

**DEVELOPING FRAMEWORK AND APPROACHES TO CARRY OUT  
DEVELOPMENT WORKS IN CONFLICT AREAS**

**Final Report**

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## Abbreviation

DFID	Department for International Development
VDCs	Village Development Committees
DDCs	District Development Committees
ITDG	Intermediate Technology Development Group
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
NGOs	Non Government Organisations
INGOs	International Non Government Organisations
AAN	Action Aid Nepal
BASE	Backward Education Society
BOG	Basic Operating Guidelines
BS	Bikram Sambat
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCS	Creation of Creative Society
CDO	Community Development Organization
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CCOMPOSA	Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia
CPR	Community Project Request
CSO	Community Support Organization
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CUG	Community User's Group
CVICT	Centre for Victims of Torture
DDC	District Development Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
ENDUREC	Environment and Rural Development Centre
FORWARD	Forum for rural Welfare and Agricultural Reform for Development
GA	General Agreement
HRYB	Human Rights Year Book
ICESCR	International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
INSEC	Informal Sector Service Centre
ITDG	Intermediate Technology Development Group
LIBIRD	Local Initiatives for Biodiversity, Research and Development
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MADE	Multi Dimensional Agricultural for Development
NGO	Non-Government Organization
PO	Project Outline
PRA	Participatory Research Appraisal
RIM	Revolutionary Internationalist Movement
RIMS	Resource Identification and Management Society
RRN	Rural Reconstruction of Nepal
RCP	Revolutionary Communist party
SAP	South-Asian Partnership
TAP	Tharuwan Autonomous Province
TNLf	Tharuwan National Liberation Front
TRP	Tharuwan Regional Province
UHN	Uday Himal Network
UK	United Kingdom
UML	United Marxist and Leninist
UPF	United People's Front
URPC	United Revolutionary People's Committee
URPG	United Revolutionary People's Government
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Aid for International Development

## **Abstract**

Conflict refers to struggle amidst the interest, values, principles and faiths. It happens when there is clash on interest, goals and concepts of one to others. People observed conflict from different perspective. Very broadly, there are two viewpoints of looking at the conflict prevailing in the society. First, conflict is destructive; it destroys society, or pushes it back in time. Therefore, conflict should always be condemned, and the warring parties should be crushed or made to comply with certain norms. Another viewpoint looks at conflict as an inevitable factor for development, rather than as a negative element. Indeed, development is an outcome of conflict. The Marxists also adhere to this belief and definition.

The political, ethnical and socio-economic conflict in South Asia is in increasing trend. Among various insurgent organisations, Maoist in South Asia (especially in Nepal), also known as the Nepal Communist Party Maoist, is unique. They have been escalating their activities through out the country. Current conflict in Nepal between Maoist insurgence and Government started since 1996. The Maoist insurgence is not only the products of the multi party democracy, but it is the cumulative effects of previous government systems. Inability to fulfill people's expectation and needs, poor governance system and failure government provided environment for conflict in Nepal. In this context, development organisations have been seeking for appropriate framework and approaches to carry out development interventions in conflict areas. Various efforts have also been made to address the problems from conflict parties and other concerns. However, the rate of conflict in Nepal has been accelerating day by day.

In this context, based on intensive interaction with development service providers and recipients and institutional approach analysis through various tools and techniques were conducted to explore the possible approaches in effective implementation of development works even in conflict. The report very briefly presents the basic causes of conflict and its impact on both general and development activities particularly, how the development interventions have been continuing and what could be the possible approach to carry out development interventions in conflict areas.

Nepal has been facing problems of conflict because of Maoist insurgency. The usual causes for the conflict like poverty and inequality, social and political exclusion, corruption, malgovernance, development mismatch and geographical disparity have been significantly observed as important causes of conflict, which has further illustrated by other documents. However, inadequate attention has been paid to the paradox that the conflict was triggered shortly after the restoration of multiparty democracy. In many countries even with worse indicators relating to the root causes of conflict, armed conflict of this scale has not been observed (Thapa and Sijapati, 2003; ICG, 2003a and b]. Acute falling down of economic situation, inside and outside migration of productive resources and difficult in daily lives have been observed as the impact of conflict in Nepal.

Furthermore, limited livelihood opportunities, inadequate need based development process and inability of political parties in governance and meet expectation of people were observed as other major causes of the present conflict in Nepal. This conflict in Nepal has created various problems especially in the context of implementation of development interventions. In this regard, different attempts like waiting and seeing, informal talks with conflicting parties, managing transparency and others have been already made by the development organisations. They also observed that the attempts very much good for one place might not appropriate to other place and situation.

Need based development projects, quick impact projects, use of local level human resources, managing programme transparency, staffs and community level skill development on negotiation, dialogue with conflicting parties, generate employment opportunities in rural areas, long term plan, guidelines on dos and don'ts and following up of quality aspects in project management cycle have been observed as important approaches to carry out development interventions in conflict areas.

## SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION

### 1. Background

Conflict is a common phenomenon. It is an intrinsic element in human relationships. Very broadly, there are two types of conflicts; "intra-conflict and inter-conflict" are found among individuals, groups, organisations, nations and international institutions as inherent elements. Conflict is a common pattern of behaviours on the part of parties, their attitudes toward each other, their fears, their interpretation of events. Conflicts arise due to ideology, identity, resource nations, nationalism, misunderstanding, anarchy and perception. As there are visible (armed confrontations) and invisible (structural violence) conflicts, which have been intensifying around the world in one form to others. In this regard, insurgency and insurgent organisations throughout the world are emerging and changing in different forms in response to the recent sweeping changes in the international environment. To address the context, state militaries, security forces and transnational actors are also acting in a various ways to meet future challenges. As a consequence, the new situations have been developed over the time period.

Among various insurgent organisations, Maoist in South Asia (especially in Nepal), also known as the Nepal Communist Party Maoist, is unique. Because of Maoist insurgency, Nepal has been facing problems of conflict. The usual causes for the conflict like poverty and inequality, social and political exclusion, corruption and malgovernance have been much documented and widely accepted [Thapa and Sijapati, 2003; ICG, 2003a and b]. However, inadequate attention has been paid to the paradox that the conflict was triggered shortly after the restoration of multiparty democracy. In many countries even with worse indicators relating to the root causes of conflict, armed conflict of this scale has not been observed. In this context, organisations including development organisations have been seeking for appropriate framework and approaches for effective development interventions. In this context, ITDG Nepal in collaboration with SANEI conducted an exploratory research project "Developing Framework and Approaches to Carryout Development Interventions in Conflict Areas". The project was conducted during May 2004 to March 2005.

The aim of this research paper is to give brief overview on causes of conflict, highlight peace initiatives particularly focusing to the two failed negotiations in Nepal, effect of conflict in development and possible approaches to carry out development interventions in conflict areas. Though the detailed analysis of all dimensions of this extremely complicated armed conflict (e.g., economic loses, psychological effects, changes in the structure of society, indirect costs of conflict, damage of social fabric and positive changes brought by the conflict, etc) are beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, as the conflict situation in Nepal is very much volatile and dynamic, all the information mentioned here are before February 2005.

### 2. The Context

Nepal is a landlocked agricultural based developing country, which is situated in latitude 26° 22' N to 30° 27' N and longitude 80° 4' E to 88°12' E. It covers 147,181 Sq. Km. In which VDC and Municipalities are the lower administrative units in each districts. Each VDC is comprised of 9 wards and wards in a Municipality ranges from 9 to 35. Currently there are 3,915 VDCs and 58 Municipalities in the country. Ecologically, Nepal has divided into three regions called Mountain region, Hill region and the Terai region.

Nepal, previously recognised as a peaceful country, is now facing severe violent conflict, which has cost more than 11000 lives, as well as billions of rupees worth of damage to property and infrastructure during 1996-2004. Current conflict between Maoist insurgents and Government started in areas, which had experienced age-old social injustice and discrimination in the western parts of Nepal. Mid Western Hills is regarded as the epicentre of the current conflict and was regarded as the 'poorest' in terms of socio-economic indicators even before the present phase of the conflict broke out in 1996. Currently, the conflict has spread out all over the country. In the districts that they control, the Maoists have declared the formation of district-level provisional governments. Their officials are raising taxes, dispensing quick justice, managing communal agriculture, and maintaining security. It is creating fear, mistrust, insecurity, civil strife and social, political and development instability. The current Nepalese politics appears incapable and ineffective to maintain security and peace in the country, which is forcing Nepal into chaos and anarchy. Following the King's arrogation of legislative power on October 4, 2002, and two-failed ceasefire negotiations, tripartite conflict has been deepening among the king, the parliamentary parties and the Maoists.

People had high expectation during the cease-fire, as both parties had submitted their agenda and entered into preliminary political negotiation. The conflict between the government and political parties, the deep suspicion between the Maoists and military and actions from the security forces during the time of peace talks mounted mistrust. Consequently, the unilateral decision of the Maoists to call-off the ceasefire aborted all these well intentioned, if flawed, efforts and the country have entered into civil war. The main causes of the ceasefire break were the stalemate on the issue of the creation of a constitutional assembly during the third round of the peace talk at Hapure village of Purandhara VDC of Dang district, and the Doramba (Ramechhap) incidence, where, according to the investigation of the National Human Right Commission, security forces killed 17 unarmed Maoists and two ordinary people. The Maoists appear to be involved in systematic human rights abuse and the security services response has also been extremely abusive. It is believed that the conflict is reaching a crisis point.

Several factors like poverty and inequality, social and political exclusion, gender disparity, caste or ethnic-based discrimination, corruption and malgovernance have been identified as root causes of the conflict, which has been much documented and discussed widely. However, inadequate attention has been paid to the paradox that the conflict was triggered shortly after the restoration of multiparty democracy. In many countries even with worse indicators relating to the root causes of conflict, armed conflict of this scale has not been observed. Furthermore, given the established religious and cultural tolerance of the diverse strands of Nepali society, violence, even as a last resort would appear to be most unlikely.

Besides, the Maoist has destroyed some important infrastructures of development ever since they launched armed conflict in 1996. These chiefly included government offices, VDC building, power stations, telecommunication tower and centres. No authentic data have been made available to date of the entire damage thus made. Development organisations have also been withdrawing or concentrating their activities in few areas.

In this context, development organisations have been seeking for appropriate framework and approaches that enable development work to continue in conflict areas during and after conflict. Unless a certain agreeable working framework is developed, it will be difficult to run

development works in conflict areas and many of these areas will suffer from disease and hunger if the conflict continues and intensifies.

### **3. Objectives**

As this is an exploratory research project, it has specific research questions and objectives as below;

#### **3.1 Research Questions**

The investigation of research project into specific interrelated questions that attempts to find answers that would be useful to many stakeholders. These research questions are:

- What are the root causes of conflict between the Maoist insurgents and the government of Nepal?
- How and to what extent the conflict has impacted on the development works that had been initiated by various development agencies?
- How has it been possible to carry out some development activities by some organisations even under the situation of conflict?
- Can we learn any suitable approach and mechanism of carrying out development activities even under conflict in Asia and other regions?
- What could be the suitable approach and framework of carrying out or initiating development activities in the conflict areas of Nepal?

#### **3.2 Research Objectives**

The main objective of the research project was to develop a framework and effective approaches to enhance the capacity of development agencies - local and international, including the private sector and government to understand the dynamics of development work within the conflict region and carry out the development works accordingly. The specific objectives of this research project are as below;

- To assess the current conflict situation in Nepal and its impact on development works.
- To review the experience, successful approaches and mechanisms demonstrated in the conflict area by the development agencies and local organisations.
- To record lessons from other countries regarding the initiation and continuation of development projects in the conflict areas.

#### **Target beneficiaries of the research findings**

The interactions and consultations covering local, national and international level during the research process will enhance the capacity of development agencies to initiate and carry out the development works in conflict regions. The research outcomes will support for positive impact on reversing the trend of withdrawal and to the some extent relaxing the intensity of conflict. In this context, development agencies including donor, INGOs, development actors and the Government are the main beneficiaries of this research. This is because these organisations are also seriously affected by the current situation whereby there are no working mechanisms to ensure that their programmes are implemented with limited interference from conflict-induced sabotage. Local NGOs, local governments, consulting firms, banks and micro-financing organisation, suppliers of development materials who normally play an intermediary or facilitator role in development process. The development beneficiaries are the ultimate target groups of this research finding.

#### **4. Research Organisation – ITDG Nepal**

ITDG demonstrates and advocates the sustainable use of technology to reduce poverty. With Head Office in the UK, it works in Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Zimbabwe. ITDG works to develop innovative and practical approaches designed to incorporate local knowledge and skills, which can be widely replicated. ITDG has focused its works in four international aims:

- Aim 1 - Reducing Vulnerability
- Aim 2- Making Market Works for the Poor
- Aim 3- Access to Basic Infrastructure Services
- Aim 3- Responding to New Technologies

ITDG Nepal works in various areas under the above mentioned four different Aims. ITDG Nepal aims to generate knowledge, impact and influence having field level experience on above Aim and priority programme areas. . ITDG Nepal has already conducted different research projects a few of them are: Impact of Globalisation on Poor Farmers, Gender and Disaster, Access of Poor People to Energy Services, Technology for Street Vendors, Framework and Approaches for the Application of Sustainable Livelihood Framework in Energy Sector, Indoor Smoke and health hazards, and Abatement Measures on Vehicular Air Pollution of Kathmandu Valley.

ITDG Nepal in collaboration with SANEI, New Delhi carried out this research project. In order to conduct research projects, ITDG Nepal has formed a research team involving various experts within and outside the organisation inputs from these experts on different areas have been incorporated in the study.

### **SECTION TWO - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **5. Research Methodology**

As it is to explore and develop an appropriate framework and approaches, this will be achieved through a process of sensitive consultation and negotiations with local people, government agencies, donors, I/NGOs and parties involved in conflicts and learning at various levels. The methodology of the research project has an in-built multi-level feedback system; exploration, analysis and triangulation. The enquiry into the nature and causes of the conflict and possible solutions will organically emerge from the communities affected, which will mature through the discussion/interaction at various levels. The methodologies used for the research are as below:

##### **5.1 Literature Review**

Review on the theories, previous studies such as reports, papers and publication were carried out to supplement the field study. Various kinds of research findings conducted in line with this research have also been reviewed.

##### **5.2 Institutional Approach Analysis**

As there are NGOs and INGOs working in different areas, they have various experiences on present conflict and its consequences. So to understand different perspectives, approaches of different institutions adopted were explored using participatory tools and techniques. The NGOs were purposively selected on the basis of (i) geographical coverage, (ii) issue coverage, (iii) smooth functioning of the programme. It is noted that 5 from each International,



national and local NGOs were selected. Based on the opened structured questionnaires, primary information was gathered from the in-charge and senior-level officials of the concerned organisations or institutions.

### 5.3 Primary Information

#### 5.3.1 Selection of the study area for field survey and case studies

Based on regional and geographical distribution and conflict sensitivity representation six districts were selected for field survey. Reports produced by Home Ministry, Department for International Development (DfID), European Commission (EC) and other institutions were used during the district selection process. The districts for the study have been selected on a purposive basis. The selected districts were Sunsari, Kavre, Baglung, Nawalparasi, Banke and Jumla,

**Table – 1: Sample Selection Criteria and Sampled districts**

Geographical distribution	Conflict Sensitiveness	
	Highly sensitive	Less sensitive
Terai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Banke</li> <li>• Nawalparasi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sunsari,</li> </ul>
Hill	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baglung</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kavre</li> </ul>
High hill	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jumla</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No</li> </ul>

#### 5.3.2 Sampling process

##### 5.3.2.1 Sampling of respondents

Based on the information required for the study, the selected six districts were clustered into two groups i.e. the development agencies as service providers (SR) and service recipients (SR). The study adopted purposive and cluster sampling techniques in order to avoid different constraints in collecting required information. The random sampling technique was not used because of the available time, resources, accessibility and others. The representative of population within these two clustered groups was selected using simple random sampling techniques. Two types of sampling units have been considered they are development service providers - organisation and development service receivers - individuals.

##### 5.3.2.2 Sample size and sampling strategy

Since we had planned to study in a very large population size of the districts, the exact number was not known, which means the population is infinitive. Therefore, for selection of the sample size from such infinitive population and having least known parameters of the population, following formula were used to estimate the total number of sample size.

$$n = \frac{z^2 pq}{e^2}$$

Where, n is the sample size,

z value at specified level of confidence or the desired degree of precision (z value is 1.96 at 95% confidence level),  
 p is probability of the success in the study population (p=0.5 and q = p-1=0.5), and  
 e is the error margin (= 7.5%)

Using the above-specified formula, the sample size is calculated as follows.


$$n = \frac{z^2 pq}{e^2}$$

$$n = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times 0.5 \times (1-0.5)}{(0.075)^2}$$

$$= 171$$

Although the formula resulted 171 samples, in order to minimise the risk of not getting responses from the selected respondents and to achieve the minimum requirement research team agreed to select 231 individuals from service providers and service receivers.

**The sampling strategy:**



NB: SP = Development Service Provider (Refers to those organisations which are responsible for the development interventions) and SR = Development Service Recipient (Refers to the people who are supposed to get the benefit from the development intervention by the different organisations)

**5.4 Randomisation of the Sample**

In order to receive the different perspectives on the topics and subject matters, the randomization of the samples with the two clusters were carried out as follows:

**Cluster 1:** Development service providers were randomly selected from the list of all the organisations available at the district level. Random number was used for selection of the organisations.

**Cluster 2:** Since the population (service receivers) was not known, the interview was taken with individuals from few locations/places of the districts. For the selection of individual interviewee, the initial letter of people's name was used. Five letters from the 26 alphabets

were selected randomly, and people with the name starting from the selected alphabet were interviewed. Maximum of six people per alphabetic name were interviewed. In case of unavailability of the particular alphabet, following alphabet was used to select the interviewee. The interview process in each district was conducted at least in three different sites.

## 5.5 Summary Chart of the Respondent for Field Survey

Respondents have been selected using various criteria and indicators; summary chart of the respondents for field survey is as below:

Table – 2: Number of respondents

SN	Types of Respondent	Subgroup of Respondent	Frequency
1.	Sex of Respondent	Male	153
		Female	60
		<b>Total</b>	<b>213</b>
2.	Level of Education	University	64
		Secondary /Higher Secondary	88
		Literate	41
		Illiterate	20
		<b>Total</b>	<b>213</b>
3.	Age Group	Below 25 years	49
		25 – 40 years	109
		Above 40 years	55
		<b>Total</b>	<b>213</b>
4.	District	Dhanusha (plain / eastern)	52
		Nawalparasi (plain / western)	33
		Banke (Plain / Mid western)	36
		Kavre (Hill / Central)	26
		Baglung (Hill / western)	33
		Jumla (Hill / far western)	33
		<b>Total</b>	<b>213</b>
5.	SOURCE	Service Provider	28
		Recipient	185
		<b>Total</b>	<b>213</b>

Based on the developed criteria total numbers of 213 respondents from different districts were sampled and interviewed. The number of respondents was from different subgroups as mentioned above.

## 5.6 Research Methods

### 5.6.1 Quantitative information

#### 5.6.1.1 Questionnaire survey

To explore different perspectives on causes of conflict, impacts of conflict and possible approaches to carry out development interventions questionnaire survey were conducted. Questionnaire survey was employed using semi-structured questionnaire and detail field survey questionnaires. The field survey questionnaires were employed to the respondents from sampled organisations and the individuals. The survey questionnaire is in appendix.

#### 5.6.1.2 Administration of the survey questionnaire

Experienced Research Assistants were hired to administer the field survey. The questionnaires were pre-tested before conducting field survey. Research team members

were also partly involved in field survey such as focus group discussions, institutional analysis and stakeholder workshops.

## **5.5.2 Qualitative information**

### **5.6.2.1 Focus group discussion**

The discussion was conducted with the government and non-government personnel, selected village representatives, political parties and others. The discussion with the key informants (maximum 6 participants) of having similar interest as focus group, age or education level in three districts was conducted to collect stakeholders' perspectives on research questions and objectives. This focus group were selected and interacted based on discussion with NGOs that are still working in rural areas. A set of checklist were developed and considered as the basis for the discussion. Several issues were identified, categorised and ranked during the discussion.

### **5.6.2.2 Group meeting with stakeholders**

Group meetings were organised with development stakeholders including government line agencies, NGOs and private sectors in three districts. During the workshop, the participants were briefed about the objectives and purpose of the study. The participants were then asked to present their views on different issues in small groups. A set of checklist was used as the basis for the discussions.

### **5.6.2.3 Key informant survey**

Based on developed checklist, key individuals in the areas who are knowledgeable on the matters were selected purposively as key informants. They were from the different development agencies, political parties, and the victim of the conflict, human right activists and others. Interview/interactions were carried out on the basis of developed checklist.

### **5.6.2.4 Case study**


A chronological detailed study on the emergence of the conflict, the effect of the conflict on development and the effect of the development on conflict, the conflict management strategy were collected and prepared as appropriate.

### **5.6.2.5 Field observation**

A critical observation and its documentation by the researchers and research assistants involved in the study process were also collected, which has also been incorporated in the report as appropriate.

### 5.7 Summary of Research Steps

A number of steps have been carried out during the research process, a schematic diagram on steps used are as below:



## 5.8 Typology of the Methods

Very briefly following summary of the methods that was used to gather the relevant information is summarised as follows:

Table – 3: Summary Chart on Research Methods and Types of Information

SN	Research Methods	Types of Information
1.	Literature review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To collect already generated information and findings.</li> </ul>
2.	Institutional approach analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To collect views of development organisations on different aspects of conflict in Nepal.</li> <li>To generate knowledge based on institutional experience.</li> </ul>
3.	Questionnaire survey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To collect detail information from the structured questionnaire.</li> <li>To collect views from different areas.</li> </ul>
4.	Focus group discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To triangulate the information with groups.</li> <li>To collect additional views on the study.</li> </ul>
5.	Group interview with stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To collect stakeholders experiences and views.</li> <li>To triangulate the survey information</li> </ul>
6.	Key informant survey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To collect information.</li> <li>To triangulate information with key selected people.</li> </ul>
7.	Case study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To carry out detailed study in the specific case.</li> <li>To relate with relevant aspects.</li> </ul>
8.	Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To observe field reality.</li> <li>To triangulate the available information</li> </ul>

## 5.9 Data Analysis

Percentage, frequencies and mean with the relevant data / information have been carried out using the standard statistical tool such as SPSS and MINITAB. In order to picturise the perspectives, proportion analyses of one variable to others were also done.

*We have very difficult situation these days. The students in the colleges and schools in Banepa and Panauti require Identification (ID) Card to enter in the colleges and schools. It is prohibited to go inside without cards. Also the colleges and schools will be closed completely if someone announces Banda (strike). There is no need to have any authorised letters and announcement for closing. This has caused severe problem in education sector. The quality of education is diminishing day by day.*

*- Mrs Januka Devi Kharel, Panauti*

## SECTION THREE - INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH ANALYSIS

### 6. Institutional Approach Analysis


Institutional approach analysis of the selected institutions working in and around conflict in the research project was one of the tools to explore the information and perspectives of these institutions. The selected institutions working at central, western and mid western regions including Kathmandu were selected purposively. Based on developed checklist, interactions with institutional representatives were carried out. The collected information was analysed and presented very briefly as below:

#### 6.1 Root Causes of the Conflict

The armed conflict in Nepal is a creation of multi-dimensional and interwoven issues. It has intensified across Nepal within a short period of time. Based on discussion and interaction with organisational representatives, the root-causes of the conflicts were identified as - economic deprivation, political repression, social discrimination and exploitation, isolation from all dimensions and socio-cultural intolerance (Fig 1).

The study reveals that one-third (32%) of the root-causes of conflict was economic issue. The economic cause includes poverty, unemployment, widening the gap between the rich and the poor, unequal resource distribution, corruption and bad governance.

One-fourth (26%) of the people was of the view that the conflict is due to the cause of political repression. The political cause mainly includes exclusion, political intervention, unequal political representation, atrocity, unconsciousness, political instability, disparity and grouping, personal ego, self-centred leaderships and their attitude of near and dear ones, less heard the voices of poor, disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.



Another 25 per cent thought that the root cause of present conflict is social discrimination and exploitation. The social cause incorporates ethnic, class, gender and class issues; discrimination and exploitation, *Haliya Pratha*, illiteracy, inequality and social insecurity. Furthermore, it includes cultural issue focuses to awareness, isolation admits regional and economic development, geographical imbalance, political and social factors and unequal access of an opportunity.

The Maoist capitalises the poor, disadvantaged and marginalised people particularly youths, who were deprived from the fruits of democracy and enjoyment of human rights. The study has proved that about one-third of the people involved into the conflict due to harsh economic

condition. One-fourth percent of the people are politically motivated. The ill practices such as race, color, sex, religion, ethnicities, etc are also helped to fuel the armed conflict within 25 percent.


The slogans of ‘liberation’ and ‘martyr’ have attracted a large section of the people. Indeed, ‘do for emancipation to the poor, disadvantaged, marginalised and vulnerable people or die once in a life time with highest respect as martyr’ are the principle motivating factors to unemployed, frustrated and alienated youths.

A 16-year old girl from Tharu community who was studying in class 9 in the village of Kailali district said: “If I lived in this feudal society and traditional system in such naïve and docile backward Tharu community and if I even passed 12 class, I never get job. After marriage, I have to live in my house with full pains, grievances and humiliations. It means that I have to die many times.” She further said, “Now, I am working as a member of the CPN (Maoist) and enjoying full dignity. Even though, I have two choices – do or die.” Finally she adds, “If we win, we shall liberate to all poor people from the crunch of feudal and if I die, I will be martyr.”

## 6.2 Intervention Approach

Most of the development agencies such as International Non-government Organisations (INGOs) and projects in the past had directly involved on development activities with the targeted communities. But, now the situation has changed and most of the international organisations are working through the local NGOs, CBOs and Community Users’ Groups.

For the smooth implementation of the programmes, all development organisations or institutions have been using their own intervention approach or development strategy. These approaches or strategies are varies from one to another that is based on their vision, mission and goals. In general the organisations are adopting right based, livelihood based, participatory, partnership and human rights approaches. One organisation may use one or more than one intervention approaches. Similarly, approach appropriate for one situation may not be appropriate for other situation.




Furthermore, several factors influence for the particular situation. It was observed in one of the uncompleted programme in western region. As the programme could not timely accomplish within December 2002, the concerned authority extended its period for one more year. But the same December, staffs as well as board members of CCS denied to work further. As a result, Action Aid Nepal (AAN) suspended its programme for three-months. Even after three-month, situation could not improve and project finally withdrew at the mid of 2003. Similarly, the partner was also stopped its programme in Bajhang district in September



2003, three-month before its completion (phase-out). Both of these programmes were micro-credit programme, which shows that such programme may have the reasons to withdraw. The people received some financial supports from the programme, but could not succeed to return back 25 per cent of its investment to the concerned organisations as per the conditions was set. It may have two reasons: (i) either the local government of the Maoists was against the foreign organisation or they were preparing the grounds to impose policy of I/NGOs registration in its local government or (ii) termination or phase out of programme would help people not to pay back allocated 25 per cent resource to the local NGO.


### 6.3 Project Selections and Implementation Strategy

Collaboration and partnership are the approach / strategies that are adopting by most of the organisations to conduct their programme activities. Generally development agencies have been following the methods of survey, interaction with others, less intervened area (absent or minimum development projects/actors), review and reflections of their old partners, forming new CBOs and application of user's group, etc. as the basis for partnership development process. The diagram (Fig 3) shows that one-third organisations select their local partners applying above mentioned processes. The development organisation or partner who applies demand driven approach, it accomplish the project in time minimising the risk due to the ownership of the people. If development actor encounters difficulties and if its programme focuses pressing needs of the community, communities take ownership of that particular programme and problems are resolved by themselves. In some cases, the Maoist themselves have involved in community development activities. For instance, when women's cooperative groups faced difficulties to return loan from their debtors in Chitwan district, the Maoists recovered the loan.



### 6.4 Problems Encountered

Because of intensification of conflict across Nepal, development organisations and its partners are encountering various obstacles in development interventions process. The development agencies are presently facing various problems.



The figure 4 tends to measure the insecurity, Maoist's policy, programme and so forth problems encountered by organisations or institutions. The insecurity measure mainly includes - difficult to visit the project sites, monitoring, reporting, evaluation, insecurity particularly by the state security forces/harassment by security force, cross fire, suspected as

informer by both conflicting parties, psychological torture to staff, difficult to reach poor, movement restriction, insecurity in participation and difficult to attain training.

The Maoist's policy includes NGO registration with their local government, inconsistent (not uniform) policy of Maoists, bomb explosion, blockade and censorship. The programme includes programme termination due to insecurity, mismanagement, resource limitation, short-term partnership, absence of clear vision of the partners (donors), in adequate sharing of experiences among the like-minded organisations and conflict management (see summary chart).

Nearly half (43%) of the professionals of the development organisations do afraid with the state-owned security forces rather than insurgents. Ram Sharma (pseudonym) development professional says, "The security forces shot from the distance, but the insurgent kill only after completing the investigation process." On January 29, 2003, the CPN (Maoist) declared Tharuwan National Liberation Front (TNLF) covering western tarai areas of Rapti to Mahakali zones excluding Dang district. The Maoist-aligned TNLF 'Tharuwan Autonomous Province (TAP)' had put forward 10-point policies of I/NGOs registration in Banke and Bardiya district. These include the working guidelines for NGOs and INGOs on their areas (for detail see annex).

Ram Charan Chaudhary, Chief of the TAP announced the policies and instructions for the development agencies at an interaction programme of the representatives of I/NGOs (working in Banke and Bardia districts) and local journalists at Bela in Bardiya district on 8 June 2004. Representatives of NGOs agreed on all policies of the TAP except the registration of I/NGOs at the *Janaparishad* (Maoist local body) and annually renew them. Taking the issue of corruption inside the NGOs, transparency was finally incorporated after the advices of NGO representatives. The policy would duly be effective after July 16, 2004 (the first day Shrawan of the fiscal year 2061/2062 BS). Development agencies are now confused and some of them have cut-off their development programmes in the area, for instance DfID UK and USA.

DfID has downsized its activities in 16 districts from 24 after imposition of registration policy effecting from July 16. United States of America temporarily suspended its Peace Corps Nepal on 12 September 2004 where 3,572 volunteers had already completed their terms and 130 were presently working. The Peace Corps volunteers, first arrived in Nepal in 1962 had been helping Nepalese in the fields of education, environment, and health and community development in both rural and urban areas.


On 26 June 2004, the Freed Kamaiya Society (FKS) organised a public meeting and warned the government that they would capture the public land if the government failed to rehabilitate them as soon as possible. They also expressed dissatisfaction with the development organisations and raised the questions of corruption within the organisations. They spoke against the seminars and other training programmes, which have been conducting at expensive hotels from the budget that has obtained for the development of poor and oppressed Kamaiya. The president of the FKS strongly condemned the programmes and activities of local NGO particularly BASE. He said that they had planned to destroy the offices of BASE as it unjustly used the name Kamaiya to increase their earnings and personal benefits. "BASE has charged around Rs. 45,000 for 7 t-shirts," he added. The CPN (Maoist) exploded a bomb at the office of BASE of Kailali district on 28 June 2004.

The Maoists do not have consistent policy of NGO registration. It varies from place to place. In Central Nepal, Maoists have adopted flexible policy and strategy towards the development organisations. The policy of NGO is also flexible at the area or regional autonomous province. The staff members of the concerned institutions are psychologically tortured and the development institutions are compelled to follow what the Maoists says. Most of I/NGOs and projects including DfID UK situated in Nepalgunj are forced to closedown their offices during the period of general strike and/or regional strike called by the Maoists. The community professionals are also facing difficulties, as their own partner/collaborator could not put forward clear policy on conflict mitigation to its local partners.

### 6.5 Problem Resolution and Contributing Factors

The mentioned encountered difficulties are resolved adopting concrete organisation policies, launching people-centred programmes, initiating formal and informal talks / discussions, maintaining transparency and others (Fig 5).

The diagram shows that one-fourth of the problems can be solved if the institution adopt or revise appropriate organisational policy. The right policy of organisation leads to selection of an experienced local partner, recruitment of local clean and neutral person, mobilisation of local user's groups and resources, and maintains low profile activity.



The organisation or staff may also face many difficulties on the course of programme intervention and implementation. Such problems can be settled introducing community demand driven participatory programmes, working with clean, transparent old partners, conducting farmers to farmers programmes, and frequent visiting and monitoring the project sites. The problems of the institutions or staff can be resolved promoting mutual understanding and holding talks to convince the conflicting parties. The issue of talks includes formal and informal discussions, mutual agreements, negotiations and trust build up. Similarly, transparency can be adopted through the process of social/public audit, production of activity fact sheet, public hearing and pasting the programmes and its budget on an appropriate place at the project sites.


With application of formal and informal community mediation technique, even serious problems can be resolved. For instance, the bilateral donors Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), DfID, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and World Food Programme (WFP) were forced to suspend their Rural Community Infrastructures Works (RCIW) programme in Humla, Jumla, Mugu and Dolpa districts in May 2004. After community mediation and some sort of informal agreement, these development agencies announced re-

start of the programme in Humla, Jumla, Mugu and Dolpa districts after July 2004 as per their Basic Operating Guidelines (BOG). They indirectly warned that they suspend activities again if programmes cannot continue to operate in accordance with the BOG. The Statement from Bilateral Donor Agencies has put forward the 14 points operating guidelines (for detail see annex). The statement states:

“Development programmes and staff in Nepal are increasingly being put under pressure by CPN (Maoist) to provide forced donations. It is essential that everybody understand that development staffs are obliged to adhere to the principles laid out in the Basic Operating Guidelines. As the guidelines clearly state, development agencies will not make contributions to political parties and will not make forced contributions in cash or kind. Continued attempts to force development agencies and development staff to pay contributions put the future of our development programmes at risk.”

The contributing factor for effective intervention and implementation depends upon the formulation of appropriate organisation policy, selection of programmes or issues, incorporating the issue of advocacy, transparency and others (Fig 6).

Almost one-fourth of the respondents were of the view that the major contributing factor for an effective work depends upon the adoption of appropriate organisation policy. The policy includes recruitment of local clean image staff; mobilisation of the local NGO, local user's groups and local resources; maintain neutrality, discipline and low profile activity and encourage enhancing community ownership.



Adoption of right organisation policy also focuses the development of position paper, conceptual clarity on grass-root, regional, national and international policies, clear political position, work through local organisations as a facilitator, and accountability of organisation.

ECARDS, the partner of SSMP, which had been implementing integrated agriculture, focused programmes in Doti district was forced to suspend its programmes due to serious threats made by the Maoists. The concerned beneficiaries 'farmers' formed a pressure group and initiated a dialogue with the Maoists saying that the programmes what the ECARDS were launching are fruitful to uplift their socio-economic structures 'livelihoods'. The farmers' group also put forward detail programmes and activities of ECARDS. Finally, the Maoists gave a permission to ECARDS to re-start its suspended works. ECARDS was able to initiate its programme again as it had adopted farmers' demand driven programmes with recruitment of local people as the facilitator of farmers.

The selection of right programme is another contributing factor for an effective work. It includes the issues of community demand driven and participatory- programmes, equal access and opportunity to all and immediate result-oriented programmes, regular reporting, and priority to physical development. Other contributing factors for effective work are transparency and advocacy, which occupied views of 11 percent respondent each. The issue of transparency leads the social/public audit, public hearing and pasting the programmes and its budget in an appropriate place at the project sites. Similarly, advocacy boosts up human rights issues that include International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) focused programmes, human rights training to security forces, declare school as a peace zone, networking among like-minded human rights organisations and fact-finding mission.

Other issues of contributing factors were to maintain self-discipline, neutrality and low profile activity, formal and informal consultation, agreement and education, enhancement of community ownership, development of code of conduct, establishing and strengthening networking and coordination among the like-minded organisations, recruitment of honest and dedicated staffs, and programmes targeted to poor and disadvantage group.

In some places, the Maoists seem quite positive with development organisations. In May 2004, the Maoists organised an interaction programme on "The Role of NGO in Present Day Nepal" at Biruwaguthi in Parsa district. People from all corners such as journalists, NGO workers and civil society were invited. The Maoists themselves asked NGO people to prioritise their works on pressing needs or immediate relief programmes for the people. Besides, the Maoists formed a sub-committee to analyse and monitor the implementation of development budget of VDC and DDC allocated in the fiscal year 2060/2061 BS in Parsa. The Maoists also urged civil society to pressurise the DDC to allocate more development funds for the work that are pressing needs of the people.

One-fourth of the total respondents was of the views that the contributing factor or success of development intervention depends upon the policy of concerned organisation. If organisation follows people-centred development approach and frequently monitor and modifies according to the surrounding environment, they shall continue their services without confrontation, contradiction, disputes and encountering difficulties. One development organisation in western Nepal while conducting agriculture training to farmers, local Maoists came and asked them about their purpose, objective, vision, mission and goal and they also seated back as trainees. As they knew all details of organisation, its staffs and target population (farmers particularly poor) of programmes, the Maoist finally said - "Your projects are fine. Why do not you go another place and work with more farmers."

After the initiation of the conflict in the country, the corruption at local level has been reduced to some extent.

- Mr Narayan Prasad Sharma, Kavre

## SECTION FOUR - DATA ANALYSIS

Based on the developed survey questionnaires, sampled respondents both from development service providers and service recipients were interviewed. The available data from the interview process have been analysed and presented as below:

### 7. Causes and Impact of Conflict

The available information on level of severity of the conflict and its causes have been analysed and presented as below:

#### 7.1 Severity of Conflict

*Table 4: Sex wise assessment on severity of the present conflict in Nepal (in percentage)*

		Very Severe	Severe	Medium	Low	Total
Sex of Respondents	Male	74.5	17.6	7.2	0.7	100.0
	Female	55.0	28.3	13.3	3.3	100.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>69.0</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>8.9</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>100.0</b>

About 74 per cent male and 55per cent female respondents have observed the conflict as very severe. Similarly, 17.6 per cent male and 28.3 per cent female have assessed the situation as only severe. Very nominal percentage of male (0.7%) and female (3.3%) respondents assessed the situation as low level of severity. The data clearly revealed that the respondents observed the situation of conflict as very severe and severe.

#### 7.2 Causes of Conflict

*Table 5: Age wise response on causes of conflict in Nepal (in percentage)*

Age group in years		PG	SE	UE	PV	PP	ED	NB	LO
Below 25	Yes	93.9	89.8	95.9	100.0	91.8	93.9	85.7	91.8
	No	6.1	10.2	4.1	0.0	8.2	6.1	14.3	8.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
25 - 40	Yes	89.0	84.4	92.7	91.7	83.5	83.5	78.0	81.7
	No	11.0	15.6	7.3	8.3	16.5	16.5	22.0	18.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Above 40	Yes	92.7	94.5	96.4	96.4	90.9	94.5	85.5	90.9
	No	7.3	5.5	3.6	3.6	9.1	5.5	14.5	9.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*(Note: PG = Poor Governance, SE = Social Exclusion / Inequalities, UE = Unemployment, PV=Poverty, PP = Party Politics, ED = Educational Deprivation, NB = Lack of need based development process and LO = Lack of opportunities for livelihoods)*

Age wise respondents explored the number of points as causes of conflict in Nepal. Among these, poor governance, social exclusion/inequalities, unemployment, poverty, party politics, education deprivation, lack of need based development process and lack of opportunities for livelihoods were found major causes of conflict in Nepal. Majority of the 25-40 age group respondent replied that social exclusion, educational deprivation, lack of need based

development process and lack of opportunities for livelihood are the major causes of conflict. The age group of below 25 and above 40 years have seen the lack of need based development process comparatively lower than the other parameters. However, all other respondents of age groups have seen lack of need based development process an important aspects.

Most of the development programmes which has aimed for empowerment of rural women and poor through awareness raising and skill development are not affected by present conflict in Panauti and Banepa of Kavre districts particularly if they are implemented by the local organisations.

- Mrs. Januka Devi Kharel, Panauti

### 7.3 Impact of Conflict

Table 6: Major impact of conflict based on information sources (in percentage)

Sources		CI	DD	PA	SE	LO	AB	MC
Service Provider	Yes	96.4	92.9	64.3	71.4	96.4	85.7	92.9
	No	3.6	7.1	35.7	28.6	3.6	14.3	7.1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Recipient	Yes	94.1	92.4	55.1	74.6	88.6	73.0	89.7
	No	5.9	7.6	44.9	25.4	11.4	27.0	10.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Note: CI = Curfew/insurgency difficult life, DD = Difficult to carry out development activities, PA = Increase political awareness, SE = Lowered social exclusion, LO = Loss of livelihood opportunities, AB = Abduction and MC = Migration within country)

More than 90 per cent of both service providers and recipients have observed major impacts of conflict as difficulties in daily life, difficulties to carry development activities, loss of livelihood opportunities and migration within country and outside country. However, the parameters related to increased political awareness and lowered social exclusion by both recipients and service providers have not been observed significantly. Similarly, 85, 96 and 92 per cent service providers have observed abduction, lowered social exclusion and migration as moderate impact respectively. However, only 73, 88 and 89 per cent recipients have observed abduction and lowered social exclusion and migration as impacts of conflict respectively. These data clearly revealed that the difficulties in daily life and difficulties to carry out development intervention followed by abduction, lowered social exclusion and migration is the major impacts of conflict in Nepal.

In the present situation this is not wise to talk with the strangers or the outsiders. We would have not talk with you, if we did not know about your arrival by the local organisation representatives. We would not have told our views to you freely in this situation. We might face problem when we give our views to someone whom we don't know.

- Mrs Laxmi Soma Sainiu Panauti

Table 7: Impact of conflict on development activities - age group wise (in percentage)

S.N.	Description		Age Group			
			Below 25	25-40	Above 40	Total
1	Destroy development	Yes	25.1	50.3	24.6	100
		No	14.3	54.8	31.0	100
2	Transportation blockage	Yes	25.7	50.3	24.0	100
		No	6.7	56.7	36.0	100
3	Bandh of staff movement	Yes	25.6	50.6	23.9	100
		No	9.1	54.5	36.4	100
4	Office displaced	Yes	27.8	50.4	21.8	100
		No	15.0	52.5	32.5	100
5	Need additional payment as tax	Yes	26.6	48.4	25.0	100
		No	17.6	55.3	27.1	100
6	Donation required	Yes	27.3	49.2	23.4	100
		No	16.5	54.1	29.4	100
7	Difficult in peoples' participation	Yes	28.6	51.3	20.1	100
		No	8.5	50.8	40.7	100
8	Initiated process in inclusion	Yes	29.3	50.4	20.3	100
		No	12.5	52.5	35.0	100
9	Difficult to reach poor people	Yes	28.6	51.7	19.7	100
		No	10.6	50.0	39.4	100
10	Empowerment of women and poor	Yes	32.5	50.0	17.5	100
		No	9.2	52.9	37.9	100
11	Frequent policy changing	Yes	27.4	51.1	21.5	100
		No	15.4	51.3	33.3	100

The present conflict affected development interventions through various ways positively as well as negatively. Empowerment of women and poor and initiation of inclusion process were the positive impact of conflict. However, age group of below 25 years were observed these areas as major positive impact. The parameters related to destroy development works, difficult to travel, difficult to reach poor people, difficult in people participation, frequent change in policy, office displacement and donation / tax were observed as major negative impact on development works.

At the end of the Kartik 2061, there was news in the media that a Maoist Mr. Upendra Mahato was killed in the firing (*Bhidanta*) in Kavre district of Nepal. But after few days it was found that Mr. Mahato is alive and he is one of the staff members in the District Agriculture Development Office (DADO) Kavre. The reality was that security forces got an identification (ID) card with the name of Mr. Mahato from the killed person, which was lost by him few days back. He had also informed about the loss of his ID card to the chief of DADO and got new one. Because of the above situation he was pulled into DADO office. But, after few days of regular attending in DADO office Mr. Mahato was called to the Chief District Office (CDO) for inquiries and also asked for regular attendance till other decisions are made. It was mentioned that Mr. Mahato was also mentally depressed during this time. After a week, the armed force came in the office and arrested Mr. Mahato and took him to an unknown place. This was not publicised until a week after the arrest (at the time of this study). The CDO was also seems helpless to this case. It was found that Mr Mahato was one of the very intelligent and hardworking staff members at his office. The other field staffs in all the offices at Dhulikhel had requested the administration to make public his condition. The staff members at district level also confirmed that they would not conduct any field activities until the case is solved.

- Prabhu Narayan Yadav, DADO, Kavre



## 7.4 Development Works in Continuing

Table 8: Ways of continuing development interventions – view of service providers and recipients (in percentage)

Respondents		PT	LP	RC	MC	PD	CA
Service Provider	Yes	90.5	76.2	19.0	95.2	33.3	71.4
	No	9.5	23.8	81.0	4.8	66.7	28.6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Recipient	Yes	85.1	80.6	50.0	90.3	53.0	63.4
	No	14.9	19.4	50.0	9.7	47.0	36.6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Note: PT = Managing programme transparency, LP = by hiring local peoples, RC = registration in the new context, MC = Mobilizing community groups of CBO's, PD = by providing donation and CA = Shifting /changing activities as per community needs)

As there are development interventions still running even in conflict situation, various reasons behind this are observed. More than 80 per cent of service providers and recipients have observed managing programme transparency, hiring local peoples, registration in the new context, mobilizing community groups of CBO's, providing donation and shifting /changing activities as per community needs as important reasons behind the running these development interventions. Among these, managing programme transparency through different ways and mobilisation of community groups / CBOs are significant reasons that have observed by both service providers and recipients. Other reasons like hiring local people and shifting activities as per community needs have also been observed by fewer number of respondents as reasons behind continuing development interventions. However, contradictory versions of service providers and recipients have observed for the parameter of providing donation and registration with Maoist. Very minimum percentage of service providers scored these parameters whereas recipients scored more than the service providers.

## 7.5 Possible Approaches for Effective Development Interventions

Table 9: Possible approaches to carry development interventions – education wise (in percentage)

Education level of Respondent		CA	OD	MT	SD	RN	SQ
University	Yes	82.8	85.9	85.9	78.1	31.3	53.1
	No	17.2	14.1	14.1	21.9	68.8	46.9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Sec. or Higher Sec.	Yes	93.2	93.2	89.8	83.0	67.0	70.5
	No	6.8	6.8	10.2	17.0	33.0	29.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Literate	Yes	85.4	85.4	85.4	73.2	73.2	73.2
	No	14.6	14.6	14.6	26.8	26.8	26.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Illiterate	Yes	75.0	60.0	65.0	45.0	20.0	55.0
	No	25.0	40.0	35.0	55.0	80.0	45.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Note: CA =Changing in the activities according to people need, OD = Ownership development at local level, MT= Manage transparency, SD = Skill development on negotiation at various level, RN = Registration with new context and SQ = Short-term and quick impact project approach)

More than 60 per cent of respondents from different education level have observed changing in the activities according to peoples need, ownership development, and managing transparency as possible effective approach to carry out development intervention during conflict. Although majority of respondents (around 70%) from secondary higher and literate educational level have replied registration with Maoist as a possible approach to carry out development interventions, 68 per cent university and 80 per cent literate respondents were of the views that these are not possible approaches.

Table 10: Possible approaches to carry development interventions – sex wise (in percentage)

		CA	OD	MT	SD	RN	SQ
Sex of Respondent		%	%	%	%	%	%
Male	Yes	86.3	86.3	86.3	77.8	54.2	68.0
	No	13.7	13.7	13.7	22.2	45.8	32.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Female	Yes	88.3	86.7	83.3	71.7	50.0	55.0
	No	11.7	13.3	16.7	28.3	50.0	45.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Note: CA =Changing in the activities according to people need, OD = Ownership development at local level, MT= Manage transparency, SD = Skill development on negotiation at various level, RN = Registration with new context and SQ = Short-term and quick impact project approach)

More than 80 per cent male and female respondents were of views that, activities according to peoples need, ownership development at local level and managing transparency are possible approaches to carry out development interventions in conflict areas. Skill development on negotiation from the both groups has also been observed as possible approach to carry out development interventions effectively.

Around 50 per cent of both male and female replied registration with Maoist and short term and quick impact project as possible approaches. However, contradiction in views of male and females (68% male and 55% female) has seen particularly regarding short term and quick impact project as a possible approach.

The development works and other activities are being continued to some extent in the areas where there is only one of the conflicting parties has its control.

- Mr Narayan Prasad Sharma, Kavre

*Table 11: Possible approaches to carry development interventions – age wise (in percentage)*

Age Group		CA	OD	MT	SD	RN	SQ
Below 25	Yes	89.8	89.8	85.7	81.6	73.5	59.2
	No	10.2	10.2	14.3	18.4	26.5	40.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
25 - 40	Yes	89.0	89.9	89.0	77.1	46.8	68.8
	No	11.0	10.1	11.0	22.9	53.2	31.2
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Above 40	Yes	80.0	76.4	78.2	69.1	47.3	60.0
	No	20.0	23.6	21.8	30.9	52.7	40.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Note: CA =Changing in the activities according to people need, OD = Ownership development at local level, MT= Manage transparency, SD = Skill development on negotiation at various level, RN = Registration with new context and SQ = Short-term and quick impact project approach)

Around 80 per cent of different age group people have observed change in the activities according to peoples need, ownership development and managing transparency are as possible approaches for effective development interventions. However, minority respondents replied registration with Maoist and short-term quick impact project as possible approach to carry out effective development intervention.

*Table 12: Possible approaches to carry development interventions – source wise (in percentage)*

SOURCE		CA	OD	MT	SD	RN	SQ
Service Provider	Yes	92.9	100.0	96.4	92.9	32.1	50.0
	No	7.1	0.0	3.6	7.1	67.9	50.0
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Recipient	Yes	85.9	84.3	83.8	73.5	56.2	66.5
	No	14.1	15.7	16.2	26.5	43.8	33.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Note: CA =Changing in the activities according to people need, OD = Ownership development at local level, MT= Manage transparency, SD = Skill development on negotiation at various level, RN = Registration with new context and SQ = Short-term and quick impact project approach)

More than 90 per cent of Service Providers observed need based programme, ownership development at local level, managing transparency and skill development on negotiation as important approaches for effective development interventions in conflict areas. Similarly, 86, 84, 84, 73, 56 and 66 per cent recipients observed change in the activities according to peoples need, ownership development at local level, managing transparency, skill development on negotiation at various level, registration with Maoist and short term and quick impact project as possible approaches respectively. However, difference between the responses of Service Providers and Recipients on the parameter of registration with Maoist has observed.

If anyone wants to implement any community support programme, the implementers should explain about the programme, where this is to be implemented, how and who are the recipient. This will be very good if you collaborate with local community based organisations as implementing partners for ease in working, traveling and transportation in the local areas.

- Mrs. Indira Sapkota, Panauti

## SECTION FIVE – DISCUSSION

### 8. Understanding on Conflict and Impact

In order to link the research findings with different aspects of conflict, relevant literature were reviewed. There are lots of documents available in conflict especially focusing in Nepal. However, very few documents are relevant in line with this research project. This is mainly because of two reasons:

- a) Firstly, the conflict is escalating at a high speed and covering more and more geographic areas rapidly, in this context analysis and the findings done in past are not very updated and relevant, and
- b) Secondly, the purpose of our research i.e. development of framework and approaches to carry out development works in conflict areas is quite new.

#### 8.1 Know How on Conflict

As the present conflict has escalated in all over the country, all respondents of this research project were very much aware about present conflict. But, the level of understanding and interpretation regarding the conflict was observed differently.

Socially, conflict refers to struggle amidst the interests, values, principles and faiths. It occurs when interest of more than an individual or human community clash, when their goals and concepts clash, when their value, cultures and principles clash each others, when it crosses the limit, or turns violence.

Very broadly, there are two viewpoints of looking at the conflict prevailing in the society. First, conflict is destructive; it destroys society, or pushes it back in time. This school of thought considers conflict as a malady. It leads development to doom or perdition. Therefore, conflict should always be condemned, and the warring parties should be crushed or made to comply with certain norms. This is a mechanical view of conflict (Martinelli and Almeieda, 1998).

Another view that looks at conflict as an inevitable factor for development, rather than as a negative element. It views conflict not essentially and inherently as a bad thing. Rather, it is an indispensable component for development. Neither society nor thoughts and nature can develop without it. Indeed, development is an outcome of conflict. The Marxists also adhere to this belief and definition (Dochorti and Fallsgraph, 1990, Warner and Jones, 1998, and Buckles, 1999).

#### 8.2 Causes of Conflict

##### Socio-economic Causes

The study clearly indicated that the socio-economic factors like social exclusion, inequalities, poverty and education deprivation were observed as major causes of the conflict in Nepal. It is well documented that social exclusion, acute inequalities, absolute poverty, lack of access to resources and failure of political structures to address these issues have made Nepali society extremely vulnerable to conflict and mass movements like the Maoists' 'people's war' (Hachhethu, 2003; Upreti, 2003b, 2002a; Hogger, 2001). Deep rooted social cleavages in terms of caste, ethnicity, gender and regional, cultural, linguistic and religious forms of

discrimination provided fertile ground to escalate the conflict. Maoists successfully capitalised on the widely discernible disillusionment of people towards poor performance of the current political structure and process, the highly unsatisfactory democratic transition of the 1990s regarding the transformation of the state, politics and society. Dominance of certain groups (e.g., Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar) in all social, political and economic sectors promoted feeling of injustice and revenge as ethnic groups and "lower" caste people strongly believe that they have been excluded from opportunities and resources. The Maoists have tactically utilised this sentiment by organising people not only on basis of social concerns but also in terms of ethnic and geographical identity.

“In this country, we have very big social difference. There are many people who have biscuit and meat for their dogs and other people do not have Gundruk and Dhido (a socially very inferior and neglected diet) for themselves and their children. This inequity and the inequality in the social and economical condition of Nepalese have created this conflict in the country”.

- - Mr Rudra Prasad Sapkota

Centralisation and regional imbalance, skewed distribution, access and control of natural and other productive resources, dominating influences of religiously and culturally biased traditional Hindu cultural values, discrimination against women, ethnic minorities, so-called lower castes and Dalits have created a feeling of injustice, frustration and have fuelled the conflict. Definitive action on radical land reform was not taken.

Centralism and social exclusion could be intentional and unintentional. However, intentional exclusion is more common and serious. Intentional social exclusion is a deliberate action of certain powerful elites<sup>1</sup> to fulfill their vested interests (to maintain prevailing economic and social structures upon which their existence is largely based) (Karki and Seddon, 2003, and Upreti, 2002a). The structural basis of Hindu society is principally shaped by a notion of exclusion and goes beyond the general social division of society. It promotes centralised exclusionary practices in individuals' life, their food habit, marriage, religious belief, education and day-to-day activities. It maintains rigid hierarchy.

### **Mismatch Development Practices**

One of the important causes that were explored in this research project was mismatch development process. As government along with other national and international organisations have been investing quite a lot of resources for sustainable development process through providing both technical and financial support. Lack of need based development process was found one of the important contributing factors. The programme and project implemented through different sources were not been able to address the basic needs of the target groups. These interventions were not able to provide impact (quick and short term) in the society. So, the Nepalese people remains poorer and poorer resulted that the country falls under the rank of Least Developed Country in the world.

Traditional social systems in Nepal is still a deeply exploitative and so-called modern economic development is failed to address pervasive poverty, unemployment, underemployment, child labour, bonded labour, gender discrimination (Pandey, 1999).

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<sup>1</sup> Intentional social exclusion also occurs within ethnic minorities. We have widely observed that elite from within ethnic groups is exploiting weak and poor members of their own ethnic community.

Poverty in Nepal is one of the major determinant factors of social exclusion, where vast majority of population is below absolute poverty line, and for their survival. These problems are causing malnutrition, high infant mortality, lack of access to basic facilities such as shelter, pure drinking water, primary health care, etc. Though, road network, telecommunication, hydropower development have been increased over the last 20-30 years, the far remote hills and mountain districts are still isolated from the mainstream development that is creating dissatisfaction, dissent and civil unrest. This is one of the major reasons of emergence of the insurgency from the Mid-West hills of Nepal (Seddon and Hussein, 2002).

These practices separated society into different distinct economic and social classes. The upper social class often wants to centralise power, resources and decision process to maintain their hierarchical social structure. They have neither confidence over their actions (they always fear for potential revolt from worst-off) nor they believe on inclusionary democratic practices (as they always want to be in power). They often fear for their social position and always show defensive response to justify their exploitative actions. They directly or often indirectly attempt to block or hinder initiation of any social reform measures.

Undoubtedly, development processes have wide ranges of impacts by the conflict. Similarly, development practices have negative impacts as it has failed to address the basic needs of the people (root causes of the conflict) and therefore contributed to escalate conflict. Despite the long rhetorical policy of decentralisation, governance practices are yet strongly centralised. Reaching the fruits of the development to the poorest of the poor in remote rural areas is still difficult and slow (Seddon and Hussein, 2002).

**Donor's assistance:** In assessing the impacts of donor intervention in development Seddon and Hussein, referring to the research work of Blaikie et al. (1980 and 2001), write, "Despite a heavy donor presence and sustained high levels of aid to Nepal (with foreign agencies contributing some 60 per cent of Nepal's development budget) and the existence of a wide variety of development programmes, that number of people falling below the poverty line has not decreased over the last twenty years. There can be little doubt that, even after half a century of development interventions Nepal is still in crisis" (Seddon and Hussein, 2002:2).

Nepal's more than 60 per cent development budget comes from donors and they have enormous influence in national economic and development policies. There is an extensive corpus of material that evaluates the impact of donor intervention in Nepal [See, for instance Keshav Acharya's work on 'A Review of Foreign Aids in Nepal (1998)', Devendra Raj Panday's work on 'Nepal's Failed Development (1999)']. The development interventions, the contribution of donor funded development interventions to address root causes of the conflict remains ineffective.

*"...What we say of the USAID implemented Rapti Zone Rural Area Development Project, and its second incarnation, the Rapti Development Project, aimed to fulfill the basic needs of the poor majority, the farmers of the mid hills. The Programme spent about US \$ 50 millions in 'improving household food production and consumption, improve income generating opportunities for poor farmers, landless labourers, occupational castes and women'. In short, the project's overall goal was to increase the well being of people. The Americans thought they would need 15 years to achieve their objectives. And, going by their reports, they worked 'hard' for those 15 years. The project started in 1980 and ended in 1995, just a month*

*and half before the Maoists began their armed movement. ...The government and donors both say development packages will help eliminate the Maoists. If that were true, why was Rapti Zone so favourable for the development of Maoist movement? If that is what you get after 15 years of American funded development, we were perhaps better without it". (Mainali, 2003:125-126).*

Of the three, political development is the most sensitive indicator of conflict if it mismatches with the other two. In contrast, social development and economic development does not lead to overt conflict, while economic empowerment alone leads to the further pursuit of economic wealth at least in the short and medium-term. Low development on all three indices leads to latent conflict, which may not erupt in violence for a long time. However, the grave potential for such situations becoming violent remains strong and even 'insignificant triggers may result in full-blown conflict. The 1990's popular movement is an example of manifestation of this situation.

### **Political Causes**

Under the political causes of present conflict lack of fulfillment of peoples' expectations, politicisations, poor governance system and lack of strategic programme planning and implementation were observed as important factors. The Nepalese culture and system that was developed based on long history and experiences were the other important contributing factors making people more frustrated.

The current conflict is also the cumulative outcome of the failure of the political systems that goes back to past regimes. People are frustrated with the previous regime and looking for a change. Consequently, people widely supported the democratic movement of the 1990 and the multiparty democracy was restored. General public had great expectation from the 1990's political change. However, it was also failed to govern the country based on the democratic ideals and the constitutional provisions detailed in the Constitution of Nepal 1990 (Thapa, 2003; Thapa, 2002). That made general public very frustrated and unhappy. This frustration became a mighty ground for the Maoists to undertake armed rebellion. The explicit aim of Maoists is to control state power to implement their agenda. There is distinctly different political perception of Maoists, the government and other political parties on the legitimate authority and representation. The Maoists are saying that they are seeking for *agragami chhalang* (Quantum leap), which requires total restructuring of the state, which other two power groups are resisting so far.

It is widely recognised that the post-democracy phase of Nepali politics, dominated by the Nepali Congress Party (NCP), failed to govern democratically or to alleviate the most urgent economic, social and political needs of the country. A detailed analysis of this failure goes beyond the scope of this study. Political parties have created and nurtured a narrowly politicised civil administration, which includes even the security forces. The weaknesses in various aspects helped to develop a widespread distrust in the democratic process in Nepal.

Time and again, military thinking has dominated both the government and the Maoists that ultimately sidelined political thinking to solve conflict through negotiation and dialogues and promoted militarisation of society. Since 4 October 2002 Royal takeover the democratic system of governance was replaced by centrally nominated governments and therefore they were not getting support from the major parliamentary parties, as major political parties are

excluded from the governance process. Legitimacy of these governments was widely questioned and has created a deep conflict between parties and the King.

Political representation in parliament as well as in party central committee structures has continued to be imbalanced through the domination of certain privileged groups (See Table 5)

Table – 13: Political representation of different groups total in percentage)

Caste/ethnicity (%)	House of representatives			Party's Central Committees					
	1991	1994	1999	NC	UML	RPP	JM	NSP	NWPP
Total seats	205	205	205	29	46	41	38	29	9
Brahmin	37.6	42	37.6	62.06	65.21	19.51	44.73	-	22.22
Chhetry	19.1	19.5	20.5	10.34	10.86	31.70	7.84	-	11.11
Newar	6.8	6.3	6.8	3.44	13.04	4.87	10.52	-	66.66
Hill ethnic groups	15.2	12.2	14.7	13.79	6.52	26.82	21.05	-	-
Terai communities	21.0	20.0	19.5	10.34	4.34	17.07	5.26	100	-
Others	2.9	2.0	2.5	-	-	-	10.52	-	-
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Adapted from Hachhethu, 2003:16 (Table 3)

This table shows the domination of certain groups and exclusion of other groups such as Dalits in the leadership both at House of Representatives and at Party's Central Committees.

### Geographical Causes

Geographical difficulties in Nepal have hindered to provide sufficient resources as well as expose with livelihood opportunities. Geographical disparity, especially Mid Western and Far Western Regions and remote areas, where there are widespread of poverty, disparity in resource distribution, structural inequality, injustice and discrimination, has heavily fuelled the Maoists conflict. Hence, the Maoist insurgency was first started from Mid-Western Region (Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan and Jajarkot). Since then their influence has been spread across the country and now they are virtually present in all 75 districts from rural to urban and hills to Tarai areas (Philipson, 2002).

Action Aid Nepal (AAN) with the partnership of DFID had been conducting integrated development programmes such as education, health, irrigation, agriculture, saving and credit and advocacy in Bajhang and Kailali districts since 1997. Uday Himal Network (UHN) and Creation of Creative Society (CCS) were the partners of AAN in Bajhang and Kailali respectively. As the programme could not timely accomplish within December 2002, the concerned authority extended its period for one year. But the same December, staffs as well as board members of CCS denied to work further. As a result, AAN suspended its programme for three-months. Even after three-month, situation could not improve and project finally withdrew at the mid of 2003. Similarly, the partner UHN has also stopped its programme in Bajhang district in September 2003, three-month before its completion (phase-out).

Nepalese geographical terrains are composed of numerous mountains, hills, Gorge, valleys, churiyas, dense forests, caves and remote areas, which are extensively used by rebels for their insurgency. Lack of good networks of transport and communication has also favoured rebels to launch their rebellions and hindered security forces. The open boarder between India and Nepal gave Maoists easy access to transport arms and run political activities.

These entire situations helped Maoist in geographical expansion and growth. The growth and expansion of Maoists were fast mainly because of two reasons. First, they effectively and



strategically utilise media, opinion leaders, frustrated masses, ex-bounded labours, unemployed youths, etc. and poor, marginalised and underprivileged groups. The rebels also gave the impression to the general public in rural areas that they truly represent the interests, needs and aspirations of poor rural population who have been excluded from the economic, political and social opportunities mainly because of staying in geographically remote and backward areas (Kievelitz *et al.* 2002). Simultaneously, they also created an environment for both convince and fear that helps them to expand their activities (Thapa, 2003). Second, the successive governments failed to recognise the gravity of the problem associated with geographical areas.

### **International Causes**

The CPN (Maoist) is a member of Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). Therefore, there is direct ideological influence of the RIM in the Maoist movement in Nepal (Thapa, 2003). The CPN (Maoist) is also member of Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) and different Indian communist groups (Jwala, 2002:146-147). The CPN (Maoist) has also official relations with Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) USA. Another ideological dimension of Maoist insurgency is similar with the insurgency of the Peruvian Communist party-Shining Path (Nickson, 2003). Critiques say that source of inspiration of the Nepalese insurgency is the Peruvian people's war waged by the Shining Path (Thapa, 2003; Jwala, 2002).

After 11 September 2001, international security interests in Nepal are growing. High-level government's officials and military visits from USA, India and UK and their direct response to the current conflict clearly indicated such interests. The strong reactions of the US Ambassador against the Maoists and placing them in the terrorist list are examples of hard line stance of USA towards the Maoists. USA also placed Nepal in the list of top six countries to support for the 'war against terrorism'; providing military assistance in security intelligence, training and millions of US dollars financial supports to strengthen the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) (Thapa, 2003).

India is another major player in the current conflict. Its attitude towards the Maoists, its level of support to the government, its influence on the political decisions of the Nepalese political parties and its perceived security concerns determine the degree of Indian influence in the conflict. Before September 11 Maoists had easy access to India, strong tie with Indian ultra leftists, obtaining training and supports like weapons, using Indian territories for meetings, organisation and publications which helped rapid expansion of Maoists activities in the country. After the September 11 India is publicly supporting the Nepalese government, declaring Maoists as 'terrorist', searching Indian territory for Maoist cadres and arms caches, reinforcing boarder security (deploying troops) and sealing of boarders and providing military equipment and helicopter support to crack down the rebels.

So far, China is not in the scene in the context of Nepalese conflict. In contrary to many speculations, China is not supporting to the Maoists and expressing dissatisfaction for the use of the name of Mao in this violent conflict. However, China is carefully watching the activities of India and USA in Nepal.

### Constitutional Causes

The study also explored that the parties both conflicting as well others were very much strict on their own stands. Each of them interpreted constitution, as they like. Some people also argue that the 1990's constitution is sexist and racist (Lawati, 2003). It is racist because it promotes one language, one culture and one religion and sexist because it does not treat men and women equally in fundamental issues like citizenship. This constitution also promotes majoritarian institutions, which discriminate against minority religious groups, women and low caste people. They argue that the Constitution has definitely provided freedom of expression but not ensure equity and justice. The constitutional unchangeable provisions have also observed undermining the sovereignty of people. It has not been recognised the constitution development is a continue process.

### 8.3 Effect of Conflict

**Conflict and development:** Although, presently the conflict is spread all over the country, almost all respondents were observed it as originated from the western parts of Nepal. Following map reinforces the points just made. It brings up the poorest region in Nepal in terms of education and development and shows how handicapped and discriminated the west is. The districts listed on the right side above the map have been ranked (1:lowest, 75: highest in terms of Literacy in 1971 vs. 2001, the regional development Index 1971 (RED) vs. Overall Composite Index of Development 1991 (OCID) and Poverty and Deprivation Index (PADI). Except for Dailekh (on literacy for year 2001), other eleven districts in the Far West and Mid-West belongs to the worst bottom third of the scale in the Maoist insurgency and that the proportion of casualties from here outmatches the one for population by five times.



**Destruction of development infrastructures:** The Maoists raiders have destroyed some important infrastructures of development ever since they launched armed rebellion in 1996. These chiefly included government offices, VDC buildings, power stations, telecommunication tower and centers. No authentic data have been made available to date of the entire damage thus made. Yet, the government sources put the figures to 16 billion rupees in 2001 (2058 BS) alone. The Maoist invasion in Arghakhanchi in September 2002 alone caused a loss of 219 million rupees. Similarly, the Maoist attack on the headwork and intake of Khimti Hydropower Project and Jhankre Power Project of 500 kW capacity damaged development infrastructures worth 963 million rupees (Dhruva Kumar, Nepal Fortnightly, 16-29 Magh 2060).

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According to Dr. Shankar Sharma, Vice-Chairman of National Planning Commission, the total loss caused by Maoist attacks comes to USD 250 million. According to a study report entitled Economic Aspects of Nepalese Insurgency, published in 2002 by ICON Centre for an economic analysis of DfID, the total economic loss caused by conflict as of date is about 18 billion rupees. But this figure is very low. The real loss might be far much higher (Sapkota, Bishnu, 2004:19).

**Erosion of social system:** Social system in Nepal is an important factors that is keeping alive the diversity and dynamics of Nepalese society. The study has been found that one of the important impacts of present conflict is disturbance on social system, which is affecting on mutual help, relationship and helping in difficulties among the social actors. The current conflict has not only eroded the social capital that existed in communities but has also severely disrupted community relationships. Indigenous forms of social networks and institutions, which glued the society together, are divided, causing the decline of both binding (relation within communities) and bridging (link between communities) social capital. The state is not able to reduce poverty, control exploitation of the disadvantaged communities by those in power and generate employment opportunities to the large mass of unemployed people. Semi-educated, left-out and unemployed frustrated youths are becoming a risky reservoir of mass movements like the Maoist insurgency in Nepal (Hogger, 2001). Corruption and irregularities are increasing and becoming an integral part of the political process (Thapa, 2002).

In Post 1990, empowerment phenomena shows that overall political empowerment is high and social and economic empowerment is low and only elite, and neo-elite got benefit of social and political development. Nepal's planned development has the proven history of grand failure (Pandey, 1999; Upreti, 2004) in terms of addressing root causes of the conflict, upon which the Maoist insurgency is breeding (Philipson, 2002). Thus, it is imperative that mismatches between social, economic and political development and empowerment is one of the major causes of conflict in Nepal, which has helped to destroy social system in Nepal.

**Acute downfall in economic growth:** One of the major impacts of Nepalese conflict in general was observed as acute downfall in economic growth. The loss of livelihood opportunities, decreasing trend in income, difficult to carry out development activities and migration to look for other jobs were the major impact observed in research process. Majority of skilled and youth people have been migrated from village to the towns and abroad to seek job opportunities as well to escape from the conflict. In the meantime, productive lands have been leaving fallow because of inadequate human resources and fear from conflict. These

factors as well as slacking in tourism due to the conflict are negatively affecting the employment opportunities.

The armed conflict has led to acute drop in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Nepal as well. According to a research conducted by Rastriya Shanti Abhiyan (National Peace campaign), the economic growth rate of Nepal was average 4.66 per cent annually prior to the conflict (1991 - 1996). But, afterwards since 1997, the economic growth rate of Nepal has dropped to an average 3.41 per cent per year. It means, Nepal has lost its potentials to an average growth of 1.25 per cent per annum in its GDP.

*A Junior Technical Assistant of the Kavre District mentioned that how he was threatened by the 'Jana sarkar' while he was going to monitor the coffee growing area in the south of the district. He told that when I crossed the boundary of the area one of the conflicting parties called jana sarkar , asked many questions. Where I was going, why and who gave the permission to enter in their area. They also threatened me to return back. But I keep on going by changing the route to the destination, after they went their way. I reached the office after having two more inquiries and threatening. However, when I was at the office some people with mobile phone came and told me that I have been abducted and I cant go anywhere for five days. Although I reached the coffee growing area, I could do nothing for farmers but escaped from there in the third day, as the villagers told me the route how to go back quickly.*

Increasing defense expenditures and militarisation is another greatest negative impact of the conflict that has led to militarisation of national economy and politics, migration and displacement of hundreds of thousands of productive manpower from the villages, and rapid decline in trade and industries.

The over-militarisation of national economy and politics has posed a big hurdle to national development. The economic militarisation gives low priority to development work, economic development, and the economy or trade. The industry falls fully flat in the absence of state protection, promotion and encouragement. The result is – destruction of development. On the other hand, political militarisation dooms democracy to perdition. It ends the rule of law. The government no longer affects transparency, good governance and accountability to people. Consequently, the economy or trade and industry cannot prosper and flourish. This is the situation of Nepal state at the moment.

The armed conflict of the Maoists has resulted in over-militarisation of Nepalese economy. A burning example of economic militarisation is– excessive growth in security expenditures in the state budgetary. The following table shows the rise in security expenditures:

*Table 6: Trend of Growth in Security Expenditures Rs in billion*

Fiscal Year (in BS)	Royal Army	Soldiers Police	Armed	Security Expenses	Growth Percentage
2052/53	2.13	1.93		4.06	
2053/54	2.36	2.20		4.56	12.3
2054/55	2.58	2.49		5.07	11.2
2055/56	2.99	2.90		5.89	16.2
2056/57	3.48	3.27		6.75	14.6
2057/58	3.81	5.18		8.99	33.2

2058/59	5.86	6.04	11.9	32.4
2059/60	7.38	6.22	13.6	14.3
2060/61	7.18	6.28	13.56	0.2
2061/62	8.00	6.74	14.74	8.7
Total Security Expenses	45.77	43.25	89.12	

*Courtesy: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2061 and Budget Speech 2060/61 and 2061/62*

The above data show that the state incurred only 2 billion Nepalese rupees for the royal Nepalese army in the fiscal budget of year 2052/53. But in this fiscal year (2061/62 B.S.), it has shot to 8 billion rupees by quadrupling the previous amount. Similarly, a decade ago, the state spent only 1.9 billion rupees on the police. But now (2061/62 B.S.) the amount has reached 6.75 billion. This is three and a half times more than it was in 2052 B.S. Then the total security expenditures were around 4 billion rupees. But currently it has reached 15.62 billion rupees. This means the current armed conflict has more than trebled the security expenses. During 2061/62 this comes to a rise of 26.4 per cent in comparison to 2052/53 B.S.

The trend of the incomes and expenditures of the state from B.S. 2051 to 2059/60 shows that it saved around 5 to 8 billion Nepalese rupees as of 2058 B.S. through its own revenues and after incurring general expenditures. The amount could have been spent on development. The remaining amount was raised through internal loans, foreign loans and external grants. But the scenario has changed drastically after the conflict flared up in *Mangsir* 2058 B.S. and the state declared emergency, especially when it mobilised the army. Now the state can afford only general expenditures, but cannot save more than 1 or 2 billion Nepalese rupees for development. It means that the state has to depend entirely on loans and foreign aids for its development. This is one of the most grave effects and outcome of the armed conflict.

*Table 7: Revenues, General Expenses and Savings Status Rs in billion*

Year in BS	Revenues	General Expenses	Amount Remaining for Development
2051/52	24.58	19.27	5.31
2052/53	27.89	21.56	6.33
2053/54	30.37	24.18	6.19
2054/55	32.94	27.17	5.77
2055/56	37.25	31.05	6.20
2056/57	42.89	34.52	8.37
2057/58	48.89	42.77	6.12
2058/59	50.45	48.49	1.86
2059/60	56.23	54.97	1.26
2060/61*	62.22	59.30	2.92

\*Amended Estimate

*Courtesy: Ministry of Finance, Office of Comptroller*

*All the world have changed and the people who can not listen are now able to listen and who can not talk are talking by using modern technology but for us, those who can listen should pretend as deaf (Bairo) and those who can speak should pretend as dumb (lato) due to this current situation. Therefore, it is only wise not to talk anything with anybody.*

*--Arjun Chokhyal, Galkot Baglung*

The data show that Nepal is now (2059-60) in a pitiable position to afford only general expenditures through its revenues. Thus it is left with a petty amount of 1.25 billion rupees. In 2058/59, the amount was just 1.86 billion rupees. It pinpoints towards a very dreadful situation. The reason is, it has no means and resources of its own to invest in development activities. It must either seek loans or solely depend on external grants. At present, the state is managing through the remittances or drafts sent by the Nepalese working abroad. Otherwise, it might have gone bankrupt. Similarly there are various kinds of visible and invisible effects of conflict.

Nepal is now on the verge of development or destruction from the consequences of the conflict. If we could address this conflict on time and hit it at the very root, then we open unique avenues of changes and development. On the reverse, we would face all-round total destruction.

*In the western part of the country in many villages, there is a system that the local people should get permission letter from Maoist's government to go out from their villages or the 'Jana Sarkar area'. The villagers those coming out from their government area get permission letter from them. The security force caught a person with the permission card while in their routine checking. This person is now suffering from many types of inquiries and torture. This is one of the terrible situations in the west. If they do not take the permission then the Maoists give punishment if they take the permission the security force punish them.*

*- Farmer of Jumla*

#### **8.4 Peace Initiatives**

Various attempts for peace initiatives in Nepal have been initiated by different organisations at different levels. The government and the Maoists made some efforts in the past to negotiate the armed rebellion and restore peace in Nepal. Similarly, international communities and civil society organisations have also greatly contributed to restore peace in Nepal.

In May 2001, the cease-fire was declared and the government invited the Maoists to peace talk. However, after 3 rounds of negotiation talk the cease-fire was broken and insurgents suddenly attacked military installations. This event turned the conflict into severe escalation. Again the cease-fire was declared second time on 29 January 2003, and 3 round of talks (27 April, 9 May and 17-19 August 2003) ended without any achievement and the Maoists unilaterally broken cease-fire on 27 August 2003.

*“Peace is a state of well-being that is characterised by trusts, compassion and justice. In this state people can be encouraged to explore as well as celebrate diversity and search for good in each other without the concern for personal pain and sacrifice (Sandy and Perkins, 2002). Peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order-in short of government, once said Albert Einstein”.*

Since 10 years, Nepal is heavily suffering from the violent conflict. It is at cross road. There are sufficient documented evidences that the major causes of conflict are political failure:

structural inequalities, rampant poverty, geographical disparity, and injustice. There is also overwhelming agreement that the protracted conflict in Nepal cannot be addressed without resolving these structural causes (Upreti, 2003a&b, 2002a&b, Philipson, 2002; Hogger, 2001; Kievelitz, and Polzer, 2002). Since the inception of conflict, different approaches were used to resolve it (e.g., police operation, military mobilisation, integrated security and development, cordon and search, state of emergency, use of special terrorist control act, ceasefire and peace talks). However these approaches were not successful to resolve the conflict. Among these efforts unilateral ceasefire by the Deuba government in July 2001 and subsequent 3 rounds of peace talks until 23 November 2001; and the second time ceasefire on 29 January 2003 and subsequent 3 rounds of peace talks until 19 August 2003 were the most appreciated endeavours. However the peace initiatives process did not succeeded to make good result and expectation of Nepalese people swept away.

After the second time ceasefire break by Maoists, security forces became more pro-active than before, but arguably not able to dominate or guarantee security outside cities and District Headquarters. General impression is that security forces are being pro-active in trying to take the battle to Maoist units. However, they are weak to provide a framework of security or maintain law and order situation. Security forces are obviously concerned to reduce own casualties that may cause slow down to have rapid response to an incident or threat. This emphasis on destroying Maoists, at the expense of extending the rule of law, they may not gain the confidence of villagers.

World's conflict history has shown that peace process is complex, sensitive, delicate and very fragile (Barnes, 2002). The Nepalese experience itself on peace talks has also proved that negotiation is not simple as it looks. The experience of the third round of peace talks has proved that ceasefire and peace talks could break at any, if there is no genuine commitment and sincere efforts of the negotiating parties. Similarly, the experience also proved that certain level of principles and process should be developed and agreed. Furthermore, importance of external mediators has also observed another important aspects for effective peace talks.

## **Civil Society Peace initiatives**

In addition to National Human Rights Commission, civil society has also been deeply engaged in peace initiatives and making several efforts. Some organisations like INSEC, CWIN, Friends for peace, Civic Solidarity for Peace, Civil Society for Peace and Development, *Manab Adhikar tatha Santi Samaj*, National Human Right Organisation, Amnesty International Nepal, and many others, are actively engaged as human right watch dog and working to protect the human rights violation. Other many organisations have active involvement in peace awareness and conflict transformation process. Several organisations have made alliance for peace. Civil Solidarity for Peace is an example of such alliances. Even in district levels several organisations have formed peace alliance to work on peace related activities and facilitated the process at local level. Civic Solidarity for Peace, Civil Society for peace and Development, Volunteer mediators Groups and many other organisations and individuals have also prepared a frameworks for conflict resolution - roadmaps. Similarly, political parties are also equally active in this process through various ways like; famous 18 points road map of five agitating political parties and nine points proposal of Communist Party Nepal, United Marxist Leninist (CPN, UML).

### **8.5 Attempts for Development Interventions**

The political, ethnical and socio economic conflicts in South Asia created the situation that an increasing number of development and donor organisations are questioning the security of their staff members and the sustainability and impact of their efforts in conflict areas. This is resulting in a significant decrease and in some areas a total cessation of long term development activities, leaving rural communities more vulnerable to natural disasters, food insecurity, epidemics and malnutrition.

At present many development projects have been affected as many donors have decided to withdraw their programmes from conflict areas. There are two different views regarding the reasons behind the attack on development works. In the view of the government the attack is simply a manifestation of terrorism, whereas insurgents argue that they have attacked only those programmes, which have no transparency in work and budget and that comes to the project site hands in hand with the reactionary government. But, now, the trend in attacking development interventions has also been observed to create problems and pressure to public and ultimately Government. Though, the other South Asian Nations (SANs) also have problems of conflict, but the impact of conflict on their socio-economic and political life is comparatively very low as compared to the impact in Nepalese context.

As there are development interventions still running in different geographical regions, the study identified various reasons behind running these development interventions. Although, various perspectives between service providers and service recipients were explored, managing programme transparency, working with local communities and CBOs, formal and informal negotiation with conflicting parties and shifting project activities based on present situation were the most important factors that helped to continue development interventions even in conflict situation.

Government of Nepal recently tried with two alternative approaches to initiate and continue development works in conflict areas. One approach was the Basket Funding Approach,



according to which a committee under the chairmanship of Chief District Officer would allocate the fund for various development activities. This approach failed because, the representatives of the people at local level did not accept the modality as it diverted the power to allocate resources from the hands of people's representative to Government Administrator. The government then came up with the concept of Integrated Security and Development Approach, which is lunched by the security personnel deployed in the conflict area. This approach also has not been found to be very effective, as once again, it has been perceived as an imposition on the people, not being able to address the people's need and vested interest of the government to minimise the effect and frequency of insurgence.

The Association of INGOs in Nepal (AIN) has been discussing the issues frequently related to development interventions and preparing discussion paper on how to initiate and continue work in conflict areas. As a result, AIN disseminated a draft discussion paper entitled "INGO/Donor Coordination on Conflict – Sensitive Development" to its members on 22 August 2002. This paper outlined an approach to help coordinate the INGOs' work and thus ensure maximum impact from its strategic priorities. The approach seeks to build on individual strengths of each INGO, and focus that talent to collectively mitigate the damaging impacts of the conflict and perhaps the conflict itself. The approach also provides a way of helping the donor community to coordinate better on conflict issues by developing a clear set of conflict principles that would provide a vehicle for strategically focused conflict-sensitive development.

One of the policies now attracting intellectual attention is " No-harm policy", whose modus operandi is yet to be conceptualised. Donors in Nepal like DfID and EC are also seeking alternative ways to initiate and continue their development works in conflict areas. For example, in September 2002, DfID launched Humanitarian and Development Situation Assessment through Huntington Associates, UK, which concluded that under current circumstances, the government of Nepal linked development, is almost impossible outside the district headquarters and pace for development is becoming squeezed. The report further discussed and suggested approaches that could be followed to initiate and possibly shore up development work within conflict regions.

This report and other initiatives of Nepal clearly indicate that development agencies are in search of effective approaches that can take their development support to the needy poor people of conflict-hit areas. Although the above-mentioned DfID report attempts to outline some approaches, but these approaches are not the outcomes of intensive research (because the report involves just three weeks efforts of a knowledgeable consultant and bases on limited informants). So there is a strong need for a broad-based intensive research to develop an implementable and practical framework and approaches, which prepares environment to initiate and continue development work in conflict areas. Donors and INGO communities are also providing capacity building training to their staff members to cope with the possible situation. Furthermore, they have also been considered the approaches of shifting their works / activities as per people need, implementing quick and short term impact projects and programmes.

In a new political situation, when there are no elected local governments at the VDC and district level and no elected government at the centre, many development agencies working with government are in serious trouble. In this context, various attempts have also been conducted for peace building and transformation process. Most of these current initiatives are

centred at the policy level and draws view of the top-level people, whereas the attempt to formulate approaches based on the hard facts and experiences emerging from the grass roots including all other sectors are missing or neglecting.

## **8.6 Gender Perspectives on Conflict**

It has been observed that women and children are the most vulnerable by the armed conflict either internally or externally. Women and children have been directly affected if their male members died. In the other hand, it has been observed from our past experience that maximum discrimination based on sex, caste, religion, happens during armed conflict situation. Considering this fact, women in the world on an institutional process approached United Nation in 2000 against discrimination effect during armed conflict. After that in 1 October 2000, UN Council made a decision, which is known as decision number 1325. This decision clearly indicated that the negative impact of conflict on women and children and its possible solutions. This decision has also mentioned the role of women in conflict, process of rehabilitation after conflict and involvement of women in decision-making process at different levels.

This decision has opened both opportunities and challenges for women in peacekeeping processes, however the involvement of women in peacekeeping process is very limited and negligible. The organisations working for women right have feeling that women have lack of access on information and resources, so they are actively involving in raising awareness at different levels. The organisations working in the area of human right and peace keeping have been influencing their respective government and other stakeholders through different process to implement the decision effectively. This process was started in Nepal since 2001, however the process has been initiated since 2004. It has also been realised that awareness at policy to grass root level should be strengthened to implement the decisions effectively. Similarly, approach for development interventions during and after conflict should also be considered the need and areas related to women.

## **8.7 Possible Approach for Effective Development Works**

In present day, development agencies in Nepal are very much confused as they find two parallel governments (formally and informally) – one leads at urban centers and another at the countryside. Due to various reasons, development agencies have been facing difficulties in continuing development works in conflict areas. The staff members are psychologically tortured, development agencies have to follow Maoist rules, difficulties in daily life because of fear, *bandh*, blast and cross fire, difficult to reach poor people and suspicious by both of the conflicting parties were the major issues in continuing development works in conflict situation. However, some of the development organisations even in this situation have been implementing their development works through developing need based project, managing programme transparency, short term and quick impact development activities, utilising and mobilising local level resources both in terms of human and other areas of resource and managing formal and informal dialogues with conflicting parties.

Time is now ripe from all angles to end the urban-oriented, rich-oriented and donor-sponsored development patterns. For this, our development strategy should be such as to gradually transform all the villages of the country in towns, and availing all the basic facilities of towns to them. It is not an easy task. Nor is it impossible if the state makes a long-term plan of 20-25 years and dedicates itself to the same with full honesty and sincerity. This,

however, requires a change in the objectives of the development projects. It should not aim blindly at deepening and widening the rift between the villages and towns, and rich and poor. Rather, it should strive to make equitable and human development based on need based projects and programme development and implementation. The major aim of our development projects and programmes should be to make fully human by uplifting the citizens' lifestyle in a just and equitable way, to reduce the rift between the haves and have-nots and to bridge that between villages and towns. Some countries have played exemplary roles in this regard; Nepal should learn from them; for example, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland in Europe, Switzerland in Western Europe, and China in Asia.

Development of need based activities, short term and quick impact activities, managing programme transparency, obtaining do no harm policies, capacity building of local people especially on negotiation, mobilisation of local resources, transparent and positive attitude staff members and effective project cycle management were observed as important approaches to continue development works in conflict areas.

## **SECTION SIX – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **9. Conclusion**

There are two different viewpoints on conflict – first, it is destructive which destroy the society and ultimately the nation, and second, it is a common phenomenon for development, which creates an environment for positive change.

The Maoist insurgency is the results of cumulative effects of various elements in the country. Furthermore, the failure of previous governments and their governance procedures added the fuel for Maoist expansion and growth. Rampant poverty, structural inequality, political oppressions, social discriminations against certain groups like *kamaiya*, women, *dalit* and marginalised people, failure of the public administration, wide spread corruption and continuous failure of successive governments to address the structural problems, poor governance, social exclusion, unemployment, poverty and party politics are the root causes of the current conflict in Nepal. Political instability, dependency syndromes, lack of transparency and lack of opportunities for livelihoods are further contributed to fuel the conflict.

Difficult in daily life, difficult to carry out development, increased in political awareness, social exclusion, loss of livelihood opportunities, abduction and in country and outside migration, difficult to reach poor strata of the community are the major impact of conflict in the society. Since the start of the armed conflict, the Maoists have adopted offensive policy against the development organisations particularly to both the national/local and international non-government organisations. Number nine of the 40 point demands concerning to nationality put forwarded by United People's Front (UPF) before the initiation of the People's War states, "The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs in the country should be stopped." Article 48 of the Common Minimum Policy and Programme of

United Revolutionary People's Council (URPC) Nepal stated, "Imperialist financial penetration and internal sabotage on the pretext of I/NGOs should be ended".

The Maoist has updated their policy on development interventions after the broken of second peace talks. Except for those I/NGOs directly financed by USA and India, the Maoists have adopted soft corner and soft policy with neutral countries or those not hostile against their movement particularly the European Union and others. But their policies are not consistent. As a result, some of the development organisations or institutions have already withdrawn, some are likely to drop their programmes, some have downsized their programmes and geographical coverage, and some have also shifted their works at the safer places.

Because of uncertainty on various aspects in Nepal, development agencies are confused as they find two juxtaposed or parallel governments – one leads at urban centres and another at the countryside. Due to I/NGOs registration policy at the local level of the Maoists system, some development agencies including DfID cut-off its development programmes. DfID has downsized its activities after the imposition of registration policy effecting from 16 July 2004. United States of America temporarily suspended its Peace Corps Nepal on 12 September 2004, where 130 volunteers were presently working in the fields of education, environment, health, and community development.

Due to the Maoists offensive activities against the development organisations, the staffs of the concerned organisation are psychologically tortured and asked for different supports. Moreover, the development organisations are compelled to follow the Maoist rule in their areas. Most of I/NGOs and projects including DfID situated in Nepalgunj and other organisations in other areas are forced to closedown their offices during the period of general strike and/or regional strike called by the Maoists. The security forces and Maoist harass the community professionals. In some places, the Maoists censor the programmes. Security forces watch the community workers suspiciously, as they do not have restriction to and from one place to another. Majority of professionals of the development organisations and community level people do afraid with the state-owned security forces rather than insurgents as they shot from the distance without any investigation. The community professionals are also facing difficulties, as their own partner/collaborator could not put forward clear policy on conflict mitigation to its local partners. Neither have they launched any reflections and sharing programmes among the like-minded professionals nor institutions. Instead of that some partners say, 'if you can work, go ahead and if you can not, pack-up the programme.'

The success of programme also relies on the involvement of actors on it. The same nature of programme has successfully been conducted in one place, but not in other place. One INGO who had been working in Gorkha district through local partner withdrew its programme at the middle of the programme. But the same programme became successful at Doti district conducted by the same organisation (The Red Cross Society). The success or failure of programme depends upon what policy and procedure that has been followed, types of programme launched, type of people recruited, type of resources used, dealing with the situation and remaining neutral. Managing transparency in programme, use of local peoples, CBOs and resources, shifting/changing activities as per community needs and providing donations and tax are the major contributing factors for continuing development interventions

in conflict areas. Furthermore, policy, attitude and behaviour of the organisations and its staff members are other important contributing factors for continuing development interventions.

There is no insecurity and risk if the concerned government and non-government organisations or institutions design organisation policies to address the gaps, demand driven and local initiatives support-based programmes, initiating formal and informal talks at various levels, maintaining transparency and others. For this, the development organisation or institution should have people focused programme with flexible, learning attitude and behaviour. Most of the organisations adopting these policies and regulations in their on going process, are continuing their programme even in conflict situations/areas.

*Informal group: In the conflict prone area, the development works are almost non-functional or turned off. Particularly, the NGO implemented works are under the victimization of the conflict. This has created problem on the effective implementation of the activities, and also increased the insecurity of the field workers. Therefore to resolve these problems, an informal talk group is created in this district. The group will coordinates and negotiates after talking in all these issues with the conflicting parties.*

*- Mr. Chanddi Prasad Sharma and Mr Mahendra Subedi, Baglung*

Similarly, the success of development intervention and implementation strategy depends upon the policy of concerned organisation. If organisation follows people-centred development approach and frequently modifies its focus according to the surrounding environment, they shall continue their services without confrontation, contradiction, disputes and encountering difficulties. Plans, programmes and policies should be reviewed regularly and based on that further policies and programme should be developed.

It is concluded that a culture of tolerance, respect for diversity, inclusions, reconciliation, need based development process, short term and quick impact interventions and local resource mobilisation must be incorporated into government and development organisations principles and practices.

*The president of the women's group in Panauti, Kavre had a bitter experience that caused due to the conflict in her life. The case is in the month of Mangsir 2062. One day in the morning some body knocked the door of her residence. She told, "I opened the door and saw that a stranger was there but I allowed him to enter because of our culture. He asked to call my husband and I did so. My husband asked him why he was there. The stranger claimed himself to be a Maoist and he knows everything about the family and their school. He further said that he needs one thousand rupees and the family should give to him. He also said that the family can call to police but we both of the parties will have problem later. After listening him, we decided to give the money. We had no cash therefore; I used the savings of our group (women's group) to escape from this person. We could not ask anything why he wants money from us because we fear from them, who play with weapons. It is not sure whether he was Maoist. He might be thief also. But in the name of the Maoist, many others are taking benefit from the people."*

*-- President of women's group in panauti*

## 10. Recommendations

On the basis of the research findings various recommendations can be made, although it was in a short period of time. Usefulness of the recommendations depends upon place to place and context to context. Some recommendations may fit into one place or context but does not fit in other place or context. However, the study came up with following recommendations on possible approach/frameworks to carry out development interventions in conflict areas:

### **Need Based Approach**

The development organisations and its partners should focus on bottom-up approach in programme planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The programme development and its planning process should be prepared based on participatory process particularly involvement of beneficiaries and primary stakeholders. Bottom-up approach in programme development, planning and implementation also help to establish need-based programme, which will also help to avoid problems related to duplication.

### **Right-based approach**

Adaptation of right-based approach leads to participatory-based planning/designing and community demand driven programmes. The right-based approach focuses to both the hardware and software part of development especially advocacy. Right-based approach leads to particularly need based programme development, which helps to fulfill the basic needs in terms of physical aspects including advocacy. This approach also helps to establish awareness of the concerned groups and communities and stakeholders simultaneously.

### **Community Mediation and Negotiation Skill**

Mediation from the local community has been observed an effective approach to carry out development interventions effectively. The community mediation skills are essential when development organisations encounter problems in intervention process at local level. So, community mediation and negotiation skills at both institutional and local level should be developed through various ways and processes.

*Shantika Lagi Yuba Parichalan (Youth Mobilisation for Peace) Network: The prevailed conflict caused insecurity and ANISCHITATA condition in the country and villages too. Therefore, people in the same locality are also feared to each other. The youth in the villages are also migrating to other places. These youths are unemployed and are not able to earn subsistence for living in the cities. To minimize these problems and to create normal condition in the villages, we (the youth) discussed and organised to establish a network for peace management. This is called Shantika Lagi Yuba Parichalan (Youth Mobilization for Peace) Network. There are four networks in four Village Development Committees (VDC). These networks conduct skill development training, saving and credit activities, negotiation skills development etc. Now we also have established a Task Force by involving many other organisations such as Chartare Yuba Club (CYC), Lahare Pipal Gramin Bikaksh Kendra and other NGOs. They are also getting some funds from an organisation called "Stri Shakti".*

*- Mr. Chanddi Prasad Sharma, Baglung*

### **Right policy approach**

If organisation follows people-centred development approach and frequently modifies it according to the needs and desires of surrounding environment, they shall continue their development activities without confrontation, contradiction, disputes and encountering difficulties. The right policy approach includes work with local NGOs, CBOs, recruit local

people, mobilise local resource, maintain neutrality in project cycle management, keep low profile activity, adopt the policies of transparency and accountability, act as facilitator rather than planners, designers, researchers or community experts or donors and long term projection.

#### **Quick impact assessment approach**

As the process oriented programme takes long time to achieve the targeted goals and objectives, community or local level people have to fulfill their basic needs on day-to-day basis. So, quick and short-term impact approach along with process in development interventions should be developed and implemented accordingly so the target groups will have quick impact on their daily life.

#### **Transparency**


In order to avoid confusion and conflict, transparency in programme and financial aspects are very much crucial. Transparency on programme and financial aspects will avoid confusion and conflict among various actors at different levels. This will also helps to increase favorable environment in surrounding. Involvement of target groups and primary stakeholders in programme development and implementation and social audit are the basic elements to develop transparency on programme and financial matters of development interventions. Similarly, involvement of target groups in programme development, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation are other important factors to develop transparency and ownership development, which enables an effective implementation process.

#### **Do no harm approach**

Not taking either side of conflicting parties, the organisation as well as professionals should recognize and establish them as "neutral party". On the other hand, they shall ensure the middle path in case of conflict arise on the programme sites. To carryout development interventions successfully even in conflict situation, the study recommends to follow do no harm approach in development interventions process.

## Project Cycle Management


As the project cycle has various steps, there are number of activities to be performed to manage project effectively. The participatory approach in project management cycle would help to make process more easy, transparent and effective, so this would help to carry out development interventions even in conflict situation.





## Principles in Project Cycle Management

Principles are the most important factors that enable process to ensure the effectiveness and quality assurance of the works. Based on the available information during research process, project cycle management framework with basic principles have been suggested as below:



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### 11. Annexes

## **Annex I: About Author and Research Assistant**

As per the nature of the research, there were number of individual experts at different levels. The members involved in this research work and their background are as below:

1. Mr. Prem Bahadur Thapa, Project Manager (Policy and Planning Manager, ITDG Nepal)  
Mr. Thapa is Ph D. student and has worked in different research projects including action research in different capacities in association with Tribhuvan University, Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science, New Era and other development institutions. Mr. Thapa has wider experience on development interventions and successfully managed various projects in different capacities in government and non-government sectors. Currently, he is working with ITDG Nepal as Policy and Planning Manager.

2. Dr. Anil Subedi, Policy Research Expert (Country Director, ITDG Nepal)  
Dr. Subedi has a Ph D. in Rural people's organisation and networks, Diffusion of Innovations and Technologies, Agricultural Extension and Communication from University of Readings, UK. He is a well-known policy research specialist in Nepal. He has led various research and development projects initiated by various national and international organisations working at different level. Dr. Subedi has published many research reports and articles in national and international journals. In this research project Dr. Subedi contributed on policy as well as conflict related areas.

### **3. Research Assistants:**

- Mr. Diwakar Paudel (Research Assistant)
- Mrs. Bandana Khand (Research Assistant)
- Mr. Ram Babu Koirala (Research Assistant)
- Mrs. Joti Dhungana (Research Assistant)
- Mr. Ghanashyam Munankarmi (Research Assistant)
- Mr. Sharad Rai (Research Assistant)
- Mr. Bishnu Kuwar (Research Assistant)
- Mr. Matrika Sharma (Designing and logistic support)

Research Assistants were mainly involved in collecting field information through field survey questionnaires and key informants' interview. Research Assistants were from various academic background and having professional experiences in various development interventions, social, and research works. All the Research Assistants were oriented on project principles, process, checklist and questionnaire before going for fieldwork.

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### **Annex – III. Statement from Bilateral Donor Agencies**

Based on principles agreed internationally and in Nepal, the bilateral donors have adopted the following BOG for all the development and, if necessary, humanitarian assistance in Nepal.

1. We are Nepal to contribute to improvements in the quality of life of the people of Nepal. Our assistance focuses on reducing poverty, meeting basic needs and enabling communities to become self-sufficient.
2. We work through the freely expressed wishes of local communities, and we respect the dignity of people, their culture, religion and customs.
3. We provide assistance to the poor and marginalized people of Nepal, regardless of where they live and who they are. Priorities for assistance are based on need alone, and not on any political, ethnic or religious agenda
4. We ensure that our assistance is transparent and we involve poor people of Nepal and their communities in the planning, management and implementation to programmes. We are accountable to those whom we seek to assist and to those providing the resources
5. We seek to ensure that our assistance tackles discrimination and social exclusion, most notably based on gender, ethnicity, caste and religion.
6. We recruit staff on the basis of suitability and qualification for the job, and not on the basis of political or any other considerations.
7. We do not accept our staff and development partners being subjected to violence, abduction, harassment or intimidation or being threatened in any manner.
8. We do not work where staffs are forced to compromise core values or principles.
9. We do not accept our assistance being used for any military, political or sectarian purposes.
10. We do not make contributions to political parties and do not make any forced contributions in cash or kind.
11. Our equipment, supplies and facilities are not used for purposes other than those stated in our programme objectives. Our vehicles are not used to transport persons or goods that have no direct connection with the development programme. Our vehicles do not carry armed or uninformed personnel.
12. We do not tolerate the theft, diversion or misuse of development or humanitarian supplies. Unhindered access of such supplies is essential.
13. We urge all those concerned to allow full access by development and humanitarian personnel to all people in need of assistance, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their operations, and to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of such personnel.
14. We expect and encourage all parties concerned to comply strictly with their obligations under International Humanitarian Law and to respect Human Rights.

**Annex – IV Survey Questionnaire Development Recipient “Developing Framework and Approach to Carry out Development Works in Conflict Area”**

**A. Background Information**

Serial Number:

District:  Location (optional)

Age (Optional):

Sex:  1. Male 2. Female

Education level:  1. University 2. Secondary/Higher secondary  
3. Literate/primary 4. Illiterate

Profession (optional):

**B. Conflict and development intervention**

1. Are you aware of the present conflict in Nepal?

1 = yes, 2 = No

2. If yes, how do you assess the present conflict situation in Nepal?

1= Very severe 2. Severe 3. Medium 4. Low

3. What do you think about the causes of present conflict?

Causes	Grouping	Rank
Ideological differences	E	
Poor governance	A	
Endemic corruption	A	
Social exclusion/ ethnic cast inequalities	D	
Development inequalities by region/ location	C	
Inadequate infrastructure development (road/communication/....)	C	
Educational deprivation	B	
Unemployment (low or no income)	B	
Poverty (low economic condition)	B	
Social injustice	D	
Party Politics	E	
Lack of decentralized administrative process	C	
Lack of need based development process	A	
Lack of opportunities for livelihood	B	
Access to District Head Quarter (DHQ)/remoteness	C	
Others specify if any	F	

4. What do you observe the major impacts / effects of the present conflict in Nepal?

Effects	Grouping	Yes /no
Curfew/ insurgency – difficult life	A	

Destruction of infrastructure	<b>B</b>	
Difficult to carry out development activities	<b>B</b>	
Loss of lives	<b>D</b>	
Increased fear on daily life	<b>A</b>	
Increased political awareness	<b>C</b>	
Lowered social exclusion and social injustice	<b>C</b>	
Migration out side country	<b>A</b>	
Migration within country	<b>A</b>	
Problem in education sector	<b>E</b>	
Reduction in level of corruption	<b>C</b>	
Travel and transportation difficulty	<b>A</b>	
Government funds used in the security purposes	<b>B</b>	
Bomb blast and cross fire	<b>A</b>	
Harassment by conflicting parties (Psychological torture)	<b>A</b>	
Loss of livelihood opportunities	<b>E</b>	
Initiated process of social reformation	<b>C</b>	
Abduction	<b>D</b>	
Other specify if any (Land mines)	<b>F</b>	
	<b>F</b>	

5. What kinds of development activities/ interventions have been carried out in your areas?

<b>Activities</b>	<b>By whom</b>
Health related programme	
Agriculture related programme	
Education related programme	
Drinking water and sanitation programme	
Infrastructure development (road, irrigation, buildings, etc) programme	
Income generation programme	
Community forestry programme	
Natural resource management programme	
Capacity building programme	
Community empowerment	
Institutional development (self governance)	
Others specify if any	

6. How do you assess the effect of conflict on these development interventions by various organizations in your area?

1= Very severe 2. Severe 3. Medium 4. Low 5. No effect

7. How the conflict has affected development intervention processes in Nepal?

<b>Effects</b>	<b>Grouping</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Destroy the development activities	<b>A</b>	
Transportation blockade (vehicle, road, etc)	<b>B</b>	
Bandh of the staff movement in the working area	<b>B</b>	
Office displaced	<b>A</b>	
Need additional payment as tax	<b>C</b>	
Donation required	<b>C</b>	
Difficult in people's participation and group activities	<b>D</b>	
Initiated process of inclusion at different level	<b>E</b>	
Difficult to reach poor people	<b>D</b>	
Questioning on development approaches	<b>E</b>	
Empowerment of women and poor	<b>E</b>	
Frequent policy changes	<b>D</b>	

Others specify if any;	<b>F</b>	
	<b>F</b>	

8. Are these activities' still running at community level even in present conflict situation?

1 = Yes, 2 = No (If Yes go to No. 8, if No go to No.9)

9. If yes, how these development interventions are continuing?

Reasons (how) behind continuing	Grouping	Rank
Managing programme transparency	<b>A</b>	
Managing financial transparency (social audit and others)	<b>A</b>	
By providing donations	<b>C</b>	
Inclusion of people in decision making and implementation process	<b>D</b>	
By hiring local people or villagers	<b>B</b>	
Shifting / changing activities as per community needs	<b>D</b>	
People driven programme development	<b>B</b>	
Modification in the working strategy and modalities	<b>D</b>	
Registration with new context (Maoist)	<b>C</b>	
Mobilizing community groups or CBOs	<b>B</b>	
Developing ownership at local level	<b>B</b>	
Others specify if any;	<b>E</b>	
	<b>E</b>	

10. What do you think for the possible approach or mechanism to carryout development interventions in this conflict situation?

Possible approach	Grouping	Rank
By hiring / involving local people at implementation level	<b>A</b>	
Change in the activities according to peoples need	<b>B</b>	
Sharing programme approach and activities	<b>A</b>	
Ownership development at local level	<b>A</b>	
Effective decentralization process at national level	<b>B</b>	
Effective and transparent decision making process at national level	<b>D</b>	
Inclusion of people (interest groups) in decision making and implementation	<b>A</b>	
Manage transparency; financial and programme	<b>D</b>	
Modification in the working strategies and modalities	<b>E</b>	
Skill development on negotiation at various level	<b>E</b>	
Registration with new context (Maoist)	<b>F</b>	
Mobilise local level resources	<b>A</b>	
Working with CBOs and local groups	<b>A</b>	
Short term and quick impact project approach	<b>C</b>	
Others if any;	<b>G</b>	
	<b>G</b>	

11. What do you see the contributing and affecting factors for effective development intervention and piece building process?

For		Against
Collaboration with community	<i>Effective development interventions and or peace building</i>	Centralized programme implementation approaches (top down approach)
Community awareness		Biasness in project implementation process
Develop transparency		Lack of employment opportunity
Involve community in the process		Social discrimination



Need based project	<i>processes</i>	No or less access to resources
Employment opportunities		
Community ownership		

12. Any other views or suggestion you would like to provide us?

**Thank you for your time and cooperation**

**Annex V**

**Checklist for Focus Group Discussion /Group workshop or meeting**

**Developing Framework and Approach to Carry out Development Works in Conflict Area**

District:  Location

1. The causes of present conflict
2. Major effects of the present conflict on people livelihoods
3. Effect of the conflict in the development interventions
4. Some of the development activities are being continuing? And how?
5. The possibilities to conduct development intervention in current situation
6. Efforts made so far in development intervention and or peace building process
7. Stakeholders' power analysis
8. The contributing and affecting factors for effective development intervention and piece building process
9. Any other views or suggestion you would like to provide us?

**Annex – VI Developing Framework and Approaches to Carry Out Development Interventions in Conflict Areas**

**(Checklist for interaction with service providers)**

**PART ONE**

1. Name of the institution:

2. Working experience in Nepal:

3. Programme focused area:

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- v.

4. Programme/Project area (geographical area):

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- v.
- vi.

5. What kind of programme approaches your institution is applying to implement development projects?

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.

6. How do you prefer to summarise your programme approach in single sentence?

- 

7. How does your institution implement the project? (ie. Itself, through, CBOs local partners and both)

- i.
- ii.
- iii.

8. How does your institution select the local partners?

i.

ii.

iii.

9. If the institution works directly, how does your institution select programme or area?

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

10. Has your institution/partner been observed or faced any difficulties in project intervention process?

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

11. If yes, what kind of difficulties?

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

vi.

12. What are the contributing factors for above difficulties?

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

13. Have you been initiated any strategies or approaches to overcome above difficulties?

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

vii.

14. If not, have you been implemented your projects / interventions effectively even in conflict situation?

- 
- 

15. If implemented effectively, what are the contributing factors for effective implementation?

i.

ii.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

16. Has your institution been learnt any suitable approach and mechanism of project implementation under conflict practised in Asia and other regions?

- 
- 
- 
- 
-

17. If yes, could you share with us?

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- v.
- vi.

**PART TWO**

1. What are the possible causes for conflict in Nepal?

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- v.
- vi.
- vii.

2. What are the existing and possible affects of conflict in development process in Nepal?

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- v.
- vi.
- vii.

3. Can we implement the development interventions in conflict areas in Nepal?

- 
- 

4. If yes, what could be the possible approaches?

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- v.
- vi.
- vii.

5. Could you please suggest any appropriate ways or process to carry out development interventions in conflict areas of Nepal?

- i.
- ii.
- iii.
- iv.
- v.
- vi.

\*

Annex – VII: List of officials/organizations interacted during the study

SN	Name	Position	Organization
1.	Mr. Balkrishna Chaudhary	Acting Regional Head	RRN, Nepalgunj
2.	Mr. Surendra Karki	Account Officer	RRN, Nepalgunj
3.	Mr. Puspa Shreatha	Regional Head	CARE Nepal, Nepalgunj
4.	Mr. Dabal Bahadur Bam	Officer	CARE Nepal
5.	Mr. Bakhat Niraula	Officer	CARE Nepal
6.	Mr. Suresh Gautam	Regional Head	CVICT, Nepalgunj
7.	Mr. Bhola Mahat	Regional Head	INSEC, Nepalgunj
8.	Mr. C.P. Singh	President	FORCE, Nepalgunj
9.	Mr. SK Shrestha	Member	FORCE, Nepalgunj
10.	Mr. Dharma Raj Shrestha	Regional Head	Save the Children Norway, Nepalgunj
11.	Mr. R Acharya	Programme Officer	Save the Children Norway, Nepalgunj
12.	Mr. Mahendra Shahi	Planning and Monitoring Head and Officer	Plan, Nepalgunj
13.	Ms. Tara Kandel	Livelihood Officer	Plan, Nepalgunj
14.	Mr. Dharma Lal Rokaya	President	ENHUREC, Banke
15.	Ms Urmila Karki	Member	ENHUREC, Banke
16.	Dr. B.P. Tripathi	Executive Director	SSMP – Helvetas, Kathmandu
17.	Dr. Bishnu Dhital	Programme Officer	SSMP – Helvetas, Kathmandu
18.	Mr. Krishna Bdr. Rawal	Programme Planning & Monitoring Coordinator	The Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Kathmandu
19.	Mr. Anil Pant	Team leader	Action Aid Nepal, Kathmandu
20.	Dr. Pratap Kr. Shrestha	Executive Director	LI-BIRD, Pokhara
21.	Mr. Bimal Regmi	Programme Officer	LI-BIRD, Pokhara
22.	Mr. Bhim Pd. Sharma	Executive Director	SAHAMATI, Nawalparasi
23.	Mr. Karuna Sagar	Member	SHAMATI Nawalparasi
24.	Mr. B.B. Khadka	Executive Director	Multi-dimensional Agriculture for Development (MADE) Nepal
25.	Mr. B.B. Silwal	Resource Coordinator	MADE Nepal
26.	Mr. M.R. Bhandari	Programme Coordinator	MADE Nepal
27.	Mr. Gum Bahadur Gurung	Programme Director	FORWARD
28.	Mr. CK Sen	Executive Director	FORWARD
29.	Mr. Narayan Gyawali	Program Chief – SCOP	SAP Nepal, Chitwan
30.	Mr. P Mudbhari		
31.	Mr. Tilu Giri	Project Coordinator	RIMS Nepal, Dhading
32.	Mr. Umesh Lama	Chairperson	RIMS Nepal, Dhading
33.	Mr. Agin Shrestha	Admin Officer	RIMS Nepal, Dhading

### **Annex VIII Declaration of Tharuwan National Liberation Front (TNLF) covering western *tarai* areas of Rapti to Mahakali zones**

On January 29, 2003, the CPN (Maoist) declared Tharuwan National Liberation Front (TNLF) covering western *tarai* areas of Rapti to Mahakali zones excluding Dang district.

The Maoist-aligned TNLF 'Tharuwan Autonomous Province (TAP)' had put forward 10-point policies of I/NGOs registration in Banke-Bardia district. These were:

- I/NGOs working at their autonomous province shall register and renew their membership paying Rs. 300 fee every year.
- I/NGOs shall submit all the details of their programmes, policies and plans at their *Janaparishad*. Programme shall periodically be reviewed and monitored.
- Staffs, who are drawing more than Rs. 10,000 each month, shall pay 10 percent tax to *Janaparishad*.
- I/NGO must be a clean image and budget of all I/NGOs shall be utilized in proper manner.
- I/NGO must consult with them on the process of new recruitment. New staff shall be a clean image and shall not find against the policies and activities of the Maoists. And curriculum vitae of all employees must submit at the *Janaparishad*.
- Local NGO should be given priority for its partner. Programme shall often launch at the priority areas of the Tharuwan Regional Province (TRP) or remote and virgin area (absence of development activities and programmes) identifying the 'pressing needs programmes' of the communities. It also discourages the system of commission while implementing the programmes.
- Programme shall not be duplicated as the representative of the state, for instance, 'poverty reduction' programme.
- All the programmes and activities shall be held in coordination with the *Janaparishad*. Taking initiatives the property of NGO as public one, NGOs shall submit all the properties at the *Janaparishad* after their closure of organization.
- I/NGOs shall conduct their training/meeting at the villages instead of expensive or big hotels.
- NGO shall maintain transparency conducting public audit/hearing and pasting forthcoming programmes on notice board at the project site.



## Annex VII - AIN Recommended - Principles and Operating Guidelines / Ground Rules for INGOs in Nepal

*We, the INGO Community, have a shared goal of Poverty reduction and of Sustainable Development in Nepal. We believe that protection from human rights abuses, physical threats, violence and extreme economic, social and environmental risks, and territorial and sovereignty threats are a necessary precondition to achieve our goal and to make lasting improvements in the lives of the Nepali people.*

*We believe that it is a strength of the International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO) sector that it is diverse: We draw strength from the fact that we vary greatly in respect to our specific aims, values, policies and methods of working. This document lays down guiding principles and core values that have in common.*

*We start with a belief in the value of the global NGO movement and its essential diversity.*

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### Guiding principles

We are guided by internationally defined principles and standards of human rights. We conduct our programmes without discrimination as to ethnic origin, disability, gender, nationality, political opinion, race, caste, or religion whilst acknowledging that adhering to these principles may sometimes involve affirmative action, whereby benefits are targeted towards to poor and marginalised.

We work with and through local communities as partners in planning and implementation and with local government structures where appropriate.

In order to ensure broad ownership of our work, we seek to be transparent and accountable, and to communicate intentions – and widen and deepen dialogue – with partners at all levels

As INGOs, We recognize that all aid can influence conflict situations and create incentives and disincentives for peace. Our programs seek to strengthen democratic systems that allow for the nonviolent resolution of conflict.

In abiding by these principles, we commit ourselves to coordinate and share information, and refrain from taking unilateral action.

---

### Operational (do's and don'ts)

#### Do's

- We will endeavor to respect and build upon the culture, structures and customs of communities we are working in.
- We will strive to achieve full community participation in all our programs actively engaging women, men, youth and children.
- We will carry out appropriate monitoring and regular assessments of our program activities.
- We will report in an open fashion upon the impact of our work and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact.
- Our programs will be based upon high standards of professionalism and high levels of staff commitment in order to minimize the wasting of valuable resources.
- We will operate in a manner that does not place our staff, partners or project participants in significant danger.
- We will hold ourselves financially accountable to our membership, our constituency, and those who assist us with resources according to the nature of our organisation. We operate accounting rules and audit procedures that enable all transactions to be traced clearly.
- We will discourage armed or uniformed personnel from traveling in vehicles belonging to INGOs or their partners.

#### Don'ts

- We will not work in an environment where authorities and/or communities require us, or our staff, to compromise our core values or principles.
- We will not allow our staff hiring process to be influenced by political, ethnic or religious considerations. We will seek to recruit a diverse staff on the basis of merit, qualification and suitability for defined job positions and through applying principles of equal opportunity.
- We will not pay ransom demands for kidnapped staff. In the event of a staff member being kidnapped, we will try every means possible to seek a negotiated and nonviolent resolution.
- We will not pay "protection money", or any other kind of forced contribution in cash or in-kind to any party.
- We will not contribute to any party politicking activity, or subscribe or support any political party of any kind.
- We will not permit the use of INGO equipment or supplies for purposes other than those stated in program objectives.
- Our staff know that if at any time they feel threatened or intimidated, or feel that they cannot properly carry out the work entrusted to them, they are empowered to withdraw from the project area

*We will seek every opportunity to enter into constructive dialogue with all key stakeholders in the districts and communities where we work. Indeed, We hope that discussion of these principles and operating guidelines, and the internationally defined principles and standards of human rights that underpin them, will contribute to building stronger, more meaningful partnerships in the best interests of Nepal and its development.*

AIN, (Association of International NGOs in Nepal) is an informal association of 38 International NGOs working in Nepal

#### **Annex VIII: Chronology of emergence and expansion of the Maoist armed conflict**

Date	Events
1985	CPN (Forth Congress) splits into CPN (Masal) and CPN (Mashal)
1989	Prachanda became the GS of CPN (Mashal)
1990	Formation of United National People's Movement (UNPM)
1990	Formation of Communist Party of Nepal–Unity Centre [Fourth Congress + Mashal]
1990	Restoration of Democracy
1991	Formation of United People's Front of Nepal (UFPN) as a political wing of the Unity Centre
12 May 1991	Election UFPN has secured 9 seats in the House of Representatives with 5.0% of the votes cast.
1991	Nepali Congress formed majority government led by Girija Prasad Koirala
1994	Unity Center splits into Prachanda and Nirmal Lama factions
1994	UFPN splits into Baburam Bhattarai and Niranjana Govinda Vaidya faction
1994	Mid-term Election UFPN (Baburam) boycotted.
1994	CPN-UML formed minority government led by Man Mohan Adhikari
1994	UFPN Vaidya group succeeded in securing recognition of the Election commission
March 1995	Unity Center (Prachanda) renamed itself the CPN (Maoist)
8 October 1995	'Sija campaign' –a political orientation programme–began in Rukum and Rolpa.
4 November 1995	"Operation Romeo" in Rolpa and Rukum district by the three-party coalition of the NC, the RPP and the NSP
4 February 1996	UPF presented a memorandum of 40-points to the government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba of Nepali Congress
13 February 1996	Declaration of "People's War" by the UPF attacking police posts in Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Jajarkot, Gorkha and Sindhuli district 4 days before termination of the ultimatum given to the government.
February 1996	First Plan of the Maoist [Slogan- 'Let's move ahead on the path of the People's War to establish the new people's democratic state by destroying the reactionary state'].
March 1996	Second Plan of the Maoist [Slogan- 'Develop the People's War in an organised way'.]
March 1997	Lokendra Bahadur Chand of RPP formed a coalition government with CPN-UML.
April 1997	Coalition government led by Lokendra Bahadur Chand of RPP formed a "Working Committee for the Study of Maoist Activities and Finding Solutions" for the first time. The committee was led by the then MP late Prem Singh Dhimi.
June 1997	Third Plan of the Maoist [Slogan- 'Raising the development of guerilla warfare to new heights'.]
October 1997	Surya Bahadur Thapa of RPP forms a coalition government with NC and NSP.
March 1998	Girija Prasad Koirala of NC forms a minority government.
August 1998	CPN (ML) joined Koirala government
October 1998	Fourth Plan of the Maoist [Slogan- 'Let's embark on the great path of creating base areas'.]
December 1998	CPN (UML) replaced CPN (ML) in Koirala government. NSP also jointed the coalition and took part in the government.
May 1999	General elections.
May 1999	Krishna Prasad Bhattarai formed a majority government of NC.
August 1999	Fifth Plan of the Maoist [Slogan- 'Let's move further ahead on the great path of creating base areas'.]
6 January 2000	Formation of a "High Level Committee to Provide Suggestions to Solve the Maoist

	Problem" by the government of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai of NC led by Sher Bahadur Deuba.
March 2000	Krishna Prasad Bhattarai ousted by Girija Prasad Koirala from the government.
July 2000-February 2001	Sixth Plan of the Maoist [Slogan- 'Raise to new heights the guerilla war and the people's resistance struggle'.]
February 2001	Second National Conference of CPN (Maoist), adopted the <i>Prachanda Path</i> as a theoretical framework of the party. The conference has passed the slogan- 'Let us consolidate and expand our base areas and move forwards towards a people's government in the center'.
1 June 2001	Royal massacre.
19 July 2001	Girija Prasad Koirala resigned from the post of Prime Minister.
22 July 2001	Sher Bahadur Deuba became the Prime Minister.
25 July 2001	Cease -fire announced by the government led by Sher Bahadur Deuba Maoists also announced the cease-fire on the same day, after the government's announcement.
30 August 2001	First round of peace talks between the government and the Maoist held in Godawari, Lalitpur
14-15 Sept 2001	Second round of peace talks held in Thakurdwara, Bardia district.
13 Nov 2001	Third round of peace talks held in Godawari, Lalitpur again.
21 Nov 2001	Maoist unilaterally broke down the cease-fire.
26 Nov 2001	Proclamation of the State of Emergency (SoE), declaration of "terrorist" to the CPN (Maoist) and its sister organizations. Deployment of RNA through out the country, and enforcement of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADO).
21 Feb 2002	Parliament ratified the SoE.
4 April 2002	Parliament passed the TADO.
23 April 2003	Government announced bounties on heads of Maoist leaders.
17 May 2002	Parliament summoned to endorse six-month extension of the SoE.
22 May 2002	House of Representatives were dissolved. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur called for fresh elections in 13 November 2002.
27 August 2002	SoE ended.
4 October 2002	Royal take-over. King sacks the Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba accusing him "incapable" of handling the government properly.
11 Oct 2002	The King appointed Lokendra Bahadur Chand Prime Minister.
3 Dec 2002	Maoists announced formation of 'central dialogue team'.
29 Jan 2003	Announcement of cease fire by both the government and the Maoist
13 March 2003	22-point of Code of Conduct was signed.
27 April 2003	First round of peace talks between the government and the Maoist held in Shankar Hotel, Kathmandu
9 May 2003	Second round of the peace talks held in the Shankar Hotel, Kathmandu
30 May 2003	Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigned from the post of Prime Minister.
4 June 2004	Surya Bahadur Thapa was appointed Prime Minister.
17-19 Aug 2003	Third-round of peace talks held in Hapure of Purandhara VDC, Dang District.
27 August 2003	Cease -fire broken down by the Maoist unilaterally. The statement issued by Prachanda, President of the Maoist stated that the significance of the cease-fire, peace talk and code of conduct has been ended.
1 Sept 2003	Letter by Maoist to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
2-10 Oct 2003	Suspension of all offensive actions by the Maoist during the context of the Dashain festival.
26 March 2004	Government's commitment on implementing human rights and humanitarian laws.
7 May 2004	Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa resigned from the post.
2 June 2004	Sher Bahadur Deuba was appointed Prime Minister.

Source: INSEC (2004).