This 'impossibility' of being able to avoid being identified as 'a Muslim' by the way they look alone is something that many of our secularised informants, particularly those with Iranian background and who want to disassociate themselves from most matters to do with Islam, frequently report and complain about.

State Policies Towards Muslims in Britain

Introduction

A significant number of Muslims has migrated to Britain in the last fifty years. It is estimated that there are currently 1.8 million Muslims out of a total population of 56 million. Almost 60 percent of the Muslim population is now British born. Therefore, most Muslims are British citizens and are now an integral part of a multi-faith Britain.

Muslims in Britain, like the followers of Islam throughout the world, are diverse in terms of cultures, languages and traditions. They come from different countries and belong to different ethnic groups. However, the core of Islamic values, dictated by the teachings of the Quran and the Suna are common amidst all this diversity. The largest number of Muslims in Britain originates from Pakistan (about 700,000) with sizeable groups from Bangladesh, India, Cyprus, Malaysia, the Arab countries and some parts of Africa. There are also an increasing number of white Muslims, about 10,000, who are mostly converts to Islam.

Muslims are settled in industrial areas where job opportunities were available, both those who initially had the freedom of movement and those who came through government and employers' recruitment efforts. At the same time, the active kinship and friendship networks and the process of chain migration have contributed to the

concentrations of Muslims in particular regions and cities.¹ In Britain, Muslims are not evenly distributed throughout the country. They are mostly found in the Greater London conurbation and some other areas of the South-East, the Midlands, West Yorkshire and the South Lancashire conurbations. There is also a concentrated Muslim population in the central Clydeside conurbation in Scotland. The country of birth figures from the 1991 Census show that a majority, about 60 percent, of all British Muslims are settled in the South East, mainly in the Greater London area.² However, there are differences between various Muslim communities in terms of settlement patterns. For example, Pakistanis are more dispersed nationally compared with Bangladeshis who are concentrated in large numbers in fewer areas, particularly in the East End of London. Birmingham has 110,000 Muslims while Bradford's Muslim population is estimated to be 70,000.

The Muslim population in Britain is much younger than the white population. It has far fewer older people, under two percent aged 65+ compared with almost 17 percent whites in this age group. However, at the other end almost 60 percent of Muslims are under 25 years of age compared with only 32 percent whites. There are more Muslim children of school age (over 30%) compared with whites (13%). This clearly has implications for the issues which are relevant to the education of a relatively large number of Muslim children in the areas of their concentrations.

Muslim households are larger, five persons per household, compared with the rest of the population (2.4 persons). Therefore, there is a significant difference between Muslim households and other households. It is also relevant to mention that many Muslims live in joint and extended families. These characteristics have clear policy implications for the size of houses available for Muslims.

Religion is not something which can be learnt and adhered to. It must be lived and fostered until it cannot be separated from life itself. Religious minorities cannot keep their ethnicity and identity confined to their homes. Society at large needs to reflect the diverse nature of communities in terms of adapting various services and provision to meet the specific needs of all communities.³ Therefore, the presence of Muslims and other non-Christian religious groups in Britain poses a challenge for the policies and practices of the institutions of society as well as for the faith communities themselves.

The composition of our society is significantly different from what it was 50 years ago, and it is changing continuously and going to be markedly different in the future. Policies and practices which have been relevant in the past are no longer appropriate. There is need for a constant review and to be responsive to new developments.

It is encouraging to note that over the past 20 years a great deal of progress has been made in addressing the needs of diverse communities in Britain. However, this change and progress has not been universal across various communities, geographical areas, in relation to issues and concerns, and within different institutions. On the contrary, the situation has worsened in certain respects. For example, the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in the West and the perception of Islam and Muslims as a threat by the West has generated Islamophobic sentiments in the community at large.


This mainly qualitative, small-scale study, that examines the state policies towards Muslims in Britain, and in particular, concentrates on the following:

- perception of the issues as they relate to social and public policy development in employment and service delivery in public, voluntary and private sectors;
- relevant policy and practice and
- the gap between the existing good policy and practices within the public, voluntary and private sectors and the aspiration of the Muslim communities, the voluntary sector and the institutions and agencies themselves, for further action.

Methodology

An interview schedule/guidelines were prepared to explore understanding and the awareness of Islam and social public policy and practices implications.

Three dimensions were included in the design:



- (1) What are the issues and concerns in these service/policy areas.
 - (2) What has been the response within public, voluntary and private sectors in addressing these issues, including examples of good practice.
 - (3) What are the perceived gaps for further actions.
- The following were the areas included in the interview guidelines, relating to central and local government, health authorities and other agencies and institutions:

Central Government:

- cabinet Office and other key central government departments and agencies and various other institutions run by these departments.
- the legislation – good and bad.
- guidance, directives, instructions and macro-policy.
- employment related issues.

Local Government:

- delivery of various services to the local communities in the field of:
 - education
 - health and Social Care
 - housing

Judiciary and Criminal Justice Systems and Institutions:

- police
- courts/Tribunals
- prison Service
- other institutions and agencies, for example:
 - armed Forces
 - sociopolitical institutions
 - antidiscrimination institutions

Sample Characteristics

People with awareness of issues and concerns with policy/practices and the perceived gaps were identified for interviews. These people included:

- local politicians, such as councillors.
- officers within the public and voluntary sectors working both at policy level and delivery services.
- Central Government officers developing policies and conducting research and carrying out training.
- Teachers, social workers, health workers, educational psychologists, regardless of their ethnicity or religious affiliation.
- people living in various parts of London, and from Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow.
- specialist NGOs e.g. Muslim College, Union of Muslim Organisations, Muslim Burial Trust, Indian Muslim Federation etc.
- members of various welfare and other interest organisations, trustees and members of the mosques, and community management committees.

Efforts were made, in particular, to identify the following groups:

- youth, young girls in particular
- elderly
- male/female
- people with disabilities
- a cross-section of Muslims settled in Britain, such as Asians (Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis); Somalis, Mauritians, Middle Easterns, White converts
- young couples with young children

It is very important to note, as mentioned in the introduction, that the post war immigration into Britain has included a significant number of Muslims from the Indian sub-continent, predominantly from Pakistan, Bangladesh and some Indian Muslims. Most of the self-help and voluntary work was established and carried out by these Muslims, such as setting up mosques and variety of organisations. Accordingly a great deal of public-sector policy development has been focused on meeting the distinct needs of these Muslim communities.

To gather relevant information various strategies were deployed as follows:

- One-to-one interviews
- Focus group meetings (two were held – one with education psychologists and the other with a learning disabilities group)
- Two round-table discussions – one in London and one in Birmingham
- The researcher also availed himself of an opportunity to participate in a Muslim Families Group discussion, where the issue of Muslim identity was discussed.
- On several occasions conversations were held with interviewees, who were then sent the interview guide which was completed and returned.
- Analysis and review of secondary research findings, government commissioned reports, policies and procedures.

Not all the participants were necessarily qualified to answer all the questions. However, it is important to note that those workers who were involved in equality, diversity, social inclusion and particularly race equality work, did possess knowledge about wide-ranging issues, and

that those who were involved in the voluntary sectors were aware of relevant issues. Altogether 30 respondents participated in the survey and several others participated in the two round tables and two focus group meetings.

The researcher also attended three different conferences and consultation meetings and a number of informal discussion groups, organised by the following:

- Indian Muslims Federation
- FAIR (Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism)
- League of British Muslims

Issues facing Muslims

It is worth mentioning that more than half of the respondents believed that there were over two million Muslims in Britain. The others estimated the number of Muslims between one and two million. In this section, interviewees were asked to comment about various services and social public policy areas relevant to Muslims. The following section summarises the views expressed, sometimes giving numbers of the interviewees to who held each view.

Education

Muslims have fallen far behind. There is an urgent need to redress this situation.

Research shows that educational achievement levels of Muslim children in Britain are generally lower than white and some other ethnic group children. For example, recent surveys show that children of Muslim parents on average

scored lower points in GCSE examinations, although there are area variations.⁴ In Birmingham with a large Muslim population Pakistani and Bangladeshi boys, in particular, have lower educational achievement than whites and Indians as shown in Table 1.

<u>Ethnicity/Gender</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Bangladeshi boys	30
Bangladeshi girls	42
Pakistani boys	27
Pakistani girls	41
Indian boys	49
Indian girls	61
White boys	36
White girls	45
All boys	34
All girls	47

*Table 1: GCSE Performance by Ethnic Group and Gender
5+A*-C Grades, 2000*

Sources: Birmingham City Council Education Department.

Figures in the table clearly show a significant gap between Muslim and non-Muslim children. It is worth pointing out that in all ethnic groups, girls were achieving higher grades than boys. However, Muslim children in Glasgow and some areas of London were performing better than Muslim children in Birmingham and Bradford. Detailed analysis shows that these differences are linked to their social class backgrounds and the length of stay in Britain. In addition, in order to tackle the educational disadvantage at school, an increasing number of Muslim children are staying on in education after the school leaving age of 16. For

example, in 1995, 55 percent of 16-19 years old Pakistanis, compared to 37 percent whites in this age group, stayed on in education. In higher education, despite the differential acceptance rates between Muslims and whites with the same qualifications by the British universities (40 percent to 54 percent), the proportion of Muslim children in higher education is slowly increasing. Other education issues which relate to Muslims include mother-tongue teaching, religious education, provision of halal meals, prayer facilities, uniforms for girls, single-sex education and state funding of Muslim schools. It is worth mentioning that there are at present over 80 Muslim independent schools in Britain and after a long campaign, only 3 have recently received state funding, while several thousand (almost 7000) Church of England, Catholic and Jewish schools have been receiving state funding for some time.

The perception of all respondents appears to be that this is an area of serious concern. Fourteen specifically said that Muslim students were under-achieving in schools. It further appears from the tenor of the other responses that this is something which all respondents accept. Apart from a reference to the high academic standards in the few Muslim schools that exist, there were no positive comments from any of the respondents in respect of the education system, which is seen as failing Muslim pupils.

The reasons suggested for this were:

- Failure of schools to meet the specific needs of Muslims
- Racism towards and stereotyping of Muslims within schools
- Contributing factors within the Muslim community itself

- Failure of schools to meet the specific needs of Muslims

Half of the respondents referred to the failure of the British education system to meet the specific needs of Muslim pupils. Some of them referred to the lack of Muslim schools as a problem, and to the lack of funds available for existing schools.

A significant number felt that mainstream schools lacked facilities for Muslims, such as prayer facilities, halal food and understanding the needs of fasting pupils. One respondent referred to the need of Muslim parents to ensure that their children received a good education while at the same time, "not absorbing those aspects of British culture which are inimical to a Muslim way of life."

Some referred to the general lack of understanding of Islam within schools, both by teachers and pupils; and the lack of information about it. One respondent explained that Islam was "often misunderstood and stereotyped and denigrated."

A number of respondents said that there were too few Muslim teachers and governors. One spoke of the problem of "very few role models for Muslim pupils in society/schools." Another referred to the lack of understanding of Muslim culture within educational psychology services and said it "tends to stereotype parents' views." A further comment illustrates the consequence of low levels of achievement, "low level of educational attainment in particular for Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities in Britain. Links with high levels of unemployment and living in deprived areas with poor housing and little support. Many young people may feel disillusioned with educational institutes, some may not be meeting specific needs of Muslim communities."

*Racism towards and stereotyping of
Muslims within schools*

Half of the respondents mentioned some aspects of the education system which go beyond a failure to meet the needs of Muslims, being more actively hostile to Islam, Muslim pupils and their parents. For example, a few referred to the stereotyping of Muslim pupils, particularly girls – including an expectation of under-achievement. Some others quoted bullying of Muslim pupils as a problem which schools are failing to tackle adequately and one of them explained that “bullying and attacks on Muslims in state schools....” are common.

Some respondents mentioned the Christian bias in religious education, and the misrepresentation and denigration of Islam (“Islam-phobic RE lessons”). A number of responses related to the high rate of exclusion of Muslim pupils.

Others felt that Muslim parents are discouraged from involvement with the schools and one felt that “parents often subtly excluded by being intimidated, made to feel unwelcome or uncomfortable within the school context.” They said that “no communication by schools with parents” takes place. Two respondents in particular felt that the admissions system in higher education was discriminatory. There was a further criticism of the various approaches of schools. One respondent said, “Psychological service tend to stereotype parents views. Often seeing large families negatively and different styles of parenting as neglect rather than a collective/extended family response. Very often home visits and seeing the parents (in school) an overlooked/excluded and therefore assessment is just done on child (individual) and the views of the school considered but not the views of parents – blamed on language

barrier and difficulties in getting interpreters. As far as I'm aware there is only *one* educational psychologist who is a Muslim. In terms of training of educational psychologists, there are only two come in Scotland (Strathclyde and Dundee in the last 10 years - *no* EP from the MEG been trained at Strathclyde (probably similar in Dundee) ever tho' more in a significant MEG population in Scotland."

One respondent felt strongly about what is taught in schools. She said "I personally think that schools teach less of education and more of social deviance that Britain is facing. The Asian culture isn't strong enough to combat that problem. Islam isn't given the merit it deserves or the practise by Muslims or English."

Contributing factors within the Muslim community itself

A small number of respondents referred to factors within Muslim communities as having a detrimental effect on the education of Muslim pupils. They said this was partly due to high levels of illiteracy amongst the adult Muslim immigrant population and that some Muslim parents tended not to encourage their children to study; one respondent compared this adversely to the encouragement given by Hindu parents.

Employment

There's discrimination in all sections of employment.

First-generation migrant Muslims were granted access only to a limited range of occupations upon arrival, and as a consequence they are concentrated in certain industrial

sectors. Depending on their locations, this has also led to their concentrations in certain towns, cities and regions.

Muslims are mainly employed in manufacturing industry. However, there is now a growing number of Muslims also working in the service sector as well as an increasing number are starting their own businesses. In addition to other reasons the high unemployment among Muslims (see below) is encouraging them to become self-employed. The 1991 Census showed that 24 percent of all employed Pakistanis and 19 percent of Bangladeshis were self-employed compared with 13 percent of whites.⁵ The self-employed Muslims are not only running small businesses but some are also providing employment as entrepreneurs. The 1991 Census showed that 38.5 percent of all self-employed Pakistanis and 72.7 percent of all self-employed Bangladeshis were also employing other people and, therefore, creating jobs.

Muslims working in the manufacturing industry are mainly manual workers. They are found largely in textiles and the metal industry. However, overall the percentage of Muslims working in the textile industry has been halved in the last 20 years from over 20 percent to 10 percent because of the virtual demise of this industrial sector. Overall it appears that because of the emergence of second generation British-educated Muslims joining the labour market, the occupational pattern is slowly changing.

It is relevant to mention here that very few Muslim women work as compared to white women. For example, according to the 1991 Census the economic activity rate for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women was very low, 28.6 and 22.4 respectively, compared with 71.4 percent for white women. These differences are partly for religio-cultural reasons. Generally Muslims are holding menial jobs and

are employed in older industries, have lower incomes and are vulnerable to unemployment.

Evidence from the 1991 Census and Labour Force Surveys clearly shows that the unemployment rate for Muslim groups is almost three times as high as the rate for whites as presented in Table 2.

Ethnic Group	Unemployment Rate	Males	Females
Pakistani	28.8	28.5	29.6
Bangladeshi	31.7	30.9	34.5
White	8.8	8.8	6.3

Table 2: Unemployment Among Pakistani, Bangladeshi and White Groups, 1991 (Percentages)

Source: 1991 Census

There is no doubt that racial discrimination against Muslims and other ethnic minorities is playing its part in this worsening situation of high unemployment among Muslims. The other trend is that it is also affecting British born and educated young Muslims in the same way as it affected the first generation migrant Muslims. For example, the unemployment rate for 16-24 year old Pakistanis was almost 36 percent, for Bangladeshis 26 percent while for white young people it was only 14.6 percent. Research also shows that even in well-respected professions such as medicine and teaching, Muslims and other ethnic minorities are facing disadvantage and discrimination thus affecting their proper integration in employment.

Almost half of the respondents felt that Muslims were disadvantaged in the field of employment. This is clearly a particularly serious issue: if Muslims are disadvantaged in the workplace, they are disadvantaged both economically and socially, in a society which defines status largely by

reference to employment. It is therefore important to consider the factors that are causing the disadvantage. Suggestions put forward were:

- Racism/discrimination in the workplace
- Lack of provision for Muslims' needs in the workplace
- Poor education
- Factors within the Muslim communities themselves.

Racism/discrimination in the workplace

Fourteen respondents specifically referred to discrimination against Muslim workers, both at the point of recruitment and within the workplace. One said: "young Muslims [...] tend to need more qualifications than their White counterparts to secure a job." Some said that there was discrimination within the public sector employment, namely in local authorities, government and the BBC. One referred to the practice of appointing from within without advertising posts as a way that Muslims were excluded from promotion. One felt that discrimination was greatest against Muslims from Bangladesh. Some other comments referred to the fact that Muslims are not protected by anti-discrimination statute ("unlike Jews and Sikhs") due to being identified as a religion rather than a race. Others felt that since Muslims do not participate in social events at work their prospects of promotion are affected. "Muslims don't fit into the social life of the British therefore making it harder to make 'contact' with peers." "Social attitudes of Hijab and non drinking of alcohol [are] interpreted as disinterest in social activities at place of employment. Hence [are] discriminated against for promotion."

One respondent commented on various aspects of the problems:

Level of unemployment for Muslim communities is significantly higher than other groups, young Muslims who do not do well in education tend to need more qualifications than their white counterparts in order to secure a job. Others who do not do as well will go into manual employment with little scope. Those who have the means would probably become self-employed. There is now a growing awareness of young Muslims to do well at school, college and university in order for them to better their chances of securing employment. There is probably a correlation between those Muslim family's parents who are educated then the likelihood is that the children will follow suit.

Lack of provision for Muslims' needs in the workplace

Some respondents felt that a problem for Muslims in employment was the lack of understanding of Islam, and the failure of employers to provide "accommodation for religious needs, holidays etc." Three comments are relevant to mention in this context:

Muslims are being disproportionately discriminated thus as Muslims (unlike Jews and Sikhs) are not protected by law thus should be changed because a huge number of young UK born Muslims are preferring to identify themselves on grounds of religion rather than race. Facilities for Muslim employees must be made.

Direct and indirect discrimination against Muslims. Bangladeshi community particularly effected. Very little accommodation for religious needs, holidays etc. Very little training to enable managers to manage a multi-racial

workplace and thereby able to understand and address the needs of Muslims.

The Muslims in Glasgow experience the racism are within many Black MEG. However, girls who wear the hijab experience some stereotypical/derogatory comment. The young Asian Muslims seem to be more assertive in relation to their religion.

Poor education

A minority of respondents said that Muslims often received poor education and training, which adversely affected their employment opportunities.

Factors within the Muslim communities themselves

A number of respondents referred to factors within their own communities which limited employment opportunities. One felt that Muslims themselves do not exert adequately to obtain jobs in right professions or trades." Another said that "girls are often dissuaded from careers out of the house, though this varies.

Social Care and Health

Last 10 years has been an improvement.
Still insufficient.

Unlike the field of education, where concern was unanimous across all respondents, there was more of a mix of views regarding social care and health. Certainly many felt

that the services on offer often failed to meet the needs of Muslim users. At the same time, however, there was little emphasis on overt discrimination against Muslims in the services. One reason for this might be the relatively high representation of Muslims as staff in this field – something which respondents applauded, but felt could usefully be increased.

Themes that emerged from the interviews were:

- The need for specific provision for Muslim patients/users
- Care of the elderly
- Employment of Muslims within the Health/ Social Care services
- Health awareness within the Muslim communities.
- The need for specific provision for Muslim patients/users

One third of the respondents referred to the need for prayer facilities, halal food, interpreters and separate facilities for women. Although four of them felt that there had been improvements in these areas in recent years, though it was “still insufficient” and “charities and smaller groups have to make up or fill in gaps left by the health department.” One respondent commented “I have little knowledge about health providers, however there may be some issues which need to be picked up for example, training needs for nurses to become aware of specific needs of Muslim patients. Other considerations around food, prayer facilities, and so on.” One other respondent added “several AHA, hospitals, and so on have begun to take on board the religious needs of Muslims. Still insufficient, particularly in provisions for facilities for Asian women in terms of separate facilities when needed.”

Care of the elderly

Some respondents referred specifically to care of the elderly as an area of concern. One of them spoke of the fact that “cultural and family remain an important part of Muslim families where they are seen as a provide care/support to family members”, and the lack of understanding of this fact by mainstream agencies. Another respondent said that “Lack of sensitive and responsive service by the public, private and voluntary sector has led to problems related to care for the elderly.” The following comments sum up the main issues about social care “the majority (in my view) of Muslim communities in Britain depend heavily on family support to provide care. This probably is due to the lack of understanding of mainstream care and support agencies of the needs of Muslim communities. Cultural and family values remain an important part of Muslim families whereby it is seen as a duty to provide care/support to family members rather than relying on mainstream agencies. Generally health awareness tends to be relatively little in comparison to white counterparts with little emphasis given to exercise or healthy eating.”

Employment of Muslims within the Health/ Social Care services

A number of respondents referred to the relatively high number of Muslims working in this field, and the beneficial effect this has on service provision are explained. “Because a large number of staff at hospitals and primary care teams are from minority communities, there is no obvious discrimination to Muslims.” Another said that “There are

enough [General Practitioners] in WF [Waltham Forest] from Islamic faith. Not enough nurses and consultants.”

Health awareness within the Muslim communities

A few respondents referred to a “lack of knowledge and concern for health care” within Muslim communities, and a consequent “need for better education in respect of preventive measures for better health.”

Housing

Muslims are on bottom rung of the ladder, as far as housing is concerned.

For some groups, housing segregation for some groups has clear implications for the quality of their education, and bad housing will certainly affect their health. The 1991 Census shows that in Britain some Muslim groups such as Pakistanis have a high owner-occupation rate (77 percent) compared with others such as Bangladeshis (44.5 percent). Overall 67 percent of whites are owner-occupiers. On the other hand 37 percent of Bangladeshi households are renting from the public sector compared with only 10.4 percent Pakistanis. One of the reasons for a relatively higher percentage of Bangladeshis in the public-sector housing is their concentration in the inner-London area, particularly in Tower Hamlets, where it is difficult to buy houses. However, the conditions of their houses are not very good because they are allocated poor quality houses by the local authorities. More Muslims are also living in terraced houses (64 percent of Pakistanis) compared with

whites (27 percent).⁶ As far as physical housing problems are concerned, the 1991 Census has provided very detailed information regarding overcrowding, the lack of or need to share bath or WC, lack of central heating or whether the accommodation was self-contained. It appears that a significant number of houses occupied by Muslims groups are overcrowded (43 percent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households) compared with white households (2 percent). Also, almost 60 percent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households are without central heating compared to 37 percent white households in this situation. Another relevant factor worth mentioning here is that an overwhelming majority of Muslims live in inner-city run-down areas with a high general level of physical housing problems. Unless conditions in these areas are improved, the differences between Muslims and the general population regarding housing problems are likely to continue in the near future.

A overwhelming majority of the respondents (21/30) felt that housing was an area of serious concern for Muslims. Only one respondent expressed a positive view - "I have seen Asian Muslims benefit from council houses."

It was pointed out by one respondent that Muslims prefer to own their own homes, and it is those on council estates who suffer problems. Another felt that the problems were experienced more severely by Bangladeshi Muslims than those from India and Pakistan. One respondent explained the situation in the following way:

Most Muslim communities tend to live in concentrated areas where there is a large proportion of black and ethnic minority communities, this is probably due to feeling more comfortable and confident living within their own community. Muslim Bangladeshi communities (most) live in deprived areas within council estates. Other factors

around housing include preference given to areas where mosques are nearby. Most Muslim families (even if they have the means to live in a more affluent area) will prefer to stay where their own family and community are near.

The issues that emerged were:

- Poor living conditions on council estates
- Overcrowding
- Ghettoisation
- The need for appropriate sheltered housing for Muslims.
- Poor living conditions on council estates

Several respondents felt that Muslims were allocated housing on poor estates: one said that “Muslims have been living in inner city ghettos and slums.” Some felt this was specifically due to discrimination on the housing lists. A significant minority of respondents spoke of racist attacks on Muslims on council estates, and the “failure to tackle racist attacks and harassment directed at Muslims” on the part of the authorities. Some recommended training of housing staff, and the recruitment of more Muslims in this area as well as and the need for better policing.

Overcrowding

More than one third of the respondents said that overcrowding was often a problem for Muslim families. This was attributed partly to economic factors but principally to “the fact that Muslim families are larger.” The lack of 4-bedroom council houses was seen as threatening the Mus-

lim way of life. One said the “extended family [was] at risk of being destroyed.” One interviewee explained:

Modern houses are too small for Muslim families. They (Muslims) need larger flats and houses e.g. 4 bed houses or flats. Often on the local authority housing list they (Muslims) are discriminated. Muslims are offered poor houses or dumped in poor housing estates.

‘Ghettoisation’

Several respondents said that Muslims tended to live in areas and on estates with a high concentration of other Muslims. One respondent felt this was by choice: “probably due to feeling more comfortable and confident living within their own community.” The others, however, saw it as more problematic, some referring to it as “ghettoisation”. One respondent illustrated various problems in this context:

In Glasgow, Pakistani families tried to cluster in certain areas of city – ghettoisation. There is a lot of sectarianism and demarcation of areas due to religion. This is extended to other minority groups. The best mix is in the west end of city, which is influx and properly more tolerant than Glaswegions. Many families in the Goranhill area are in proportion that are part housing association – rather than council housing – often in extended families. Muslims generally prefer to live in their own homes. Those living in council homes often suffer serial abuse and harassment from other non-Muslim tenants. Children from some town council estates are mugged/bullied or physically attacked for their mobile phones, bicycles/money etc.

The need for appropriate sheltered housing for Muslims

A few respondents raised the issue of sheltered or supported housing for elderly people, students and people with disabilities: they felt that there should be such housing specifically for Muslims. The number of elderly Muslims is likely to increase in the future and therefore, appropriate sheltered housing for Muslims should be seen as a priority.

Police

High levels of scepticism around policing....little trust exists.

In the last year young Muslim people had confrontations with the police in Oldham, Bradford and Burnley during street disturbances.⁷ There is no doubt that Muslim youths are becoming more aware of their rights as British citizens as compared with their migrant parents, who often tolerated racial disadvantages and racial and religious discrimination as a price for settlement in Britain. Second and third generation Muslims are not prepared to tolerate inequalities in education, employment, housing and other fields and would like to be treated fairly and equally. In this context the police as a frontline service are generally seen as hostile to the Muslim community.

The majority of respondents felt that the relationship between the police and Muslims was problematic. Several respondents felt there had been a breakdown in trust between Muslims and the police, largely due to racist practices by the police both in policing and recruitment. However, it was felt by some that useful work had been

done through dialogue between the police and Muslim community organisations.

Issues that were raised therefore include:

- Racism in the police force towards Muslims
- Recruitment of Muslims into police force
- Involvement of community organisations with the police.
- Racism in the police force towards Muslims

Almost half of the respondents referred to the perception amongst many Muslims of racism within the police force. This manifested itself in the following typical answers: “disproportionate use of stop and search powers”, “discrimination in responding to calls”, “institutional racism” and “harassment of Muslims.” On the other hand, one respondent felt that, although discrimination exists in the police against ethnic minorities, generally, “there is no specific anti-Muslim discrimination in the police force.” While some others felt that, “more than religion I think race is the issue.” Two answers are worth quoting:

high levels of scepticism around policing, particularly in light of the issues in Oldham where young Muslims feel little is being done and take matters into their own hands. Little trust exists and there maybe factors around institutional racism. The majority of Muslim communities would not even consider joining the force. Action needs to be taken very soon if the situation between young Muslims (particularly in deprived areas) is to be contained.

Racism amongst the police force and stereotypical view amongst society and (the police) that views many Asians as thugs.

Some respondents mentioned the apparent misunderstanding of racial issues by the police: One felt that they were trying to seem less racist than formerly but that “attitudes are still macho/ nationalistic/ colonial - but mainly patronising.” However, the majority of the respondents referred to the misuse of racial aggravation as an aggravating factor when charging offenders: one explained that it was done by “confusing white complaints of racism as equal to black.”

Recruitment of Muslims into police force

Almost half the respondents said that there were too few Muslims in the police force - a factor which many felt added to the problematic relationship between Muslims and the police. However, reasons given for this lack of Muslim recruitment were varied. For example, one respondent specifically said that recruitment of Muslims was discouraged by the police force: “ethnic applicants discouraged in recruitment. Maltreatment of ethnic police officers common. Discrimination at promotion.” Another commented that “too few Muslims recruited into the police service. Still considerable racist attitudes towards Muslims, occasional racial harassment on Muslims by officers. Charging Muslims, and other minorities with racial aggravation added to charges.”

By contrast, some respondents felt that Muslims were underrepresented in the police due to Muslims’ own decision not to join. Of these, one respondent felt that the reason was lack of trust between police and the community. Another felt that Muslim women, in particular, were discouraged by their own community from joining the police, this being partly attributable to insensitivity within the force

to issues of dress. Others felt that Muslims ought to join the police, with one saying that “the police are now ready and willing to employ Muslim youths.” “Muslims should be encouraged to put themselves forward for recruitment in police department. They should form the police force in substantial numbers and help the authority to fight racism and Islamphobia. There are no good role models for young people to follow.”

One respondent felt that police officers have “unsociable working hours. Muslim women were not allowed to wear hijab previously due to alleged safety reasons, thus unable to follow their religion to the fullest. Extended families demoralised women who were police officers as they did not see them as good role models of traditional women.”

In this context it is relevant to mention that the Metropolitan Police has recently allowed Muslim women to wear headscarves as part of their uniform.

Involvement of community organisations with the police

Some respondents said that a way forward was for the police to be more involved with community organisations, mosques etc. However, despite the problems which surface from time to time, one respondent explained that the “general relationship between the police and Muslim communities are good, and faith groups and mosques cooperate fully.”

Criminal Justice System

The Criminal Justice System is generally seen as discriminating against minorities...

It was pointed out that Muslims by and large have a great respect for law and order as a reflection of the Islamic way of life; however, faith in the British criminal justice system was not high. A large majority of the respondents felt that the criminal justice system was in some way discriminatory, either against Muslims specifically or members of ethnic minorities generally. Only one respondent felt that "there is no specifically anti-Muslim discrimination in the criminal justice system." Another linked it to the policing and other issues:

The British Criminal Justice System should be fair and culturally blind. 10% Muslims in jail, Muslims in inner cities have bad relations with police, though Muslims are encouraged to participate in consultations the recruitment of Muslims is very little. Institutional racism based on culture is deep-rooted. Policing multi-cultural communities must be based on the principles of dignity, respect, equality, difference, consultation an openness and dealing with complaints effectively. Proper and real training about colour, culture and institutional racism should be undertaken. Arbitrary stop and search policy must be changed.

Issues that arose were:

- discrimination in the courts
- the need for the criminal justice system to protect Muslims
- discrimination in the courts

Several respondents said that there was discrimination in the courts against Muslims, in a variety of ways:

- that Muslims/ members of ethnic minorities tended to receive higher sentences than white defendants.
- that language and communication was a problem, with a shortage of interpreters.
- that lack of representation of Muslims on the bench was also a factor.

The need for the criminal justice system to protect Muslims

As well as treatment of Muslims within the criminal justice system, the respondents raised issues concerning the need for the criminal justice system to protect Muslims. Some spoke of the need for statutory changes to be made: “religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred must be outlawed without further delay”, “make Islamic phobia illegal”, “Muslims should be protected through more statute law.” There was also “reluctance to recognise racial elements in crimes against Muslims.” One respondent said that “the British justice generally is fair but sometimes Muslims suffer from racial and religious prejudice and they do not get fair treatment.” This is how one respondent explained:

Religious discrimination and incitement to religious hatred must be outlawed without further delay. Religious attacks on Muslims and their properties must be taken seriously. Evidence suggests Muslims are treated differently in all stages of British Penal and Criminal justice system. Asian and Blacks receive longer sentences. Religious

needs of Muslim prisoners need to be met. A Muslim Advisor post in the service has existed for the last two years but a new Prison Act should be introduced to reflect the multi-cultural society.

Prison Service

Harsh regimes are being applied to Muslims in prison. No opportunity for practice of Islam.

In 1991 there were 731 Muslims in British prisons. However, in 2001 this number reached 5190. This is a very significant increase in 10 years. Several respondents referred to the increasing numbers of Muslims in British prisons. Such an increase requires that attention be given to the needs of such prisoners. However, many respondents felt that Muslims fared badly in prisons compared to other prisoners. This was felt to be (as with many of the other services under study) due both to active racism, and to a failure to provide appropriately for specific needs. Muslim staff also experienced problems, for broadly the same reasons. A significant number of respondents pointed to the need for the prison service to look at the specific needs of Muslim prisoners. Typical answers included: "religious needs of Muslim prisoners need to be met"; "Cultural training for prison staff a must."

The issues raised were:

- facilities for the practice of religion
- staff hostility
- harassment and attacks by other prisoners

Facilities for the practice of religion

At a national level, a Muslim Advisor has been in post for two years who is trying to bring about changes. However, almost half of the respondents said that more should be done to enable Muslim prisoners to practise Islam in prison. Some felt that Imams visiting prisoners should be given more support: one explained that “a visiting Imam must receive a proper employment contract and access to Muslim inmates same as Chaplains of the Christian faith.” Others referred to Halal food and prayer facilities (including for staff) as essential for Muslim prisoners. One explained that “although there are diversity officers to represent ethnic prisoners in prisons, they might not be sensitive to Muslim needs, specially due to lack of Islamic awareness of religion and practices. There should be more support to prisoners by letters, people’s visits, more cleaning services, including Halal food and prayer rooms.”

Staff hostility

Several respondents specifically referred to hostility from prison staff towards Islam and Muslim prisoners: “contempt towards Islam.” Several felt that staff should receive training in Islamic cultural awareness.

Harassment and attacks by other prisoners.

Muslim prisoners are often subject to racist harassment or attacks by other prisoners. Some respondents referred to Muslim prisoners being put into cells with known racists. One of them felt strongly and said the Muslim “convicts

face harassment/ racial discrimination, some have been murdered. [Some Muslims have also been] put in same cell as known racist.”

Armed Forces

Most Muslims would give little thought to the armed forces and even fewer would consider joining up. Stories of discrimination and racism far outweigh other considerations.

It was generally felt that Muslims were underrepresented in the armed forces. There were no positive opinions expressed, with the overwhelming view being that the armed forces were a very long way indeed from having a good relationship with Muslim communities, or in any way reflecting the diversity of British society.

Issues raised were:

- Racist culture within the forces
- Facilities for practice of religion
- Political considerations

The racist culture within the forces was by far the biggest concern for the respondents. Muslims did not join the forces because of “a culture of racism”. The armed forces are perceived as “very male, white, right and Christian, governed by class.” One respondent said “I don’t think Muslims have a place in the Armed Forces.” Some respondents also spoke of the need for a change to policies and procedures within the forces to tackle this problem. The feeling was that the armed forces should be making active efforts to encourage Muslim recruitment. A lack of facili-

ties for the practice of religion was put forward by several respondents as one of the reasons Muslims do not join the forces. One spoke of the need for an “active effort to get more Muslims involved and offer them essential help and allow them to pray, fast and celebrate festivals. They must also have halal food for them.” It was also pointed out that a factor deterring Muslims from joining the armed forces is the fact that, both recently and historically this has meant fighting Islamic countries. Therefore, many Muslims do not want to put themselves in situations where they will sometimes end up fighting against other Muslims. Generally it was felt that “policies, procedures and practices in the armed forces need to be changed to attract, retain and reflect the multi-cultural aspects of the communities and eventual constitution of the force, such as Hijab wearing for women, flexibility/sensitivities to Islam customers and so on.”

Political Participation and Representation

Lack of a Muslim voice

Political participation is a good measure of the integration of Muslims in Britain. Most British Muslims have a right to vote and stand for elections. The concentration of Muslims in certain areas means that in statistical terms they are in a position to influence the political and electoral process in the areas of their settlement.⁸ Their participation in the electoral process has increased in the last 20 years but their representation has made slow progress. There are only 2 MPs (Members of Parliament) in the House of Commons out of 659 MPs. There are 4 members of Muslim origin in the House of Lords. At a local level there are 153 local gov-

ernment councillors. There is one Muslim MEP (Member of European Parliament) from Britain. However, there is no Muslim representation in the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and in the Greater London Authority.

Two-thirds of respondents felt that Muslims lacked a sufficient voice in the political process. Clearly such a situation has important repercussions for the welfare of British Muslims generally. This is both in terms of the impact of Muslims on the policies driving the nation, and in terms of the relationship between the Muslim communities and the country they are living in: a people without a political voice are a people forced out of the mainstream of national life. If this is the case for British Muslims, it is so despite the fact that they have contributed significantly in terms of economic growth. However, one respondent disagreed that Muslims lacked political representation, saying that “representation seems okay, at local and now national level; although limited to Labour Party and with a lack of visible Muslim women.”

However, of those who expressed concerns about this situation, many did feel that at local levels at least Muslims were making their presence felt. Other issues raised were:

- Muslim participation in central government
- Muslim participation in local government
- Perception by Muslims of the political system

Several respondents commented on the shortage of Muslim MPs and that there were too few Muslims in the House of Lords. It appeared that the problem was that parties did not put forward Muslims for safe seats, and that this should be tackled. For example, one respondent suggested that “all political parties should offer more safe seats in council and national elections to Muslim candidates.”

Some felt that there was a need specifically for younger Muslims to become involved in the politics of central government: "We need more sensible councillors and MPs from the new generation."

Local government was perceived by the respondents as an area where Muslims are better represented. One respondent said that, although there were Muslim councillors, there was still a shortage of Muslims chairing "key committees at local authority level."

It was felt that generally Muslims have contributed substantially in business and in the economic growth of the country, yet they nonetheless lack proper power and share of resources in British society. Some respondents expressed disillusionment with the attitude of the political parties towards Muslim issues. Some typical responses in this context included: "tokenistic", "little support by politicians for Muslim", "Muslims feel badly let down by both the political parties", "there is a lot of talk but very little action." However, there was also the feeling that Muslims should make a greater effort to become involved in politics, because currently "the burden of effectively representing the Muslim interests falls on an extremely small number of individuals who participate in politics." On the whole, the political parties have a long way to go to provide proper representation for Muslims in the political institutions according to their numbers in the population.

Religious and Racial Discrimination and Violence

For many Muslims, religious and racial discrimination and violence is a fact of life.

The first Race Relations Act in Britain was passed 37 years ago in 1965, the second in 1968 and the third in 1976 (current Race Relations Act). The 1976 Act is now being extended to include some public bodies and government functions which were so far not included in the scope of the Act. The Race Relations Act deals with racial discrimination. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2001 has recently strengthened the 1976 Act. Under the 1976 Act the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) was set up and now there is a network of over 100 local Racial Equality Councils partly funded by the CRE. Many local authorities also have their own equalities and/or race relations units.

Religious discrimination can take different forms. For example, it could simply be religious prejudice which is attitudinal, and/or there could be a deliberate act of direct discrimination based on religion. It is also possible that Muslims are discriminated against as a result of institutional practices or procedures which is seen as indirect discrimination.

Despite the legislation in Britain against racial discrimination for the last 37 years, ethnic minorities, including Muslims, are still victims of racial discrimination. The Race Relations Act of 1976 does not fully protect Muslims because religious discrimination is not unlawful in Britain. It is worth mentioning that due to case law two religious groups, Sikhs and Jews are protected by the Race Relations Act. However, in another part of the country, namely, Northern Ireland, religious discrimination is unlawful under the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989. A close examination of this Act shows that there is nothing in it which could not be implemented in Britain for Muslims and other religious groups. Therefore, this anomaly could be removed, if the political will were there.⁹ Some Muslim workers have been sacked because they wanted to offer

prayers at their work place and some Muslim women have been refused jobs because of their dress, and sometimes Muslim girls have been excluded from schools because they wanted to wear headscarves. Last year research funded by the Home Office showed that Muslims perceived and experienced religious as well as racial discrimination. The Human Rights Act (1998) also prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion.

One respondent said that “most Muslims are passionate about Islam as a way of life. Although a tolerant community the younger generation of Muslims do not feel they should put up with any sort of religious or racial discrimination or violence.”

Of all the questions put to respondents, this one drew the greatest response – reflecting the centrality of this issue to Muslims. Almost all respondents expressed a view, and all felt that discrimination and/or violence were a major problem for Muslims. The importance of action around this issue can therefore hardly be overstated: it is clearly unacceptable for a community to be living in fear.

Issues raised were:

- discrimination
- violence
- the need for legislation.

An overwhelming majority of respondents said that Muslims experienced discrimination in their daily lives. Some of these specifically referred to “Islamophobia” as the context for the discrimination, and one referred to Islam as the “most hated religion”, both by white people and also some other ethnic minorities. Respondents also referred to discrimination in the workplace, both in the sense that Muslims may be passed over for promotion and so on,

and also in that employers generally fail to be sensitive to the needs of Muslim employees, eg: "lack of facilities for prayers during the month of Ramadan", "limited holiday allowance/entitlements if Muslims want to go away for Haj", "limited understanding of women wearing Hijab/Burka by fellow white people." Some respondents referred to children facing discrimination in schools, and one felt that there exists a "conscious part in schools (in my opinion) to confuse students about their identity." It was also felt the misrepresentation of Islam by the media as one of the causes of the discrimination experienced by Muslims. In addition, several respondents spoke of racist violence directed towards Muslims, including "violence against mosques" and "gangs of skinheads and National Front hooligans taunting Muslim women and children." One said that hostility and violence had become worse since 11 September, 2001. A couple of respondents mentioned domestic violence experienced by Muslim women, and the lack of appropriate services to help. In brief, several respondents called for legislation to protect Muslims from discrimination, and to rectify the current situation whereby racial discrimination is illegal, but not discrimination on the grounds of religion. Some additional comments are reproduced below:

Many attacks are made on the Muslim population by the other groups. However, recent events show retaliation is just as prevalent.

In outlawing Islamophobia many barriers that keep Muslims from full participation in society can be received. Also there are many problems which affect Muslim women, but must be dealt with in a particular way, for example, domestic violence, but Muslim women's organisations are

not being funded because they associate themselves with religion and not race.

Employers not aware of Muslim festival holidays and significance of holy days, including Friday prayer times. Gangs of skin heads and national front hooligans taunt Muslim women and children.

Community Facilities and Inter-Community Contacts

Slow and gradual inter-community links

First let us examine how Muslims in Britain have responded to their religio-cultural needs. This has resulted in establishing community facilities, particularly for worship and religious instruction. In order to organise these facilities, several organisations and associations at local, regional and national levels have been formed. In Britain, it is now estimated that there are over 1200 local Muslim organisations and that there is an estimated number of almost 1000 mosques. The first mosque in Britain was established at Woking in Surrey in 1890. Mosques now include both newly purpose-built mosques and also converted houses and factories. The newly built mosques are found in several areas including London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow and Bradford. There are 58 mosques, old and newly purpose-built, in Birmingham and almost 50 in Bradford.

Among the national and European level co-ordinating organisations is the Islamic Council of Europe, whose role is to provide a link between Muslim organisations in various European countries and the necessary support for their activities. It was very active in the 1970s and 1980s but

more recently its activities have diminished significantly, partly due to funding problems. The Union of Muslim Organisations in the United Kingdom and Eire (UMO) is one of a number of national co-ordinating bodies. Another newly formed national group, the Muslim Council of Britain (MBC) was launched in November of 1997 claiming a membership of 300 Muslim organisations. Some of the other important organisations with religio-educational roles at national level include the United Kingdom Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation, the Muslim Education Trust, the National Muslim Education Council of the UK, and the Council of Mosques.

Mosques play an important religio-educational role and organised religious activities take place in mosques under the auspices of Muslim organisations in Britain. Muslim organisations locally, regionally and nationally, provide an opportunity for the development of religio-cultural awareness and help bring Muslims together. They also become contact points for inter-community links.

Secondly, we will look at the responses in relation to inter-community contacts.

Rather than focussing on a service, respondents under this heading considered two issues:

- the relationship between Muslims and other communities
- the relationship among the various Muslim communities.

The relationship between Muslims and other communities

Half of the respondents felt that there were difficulties in the relationship between Muslims and some other sections

of the community in Britain. Of these, some pointed to tensions between Muslims and white people, quoting problems in various cities, notably “examples are Bradford, Oldham, Birmingham and Manchester, where local authorities have encouraged segregation.” Some respondents also spoke of tension between Muslims and other ethnic minority communities. One explained that “strained relations with other Asian communities such as Hindus and Sikhs lead to further problems.” A few of the respondents felt that the political history of the Indian sub-continent was still very much a factor in causing hostility between these communities. However, others felt that the situation was positive: “satisfactory relationship with other minority communities – no concern.” Of those who did express concern about the situation, some called for an improvement in inter-community links, by various means. Examples of such suggestions include: “more understanding amongst various communities through education.” “Effective and efficient liaison to be established between various communities, authorities and committees to develop understanding, tolerance and relationships.” “Muslims are introverts. They need to become extroverts.” Some other comments in this context are listed below:

There are some tensions between various sections of communities.

It is important that a culture of mutuality and trust is built between all faith communities.

There must be channels of communication opened for bridge-building and the seeking of a common good.

There must be co-operation between different people for good causes.

Due to historical reasons Muslims do not trust other faith communities.

Inter-faith movement is relatively very new.

Dialogue and encounters between various faith communities on mutual interest issues have just begun.

Effective and efficient liaisons to be established between various communities, authorities and committees to develop understanding, tolerance and relationships.

The relationships among the various Muslim communities.

This did not appear to be an area of great concern, with only 5 respondents expressing a view. Of these, 2 felt that there were “some differences and difficulties within the Muslim community”, and that “Muslims may not interact enough due to diversity in languages and different cultures.” On the other hand, a few respondents, however, referred to the “sense of unity” within the Muslim community, and pointed to the “generous donations” from Muslims which allow mosques and Muslim schools to be maintained.

Policy and Practice

This was the second dimension in our design to ascertain how these issues and concerns have been addressed by the various institutions. We included a number of key agencies to check awareness of the role of these institutions and agencies and to see to what extent these agencies have been successful in responding.

There is generally a great deal of awareness now of the specific needs of individual communities in particular in light of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and the CRE Standard for local government. Race issues are on the agenda.

This section summarises the positive and negative comments made by interviewees regarding the services under discussion: it then lists their recommendations. Again, direct quotations from respondents are in italics. However, first we outline examples of good practice as mentioned by the respondents.

Examples of Good Practice

Respondents were asked to point to examples of good practice from their own places of work. Twenty six were able to give examples of good practice; only 2 said there were none. The examples can be broken down into 4 categories:

- policies
- provision of facilities
- initiatives
- achievements

Policies

Several respondents referred to successful Equal Opportunities policies operating at their places of work. A typical answer was that “any form of discrimination or harass-

ment is not tolerated.” Others said that Muslim applicants are given equal access to jobs and that equal opportunities were followed. One further respondent spoke of a racial equality plan being developed and implemented, while another referred to the implementation of the “Religious and Cultural Guidelines in Schools.”

Provision of facilities

A number of respondents said that their places of work had taken steps to enable prayer, to make halal food available and were being extremely supportive during the month of Ramadan and flexible to allow staff to break the fast. One mentioned that the borough had a day’s holiday for Eid (although they “mostly get the date wrong!”)

Initiatives

Almost half of the respondents quoted initiatives put in place, including:

- Training in racial awareness
- Establishment of forums for consultation between community groups and service providers
- Positive Action schemes for recruitment of Muslim staff
- Process of sharing and cascading best practice in schools
- Formation of Black Workers’ Groups
- Service Models

Achievements

Several respondents spoke of things achieved in their work, including:

- Successful partnership between community groups/ organisations and the Local Authority
- A successful self-help group of Muslim women care-givers, now given Council funding
- Respect for clients
- Equality and democracy in the workplace
- Inter-faith dialogue and harmony
- A new care centre that caters for the needs of Muslims
- Increased recruitment of Muslim staff

Local Councils

The general view was that councils are now prepared to take Muslim issues on board, following pressure from Muslim groups. "Under political and community's pressure, the local councils have often come forward to recognise the needs and demands of the Muslims." Another typical answer was that the situation is improving because Muslims have taken initiatives and actively participated in local politics. Respondents also welcomed the anti-racist policies and initiatives being implemented in some councils. Several of them commented on initiatives relating to anti-racism and celebrating diversity as well as appointments of specialist consultants on issues affecting local ethnic minority communities. It was pointed out that there has been an increase in literature in various languages, and an improvement in the availability of interpreters. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, the McPherson Re-

port (1999) ¹⁰ and the CRE Standard for Local Government initiatives in this context were mentioned. One respondent said that “some local councils have taken some good initiatives to meet the needs of Muslims but still many have not. Councillors and political parties have difficulty supporting the Muslim community for fear of a white backlash....”

However, a significant number of respondents felt that some councils remain actively hostile to Muslims. A typical answer was: “there are some councils which are extremely anti-Muslim.” Some others felt that the policies put in place to tackle the problems are insufficiently implemented in practice. One said that “we have a long way to go yet.” Another respondent felt that “middle management is still very prejudiced.” From the interviews and round table discussions the following suggestions emerged in relation to local councils in Britain.

Suggestions

1. Local councils should employ more Muslim staff.
2. Councils need to liaise more actively with Muslims and Muslim groups: one respondent in particular said to “involve them in regeneration proposals and continue to consult them.”
3. Councils should change their practices in light of the Human Rights Act and other relevant legislation.

Health Service Providers

It appears that there is an increased availability of halal meals in hospitals. Many Health Service staff are from the Muslim community. There is also an increased availability

of interpreters within the Health Service. However, some respondents felt that insufficient attention is paid to the religious needs of Muslim patients and users.

There are insufficient specialist services provided: “particularly in provision of facilities for Asian women in terms of separate facilities.” Therefore, quite often charities and smaller groups have to make up or fill in gaps left by the Health Department. Several useful suggestions were made to improve the Health Service in relation to Muslim patients. The following comments illustrate some of these points:

There are enough GPs in WF from Islamic faith. Not enough nurses and consultants from Muslim communities. Not enough dialogue between health providers and faith groups, although [that of the] Mauritian cultural society is exemplary and commendable.

There is need for better education in respect of preventive measures for better health. Otherwise Muslims suffer as much as others in lack of services.

Several AHA, hospitals, and so on. have begun to take on board the religious needs of Muslims. Still insufficient, particularly in provisions for facilities for Asian women in terms of separate facilities when needed.

Suggestions

1. training of Health Service staff in awareness of issues affecting Muslims.
2. updating of policies in line with the Human Rights Act 1998.

3. a package of measures regarding language and religious practice. For example bi-lingual assistance and leaflets should be made available in three main languages, Urdu, Hindi and Punjabi and other relevant community languages for non-English speaking communities.

Also the following services should be provided in various languages:

- telephone helplines
- trained interpreters
- advocacy provision
- prayers rooms with paid imams equal to Christian Chaplains
- provision of culturally accepted food.

Schools

Educational issues generally bring out the most passion and get the strongest reactions. Some of these issues have been raised by Muslim parents and Muslim organisations in recent years and have been handled by relevant authorities differently. A few respondents felt that there is an increased availability of ESL (English as a Second Language) teaching. Muslim festivals are increasingly being recognised. There is an awareness to look into why more black and ethnic minority children are being excluded or are under-achieving in schools. It appears that some schools are meeting the needs of their multi-faith student population, including Muslims. Some respondents also said that, generally, Muslim schools are “good and involving.” One, in particular, said “there is now a drive into why more black and ethnic minority children are being excluded or

are under achieving in schools and action will need to be taken to address this. Although statistics are produced, the issue is whether there is a real commitment to ensure that these communities improve." Another felt that "there is a need for seemingly Muslim teachers where there is a large number of Muslim boys and girls. Teachers [are needed] who can speak to them in their own language and not hold any bias or prejudice against other ethnic groups."

On the other hand some respondents said that there are very few Muslim schools - only 3 having received government funding. Single-sex schools are discouraged although there is demand for such schools by a vast majority of parents. It was also felt that practice of Islam in schools is "looked down upon". Some of the action to meet the needs of the Muslims was seen by one respondent as tokenistic: "window dressing, eg appoint a few black faces on the staff." In the light of Muslim parents concern about education issues the following suggestions were put forward by those who participated in the study:

Suggestions

Policies, strategies and guidelines ought to be put in place:

1. achievement strategies with specific intervention measures to tackle underachievement (Differentiated Target Setting)
2. close analysis of permanent exclusions (informing intervention)
3. developing religious/ cultural guidelines for schools
4. provision of community language teaching in schools

5. wider advertisement of job vacancies (specific competencies inserted into Job Specification)
6. training staff in religious and cultural awareness.
7. increasing the number of Muslims both on the staff and on the boards of governors.
8. increasing the involvement of local people in the running of schools

Central Government

It was felt that “government guidance and commitment is forthcoming in addressing issues around race, discrimination, equality and inclusion, however, it is mostly directed towards public services. It would be nice if it were extended across all sectors.” Another commented that “the little worth that is conducted by local councils is seen as enough; community projects do exist, but not on a large scale. We need government policies to deal with larger issues; the council is not enough.” One interviewee explained that “Muslims are underrepresented at the higher echelons of power in central government. Not enough MPs in parliament. Muslim lobby is weak.” “Muslims as a community have made no impact in offering the national government policies particularly in the area of foreign policy and immigration.” It was felt that there was insufficient representation in Parliament and that little attention is paid to Muslim needs. Concern is only raised when a situation occurs such as Oldham. Otherwise Muslims needs are not on the government’s agenda. However, it was acknowledged by several respondents and those who participated in round table discussions that some good government initiatives have been taken. In particular, “initiatives for social inclusion are helpful, and DfEE targeting [concerning the]

school's exclusion and underachievement" were appreciated. It was also the view that there is an increased awareness of racial issues. One respondent said that people were "beginning to acknowledge the 'whitewash' in Parliament and that black voices need to be heard." However, there were others who were not satisfied and felt that there was a lack of interest in Muslim issues at central government level. One of them said, "Muslims as a community have made no impact in affecting the national government policies." Several others felt that most government departments are unsympathetic to issues concerning Muslims and that Muslims are underrepresented at the higher echelons of power in central government. For example there are not enough MPs in parliament and generally the Muslim lobby is weak."

To deal with some of these issues the following suggestions were made:

Suggestions

1. The Government should produce legislation to tackle religious discrimination.
2. There should be an increase in Government policies and guidelines around religious discrimination.
3. More Muslims should be recruited into government and in the civil service because progress is not possible until Muslims are recruited into key jobs.
4. Liaisons between government and Muslim community groups should be increased and developed.

Communities

It was recognised by several respondents that there is some highly positive Muslim involvement in groups and committees dealing with matters of interest to the community. For example, there is linkage to the Asian Heritage Achievement Group. There was a regular dialogue taking place with Standing Consultative forum groups. There is also representation of Muslims on the Standing Advisory Committee for Religious Education.

“Organisations like Muslim Council of Britain are doing their best to encourage Muslims to participate in public affairs.” Some useful self-help initiatives exist. Muslims are becoming more integrated, and consequently “less threatened by the rest of the society.” However, some respondents were not satisfied with the situation and felt that there is not enough self-help work. Several said that “not enough is done by the Muslim community and they felt that Muslims cannot expect others to help them, when they do not help themselves.” There was also a feeling that those Muslims who are involved in public affairs may not be truly representative: “The danger here is that they may not be speaking for the Muslim community at large.” “Women are not properly represented in Muslim community organisations.” Some other comments are worth noting here:

Action at community level is mostly through voluntary organisations and so-called community leaders and representatives. The danger here is that they may not be speaking for the Muslim community at large. There is enthusiasm by the Muslim community to become involved in decision-making processes but little is actually been done on the ground.

Communities need to educate their young, especially females....Mosques should develop greater levels of support for their congregations by involving in social care and health care work.

Although the communities are trying to develop themselves on self-help, they would need support from the authorities in terms off additional resources.

Need to become tolerable and show respect for each others religious faiths, cultural and social attitudes and pre-dacious.

Accept that there are many internal problems which must be sorted out by taking an active role in combating injustice themselves. These include standing up against domestic violence, forced marriages, drugs, alcohol abuse, academic underachievement, islamophobia, and others.

Some suggestions included:

- More Muslim elders should participate in adult education to better themselves
- Mosques should develop greater levels of support for their congregations by involving themselves in social care, health care work, including prevention
- More dialogues between differing Islamic groups and other religious groups ought to take place
- More social work by Muslims for indigenous populations should also take place.

Suggestions

1. Self-help schemes within the Muslim community should be further developed and funded

2. Dialogue between Muslim groups and government should be increased.

Other Institutions

(including Prison, Judiciary, CRE, RECs)

Valuable work is done by the CRE and RECs to promote racial equality. However, it was felt that the CRE and RECs tend to be dominated by a particular racial/cultural group, and concentrate on the welfare of that group only. In this context many public bodies are seen as hostile or indifferent to Muslim interests. At the same time there is not enough knowledge amongst the public about relevant information as the Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia showed clearly. One respondent felt that “as far as the CRE and RECs are concerned, a lot of work is being done to promote racial equality. However, in terms of very specific issues relating to the Muslim community there is not a single organisation which can be identified as being proactive. Other areas of the legal framework are very patchy.” Another respondent expressed this way: “working in the equality field I am quite shocked to learn that not much is known about islamophobia, Worse still, is that recommendations stated in the Runnymede Report are not known.”

Generally several suggestions were made to address provisions for Muslims are perceived to be inadequate and token – like in nature.

Suggestions

1. More Muslims in the legal field, particularly on the bench are needed.

2. Legislation to outlaw religious discrimination is urgently needed and an amended Prison Act putting Islam on a par with Christianity.
3. Organisations must update their policies and practices in line with the Human Rights Act.
4. Positive recruitment of Muslims to key organisations should be useful.

Generally, it was felt that there was “blatant discrimination in the Criminal Justice System.” There was discrimination in universities, and in relation to Muslim schools. It was also felt that generally, services such as the Prison Service, the Health Service and the Police Service, were not sensitive to the needs of Muslims and the insufficient provision for Muslims were made by local authorities. All this was not helped by the lack of legislation to deal with religious discrimination.

Two other concerns were also mentioned by several participants in the study. One was about the negative attitudes of the media towards Islam and Muslims. Typical answers included: “press and Media are generally xenophobic.” There is “anti-Muslim hostility in the media.” The other concern was about the future of young Muslims in Britain. They were worried about the “de-Muslimisation of the Muslim youth.” They were also worried about the “future of family unit given high divorce rates in Britain.” Some also felt that there was “shortage of Muslim boys/girls when seeking marriage partner for their children,” and this sometimes created practical problems about arranging the marriages of Muslims in this country.

All Services

The respondents were asked to consider improvements they would like to see across all services. Their responses are summarised below:

Better accommodation for religious practice:

Prayer rooms, shorter or earlier working hours during Ramadan. Eid should be recognised as an official religious holiday. There should be paid leave to go on Hajj

Greater understanding of Islam:

Awareness of the different lifestyle of Muslims should be increased. Islamic studies should be provided as an option at the GCSE level and efforts should be made to eradicate misunderstanding about Islam.

Muslims working together:

All Muslim groups ought to unite and stand on one platform and speak with one voice on common issues facing British Muslims.

Respect and better relationships between Muslims and others:

There was an urgent need to have better relationships between diverse communities and in particular initiatives should be taken by communities to foster understanding between different faiths.

Conclusions

Muslims are now an integral part of a multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-faith Britain. Religious organisations play an important role in civil society and provide substantial support for their members. There are multi-faith organisations set up by the government such as the Inner Cities Religious Council and guidance on involving them in regeneration programmes has been issued.¹¹ However, in both legal and symbolic connections between church and state, except the Anglican Church all other churches and religions are excluded. In particular, the Act of Settlement 1701, the Marriage Acts 1949-96 and the Prison Act 1952 are widely felt to privilege Anglicans in England over other denominations and faiths. Also there are customs related to civic religion such as daily prayers at Westminster and various religious ceremonies including memorial events, the law of blasphemy and the coronation oath which exclude other religious groups. Therefore, there is a general feeling that the Church of England should be disestablished to meet the requirements of a multi-faith Britain in the 21st century.

It appears from research evidence that hostility and general discrimination against Muslims force them to seek support from their own communities. Muslim school leavers as well as their parents face very high unemployment rates compared with whites and others from the same areas. This is partly due to racial and religious discrimination. In education Muslim children are also facing disadvantages in terms of poor educational achievements and lack of facilities for the teaching of their religion and culture in schools. Muslim parents are generally concerned that their children are not able to learn about their religion in formal educational institutions. Although Muslim organisations

provide such teaching facilities in mosques and community centres, these activities are not enough. The housing conditions of Muslims are also inferior compared with indigenous white people.

Muslims are over-represented in the prison population (almost 10% of the total). However, they are under-represented in the police, the judiciary, the civil service, the media, public appointments and also in the decision-making process. For example, there are only two MPs of Muslim origin in the House of Commons out of 659. However, to reflect the Muslim population in Britain, there should be at least 20 MPs of Muslim origin.

Legislation in Britain against racial discrimination has been in operation since 1965. But there is still widespread racial and religious discrimination against Muslims and other ethnic minorities. The Race Relations Act 1976 does not fully protect Muslims because religious discrimination is still not unlawful in Britain. Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam provides a legal basis for the European Union to take action against discrimination in religion or belief in addition to racial or ethnic origin. There is also recognition of this in the Human Rights Act (1998), the Scotland Act (1998) and the Greater London Authority Act (1999). However, very few participants were aware of these developments. Muslims feel that they need to be protected by law as Sikhs and Jews are protected from religious discrimination as a result of case law. In particular, since 11 September, 2001, the hostility and attacks against Muslims, both verbal and physical have increased. Recently there have been numerous press reports attributing violent assaults and attacks on individuals and property such as mosques. Generally, there seems to be an increase in islamophobia.¹²

Our research has shown that there is general hostility towards Islam and Muslims in Britain by services, in the

media and by the general public.¹³ Racism and religious discrimination against Muslims, in the workplace,¹⁴ in schools, on council estates is widespread.¹⁵ The public services have, in general, failed to meet the specific needs of Muslims in terms of prayer facilities, halal food, religious holidays and so on. There is also serious underrepresentation of Muslims in the national and local level decision-making process and in key agencies such as Government, the Health Service, Education Service and the judiciary.

With the significant demographic change which has taken place within the Muslim communities in Britain, namely a shift from first generation migrants towards second and third generation British-born citizens, the question of identity is now part of an ongoing discussion within the Muslim communities in Britain. This discussion is relevant, among other factors, for community facilities, and the responses of relevant authorities to the needs of Muslims in the areas of their settlement. The Queen, commenting on Muslim identity while on a state visit to Pakistan, said in a speech in Islamabad on 8 October, 1997, that "A distinctive new identity that of the British Muslim, has emerged. I find that healthy and welcome". But be as it may, Muslims are generally misunderstood by non-Muslims in Britain and they face problems in terms of integration. Young Muslims generally feel that while they are getting the same education and training as white indigenous young people they are not being treated equally and that they are in practice second-class citizens. They also feel that their parents have, on the whole, tolerated prejudice, discrimination and harassment, perhaps as the price of settling in Britain. However, it appears that young Muslims are not prepared to accept racial and religious discrimination and harassment. Unless Muslim young people receive equal treatment the tensions between Muslim young people and non-Muslims

are likely to grow as was seen in street disturbances in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the summer of last year. Therefore, positive policies and measures are needed by the state agencies and others to facilitate the integration of Muslims by bringing their rights and their working and living conditions in line with those of their fellow-citizens. It is in this context that the following recommendations are made.

Recommendations

A number of suggestions were made by the respondents during our research which are mentioned in detail in previous chapters. Here we outline general recommendations.

1. Like race and sex discrimination, religious discrimination should be made unlawful in Britain.
2. In addition to ethnic and gender monitoring, religious affiliation should also be monitored by all public and private sector employers and service providers.
3. Race equality policies in all institutions must address religious and cultural racism.
4. Regular monitoring on religious affiliation basis must take place to evaluate the effectiveness of equal opportunity policies.
5. Facilities should be made available by employers for Muslims for the practice of religion.
6. There should be guidelines for service providers and employers on matters affecting Muslims.
7. Service providers should be sensitive to the religious and cultural needs of Muslims. This could, in par-

- ticular, be achieved by training of staff and recruitment of Muslims by various service providers.
8. Schools should develop guidelines about the religious and cultural needs of Muslim pupils.
 9. To correct their underrepresentation, more Muslims should be trained and recruited into key positions in government, services, the police, the judiciary and elsewhere.
 10. Research should be carried out to analyse the police responses to hate crimes related to religious aspects.
 11. There is an urgent need for a review of definitions of racial harassment by the public sector, education and housing departments, in particular, to ensure that there is a reference to religion.
 12. Schools, employers and others need to recognise the importance of Hijab to their Muslim women students and employees and there should be clear guidelines on this.
 13. Schools should include more information on Islam and Muslims in their curriculum to correct the current myths and misconceptions.
 14. There is need to dispel ignorance about Islam in the West. The media could play an important role in this context. The media should also be sensitive to the feelings of Muslims when reporting issues involving religion and religious groups. There should be guidelines for journalists on reporting religion and culture like the current guidelines on race reporting.
 15. There is need to address adverse views of Islamic practices perceived to be inimical to the British way of life.
 16. There should be equitable treatment of Muslim schools with the Church and Jewish schools in terms of grant-maintained status.

17. Muslims should participate actively and develop closer links with other religious groups to improve inter-faith relations.
18. All political parties should ensure that Muslims are appropriately represented at local and national levels and in public appointments.
19. There is a need to launch specific campaigns on various issues, in particular on those having to do with Muslim women and young people.¹⁶
20. There should be a commission on the role of religion in the public life of a multi-faith Britain, in particular, one that will look into legal and constitutional matters.

Notes

- ¹ M. Anwar: 1979, *The Myth of Return*, London. Heinemann.
- ² M. Anwar: 1993, *Muslims in Britain: 1991 Census and Other Statistical Sources*, Birmingham: Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations.
- ³ Q. Bakhsh and D. Sullivan: 1985, *Multi-Faith Britain: A Way Forward*, London: Cheeta Books.
- ⁴ M. Anwar: 1998, *Between Cultures*, London: Routledge.
- ⁵ Office of Population Censuses and Surveys: 1993; 1991 Census: *Ethnic Group and Country of Birth (Great Britain)*, London: HMSO.
- ⁶ T. Modood, R. Berthoud, et al.: 1997, *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage*, London: Policy Studies Institute.
- ⁷ Home Office: 2001, *Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team*, London: Home Office.
- ⁸ M. Anwar: 1994, *Race and Elections*, Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations.
- ⁹ M. Anwar: 2000, "The Impact of Legislation on British Race Relations", in: M. Anwar et al. (eds): *From Legislation to Integration?* London: Macmillan.
- ¹⁰ W. McPherson: 1999, *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report*, London: HMSO.

- ¹¹ Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions: 1997, *Involving Communities in Urban and Rural Regeneration: a Guide for Practitioners*, London.
- ¹² See European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (October 2001): *Two Reports, Anti-Islamic reactions in the EU after the terrorist acts against the USA*, Vienna, EUMC.
- ¹³ P. Weller, A. Feldman and K. Purdam: 2001, *Religious Discrimination in England and Wales*, London: Home Office.
- ¹⁴ B. Hepple and T. Choudhry: 2001, *Tackling religious discrimination: practical implications for policy makers and legislators*, London: Home Office.
- ¹⁵ *The 2001 Census of Population (1999)* London: HMSO. The 2001 Census included for the first time a question on religious affiliation which should provide systematic information about the demographic and socio-economic position of Muslims and other religious groups in Britain. The information will be available in 2003.
- ¹⁶ Also see the Parekh Report: 2000, *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, London: Profile Books.

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