# REVITALIZING <br> <br> THE UNITED NATIONS 

 <br> <br> THE UNITED NATIONS} REFORM THROUGH WEIGHTED VOTING

Joseph E. Schwartzberg

Institute for Global Policy World Federalist Movement


## Cover illustration:

## Brittlebush in Bloom, Death Valley, California

by courtesy of Cynthia Johnson
The impulse to life is universal.
When nature wills it, even the desert will bloom.
With creativity and collective human will, we can revitalize the United Nations.
Indeed, we now have no other viable option.

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2004
Institute for Global Policy, World Federalist Movement New York and The Hague

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| To the men and women, |
| :---: |
| soldiers and civilians alike, |
| who gave their lives in the service of |
| United Nations peacekeeping missions. |

## An Affirmation of Human Oneness

> I am a member of the human family, a citizen of the world. The achievements of men and women throughout the ages are my heritage. My destiny is bound to that of all my fellow human beings. What we jointly create forms our bequest to future generations.

> May my life serve the good of my family. May our use of the earth preserve it for those yet to come.

Note: The above affirmation was written, with slightly different wording, in 1976. Originally it began with the words: "I am a member of the human family. My home is Earth." Since 1976, the author has had the original form of the affirmation translated into the following languages: Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, Bengali, Chinese, Dutch, Esperanto, Farsi, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Gujarati, Hausa, Hebrew, Hindi, Italian, Kannada, Kashmiri, Korean, Marathi, Norwegian, Ojibwe, Polish, Portuguese, Punjabi, Russian, Spanish, Swahili, Swedish, Thai, Telugu, Turkish, Urdu, and Vietnamese. All translations are available in the roman script and, where appropriate, in the proper transliterated form as well. Additional translations are planned as is the conversion of the translations of the original to reflect the present wording. J.E.S.

# REVITALIZING THE UNITED NATIONS REFORM THROUGH WEIGHTED VOTING 

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan has declared emphatically that major reforms in the United Nations system are needed. To further that end he appointed in November 2003 a high-level commission of experts to make specific reform recommendations. Chaired by Anand Panyarachun, a former Prime Minister of Thailand, the commission's sixteen distinguished members represent all major parts of the world. This monograph is addressed to them and to all others who wish to promote a more representative, effective, and universally respected UN.

Among the most needed changes are: reform of the decision-making system in both the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (SC), a more robust peacekeeping system, greater use of the International Court of Justice, institutionalizing other measures for conflict prevention, and a more adequate funding system. But additional funding and other reforms will not likely be forthcoming until basic flaws in the present decision-making system are corrected. To be specific, the one nation - one vote system of decision making in the GA is unrealistic, bearing no relationship to the actual distribution of power in the world. Hence, GA decisions are only recommendatory rather than binding. Additionally, the method of allocating seats in the more powerful SC is neither fair nor representative. Finally, the SC's moral authority in dealing with many important issues is compromised by the anachronistic special status of the five permanent members, in particular by their being endowed with the power of the veto. The fact that many nations see themselves as marginalized by the present system contributes to anti-Western sentiment and leads to questioning the very legitimacy of the UN system. This study analyzes the shortcomings of the GA and SC, shows why and to what extent they have increased over time, points out realistic ways by which the shortcomings can be corrected, anticipates and responds to objections that certain countries may have to the reforms proposed, and suggests the specific wording for two Charter amendments, one for the GA and the other for the SC.

Under the present rule in the essentially powerless GA, the votes of scores of states with populations of less than a million and/or paying the stipulated minimum of only $0.001 \%$ of the total UN budget, count as much as the vote of China or the United States. I suggest instead that the GA be empowered to make needed binding decisions in carefully defined spheres of concern and that the voting system be rationalized and made more congruent with the global realities of power. Instead of each country having one vote, regardless of its population or economic influence, there would be a system of weighted voting. The weighted vote of each would depend on its population, its contribution to the UN budget, and its unit share of the UN membership. In other words, a country's weighted vote would be the average of three fundamental factors and would be determined by the following simple formula:

$$
\mathbf{W V}=\frac{P+C+M}{3}
$$

WV here represents a nation's weighted vote, the average of: $\mathbf{P}$, its percentage share of the total population of all UN members; C, its financial contribution as a percentage of the total UN budget; and M, its share of the total UN membership (i.e., $1 / 191$, or $0.524 \%$ ). This formula embodies three fundamental principles: democratic/demographic, economic, and legal (the sovereign equality of nations).

Were it in place today, the proposed system would give the USA a weighted vote of roughly $9.1 \%$, China $7.7 \%$, Japan $7.3 \%$, India $6.0 \%$, Germany $3.8 \%$, France $2.6 \%$, the UK $2.3 \%$, etc. At the opposite extreme a number of microstates would each have a WV of $0.17 \%$. (Map 3, on p. 15, indicates the weights of all 191 UN members.) In all, 33 nations would gain under the proposed system. While not a large proportion of the UN's membership, those states include almost all significant actors on the world stage, contain roughly $79 \%$ of the world's people, and account for $92 \%$ of the contributions to the UN budget. While 158 countries, $83 \%$ of the total, would lose some degree of power, the system would remain
strongly biased in their favor in that they would still have $38 \%$ of all votes, while accounting for much smaller shares of the world's population and budgetary contributions. Reasoning that $38 \%$ of something an empowered GA - is much better than $83 \%$ of nothing, most small states should recognize the benefits to them of the proposed reform. Additional benefits of the proposal are that it would: a) provide an incentive for countries to pay their assessed dues; b) result in a rough balance between the power of the world's major economic blocs, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the so-called "Group of 77 ," which will necessitate creative bargaining and compromise between the two; and c) substantially increase the voting strength of the relatively free nations of the world.

In respect to the SC, the number of seats allocated to nonpermanent members, six prior to 1966 and ten thereafter, has never been adequate. Moreover, seventy-seven member nations have yet to serve a single term; and only eight have served more than $20 \%$ of the total number of years since they joined the UN. Japan, with 16 years of service ( $34 \%$ ), leads this group. Yet, several microstates have occupied SC seats; and Mauritius, with only 1.2 million people, has served four years, no fewer than Indonesia, which, with 211 million inhabitants, is the world's fourth most populous nation. This remarkably arbitrary situation might not be so bad if nonpermanent SC members were willing and able to represent the interests of the vast and diverse regional blocs from which they were elected. But they can't and don't even try.

The idea of specifying permanent seat holders has led to such wholly unrealistic situations as having Taiwan, formerly regarded as the legal embodiment of China, hold a seat in the SC for twelve years. Permanent SC seats, along with the attendant veto, should be abolished and membership should be based on objective eligibility criteria. The proposed WV formula provides a means of doing so. I suggest that any single nation with a WV of more than $4 \%$, or any self-formed caucus of like-minded nations with a combined WV of more than $4 \%$ would be entitled to a seat, up to a total of seventeen seats in an eighteen-seat SC. Presently, the United States, China, Japan, and India would individually qualify. Terms would be for three years. Given the contemporary distribution of regional organizations and political interests, one may reasonably anticipate formation of twelve or thirteen bloc seats in addition to the four going to individual nations. Any remaining seat(s) would then be filled by the GA voting among candidates nominated at-large from non-bloc nations. Various methods for selection of bloc representatives are suggested. (Hypothetical distributions of seats under this plan are shown on Maps 5 and 6 , on pp. 40-41.) The proposed system would enable representation in the SC of more than $90 \%$ of the world's people at any given time, far more than has ever occurred to date. Additionally, the need for consultation and cooperation within bloc caucuses should lead to a variety of regional benefits.

One need not assume the necessity of adopting the proposed voting reform for the GA as a precondition for implementing the proposal set forth for the SC and vice versa. Even if the GA were to remain as it is at present, country weights could still be derived for each UN member nation and applied in determining SC eligibility for individual nations and blocs.

While some opposition to the changes suggested would be inevitable among nations fearing a diminution of their present influence, it would be possible, to mitigate their concerns by implementing the proposed changes over a transitional period of up to fifteen years. This would allow time for adjustment to new political realities.

The potential benefits of the reforms proposed here are enormous. They would provide the GA with needed binding powers and impart a sense of realism and fairness in the allocation of power within that body. They would also make the SC a much more representative and efficient body and enhance the legitimacy of its decisions. Despite the difficulty of Charter amendment, there is reason to believe that once people recognize the extent to which the benefits of change outweigh the risks, enlightened public opinion will come to see major reform as necessary. The world's people deserve no less.

## Joseph E. Schwartzberg

## Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Illustrations and Tables ..... $\mathbf{x}$
Foreword xi
Preface ..... xiii
I. Introduction ..... 1
II. Reform of the General Assembly ..... 3
A. The Growing Need for Voting Reform ..... 3
B. A Realistic Basis for Weighted Voting ..... 11
C. An Alternative Basis for Assessments ..... 16
D. A Legislative Concomitant of the Proposed System of Weighted Voting ..... 18
E. Benefits of a Change to Weighted Voting ..... 20
F. Adapting to Future Change ..... 24
Annex: A Proposed Charter Amendment ..... 27
III. Reform of the Security Council ..... 29
A. Shortcomings of the Present System ..... 29
B. WV-Based Allocation of Security Council Seats ..... 36
C. Two Hypothetical SC Membership Scenarios ..... 39
D. Procedures for Selecting Delegates ..... 45
E. Eliminating the Veto ..... 47
Annex: Proposed Charter Amendments ..... 49
IV. Steering a Course toward Reform ..... 51
A. Introduction ..... 51
B. Amending the Charter ..... 52
C. Generating the Will for Change ..... 53
Notes ..... 56
Appendices ..... 59
I. General Assembly Weighted Votes (WV) by Country and Terms Used in Their Calculation ..... 60
II. General Assembly Votes of Countries Grouped by Economic Blocs under Present and Proposed Weighted Voting Systems ..... 64
III. General Assembly Votes of Countries Grouped by Freedom House Rankings under Present and Proposed Weighted Voting Systems ..... 66
IV. Years Served on Security Council by Nonpermanent Members, 1946-2003, and Total Years of Service as a Percentage of Total Years of Eligibility ..... 68
V. Percentage of World's Population in UN Member Nations and in Nationsthat Are and Are Not Members of the Security Council, 1946-200372
VI. Composition of Hypothetical Security Council: Two Scenarios ..... 74
About the Author ..... 77

## Illustrations and Tables

## Maps:

1. Original Members of the United Nations, 19454
2. Members of the United Nations in 2003
3. Proposed Distribution of Weighted Votes (WV) in General Assembly 15
4. Frequency of Representation in Security Council, 1946-2003 31
5. Hypothetical Allocation of Seats in a Reformed Security Council, Method A: Present scale of assessments used for economic term in weighing formula
6. Hypothetical Allocation of Seats in a Reformed Security Council with Temporary Retention of P5 Membership,
Method B: GNP used for economic term in weighing formula

## Figures:

1. Growth in Membership of the United Nations, 1945-2003
2. Degrees of Inequality among UN Member Nations in Respect to Selected Variables10
3. Strength of Groups of Nations That Would Gain or Lose from Weighted Voting in Respect to Population, Contributions to UN Budget, and Aggregate GA Votes under Present and Proposed Voting Systems ..... 21
4. Strength in GA of Economic Blocs under Present and Proposed WV Voting Systems ..... 23
5. Strength in GA of Groups of Nations Classified by Degrees of Freedom under Present and Proposed WV Voting Systems ..... 23
6. Percentages of World's Population in the United Nations and in Nations with Seats in the Security Council, 1946-2003 ..... 34

## Tables:

1. Mean, Median, Maximum and Minimum Population, Area, Gross National Product, and Assessed Contributions to UN Budget, of Member Nations, 1946 and Latest Available Year
2. Shares of Security Council Members in Population of World and of All UN Members: 1946-1965, 1966-2003, and 1946-2003:
Maxima, Minima, Means, and Medians, by Period

## Foreword

No less an authority than United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has indicated that unless the international community commits to deep reforms of the international organization, its very survival is threatened. The Secretary-General, governments, foundations and nongovernmental organizations have convened and continue to form high-level commissions and panels to address increased threats to international peace and security. At the same time, the leaders of the most powerful government in history, the host government to the United Nations, have proposed a "new world order" dominated by the military, political, and economic forces of the USA. The UN Charter's vision of international cooperation and multilateralism is to be marginalized and replaced by USA-led "coalitions of the willing," preventative wars, wars against terrorism and "evil" governments, and wars to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Disarmament and non-proliferation, however, would be dealt with selectively. In the United States and other powerful countries many defenders of the global status quo sanction the development of new types of WMD, and the new policy will essentially be one of enforced WMD apartheid. This juxtaposition of a call for radical reform of the UN, on the one hand, and USA military domination of $21^{\text {st }}$ century world politics, on the other hand, may be as toxic and dangerous as the USA-USSR nuclear confrontation of "mutual assured destruction" that lasted from 1950 to 1987.

The Institute for Global Policy (IGP), the research and policy analysis mechanism of the World Federalist Movement, is dedicated to publishing original research and policy proposals on democratizing and strengthening the international legal order and the United Nations system. We are pleased to publish the monograph, Revitalizing the United Nations, by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg. The essence of the work is "weighted voting." Weighted and qualified voting is perhaps the least heralded and yet one of the most vital elements of any constitutional reform of international organizations. Weighted voting lay at the heart of the differences between the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions' constitutions in 1945. It is also at the center of the development of a constitution for the European Union and is being debated as this publication goes to press. Weighted voting is, indeed, an essential component of democratic governance at the regional and global levels.

Professor Schwartzberg's proposal maintains the principle of the sovereign equality of nations, but proposes that for certain limited matters in which governments agree to making binding legal and financial decisions, voting weights shall factor in population and economic considerations. The proposed formula is applied to both the UN General Assembly, the world's most universal and legitimate policy-making body, and the Security Council, the world's most powerful multi-lateral body. The final section addresses how the reforms could be adopted.

The Institute supports and encourages original research and policy analysis, but does not endorse individual proposals. Its goal in publishing this research is, rather, to promote awareness of and debate about the in-depth weighted-voting analysis in this monograph. The statistical and geographical analyses alone make the work an important contribution to UN reform research. The appendices, too, are an extraordinary mine of fascinating data.

I encourage readers to approach this research with an open and global perspective. Professor Schwartzberg is from the USA, the most powerful nation in the world, and his political vision cannot be separated from his own roots. Yet, he is also an idealist and values his world citizenship as much as he does his nationality. His writing reflects his background and his passion for global democracy. The paper is a kind of constitutional document; but the author and Institute are aware that such proposals cannot contribute directly to serious intergovernmental processes. Yet, we hope that this research and the weighted-voting proposals for the United Nations will provide governments and non-governmental representatives a wealth of statistics and analysis with which to address one of the most important democracy deficits in the world.

The Institute is aware of and has published many other papers and monographs addressing deficits in democracy and human rights at the UN and in other international organizations. Proposals for second assemblies, a UN Parliamentary Assembly, and civil society forums are complementary to those for weighted-voting. Additionally, a constellation of improvements and structures is needed if the world is to replace the rule of brute military and economic force and anarchy with national and international democracy, justice and the rule of law.

William R. Pace, Executive Director World Federalist Movement - IGP

To work with what one has and at the same time for what one hopes to have - this is the guiding principle of political progress.

- Ralph Barton Perry

One World in the Making, 1945

It is not by the consolidation or concentration of powers, but by their distribution that good government is effected.

- Thomas Jefferson


## Preface:

In his opening address to the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2003, Secretary General Kofi Annan indicated that in light of recent events the time had come for "radical changes," perhaps including "far-reaching institutional reforms" in the structure of the United Nations. Indeed, it may be argued that such changes are long overdue. Among the institutions to be rethought, said Mr. Annan, "none is more important than the Security Council itself." But the General Assembly, he added, also "needs to be strengthened." In November 2003 Mr. Annan appointed a high-level, sixteen-member panel to consider what reforms might be most needed and to make specific recommendations for change. Chaired by Anand Panyarachun, a former Prime Minister of Thailand, the panel represents all major regions of the world. This monograph is addressed to that panel and to all others who wish to promote a more representative, effective, and universally respected United Nations. It is a reworking and expansion of ideas that I have put forward in various publications over a period of several decades." Among the diverse audiences I hope to reach are the UN delegations of all member nations and other key personnel working within the UN system; globally-minded parliamentarians in democratically ruled countries, especially those serving on the foreign relations committees of their respective legislatures;

[^0]academics in the Academic Council on the United Nations System, as well as others who share their interest in the UN; the staff of foreign policy "think tanks"; and citizen activists seeking to promote world peace and justice and to improve the institutional framework within which those goals can best be promoted.

The United Nations is presently undergoing a perceptual crisis. The inability of the Security Council to craft a workable UN resolution on how to rid Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction in the months leading up to the essentially unilateral American invasion of that country is but one among many instances of the perceived failure of the UN to work effectively. Nevertheless, despite the Council's unwillingness to bend to the wishes of the current US administration in respect to Iraq, the UN is, remarkably, regarded in some quarters as an instrument of American foreign policy. Hence the targeting of UN personnel by extremist groups in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But many observers would assert that the supposed policy failure was not to be blamed on the organization as such, but rather on several of its more powerful members who were unwilling to compromise in order to devise a workable resolution.

In any event, the very legitimacy of the Security Council has become a matter for serious concern. The special status accorded the five permanent members, each endowed with the power of the veto, is widely questioned and correctly viewed as an anachronistic legacy of World War II. Furthermore, the Council, which was never sufficiently representative of the peoples of the world, has grown progressively less so, not only because of the nearly fourfold increase in the UN's membership, but also because the population of the permanent members has grown much more slowly than that of the world as a whole. Thus, their aggregate share of the world's population has been greatly reduced since the UN's founding.

The continuing relevance of the United Nations is also now in question. This is especially true in respect to the excessively large and inefficient Economic and Social Council (which is not discussed in this work) and the virtually all-inclusive, but essentially powerless, General Assembly, which is criticized for its long-winded debates and systemic ineffectuality. A major reason why many critics hold the Assembly in low regard is that body's one nation - one vote rule in decision-making. The allocation of power, such as it is, in the GA bears no resemblance to the distribution of power in the world outside the arena of the UN itself. The
global "North," the relatively affluent but numerically small group of nations that have the capability to effect positive change in the world, should it wish to do so, finds itself in a permanent minority, outvoted on issue after issue by nations of the global "South," the great majority of which are not only poor but small in population and with negligible individual influence. Small wonder then that the recommendatory resolutions that the latter group manages to pass are then largely ignored by the former.

All of the shortcomings to which I have just referred can and should be corrected by reasonable changes in the UN Charter. This work puts forward carefully crafted recommendations for needed Charter amendments. The first of these relates to establishing an objective and realistic system of weighted voting in the General Assembly. A simple mathematical formula, taking into consideration population and contributions to the UN budget, along with national sovereignty, is proposed for that purpose. Ideally, a General Assembly with such a voting system would be endowed with the power to pass binding and enforceable resolutions in respect to a carefully circumscribed set of issues of truly global concern. But even if a new system of weighted voting were to stop short of this goal, it would still result in a much more credible and responsible body.

Also proposed in the discussion of weighted voting is a reformed system for assessing UN dues, namely that of charging all countries a very low, but uniform, percentage of their GNP, say $0.1 \%$. Such a change promises to yield much greater revenues than the meager sums on which the UN presently depends. Since the Charter is silent in regard to how the UN is to be financed, the recommended change would not call for its revision.

A second proposed amendment calls for terminating permanent membership and the veto in the Security Council (either at once, or over a transitional period of, say, fifteen years), enlarging that body to eighteen members, and basing the right to membership on country weights derived from the aforementioned formula. More specifically, it proposes that Council seats be allocated to individual countries with weights above a specified threshold and to self-formed caucuses of UN member nations whose collective weights exceed the same threshold.

I do not regard the recommendations put forward in this work as a panacea for what ails the UN, much less for resolving the larger problems confronting the global community. But I do suggest that better systems of decision-making will provide a vitally needed key to making better decisions, decisions that will be widely regarded as more legitimate and, as such, more likely to be honored and followed than has been the case with UN resolutions in recent decades. That, in turn, should restore to the UN the high esteem that characterized earlier periods of the organization's existence, provide an incentive for more adequate funding, and help pave the way for additional reforms that would progressively revitalize the entire UN system. ** The logic of weighted voting, it should be noted, is applicable not only to the General Assembly, but also to a host of specialized agencies (WHO, FAO, UNESCO, etc.) affiliated to the UN.

The discussion in this work of both the General Assembly and the Security Council begins with a detailed historical and geographic analysis of their systemic shortcomings and a demonstration of how and to what a remarkable extent those problems have become exacerbated with the passage of time. The needed corrective measures are then explained, rationally justified, and demonstrated. Recognizing, however, that all proposed changes would be resisted, to varying degrees, by nations with particular vested interests, I have attempted to anticipate and respond to the objections to the proposals that one might reasonably expect. Annexes to the discussions of both the GA and the SC provide the text of the relevant proposed Charter amendments.

Throughout this work I rely heavily on maps, graphs, and tables to make my case, in that they convey information much more efficiently than extensive prose expositions and provide useful overviews that would not otherwise be possible. The detailed statistical data on which these summary presentations are based are presented in six appendices that will permit interested readers to examine relevant data on individual countries. Notes (apart from the two in this preface) are placed at the end of the text. In respect to style, I have confined my use of the first person singular to this preface and have resorted occasionally to the more formal "editorial we" in the text proper.

[^1]Readers have a right to know of my background and qualifications in putting forth this monograph. To some degree they can be ascertained from the bio-data presented at the conclusion of the work. Among my academic credentials is the fact that I taught political geography for roughly forty years and thus have a keen appreciation for Realpolitik. I recognize that nation states seldom, if ever, act from purely altruistic motives and that statesmen still tend to operate in a Hobbesian climate of perpetual competition, Yet I am convinced that morality does make a difference and that enlightened self-interest should incline nations increasingly toward international cooperation and to the position that what is in the best interests of the earth as a whole will often best serve their own long-term welfare.

Also relevant is my extensive and varied experience in living, studying, carrying out research, teaching, and traveling abroad. Although I regard myself as a "citizen of the world," I have, inevitably, been shaped by my upbringing in the United States and my early indoctrination with and enduring attachment to a liberal democratic ethos. For most of my adult life I have been a peace and justice activist and have been particularly active in the World Federalist Movement (WFM). This movement is predicated on the belief in several fundamental principles: that global problems require global solutions; that the promotion of global justice will often best be effected through the development of global law; and that the force of law must replace the no longer tenable law of force and its concomitant belief that might makes right. Thus, WFM promotes the development of constitutional and democratic governance at the national, regional, and global levels while affirming the sovereignty of nation states in matters that are essentially internal.

I firmly espouse an eventual system of democratic, federal world governance with builtin checks and balances to ensure that it will not take on an authoritarian character. Such a governance system, I am convinced, will offer the best means of advancing the twin goals of global peace and justice while guaranteeing to individual nations the preservation of their national identity and the sovereign right to manage all affairs that can best be dealt with at the national level. I harbor no illusions that that my worldview and optimistic vision will now be fully embraced by more than a small fraction of my readers. One need not do so, however, to endorse the specific, practical and essentially short-term recommendations for change set forth in this work.

I cannot close without extending thanks to numerous individuals and organizations that helped bring this work to fruition. First, I must express my gratitude to the staff members of the UN Secretariat who unfailingly provided me with data needed to analyze the workings of the General Assembly and Security Council. They are named individually in relevant footnotes. To the editors of The Professional Geographer, Political Geography, Global Dialogue and Global Governance, all of which printed articles presaging the ideas appearing in this monograph and to the anonymous reviewers who suggested improvements to my submissions I extend my thanks. Thanks, too, to Professors Ronald Glossop and Walter Hoffmann and to the Hon. Klaus Törnudd of Finland for additional useful criticisms. I am grateful to the following individuals for various forms of assistance: William Pace, for his powerful foreword to this work; my son Philip, owner of Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis for help in designing and executing the monograph's illustrations; my partner and best friend, Louise Pardee, for valuable editorial advice, for help with data entry and calculations, and for formatting the appendices undergirding the analysis and the tables synthesizing some of my key findings; my sister, Pearl Hochstadt, for her meticulous copy-editing; and Kelly Bean and Jennifer Eyring for seeing the work through the printing stage. Facilities for research and technical assistance provided for me by the Department of Geography at the University of Minnesota greatly facilitated my research. For moral support, I am indebted to many friends in Citizens for Global Solutions (formerly the World Federalist Association); and the Minnesota Alliance of Peacemakers. Among those friends, none has been a source of greater inspiration than the late Stanley Platt of Minneapolis. To those who have endorsed my proposals for UN reform and to the organizations that have agreed to help in disseminating this work to concerned citizens around the world, I offer heartfelt thanks. My deepest gratitude is extended to my dear friend, Farooq Kathwari, CEO of Ethan Allen, Inc., who, through the Irfan Kathwari Foundation, Inc., has so generously financed the printing of this monograph.

Finally, I must note that the responsibility for factual accuracy throughout the work is mine alone and that the opinions and recommendations that I have put forward may or may not be endorsed by any of the individuals or institutions noted above.

Joseph E. Schwartzberg
White Bear Lake, MN
February 2004

The ability to create order is no less important to human survival than the ability to overcome famine, construct great edifices, write great books, or compose great symphonies.

- Norman Cousins, The Human Adventure

Whatever you can do or dream, you can begin it. Boldness has genius, power, and magic in it.

- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe


## I. Introduction

The ability of the United Nations to function effectively is limited by several serious structural deficiencies. First, the one nation-one vote system of decision making in the General Assembly is unrealistic, bearing no relationship to the actual distribution of power in the world at large. Hence, it is hardly surprising that its decisions are only recommendatory rather than binding. Second, the method of allocating seats in the more powerful Security Council is neither fair nor representative. Finally, the Security Council's legitimacy in dealing with many important issues is compromised by the anachronistic special status of the five permanent members and, in particular, by their being endowed with the power of the veto. The fact that a large part of the global community considers itself marginalized by the present system is, arguably, a significant contributor to anti-Western and, in particular, anti-American sentiment and among the many factors contributing to political alienation and the spread of terrorism.

All of the foregoing deficiencies can and should be corrected by appropriate revisions of the United Nations Charter. This monograph details the case for the needed reforms, quantifies and explains their likely systemic effects, discusses obstacles in the way of their acceptance, and sets forth specific recommendations for workable Charter amendments. The key to the proposed reforms is the adoption of a coherent system of weighted voting, by nations in the General Assembly and by individual nations and selfformed caucuses of like-minded nations in the Security Council.

Weighted votes for each member nation in the General Assembly would be objectively determined, based on a simple arithmetic formula taking into simultaneous consideration three principles for representation: a) the present legal principle of the
sovereign equality of nations, b) a population-based, democratic/demographic principle, and c) a capability principle based on contributions to the regular UN budget, which are essentially a function of national wealth.

In the Security Council permanent membership would be terminated. Instead, seats would be guaranteed to nations with weights in excess of a specified threshold value and also to self-formed caucuses of nations whose combined weights exceeded that threshold. The veto would be terminated, either at once or gradually phased out.

In both the General Assembly and the Security Council the proposed system would not only be objective and uniformly applied but would also be nuanced and flexible, thereby maximizing fairness and enabling periodic revisions consistent with changing demographic and economic conditions. ${ }^{1}$

Ideally, the recommendations in this monograph would be applied to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. However, if, for any reason, there should be insufficient support for their application to either one of those two bodies, there would be no compelling reason not to apply the suggested changes to the other.

While any radical shift in power within the United Nations would presumably meet with initial opposition from certain nations, it will be demonstrated that, because of desirable trade-offs to which the proposed reforms would lead, the global system as a whole would greatly benefit, leading to a more orderly, democratic, and collaborative international order. In the recognition of this anticipated outcome lies the hope that the reforms will, before long, receive the requisite support for their adoption.

For I dipped into the future, far as human eye could see, Saw the Vision of the world and all the wonder that would be; ... Till the war-drum throbbed no longer, and the battle flags were furled, In the Parliament of man, the federation of the world.

- Alfred, Lord Tennyson, "Locksley Hall," 1842

I believe at some future day, the nations of the earth will agree on some sort of congress which will take cognizance of international questions of difficulty and whose decisions will be as binding as the decisions of our Supreme Court are upon us.

- Ulysses S. Grant, U.S. President, 1869-1877


## II. Reform of the General Assembly

## A. The Growing Need for Voting Reform:

The profound changes in the General Assembly (GA) over the period since the UN was founded were clearly not anticipated by those who drafted the Charter. Today's UN is a virtually universal body, encompassing more than ninety-nine percent of the world's people. ${ }^{2}$ The number of member nations has almost quadrupled, rising from the original 51 to the present total of 191, and their geographic distribution has shifted radically (see Maps 1 and 2 and Figure 1). Africa, for example, which accounted for a mere four members in 1945 ( 7.8 percent of the total), now has 53 members ( 27.7 percent). Asia, too, has greatly increased its proportion of the total membership. And, in the Caribbean region alone, thirteen new states were added, all former British and Dutch dependencies, only two of which, Jamaica and Trinidad \& Tobago, have populations exceeding a million. This group of states, admitted over the period 1962-83, collectively contains scarcely 0.1 percent of the world's population, yet accounts for 6.8 percent of all GA votes. A similar anomalous situation exists in respect to the numerous small island nations of the western Pacific. More significant additions were those of all the World War II Axis powers and their allies. Finally, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia also swelled the UN's membership.

Expanded membership brought important changes in the political orientation of the GA and a tendency toward polarization in that body, first of East versus West, then of North versus South. The former problem, presaged even as the Charter was being drafted,



## Figure 1. Growth in Membership of the United Nations, 1945-2003

Seats held by members that were independent states in 1945.


Seats held by members that were dependencies
of foreign powers up to World War II
Seats created by break-up of U.S.S.R.,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia (excluding core units of same and Ukraine and Belarus).

persisted throughout the Cold War. The latter became salient only with the liberation of most of Africa in the 1960s and continues to the present day. Because the East and South often made common cause in confronting the West - on issues bearing on colonialism, racism (especially apartheid), Zionism, economic development, and international trade, the comfortable majority initially enjoyed by the United States, in league with other economically advanced democracies (and their respective client states), was steadily eroded. ${ }^{3}$

States that were dependencies prior to World War II, in concert with countries of Latin America that gradually weaned themselves away from unwavering political allegiance to the West, became a new Third World bloc. Within and outside the UN they have come together as the "Group of 77 " (though now expanded to 132 nations). Either alone or with support from nations of the former communist bloc, they can easily command the required two-thirds majority in the GA to win votes on a wide range of substantive issues. But the veto power, on which the Soviet Union formerly relied so heavily, came to be increasingly exercised in the Security Council by the United States and, less often, by the United Kingdom and France, and effectively nullified many such GA votes, transforming them into pyrrhic rhetorical victories. ${ }^{4}$ Consequently, the fact that GA decisions are merely recommendatory, rather than binding, is widely perceived in the North as a good thing. Until such time as the UN adopts a system of weighted voting that realistically reflects the actual global distribution of power, it seems doubtful that any major state will willingly grant the GA, the most representative organ within the UN system, the authority to make binding decisions.

Concomitants of GA expansion (see Table 1) were a slight reduction in the average member's population (despite a more than 150 percent increase in the world's population) and dramatic decreases in the average member's area and percentage contributions to the UN budget. Even more dramatic were the declines in the median population, area, and level of UN contributions. Thus, the UN has evolved into an incongruous organization with a relatively small number of major states, a considerably larger number of medium-level actors, and a substantial majority of members with negligible international significance.

Especially striking in Table 1 are the enormous disparities between the largest and smallest member nations regarding all four of the variables to which it relates. Even in 1946, these disparities were vastly greater than those among the primary administrative divisions (e.g., states in the United States and India, provinces in China, and Länder in Germany) of any present or former nation-state. Nevertheless, the disparities have increased by up to three orders of magnitude since the UN was founded.

## Table 1. Mean, Median, Maximum and Minimum Population, Area, Gross National Product, and Assessed Contribution to UN Budget of Member Nations, 1946 and Latest Available Year

Figures in parentheses in lines a through $d$ are percentages of totals for all UN member nations. Ratios in line e are rounded off to two or three significant figures.

| Variable | $\begin{array}{r} \text { b } \\ 1946 \text { (51 nations) } \end{array}$ | Latest Available $\stackrel{\text { C }}{\text { Year (191 nations) }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Population |  | 2002 |
| a) Mean | 6.3 m. (0.920\%) | 32.2 m. (0.524\%) |
| b) Median | Australia, 7.3 m. (0.39\%) | Burundi, 5.93m. (0.098\%) |
| c) Maximum | China, 512 m . (27.4\%) | China, 1.291 m (21.0\%) |
| d) Minimum | Luxembourg, 289 k. (0.01\%) | Tuvalu, 10.6 k. (0.0002\%) |
| e) Ratio of c) to d) | 1,770:1 | 122,000:1 (ca. $70 \times 1946$ ratio) |
| Area (square km.) |  | 2003 |
| a) Mean | 1.823 m. (1.96\%) | 0.493 m. (0.524\%) |
| b) Median | Poland, 314 k. (0.34\%) | Korea, Dem. Rep. of, 164 k. (0.092\%) |
| c) Maximum | USSR, 21.6 m. (23.2\%) | Russia, 17.1 m. (18.4\%) |
| d) Minimum | Luxembourg, 2,586 (0.028\%) | Monaco, 1.95 (0.0000001\%) |
| e) Ratio of c) to d) | 8,350:1 | 8.8 m.:1 (ca. 1,000 X 1946 ratio) |
| Gross National Product (US\$ millions) |  | 1999 |
| a) Mean | n.a. | 155,200 (0.524\%) |
| b) Median | n.a. | Uganda, 6,794 (0.023\%) |
| c) Maximum | n.a. | United States, 8,879,500 (29.954\%) |
| d) Minimum | n.a. | Tuvalu, 12 (0.00000004\%) |
| e) Ratio of c) to d) | n.a. | 740,000:1 |
| Assessed Share of UN Budget |  | 2003 |
| a) Mean | 1.96\% | 0.524\% |
| b) Median | Yugoslavia, 0.34\% | 5 nations, 0.010\% each |
| c) Maximum | USA, 39.87\% | USA, 22.00\% |
| d) Minimum | 6 nations, 0.04\% each | 35 nations, 0.001\% each |
| e) Ratio of c) to d) | 97:1 | 22,000:1 (22 X 1946 ratio) |

Abbreviations: $\mathrm{k} .=1,000, \mathrm{~m} .=1,000,000$, n.a. $=$ not available

## Notes:

China data are de facto, rather than de jure, and thus do not include Taiwan in the years 1999-2003.
USSR area figure for 1946 excludes Ukraine and White Russia, each of which had its own UN seat.

## Sources:

1946: Population data are estimated extrapolating backward from earliest data provided in UN Demographic Yearbook, 1979, Historical Supplement; area data for 1946 are from Statesman's Yearbook, 1946.
1946 and 2003: Source for data on UN assessments is cited in endnote 7.
2003 (or latest date): data on population, area, and GNP are from Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year, 2003:

The inequalities among UN member nations - in respect to population, area, presently assessed contributions, and gross national product - are made evident by the Lorenz curves of Figure 2, graphs a-d. Such curves array members of a set, in this case nations, in rank order with respect to a given variable along the horizontal axis, and their cumulative percentage of the total for that variable (population, area, etc.) along the vertical axis. The measure of inequality in the set is indicated by a "Gini coefficient," which can vary from zero, signifying perfect equality among members (as in the GA's present voting system, as illustrated in Figure 2, graph e) to one, which would signify that a single member of a set accounts for the whole of the variable under consideration. The Gini coefficients indicated near the upper left corners of Figure 2, graphs a-d. are remarkably high and in all cases would be significantly greater than those obtaining when the UN was created (though we have not worked out the respective figures for that initial period). The maximum figure is that for UN assessments and suggests the desirability of modifying the present assessment formula, a subject that we will consider in section II.C of this monograph.

At the founding of the UN, its 51 member nations ( 27 percent of the present total) already accounted for roughly 70 percent of the world's total population. Since then, voting power has been skewed more or less steadily in the direction of states that are relatively inconsequential players in political and economic arenas outside the UN itself. As early as 1961, the proportion of the world's people living in UN member states (then numbering 104) had risen to almost 92 percent. The subsequent incorporation of eighty-seven additional members, 46 percent of the present total, increased the proportion of the world's population within the UN by only 8 percent (see Figures 1 and 6 .). Particularly noteworthy is the proliferation of membership among microstates, a trend likely to continue as a dozen or more of the world's remaining dependencies attain their independence. No fewer than forty-two members presently have less than a million inhabitants each; and thirteen of those have fewer than 100,000 , including two that barely exceed 10,000 .

The sixty-four least populous members - enough to block a two-thirds majority vote - comprise less than one percent of the world's total population! And, in theory, the 127 least populous members, accounting for barely eight percent of humanity, are enough to provide the two-thirds majority needed to pass a substantive resolution. An even worse situation exists in respect to contributions to the UN budget. As of the year 2003, some forty-five nations paid the arbitrary minimum of 0.001 percent each; and the sixty-four smallest contributors, paying from 0.001 to 0.003 percent each, collectively contributed only 0.073 percent of the total. And a two-thirds majority can be constituted - once again, in theory - from 127 members, each assessed at levels from 0.001 to 0.039 percent, and


Figure 2. Degrees of Inequality among UN Member Nations in Respect to Selected Variables
collectively paying less than 0.9 percent of the total UN budget! (Appendix I provides details for each member nation.)

It may be objected that the theoretical worst-case scenarios alluded to in the preceding paragraph are unlikely to come to pass in that the world's smaller nations seldom, if ever, vote as a coherent bloc in those cases where the GA does not adopt resolutions by consensus. Liechtenstein and Kiribati, after all, have very little in common. Although this is undoubtedly true, there are far more than enough relatively insignificant nations, in terms of both population and assessed contributions to facilitate dominance within the GA of a wholly unrepresentative minority of the world's people. If one is to oppose - quite rightly the undemocratic veto by any of five relatively strong nations with permanent membership in the Security Council, one should also oppose an unwarranted exercise of political power by any GA coalition of the very weak. Moreover, absurd as the present situation is, the prospects are - in the absence of Charter reform - that it will become even worse in the future, not only because of the aforementioned likelihood that many of the world's several dozen remaining dependencies will ultimately attain their independence and swell the ranks of micro-states, but also because of the possible break-up of a number of strife-ridden multi-ethnic states.

Given the inordinate degree of voting power conferred on the weak by the one nation - one vote rule, it is hardly surprising that, on issues that impinge on the vital interests of the major world powers, those states will often resort to political tactics of dubious propriety, either by bribery or by the use of various threats, to purchase or otherwise influence the votes of the numerically preponderant weak. Such practices, common during the period of the Cold War, continue to subvert the political process. Recent and largely successful American efforts to block UN cooperation with the recently formed International Criminal Court are a case in point. While it would be difficult to establish the degree to which malpractices have influenced the outcome of important GA votes, it is reasonable to suppose that a system of weighted voting would substantially reduce their incidence if only because the gains to the strong that could be derived from improperly influencing the weak would then be so much less than under the present one nation-one vote system.

## B. A Realistic Basis for Weighted Voting:

Not surprisingly, there have been numerous proposals for a more realistic weighted voting system in the General Assembly. ${ }^{5}$ Most such proposals have sought to take population and/or some measure of economic importance into account. Although the case
for considering population in a world that aspires to promote the ideal of democratic governance is undoubtedly very strong, this is not to say that population should be the only, or even the principal, determinant of weighted voting. This is especially so in an international system in which democratic and non-democratic regimes frequently have no choice other than to work together. Economic measures are also valid and include, inter alia, gross national product, GNP per capita, contributions to the UN budget, volume of foreign trade, and various quality of life indices. While all of these tend to be highly inter-correlated, some measures are much harder to calculate than others, often entailing numerous subjective judgments. ${ }^{6}$ Furthermore, the desired data for much of the world are still either lacking or, when available, highly suspect. Hence, because it is a simple, objective, and highly relevant measure, we shall here argue only for the use of contributions to the regular UN budget. ${ }^{7}$

But suppose we do accept the necessity of weighted voting, taking into account both population and contributions to the UN budget, does that imply that we abandon the legal principle of the "sovereign equality of nations" on which the one nation-one vote system is predicated? Not at all. There is no reason why the sovereign equality principle should not remain one, among several, to be simultaneously considered in arriving at a workable system for allocating voting power.

Some commentators, opposed in principle to the use of economic criteria, have argued for a bicameral legislature for the UN, analogous to the United States Congress, whereby representation in one chamber would be based on population, while in the other equal voting rights would be accorded to all member nations, as in the present General Assembly. This approach, however, presents several serious problems. First, as we have seen, the discrepancies between the most and the least populous states are vast, several orders of magnitude greater than those in any past or present national legislature. ${ }^{8}$ A second difficulty has to do with the fact that voting mainly according to population would give inordinately great power to a handful of populous nations, some of which are not yet democratic. In China, for example, a numerically minuscule governing elite, drawn exclusively from the ruling party, determines state policy. Elsewhere, in populous, but relatively poor, states, such as democratically ruled India, the capacity to play a major role in global affairs is still rather limited. In neither case can one imagine the acquiescence of the United States, other major Western powers, or Japan in a primarily population-based system.

In respect to UN contributions (or GNP) as a criterion, the situation is not very different. A mere three nations (the United States, Japan and Germany) contribute more than half the total regular budget of the UN (and an even higher proportion of the
peacekeeping budget). The United States, which presently accounts for roughly 30 percent of the world's total GNP, is assessed only 22 percent of the UN's budget (recently reduced from 25 percent, and well below its original assessment of roughly 40 percent over the period 1946-51). Japan and Germany are presently assessed another 20.57 percent and 9.85 percent respectively. Clearly, a weighted voting system, with voting power determined primarily by UN contributions, would be found unacceptable to the vast majority of the UN's 191 member nations.

Bearing in mind all of the foregoing considerations (and others that will become apparent later in this work), we list below a set of conditions that would provide a conceptual basis for an effective weighted GA voting system:

## DESIDERATA FOR AN EFFECTIVE VOTING SYSTEM IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

- It must be based on clear and valid principles.
- It must be objectively determined.
- It must be applied uniformly to all members.
- It must be flexible (easily adjustable for future demographic and economic changes and change in number of members).
- It must be nuanced (i.e., a small change in one of the determining factors should not result in a large change in voting power).
- It must be "realistic" (i.e., the distribution of voting power in the GA must have a meaningful relationship to the distribution of power outside the arena of the UN itself).
- Ideally, the factors that determine voting strength in the GA should have relevance for the Security Council as well.

In keeping with the above precepts, we suggest a voting system that assigns equal weight to each of three fundamental and valid principles:

- the democratic / demographic principle, in which population is the determining factor
- the economic / capacity-to-be-effective principle, represented by assessed and paid contributions to the UN budget
- the legal / sovereign-equality-of-nations principle, according to which all nations are counted equally.

Each UN member nation would thus be assigned a weighted vote (WV) based on the following simple formula, averaging three relevant quantifiable factors:

$$
\mathbf{W V}=\frac{\mathbf{P}+\mathbf{C}+\mathbf{M}}{\mathbf{3}}
$$

in which $\mathbf{P}$ represents the nation's population as a percentage of the total population of all UN member nations; C represents the nation's assessed and paid financial contribution to the UN over a specified period (say the previous three years) as a percentage of the total contributions over the same period; and $\mathbf{M}$ represents the nation's unit share of the total membership (presently $1 / 191$ or 0.524 percent). Relevant data for all UN member nations are provided in Appendix I.

To illustrate how the formula would work, we provide the following examples:

## For the United States:

$\mathrm{WV}=\frac{4.672 \%+22.000 \%+0.524 \%}{3}$. This comes to $\frac{27.196 \%}{3}$ or $\mathbf{9 . 0 6 5 \%}$.

For China:

$$
\mathrm{WV}=\frac{20.981 \%+1.512 \%+0.524 \%}{3} \text {. This comes to } \frac{23.017 \%}{3} \text { or } \mathbf{7 . 6 7 2 \%} .
$$

For the smallest microstates, those with negligible (n) populations and negligible (n) contributions to the UN budget (each less than 0.0005\%):
$\mathrm{WV}=\frac{\mathrm{n}+\mathrm{n}+0.524 \%}{3}$ or $\mathbf{0 . 1 7 5 \%}$.
The ratio between US, the country with greatest weight, and the smallest microstates would thus be roughly 52:1.

Based on the scale of UN assessments currently in place, the overall degree of inequality in the distribution of weighted votes that would result from adopting the suggested formula is indicated in Figure 2, graph f, while the distribution of voting power by country is mapped on Map 3. The circles on the map, representing the 191 member nations, are scaled in proportion to each country's weight. Red circles represent the thirtythree nations with weights above the world average of 0.524 percent, while blue circles indicate countries with weights below that figure. Within the former group are sixteen countries with weights above one percent, for each of which the weight is indicated on the map to the nearest 0.1 percent. To facilitate comparisons of voting power from one map to another in this monograph, the total area of all circles on Map 3 is equal to the total area of all circles on the maps presented in Map 2, relating to the present GA, and also on Maps 5 and 6, relating to the Security Council.


The United States, the country gaining most under the proposed formula, would see its voting strength in the General Assembly multiplied roughly seventeen times. Other leading gainers, in order, of weight would be China, Japan, and India, each with a WV in excess of four percent (a critical figure to which we will give further consideration when discussing reform of the Security Council). Germany, France, the UK and Italy would follow. Russia would also gain, but would, nevertheless, carry the least weight among the so-called P-5, the present permanent members of the Security Council. Of the countries losing strength, relative to their equal unit weight under the present system (those shown by blue circles), some would be only marginally affected, while in no case, could any lose quite as much as two-thirds of its present $0.524 \%$ of the total.

Obviously, the weighted votes of member nations will have to be periodically adjusted - possibly markedly so - according to fluctuations in their relative population sizes and economic fortunes, as well as changes in the total number of UN member nations. This will necessitate periodic recomputation and reallocation of national WVs. The frequency of such reallocation - whether every decade, as for the US House of Representatives, or more often - should not be a major concern and would be negotiable; but there is no compelling reason, given the current level of statistical capability within the UN system, why more frequent adjustments - say every third year - should not be made. The modalities for determining each nation's WV would most appropriately be entrusted to a neutral agency within the UN Secretariat, subject to approval by the General Assembly, just as budget assessments are determined at present.

## C. An Alternative Basis for Assessments:

In the foregoing examples, and in Map 3, we have used the present UN scale of country assessments in the WV formula. While determined by a fairly complex set of rules, those assessments are essentially proportional to the gross national product of each member nation, with minor progressive adjustments: downward for the poorer nations and slightly upward for those that are relatively affluent. The only major exception to this practice is in the assessment of the United States, which, as previously noted, was recently reduced from 25 to 22 percent, despite the fact that the US share of the of the world's total gross product comes to roughly 30 percent.

Arguments put forward in the US Congress in support of the demand to have the level of the US assessment reduced were: a) that the UN is a vast, inefficient, wasteful, and corrupt bureaucracy that will have to undergo substantial administrative and fiscal reform
before meriting substantial outlays of US tax dollars; and b) that it was manifestly unfair for the US to pay 25 percent of the regular UN budget, while having only one vote in the GA, no more than the many members paying the arbitrary minimum of 0.001 percent. These arguments played well to the sentiments of many conservative Americans, most of whom apparently had little idea of how miniscule a proportion of their taxes went toward meeting the needs of the UN (less than a dollar per capita annually in respect to the UN's regular operating budget of roughly $\$ 1.1$ billion). ${ }^{9}$ Total costs for the UN system as a whole (excluding the Bretton Woods financial institutions) came to only $\$ 10.4$ billion (1997 data, but not likely to vary much from current figures, given largely successful US insistence on no-growth budgets for the UN and its specialized agencies). The remarkable misperception by many Americans of the costs and benefits of financially supporting the UN has had a seriously adverse effect on that body; and it goes without saying that what the US Congress views as fair bears little relationship to notions of fairness in the rest of the world. This leads us to recommend a change that could result in a tremendous increase in UN revenues, the necessity for which has been pointed out in innumerable discussions on UN reform. ${ }^{10}$

The recommended change is simple, namely to have all countries - no matter how rich or poor they may be - assessed at exactly the same rate, set as a very small percentage of their gross national products. The GNP of each UN member country and its proportional share of the total global product are indicated in columns e and f of Appendix I, and the WV of each country - using those shares, rather than the present scale of assessments, in the WV formula - is indicated in column h . WVs among countries under this assessment system would vary little from what they are at present; those for the relatively affluent nations, other than the US, would decline slightly, while many less developed nations would undergo very modest increases. The only significant gainer, the US, would see its WV increased from $9.065 \%$ to $11.716 \%$. Country ranks would also change little, though Japan's WV would fall from third to fourth place, behind India's.

At the outset, we would suggest that assessments be set at the very modest level of 0.1 percent of GNP. In that the world's total product is on the order of $\$ 30$ trillion, this rate of assessment would result in UN revenues of roughly $\$ 30$ billion, much more than enough to meet all the needs of not only the principal organs of the UN, but also of all current peacekeeping operations, the affiliated specialized agencies (other than the Bretton Woods institutions), the UN Development Program and other UN-funded programs. It would also allow payments for arrears on past peacekeeping missions and the creation of a reserve fund with which to respond in a timely manner to inevitable future emergencies. Finally, it would permit a substantial expansion in the UN's institutional capability to address a host of major issues of global concern.

The suggested 0.1 percent level of assessment is so low that even the poorest of nations could afford it. It is much lower than what all but a handful of those nations now spend for military purposes, but would, we believe, yield far greater returns in promoting their national security. Moreover, in that a large proportion of the increased spending would be allocated to economic and social projects in the world's developing countries, the departure from the present slightly progressive assessment system would be more than compensated for by the redistributive aspects of the new system.

A major argument in favor of the uniform assessment rate is that it would preclude any argument that the United States - or any other affluent nation - is being unfairly taxed, especially so in light of the fact that the payments made would be factored into the weighted voting formula and would thereby be reflected in enhanced national voting strength. Thus, rather than seeking to have payments to the UN reduced, wealthy nations would have a strong incentive to pay their assessments in full. Further, if predetermined penalties were imposed - say, in terms of interest charged on late payments and, perhaps, in weighing late payments at a discounted rate in the WV formula - nations would have an incentive to make their assessed payments in a timely manner as well.

Finally, there is a significant additional psychological argument in favor of the proposed $0.1 \%$ assessment rate. Most individuals, even persons who are well educated, have considerable difficulty in conceptualizing and relating to numbers with seven or more digits; but they do fully appreciate (or suppose that they do) numbers with four or fewer digits. Thus, many who would likely recoil at the idea that the US should be assessed as much as twenty-two percent of the total UN budget, would find it quite acceptable that the country should pay, like all other nations, "a mere $0.1 \%$ " of its GNP - actually a far greater sum for the very same purpose.

## D. A Legislative Concomitant of the Proposed System of Weighted Voting:

Global problems require global solutions. In our highly interdependent world there are numerous problems (e.g., global warming) that individual nations cannot adequately deal with acting on their own. In light of this irrefutable fact, the time has come to endow the General Assembly with a limited capacity to pass legally binding resolutions rather than restricting it solely to a recommendatory role (apart from a few matters relating to UN administration and determining the UN's budget). So long as the competence of the GA remains what it is at present, the gains to be derived from weighted voting, while not
insignificant, would be much less meaningful than they should ideally be. We propose, therefore, that the GA be authorized to make binding decisions - i.e., to legislate - under the proposed weighted voting system.

The ability to create new international law would, however, have to be carefully circumscribed. At the outset, it should apply to a limited range of important substantive issues. Just what those issues might be would obviously be a matter for negotiation. How to deal with this issue is clearly addressed by the late Paul C. Szasz, whose career included more than forty years of service to the UN and related agencies. ${ }^{11}$ Szasz asserted that the scope of legislative authority for the GA would best be limited to matters with an obvious "international dimension," especially those deemed to be "global" or "world-wide" in nature, and also "general," as opposed, let us say, to such specific and contentious issues as boundary disputes. Barred from legislation would be matters "essentially within the jurisdiction of any state." Additionally, it would be appropriate to draw up a list of specific "preclusions" (matters not subject to GA legislation) as well as a list of admissible issues. In the latter category, Szasz suggests that the GA might be empowered to legislate with respect to the following:
> the high seas, Antarctica, outer space, weapons of mass destruction, the international trade in weapons, international trade and commerce, transboundary environmental matters, human rights (though that might be considered too broad a subject), and humanitarian rules of warfare . . . ${ }^{12}$

In regard to human rights, we suggest that only egregious offenses such as genocide and ethnic cleansing would initially be subject to binding resolutions. A more controversial set of topics, in Szasz's view, would include: "refugees and stateless persons, narcotic drugs, international terrorism and related crimes." Szasz's list of specific preclusions noted such issues as "immigration and naturalization, education, health (except in transboundary aspects), [and] domestic taxation . . ."13

For GA resolutions to be binding, we would suggest - on legal, pragmatic, and moral grounds - that three conditions be met: first, that they fall within the admissible range of issues for GA legislation; second, that they be approved by a group of nations with combined WVs accounting for at least two-thirds of the total WVs of all the members present and voting; and third, that the concurring nations must also account for a majority of the total population of all UN member nations present and voting. Such relatively democratic decisions would then have the character of international law and would therefore
be applicable to all UN member nations, as well as subject to enforcement action by the Security Council, should the latter body see fit to take such action. ${ }^{14}$

Authorizing the GA to enact binding legislation has the potential, in some circumstances, to create tension between it and the Security Council. In such an eventuality, Clause 1 of Article 12 of the present Charter would provide an important and legitimate check. It reads:

While the Security Council is exercising in respect to any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

## E. Benefits of a Change to Weighted Voting:

Obviously, the enhanced capability of the GA, together with a more realistic reconfiguration of power relationships therein, will strengthen the UN's credibility, make it much more democratic, and create a new political dynamic. In the following few pages we consider some of the less immediately apparent reasons why the proposed change should work for the betterment of the UN system and the world as a whole.

Figure 3 presents a set of pie graphs that portray the strength of each of three groups of member nations with respect to four critical variables. The groups in question are the four principal gainers - the US, China, Japan, and India - under the proposed WV system, twenty-nine additional gainers, and 158 remaining nations. The variables depicted are: a) the total population of UN member nations, b) the total assessed contributions to the UN budget, c) voting strength in the GA under the present one nation - one vote system, and d) the total WV if the proposed system were to be adopted. Analysis of these four graphs provides what may be the most persuasive argument in favor of a change.

Particularly striking is the fact that the four principal gainers presently have only $2.1 \%$ of the votes in the GA, despite accounting for $45.5 \%$ of the world's people and $43.1 \%$ of the total UN budget. Under the WV proposal their combined WV would come to $30.0 \%$, a more than fourteen-fold increase. The twenty-nine additional nations that would gain under the proposed system, account for $15.2 \%$ of the votes, yet have $33.3 \%$ of the world's people and provide $48.5 \%$ of the UN's budget. Under the proposed system their share of

Figure 3. Strength of Groups of Nations That Would Gain or Lose from Weighted Voting in Respect to Population, Contributions to UN Budget and Aggregate GA Votes under Present and Proposed Voting Systems

\% of Total Population of All Members of United Nations


Voting Strength of Groups under One Nation-One Vote System, 2003

\% of Total Contributions to United Nations Budget


Voting Strength under Proposed WV System

Nations That Would Gain


4 nations (US, China, Japan and India) with WVs > 4.0\%, sufficient for automatic representation in Security Council


29 nations with WVs of $0.53 \%-3.85 \%$

Nations That Would Lose

the votes would come to a much more reasonable $32.3 \%$. Thus it is evident that nations with roughly $79 \%$ of the world's population and contributing nearly $92 \%$ of the total UN budget would see themselves as better off with weighted voting than they are under the present one nation - one vote regime. Those are very powerful majorities.

While many of the 158 nations that might see themselves - at least in the short-run - as worse off may be expected initially to oppose a change to the WV system, the fact that they enjoy only negligible power, economically or otherwise, outside the UN arena leaves them in a weak bargaining position and therefore subject to pressure to accede to the proposed change should a majority of the economically more powerful and/or populous nations support it. Yet, the reduction in voting strength for the weaker states - from roughly $83 \%$ to $38 \%$, - would still leave those states in a highly favored position given their relatively small aggregate population and limited economic capability. In short, the new system would still be strongly biased in favor of the weak, though not nearly to the absurd degree that characterizes the present situation. Most would eventually recognize that $38 \%$ of something (i.e., an empowered GA) would be a great deal more favorable to their long-term interests than their present $83 \%$ of what is now, in effect, virtually nothing.

A change in the balance of power in the GA would occur also in the economic domain. This is illustrated by Figure 4, which shows the strength of the world's two major economic blocs under the present and proposed voting systems. ${ }^{15}$ The nations constituting each of these blocs are indicated in appendix II. Presently, the 131 relatively poor nations of the so-called "Group of 77 " command $68.6 \%$ of all the GA votes, more than enough for the two-thirds majority needed for passing a substantive resolution, whereas the thirty relatively affluent nations comprising the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) account for only $15.7 \%$ of the votes, with the balance, also $15.7 \%$, being made up of nations from the former Soviet bloc, plus a few small island states that have not associated themselves with either of the former two groups. Under the proposed WV voting system, the strength of the Group of 77 would decline to $51.6 \%$, while that of the O.E.C.D. would be raised to $40.7 \%$. The remaining $7.6 \%$ of the weighted votes are held almost entirely by Russia and other nations of Eastern Europe, whose economic orientations are, on the whole, moving toward those of the OECD bloc. The essential point to be made in this context is that neither of the two major economic blocs can independently marshal the two-thirds majority needed to win a vote on a substantive proposal in the GA. Consequently, instead of passing a plethora of meaningless resolutions favored by the Group of 77, which the world's wealthier nations would then largely ignore, each economic bloc would necessarily have to listen to and try to understand the concerns of the other and then enter

Figure 4. Strength in GA of Economic Blocs under Present and Proposed WV Voting Systems


Voting Strength of Groups under
One Nation - One Vote System, 2003


Voting Strength under Proposed WV System

Figure 5. Strength in GA of Groups of Nations Classified by Degrees of Freedom under Present and Proposed WV Voting Systems
(Numbers 1.0-7.0 are ranks assigned by Freedom House for the year 2003.)


Voting Strength of Groups under One Nation - One Vote System, 2003


Voting Strength under Proposed WV System
into creative compromises if constructive economic resolutions are to be crafted. On balance, this would be a very salutary development.

No less important than the approach to parity in voting strength between the major economic blocs is the fact that the proposed WV system would substantially augment the voting strength of the world's democratic nations and those rated as "free" in the annual ratings of Freedom House. ${ }^{16}$ This is made evident by Figure 5, which shows the relative power under the present and proposed WV systems of groups of countries ranked on a "freedom" scale from 1.0 to 7.0. The specific countries within each rank and their respective WVs are indicated in Appendix III. The most important information in Figure 5 is that nations in the "free" cohort would have their combined share of the total vote raised from the present $46.1 \%$ to $60.7 \%$. Moreover, within the free group the greatest gains would be registered by those with the highest ranking, 1.0, whose WVs would increase from $17.8 \%$ to $31.3 \%$. The "not free" group, by contrast, would see its combined strength decline from $25.6 \%$ to $21.4 \%$. The balance in each case lies with nations classified as "partly free." Virtually all of the world's relatively wealthy states now do have more or less free and democratic regimes. They, together with a number of poorer - but also democratic - states, should therefore be able to forge a strong and cohesive voting bloc with enormous potential for advancing democratic governance and promoting basic human rights, sustainable development, environmental protection, and other benign objectives.

Finally, we must note that institutionalizing the principle of realistically weighted voting in the GA would establish a model of decision-making that would be applicable also to the UN specialized agencies, most of which also follow the one nation - one vote rule. While we do not here suggest that the voting formula adopted for the GA would necessarily be the ideal formula for all of the specialized agencies, we do believe that, for each agency, some appropriate, fair, and objective formula can be derived. For example, in determining weighted votes in the FAO one might take into consideration each country's share of the world's population, of the world's food production and of the value of the world's trade in agricultural commodities, in addition to the sovereign equality of nations. The resultant formula would then have four terms (not necessarily all of the same weight), instead of the three used in the formula proposed for the GA.

## F. Adapting to Future Political Changes:

Since the political map of the world is forever in flux, all recommendations for UN reform should anticipate future changes and be adaptable to them. Up to now, when states
have merged (e.g., West and East Germany, North and South Yemen, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and Egypt and Syria - albeit briefly - in the United Arab Republic) their two GA votes became but one. The opposite was true with respect to countries created on the disintegration of certain states (Pakistan out of India, Bangladesh out of Pakistan, Eritrea out of Ethiopia, and a host of states out of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia). In such cases, all of the newly independent states soon became members of the UN. It seems perverse, however, to reward state failure by conveying extra voting strength to the region in which that failure occurred (e.g., Yugoslavia) and, conversely, to penalize voluntary national integration. This problem, however, would be substantially mitigated under the proposed WV system of weighted GA votes in that statehood per se is but one among three factors taken into consideration in determining each nation's WV.

But what of future federal unions? The most likely of these appears to be a truly federal European Union. Should the constituents of this potential federation - which would likely comprise more than twenty-five formerly independent states - be penalized for having the good sense to integrate economically and politically, by losing out on the membership term of the WV equation? A compromise on this issue would be in order. So as not to greatly discourage beneficial future unions, one might stipulate that, for a specified period (say up to fifteen years) following the union, the federating units could retain their individuality for purposes of representation in the GA (and also in the SC). The three GA seats held by the Soviet Union - including those for the Ukraine and White Russia - prior to its disintegration provide a precedent for such an arrangement. During the transitional period, the economic gains derived from the union might well suffice to compensate for any political loss in a progressively less confrontational UN political arena.

Whatever the pragmatic merits of the WV formula may be, the idea of giving equal weight to three factors - population, budgetary contributions, and membership (i.e., the sovereign equality of nations) - is bound to meet with disapproval in certain quarters. So too would endowing the GA with legislative powers. Most nations still guard their sovereignty zealously and resist the idea of its being encroached upon by forces external to the state, including the UN. Nevertheless, many observers would assert that the sovereignty of individual states in an age of intricate global interdependence is being progressively eroded and is now often dysfunctional. They would, therefore, draw the conclusion that the weight of the nationhood, or membership, term in the WV formula should be diminished with the passage of time. Others, especially those with a pronounced democratic bent, will recoil from the idea that wealth (as represented by assessed UN contributions) should be weighted as heavily as population, not recognizing that without this condition the more affluent nations of the world would presently have insufficient incentive to agree to
meaningful UN reform. However, with the world's steady, even if fitful, evolution toward more democratic forms of governance - a process that would receive considerable impetus from a reformed and more effective UN system - the wealthy nations' fear of being outvoted on certain issues by poorer, but more populous, nations in transition to becoming full-fledged democracies should gradually diminish.

In light of the above considerations, it may be wise to require reconsideration (but not necessarily change) of the WV formula after a specified period. Again, fifteen years might be appropriate. If, at that time, in the collective wisdom of the GA, as expressed in a requisite two-thirds vote, a change is deemed to be in order, it could be brought about. If the Charter amendment originally establishing the WV system of voting were appropriately worded (as indicated in the following annex), no additional amendment would be necessary. Thus, fifteen years or so after the original amendment takes effect, the weighted voting formula might be revised as follows:

$$
W V=\frac{P+C+M}{3} \text { might be changed to } W V=\frac{2 P+2 C+M}{5} .
$$

This would double the relative weight of both population and contributions and correspondingly reduce the original formula's substantial bias in favor of small and microstates. In another fifteen or so years, assuming further democratization, another change might be made, whereby population would become the principal determinant of voting strength. The formula might then be:

$$
W V=\frac{3 P+2 C+M}{6}
$$

By the time the changes envisaged above are effected, however, the political evolution of the global community might be such as to have brought about the establishment of a popularly elected People's Assembly and/or a Parliamentary Assembly of representatives elected by the parliaments of the UN member states to function alongside the appointive General Assembly. Following the example of the European Union, any such coordinate assembly/assemblies would initially be only advisory in nature; but either, or both, could, in time, be vested with increasing degrees of binding legal authority. ${ }^{17}$ Charters are not written in stone and the process of democratic reform should continue as long and as far as the global community deems necessary.

## Annex: A Proposed Charter Amendment

In respect to voting in the General Assembly, changes would be required in Article 18 , paragraph 1 ; the first sentence of paragraph 2 ; and paragraph 3 . These presently read as follows:
"1. Each Member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
" 2 . Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting. [The balance of the paragraph specifies which questions shall be deemed important.]
"3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the Members present and voting."

The following substitute text is proposed [wording in square brackets relates to optional inclusions and/or negotiable issues]:

1. Each Member of the General Assembly shall cast a weighted vote. For an initial period of [fifteen] years, the weights assigned to each Member's vote shall be the average of three percentages: a) its population as a percentage of the total population of all Member nations, b) its assessed and paid contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations as a percentage of the contributions of all Member nations during the previous [three-]year period, and c) its membership as a percentage of the total membership of the United Nations.
2. After the expiration of the [fifteen-] year period specified in paragraph 1 , the General Assembly shall consider whether or not to change the formula for determining each Member's weighted vote. If changes are deemed desirable, the General Assembly shall decide upon a new weighted voting formula and specify a minimum period during which the new formula shall be applicable. Thereafter, the weighted voting formula may be reconsidered and altered at the discretion of the Assembly without further amending of the Charter.
3. Member nations entering into larger federal unions will be entitled to retain their individual weighted votes under the rules specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 for a period of [fifteen] years subsequent to their entry into the union.
4. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the weighted votes of the Members present and voting, provided that the total population of the concurring Members represents a majority of the total population of the Members present and voting. Such decisions shall be binding on all members of the United Nations. [The balance of the paragraph would include the relevant text on "important questions" in Article 18, paragraph 2 of the present Charter and also specify those additional subjects on which the Assembly would be deemed competent to pass "binding resolutions" as per an amended Article 10.]
5. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority of the weighted votes, shall be made by a simple majority of the weighted votes of the Members present and voting, provided that the total population of the concurring Members represents a majority of the total population the Members present and voting.

The central task of our time is to evolve a new system of world order based on principles of peace and justice.

- Richard Falk, Emeritus Professor of Law Princeton University

The proposed system of comprehensive security will become operative to the extent that the United Nations, its Security Council and other international institutions and mechanisms function effectively. A decisive increase is required in the authority and role of the United Nations . . .

- Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet General Secretary

Address to UN, September 1987

## III. Reform of the Security Council

## A. Shortcomings of the Present System:

Originally, the UN Charter established a Security Council (SC) of eleven members, five of whom - China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - were designated as "permanent." Another six elected members served staggered two-year terms, three being elected every year, with "due regard being paid in the first instance to the contribution of Members to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution." (UN Charter, Article 23, paragraph 1) Thus, more than a fifth of the original fifty-one members were represented on the SC when it first convened. In 1946 the population of the eleven initial SC members collectively comprised 63 percent of the total population of all member nations (nearly $56 \%$ being accounted for by the five permanent members), while the combined population of the six nonpermanent members comprised only a sixth of the total for the 46 states from which that group was selected.

As new nations were accepted into the organization, the representativeness of the Council's membership declined substantially (even if we ignore the dramatic decrease occasioned by the fact that mainland China was not truly represented during the period 1949-71 when Taiwan held the permanent seat reserved for "the Republic of China"). This expansion led, naturally, to a demand to expand the SC's membership. Although the GA
voted in 1963 to increase the membership to fifteen, it was not until 1965 that the requisite ratifications of the enabling Charter amendment were obtained. When the expanded Council, newly containing a total of ten nonpermanent members, convened in January 1966, the proportion of Council members to total members was raised from 9.9 to 13.5 percent; but, with further UN expansion, that proportion immediately began again to decline and, by the year 2003, it had sunk to only 7.9 percent. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that there is now wide sentiment that the time has come to enlarge the Council yet again, by anywhere from two to ten new members.

Map 4 and Figure 6 respectively provide a geographic and historical perspective on the representativeness of the SC. The former of these shows, for all countries of the world, the number of terms served on the SC, from 1946, when that body first met, to the year 2003 and distinguishes between terms served before and after the Council's expansion in 1966. ${ }^{18}$ It also indicates, by color, the number of years of each country's Council service as a proportion of the number of years of eligibility, which is, of course, dependent on its date of admission to the UN. (These dates and specific years of membership are provided in Appendix IV.) For the nonpermanent members, the range in number of years served varies from zero, for seventy-seven states, and one for Liberia (which served one half term in 1946), to as many as sixteen for both Brazil and Japan. But, as Brazil is a charter member of the UN, while Japan joined only in 1956, Japan has had a somewhat higher frequency of membership, $34 \%$, as opposed to $28 \%$ for Brazil. The only other countries serving for more than twenty percent of the total years of eligibility were Argentina (24\%), Germany (23\%), and Canada, Colombia, India, and Italy (each with roughly $21 \%$ ).

Examined in detail, Map 4 reveals many hard-to-explain anomalies. For example, the small island nation of Mauritius, with a population of only 1.2 million, has served four years, no fewer than Indonesia, which, with 211 million people, ranks as the world's fourth most populous state. Similarly, Panama, with a population only one thirty-fifth that of Mexico, has served eight years, compared to Mexico's five. Explanations for these anomalies differ; but an important factor is the varying degrees of fervor with which individual countries lobby for SC seats. Whereas most nations vie keenly with others in their region to be elected to the Council, Mexico appears to have concluded that the selection process is excessively dominated by the permanent Council members, especially the United States, and that the prize of membership is simply not worth the effort of courting General Assembly votes. ${ }^{19}$ In any event, the politicization of the SC selection process, and the insufficient role played therein by merit cannot be seriously questioned.


The seventy-seven nations that never served at all on the SC are, for the most part, rather small; but the list does include Vietnam (with a population of 80 million), Myanmar, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia. Israel is another conspicuous omission. ${ }^{20}$ In all the named cases, the nations in question are (or were) viewed by significant portions of the world community as pariah states, a fact that virtually precluded their selection. Other states also suffered, presumably, from negative international perceptions, which might explain why Iran, for example, never served on the SC since its initial term in 1955-56. Also noteworthy is the number of very small states that have held SC seats, including Bahrain, Cape Verde, Djibouti, and Malta, each with fewer than a million inhabitants.

Map 4 reveals striking differences from one part of the world to another. These contrasts indicate that attention to "equitable geographical distribution" has often been given precedence over representation based on "contribution[s] ... to the maintenance of international peace and security," the aforementioned primary principle set forth in the UN Charter. Until 1966, the six nonpermanent seats were generally allocated as follows: two seats for Latin America; and one seat each to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia and North Africa, and the diverse group of nations comprising the older members of the British Commonwealth. ${ }^{21}$ This arbitrary formula not only left a growing number of countries, including such important states as Japan and Indonesia, without a clear regional affiliation, but also failed utterly to allow for adjustments in representation in response to the explosion of membership within Africa south of the Sahara and, to a lesser degree, within Asia as well. Although the formula was not always strictly followed, Latin America and Eastern Europe, many would argue, received substantially more than their due (largely for reasons relating to the Cold War), while Africa and Asia received significantly less. For example, Indonesia, though admitted to the UN as early as 1950, did not serve on the SC until 1973-74.

Since 1966, a new, but still arbitrary, regional allocation scheme has been in effect. Three of the ten nonpermanent seats are now allocated to Africa, two to Asia, two to Latin America and the Caribbean, two to "Western Europe and Other," and one to Eastern Europe. Although this does represent some gain for the Afro-Asian bloc, an examination of population and economic data, as well as of the number of member countries from those two continents, leads one to question whether the reform has been sufficient. The 103 member nations from Africa and Asia (excluding China) accounted for a population slightly in excess of 3.4 billion, out of a total of roughly 4.1 billion (roughly 83 percent) in the 186 members of the UN other than the P-5; yet, they are allotted only half the nonpermanent seats. Relatively speaking, Latin America and Eastern Europe remain advantaged regions. So too is the newly minted, amorphous "Western Europe and Other" bloc, especially when
one considers the political affinity of most of its members to the permanently seated France, United Kingdom, and United States.

A comparison of the population of the permanent and nonpermanent members of the SC to those of all UN members combined and of the world as a whole is depicted, year-by-year, in Figure 6, the data for which are presented in Appendices V and VI and summarized in Table 2. Analysis of these presentations leads to some interesting conclusions. Most striking, perhaps, is that the share of the permanent members in the total population of both the UN members and the world as a whole has declined more or less steadily (if one ignores the period when the government on Taiwan held the Chinese seat) from an initial high of 39 percent of the world total and 63 percent of the UN total to the present share of not quite 30 percent for both the UN and the world as a whole. The explanation lies not only in the expansion of the UN's membership, but also in the differential rates of population growth in various parts of the world, slow (or even negative) in most economically developed countries and relatively rapid in those that are less affluent. Yet there has been no commensurate diminution in the power of the P-5.

Within the P-5 the relative shares of the population held by China on the one hand and, on the other hand, by the United States, the USSR (until 1991) or Russia (since 1991), France, and the United Kingdom is also of interest. The overwhelming demographic predominance of China is striking for most of the period since the UN's founding; but for the period from 1950 to 1971, Taiwan's hold on the permanent Chinese seat represented a strange and contentious departure from this pattern. While less dramatic, the decline in the population represented when Russia took over the former permanent seat of the Soviet Union is also worth noting.

The share of the ever-changing cohort of nonpermanent members in the population represented on the SC and also in the world as a whole has fluctuated greatly and in a seemingly random manner. In 1965, for example, the then six nonpermanent members - the Netherlands, Malaysia, Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, Uruguay, and Jordan, in that order of population size - collectively accounted for just over one percent of the world's total population, and less than that of any single one of the P-5 at the time. Only two years later, in the expanded SC, the cohort of ten nonpermanent members, again in descending order of population (at that time), were India, Japan, Brazil, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Canada, Argentina, Bulgaria, Denmark, and Mali. Each of the first four in this group had a far greater population than all six of the 1965 cohort combined and the group as a whole accounted for almost a fourth of humanity, a share never since equaled. Not surprisingly, all six of the peak periods for the nonpermanent group shown on Figure 6 are accounted for by the six

Figure 6. Percentages of World's Population in the United Nations and in Nations with Seats in the Security Council, 1946-2003

Security Council, Permanent Seats:

$\square$ France, UK, USA and USSR/Russia (1992-2003)
China (regime recognized by UN)
$\square$ Security Council, Nonpermanent Seats
$\square$ Other Members of UN

N.B. Populations shown are mid-year estimates.


Table 2. Share of Security Council Members in Total Population of World and of All UN Members, 1946-65, 1966-2003, and 1946-2003; Maxima, Minima, Means, and Medians by Period

Years of maxima and minima are noted in parentheses.

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline a

Period \& | b |
| :---: |
| P-5 as |
| $\%$ of World | \& \[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { P-5 as } \\
& \% \text { of UN }
\end{aligned}
$$

\] \& | d |
| :--- |
| Temporary Members as \% of World | \& | e |
| :---: |
| Temporary |
| Members |
| as \% of |
| UN | \& | $f$ |
| :---: |
| Temporary |
| Members |
| as \% of |
| non-P-5 | \& | g |
| :--- |
| Total SC as \% of World | \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
\hline \mathrm{h} \\
\text { Total SC } \\
\text { as \% of } \\
\text { UN }
\end{gathered}
$$
\] <br>

\hline 1946-65 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>

\hline Maximum (Year) \& $$
\begin{gathered}
39.1 \\
(1949)
\end{gathered}
$$ \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
55.6 \\
(1946)
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
18.1 \\
(1951)
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
33.3 \\
(1951)
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
48.7 \\
(1951)
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
44.3 \\
(1946)
\end{gathered}
$$

\] \& \[

$$
\begin{gathered}
63.2 \\
(1946)
\end{gathered}
$$
\] <br>

\hline Minimum \& 16.2 \& 22.6 \& 1.0 \& 1.5 \& 1.9 \& 17.2 \& 24.4 <br>
\hline (Year) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) <br>
\hline Mean \& 21.2 \& 32.5 \& 5.1 \& 8.5 \& 12.9 \& 26.3 \& 40.9 <br>
\hline Median \& 16.9 \& 29 \& 4.1 \& 7.3 \& 8.7 \& 21.3 \& 36.2 <br>
\hline 1966-2003 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline Maximum \& 36.6 \& 38.9 \& 23.7 \& 36.5 \& 45.0 \& 57.6 \& 61.3 <br>
\hline (Year) \& (1972) \& (1972) \& (1967) \& (1967) \& (1967) \& (1972) \& (1972) <br>
\hline Minimum \& 15.2 \& 21.0 \& 2.6 \& 2.6 \& 4.1 \& 18.7 \& 25.8 <br>
\hline (Year) \& (1971) \& (1971) \& (1986) \& (1986) \& (1986) \& (1970) \& (1970) <br>
\hline Mean \& 30.6 \& 32.2 \& 9.8 \& 10.5 \& 15.8 \& 40.3 \& 42.7 <br>
\hline Median \& 33.7 \& 34.3 \& 6.5 \& 8.1 \& 10.8 \& 39.7 \& 41.3 <br>
\hline 1946-2003 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline Maximum \& 39.1 \& 55.6 \& 23.7 \& 36.5 \& 48.7 \& 57.6 \& 63.2 <br>
\hline (Year) \& (1949) \& (1946) \& (1967) \& (1962) \& (1951) \& (1972) \& (1946) <br>
\hline Minimum \& 15.2 \& 21.0 \& 1.0 \& 1.5 \& 1.9 \& 17.2 \& 24.4 <br>
\hline (Year) \& (1971) \& (1971) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) \& (1965) <br>
\hline Mean \& 27.3 \& 32.3 \& 8.1 \& 9.8 \& 14.8 \& 35.5 \& 42.1 <br>
\hline Median \& 30.5 \& 36.2 \& 5.9 \& 7.3 \& 10.7 \& 38.2 \& 37.8 <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

Sources: Appendices IV and V.
terms (twelve years) when India served as a Council member in that India alone accounts for roughly a sixth of the world's population. Those same twelve years were the only ones in which the population of the SC was more than half that of the UN as whole, and in eight of those years more than half that of the planet.

Oddly, the expansion of the number of nonpermanent members from six to ten had little effect in increasing their representation as a proportion of the world's people living in UN member nations. The average for the cohorts of six in the period from 1946 to 1965 was $8.7 \%$, while that for the cohorts of ten over the period since 1966 was only $8.9 \%$. Moreover, since the proportion of the UN members' population living in countries other than the P-5 has steadily increased, the average share of the nonpermanent SC members relative to the group of nations from which they were elected has actually declined in the post-1965 period.

How best to make the SC more representative has been keenly, but inconclusively, debated. The case for adding permanent seats for Japan and Germany is widely believed to be very powerful. Both those nations have much larger populations than either France or the United Kingdom and contribute much more to the UN budget than any of the permanent members other than the United States (when it actually does pay its dues). But many would question whether they or other would-be major players on the UN stage (e.g., India or Brazil) should be given the veto; and there is no agreement, as yet, on how widely diffused permanent membership should become. ${ }^{22}$ Some observers have argued for "semipermanent" status (a blatant oxymoron) for members from some regions of the world, whereby, for example, India and Japan would alternate in holding a reserved Asian seat, Brazil and Argentina in holding a seat for Latin America, and so forth. ${ }^{23}$ It is at this point that consensus tends to break down.

In sum, the SC has been, since its inception, a far from adequately representative body and proposals thus far put forward within the UN to rectify that deficiency offer little assurance of attaining their ostensible goal. Moreover, the fact that five specially privileged members occupy permanent seats and enjoy the power of the veto is now widely - and reasonably - perceived as an unfair and anachronistic legacy of World War II.

## B. WV-Based Allocation of Security Council Seats:

Major reform of the Security Council has widespread support and could, in principle, be achieved with or without concurrent reform of the General Assembly. In our view, reform of
the two bodies in tandem is the preferable course of action and, arguably, the more feasible. To date, however, recommendations for SC reform have had little tie-in with those for reform of the GA. Most recommendations relating to the SC have reflected the vital interests of relatively powerful states, especially those of the permanent members, none of whom will readily surrender its special privileges, at least not without a substantial quid pro quo. The quid pro quo recommended here is to grant the major powers - among others - a substantial augmentation of voting strength through a realistic system of weighted voting in a more empowered GA in return for the elimination or phasing out of the veto. Equally important, the UN should replace the concept of permanent SC membership by the concept of membership based on meeting certain objective criteria (which would also be based on country weights). These issues are considered below.

The word "permanent" does not belong in any constitution or charter, for the simple reason that no human creation is truly permanent. The once-mighty Soviet Union is no more and only by an act of political legerdemain has Russia, its largest surviving remnant, come to occupy the permanent SC seat reserved for that state. And if the Russian Federation were itself to suffer additional territorial losses, at what point would the process of reallocation come to an end? Suppose further that, a generation hence, Scotland and Wales were to achieve complete independence from the United Kingdom. Would one then - taking the case of the USSR and Russia as a precedent - declare that the rump territory of England would thenceforth hold the seat originally allocated to the UK? Or consider a diametrically opposite scenario, namely that of the United Kingdom and France merging with other countries within a federated Europe. What, then, would become of their two permanent seats? The time has come to put an end to the idea of "permanent" membership and also to the attendant privilege of the veto, an issue to which we shall revert below.

With respect to SC size, it will be necessary to strike a workable balance between two opposing considerations. On the one hand, there is need for a Council small enough to make decisions efficiently and expeditiously in situations involving threats to the peace; on the other hand, one would wish for a Council large enough to be much more representative of the political will of the world's peoples of than has been the case up to now. Experiments with various formulae suggest that a Council with a modest increase - to eighteen members - would be optimal. We would also recommend, for reasons that will become clear below, that SC terms be concurrent, rather than overlapping as at present, and extended to three years, with each seat holder assuming, in alphabetical order, the role of SC President for a two-month period.

Enlarging the SC to eighteen seats will necessarily require increasing the number of affirmative votes for a decision. In respect to procedural matters, we suggest an increase from the present nine to ten, a simple majority. For decisions on substantive matters a higher threshold would be in order, say eleven or twelve. If the veto were to be eliminated or phased out, as suggested below, twelve would convey a greater sense of legitimacy.

The current practice of allocating SC seats on a predetermined regional basis is arbitrary and inflexible, and it attaches unwarranted importance to continents as meaningful political entities. ${ }^{24}$ It ignores the fact that Asia alone contains approximately sixty-one percent of the world's people and contains cultural realms (e.g., the Islamic and the Confucian) whose differences are no less pronounced than those of an intercontinental nature. Does anyone seriously suppose, for example, that, when a country such as Jordan holds one of the two nonpermanent seats allocated to the vast Asian bloc, it seeks to ascertain and promote the political will of such distant nations as either North or South Korea? And, should one of the SC members happen to be either India or Pakistan, the other of the two might, in certain circumstances, prefer not to be "represented" at all than to have its long-standing antagonist seated on the Council. Such cases are not uncommon. During the Cold War, the alignments of many states to either Eastern or Western coalitions often took precedence over regional loyalties in deciding votes on SC resolutions. Today, votes along lines of cleavage between North and South are more common. Obviously, the old implicit notion that the relative importance and political orientation of different major areas of the world would not change appreciably with the passage of time has been shown to be erroneous. A related final problem is that in any given year the set of non-permanent members on the SC may not include a combination of states with sufficient conviction and confidence to stand up to one or more of the P-5 powers on an issue of global importance. Ideally, the merits of the case, rather than the fortuitous and ever-shifting configurations of nonpermanent SC membership ought to determine the outcome of Council votes.

Thus, rather than having some group of "experts" determine the appropriate regions for SC representation, it would be far more appropriate to allow UN member nations to form and - as and when it suits them - to reconfigure the regions from which they wish to be represented. A workable means of doing this would be to allocate SC seats to individual nations or to blocs of nations in accord with the following set of rules:

- Individual nations, with a WV exceeding four percent, would have a seat.
- Blocs of like-minded nations (not necessarily contiguous), with an aggregate WV exceeding four percent as well as a total population in excess of one
percent of the total population of all UN member nations would have a seat, up to a permissible total of seventeen seats for individual qualifying nations and blocs combined.
- The remaining seat(s) would be reserved for one or more nations not otherwise represented and its (their) occupant(s) would be elected at-large by the GA from among that group of nations.

Additionally, no nation would be permitted to join more than a single caucus. (The specified conditions would apply whether or not WVs were actually used for determining weighted votes in the GA. In the latter case, the relevant term used would be "weight" [W], rather than "weighted vote" [WV].) Several possible ways of selecting national and bloc representatives will be considered in section III.D of this work.

The qualifying WV threshold of four percent, like the suggested total of eighteen SC seats, was decided upon as a result of experiments with several possible figures. Five percent, it was found, would raise the bar too high to permit a sufficiently wide distribution of blocs with clearly identifiable common interests, while three percent, on the other hand, would result in an unmanageably large number of claimants. Even the suggested figure of four percent raises the theoretical possibility that as many as twenty-four regions could claim their right to representation. But, since a number of individual states will, for the foreseeable future, have WVs well in excess of four percent (e.g., roughly $9.1 \%$ for the United States) and since many of the likely regions to be formed would do so as well, such an eventuality is most unlikely. Nevertheless, since satisfying all claims for representation in a Council with only seventeen seats allocated under the stipulated rules could theoretically become an impossibility, a necessary additional rule would be to have the GA elect holders of bloc seats beginning with the bloc with the highest WV and proceeding to claimants with successively lower WVs until reaching the specified maximum. The non-bloc holder of the eighteenth seat would be the last to be elected.

## C. Two Hypothetical SC Membership Scenarios:

Maps 5 and 6 present somewhat different sets of hypothetical, but plausible, allocations of SC seats based in whole or part on the reformed system recommended above. The data on which they are based are presented in Appendix VI. In Map 5 we assume utilization of the present scale of UN budgetary assessments in the formula for calculating WVs and no departures from the rules just specified. In Map 6 we assume a scale of


assessments strictly proportional to GNP and a transitional period of up to fifteen years during which all five of the present permanent members of the SC would be able to retain their seats, whether or not they met the four percent WV threshold. The latter scenario might be indicated if there were no other way of achieving acquiescence in the proposed change by Russia, France, and the United Kingdom, each of which would lose its privileged position under the proposed system. In considering these two maps, it is important to bear in mind that each presents but one from among countless bloc configurations of nations that could be formed for purposes of SC representation. Neither is intended as a prescription for how the SC should be organized. Rather, each is analyzed below in such a way as to throw light on the type of new political thinking and dynamics to which the proposed reforms would likely lead. The final decisions on bloc formations would best be made, not by any outside brain trust, but by the countries concerned, each acting in accordance with what it believes to be in its own national interests.

Circles representing each bloc or nation identified on Maps 5 and 6 are scaled according to its aggregate or individual WV ; and that figure (to the nearest $0.1 \%$ ) is indicated therein. SC voting, however, - unlike the procedure suggested for the GA - would not be by WVs; rather, each SC representative would have, as at present, an equal vote. Collectively, the WVs for the sixteen seats allocated to the blocs and nations shown on Map 5 come to a total of $89.7 \%$ while their share of the world's population would be $92.5 \%$. For the seventeen seats indicated on Map 6 the respective figures would be $89.6 \%$ and $93.4 \%$. Either scenario would yield a much higher degree of representation of the world's nations and people than has ever been attained in the SC in its present form.

The number of states included in the hypothetical blocs depicted varies from as few as two - Germany and Austria - in the case of Central Europe on Map 5, to as many as twenty-three (for either Meso-America or Central, Eastern and Southern Africa on Maps 5 and 6). Not surprisingly, each bloc depicted would have a small number of key core members, most often just one (e.g., Mexico in Meso-America, Nigeria in West Africa). How receptive these core member(s) of a given bloc would be to including would-be additional members, assuming that the bloc had already attained the four percent threshold would depend on several factors: a) the bloc's need to attain sufficient weight above the minimum to insure its continuation in the event of a relative decline in its overall population and/or economic fortune or the defection of one or more of its members; b) balancing possible losses from having to make policy compromises with additional bloc members with differing views and interests against the gains derived from the greater overall political influence that come from representing a larger cohort of nations and people; and c) the good- or bad-will likely to result from its decision. The political calculus will vary markedly
from region to region and also from one time period to another; but diplomats will quickly learn to do the necessary arithmetic and work out the appropriate etiquette to create and maintain viable blocs.

States contemplating their own inclusion within a nascent bloc will similarly weigh their options carefully in seeking membership. Each would seek association with other nations with compatible interests and with a willingness to take heed of its concerns. If blocs are to cohere and thereby maintain their bargaining power, it will be in the interest of all members to consult with and try to understand the concerns of their associates and work out common positions on important issues likely to come before the SC. Regular consultation would also lead to cooperation on matters outside the purview of the UN. On balance, this is all to the good.

Additional benefits of the proposed system evident in the scenarios presented in Maps 5 and 6 (and also in all the others experimentally created by the author) are that the hypothetical SCs to which they lead all have a rough balance between relatively well developed and less developed parts of the world, as well as a balance among regions. This would make dominance of the SC by any single part of the world exceedingly difficult.

The rationale for establishing the hypothetical blocs shown in Maps 5 and 6 is largely self-evident. In fact, one of the blocs, the Arab League, already exists, as do close approximations of several others (e.g., ASEAN vis-à-vis Southeast Asia, ECOWAS vis-àvis West Africa). In all cases, one finds some meaningful combination of shared political orientation, common culture, regional proximity, historical experience, etc. While one might quibble about the likelihood of specific nations being included in a given bloc (e.g., whether or not the Southeast Asian bloc would include Sri Lanka, which is presently not a member of ASEAN), the questionable inclusions would seldom be of sufficient importance to preclude bloc formation if that nation were to be left out

There are, however, some potential blocs, the Non-Arab Islamic States of Central and Southwest Asia on Maps 5 and 6, and Eastern Europe on Map 5, whose cohesiveness is problematic and for which the aggregate WV would barely pass the four percent threshold. In each of these cases the absence of even a single hypothetical member might prevent the bloc's formation. Turkey, for example, seeks to become a part of the European Union and might be unwilling to prejudice its chances of achieving that objective by joining any Islamic bloc of nations. If that were the case, other countries of the bloc might make a point of courting Bangladesh as a member to ensure that they surpassed the requisite four percent threshold. Similarly, if Poland or certain other nations of Eastern Europe were to become
members of European blocs to their west or south, that would prevent the formation of the Eastern European bloc indicated on Map 5. In any such eventuality, the number of SC members elected at-large by the GA would be increased.

Among the countries that do not form a part of any of the blocs depicted (thirty on Map 5 and thirty-nine on Map 6) are some that are rather large and/or populous. In order of WV, these include Russia, Canada, Bangladesh, and Australia on Map 5 and Russia, Bangladesh, Australia, and the Ukraine on map 6; but most non-bloc states would range from small to insignificant. Several circumstances account for these omissions. In many cases the only neighbors of the countries in question are states that are entitled to a Council seat in their own right and therefore have no need to caucus with others. Canada's only immediate neighbor, for example, is the United States; Nepal and Bhutan are wedged in between China and India; both Koreas lie between China and Japan; etc. Other nations, such as Australia and New Zealand, are geographically isolated from neighbors of similar political and economic orientation, though there would be no bar to their seeking to enter into a bloc with like-minded, but distant states. And some states are presently excluded from bloc membership because of their ethnically divided populations (e.g., Cyprus) and/or their lack of friendly relations with other states in their region (e.g., Israel). But these states have also been excluded from SC membership under the selection system now in operation.

The case of Russia, long a major player on the global stage, calls for special comment. Because of its severely depressed economy, Russia presently has too small a WV to form the core of a bloc in the scenario of Map 5, even if it were to be joined by the five other non-Islamic republics (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia) of the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, a bloc consisting of all twelve republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would collectively come close to meeting the qualifying threshold, given the present scale of assessments, and would slightly exceed that threshold if assessments were in direct proportion to GNP. But any attempt to form an allinclusive CIS bloc would run counter to aspirations to establish a bloc consisting of the Non-Arab Islamic States of Central and Southwest Asia. The choice of orientation of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and of Azerbaijan, should they be invited to join a CIS bloc, would not be an easy one. But, the problem for Russia is very likely only temporary. Given its rich natural resource base, its well developed infrastructure, and, above all, its highly educated population, Russia should reemerge, before long, as a significant economic power.

With respect to the United Kingdom and France, the loss of a permanent SC seat would be less of an immediate political blow than for Russia in that both have neighbors
with political and economic outlooks sufficiently similar to their own to form reasonably cohesive blocs with the requisite WV for SC representation. It should not be too great a matter of concern for a citizen of France, for example, to be represented in the SC by a Belgian or a Dutch diplomat or for a Briton to be represented by, let us suppose, a Swede. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the European Union is, in any event, feeling its way toward a common foreign policy.

What ought to happen if the European Union were to become a single federation is an altogether different matter. Should the four (or, counting Eastern Europe, five) seats that the presently divided Europe might otherwise command be reduced to only one? Although some altruistic advocates of European federation do take precisely this position, many others, no less well intentioned, would oppose it. In that there is much to be gained from the creation of large regional federations, nations taking part in their formation - whether in Europe, Africa, Latin America, or elsewhere - should not be penalized by inordinate reduction in their representation in the UN. Some compromise measure, similar to what was recommended earlier in respect to the GA, would therefore be in order, namely, to allow the federating units to retain their individuality, for purposes of SC representation for a transitional period of up to fifteen years.

## D. Procedures for Selecting Delegates

In what follows, we suggest several possible procedures for selecting delegates to represent both individual nations and blocs in the SC. We begin with one that represents a radical departure from the present method, proceed to a less radical alternative, and conclude with a possible compromise between the two approaches. Since the issue under consideration would be procedural, it would not, in itself, call for Charter revision.

In the most radical scenario, each nation entitled to a seat in its own right would continue, as at present, to select its SC representative. Each bloc formed by a caucus of nations would, however, nominate from two to five individual candidates for a Council seat, with no more than one candidate coming from a single country. For each such bloc, the candidate obtaining the largest number of General Assembly votes would be elected as the bloc's representative and the runner-up candidate would then serve as the representative's alternate. Nominations would be agreed to at three-year intervals through consultation among delegates from the respective foreign ministries of the bloc caucuses. This would normally take place in the late spring, which would allow informal campaigning during the following summer months in anticipation of elections shortly after the opening of the GA in

September. (Such lobbying for support occurs even now when nations vie with one another for support in seeking SC seats. ${ }^{25}$ Once elected by the entire GA, bloc representatives would be expected to act in the SC on behalf of the entire group of nations that they represent. This presumes regular consultation - whether face-to-face or by electronic means - among the foreign ministries and UN delegates of all the bloc members to work out common approaches in regard to issues coming before the SC and frequent and full reporting by the bloc representatives to all of the constituent nations. Any egregious failure to do so would probably result in the dissolution of the bloc, and/or rejection of the representative by the bloc during the next triennial caucus period. Alternatively, the representative might be recalled even earlier by some previously agreed procedure and replaced by his/her alternate. Reelection of representatives would be permitted.

Several important benefits would flow from the system just proposed. First, the intra-bloc consultation on which it would depend would enhance the bloc's cohesion and bargaining power in dealing with other important actors on the global stage. Additionally, the system would naturally conduce to meritocracy. Rather than resorting to nepotism or cronyism in choosing a nominee or promoting the candidacy of a political opportunist, each member of a multi-national caucus would seek to sponsor an individual of commanding stature and relatively high international visibility in hopes that its nominee would be included in the bloc's slate of two to five candidates and that, once nominated, he/she would be selected in the GA balloting. A third advantage of the proposed innovation is that it would substantially heighten the sense of democratic decision-making in the UN system as a whole by giving the GA a meaningful role in selecting individuals to whose care the security of the planet would be entrusted. Finally, the possibility of reelection, among other concerns, would promote accountability, not only to one's own bloc, but also to the world as a whole.

Alternatively, and more in keeping with the present system, each regional caucus could select a specific country to represent it, rather than putting forth a slate of individuals. In such a system, each caucus would probably adopt some informal principle of rotation among countries chosen, since a bloc would not likely endure if representatives from only one nation therein were always to have the role of spokesperson in the SC. In any event, as in the previously described procedure, the mutual responsibilities of reporting and mutual consultation would be essential for the smooth functioning and maintenance of the system.

Finally, there is no reason in principle why some compromise between the two systems just noted could not be instituted, namely to allow each bloc caucus to decide which method it prefers in the selection of its own representative. For example, a bloc might decide
to nominate from two to five countries, rather than two to five individuals. Assigning to the GA the final choice among candidates, whether they be countries or individuals, would confer on the winners greater moral authority within the world community than they would enjoy if they were selected by their caucus alone. Consequently, their voices might carry somewhat greater weight in SC deliberations. Additionally, charging the GA with the authority to make the selection would shift the onus for the choice away from the foreign ministries of the caucusing nations and avoid embarrassing intra-bloc recriminations from the backers of unsuccessful candidates. While the GA election route might initially find few adherents, its use would set an example of global democracy and would likely gain in popularity with the passage of time.

Whatever system might be chosen, the order of selection of bloc representatives would be according to the total WV of the blocs themselves, beginning with the caucus with the largest WV and proceeding to those whose WVs were successively smaller. The process would continue either until all eligible caucuses were represented or until a total of seventeen SC seats were filled, whichever were to come first.

Thus, at least one SC seat - and, quite possibly two, three, or four - would be filled at large from non-bloc nations. Whether these seats would best be filled for the entirety of the proposed three-year term or whether split terms should be allowed, as they occasionally are under the present system, is an open question. The latter position seems preferable in that it would allow more widespread SC representation than the former. In filling the atlarge seats, certain countries already noted would loom as obvious favorites because of their size or importance But it should also be tacitly understood that regional balance as well as a balance between wealthy and developing nations would be desirable goals. Finally, as in the present system, nations chosen to fill at-large seats would be barred from serving consecutive terms on the Council, whereas individuals or nations representing blocs would be permitted to do so if the bloc so desired.

## E. Eliminating the Veto:

As previously noted, the anachronistic and morally indefensible veto should be terminated. Although an overwhelming majority of UN member nations would undoubtedly support such a reform, any such action would most likely be forestalled by one or more of the present veto-wielding powers, even if the aforementioned trade-offs in respect to weighted voting in the GA were offered as an inducement. But there should also be one additional powerful inducement, namely the certainty that a fairer voting system in both the

GA and the SC would enhance the legitimacy of UN decisions and contribute substantially to the creation of a more just and orderly world, a world in which the force of law replaces the law of force. This consideration takes on additional weight in pointing to an alternative to the present world situation in which the United States seeks, in an essentially unilateral way, to combat global terrorism through military means and without appropriate authorization from the community of nations. Further, if, in a reformed UN, all or a great majority of nations were to be meaningfully represented, fewer groups would be convinced of the need to resort to terrorism as a means of achieving their political goals, while those that did, nevertheless, engage in terrorist acts would find fewer supporters.

But let us suppose that a bargain cannot be struck to do away with the veto by a single bold act. It might then still be eliminated, in stages, over a transitional period of, say, up to fifteen years. This process could be effected, in part, by gradually increasing the number of P-5 nations whose dissenting voices would suffice to block resolutions that an otherwise qualifying SC majority favored, from say one in the first three years of the reform period, to two in the next three, and so forth. Additionally, there might be a phased narrowing in the range of subjects to which the veto might apply. The first step in this process would be to prohibit a veto by any of the P-5 in any case in which that SC member was itself one of the principal parties. Subsequently, one might preclude vetoes of resolutions calling for the use of inspection teams or monitors in situations deemed to present a threat to the peace. Next, one might proscribe vetoes condemning acts in contravention of the UN Charter or other treaties or human rights conventions. Vetoes of resolutions calling for economic sanctions against offending states might be permitted for a somewhat longer period. The last category of resolution on which the veto might be allowed might be those calling for armed intervention in an area of actual or impending military conflict. This list is suggestive, rather than complete, and the subjects and timing indicated would be negotiable.

## Annex: Proposed Charter Amendments

In respect to the Security Council, as dealt with in Chapter V of the Charter, extensive changes would be necessary. The three paragraphs of Article 23, dealing with permanent and nonpermanent members respectively, would be deleted in their entirety and replaced by the following [text in square brackets would be optional and/or subject to negotiation]:

1. The Security Council shall consist of eighteen individuals, each of whom shall represent either an individual Member nation of the United Nations or a selfformed group of Member nations.
2. Representatives will normally serve concurrent three-year terms and, with the exception of those selected in accordance with paragraph 8, may serve successive terms.
3. Any Member nation whose weighted vote in the General Assembly exceeds four percent of the total shall thereby be entitled to appoint a representative to the Security Council. ${ }^{26}$
4. Subject to the numerical limit specified in paragraph 5, groups of Member nations whose weighted votes in the General Assembly collectively exceed four percent of the total and who wish to be represented as a group shall be entitled to have a group representative provided that the total population of the Member nations comprising the group exceeds one percent of the total population of all Member nations.
5. The total number of Council members chosen under the terms of paragraphs 3 and 4 shall not exceed seventeen. Selection of blocs eligible for representation in the Security Council seats shall be held in rank order of the total aggregate of weighted votes in the General Assembly of the qualifying groups. Any vacancies on the Council remaining after the selections in accordance with the foregoing paragraphs shall be filled in accordance with the terms of paragraph 8.
6. The procedures for selecting representatives from groups of nations eligible for a seat on the Security Council shall be established by the General Assembly.

The General Assembly shall also establish procedures for selecting alternates for each representative. These selection procedures with respect to both representatives and their alternates may be revised from time to time as circumstances warrant.
7. In the event that a representative is, for any reason, temporarily incapable of fulfilling his/her duties, the alternate shall assume the duties of the representative for the period of his/her incapacity. In the event of the individual representative's death, resignation, or removal from office, the alternate shall assume the duties of the representative for the balance of his term. The group of Member nations from which the representative was chosen will then, at its earliest convenience, choose a successor to the alternate and that individual shall serve for the balance of the alternate's term.
8. The eighteenth Council seat and any others that remain unfilled after the application of rules 3 to 7 [and 9 ] shall be filled by the General Assembly by at-large elections from among candidates from the group of Member nations not otherwise represented. In these elections the General Assembly should seek to promote regional balance and a balance of interests within the Council and, in pursuance of this objective, may, if it chooses, divide the three-year term among either two or three Member nations.
[9. For a period of fifteen years following the entry into effect of this amendment, each of the five nations previously designated as a permanent member of the Security Council shall retain its seat on the Security Council, whether or not its weighted vote in the General Assembly exceeds four percent and whether or not it contains one percent of the world's population, provided that it neither enters into a larger federal union nor is divided into two or more independent nations.]

Articles 24-26, dealing with the functions and powers of the Security Council, would remain as in the present Charter, as would Articles 28-32 on procedure.

Article 27, clause 1,"Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote." would not be changed, even though the combined weighted votes of the nations and groups of nations represented would vary considerably. Clause 2 would be changed by a single word, replacing and would read: "Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of ten members." (Presently nine votes are needed.) The wording of Clause 3 would be more problematic. If the veto were abolished, it would best read: "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of [twelve] members." But, if the veto were to be phased out over a period of, say, fifteen-years, a more complicated formulation would be necessary.

I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than are governments. Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it.

- Dwight D. Eisenhower

Another world is not only possible; she is on her way. On a quiet day I can hear her breathing.

- Arundhati Roy

The beginning is always today.

- Mary Wollstonecraft


## IV. Steering a Course toward Reform

## A. Introduction:

Looking backward, one must acknowledge that the United Nations was created in a bit of a rush. More protracted and open deliberations with wider participation than the circumstances of the World War II period permitted might have resulted in a Charter that guarded against or precluded some of the structural problems that became increasingly apparent over the ensuing decades. Nevertheless, it is clear that the organization's founders recognized that they had crafted an imperfect system and that structural changes would, from time to time, prove to be necessary. Provisions for Charter amendment were therefore built into the Charter.

Political inertia, however, is a powerful force. Institutions that have conducted business in a certain way for more than half a century are not easily reformed. Moreover, since structural changes are normally perceived - even if incorrectly - as leading to winners and losers in the perennial struggle for political power, rather than as establishing a basis for "win-win" outcomes, suggestions to implement them are typically greeted with distrust and resisted by those who fear that they might be worse off under a reformed system. Of particular concern is the reluctance of almost all states to part with any measure of their precious sovereignty. But sovereignty in today's highly interdependent world cannot and should not mean what it did centuries ago, when the Treaty of Westphalia established the long-accepted template for international relations. What states now do or allow to be done
within their own borders - in respect to the environment, infectious diseases, genocide, ethnic cleansing, preparation for war (whether by stockpiling weapons of mass destruction or by more conventional means), and other matters - is no longer solely their own affair, but of legitimate concern to others; and in certain instances it should provide legal grounds for responses through the UN.

It bears repeating, then, that global problems require legally enforceable global solutions. Many such solutions will be more easily promoted through a restructured, more effective and more credible UN than through the UN in its present form. Fundamental changes will require creative diplomacy within the UN itself and sustained political effort within the governments of the many UN member nations that will be needed to ratify proposed Charter amendments (such as those presented in this monograph). Reform, however, will not be forthcoming in the absence of the requisite political will. In what follows we shall first note the legal processes by which the Charter may be amended and conclude with a consideration of the potential roles of state and non-state actors in generating the will to carry those processes through to fruition.

## B. Amending the Charter:

Articles 108 and 109 of Chapter XVIII of the UN Charter set forth two methods by which that document can be amended. Until now, however, only Article 108 has been utilized and only three amendments, affecting four articles of the original document, have ever been approved. The prescribed process requires ratification by two thirds of the member states, including all five of the permanent Security Council members; and, thus far, it has taken from roughly twenty to thirty months to complete. The first amendment, adopted in 1965 and effective the following year, enlarged the Security Council from eleven to fifteen members (Article 23), and changed the requisite number of affirmative votes from seven to nine for decisions on both procedural and other matters (Article 27). Also included in this amendment was an increase in the size of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) from eighteen to twenty-seven members (Article 61). The latter figure was further increased to fifty-four by the third amendment, which became effective in 1972. ${ }^{27}$

The second amendment, entering into effect in 1968, related to Article 109, which provides a second method of altering the Charter. As originally drafted, Article 109, clause 1, specified that:

A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose
of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council . . . (emphasis added).

This clause offers a promising avenue for comprehensive Charter review in that it cannot be blocked by a great power veto. The change effected by the amendment - considered necessary because of the enlargement of the Security Council in 1966 - simply raised the requisite number of concurrent votes in the Council from seven to nine. Regrettably, however, clause 2 of Article 109 stipulates that

Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council (emphasis added).

Comprehensive Charter reform, therefore, cannot easily be effected. Nevertheless, the logic of global interdependence and the inadequacies of the present system point to its necessity.

## C. Generating the Will for Change:

Given the erratic behavior of the United States Senate in respect to international organizations and the propensity of the present administration to resort to unilateral action (often in disregard, or even defiance, of international opinion), it is difficult to be sanguine about the short-term prospects for adopting the changes recommended in this essay - or, for that matter, any other set of fundamental Charter amendments. Other countries, to varying degrees, are also inclined to similar attitudes and behavior. However, the world has been irrevocably altered by the fateful events of September 11, 2001 as well as by the largely military responses. While the thinking of many key decision-makers has yet to come adequately to grips with the new global realities, it is now imperative that more serious consideration be given to the political, economic, and social systems that shape the fortunes of nations, social groups, and individual actors on the global stage. In this necessary reexamination of how the world works, concern for justice and inclusiveness should play a major role, for reasons of both morality and enlightened self-interest.

The roots of terrorism lie mainly in the perception - often correct - of massive injustice and a sensed inability to change the status quo, because of being either excluded
from or marginalized within the UN and other decision-making institutions. The resultant alienation leads many to conclude that terrorism and other illegal activities are the only available options that offer any hope of securing their political ends. It is, therefore, incumbent on responsible state and non-state actors to promote a more holistic and realistic view of the world, rather than to continue viewing it through a parochial lens. This calls for enlightened diplomacy, education, lobbying, and other forms of political action that will generate a more favorable climate for change and strengthen advocacy for proposals that will make UN decision-making more inclusive and just.

In the event that the proposed Charter amendments or any others voted for in the UN pursuant to Article 108 are thwarted by the veto of one or more of the P-5, change might still be sought by following the route prescribed in Article 109. Should an overwhelming majority of the world's nations vote in favor of a general Charter review, implicitly endorsing a more rational world order, that very act would precipitate a debate which, in the fullness of time, might well lead to needed reforms.

Alternatively, the process of review might induce the concurring nations to establish an entirely new international entity alongside of - or even in place of - what those nations would then regard as an ineffectual and unsalvageable United Nations. Sooner or later, people, corporations, trade unions, the media, think tanks, and nations will have to come to terms with new global realities, the centrality of justice as a prerequisite for enduring peace, and the recognition that global problems (such as terrorism, environmental degradation, or new epidemic diseases) require legally binding global solutions. When that recognition takes hold, we may hope that the United States, as well as other recalcitrant permanent members of the Security Council, will join or even lead the movement for change. ${ }^{28}$

The United Nations suffers from serious structural deficiencies, especially in respect to its decision-making processes. Merely tinkering with the Charter, as has been done several times in the past, will not rectify that increasingly anachronistic document. Let the United Nations, then, gather the resolve to cut the proverbial Gordian knot and let realistically weighted voting and enhanced inclusiveness, among other overdue reforms, become key instruments for ushering in a more viable global system. Let the leaders of the global community of nations emulate the example of the founding fathers of the American nation who, in 1787, took it upon themselves in Philadelphia to replace the dysfunctional Articles of Confederation and write a radically new federal Constitution. Let us, finally, learn from such far-sighted statesmen as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, and Paul-Henri Spaak, who planted the seeds of the expanding European Union. Today's political leaders, working together with an informed and electronically connected global civil society, now
have an opportunity to fundamentally reshape the course of history. The twin causes of peace and justice demand no less. Acting boldly, we now have it in our power to enable the UN to realize the dream that its creators set forth in the preamble to the Charter:
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, . . . to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

## Notes:

${ }^{1}$ Of particular relevance in the evaluation of the proposals put forward in this monograph is a special number of International Organization (vol. 55, no. 4 [autumn 2001]), entitled "The Rational Design of International Institutions." The introductory essay - with the same title - by the issue editors, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidel, pp. 761-789, presents an explicit theoretical framework (based primarily on rational choice theory) for analyzing the design of international institutions. While the theoretical concerns of the present work regarding UN reform are implicit, rather than being fully spelled out, they nevertheless do address most, if not all, of the essay's suggestions as to what contributes to a rational institutional design. Another excellent study, analyzing and evaluating attempts at reform, is Edward C. Luck, Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress, New Haven, CT: The Academic Council on the United Nations System, International Relations Studies and the United Nations Occasional Papers, no. 1, 2003.
${ }^{2}$ The only inhabited areas not yet represented are thirty-eight "dependent states" ranging in population from Puerto Rico, with 3.9 million inhabitants, down to Pitcairn Island, with no more than a few dozen, as well as the disputed territories of Gaza and the West Bank (i.e., Palestine) and Western Sahara. All told these areas account for only 11.4 million persons. If one chooses to add to this total the 22.5 million inhabitants of Taiwan, the total of non-represented people comes to only $0.55 \%$ of humanity.
${ }^{3}$ Numerous studies of changes in voting patterns within the GA have been published. The definitive work, however, is that of Miguel Marín-Bosch, Votes in the United Nations General Assembly (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998). This work also contains, despite its title, much valuable information on the workings of the Security Council and on the evolution of the UN in general.
${ }^{4}$ For data on 240 vetoes cast in the Security Council between February 1946 and August 1997, see Sidney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, $3^{\text {rd }}$ Ed., 1998), pp. 231-239.
${ }^{5}$ Many such proposals appear in the following works: Carol Barrett and Hannah Newcombe, Weighted Voting and International Organizations, a special number of Peace Research Reviews, published by the Canadian Peace Research Institute, Oakville, Ont., vol. 2., no. 2, April 1968; Hannah Newcombe, "Voting Systems in the United Nations," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, no. 1, Oslo, Universitetsvorlaget, 1970, 7080; Robert K. Morrow, Proposals for a More Equitable General Assembly Voting Structure, Washington, DC: Center for UN Reform Education, Monograph No. 5, 1989; Walter Hoffman (ed.), A New World Order: Can It Bring Peace to the World's People? Essays on Restructuring the United Nations, Washington, DC: World Federalist Association, 1991; and Paul C. Szasz, Alternative Voting Systems in International Organizations and the Binding Triad Proposal to Improve U.N. General Assembly Decision-Taking, Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, Monograph No. 17, 2001.
${ }^{6}$ Proposals calling for multi-factor formulae for representation in a global assembly date back at least to 1943, when Harold Stassen (who was later to become a member of the American delegation to the UN drafting conference) suggested that voting power in a unicameral legislature be based upon "a formula [reflecting] . . . as accurately as possible . . . the actual strength which each nation has in the world," taking into account not only population, but also, and more importantly, economic strength, literacy, and other factors (Harold E. Stassen, "Blueprint for a World Government," New York Times Magazine, May 23, 1943, pp. 3 and 34). What that formula might be, however, was never specified. However, a simple twofactor formula put forward in 1972 envisaged a General Assembly with 2,000 votes in which 1,000 votes each were to be allocated on the basis of population and GNP. This appears in Richard L. Morrill, "The Geography of Representation in the United Nations," The Professional Geographer, vol. 24, 1972, pp. 297301. In response, the present author proposed a tripartite formula - the forerunner to the proposal set forth in this paper - in which "the sovereign equality of nations" would also be taken into account. It appears in

Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "More on 'The Geography of Representation in the United Nations,' - An Alternative to the Morrill Proposal," The Professional Geographer, vol. 25, 1973, pp. 205-210.
${ }^{7}$ I am indebted to Mr. Mark E. M. Gilpin and Ms. Mya M. Than of the United Nations Contribution Service for sending me a copy of the excerpts from various General Assembly reports detailing the current and past methodologies for calculating the scale of UN budget assessments as well as a year-by-year, country-by-country listing of assessments from 1946 to 1991, and supplements for the periods 1992-2000 and 2003 (communications dated 20 January 1998, 9 February 1998, and 28 July 2003). The methodology for determining assessments has been repeatedly modified, but has always been based primarily on gross national product, with subsequent prorated deductions for a large group of countries with low GNP per capita, as well as augmentations for a much smaller set of countries toward the upper end of the economic spectrum. There have also been arbitrarily set maximum and minimum contributions, the former now set at $22 \%$ (for the United States) and the latter, since 1998, at a mere $0.001 \%$ (reduced in stages from $0.04 \%$, from 1945 to 1970 and $0.01 \%$ over the period 1994-97).
${ }^{8}$ In contrast to the already noted enormous difference between the populations of China and Tuvalu noted on Table 1 (a ratio of more than $120,000: 1$ ), when the United States was established the difference in population-based representation in the House of Representatives between Virginia and Delaware, the most and least populous states respectively, was set at a mere ten to one. Even today, the ratio of seats held by California and Wyoming respectively is only $52: 1$, while that between their respective populations is 59:1.

9 "Total UN System Expenditures: 1986-1997," Global Policy Forum, www.globalpolicy.org/finances/tables/tabsyst.htm, revised October 1999.
${ }^{10}$ Proposals have included recommendations for small surcharges on the cost of international air travel and/or international postage and more substantial taxes on international arms transactions. Especially popular is the so-called "Tobin tax," whereby a very small surcharge is applied to non-productive currency transactions, which amount to hundreds of billions of dollars daily. The sums that such a measure might raise are staggering, but instituting the mechanisms for collecting them poses special problems. In any event, the United Nations, as it is presently constituted, would have no way to spend more than a small fraction of what the Tobin tax might potentially yield.
${ }^{11}$ Paul C. Szasz, Alternative Voting System in International Organizations and the Binding Triad Proposal to Improve U.N. General Assembly Decision-Taking," Wayne, NJ: Center for U.N. Reform Education, Monograph \# 17, 2001, pp. 44-47.
${ }^{12}$ Ibid. pp. 46-47.
${ }^{13}$ Ibid., p. 47.
${ }^{14}$ The idea of empowering the General Assembly to make binding decisions has been forcefully argued by Richard Hudson in many publications of the New York-based Center for War/Peace Studies of which he is the Director. See, for example, the Center's 1981 publication, The Case for the Binding Triad. Although Hudson's proposal has much in common with recommendations put forward in the present essay, there are also very significant differences, the most important being that, in place of weighted votes, Hudson's proposal, would require that binding decisions entail three concurrent two-thirds majorities: of the population, of the contributions, and of the UN members present and voting. The principal shortcoming of the binding triad proposal is that it perpetuates an excess of power in the hands of insignificant nations any sixty-four of which (one-third plus one) could block the will of nations that account for the vast majority of the world's people and that pay the vast majority of the UN's assessed dues.
${ }^{15}$ Memberships are indicated in www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340 and www.g77.org/main/gen info3.htm.
${ }^{16}$ Ratings are provided in www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm. For those interested, the ranking methodology of ranking is specified. Because of the highly subjective nature of judgments as to what constitutes a democracy, we have not ventured to estimate the aggregate WV of the world's democracies.
${ }^{17}$ On this issue see Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "Toward Global Parliament," Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no. 1, Jan./Feb. 2001 pp. 212-220; reprinted in Saul H. Mendlovitz and Barbara Walker (eds.), A Reader on Second Assembly \& Parliamentary Proposals, Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, 2003, pp. 11-19. Among the essays in that excellent anthology is one by the present author, "Overcoming Practical Difficulties in Creating a World Parliamentary Assembly," pp. 80-92.
${ }^{18}$ I am grateful to Mr. Rolando Gomez of the Office of the Spokesman for the [UN] Secretary General for faxing data for this map to me on 21 January 1997 and for several later communications. Data, by regions, through 1997, are also provided by Bailey and Daws, op. cit., pp. 148-151.
${ }^{19}$ David Malone, "Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for Nonpermanent Seats on the UN Security Council," Global Governance," vol. 6, no. 1, Jan-Mar 2000, pp. 3-23, esp. p. 19, note 7.
${ }^{20}$ Israel, in fact, was not in any electoral group for purposes of membership in the Security Council, until 2001, when it was admitted into the "Western European and Other" group. Several other nations were, for short periods following their admission to the UN, also excluded from group membership. Sam Daws, "The Origins and Development of UN Electoral Groups," in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), What Is Equitable Geographic Representation in the Twenty-first Century, Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1999, pp. 11-29, provides an excellent review of the history of representation by regions.
${ }^{21}$ Daws, Ibid.
${ }^{22}$ Some propose as many as five new permanent members (though without the veto): two from the developed world (Japan and Germany being the obvious choices) and one each from Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as four new nonpermanent members. This proposal, among others, is discussed in Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, op. cit., pp. 382-390; and the four essays included in Ramesh Thakur (ed.), What Is Equitable . . .
${ }^{23}$ Walter Hoffmann, United Nations Security Council Reform and Restructuring, Wayne, NJ: Center for UN Reform Education, Monograph No. 14, 1994, pp. 58-67.
${ }^{24}$ For relevant observations on this point see Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997, passim.
${ }^{25}$ Malone, passim.
${ }^{26}$ If the Security Council were to be reformed without concomitant reform of the General Assembly, the text for the relevant Article would have to be appropriately modified. Specifically, it would require an explication of the system of weighting by nation that is provided in section II.B of this monograph in respect to the Assembly and that the term "national weight" be used in preference to "weighted vote."
${ }^{27}$ Although ECOSOC has not been considered in this essay, a variant of the system of selecting members using weighted voting by entitlement quotients and of assigning appropriate national and regional thresholds for membership might also be made applicable to that body. Decisions in ECOSOC, however, are made by a simple majority, rather than the $60 \%$ majority required in the SC . It has been argued that so large a body, comprised mainly of representatives with little economic expertise, virtually guarantees votes favorable to the global "South." This has contributed to ECOSOC's being increasingly regarded in the "North" as irrelevant and, therefore, to its falling into virtual desuetude. Hence, the recommendation by the Commission on Global Governance (Our Global Neighborhood, pp. 153-62 and passim.), among others, to replace ECOSOC by a smaller "Economic Security Council."
${ }^{28}$ In a sweeping review of world social and political history, Robert Wright presents a powerful case for the type of synergistic cooperation at the global level that is implicit in the recommendations put forward in this study, though he offers no prediction as to the rapidity with which it will come about. His argument is predicated on the propensity of increasingly large communities to evolve beneficial positive-sum solutions to shared problems. His thesis is set forth in Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, New York: Pantheon Books, 2000.

Appendices

## Appendix I. General Assembly, Weighted Votes (WV) by Country, and Terms Used in Their Calculation

## Key to Columns and Relevant Notes:

a. Country: current names are used even though many were admitted to UN under different names.
b. Population: mid-year, 1992. Source: Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year, 2003, pp. 778-783.
c. Population as percentage of total for all members of UN.
d. Scale of assessments: country assessments as percentages of total UN budget. Sources: data supplied by United Nations.
e. Gross National Product: data are mainly for 1999; but, in a few cases, for earlier years. Source: as for b, pp. 808-813.
f. GNP as percentage of total for all members of UN.
g. Weighted Vote (S. of A.): WV derived using scale of assessments in equation $\mathrm{WV}=(\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{C}+\mathrm{M}) / 3$. In this case the data for P are those of column b , the data for C are those of column d , and M is a constant, $0.524 \%(1 / 191)$.
h. Weighted Vote (GNP): WV derived using GNP in equation $\mathrm{WV}=(\mathrm{P}+\mathrm{C}+\mathrm{M}) / 3$. In this case data for P and M are same as noted for column g , but data for $C$ are those of column $f$.
N.B.: In calculating WV, it was assumed that all countries paid their full assessments when due. Data for only one year were used, whereas in practice the total contributions for each country for a specified number of years would be used in deriving the M term in the WV equations.
Data for China in this appendix are inclusive of Hong Kong and Macao, but not of Taiwan.

| Country a | b Population | c <br> Population as \% of UN total | d <br> Scale of assessments (\%) | e GNP | f GNP as $\%$ of UN total | g <br> Weighted Vote (S. of A.) | h <br> Weighted Vote (GNP) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Afghanistan | 27,756 | 0.451 | 0.001 | 5,666 | 0.019 | 0.325 | 0.331 |
| Albania | 3,108 | 0.050 | 0.003 | 3,146 | 0.011 | 0.192 | 0.195 |
| Algeria | 31,261 | 0.508 | 0.069 | 46,548 | 0.157 | 0.367 | 0.396 |
| Andorra | 66 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 850 | 0.003 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Angola | 10,593 | 0.172 | 0.002 | 3,276 | 0.011 | 0.232 | 0.235 |
| Antigua \& Barbuda | 76 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 606 | 0.002 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Argentina | 36,446 | 0.592 | 0.956 | 296,097 | 0.999 | 0.690 | 0.705 |
| Armenia | 3,008 | 0.049 | 0.002 | 1,878 | 0.006 | 0.191 | 0.193 |
| Australia | 19,702 | 0.320 | 1.606 | 397,345 | 1.340 | 0.816 | 0.728 |
| Austria | 8,077 | 0.131 | 0.935 | 205,743 | 0.694 | 0.530 | 0.449 |
| Azerbaijan | 8,176 | 0.133 | 0.004 | 3,705 | 0.012 | 0.220 | 0.223 |
| Bahamas, The | 309 | 0.005 | 0.012 | 3,288 | 0.011 | 0.180 | 0.180 |
| Bahrain | 672 | 0.011 | 0.018 | 4,909 | 0.017 | 0.184 | 0.183 |
| Bangladesh | 133,377 | 2.167 | 0.010 | 41,071 | 0.139 | 0.900 | 0.943 |
| Barbados | 270 | 0.004 | 0.009 | 2,294 | 0.008 | 0.179 | 0.178 |
| Belarus | 9,933 | 0.161 | 0.019 | 26,299 | 0.089 | 0.234 | 0.258 |
| Belgium | 10,280 | 0.167 | 1.115 | 252,051 | 0.850 | 0.602 | 0.513 |
| Belize | 251 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 673 | 0.002 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Benin | 6,788 | 0.110 | 0.002 | 2,320 | 0.008 | 0.212 | 0.214 |
| Bhutan | 721 | 0.012 | 0.001 | 399 | 0.001 | 0.179 | 0.179 |
| Bolivia | 8,401 | 0.136 | 0.008 | 8,092 | 0.027 | 0.222 | 0.229 |
| Bosnia \& Herzegovina | 3,964 | 0.064 | 0.004 | 4,706 | 0.016 | 0.197 | 0.201 |
| Botswana | 1,679 | 0.027 | 0.010 | 5,139 | 0.017 | 0.187 | 0.189 |
| Brazil | 174,619 | 2.837 | 2.359 | 730,424 | 2.464 | 1.906 | 1.941 |
| Brunei | 351 | 0.006 | 0.033 | 7,209 | 0.024 | 0.187 | 0.184 |
| Bulgaria | 7,890 | 0.128 | 0.013 | 11,572 | 0.039 | 0.221 | 0.230 |
| Burkina Faso | 12,603 | 0.205 | 0.002 | 2,602 | 0.009 | 0.243 | 0.246 |
| Burundi | 6,373 | 0.104 | 0.001 | 823 | 0.003 | 0.209 | 0.210 |
| Cambodia | 13,414 | 0.218 | 0.002 | 3,023 | 0.010 | 0.248 | 0.250 |
| Cameroon | 16,185 | 0.263 | 0.009 | 8,798 | 0.030 | 0.265 | 0.272 |
| Canada | 31,244 | 0.508 | 2.524 | 614,003 | 2.071 | 1.185 | 1.034 |
| Cape Verde | 453 | 0.007 | 0.001 | 569 | 0.002 | 0.177 | 0.177 |
| Central African Republic | 3,643 | 0.059 | 0.001 | 1,035 | 0.003 | 0.194 | 0.195 |


| Country | b Population |  |  | e GNP |  | Weighted Vote (S. of A.) | Weighted (GNP) (GNP) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Chad | 8,997 | 0.146 | 0.001 | 1,555 | 0.005 | 0.223 | 0.225 |
| Chile | 15,082 | 0.245 | 0.219 | 69,602 | 0.235 | 0.329 | 0.334 |
| China | 1,291,434 | 20.981 | 1.512 | 1,151,177 | 3.883 | 7.672 | 8.462 |
| Colombia | 41,008 | 0.666 | 0.178 | 90,007 | 0.304 | 0.456 | 0.498 |
| Comoros | 583 | 0.009 | 0.001 | 189 | 0.001 | 0.178 | 0.178 |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. of the | 52,557 | 0.854 | 0.004 | 5,433 | 0.018 | 0.460 | 0.465 |
| Congo, Rep. of the | 2,899 | 0.047 | 0.001 | 1,571 | 0.005 | 0.190 | 0.192 |
| Costa Rica | 3,960 | 0.064 | 0.020 | 12,828 | 0.043 | 0.202 | 0.210 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 16,805 | 0.273 | 0.009 | 10,387 | 0.035 | 0.268 | 0.277 |
| Croatia | 4,405 | 0.072 | 0.039 | 20,222 | 0.068 | 0.211 | 0.221 |
| Cuba | 11,267 | 0.183 | 0.030 | 18,600 | 0.063 | 0.245 | 0.256 |
| Cyprus | 907 | 0.015 | 0.038 | 9,086 | 0.031 | 0.192 | 0.189 |
| Czech Republic | 10,210 | 0.166 | 0.200 | 51,623 | 0.174 | 0.296 | 0.288 |
| Denmark | 5,377 | 0.087 | 0.740 | 170,685 | 0.576 | 0.450 | 0.395 |
| Djibouti | 473 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 511 | 0.002 | 0.177 | 0.177 |
| Dominica | 72 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 238 | 0.001 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Dominican Republic | 8,833 | 0.144 | 0.230 | 16,130 | 0.054 | 0.299 | 0.240 |
| Ecuador | 13,095 | 0.213 | 0.025 | 16,841 | 0.057 | 0.254 | 0.264 |
| Egypt | 66,341 | 1.078 | 0.080 | 86,544 | 0.292 | 0.560 | 0.631 |
| El Salvador | 6,354 | 0.103 | 0.018 | 11,606 | 0.039 | 0.215 | 0.222 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 498 | 0.008 | 0.001 | 516 | 0.002 | 0.177 | 0.178 |
| Eritrea | 3,981 | 0.065 | 0.001 | 779 | 0.003 | 0.196 | 0.197 |
| Estonia | 1,359 | 0.022 | 0.010 | 4,906 | 0.017 | 0.185 | 0.187 |
| Ethiopia | 67,673 | 1.099 | 0.004 | 6,524 | 0.022 | 0.542 | 0.548 |
| Fiji | 824 | 0.013 | 0.004 | 1,848 | 0.006 | 0.180 | 0.181 |
| Finland | 5,201 | 0.084 | 0.515 | 127,764 | 0.431 | 0.374 | 0.346 |
| France | 59,440 | 0.966 | 6.381 | 1,453,211 | 4.902 | 2.623 | 2.130 |
| Gabon | 1,233 | 0.020 | 0.014 | 3,987 | 0.013 | 0.186 | 0.185 |
| Gambia, The | 1,418 | 0.023 | 0.001 | 415 | 0.001 | 0.182 | 0.182 |
| Georgia | 4,961 | 0.081 | 0.005 | 3,362 | 0.011 | 0.203 | 0.205 |
| Germany | 82,506 | 1.340 | 9.642 | 2,103,804 | 7.097 | 3.835 | 2.987 |
| Ghana | 20,244 | 0.329 | 0.005 | 7,451 | 0.025 | 0.286 | 0.292 |
| Greece | 10,994 | 0.179 | 0.532 | 127,648 | 0.431 | 0.411 | 0.377 |
| Grenada | 101 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 334 | 0.001 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Guatemala | 11,987 | 0.195 | 0.027 | 18,625 | 0.063 | 0.248 | 0.260 |
| Guinea | 7,775 | 0.126 | 0.003 | 3,556 | 0.012 | 0.217 | 0.220 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1,345 | 0.022 | 0.001 | 194 | 0.001 | 0.182 | 0.182 |
| Guyana | 775 | 0.013 | 0.001 | 651 | 0.002 | 0.179 | 0.179 |
| Haiti | 7,064 | 0.115 | 0.002 | 3,584 | 0.012 | 0.213 | 0.217 |
| Honduras | 6,561 | 0.107 | 0.005 | 4,829 | 0.016 | 0.212 | 0.215 |
| Hungary | 10,162 | 0.165 | 0.119 | 46,751 | 0.158 | 0.269 | 0.282 |
| Iceland | 288 | 0.005 | 0.033 | 8,197 | 0.028 | 0.187 | 0.185 |
| India | 1,047,671 | 17.020 | 0.337 | 441,834 | 1.490 | 5.960 | 6.345 |
| Indonesia | 211,023 | 3.428 | 0.197 | 125,043 | 0.422 | 1.383 | 1.458 |
| Iran | 65,457 | 1.063 | 0.268 | 113,729 | 0.384 | 0.618 | 0.657 |
| Iraq | 24,002 | 0.390 | 0.135 | 11,500 | 0.039 | 0.349 | 0.317 |
| Ireland | 3,926 | 0.064 | 0.291 | 80,559 | 0.272 | 0.293 | 0.286 |
| Israel | 6,394 | 0.104 | 0.410 | 99,574 | 0.336 | 0.346 | 0.321 |
| Italy | 57,988 | 0.942 | 4.999 | 1,162,910 | 3.923 | 2.155 | 1.796 |
| Jamaica | 2,630 | 0.043 | 0.004 | 6,311 | 0.021 | 0.190 | 0.196 |
| Japan | 127,347 | 2.069 | 19.253 | 4,054,545 | 13.678 | 7.282 | 5.423 |
| Jordan | 5,260 | 0.085 | 0.008 | 7,717 | 0.026 | 0.205 | 0.211 |
| Kazakhstan | 14,884 | 0.242 | 0.028 | 18,732 | 0.063 | 0.264 | 0.276 |


| Country ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | b Population | Population as \% of UN total |  | GNP | $\begin{gathered} \text { f } \\ \text { GNP } \\ \text { as \% of } \\ \text { UN total } \end{gathered}$ | $\underset{\text { Weighted }}{g}$ <br> (S. of A.) | Weighted Vote (GNP) (GNP) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kenya | 31,139 | 0.506 | 0.008 | 10,696 | 0.036 | 0.346 | 0.355 |
| Kiribati | 91 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 81 | 0.000 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Korea, Dem. Rep. of | 22,224 | 0.361 | 0.009 | 17,700 | 0.060 | 0.298 | 0.315 |
| Korea, Rep. of | 47,640 | 0.774 | 1.827 | 397,910 | 1.342 | 1.041 | 0.880 |
| Kuwait | 2,253 | 0.037 | 0.145 | 35,152 | 0.119 | 0.235 | 0.226 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 5,002 | 0.081 | 0.001 | 1,465 | 0.005 | 0.202 | 0.203 |
| Laos | 5,777 | 0.094 | 0.001 | 1,476 | 0.005 | 0.206 | 0.207 |
| Latvia | 2,341 | 0.038 | 0.010 | 5,913 | 0.020 | 0.190 | 0.194 |
| Lebanon | 3,678 | 0.060 | 0.012 | 15,796 | 0.053 | 0.198 | 0.212 |
| Lesotho | 2,208 | 0.036 | 0.001 | 1,158 | 0.004 | 0.187 | 0.188 |
| Liberia | 3,288 | 0.053 | 0.001 | 1,174 | 0.004 | 0.192 | 0.193 |
| Libya | 5,369 | 0.087 | 0.066 | 32,663 | 0.110 | 0.225 | 0.240 |
| Liechtenstein | 33 | 0.001 | 0.006 | 714 | 0.002 | 0.177 | 0.175 |
| Lithuania | 3,473 | 0.056 | 0.017 | 9,751 | 0.033 | 0.199 | 0.204 |
| Luxembourg | 447 | 0.007 | 0.079 | 18,545 | 0.063 | 0.203 | 0.198 |
| Macedonia | 2,031 | 0.033 | 0.006 | 3,348 | 0.011 | 0.187 | 0.189 |
| Madagascar | 16,473 | 0.268 | 0.003 | 3,712 | 0.013 | 0.265 | 0.268 |
| Malawi | 10,520 | 0.171 | 0.002 | 1,961 | 0.007 | 0.232 | 0.234 |
| Malaysia | 24,370 | 0.396 | 0.232 | 76,944 | 0.260 | 0.384 | 0.393 |
| Maldives | 281 | 0.005 | 0.001 | 322 | 0.001 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Mali | 11,340 | 0.184 | 0.002 | 2,577 | 0.009 | 0.236 | 0.239 |
| Malta | 386 | 0.006 | 0.015 | 3,492 | 0.012 | 0.181 | 0.180 |
| Marshall Islands | 57 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 99 | 0.000 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Mauritania | 2,656 | 0.043 | 0.001 | 1,001 | 0.003 | 0.189 | 0.190 |
| Mauritius | 1,211 | 0.020 | 0.011 | 4,157 | 0.014 | 0.185 | 0.186 |
| Mexico | 100,977 | 1.640 | 1.072 | 428,877 | 1.447 | 1.078 | 1.203 |
| Micronesia | 109 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 212 | 0.001 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Moldova | 3,620 | 0.059 | 0.002 | 1,481 | 0.005 | 0.195 | 0.196 |
| Monaco | 32 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 793 | 0.003 | 0.176 | 0.175 |
| Mongolia | 2,457 | 0.040 | 0.001 | 927 | 0.003 | 0.188 | 0.189 |
| Morocco | 29,376 | 0.477 | 0.044 | 33,715 | 0.114 | 0.348 | 0.371 |
| Mozambique | 18,083 | 0.294 | 0.001 | 3,804 | 0.013 | 0.273 | 0.277 |
| Myanmar (Burma) | 42,238 | 0.686 | 0.010 | 55,700 | 0.188 | 0.406 | 0.466 |
| Namibia | 1,837 | 0.030 | 0.007 | 3,211 | 0.011 | 0.187 | 0.188 |
| Nauru | 12 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 128 | 0.000 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Nepal | 23,692 | 0.385 | 0.004 | 5,173 | 0.017 | 0.304 | 0.308 |
| Netherlands, The | 16,142 | 0.262 | 1.716 | 397,384 | 1.341 | 0.834 | 0.709 |
| New Zealand | 3,893 | 0.063 | 0.238 | 53,299 | 0.180 | 0.275 | 0.255 |
| Nicaragua | 5,024 | 0.082 | 0.001 | 2,012 | 0.007 | 0.202 | 0.204 |
| Niger | 10,640 | 0.173 | 0.001 | 1,974 | 0.007 | 0.232 | 0.234 |
| Nigeria | 129,935 | 2.111 | 0.067 | 31,600 | 0.107 | 0.900 | 0.914 |
| Norway | 4,537 | 0.074 | 0.638 | 149,280 | 0.504 | 0.412 | 0.367 |
| Oman | 2,522 | 0.041 | 0.060 | 13,135 | 0.044 | 0.208 | 0.203 |
| Pakistan | 145,960 | 2.371 | 0.060 | 62,915 | 0.212 | 0.985 | 1.035 |
| Palau | 20 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 129 | 0.000 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Panama | 2,915 | 0.047 | 0.018 | 8,657 | 0.029 | 0.196 | 0.200 |
| Papua New Guinea | 5,426 | 0.088 | 0.006 | 3,834 | 0.013 | 0.206 | 0.208 |
| Paraguay | 5,774 | 0.094 | 0.016 | 8,374 | 0.028 | 0.211 | 0.215 |
| Peru | 26,749 | 0.435 | 0.117 | 53,705 | 0.181 | 0.358 | 0.380 |
| Philippines | 79,882 | 1.298 | 0.099 | 77,967 | 0.263 | 0.640 | 0.695 |
| Poland | 38,644 | 0.628 | 0.373 | 157,429 | 0.531 | 0.508 | 0.561 |
| Portugal | 10,384 | 0.169 | 0.456 | 110,175 | 0.372 | 0.383 | 0.354 |
| Qatar | 606 | 0.010 | 0.034 | 6,473 | 0.022 | 0.189 | 0.185 |


| Country a | b Population | c <br> Population as \% of UN total | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{d} \\ \text { Scale of } \\ \text { assess- } \\ \text { ments (\%) } \end{gathered}$ | e GNP | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{f} \\ \text { GNP } \\ \text { as \% of } \\ \text { UN total } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{g} \\ \text { Weighted } \\ \text { Vote } \\ \text { (S. of A.) } \end{gathered}$ | h Weighted Vote (GNP) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Romania | 21,667 | 0.352 | 0.057 | 33,034 | 0.111 | 0.311 | 0.329 |
| Russia | 143,673 | 2.334 | 1.184 | 328,995 | 1.110 | 1.347 | 1.322 |
| Rwanda | 7,398 | 0.120 | 0.001 | 2,041 | 0.007 | 0.215 | 0.217 |
| Samoa | 178 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 181 | 0.001 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| San Marino | 28 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 883 | 0.003 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| São Tomé \& Príncipe | 147 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 40 | 0.000 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Saudi Arabia | 23,370 | 0.380 | 0.546 | 139,365 | 0.470 | 0.483 | 0.458 |
| Senegal | 9,905 | 0.161 | 0.005 | 4,685 | 0.016 | 0.230 | 0.233 |
| Serbia \& Montenegro | 10,664 | 0.173 | 0.020 | 13,742 | 0.046 | 0.239 | 0.248 |
| Seychelles | 83 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 520 | 0.002 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Sierra Leone | 4,823 | 0.078 | 0.001 | 653 | 0.002 | 0.201 | 0.201 |
| Singapore | 4,204 | 0.068 | 0.388 | 95,429 | 0.322 | 0.326 | 0.304 |
| Slovakia | 5,383 | 0.087 | 0.043 | 20,318 | 0.069 | 0.218 | 0.226 |
| Slovenia | 1,948 | 0.032 | 0.080 | 19,862 | 0.067 | 0.212 | 0.207 |
| Solomon Islands | 439 | 0.007 | 0.001 | 320 | 0.001 | 0.177 | 0.177 |
| Somalia | 7,753 | 0.126 | 0.001 | 706 | 0.002 | 0.217 | 0.217 |
| South Africa | 45,172 | 0.734 | 0.403 | 133,569 | 0.451 | 0.553 | 0.569 |
| Spain | 40,998 | 0.666 | 2.486 | 583,082 | 1.967 | 1.225 | 1.052 |
| Sri Lanka | 18,870 | 0.307 | 0.016 | 15,578 | 0.053 | 0.282 | 0.294 |
| St. Kitts \& Nevis | 46 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 259 | 0.001 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| St. Lucia | 160 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 590 | 0.002 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| St. Vincent | 113 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 301 | 0.001 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Sudan, The | 37,090 | 0.603 | 0.006 | 9,435 | 0.032 | 0.377 | 0.386 |
| Suriname | 436 | 0.007 | 0.002 | 684 | 0.002 | 0.177 | 0.177 |
| Swaziland | 1,124 | 0.018 | 0.002 | 1,379 | 0.005 | 0.181 | 0.182 |
| Sweden | 8,925 | 0.145 | 1.014 | 236,940 | 0.799 | 0.561 | 0.489 |
| Switzerland | 7,282 | 0.118 | 1.257 | 273,856 | 0.924 | 0.633 | 0.522 |
| Syria | 17,156 | 0.279 | 0.079 | 15,172 | 0.051 | 0.294 | 0.284 |
| Tajikistan | 6,327 | 0.103 | 0.001 | 1,749 | 0.006 | 0.209 | 0.211 |
| Tanzania | 34,902 | 0.567 | 0.004 | 8,515 | 0.029 | 0.365 | 0.373 |
| Thailand | 63,430 | 1.030 | 0.290 | 121,051 | 0.408 | 0.614 | 0.654 |
| Timor-Leste | 797 | 0.013 | 0.001 | 113 | 0.000 | 0.179 | 0.179 |
| Togo | 5,286 | 0.086 | 0.001 | 1,398 | 0.005 | 0.203 | 0.205 |
| Tonga | 101 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 172 | 0.001 | 0.175 | 0.175 |
| Trinidad \& Tobago | 1,304 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 6,142 | 0.021 | 0.187 | 0.188 |
| Tunisia | 9,764 | 0.159 | 0.030 | 19,757 | 0.067 | 0.237 | 0.249 |
| Turkey | 69,359 | 1.127 | 0.435 | 186,490 | 0.629 | 0.695 | 0.760 |
| Turkmenistan | 4,946 | 0.080 | 0.003 | 3,205 | 0.011 | 0.202 | 0.205 |
| Tuvalu | 11 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 7 | 0.000 | 0.175 | 0.174 |
| Uganda | 24,378 | 0.396 | 0.005 | 6,794 | 0.023 | 0.308 | 0.314 |
| Ukraine | 48,120 | 0.782 | 0.052 | 41,991 | 0.142 | 0.452 | 0.482 |
| United Arab Emirates | 3,550 | 0.058 | 0.199 | 48,673 | 0.164 | 0.260 | 0.248 |
| United Kingdom | 60,178 | 0.978 | 5.464 | 1,403,843 | 4.736 | 2.322 | 2.079 |
| United States | 287,602 | 4.672 | 22.000 | 8,879,500 | 29.954 | 9.065 | 11.716 |
| Uruguay | 3,383 | 0.055 | 0.079 | 20,604 | 0.070 | 0.219 | 0.216 |
| Uzbekistan | 25,484 | 0.414 | 0.011 | 17,613 | 0.059 | 0.316 | 0.332 |
| Vanuatu | 207 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 227 | 0.001 | 0.176 | 0.176 |
| Venezuela | 25,093 | 0.408 | 0.205 | 87,313 | 0.295 | 0.379 | 0.408 |
| Vietnam | 80,200 | 1.303 | 0.016 | 28,733 | 0.097 | 0.614 | 0.641 |
| Yemen | 19,495 | 0.317 | 0.006 | 6,080 | 0.021 | 0.282 | 0.287 |
| Zambia | 9,959 | 0.162 | 0.002 | 3,222 | 0.011 | 0.229 | 0.232 |
| Zimbabwe | 11,377 | 0.185 | 0.008 | 6,302 | 0.021 | 0.239 | 0.243 |
| Total in UN | 6,155,382 | 100.000 | 100.000 | 29,643,667 | 100.000 | 100.000 | 100.000 |

## Appendix II. General Assembly Votes of Countries Grouped by Economic Blocs under Present and Proposed Voting Systems

Key to Columns and Relevant Notes:
a. Economic Blocs (OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; Group of 77; and Non-Bloc, all other nations) and Member Nations.
b. Weighted Vote $=$ Weights using current UN scale of assessments in weighted voting formula.
(Source: Appendix I, column g; for comparison with weights using GNP in formula see column h.)

| Blocs/ Nations | b <br> Weighted Vote <br> (\%) | a Blocs/ Nations | b <br> Weighted Vote <br> (\%) | Blocs/ Nations | b <br> Weighted Vote <br> (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| OECD (30 Nations) |  | Group of 77 (131 Nations) |  |  |  |
| Australia | 0.816 | Afghanistan | 0.325 | Djibouti | 0.177 |
| Austria | 0.530 | Algeria | 0.367 | Dominica | 0.175 |
| Belgium | 0.602 | Angola | 0.232 | Dominican Republic | 0.299 |
| Canada | 1.185 | Antigua \& Barbuda | 0.175 | Ecuador | 0.254 |
| Czech Republic | 0.296 | Argentina | 0.690 | Egypt | 0.560 |
| Denmark | 0.450 | Bahamas, The | 0.180 | El Salvador | 0.215 |
| Finland | 0.374 | Bahrain | 0.184 | Equatorial Guinea | 0.177 |
| France | 2.623 | Bangladesh | 0.900 | Eritrea | 0.196 |
| Germany | 3.835 | Barbados | 0.179 | Ethiopia | 0.542 |
| Greece | 0.411 | Belize | 0.176 | Fiji | 0.180 |
| Hungary | 0.269 | Benin | 0.212 | Gabon | 0.186 |
| Iceland | 0.187 | Bhutan | 0.179 | Gambia, The | 0.182 |
| Ireland | 0.293 | Bolivia | 0.222 | Ghana | 0.286 |
| Italy | 2.155 | Bosnia \& Herzegovina | 0.197 | Grenada | 0.175 |
| Japan | 7.282 | Botswana | 0.187 | Guatemala | 0.248 |
| Korea, Rep. of | 1.041 | Brazil | 1.906 | Guinea | 0.217 |
| Luxembourg | 0.203 | Brunei | 0.187 | Guinea-Bissau | 0.182 |
| Mexico | 1.078 | Burkina Faso | 0.243 | Guyana | 0.179 |
| Netherlands, The | 0.834 | Burundi | 0.209 | Haiti | 0.213 |
| New Zealand | 0.275 | Cambodia | 0.248 | Honduras | 0.212 |
| Norway | 0.412 | Cameroon | 0.265 | India | 5.960 |
| Poland | 0.508 | Cape Verde | 0.177 | Indonesia | 1.383 |
| Portugal | 0.383 | Central African Republic | 0.194 | Iran | 0.618 |
| Slovakia | 0.218 | Chad | 0.223 | Iraq | 0.349 |
| Spain | 1.225 | Chile | 0.329 | Jamaica | 0.190 |
| Sweden | 0.561 | China | 7.672 | Jordan | 0.205 |
| Switzerland | 0.633 | Colombia | 0.456 | Kenya | 0.346 |
| Turkey | 0.695 | Comoros | 0.178 | Korea, Dem. Rep. of | 0.298 |
| United Kingdom | 2.322 | Congo, Dem. Rep. of the | 0.460 | Kuwait | 0.235 |
| United States | 9.065 | Congo, Rep. of the | 0.190 | Laos | 0.206 |
| Total OECD | 40.759 | Costa Rica | 0.202 | Lebanon | 0.198 |
|  |  | Côte d'Ivoire | 0.268 | Lesotho | 0.187 |
| These 30 nations have $\mathbf{1 5 . 7 0 7 \%}$ of votes in present system. |  | Cuba | 0.245 | Liberia | 0.192 |
|  |  | Cyprus | 0.192 | Libya | 0.225 |



## Appendix III. General Assembly Votes of Countries Grouped by Freedom House Ranking under Present and Proposed Weighted Voting Systems

Key to Columns and Relevant Notes:
a. Ranks/Nations, grouped as "Free," "Partly Free," and "Not Free"
b. Weighted Vote: Weights using current UN scale of assessments in weighted voting formula
(Source: Apprendix I, column g; for comparison with weights using GNP in formula see column h).

| a Groups/Ranks/Nations | b Weighted Vote (\%) | Groups/Ranks/Nations | b Weighted Vote (\%) | ( ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { Weighted Vote } \\(\%)}}{\mathrm{b}}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Free, Rank 1.0 |  | Free, Rank 1.5 |  | Free, Rank 2.0 |  |
| Andorra | 0.176 | Belize | 0.176 | Botswana | 0.187 |
| Australia | 0.816 | Bulgaria | 0.221 | Croatia | 0.211 |
| Austria | 0.530 | Cape Verde | 0.177 | Dominican Republic | 0.299 |
| Bahamas, The | 0.180 | Chile | 0.329 | Guyana | 0.179 |
| Barbados | 0.179 | Costa Rica | 0.202 | Israel | 0.345 |
| Belgium | 0.601 | Czech Republic | 0.296 | Korea, Rep. of | 1.040 |
| Canada | 1.184 | Estonia | 0.185 | Mexico | 1.075 |
| Cyprus | 0.192 | Greece | 0.411 | Mongolia | 0.188 |
| Denmark | 0.450 | Grenada | 0.175 | Romania | 0.310 |
| Dominica | 0.175 | Hungary | 0.269 | Samoa | 0.176 |
| Finland | 0.374 | Japan | 7.278 | Subtotal | 4.010 |
| France | 2.621 | Latvia | 0.190 |  |  |
| Germany | 3.833 | Lithuania | 0.199 | Free, Rank 2.5 |  |
| Iceland | 0.187 | Mauritius | 0.185 | Benin | 0.212 |
| Ireland | 0.292 | Micronesia | 0.175 | Bolivia | 0.222 |
| Italy | 2.153 | Monaco | 0.176 | Brazil | 1.901 |
| Kiribati | 0.175 | Nauru | 0.175 | El Salvador | 0.215 |
| Liechtenstein | 0.177 | Palau | 0.175 | Ghana | 0.285 |
| Luxembourg | 0.203 | Panama | 0.196 | India | 5.929 |
| Malta | 0.181 | Poland | 0.507 | Jamaica | 0.190 |
| Marshall Islands | 0.175 | São Tomé \& Príncipe | 0.175 | Lesotho | 0.187 |
| Netherlands, The | 0.833 | Slovakia | 0.218 | Mali | 0.236 |
| New Zealand | 0.275 | South Africa | 0.552 | Namibia | 0.187 |
| Norway | 0.411 | St. Kitts \& Nevis | 0.175 | Papua New Guinea | 0.206 |
| Portugal | 0.382 | St. Lucia | 0.176 | Peru | 0.357 |
| San Marino | 0.175 | St. Vincent | 0.175 | Philippines | 0.638 |
| Slovenia | 0.211 | Suriname | 0.177 | Senegal | 0.229 |
| Spain | 1.224 | Vanuatu | 0.176 | Serbia \& Montenegro | 0.238 |
| Sweden | 0.560 | Subtotal | 13.520 | Thailand | 0.613 |
| Switzerland | 0.633 |  |  | Subtotal | 11.844 |
| Tuvalu | 0.175 |  |  |  |  |
| United Kingdom | 2.320 |  |  | Total Free | 60.702 |
| United States | 9.057 |  |  |  |  |
| Uruguay | 0.219 |  |  | These 88 nations have $\mathbf{4 6 . 0 7 3 \%}$ of votes in present system. |  |
| Subtotal | 31.329 |  |  |  |  |


| a Groups/Ranks/Nations | b Weighted Vote (\%) | a Groups/Ranks/Nations | b Weighted Vote (\%) | ${ }_{\text {Groups/Ranks/Nations }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ | $\underset{\substack{\text { Weighted Vote } \\(\%)}}{\mathrm{b}}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Partly Free, Rank 3.0 |  | Partly Free, Rank 4.5 |  | Not Free, Rank 5.5 (cont.) |  |
| Albania | 0.192 | Comoros | 0.178 | Tajikistan | 0.209 |
| Antigua \& Barbuda | 0.175 | Côte d'Ivoire | 0.268 | Togo | 0.203 |
| Argentina | 0.689 | Djibouti | 0.177 | Tunisia | 0.237 |
| Ecuador | 0.253 | Gabon | 0.186 | United Arab Emirates | 0.260 |
| Honduras | 0.211 | Guinea-Bissau | 0.182 | Yemen | 0.281 |
| Macedonia | 0.187 | Kuwait | 0.235 | Subtotal | 5.684 |
| Nicaragua | 0.202 | Nigeria | 0.896 |  |  |
| Seychelles | 0.175 | Singapore | 0.326 | Not Free, Rank 6.0 |  |
| Solomon Islands | 0.177 | Subtotal | 2.448 | Afghanistan | 0.324 |
| Timor-Leste | 0.179 |  |  | Belarus | 0.234 |
| Trinidad \& Tobago | 0.187 | Partly Free, Rank 5.0 |  | Cameroon | 0.265 |
| Subtotal | 2.628 | Bahrain | 0.184 | Congo, Dem. Rep. of the | 0.459 |
|  |  | Central African Republic | 0.194 | Egypt | 0.558 |
| Partly Free, Rank 3.5 |  | Congo, Rep. of the | 0.190 | Haiti | 0.213 |
| Fiji | 0.180 | Ethiopia | 0.540 | Iran | 0.616 |
| Indonesia | 1.377 | Malaysia | 0.383 | Liberia | 0.192 |
| Madagascar | 0.264 | Mauritania | 0.189 | Qatar | 0.189 |
| Moldova | 0.194 | Morocco | 0.347 | Rwanda | 0.215 |
| Mozambique | 0.272 | Russia | 1.343 | Zimbabwe | 0.238 |
| Paraguay | 0.211 | Uganda | 0.307 | Subtotal | 3.503 |
| Sri Lanka | 0.281 | Subtotal | 3.678 |  |  |
| Tanzania | 0.364 |  |  | Not Free, Rank 6.5 |  |
| Turkey | 0.693 | Total Partly Free | 17.749 | China | 7.634 |
| Venezuela | 0.378 |  |  | Equatorial Guinea | 0.177 |
| Subtotal | 4.214 |  |  | Eritrea | 0.196 |
|  |  |  |  | Laos | 0.206 |
| Partly Free, Rank 4.0 |  | These 54 nations have $\mathbf{2 8 . 2 7 2 \%}$ of votes in present system. |  | Somalia | 0.216 |
| Armenia | 0.191 |  |  | Uzbekistan | 0.315 |
| Bangladesh | 0.896 | Not Free, Rank 5.5 |  | Vietnam | 0.612 |
| Bosnia \& Herzegovina | 0.197 | Algeria | 0.366 | Subtotal | 9.356 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.243 | Angola | 0.232 |  |  |
| Colombia | 0.455 | Azerbaijan | 0.220 | Not Free, Rank 7.0 |  |
| Gambia, The | 0.182 | Bhutan | 0.179 | Cuba | 0.245 |
| Georgia | 0.203 | Brunei | 0.187 | Iraq | 0.349 |
| Guatemala | 0.248 | Burundi | 0.209 | Korea, Dem. Rep. of | 0.297 |
| Kenya | 0.345 | Cambodia | 0.247 | Libya | 0.225 |
| Malawi | 0.232 | Chad | 0.223 | Myanmar (Burma) | 0.405 |
| Nepal | 0.303 | Guinea | 0.217 | Saudi Arabia | 0.482 |
| Niger | 0.232 | Jordan | 0.205 | Sudan, The | 0.376 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.201 | Kazakhstan | 0.264 | Syria | 0.293 |
| Tonga | 0.175 | Kyrgyzstan | 0.202 | Turkmenistan | 0.202 |
| Ukraine | 0.451 | Lebanon | 0.198 | Subtotal | 2.874 |
| Zambia | 0.229 | Maldives | 0.176 |  |  |
| Subtotal | 4.781 | Oman | 0.208 | Total Not Free | 21.418 |
|  |  | Pakistan | 0.980 |  |  |
|  |  | Swaziland | 0.181 | These 49 nations have $\mathbf{2 5 . 6 5 4 \%}$ of votes in present system. |  |

## Appendix IV. Years Served on Security Council by Nonpermanent Members, 1946-2003, and Total Years of Service as a Percentage of Total Years of Eligibility.

## Key to Columns and Relevant Notes:

a. Country: current names are used, except as noted below, even though many countries were admitted to the UN under different designations.
b. Year of Admission to UN : for countries formed from pre-existing Members, the year indicated is when country was admitted in its own right.
c. Years of UN membership: total derived by subtracting date of admission from 2003, except as indicated below.

The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) is shown as a UN member for only 17 years as it ceased to exist in 1990.
Indonesia's years of membership were decreased by two to a total of 46 because of its withdrawal from the UN for the period 1965-66.
Yugoslavia's years of membership are indicated as 47, relating to the period 1945-92; the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, renamed
Serbia \& Montenegro in 2003, is here indicated under the latter name for the period from 1993-2003.
d. Years of SC membership: total of all years indicated in column $f$.

Source: United Nations, Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary General.
e. Frequency of Membership: Number of years of membership as a percentage of number of years of eligibility (column c); the absence of a figure indicates no terms on Security Council.
f. Specific years of membership.

| a | b | c | d | e | f |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country | Year of Admission to UN | Years of UN <br> Membership | $\begin{gathered} \text { Years of } \\ \text { SC } \\ \begin{array}{c} \text { Member- } \\ \text { ship } \end{array} \end{gathered}$ | Frequency of Membership (\%) | Specific Years of Membership |
| Afghanistan | 1946 | 57 | 0 |  |  |
| Albania | 1955 | 48 | 0 |  |  |
| Algeria | 1962 | 41 | 4 | 9.8 | 1968-69, 88-89 |
| Andorra | 1993 | 10 | 0 |  |  |
| Angola | 1976 | 27 | 1 | 3.7 | 2003 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 1981 | 22 | 0 |  |  |
| Argentina | 1945 | 58 | 14 | 24.1 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1948-49, 59-60, 66-67, 71-72, 87-88, 94-95, } \\ & 1999-2000 \end{aligned}$ |
| Armenia | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Australia | 1945 | 58 | 8 | 13.8 | 1946-47, 56-57, 73-74, 85-86 |
| Austria | 1955 | 48 | 4 | 8.3 | 1973-74, 91-92 |
| Azerbaijan | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Bahamas, The | 1973 | 30 | 0 |  |  |
| Bahrain | 1971 | 32 | 2 | 6.3 | 1998-99 |
| Bangladesh | 1974 | 29 | 4 | 14.3 | 1979-80, 2000-01 |
| Barbados | 1966 | 37 | 0 |  |  |
| Belarus | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 6.3 | 1974-75 |
| Belgium | 1945 | 58 | 8 | 13.8 | 1947-48, 55-56, 71-72, 91-92 |
| Belize | 1981 | 22 | 0 |  |  |
| Benin | 1960 | 43 | 2 | 4.7 | 1976-77 |
| Bhutan | 1971 | 32 | 0 |  |  |
| Bolivia | 1945 | 58 | 4 | 6.9 | 1964-65, 78-79 |
| Bosnia \& Herzegovina | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Botswana | 1966 | 37 | 2 | 5.4 | 1995-96 |
| Brazil | 1945 | 58 | 16 | 27.8 | $\begin{aligned} & 1946-47,51-52,54-55,63-64,67-68,88-89 \text {, } \\ & 93-94,98-99 \end{aligned}$ |
| Brunei | 1984 | 19 | 0 |  |  |
| Bulgaria | 1955 | 48 | 6 | 12.5 | 1966-67, 86-87, 2002-03 |
| Burkina Faso | 1960 | 43 | 2 | 4.7 | 1984-85 |
| Burundi | 1962 | 41 | 2 | 4.9 | 1970-71 |
| Cambodia | 1955 | 48 | 0 |  |  |
| Cameroon | 1960 | 43 | 4 | 9.3 | 1974-75, 2002-03 |
| Canada | 1945 | 58 | 12 | 20.7 | 1948-49, 58-59, 67-68, 77-78, 89-90, 99-2000 |
| Cape Verde | 1975 | 28 | 2 | 7.1 | 1992-93 |
| Central African Republic | 1960 | 43 | 0 |  |  |
| Chad | 1960 | 43 | 0 |  |  |
| Chile | 1945 | 58 | 7 | 12.1 | 1952-53, 61-62, 96-97, 2003 |
| Colombia | 1945 | 58 | 12 | 20.7 | 1947-48, 53-54, 57-58, 69-70, 89-90, 2001-02 |
| Comoros | 1975 | 28 | 0 |  |  |


| a | b | c | d | e | f |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year of } \\ & \text { Admission } \\ & \text { to UN } \end{aligned}$ | Years of UN <br> Membership | $\begin{gathered} \text { Years of } \\ \text { SC } \\ \begin{array}{c} \text { Member- } \\ \text { ship } \end{array} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Frequency of Membership (\%) | Specific Years of Membership |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. of | 1960 | 43 | 4 | 9.3 | 1982-83, 90-91 |
| Congo, Rep. of the | 1960 | 43 | 2 | 4.7 | 1986-87 |
| Costa Rica | 1945 | 58 | 4 | 6.9 | 1974-75, 97-98 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 1960 | 43 | 4 | 8.3 | 1964-65, 90-91 |
| Croatia | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Cuba | 1945 | 58 | 6 | 10.3 | 1949-50, 56-57, 90-91 |
| Cyprus | 1960 | 43 | 0 |  |  |
| Czech Rep./Czechoslovakia | 1945 | 58 | 5 | 8.6 | 1964, 78-79, 94-95 |
| Denmark | 1945 | 58 | 6 | 10.3 | 1953-54, 67-68, 85-86 |
| Djibouti | 1977 | 26 | 2 | 7.7 | 1993-94 |
| Dominica | 1978 | 25 | 0 |  |  |
| Dominican Republic | 1945 | 58 | 0 |  |  |
| Ecuador | 1945 | 58 | 6 | 10.3 | 1950-51, 60-61, 91-92 |
| Egypt | 1945 | 58 | 9 | 15.5 | 1946, 49-50, 61-62, 84-85, 96-97 |
| El Salvador | 1945 | 58 | 0 |  |  |
| Equatorial Guinea | 1968 | 35 | 0 |  |  |
| Eritrea | 1993 | 10 | 0 |  |  |
| Estonia | 1991 | 12 | 0 |  |  |
| Ethiopia | 1945 | 58 | 4 | 6.9 | 1967-68, 89-90 |
| Fiji | 1970 | 33 | 0 |  |  |
| Finland | 1955 | 48 | 4 | 8.3 | 1969-70, 89-90 |
| Gabon | 1960 | 43 | 4 | 9.3 | 1978-79, 98-99 |
| Gambia, The | 1965 | 38 | 2 | 5.3 | 1998-99 |
| Georgia | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Germany, Fed. Rep. of | 1973 | 30 | 7 | 23.3 | 1977-78, 1987-88, 95-96, 2003 |
| Germany, Dem. Rep. of (see notes) | 1973 | 17 | 2 | 11.8 | 1980-81 |
| Ghana | 1957 | 46 | 4 | 8.7 | 1962-63, 86-87 |
| Greece | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 3.4 | 1952-53 |
| Grenada | 1974 | 29 | 0 |  |  |
| Guatamala | 1945 | 58 | 0 |  |  |
| Guinea | 1958 | 45 | 4 | 8.9 | 1972-73, 2002-03 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1974 | 29 | 2 | 6.9 | 1996-97 |
| Guyana | 1966 | 37 | 4 | 10.8 | 1975-76, 82-83 |
| Haiti | 1945 | 58 | 0 |  |  |
| Honduras | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 3.4 | 1995-96 |
| Hungary | 1955 | 48 | 4 | 8.3 | 1968-69, 92-93 |
| Iceland | 1946 | 57 | 0 |  |  |
| India | 1945 | 58 | 12 | 20.7 | 1950-51, 67-68, 72-73, 77-78, 84-85, 91-92 |
| Indonesia (see notes) | 1950 | 51 | 4 | 7.8 | 1973-74, 95-96 |
| Iran | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 3.4 | 1655-56 |
| Iraq | 1945 | 58 | 4 | 6.9 | 1957-58, 74-75 |
| Ireland | 1955 | 48 | 5 | 10.4 | 1962, 81-82, 2001-02 |
| Israel | 1949 | 54 | 0 |  |  |
| Italy | 1955 | 48 | 10 | 20.8 | 1959-60, 71-72, 75-76, 87-88, 95-96 |
| Jamaica | 1962 | 41 | 4 | 9.8 | 1979-80, 2000-01 |
| Japan | 1956 | 47 | 16 | 34.0 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 1958-59, 66-67, 71-72, 75-76, 81-82, 87-88, } \\ & 92-93,97-98 \end{aligned}$ |
| Jordan | 1955 | 48 | 4 | 8.3 | 1965-66, 82-83 |
| Kazakhstan | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Kenya | 1963 | 40 | 4 | 10.0 | 1973-74, 97-98 |
| Kiribati | 1999 | 4 | 0 |  |  |
| Korea, Dem. Rep. of | 1991 | 12 | 0 |  |  |
| Korea, Rep. of | 1991 | 12 | 2 | 16.7 | 1996-97 |
| Kuwait | 1963 | 40 | 2 | 5.0 | 1978-79 |
| Kyrgyzstan | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Laos | 1955 | 48 | 0 |  |  |
| Latvia | 1991 | 12 | 0 |  |  |
| Lebanon | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 3.4 | 1953-54 |
| Lesotho | 1966 | 37 | 0 |  |  |
| Liberia | 1945 | 58 | 1 | 1.7 | 1961 |


| a | b | c | d | e | f |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country | Year of Admission to UN | Years of UN <br> Membership | Years of SC <br> Membership | Frequency of Membership (\%) | Specific Years of Membership |
| Libya | 1955 | 48 | 2 | 4.2 | 1976-77 |
| Liechtenstein | 1990 | 13 | 0 |  |  |
| Lithuania | 1991 | 12 | 0 |  |  |
| Luxenbourg | 1945 | 58 | 0 |  |  |
| Macedonia | 1993 | 10 | 0 |  |  |
| Madagascar | 1960 | 43 | 2 | 4.7 | 1985-86 |
| Malawi | 1964 | 39 | 0 |  |  |
| Malaysia | 1957 | 46 | 5 | 10.9 | 1965, 89-90, 99-2000 |
| Maldives | 1965 | 38 | 0 |  |  |
| Mali | 1960 | 43 | 4 | 9.3 | 1966-67, 2000-01 |
| Malta | 1964 | 39 | 2 | 5.1 | 1983-84, |
| Marshall Islands | 1991 | 12 | 0 |  |  |
| Mauritania | 1961 | 42 | 2 | 4.8 | 1974-75 |
| Mauritius | 1968 | 35 | 4 | 11.4 | 1977-78, 2001-02 |
| Mexico | 1945 | 58 | 5 | 8.6 | 1946, 80-81, 2002-03 |
| Micronesia | 1991 | 12 | 0 |  |  |
| Moldova | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Monaco | 1993 | 10 | 0 |  |  |
| Mongolia | 1961 | 42 | 0 |  |  |
| Morocco | 1956 | 47 | 4 | 8.5 | 1963-64, 92-93 |
| Mozambique | 1975 | 28 | 0 |  |  |
| Myanmar (Burma) | 1948 | 55 | 0 |  |  |
| Namibia | 1990 | 13 | 2 | 15.4 | 1999-2000 |
| Nauru | 1999 | 4 | 0 |  |  |
| Nepal | 1955 | 48 | 4 | 8.3 | 1969-70, 88-89 |
| Netherlands, The | 1945 | 58 | 9 | 15.5 | 1946, 51-52, 65-66, 83-84, 99-2000 |
| New Zealand | 1945 | 58 | 5 | 8.6 | 1954-55, 66, 93-94 |
| Nicaragua | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 3.4 | 1983-84 |
| Niger | 1960 | 43 | 2 | 4.7 | 1980-81 |
| Nigeria | 1960 | 43 | 6 | 14.0 | 1966-67, 78-79, 94-95 |
| Norway | 1945 | 58 | 8 | 13.8 | 1949-50, 63-64, 79-80, 2001-02 |
| Oman | 1971 | 32 | 2 | 6.3 | 1994-95 |
| Pakistan | 1947 | 56 | 11 | 19.6 | 1952-53, 68-69, 76-77, 83-84, 93-94, 2003 |
| Palau | 1994 | 9 | 0 |  |  |
| Panama | 1945 | 58 | 8 | 13.8 | 1958-59, 72-73, 76-77, 81-82 |
| Papua New Guinea | 1975 | 28 | 0 |  |  |
| Paraguay | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 3.4 | 1968-69 |
| Peru | 1945 | 58 | 6 | 10.3 | 1955-56, 73-74, 84-85 |
| Philippines | 1945 | 58 | 4 | 6.9 | 1957, 63, 80-81 |
| Poland | 1945 | 58 | 9 | 15.5 | 1946-47, 60, 70-71, 82-83, 96-97 |
| Portugal | 1955 | 48 | 4 | 8.3 | 1979-80, 97-98 |
| Qatar | 1971 | 32 | 0 |  |  |
| Romania | 1955 | 48 | 5 | 10.4 | 1962, 76-77, 90-91 |
| Rwanda | 1962 | 41 | 2 | 4.9 | 1994-95 |
| St. Kitts and Nevis | 1983 | 20 | 0 |  |  |
| St. Lucia | 1979 | 24 | 0 |  |  |
| St. Vincent | 1980 | 23 | 0 |  |  |
| Samoa | 1976 | 27 | 0 |  |  |
| San Marino | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| São Tomé \& Príncipe | 1975 | 28 | 0 |  |  |
| Saudi Arabia | 1945 | 58 | 0 |  |  |
| Senegal | 1960 | 43 | 4 | 9.3 | 1968-69, 88-89 |
| Serbia \& Montenegro (see notes) | 2000 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Seychelles | 1976 | 27 | 0 |  |  |
| Sierra Leone | 1961 | 42 | 2 | 4.8 | 1970-71 |
| Singapore | 1965 | 38 | 2 | 5.3 | 2001-02 |
| Slovakia | 1993 | 10 | 0 |  |  |
| Slovenia | 1992 | 11 | 2 | 18.2 | 1998-99 |
| Solomon Islands | 1978 | 25 | 0 |  |  |
| Somalia | 1960 | 43 | 2 | 4.7 | 1971-72 |


| a | b | c | d | e | f |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Country | Year of Admission to UN | Years of UN <br> Membership | Years of SC <br> Membership | Frequency of Membership (\%) | Specific Years of Membership |
| South Africa | 1945 | 58 | 0 |  |  |
| Spain | 1955 | 48 | 7 | 14.6 | 1969-70, 81-82, 93-94, 2003 |
| Sri Lanka | 1955 | 48 | 2 | 4.2 | 1960-61 |
| Sudan, The | 1956 | 47 | 2 | 4.3 | 1972-73 |
| Suriname | 1975 | 28 | 0 |  |  |
| Swaziland | 1968 | 35 | 0 |  |  |
| Sweden | 1946 | 57 | 6 | 10.5 | 1957-58, 75-76, 97-98 |
| Switzerland | 2002 | 1 | 0 |  |  |
| Syria | 1945 | 58 | 6 | 10.3 | 1947-48, 70-71, 2002-03 |
| Tajikistan | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Tanzania | 1961 | 42 | 2 | 4.8 | 1975-76 |
| Thailand | 1946 | 57 | 2 | 3.5 | 1985-86 |
| Timor-Leste | 2002 | 1 | 0 |  |  |
| Togo | 1960 | 43 | 2 | 4.7 | 1982-83 |
| Tonga | 1999 | 4 | 0 |  |  |
| Trinidad \& Tobago | 1962 | 41 | 2 | 4.9 | 1985-86 |
| Tunisia | 1956 | 47 | 6 | 12.8 | 1959-60, 80-81, 2000-01 |
| Turkey | 1945 | 58 | 5 | 8.6 | 1951-52, 54-55, 61 |
| Turkmenistan | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Tuvalu | 2000 | 3 | 0 |  |  |
| Uganda | 1962 | 41 | 3 | 7.3 | 1966, 81-82 |
| Ukraine | 1945 | 58 | 6 | 10.3 | 1948-49, 84-85, 2000-01 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1971 | 32 | 2 | 6.3 | 1986-87 |
| Uruguay | 1945 | 58 | 2 | 3.4 | 1965-66 |
| Uzbekistan | 1992 | 11 | 0 |  |  |
| Vanuatu | 1981 | 22 | 0 |  |  |
| Venezuela | 1945 | 58 | 8 | 13.8 | 1962-63, 77-78, 86-87, 92-93 |
| Vietnam | 1977 | 26 | 0 |  |  |
| Yemen | 1947 | 56 | 2 | 3.6 | 1990-91 |
| Yugoslavia (see notes) | 1945 | 47 | 7 | 14.9 | 1950-51, 1956, 1972-73, 1988-89 |
| Zambia | 1964 | 39 | 6 | 15.4 | 1969-70, 79-80, 87-88 |
| Zimbabwe | 1980 | 23 | 4 | 17.4 | 1983-84, 91-92 |

## Appendix V. Percentages of World's Population in UN Member Nations and in Nations That Are and Are Not Members of Security Council, 1946-2003

## Key to Columns and Relevant Notes:

a. Year.
b. - j.: All figures in these columns refer to percentages of total world population living in the areas designated.
b. France, UK, US, USSR/Russia: France, United Kingdom, United States, and USSR (1945-91) / Russia (1992-2003).
c. China: Area of China under regime then recognized by UN.
d. P-5: Permanent members of Security Council.
e. Nonpermanent Members: Nonpermanent members of Security Council, six from 1946 to 1965, ten from 1966 to 2003.
f. Total SC: All members of Security Council.
g. Other UN: All member nations not holding a seat on Security Council.
h. Total UN, Unofficial: All UN member nations, excluding areas noted in column I.
i. CPR ('50-'71) / Taiwan ('72 -- ): Population of area of China living under regime not recognized by UN.
j. Total UN, Official: All member nations, including areas noted in column I.

Sources: UN Demographic Yearbook various years; Encyclopedia Brittanica Book of the Year, various years; with abundant interpolation and some estimates by author.

| a | b | C | d | e | f | g | h | i | j |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | France, UK, US, USSR/ Russia | China | P-5 | Nonpermanent Members | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total } \\ \text { SC } \end{gathered}$ | Other UN | Total UN, Unofficial | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CPR } \\ & (' 50-' 71) \\ & \text { Taiwan } \\ & (' 72--) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Total } \\ & \text { UN, } \\ & \text { Official } \end{aligned}$ |

1946-1965. Security Council of Eleven Members.

| 1946 | 17.2 | 21.8 | 39.0 | 5.3 | 44.3 | 25.8 | 70.2 |  | 70.2 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1947 | 17.1 | 21.9 | 39.0 | 4.2 | 43.2 | 28.6 | 71.8 | 71.8 |  |
| 1948 | 16.9 | 22.0 | 39.0 | 2.1 | 41.1 | 31.7 | 72.8 | 72.8 |  |
| 1949 | 16.8 | 22.1 | 39.1 | 2.3 | 41.4 | 31.6 | 73.0 | 73.0 |  |
| 1950 | 16.8 | 0.4 | 17.2 | 15.9 | 33.1 | 17.4 | 51.0 | 21.7 | 72.7 |
| 1951 | 16.7 | 0.4 | 17.1 | 18.1 | 35.2 | 19.0 | 54.2 | 21.8 | 76.0 |
| 1952 | 16.7 | 0.4 | 17.1 | 6.8 | 23.9 | 30.6 | 54.4 | 21.8 | 76.3 |
| 1953 | 16.7 | 0.4 | 17.0 | 4.2 | 21.2 | 33.5 | 54.7 | 21.9 | 76.6 |
| 1954 | 16.6 | 0.4 | 17.0 | 4.1 | 21.1 | 34.0 | 55.1 | 21.9 | 77.0 |
| 1955 | 16.6 | 0.4 | 16.9 | 4.8 | 21.7 | 33.6 | 55.3 | 22.0 | 77.2 |
| 1956 | 16.5 | 0.4 | 16.9 | 2.5 | 19.4 | 42.1 | 61.5 | 22.0 | 83.4 |
| 1957 | 16.4 | 0.4 | 16.8 | 2.4 | 19.2 | 46.6 | 65.8 | 22.0 | 87.8 |
| 1958 | 16.4 | 0.4 | 16.8 | 4.3 | 21.4 | 44.5 | 66.0 | 22.0 | 88.0 |
| 1959 | 16.3 | 0.4 | 16.7 | 6.2 | 22.9 | 43.1 | 66.0 | 22.1 | 88.0 |
| 1960 | 16.3 | 0.4 | 16.7 | 3.9 | 20.6 | 45.4 | 66.0 | 22.1 | 88.1 |
| 1961 | 16.2 | 0.4 | 16.6 | 2.5 | 19.1 | 50.4 | 69.6 | 22.1 | 91.7 |
| 1962 | 16.1 | 0.4 | 16.5 | 2.3 | 18.8 | 51.3 | 70.1 | 22.1 | 92.2 |
| 1963 | 16.0 | 0.4 | 16.4 | 4.2 | 20.6 | 50.3 | 70.9 | 22.1 | 93.0 |
| 1964 | 15.9 | 0.4 | 16.3 | 3.6 | 19.8 | 51.5 | 71.3 | 22.2 | 93.5 |
| 1965 | 15.8 | 0.4 | 16.2 | 1.0 | 17.2 | 54.3 | 71.5 | 22.2 | 93.7 |


| a | b | c | d | e | f | g | h | i | j |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | France, UK, US, USSR/ Russia | China | P-5 | Nonpermanent Members | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total } \\ \text { SC } \end{gathered}$ | Other UN | Total UN, Unofficial | $\begin{gathered} \text { CPR } \\ (' 50-' 71) \\ \text { Taiwan } \\ (' 72--) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Total } \\ & \text { UN, } \\ & \text { Official } \end{aligned}$ |

1965-2003. Security Council of Fifteen Members.

| 1966 | 15.7 | 0.4 | 16.0 | 6.1 | 22.1 | 46.3 | 68.4 | 22.2 | 90.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1967 | 15.5 | 0.4 | 15.9 | 23.7 | 39.6 | 28.9 | 68.5 | 22.1 | 90.6 |
| 1968 | 15.3 | 0.4 | 15.9 | 22.8 | 38.6 | 33.4 | 72.0 | 22.1 | 94.0 |
| 1969 | 15.2 | 0.4 | 15.6 | 6.4 | 21.9 | 50.1 | 72.1 | 22.0 | 94.1 |
| 1970 | 15.0 | 0.4 | 15.4 | 3.3 | 18.7 | 53.6 | 72.3 | 21.9 | 94.2 |
| 1971 | 14.8 | 0.4 | 15.2 | 6.5 | 21.8 | 50.6 | 72.4 | 21.9 | 94.3 |
| 1972 | 14.7 | 21.9 | 36.6 | 21.0 | 58.4 | 35.6 | 94.0 | 0.4 | 94.4 |
| 1973 | 14.6 | 21.9 | 36.5 | 20.3 | 58.3 | 35.8 | 94.1 | 0.4 | 94.5 |
| 1974 | 14.5 | 21.9 | 36.3 | 5.1 | 41.4 | 52.8 | 94.2 | 0.4 | 94.6 |
| 1975 | 14.4 | 22.0 | 36.2 | 5.3 | 41.5 | 54.8 | 96.3 | 0.4 | 94.7 |
| 1976 | 14.2 | 21.9 | 36.1 | 7.2 | 43.3 | 53.5 | 96.8 | 0.4 | 97.2 |
| 1977 | 14.1 | 21.9 | 36.0 | 19.7 | 55.7 | 41.3 | 96.9 | 0.4 | 97.3 |
| 1978 | 14.0 | 21.8 | 35.8 | 19.5 | 55.3 | 42.7 | 98.0 | 0.4 | 98.4 |
| 1979 | 13.9 | 21.8 | 35.7 | 4.8 | 40.5 | 57.5 | 98.0 | 0.4 | 98.4 |
| 1980 | 13.8 | 21.8 | 35.5 | 5.8 | 41.4 | 56.6 | 98.0 | 0.4 | 98.4 |
| 1981 | 13.6 | 21.8 | 35.4 | 7.0 | 42.4 | 55.7 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1982 | 13.5 | 21.7 | 35.2 | 5.4 | 40.6 | 57.5 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1983 | 13.3 | 21.7 | 35.0 | 4.1 | 39.1 | 59.0 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1984 | 13.1 | 21.7 | 34.8 | 19.4 | 54.2 | 43.9 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1985 | 13.0 | 21.7 | 34.6 | 18.7 | 53.9 | 44.8 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1986 | 12.8 | 21.6 | 34.4 | 2.6 | 37.0 | 61.1 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1987 | 12.7 | 21.6 | 34.3 | 6.4 | 40.7 | 57.4 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1988 | 12.6 | 21.6 | 34.1 | 9.6 | 43.7 | 54.3 | 98.1 | 0.4 | 98.5 |
| 1989 | 12.4 | 21.5 | 33.9 | 6.5 | 40.4 | 57.7 | 98.0 | 0.4 | 98.4 |
| 1990 | 12.3 | 21.5 | 33.8 | 4.1 | 37.9 | 60.1 | 98.0 | 0.4 | 98.4 |
| 1991 | 12.2 | 21.4 | 33.6 | 18.3 | 51.9 | 46.1 | 98.0 | 0.4 | 98.4 |
| 1992 | 9.6 | 21.4 | 30.9 | 20.0 | 50.9 | 48.4 | 99.2 | 0.4 | 98.6 |
| 1993 | 9.5 | 21.3 | 30.8 | 9.0 | 39.8 | 59.2 | 99.0 | 0.4 | 99.4 |
| 1994 | 9.4 | 21.3 | 30.7 | 8.6 | 39.3 | 59.7 | 99.0 | 0.4 | 99.4 |
| 1995 | 9.3 | 21.2 | 30.5 | 8.8 | 39.3 | 59.7 | 99.0 | 0.4 | 99.4 |
| 1996 | 9.3 | 21.1 | 30.4 | 8.8 | 39.2 | 59.9 | 99.0 | 0.4 | 99.4 |
| 1997 | 9.2 | 21.1 | 30.3 | 5.9 | 36.2 | 62.9 | 99.0 | 0.4 | 99.4 |
| 1998 | 9.2 | 21.0 | 30.2 | 6.0 | 36.2 | 62.9 | 99.0 | 0.4 | 99.4 |
| 1999 | 9.1 | 21.0 | 30.1 | 4.6 | 34.7 | 64.3 | 99.0 | 0.4 | 99.4 |
| 2000 | 9.0 | 21.0 | 30.0 | 5.1 | 35.1 | 64.0 | 99.1 | 0.4 | 99.5 |
| 2001 | 9.0 | 20.9 | 29.9 | 4.2 | 34.1 | 65.2 | 99.2 | 0.4 | 99.6 |
| 2002 | 8.9 | 20.9 | 29.8 | 3.3 | 33.1 | 66.2 | 99.3 | 0.4 | 99.6 |
| 2003 | 8.8 | 20.9 | 29.7 | 7.2 | 36.9 | 62.5 | 99.4 | 0.4 | 99.7 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9 |

## Appendix VI. Composition of Hypothetical Security Council: Two Scenarios

## Method A: Present Scale of UN Assessments Used for Economic Term in Weighting Formula, No Extension of P-5 Privileges.

Weighted votes are noted following each bloc and country name.
Arab League (AL) 5.585: Algeria 0.367, Bahrain 0.184, Djibouti 0.177, Egypt 0.560, Iraq 0.349, Jordan 0.205, Kuwait 0.235 , Lebanon 0.198 , Libya 0.225 , Mauritania 0.189 , Morocco 0.348 , Oman 0.208 , Qatar 0.189, Saudi Arabia 0.483, Somalia 0.217, The Sudan 0.377, Syria 0.294, Tunisia 0.237, United Arab Emirates 0.260, Yemen 0.282.

Central, Eastern and Southern Africa (CESA) 6.132: Angola 0.232, Botswana 0.187, Burundi 0.209 , Comoros 0.178, Dem. Rep. of the Congo 0.460, Rep. of the Congo 0.190, Eritrea 0.196, Ethiopia 0.542, Kenya 0.346, Lesotho 0.187, Madagascar 0.265, Malawi 0.232, Mauritius 0.185 , Mozambique 0.273 , Namibia 0.187, Rwanda 0.215, Seychelles 0.175, South Africa 0.553, Swaziland 0.181, Tanzania 0.365, Uganda 0.308, Zambia 0.229, Zimbabwe 0.239.
Central Europe (CE) 4.365: Austria 0.530, Germany 3.835 .
China (CH) 7.672.
Eastern Europe (EE) 4.220: Albania 0.192, Belarus 0.234, Bosnia \& Herzegovina 0.197, Bulgaria 0.221, Croatia 0.211, Estonia 0.185, Hungary 0.269, Latvia 0.190, Lithuania 0.199, Macedonia 0.187, Moldova 0.195, Poland 0.508, Romania 0.311, Serbia \& Montenegro 0.239, Slovakia 0.218, Slovenia 0.212, Ukraine 0.452.

India (IN) 5.960.
Japan (JA) 7.282.
Meso-America (MA) 5.430: Antigua \& Barbuda 0.175, The Bahamas 0.180, Barbados 0.179 , Belize 0.176, Costa Rica 0.202, Cuba 0.245, Dominica 0.175, Dominican Republic 0.299, El Salvador 0.215, Grenada 0.175 , Guatemala 0.248 , Guyana 0.179 , Haiti 0.213 , Honduras 0.212 , Jamaica 0.190 , Mexico 1.078 , Nicaragua 0.202, Panama 0.196, St. Kitts \& Nevis 0.175 , St. Lucia 0.176 , St. Vincent 0.175 , Suriname 0.177 , Trinidad \& Tobago 0.187.
Non-Arab Islamic States (NAI) 4.212: Afghanistan 0.325, Azerbaijan 0.220, Iran 0.618, Kazakhstan 0.264 , Kyrgyzstan 0.202, Maldives 0.176 , Pakistan 0.985 , Tajikistan 0.209 , Turkey 0.695 , Turkmenistan 0.202, Uzbekistan 0.316 .

Northern Europe (NE) 4.598: Denmark 0.450, Finland 0.374, Iceland 0.187, Ireland 0.293, Norway 0.412, Sweden 0.561, United Kingdom 2.332.

South America (SA) 5.024: Argentina 0.690, Bolivia 0.222, Brazil 1.906, Chile 0.329, Colombia 0.456, Ecuador 0.254, Paraguay 0.211, Peru 0.358, Uruguay 0.219, Venezuela 0.379 .

Southeast Asia (SEA) 5.290: Brunei 0.187, Cambodia 0.248, Indonesia 1.383, Laos 0.206, Malaysia 0.384, Myanmar (Burma) 0.406, Philippines 0.640, Singapore 0.326, Sri Lanka 0.282, Thailand 0.614 , Vietnam 0.614.

Southern Europe (SE) 4.882: Andorra 0.176, Greece 0.411, Italy 2.155, Malta 0.181, Monaco 0.176, Portugal 0.383, San Marino 0.175, Spain 1.225.

United States (US) 9.065.
Western Africa (WA) 5.184: Benin 0.212, Burkina Faso 0.243, Cameroon 0.265, Cape Verde 0.177 , Central African Republic 0.194, Chad 0.223, Côte d'Ivoire 0.268, Equatorial Guinea 0.177, Gabon 0.186, The Gambia 0.182, Ghana 0.286 , Guinea 0.217 , Guinea-Bissau 0.182 , Liberia 0.192 , Mali 0.236 , Niger 0.232 , Nigeria 0.900, São Tomé \& Príncipe 0.175, Senegal 0.230, Sierra Leone 0.201, Togo 0.203.

Western Europe (WE) 4.894: Belgium 0.602, France 2.623, Luxembourg 0.203, The Netherlands 0.834, Switzerland 0.633.

Others 10.255: Armenia 0.191, Australia 0.816, Bangladesh 0.900, Bhutan 0.179, Canada 1.185, Cyprus 0.192, Czech Republic 0.296, Fiji 0.180, Georgia 0.203, Israel 0.346, Kiribati 0.175, Dem. Rep. of Korea 0.298, Rep. of Korea 1.041, Liechtenstein 0.177, Marshall Islands 0.175, Micronesia 0.175, Mongolia 0.188, Nauru 0.175, Nepal 0.304, New Zealand 0.275, Palau 0.175, Papua New Guinea 0.206, Russia 1.347, Samoa 0.176, Solomon Islands 0.177 , Timor-Leste 0.179 , Tonga 0.175 , Tuvalu 0.175 , Vanuatu 0.176 .

## Method B: GNP Used for Economic Term in Weighting Formula, P-5 Privileges Extended for Specified Period.

N.b. In the listing below only the aggregate WV is indicated for those blocs where membership is identical to that indicated for Method A. (WVs for individual members are indicated in Appendix I, column h). For blocs with membership different from that indicated for Method A, individual country data are provided.

Arab League (AL) 5.673.
Central, Eastern and Southern Africa (CESA) 6.213.
Central Europe (CE) 4.774: Austria 0.449, Czech Republic 0.288, Germany 2.987, Hungary 0.282, Poland 0.561, Slovenia 0.207.

China (CH) 8.462.
France (FR) 2.130.

## India (IN) 6.345.

## Japan (JA) 5.423.

Meso-America (MA) 5.555.
Non-Arab Islamic States (NAI) 4.408.
North Atlantic Bloc (NAB) 5.219: Belgium 0.513, Canada 1.034, Denmark 0.395, Finland 0.346, Iceland 0.185, Ireland 0.286, Liechtenstein 0.175, Luxembourg 0.198, The Netherlands 0.709, Norway 0.367, Sweden 0.489, Switzerland 0.522.

Russia (RU) 1.322.
South America (SA) 5.190.
Southeast Asia (SEA) 5.546.
Southern Europe (SE) 4.287.
United Kingdom (UK) 2.079.
United States (US) $\mathbf{1 1 . 7 1 6 .}$
Western Africa (WA) 5.240.
Others 10.383: Albania 0.195, Armenia 0.193, Australia 0.728, Bangladesh 0.943, Belarus 0.258, Bhutan 0.179, Bosnia \& Herzegovina 0.201, Bulgaria 0.230, Croatia, 0.221, Cyprus 0.189, Estonia 0.187, Fiji 0.181, Georgia 0.205, Israel 0.321, Kiribati 0.175, Dem. Rep. of Korea 0.315, Rep of Korea 0.880, Latvia 0.194, Lithuania 0.204, Macedonia 0.189, Marshall Islands 0.175 , Micronesia 0.175 , Moldova 0.196 , Mongolia 0.189, Nauru 0.175, Nepal 0.308, New Zealand 0.255, Palau 0.175, Papua New Guinea 0.208, Romania 0.329, Samoa 0.176, Serbia \& Montenegro 0.248, Slovakia 0.226, Solomon Islands 0.177 , Timor-Leste 0.179 , Tonga 0.175 , Tuvalu 0.175 , Ukraine 0.482 , Vanuatu 0.176 .

## About the Author

Born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1928, Joseph E. Schwartzberg received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin in 1960. He has since taught at the University of Pennsylvania (1960-64), the University of Minnesota (1964-2000) and the Center for the Study of Regional Development at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi (1979-80). His academic specialties are the geography of South Asia, political geography, and the history of cartography.

Professor Schwartzberg is best known as the editor and principal author of the monumental and highly innovative Historical Atlas of South Asia (University of Chicago Press, 1978 and Oxford University Press, 1992). Fourteen years in the making, this atlas won the Watumull Prize of the American Historical Association as the best historical work on South Asia for the 1978-1980 biennium and a distinguished achievement award from the Association of American Geographers. Among his other books are Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies and Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies, Vol. II, Books 1 and 2 respectively of The History of Cartography (University of Chicago Press, 1992 and 1994), of both of which he was principal author and associate editor. These works focus on little known indigenous traditions of cosmography and cartography. The former won the 1992 R.R. Hawkins Award of the Association of American Publishers as the year's best academic reference work. Schwartzberg is also a co-author of The Kashmir Dispute at Fifty: Charting New Paths to Peace and the author of Kashmir: A Way Forward, published in 1997 and 2000 respectively by the Kashmir Study Group, an influential think-tank that he helped form in 1996. Additionally, he has done pioneering research on the geography of the Indian caste system during two years of field work during which he bicycled over 10,000 miles throughout India and conducted interviews, aided by Indian assistants, in about 325 villages. His doctoral dissertation, Occupational Structure and Level of Economic Development in India, A Regional Analysis, was published as a monograph of the 1961 Census of India. Schwartzberg has served as a reviewer of, editorial consultant for, and/or contributor to hundreds of works on South Asia and/or political geography for numerous publishers and for several government agencies in the United States and India.

After 32 months of military service during the Korean War (final rank of $1^{\text {st }}$ lieutenant), Schwartzberg spent an equal time traveling throughout Europe and much of North Africa and Asia. He has since extended his travels considerably. He has lived in India (four years), Germany, France, and Spain, and is multi-lingual. He participated in various Peace Corps training programs (directing the first program for Ceylon) and also directed Minnesota Studies in International Development, an overseas internship program of the University of Minnesota. He has served as Chair of Minnesota's Department of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, as a Trustee and Executive Council member of the American Institute of Indian Studies, as an elected member and Secretary of the US National Committee for the International Geographical Union.

A life-long peace activist, Schwartzberg has a particular interest in the United Nations system and has written numerous articles relating to it, especially in regard to UN reform, in Global Governance and other journals. He has served several terms on the Board of Directors of the World Federalist Association (recently renamed Citizens for Global Solutions), has chaired its Policy and Issues Commission, and is presently President of its Minnesota Chapter. He was a cofounder in 1996 of the Minnesota Alliance of Peacemakers, a coalition now comprising fiftythree peace and justice organizations, and served seven years on its Executive Committee.

Professor Schwartzberg may be reached at schwa004@tc.umn.edu

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Wilfred Laurier University, 75 University Avenue W., Waterloo, ON, Canada N2L 3C5. Tel. 519-884-0710, ext. 2766. Fax: 519-884-5099. Web: www.acuns.wlu.ca

Founded in 1987, ACUNS seeks to promote excellence in research, writing and teaching about the United Nations, the fields of international organization and international law, and related issues of global governance. Its quarterly newsletter provides updates on ACUNS' activities, and the Occasional Papers series provides analysis of selected topics in UN studies. In addition, ACUNS works to bring more closely together scholars and practitioners engaged in these issues, and to develop a better-informed dialogue between them. Regular programs include the Annual Meeting and the summer workshop on international Organization Studies, co-sponsored with the American Society of International Law; and period seminars and workshops are held on key contemporary topics. With support from the United Nations University, ACUNS also sponsors the award-winning journal, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations.

## Center for UN Reform Education

1160 Hamburg Turnpike, Wayne, NJ 07470, USA. Tel. 973-872-8900.
Fax: 973-872-8964. Web: www.unreformcenter.org. E-mail: unreform@msn.com.
The Center for UN Reform Education, founded in 1978, has sponsored conferences at various sites around the US and has, since 1982, published numerous monographs, special papers, and anthologies of articles on ways to improve the United Nations system. All publications can be ordered via the contact numbers and addresses noted above. As a non-profit educational organization, it does not take positions on specific reform proposals. Rather, it encourages their discussion. The conclusions and recommendations of each publication are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center or of its affiliated organizations. CUNRE is funded by dues from member organizations, by grants from private foundations, by legacies, and by contributions from individual donors.

## Citizens for Global Solutions

$4187^{\text {th }}$ Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., 20003, USA. Tel. 202-546-3950.
Fax: 202-546-3749. Web: www.globalsolutions.org. E-mail: info@globalsolutions.org.
Citizens for Global Solutions, the US affiliate of the World Federalist Movement, envisions a future in which nations work together to abolish war, protect our rights and freedoms, and solve the problems facing humanity that no nation can solve alone. This vision requires effective democratic global institutions that will apply the rule of law while respecting the diversity and autonomy of national and local communities. CGS is a membership organization working to build political will in the United States to achieve its vision. It does this by educating Americans about global interdependence, communicating global concerns to public officials, and developing proposals to create, reform and strengthen international institutions such as the United Nations. CGS was created on January 1, 2004 out of a strategic partnership between the World Federalist Association and the campaign for UN Reform.

## Earth Action

30 Cottage St., Amherst, MA 01002, USA. Tel. 413-549-8118. Fax: 413-549-0554.
Web: www@earthaction.org. E-mail: Amherst@earthaction.org.
Earth action is a global network of more than 2,200 organizations in over 160 countries, and thousands of citizens and parliamentarians, who work together for a more just, peaceful and sustainable world. Since 1992 earth Action has carried out 82 global campaigns on the world's most critical environment, development, peace, human rights and governance issues, including several major campaigns on reform of the UN.

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Since its establishment in 1992, the Foundation's work has been both regionally focused and international. Among its objectives is promoting the study and knowledge of the history, customs, and contemporary affairs of the people of Kashmir. Since 1997 it has financially supported the work of the Kashmir Study Group to help develop ideas that would lead to a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict. The Foundation also provides financial assistance for youth education and works with organizations devoted to developing and disseminating new ideas, concepts and programs for improving society, such as in medicine, civil affairs, the promotion of democratic institutions and international law, and fostering peace and order among peoples and nations.

## World Federalist Movement (WFM) <br> 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA. Tel. 212-599-1320. <br> Fax: 212-599-1392 Web: www@wfm.org. E-mail: igc@wfm.org.

The World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy is a global peace movement dedicated to the development of a just world order through a strengthened and more democratic United Nations, Formed in 1947, WFM has a long history of leadership and innovation in promoting international democracy, justice and the rule of law. WFM has ECOSOC consultative status at the United Nations and has national member associated organizations and individual members in more than seventy nations.

There is one thing stronger than all the armies of the world and that is an idea whose time has come.

- Victor Hugo

Readers: You too can be a friend of this project. If you believe that the proposals put forward in this monograph have merit, you are urged to promote them in any way you deem appropriate in your community and in organizations concerned with peace, justice, and global governance; and through letters to the media and your legislators. Additional copies of the monograph can be obtained from the Center for UN Reform Education (see contact information on facing page) for $\$ 20$ each for orders within the United States or $\$ 25$ for orders in other countries. Discounts of $25 \%$ are available for orders of ten or more copies.

## What some have said:

"Professor Schwartzberg's proposals for reform of the UN are backed by formidable research. His ideas are of particular salience today and are worthy of emphatic endorsement. The achievement of world peace through world law is dependent upon Charter reform in general and specifically on achieving weighted voting in both the General Assembly and Security Council as Professor Schwartzberg recommends."

The Hon. John Anderson<br>Former Congressman from Illinois Independent candidate for US Presidency, 1980 President, Center for Voting and Democracy

"Radical reform of the United Nations is needed to make the UN a more effective vehicle for achieving the hopes and desires of member states and peoples. When the time comes for major moves, Professor Schwartzberg's weighted voting proposal will be a leading candidate on grounds of its practicality, equity and effectiveness."

## Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean

Advisor on International Security Issues, Union of Concerned Scientists
"The monumental task of reformulating the decision-making system in both the Security Council and the General Assembly has been addressed in a most insightful way by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg, who argues eruditely and persuasively for adoption of a carefully drafted system of weighted voting. The reader is left asking, 'Why not?' A noteworthy feature of Professor Schwartzberg's presentation is his sensitivity to arguments that might be offered in opposition and his well-reasoned responses."

## Dr. Ronald Glossop

Professor Emeritus of Philosophical Studies and Coordinator of Peace Studies Program, Southern Illinois University
"While there is unanimous agreement on the need to reform the basic architecture of the United Nations, efforts to reach agreement on new arrangements for voting rights and representation have foundered. Most reform proposals have been based on blatantly political or geo-strategic concerns, and they have been rejected on the same grounds. Professor Schwartzberg offers an extremely thoughtful alternative structure, based on objective criteria with which the UN is already familiar. His proposals deserve serious consideration by all those who seek to make the UN more relevant and effective in the future."

Dr. Hurst Hannum<br>Professor of International Law and Co-Director, Center for Human Rights and Conflict<br>Resolution, Fletcher School of Law and<br>Diplomacy, Tufts University

"The flaws incorporated into the structure of the United Nations at its creation - the one nationone vote system of decision-making in the General Assembly and the method of allocating seats in the powerful Security Council along with the veto power of the Council's five permanent members - have brought our first and last best hope for the world rule of law to an impasse. Unless these flaws are addressed effectively and immediately, they will prove fatal. Professor Schwartzberg's proposal to reform these structural deficiencies by a principled system of weighted voting is both brilliant and simple. Surely, the thinking and concerned people of the world will rally to support and implement this proposal."

The Hon. Rosalie Wahl
Retired Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court


[^0]:    * The most recent of these, is Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "Entitlement Quotients as a Vehicle for United Nations Reform," Global Governance [the journal of the Academic Council on the United Nations System], vol. 9, spring 2003, pp. 81-114. A more encompassing conceptual framework for my approach to UN reform appears in Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "Needed: A Revitalized United Nations," Global Dialogue, vol. 2, no. 2 (special no. on "The United Nations: Reform and Renewal"), Spring 2000, pp. 19-31.

[^1]:    ** Among many such needed reforms, I attach particular importance to strengthening the UN's peacekeeping capability through the establishment of a standing internationally recruited, all-volunteer, highly trained, and rapidly deployable peace force. Details are provided in Joseph E. Schwartzberg, "A New Perspective on Peacekeeping: Lessons from Bosnia and Elsewhere," Global Governance, vol. 3, 1997, pp. 1-15.

