Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November
2006, pages 44-45
Talking Turkey
Bombing Campaign a Response to Ankara’s Kurdish Policies,
or “Deep State” Plot?
By Jon Gorvett
|
RIWAQ architect and supervisor
Dima Abu al-Saud (Staff photos P. Pasquini). |
A STRING OF BOMBS IN SOME of Turkey’s top tourism resorts
this past summer has once more plunged the country’s Kurdish
policy back into the headlines. The attacks also reinforced calls
for a restoration of emergency rule in Kurdish areas, while leaving
the government between a rock and hard place, as it tries to combat
the bombers while also downplaying their significance.
Meanwhile, though, the source of the explosions—and the
fact that they also were condemned by the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK), Turkey’s main Kurdish guerrilla group—has remained
largely unexplored, leaving suspicions as to the motivations behind
the shadowy Kurdish Freedom Falcons, or Hawks (TAK).
This group claims responsibility for a series of bomb attacks
across the country, including several on Aug. 28. On that day,
three bombs went off in the Aegean resort town of Marmaris, one
in the Mediterranean city of Antalya and one in Istanbul. The bombs,
most likely hidden in trashcans, killed three and wounded over
40. Many of the injured were tourists; all were civilians. This
came after a string of similar attacks going back to 2004, when
the group was formed, all mainly targeting tourists.
The response of the Turkish authorities was to play down the attacks
as much as possible. When, back in June, TAK killed four tourists
in a bombing at a tourist stop in the hills near Antalya, the local
governor’s office claimed the explosion had been caused by
a faulty liquid gas canister.
Authorities attempted to lay the blame for these bombings at the
doorstep of something approximating “natural causes” for
obvious reasons. Turkey’s tourism sector is a major currency
earner and employer, and this year’s arrivals numbers had
already been down. Yet there now is little disguising the fact
that a major bombing campaign is underway across Turkey.
At the same time, the conflict between the Turkish security forces
and the PKK has continued to escalate. Seven Turkish soldiers were
killed by the PKK in early September, with fighting in the predominantly
Kurdish southeast of Turkey spilling over—albeit on a small
scale—into cross-border incursions into northern Iraq.
Indeed, it is in northern Iraq that much of the current equation
is balanced. The PKK long have maintained bases there, much to
the anger of Turkish authorities, who repeatedly have called on
the U.S. to roll up these camps.
While the military significance of these bases may now be minor—many
guerrillas having crossed back into Turkey, with the rest largely
dispersed—their political significance as a source of aggravation
between Washington and Ankara is major.
In an effort to ease some of these frictions, at the end of August
the U.S. appointed a retired general, Joseph W. Ralston, as special
envoy to coordinate U.S., Iraqi and Turkish anti-PKK efforts. This
also followed strong Iranian demonstrations to Turkey of Tehran’s
determination to combat Kurdish groups—the Iranian army had
been periodically shelling suspected PKK positions inside northern
Iraq for some time. Iran, too, has a fear of Kurdish insurrection,
via the Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). This group
has launched repeated attacks against Iranian forces in recent
years, often from its bases in northern Iraq.
While Ralston’s appointment was welcomed in Ankara, privately
few seem to place much faith in it signifying any major new move
against the PKK by U.S. or Iraqi forces.
To some extent, however, the many-cornered fight for the stretch
of territory dominated by ethnic Kurds that runs from the Mediterranean
coast through Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran is nothing new. What
is new is the element of urban terrorism that the TAK has thrown
into the equation. Traditionally, the PKK had confined its activities
largely to the southeast of Turkey, its self-declared Kurdish homeland,
and had not been known for attacks on civilian targets.
Common wisdom is that TAK is a splinter from the PKK that fell
out with its commanders precisely on this issue, however. TAK’s
cadres saw the PKK’s insistence on a political solution as
a sign of weakness. The lack of a campaign targeting Turkey’s
economic—in other words, civilian—infrastructure was
a reason for the struggle’s failure to prevent a campaign
of “destruction and denial” by the Turkish authorities,
according to TAK’s now-offline Web site. Rather disingenuously,
TAK also insists that it is not trying to kill foreigners, but
merely to disrupt Turkey’s economy.
The hard fact is, however, that in other countries, such urban
bombing campaigns often have indeed been more successful than efforts
by insurgent groups taking to the hills and trying to shoot it
out with much better equipped and trained security forces.
Yet speculation is rife as to who might really be behind the group.
There is a lingering suspicion, by the Turkish political left in
particular, that TAK is a creation of the “deep state”—the
secret authority of generals, politicians, bureaucrats and organized
criminals often held responsible for the dark side of Turkish politics.
According to this interpretation, TAK’s bombing campaign
is an attempt by this deep state to force the government to grant
emergency powers to the security authorities—themselves thought
to be dominated by the deep state—and thus entrench
the power of these dark forces.
Indeed, the military has been strongly arguing that the heightened
violence requires just such a move. Its case is being more forcefully
put by senior commanders now that the previously more liberal chief
of the General Staff, Gen. Hilmi Ozkok, has retired. Since August,
his place has been taken by Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, widely seen as
much more of a hard-liner.
Nor is this only relevant to the Kurdish issue. Buyukanit’s
hard-line status also is a result of his staunch secularism and
known dislike of the current government, with its Islamist roots.
Yet for all the security issues now coming into play, many ethnic
Kurds in Turkey also are keen to stress that there are deeper reasons
for such a campaign of bombings—just as there are behind
continued support of the PKK by many of Turkey’s
Kurds.
Since the PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire back in 1999, after
the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, by Turkish special
forces, the Turkish authorities have done very little to address
such real problems in the southeast as economic decline, unemployment
and cultural and political marginalization. Efforts by ethnic Kurds
to form political groups to contest Ankara’s policies often
have ended in the arrest of activists and banning of parties. Many
have relatives who have “disappeared,” and blame the
security forces for their abduction and probable murder. Campaigns
to return people to their villages and homes which the army destroyed
as part of its anti-PKK campaign in the 1980s and 1990s, have foundered
in conflicts with these villages’ new occupiers—pro-Turkish
village guard militias.
This is the “destruction and denial” to which the
TAK refers. Without any real progress in this sphere, its bombings
are likely to continue, while the PKK continues to fight on in
the mountains, its ranks swollen with young recruits who have grown
up in the recent years of frustration. Ankara’s Kurdish problem,
therefore, is not likely to go away any time soon.
Jon Gorvett is a free-lance writer based in Istanbul. |