

ENSENADA VERSUS CARVAJAL: A TOPIC FOR DEBATE

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Introduction

The differing characters and political ideologies of the Marquis of la Ensenada and José de Carvajal are still the subject of historiographic debate. The idea defended from the time of Menéndez Pelayo through that of John Lynch emphasised the Ensenada-Carvajal confrontation as one of the factors that slowed the major Bourbon reforms until the arrival of Carlos III. An opposing viewpoint is presented by the works of Gómez Molleda and Gómez Urdáñez, who maintain that these differences never completely obstructed the reforms. This debate continues in the most recent studies of Fernando VI's reign. In the following pages, the reader will find a general view of this phenomenon. The first part outlines the personal and professional similarities and differences between Ensenada and Carvajal from the time of their birth until the beginning of their careers – a period not often dealt with in historical texts. The second part focuses on their rise to, and exercise of, power during the reign of Fernando VI. In that section, their theoretical fluctuations and supposed alternation of power as ministers will be traced, followed by a brief consideration of their later influence during the reigns of Carlos III and Carlos IV.

The protagonists, face to face: a brief description Their social origin and early careers under Felipe V

The humble origin of Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea (Hervías, La Rioja, 1702-Medina del Campo, 1781), son of a family of impoverished *Hidalgos*, has awoken historical interest, which is logical, given the rapid political and social ascension of this minister from Rioja during the reigns of Felipe V and Fernando VI. His climb was slower in the first phase (1702-1719), though, and this was not such an uncommon phenomenon in the history of the Spanish administration, as is shown by the careers of Valenzuela – under Carlos II – and Manuel Godoy, under Carlos IV.

The reiteration of this fact was certainly intentional. Its objective was to locate any possible element of confrontation between Ensenada and José de Carvajal y Lancáster (Cáceres, 1698 - Madrid, 1754), who was another of the political protagonist during the first years of Fernando VI's reign. The social origin of this minister from Extremadura was marked by generation after generation of illustrious lineage. History tells us that the Carvajal y Lancáster were related to the Sande, Montezuma, Silva, and Noroña families, and with a long list of nobility and leading statesmen close to the throne, including the House of Abrantes, which was held by the older brother, Juan de Carvajal. Their differing social origins shaped Fernando VI's two future ministers in opposing ways. Ensenada chose the field of professional experience, first in Madrid and later in Cádiz. We know little of his

career between 1702 and 1719, but we do know that he was under the aegis of José Patiño. Carvajal was an alumnus of the *Colegio Viejo de San Bartolomé* ("Old School of Saint Bartholomew") in Salamanca, and his transfer to Madrid was only a matter of time. The Court was the best option for the son of a large family whose elder brothers enjoyed either the family legacy or military or ecclesiastical leadership. Historical texts have made much of the differing personalities of Ensenada and Carvajal and I won't go into detail here, but the differences were very clear. As Ozanam pointed out: "the inflexible and severe integrity of Carvajal's character collides with Ensenada's agile and suggestive ambition on both domestic and foreign matters...." Descriptions of Ensenada are frequent, perhaps because of the existence of the "farándula de don Zenón" ("don Zenón's Troupe"). Carvajal went much more unnoticed in political satire and public opinion of his time, as Teófanos Egido points out in his study. This fact has not been well interpreted and is an example of the disinterest history has shown for the political role of this minister from Extremadura. And yet, despite the differences, there were similarities in certain personality traits, for example both were bachelors and neither, to use a phrase from their time, had ever known a woman, that is, been married. Carvajal's will leaves no room for doubt; he left everything to his nephew, Manuel Bernardino, his niece, María Sinforosa, and his brother Nicolás, with no mention of wife nor children. Huéscar rather jokingly pointed out his excessive coldness in affairs of State and of the heart: "...if only you were slightly in love, then there would be nothing left to reproach in you...." and he added, "...you lack only two things to be a great man.. and the second of these is to fall in love at least once in your life..."

Ensenada was also a bachelor, although his will has yet to be located, but his bachelorhood was different than Carvajal's. Gómez Molleda discussed Ensenada's relationship with the Marchioness of Salas and other ladies of the Court, but as far as we know, it was never more than a matter of friendship. He was always surrounded by women, but he "used" them more for political than for sentimental advantage. Ensenada needed this type of friendship in order to progress in the courtly circles closest to the monarchs. It is curious – or perhaps not – that during his exile in Granada he allowed no women to enter his home.

Court patrons and early political responsibilities (1720-1746)

As we have seen, the two ministers had quite different training, and yet, despite these differences there were links that led them to a similar starting point: the posts of political responsibility they held during the reign of Felipe V, retained, and expanded, under Fernando VI. I am referring not only to their first professional skirmishes at the head of various institutions and administrative organisations under Felipe V, but also to posts with considerable political responsibility. This was clearer in the case of Ensenada, who headed the Ministry of War, Finance, Navy and of the Indies; but Carvajal was no less effective in this sense as president of the Commerce

and Currency Committee. This committee was reformed in 1730 and became an institution representing the late mercantilism of the period.

Ensenada in the wake of administrators and statesmen

The golden triangle of the administration under Felipe V was formed by José Patiño, José del Campillo and... Ensenada. All of them held positions of major administrative responsibility under Felipe V and successively took on their posts and areas of influence.

Ensenada's training was mainly practical, dictated by his humble social origin and high professional qualities. This training, essentially in maritime and military matters, allowed him to ascend from the rank of warrant officer in the Navy up to the Ministry of Finance, War, Navy and the Indies in 1743, a position which he held through the reign of Fernando VI, until 1754.

Ensenada's first posts at the ministry of the Navy were under the patronage of José Patiño, who promoted him on numerous occasions between 1720 and 1736. Among his jobs there – warrant officer at the Ministry of the Navy, first officer and commissar of licences in Cantabria, Garrison officer, Royal Commissar of the Navy, comptroller of the maritime department in Cartagena, director of the Ferrol shipyards, Commissar of orders of the Navy for the recovery of Oran, etc. – we must emphasise his work as Garrison officer in 1726, when he was under the orders of José del Campillo, his future patron.

Ensenada's career took definitive shape during the years between the death of Patiño in 1736 and the end of Campillo's term as minister in 1743. His maritime and military experience was rounded out with diplomatic experience between 1740 and 1742, when he was named Secretary of State and War to prince Felipe following the death of Carlos VI. The Marquis took advantage of this diplomatic experience to mingle with ambassadors and diplomatic personnel and established a vast network of clientele. These are the famous *hechuras zenonicias* ("confections of Zenón") studied by Gómez Urdáñez and Cristina González.

Gómez Urdáñez ponders the reasons for Ensenada's rise to the secretariat of Finance, War, Navy and the Indies in 1743. The classic explanations offered by historians emphasise Ensenada's relations with Campillo, the self-interested manoeuvres of the Marchioness of Torrecuso – who was the queen's lady in waiting and a very intimate friend of the Marquis – and the fact that his training and experience made him the ideal candidate for the job. To this, Gómez Urdáñez adds the notion of Ensenada's "complicity" with Isabel de Farnesio, who was always willing to look out for the European interests of the royal children.

Despite early resistance to accept the ministry – Gómez Urdáñez attributes this more to a character trait motivated, perhaps, by his humble origins, than to any humility or lack of ambition – he was named minister of Finance, War, the Navy and the Indies in May 1743, along with added responsibilities as General Superintendent of the general income of millions, lieutenant of the Admiralty, notary of the

kingdoms of Spain, counsellor of State, etc. Ensenada's political and reformist activity between 1743 and 1746 was centred around the Royal Exchequer, which had to be stabilised in order to cover war costs, especially those of the Navy, which was suffering terrific losses.

The oft-repeated idea that Ensenada was passive in foreign policy – it earned him the accusation of francophile – was actually a sign of his wisdom. The Court of Felipe V was a hotbed of ossified bureaucracy, but Ensenada understood that, for the Monarchy, the Council of State was the axis of domestic and foreign policy from which France controlled the flux of relations with Spain. Therefore, Ensenada paid close attention to the prince's intentions in Italy, a policy which utterly failed. In order to avoid future errors, he sent Huéscar to Paris as extraordinary ambassador, and Grimaldi to Genoa, and later to Vienna. He thus established, and exploited, a double flow of information to and from Paris: the official State channel through Villarias, and the unofficial "reserved channel" controlled directly by Ensenada. His manoeuvres had only just begun. And what was Ensenada's relation with Carvajal during those years? His patronage of Carvajal between 1744 and 1745 was ambiguous, and we do not really know whether it was intended to help Carvajal or hurt him. The advantages were Carvajal's direct contact with the prince and princess of Asturias, Fernando and Barbara. Ensenada made it extremely easy for Carvajal to deal directly with the future king and queen and with a small courtly circle that included the Viscount of Vilanova da Cerveira, Portuguese ambassador to Spain. But the disadvantages were equally clear, given Isabel de Farnesio's open hostility to prince Fernando. It was a reckless and risky measure but, with an eye to the future, Ensenada took advantage of the situation. If things turned out badly, he would lose little or nothing. If they turned out well, then he would have something to hang onto during the always foreseeable period of instability between the death of one king and the crowning of the next. His wager was very nearly perfect.

Carvajal, between aristocracy and royalty: Alba, Montijo and the Prince and Princess of Asturias

José de Carvajal's career was initially linked to law as a result of his studies in the *Colegio El Viejo de San Bartolomé* of Salamanca, where he began studies in 1717, earning his law degree in 1722. His first job was as monitor in the Chancellery of Valladolid (1730), and he later became a member of the Council of the Indies – first as a lawyer-minister (1738) and later, thanks to Campillo and Ensenada's support, as Governor (1742-1744) – where he was practically Montijo's substitute. Thus, between 1742 and 1744 Carvajal was *de facto* president of the Council of the Indies while Campillo and Ensenada successively held the post of Secretary of War, Finance, the Navy and the Indies. Finally, in January 1746, while Felipe V was still king, he was named president of the Commerce and Currency Committee.

José de Carvajal's main contact with the Court in Madrid was the Alba family, especially Fernando de Silva Álvarez, Duke of Huéscar and future Duke of

Alba, and his mother. Didier Ozanam has studied the close relations that already existed between the Carvajal and Álvarez de Toledo families before José de Carvajal ascended to ministerial and diplomatic posts in Madrid. This friendship generated an abundant exchange of letters between 1746 and 1749.

Another friend of Carvajal was Cristóbal Gregorio Portocarrero y Guzmán, V Count of Montijo, whom Carvajal met at Court. Montijo became president of the Council of the Indies in 1737, where Carvajal became lawyer-minister in 1738. The friendship was undoubtedly encouraged by their shared origins as leading aristocrats from Extremadura, and it was so intimate that when Montijo was appointed ambassador to the *Diet* in Frankfurt, he named Carvajal his secretary and, in light of his lofty origins, second ambassador with full powers in the case of his absence.

Traditionally, historians have pointed out that Carvajal's role was lauded by his superiors, but that when, for some strange reason, he became Montijo's enemy, he was called to the Court by Campillo in 1742 and named Governor of the Council of the Indies. This was an interim post while president Montijo remained in Europe, but he continued to hold it after the death of Campillo in 1743, right up to Montijo's return in 1744.

Juan Carlos Lavandeira has debunked the greater part of this historical stereotype. It now seems clear that the real reason for Carvajal's return to the Court was economic, since it was quite costly to maintain this jurist in Germany when the diplomatic mission was finished. Economic difficulties delayed Carvajal's trip for three months, until 13 July 1742, when he was finally able to travel thanks to the personal guarantee of Montijo, who set no limits on the cost. Carvajal carried two letters to the King and Queen, one of which praised his work at the *Diet*, while the other recommended that he preside over the Council of the Indies "...whenever I am not able to attend..." Montijo's return put an end to Carvajal's political projects and aspirations and, theoretically, the two became enemies. Nevertheless, Montijo's close relations with Felipe V and Isabel de Farnesio, the declared enemy of prince Fernando, were incompatible with Carvajal's incipient relation to the prince and princess of Asturias. Still, Montijo never openly acted against Carvajal, who was finally named president of the Commerce Committee in January 1746. But let us return to the events. In 1745 Carvajal was navigating the choppy seas between the palace cliques and his work in the Council of the Indies. He became ill, perhaps because of his discontent at finding himself relegated to the Council of the Indies, and this allowed him time enough to draft the Political Testament, a sort of programme of political intentions which he drew up between 5 July and 15 September 1745. Ozanam points out that, according to Argenson, Carvajal mostly instructed the Prince regarding "... des améliorations du dedans, des plantations, des manufactures, des réglemens..." Perhaps the first conversations between Carvajal and prince Fernando in 1745 led to the posterior drafting of the Political Testament, which dealt with the Monarchy's domestic and foreign policy. It served as a sort of

instruction book or guide for the prince and future king, but with a considerable dose of programmes, especially when the projects proposed there are compared to what Carvajal actually carried out as minister under Fernando VI.

In the end, Carvajal's patrons proved stronger, more skilful and faithful than his detractors and he was again restored to public office in January 1746 with the surprising – for a lawyer-minister of the Council of the Indies – post of President of the Commerce and Currency Committee. On one hand, As Pere Molas has pointed out, this was a surprise because it was an exception to the institution's history from 1730 to 1808; on the other, and equally surprising, Carvajal's appointment displaced the president, who had been so since 25 May 1743. And the president was none other than Ensenada. This change appeared to have been made in "friendly" circumstances. Was it a question of skill and foresight on the part of the Minister from La Rioja? Was it in fact a friendly move motivated by that very friendship? Or was it quite the opposite?

Fernando VI's ministers: ministerial fluctuations (1746-1754)

European Courts of the time were constantly debating the limits of the principal ministers' responsibilities and questioning which minister could be considered *primus inter pares*. In Spain there was no real balance of powers between ministers Ensenada and Carvajal. Strictly speaking, the famous image of a political tandem – that is, two political figures pulling on the machinery of the state at the same time – didn't exist. Gómez Urdáñez has shown that, politically, their relation could be better described as a binomial one that functioned despite their differences. Differing origins, training and experience do not signify opposite policies, nor personal confrontations with regard to the king, and despite fluctuations of power in the ministries, reforms advanced and political progress was clearly made. The reformation projects were coherent with the general characteristics of the central decades of the eighteenth century. Gómez Urdáñez reminds us that when Carvajal could have put an end to Ensenada's political standing he didn't want to. Later he could no longer have done so, although perhaps those were not his intentions, anyway. On the other hand, Ensenada could not, at first, eliminate Carvajal, and later, when he could have done so, the latter was no longer a threat. Finally, when one of its two members was no longer around, the political pair was immediately eliminated, although the process of elimination was sadly different in the two cases: Carvajal's death stands in stark contrast to Ensenada's political exile. The complex process underlying Ensenada and Carvajal's binomial politics may never have been consciously orchestrated by them, but it was wiped off the books between April and July 1754.

The Hour of Extremadura: Carvajal as Minister of State, Ensenada as the power behind the scenes (1746-1748)

José de Carvajal's time had come. The coronation of Fernando VI signified the possibility of obtaining

new appointments in the administration and Carvajal was first offered the presidency of the Council of Castile, which he rejected. That position was later accepted by Gaspar Vázquez Tablada, head of the Collegiate church and Bishop of Toledo. Afterwards, Carvajal accepted the secretariat of State, a complex appointment in the judicial sense and one which drew the attention of José Antonio Escudero. That was only the beginning, and he would later become director and president of both the Royal Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando, and the Spanish Royal Academy, with the addition of the Commerce Committee and responsibilities in the Post, Mines and Foreign Affairs.

Carvajal's power was visible in the gradual reshaping of the previous cabinet that affected Villarias, among others. The latter lost ground, but retained his post as secretary of Justice. Isabel de Farnesio's exile to San Ildefonso put an end to this reconciliatory attitude.

No longer a figure under the patronage of another, Carvajal became a patron himself. Under his aegis was Ensenada, among others. On 21 September 1747, Carvajal wrote to Huéscar: "I can assure you that at the beginning, B [Ensenada] owed his position as a civil servant entirely to me, and later he frequently owed me his being able to keep his job, because he started out by making an adverse impression, and all efforts served only to calm this impression, rather than actually eliminating it." Ensenada's strategy was to go unnoticed in Carvajal's shadow, but this policy was short-lived, given the Marquis' character and the arrival of circumstances favourable to his objectives. Shortly after the coronation of Fernando VI, in which a helpful Ensenada took active part, he was named personal secretary to Bárbara de Braganza, though even this was small protection for a minister with past links to Isabel de Farnesio and the Villarias "group."

One efficient way to obtain political protection was to gain the Queen's trust. Ensenada took full advantage of his proximity to Queen Bárbara, reinforcing matters through "reports" to the King. At a time of memos, reports, tracts, gazettes, etc., this was the perfect complement for earning the trust of Fernando VI and Bárbara de Braganza. These reports contained current information whose concrete and dynamic nature made it interesting or at least only slightly boring to the king and queen. Mostly, they dealt in a general way with international relations – these were somewhat more relaxed during the "neutrality of Fernando" – and emphasised domestic reform. These reports assured and confirmed Fernando's goals of neutrality in Europe and domestic reconstruction at home.

Cleverly, Ensenada used other schemes to capture the monarchs' attention as well. Many of the projects in these reports followed the guidelines set down by Carvajal's Political Testament, a document the latter had presented to the monarchs when they were still prince and princess of Asturias. Ensenada took wise advantage of the stature the minister from Extremadura then enjoyed in the Court.

Ensenada's friendship with Farinelli, Bárbara de Braganza's favourite singer, did the rest. Opera performances were all the rage at the Palace and

Carvajal could not contain his malaise, criticising the parties and operas at the palace. It is hardly strange that Ensenada rose rapidly in Fernando's Court and, no longer fearing for his political career, was able to abandoned the protection of Carvajal.

Ensenada flexes his political muscles... as early as 1748

Beginning in 1748, and more clearly by 1749, Ensenada's political power became publicly and notoriously manifest. Between April and October 1748, with the treaty of Aachen, the Marquis revealed many of his political intentions, both the major Bourbon reforms that marked that epoch, and his meddling in matters of State, despite Carvajal's presence. Ensenada's interference in the Council of State was known, and he carried it out from Villarias ministry. And yet, despite its being known, the situation seems to have reached a crucial point. Carvajal caught on to Ensenada's power as early as July 1748, as the latter's meddling was so obvious that it constituted yet another complication in the already complex system through which Carvajal sought to maintain a European equilibrium. "I assure you that what he is doing makes me desperate," wrote Carvajal to Huéscar in reference to Ensenada's behaviour.

The situation worsened quickly, and on 15 January 1749 Carvajal again wrote to Huéscar: "the truth is that I work without knowing what I am really working on. I take part in nothing except what you can plainly see. The days that I go to the Council [of the Indies] I speak only of trifles, and the same thing happens in the Commerce Committee. That is all I participate in, and I only find things out when I hear them on the street. And yet I work, but it is only because that is my nature..."

The "enmity" between Ensenada and Carvajal lasted throughout 1749. Rávago had to calm the King on 25 November because he had found out about the confrontation between his two ministers: "and to console him, I added – to his delight – that I didn't know what would be worse for a State, collaboration or conflict among the ministers. They are hardly saints and if they are too united, then each protects the other, and their errors never come to light."

Time was on Carvajal's side, and not enough had passed since Aachen for Ensenada's meddling to really affect Spanish foreign policy. The political turn soon became obvious, but Carvajal did not realise this and continued to dream of a European equilibrium. In the end, Ensenada found himself in exile as a direct result of Keen, Huéscar and Wall's clever handling of his own attitude.

At first glance, domestic policy seemed more peaceful. These were the years of the great reforms, but they were not lacking in friction. The policies of different ministries were tightly linked, leading to, for example, the defence of a single tax payment and the carrying out of a cadastre on the wealth of the Crown of Castile, as well as resettlement projects, social reforms, the development of the Navy and Merchant Marines, etc. This understanding was long-standing, dating from the encouragement of industry through the founding of commercial and

manufacturing companies in Extremadura and Saragossa (1746), Seville and Granada (1747) and Toledo (1748).

The dismantling of the binomial relation (1750-1754)

Between 1750 and 1754 we can observe a growing tension in Spain's domestic and foreign policy. Reforms continued because there was nothing to brake or definitively block the projects, and those that failed did so because of reform politics' typical Achilles' heel: lack of foresight with regard to cost and profits, opposition and resistance by private interests, etc.

Carvajal's power, if indeed he ever had any, was wounded. His feeling of impotence was so great that, in 1753, in *My Thoughts about the need for a Prime Minister*, his disenchantment with his situation led him to write "...I am not [the prime minister]..." The storm began to rise in 1753 and, logically, it gained force when Carvajal died on 8 April 1745.

Carvajal, "the Quixote of Europe." Ensenada, "Secretary of everything."

Carvajal defended his political project for Europe with passion and, it must be said, considerable naiveté. It was an impossible, though not utopian, project. Furthermore, it was out of date and had been torpedoed by Ensenada.

And yet, Carvajal, who was not entirely unaware of all that, counterattacked. First, in order to combat the Marquis' power, he organised active diplomatic policy on several fronts; second, in a final exercise of responsibility for domestic policy, he used the arms at his disposal – his powers as president of the Commerce Committee – to interfere in the Secretary of Finance's industrial development program. His active diplomatic policy involved the signing of commercial and friendship treaties among different European powers, in other, less-known, European settings, all of which have been studied by Juan Molina Cortón. His main acts were the Spanish-British Commerce Treaty (15 October 1750) and the Treaty of Aranjuez (14 June 1752). Efforts to strengthen relations between Spain and Piamonte through the marriage of princess María Antonia, Fernando VI's sister, to the prince of Piamonte, son of the king of Sardinia – the wedding took place on 12 April 1750 – earned Ensenada and Carvajal the Golden Fleece. So the binomial relation worked in spite of everything.

But there was another reality alongside this one. Ensenada's royal scope of action was very broad indeed. Rather than "En-sí-nada" he was "En-sí-todo," * since, according to father Isla, Ensenada was "Secretary of everything." His main meddling at the time was in negotiations surrounding the Concordat of Privilege of the Holy See, and in the secret policy against England in America.

Rafael Olaechea has pointed out the double lines of negotiation between Madrid and Rome. On one hand, there was the private line through the Ministry of Justice, with Figueroa informing Ensenada; on the other, the line through the Secretary of State, with Portocarrero reporting to Carvajal. In the end it was the Ministry of Justice

under the direction of Ensenada that prevailed, and the Concordat with the Holy See was signed on 11 January 1753 and ratified on 20 February.

Ensenada's project to control and monopolise the logwood crop from Honduras – of incalculable value for dyeing European textiles – was an aggressive commercial policy against English merchants. This policy brought about a spiral of violence in the area that, years later, would lead to the Marquis' fall. Ensenada's project was to compete against the English without recourse to diplomacy, which had thus far failed to produce positive results by forming an ambitious and complex plan of commercial action. The building of merchant ships, the organisation of commercial expeditions, the extraction of the dye in Honduras and Campeche, its commercialisation in Spain through Cádiz and other ports, and its sale with the corresponding increase in tariffs to foreign merchants, especially the English, etc. resulted in increased pressure on Madrid by the British Parliament and increased hostilities in America. Carvajal was unaware of this aggressive policy until he received indirect news of clashes between English warships and the Spanish coast guard in May 1753.

Carvajal's response: domestic action

Carvajal's response was to intervene in domestic projects. As president of the Commerce Committee, he was able to intervene mostly in the Monarchy's development of industry and manufacturing. Although the conflict reached the point of open confrontation, the reformation process was not paralysed because there were shared political interests and a unanimous will to sustain the advances made between 1746 and 1748. The debate deepened in 1753, when factories were unable to meet their goals.

Rivalry between the Commerce Committee and the Royal Treasury was not easily resolved, especially when the leaders of these two institutions Ensenada and Carvajal had similar political orientations, but very different clientele to satisfy. This provoked clashes between the two ministers, a process well-analysed by González Enciso in the case of the Royal Factory of Fine Fabrics of San Fernando.

The differences between Ensenada and Carvajal were more in the means than in the ends. Both sought to encourage Spain's self-sufficiency in industrial matters, and the means to this end were the encouragement of liberalising measures in manufacturing processes and the support of commercial and manufacturing companies with special privileges.

Two concrete examples of these differences were the San Fernando textile factories and the arguments about their tax-exemption. Underlying these arguments was the old debate about the viability of state monopolies and state protection of production. In San Fernando, the two ministers disagreed about who should be put in charge of the factories. The person chosen as director had to have greater technical knowledge while the person designated governor of the Royal Seat needed a more political orientation. Carvajal's goal was to shield the governor's responsibilities from the influence of the

secretariat of Finance, which was closely controlled by Ensenada.

The first death-blow to the industrial establishments was the Royal Decree of 24 June 1752. It was intended to generalise privileges and fiscal exemptions for all manufacturers. This was a terrible blow to those factories previously protected by the State. Carvajal defended them in his Report of 1752 and he was successful. On 30 March 1753 another Royal Decree was issued, softening the most drastic aspects of its predecessor. The State's right to first bid was maintained with regard to merchants and retailers, but not with regard to other manufacturers, some exemptions were maintained and first wholesale or retail sales were exempted from payment of sales taxes. But this was only one battle, and the war continued. The Royal Decree of 18 June 1756 specified that franchises would be maintained only for the period of the concession, although the Commerce and Currency Committee would be allowed to extend that period. The debate continued, but without the presence of Ensenada, by then in exile, or Carvajal, who had died.

A brief epilogue... the ministers of Fernando VI with Carlos III and Carlos IV

With Carvajal dead, there was nothing to restrain Ensenada's political acts. Although its intensity varied, the friendship shared by the two ministers lasted to the end. To a certain degree, Carvajal's death speeded Ensenada's fall between April and July 1754.

History distinguishes between the much-missed Ensenada and the lamentable oblivion of Carvajal. I will not discuss, here, the many Ensenada-inspired programmes included in the reforms carried out during the century of Enlightenment that subject will be discussed by José Luis Gómez Urdáñezbut, as an effort to balance this last image of Fernando IV's ministers, I will mention some of the projects by Carvajal that were recovered during the reigns of Carlos III and Carlos IV. The first of these was the creation of the Royal Company of Barcelona between 1755 and 1756. With some variants, the project appeared in the Political Testament of 1745. In Carvajal's time no privileged commercial company was founded, despite his obsession with their creation, but after his death it was quite hurriedly set up a curious situation arising from political and economic circumstances. In 1785 the Royal Company of the Philippines was established under the auspices of Cabarrús, and this too was a project that had appeared in Carvajal's Political Testament. We could mention other projects, like the New Settlements in Sierra Morena, the social reforms in hospices, founding homes and hospitals, and so on. In the end, José de Carvajal's work extended beyond the century of Enlightenment. The Political Testament was published in 1818 as part of the Continuation of the Treasury of Literary Works, along with the work of father Gándara, and was considered by its publishers to be an example of global reform projects for ministers and statesmen.