



Federal Ministry  
of the Interior

# Annual Report of the Office for Protection of the Constitution

# 2003

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## **Organisational Data**

### **I. Organisational data pursuant to Section 16 (2) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, BVerfSchG*)**

#### **1. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV*)**

The BfV subsidy from the federal budget amounted to € 144,075,146.73 in 2003 (2002: € 123,895,737.62). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution had 2,401 staff members (2002: 2,235).

#### **2. Military Counterintelligence Service (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst, MAD*)**

The MAD subsidy from the federal budget amounted to € 64,983,585 in 2003 (2002: € 65,401,567). The Military Counterintelligence Service had 1,249 staff members (2002: 1,286).

### **II. Other organisational data**

In January 2004, the federal government and its agencies (*Bund*) and the states (*Länder*) together had a total of 985,300 personal data entries in the NADIS\* database (January 2003: 942,350). Of these, 569,700 entries (57.8 %) were based on security checks (January 2003: 55.2 %).

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\* Nachrichtendienstliches Informationssystem - Intelligence Information Service

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## Democracy and Protection of the Constitution

### I. Protection of the Constitution under the Basic Law

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, known as the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*, GG), guarantees German citizens a variety of basic rights, including the right to freedom of expression (Article 5), freedom of assembly (Article 8) and freedom of association (Article 9). These rights are extended even to opponents of our state's free democratic fundamental order. But limits to these rights must be clearly set wherever it becomes obvious that they are being misused for undermining the free and democratic order and thereby destroying the foundation on which these same rights are based.

Drawing on the painful lessons learnt from the failure of the Weimar Republic, whose Constitution lacked effective mechanisms for its defence, the principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values has been anchored in the Basic Law.

"Strong  
democracy"<sup>i</sup>

This principle is characterised by three essential features:

- **Commitment to values**, i.e. the state recognises its attachment to certain values it considers especially important and which are therefore not negotiable;
  - the **readiness to defend values**, i.e. the state is willing to uphold these most important values against extremist positions; and
  - preventive action to **protect the constitution**, i.e. the state does not wait to react until extremists have violated the law.
-

The principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values is clearly expressed in a number of the Basic Law's provisions:

- Article 79 (3) provides that fundamental principles of the constitution – including the inviolability of human dignity under Article 1 (1) – are unalterable and thus may not be modified by legislative process.
  - Under Article 21 (2), political parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic fundamental order may be declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*, BVerfG).
  - Article 9 (2) provides that associations which oppose the constitutional order or the idea of international understanding shall be prohibited.
  - Under Article 18, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) may declare certain basic rights to be forfeited if these rights are abused to attack the free democratic basic order.
  - Articles 73, No. 10, *litt. b*, and 87 (1), 2<sup>nd</sup> sentence, provide the basis for the establishment and operation of the Federal and *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution.
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## II. Offices for the Protection of the Constitution: Tasks and powers

### Tasks

Pursuant to the Act on the Co-operation of the *Bund* and the *Länder* with regard to the Protection of the Constitution, and on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (short title: Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution - *Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*, BVerfSchG), the main task of the federal and *Land* authorities responsible for the protection of the constitution is gathering and analysing information on the following:

- activities directed against the free and democratic order or against the existence or security of the Federal Republic or of one of the federal states (*Länder*), or intended to unlawfully hinder federal or *Land* constitutional bodies or their members from carrying out their official duties;
- intelligence activities or those that endanger state security, carried out on behalf of a foreign power within the area of the territorial application of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution;
- activities in the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which – by actual, or preparations for intended, use of force – threaten the foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany;
- activities within the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which are directed against the idea of international understanding, in particular peaceful co-existence.

### Information-gathering

The agencies responsible for the protection of the constitution primarily gather the information needed for fulfilling their tasks from publicly accessible sources. Where this is not possible or effective, they may, within the limits of clearly defined legal powers and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, use intelligence methods for covert information-gathering. These resources include informers, surveillance, video and audio recordings, and interception of correspondence, mail and telecommunications in accordance with the Act (adopted by virtue of Article 10 of the Basic Law) to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts and Telecommunications (*Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses* - short title: *Artikel 10-Gesetz*, abbr. G 10).

The Act to Fight International Terrorism (short title: Counter-Terrorism Act - *Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus*) extended the powers of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Con-

stitution (BfV). Among other things, the Act gives the BfV the right, under narrowly defined conditions, to gather information from financial enterprises, airlines, postal services, telecommunications services, and teleservices providers.

**Security vetting**

In addition, the agencies responsible for the protection of the constitution are responsible for assisting with security clearance checks of personnel granted access, in the public interest, to classified information or of persons actually employed in, or recruited for, security-sensitive posts within essential civil or military establishments. The BfV's powers in this context are governed in detail by the Act on the Prerequisites and Procedures for Security Clearance Checks Undertaken by the Federal Government (*Gesetz über die Voraussetzungen und das Verfahren von Sicherheitsüberprüfungen des Bundes*, short title: *Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz*, SÜG - Security Clearance Check Act).

**No police powers**

In carrying out their duties, the agencies for the protection of the constitution have no police powers, i.e. among other things, they may not perform arrests or searches or seize any property.

**Bound by law and justice**

The agencies for the protection of the constitution are bound by the general law. This means above all that they may not violate any laws when carrying out their duties.

Within their area of responsibility, the authorities for the protection of the constitution help to ensure the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany. As provided by law, they work closely, on a basis of trust, with other security authorities, in particular the other federal intelligence services - the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD), responsible for the Federal Armed Forces (*Bundeswehr*, Bw), and the Federal Intelligence Service (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*, BND), responsible for foreign intelligence - and with police and criminal prosecution authorities. In view of the increasingly international nature of threat phenomena, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) also maintains active contacts with its partner services abroad.

### III. Supervision of the authorities responsible for the protection of the constitution

<b>Federal Government</b>	The activities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) are subject to supervision by the Federal Government and the German <i>Bundestag</i> . The Parliamentary Control Body established for this purpose is to be regularly provided with comprehensive information on the general activities of the BfV, MAD and BND and on incidents of special significance (Section 2 of the Act on Parliamentary Control of Federal Intelligence Activities [ <i>Gesetz über die parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher Tätigkeit des Bundes</i> , short title: <i>Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremiumsgesetz</i> , PKGrG – Parliamentary Control Body Act]). Upon request, this body must be permitted by the Federal Government to inspect records and files, and to conduct staff hearings. The Parliamentary Control Body appoints the independent G-10 Commission which, always in advance of any such operations, will consider the permissibility and necessity of restrictions of the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications in accordance with Article 10 of the Basic Law. The same applies to the new information-gathering powers granted by the Act to Fight International Terrorism (see Section II above).
<b>Parliamentary Control Body</b>	
<b>G-10 Commission</b>	
<b>Right to information</b>	The BfV is legally obligated to provide data subjects, upon request, with information about their personal data files free of charge, if such persons provide reference to specific information and can demonstrate a particular interest in such information (Section 15 (1) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution). Disclosure of information will be denied only if any of the reasons for refusal as listed in sub-section 2 of Section 15 applies.
<b>Supervision by the courts</b>	Should a person (data subject) claim that measures taken by the BfV have violated his or her rights, these measures are subject to judicial review.
<b>Supervision by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection</b>	The Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG) contains a large number of provisions pertaining to data protection legislation which provide for extensive control exercised by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection ( <i>Bundesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz</i> , BfD).



#### IV. Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution

##### Annual reporting

The Annual Report is intended to inform the public and increase general awareness about anti-constitutional activities in the Federal Republic of Germany. This report is based on intelligence collected by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in the course of its legally assigned duties, in co-operation with the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. The report cannot give an exhaustive overview but provides information about the essential findings, and analyses and evaluates significant developments and correlations.

With regard to the associations (political parties, organisations and groups) described in this report, the legal prerequisites for monitoring by the BfV have been met. However, the intelligence situation for the groups described may vary greatly depending on the scope and detail of information gathered, which in turn can influence the observation methods used by the BfV. Assessing a certain group as "extremist" does not always imply that all of its members pursue extremist aims.

All figures given for the potential membership of the organisations and associations mentioned in the report refer to Germany and in part are estimates and rounded. Also, it should be pointed out that the agencies for the protection of the constitution do not have individual intelligence regarding all persons. This follows from the fact alone that the main mission of these agencies is to observe structures; this does not require detailed intelligence on all individual members of the observed organisations.

Any misspellings or incorrect grammar contained in the original texts appear unchanged in the quotations.

Finally, it should be noted that the Annual Report does not provide an exhaustive list of all associations that the agencies for the protection of the constitution may consider relevant.

## V. Protection of the constitution through information and awareness

At the federal level, the task of protecting the constitution by providing information and raising awareness is carried out jointly by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV); at the level of the states (*Länder*), it is the responsibility of the *Land* Ministries of the Interior and the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. Maintaining a dialogue with citizens about the tasks of the agencies responsible for the protection of the constitution is a central focus of this effort. In working with the public, these agencies provide information about their intelligence in order to enable each individual to make up his or her own mind regarding the threats anti-constitutional forces pose to our rule-of-law state.

Fundamentalism, extremism, xenophobia and violence are a constant challenge to a democratic and social state based on the rule of law. Fighting all forms of political extremism wherever they appear is therefore an ongoing priority of domestic policy.

The Federal Government considers it extremely important to prevent and fight such phenomena.

The Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – Against Extremism and Violence (Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz – gegen Extremismus und Gewalt), initiated by the Federal Government and presented to the public on 23 May 2000, plays a special role in strengthening civil society and consensus on the values enshrined in the Constitution. This Alliance combines and mobilises forces in society to fight extremism, xenophobia and violence. One of the Alliance's key tasks is to promote, support, network and publicise local initiatives and projects by providing information, advice and documentation (see [www.buendnis-toleranz.de](http://www.buendnis-toleranz.de) on the Internet).

The Alliance also encompasses important public support programmes aimed at fighting xenophobia, racism, right-wing extremism and violence, such as XENOS, CIVITAS and ENTIMON, within the framework of the action programme "Youth for Tolerance and Democracy – Against Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism" ("Jugend für Toleranz und Demokratie – gegen Rechtsextremismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus"; see also [www.bmfsfj.de](http://www.bmfsfj.de)).

In order to preserve the free democratic fundamental order, it is necessary to continually confront the various forms of extremism on a political and intellectual level. Thorough information and awareness-

raising about the nature and scope of extremist activities are an essential part of this effort.

The series *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit* (Texts on Internal Security) published by the Federal Ministry of the Interior also comprises monographs which, irrespective of the position taken by the editor, provide a platform for a policy discussion. In January 2004, a new monograph on "Islamism" was published. In support of the intellectual and political discourse on this phenomenon, this volume contains scholarly articles introducing the reader to the background and contexts of Islamistic worldviews, presenting the current state of related research and, in particular, providing in-depth information on the Muslim Brotherhood's concepts of state order and society and on the significance of the shari'a. The civil society perspective is introduced by an article on the attempts by Islamistic organisations to bring pressure to bear on actors of civil society.

As part of its public information activities, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) disseminated information on its fields of activity and current findings via its website, through information stalls at numerous exhibitions and fairs, by a wide range of publications and by answering a large variety of questions from the general public.

The Internet is an important public information tool. The BfV website contains detailed information on the BfV's responsibilities and fields of activity. The primary focus is on roughly 30 publications which can be downloaded. On its "News" and "Exhibition" pages, the site also provides regularly updated news about activities related to the protection of the constitution and current information on the travelling exhibitions organised by the Federal Office.

In 2003, the public continued to show great interest in the BfV's travelling exhibitions. A total number of around 70,000 people visited the two exhibitions, which travelled to 16 different sites throughout Germany, on democracy and extremism: "Protecting democracy - Against extremism in Germany" (*"Es betrifft Dich! Demokratie schützen - Gegen Extremismus in Deutschland"*), and "Democracy is vulnerable - Right-wing extremism in Germany" (*Demokratie ist verletzlich - Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland*). The latter was replaced, in early 2004, by a modern new concept based on educational principles and entitled "The brown trap - A 'career' in right-wing extremism" (*Die braune Falle - Eine rechtsextremistische 'Karriere'*). As well as individuals, mainly school classes visited these exhibitions to find out more about extremism and the forms it can take. BfV staff members

accompany each exhibition to provide guided tours on site and answer visitors' questions.

In addition, the BfV took part in various trade fairs, such as the educational fair *didacta* in Nuremberg and the Berlin *Abi-Messe* which provided information to high school graduates on vocational training and courses of university studies.

In 2003, the BfV printed and distributed a total of roughly 49,000 brochures, including reprints. In addition, these publications can be accessed via the BfV's website which is visited by many interested Internet users.

**Contact address**

For all questions regarding protection of the constitution, please contact the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in Cologne:

**Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV)**  
**Merianstraße 100**  
**D-50765 Köln**  
**tel.: 02 21 - 792-0**  
**fax: 02 21 - 10-792-2915**

On the Internet, the BfV can be found at:

[www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de)

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## Right-Wing Extremist Activities

### I. Overview

#### 1. Ideology

##### **Nationalism and racism**

Right-wing extremist ideology is characterised by nationalist and racist beliefs and attitudes. It is governed by the idea that ethnic affiliation with a nation or race determines the value of a human being. Because, according to right-wing extremist thinking, human and civil rights are subordinate to this criterion, right-wing extremists fundamentally contradict the Basic Law, which accords these rights special priority and protection. Right-wing extremists thus reject the universal principle of equality for every individual as specified in Article 3 of the Basic Law.

##### **Authoritarian state and *Volksgemeinschaft* ideology**

They typically call for an authoritarian political system in which the state and the people – in their view an ethnically homogeneous group – join together as a single unit within a supposedly natural order. In this ideology of *Volksgemeinschaft*, a National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics, the state's leaders intuitively act in accordance with the supposedly uniform will of the people. Starting from this premise, right-wing extremists believe that a state based on right-wing extremist ideology can do without the essential controls of a free democratic order, such as the people's right to exercise state authority through elections, or the right to form an opposition and take action.

##### **Ideologically heterogeneous**

Right-wing extremism in Germany demonstrates differing forms of nationalist, racist and anti-Semitic elements and resulting goals: Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence – particularly right-wing extremist skinheads – usually have a confused view of the world marked by xenophobic and often racist attitudes. They express their desire to “free” Germany of foreigners through spontaneous acts of violence and aggressive music that incites hatred. Neo-Nazis are more strongly oriented towards targeted political activities, which are often intended to provoke specific action. Their beliefs are oriented on National Socialist notions of a totalitarian state based on racist principles and led by a Führer. In their view, the German people are

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“superior” and must therefore be protected from “racially inferior” foreigners and Jews. The right-wing extremist political parties, by contrast, represent more nationalistic positions. For them, the nation is the supreme principle; this results in devaluing human and civil rights and in particular denying equal rights to those who are not members of the “German people”, which they define strictly in ethnic terms. Their aim is to establish an authoritarian state that would do away with the free and democratic order.

## 2. Developments within right-wing extremism

### **Fewer incidents of right-wing extremist violence**

Despite a decline in incidents of right-wing extremist violence, the overall level of crimes and acts of violence remained high (cf. Section II, 2).

### **Smaller right-wing extremist following and fewer violent right-wing extremists**

As in previous years, the right-wing extremist following continued to shrink (cf. Section II, 1). In 2003 the number of right-wing extremists willing to use violence fell for the first time in nine years. Nearly half of right-wing extremist skinheads and other violent right-wing extremists are based in eastern Germany.

### **Weapons and planning for attacks**

The Public Prosecutor General opened an investigation of persons linked to the leader of the Kameradschaft Süd, a group made up of neo-Nazis and skinheads (cf. Section III, 2), on suspicion of forming a terrorist association and charged five members of the group on 28 April 2004. Key persons in this group were planning to set off a bomb at a cornerstone-laying ceremony for a Jewish community centre in Munich, and were considering other targets in the city. There were no other indications of terrorist activity by right-wing extremists in 2003, although security authorities confiscated weapons and explosives. Even though most right-wing extremist groups condemned the planned attacks after they were made public, individual strategies disseminated over the Internet for “waging war against the system” are certainly capable of reducing hesitations about committing very serious crimes (cf. Section III, 2).

### **Influence of right-wing extremist skinhead music**

Many young people continue to find skinhead music appealing. Through such music, they come into contact with the right-wing extremist scene. Skinhead music continues to play an important role in bringing together and consolidating groups of extreme right-wing youth willing to use violence. The subcultural skinhead scene continues to be active in this area: The number of concerts slightly increased in 2003, while the number of skinhead bands and music distributors remained about the same. Skinheads like to take part in

events that attract publicity, and they continued to participate in neo-Nazi demonstrations as well as those of the right-wing extremist Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) (cf. Section III, 3).

**Actionism in the neo-Nazi scene**

The neo-Nazi following, which is primarily organised in groups known as *Kameradschaften*, grew in 2003, while the number of *Kameradschaften* remained at roughly 160. The neo-Nazi milieu continued to appeal to skinheads in particular. The trend of the past few years continued as neo-Nazis and skinheads increasingly moved in the same circles. Although the neo-Nazis' strategy of actionism – organising as many demonstrations as possible – provided them with a certain public presence, the large number of demonstrations resulted in fatigue and created internal dissent over the lack of coordination. A number of regional alliances were initiated, but efforts to coordinate the scene were only partly successful (cf. Section IV, 1).

**NPD in orientation phase**

Legal proceedings to ban the NPD, which the Federal Constitutional Court discontinued in March, weakened the party in organisational and financial terms, and it saw a significant drop in membership. Led by Udo VOIGT, the party appeared unimpressed by the proceedings and in 2003 continued its aggressive efforts to undermine the free and democratic basic order. Although the NPD was still able to mobilise right-wing extremist skinheads and neo-Nazis to attend its demonstrations (“battle for the streets”), it no longer managed to play a leading role in the “national resistance”, as many neo-Nazis have distanced themselves from the party. The party's three-point strategy remained in force, but the party leadership strengthened its ideological training (“battle for the minds”);( cf. Section V, 1).

**Stagnation at the DVU**

Even though its membership continued to decline, the Deutsche Volkunion (DVU, German People's Union) remained the strongest right-wing extremist organisation in terms of membership and financing. Within the party, the power of chairman Dr. Gerhard FREY remained unchallenged. However, the DVU carried out fewer activities, and instead of the usual annual mass rally, there were four regional events. In 2003, the party ran only in the elections in the city-state of Bremen, where it received 2.3% of the vote. The DVU did not take part in any other *Land* elections. Having won one seat in Bremen, and with its five seats in the parliament of the *Land* of Brandenburg, the DVU is currently represented in two *Land* parliaments (cf. Section V, 2).

**Decline of the REP**

There are still concrete indications that the party Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans) has right-wing extremist ambitions. As in



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previous years, in 2003 the party, led by Dr. Rolf SCHLIERER, was plagued by internal conflicts and declining membership. Numerous members sought contacts to other right-wing extremists due to their dissatisfaction with the party leadership. The REP ran in the *Land* elections in Hesse (1.3%), Lower Saxony (0.4%) and Bavaria (2.2%), significantly losing votes everywhere (cf. Section V, 3).

**Unsuccessful attempts to make the movement more intellectual**

Right-wing extremists' attempts to give their efforts a more intellectual image, particularly in the direction of what they call "cultural hegemony", remained unsuccessful also in 2003. Independent publications in this area were published only at very irregular intervals. But this theory-oriented right-wing extremism found a certain response in NPD circles through articles published in its party newspaper *Deutsche Stimme* or in seminars put on by the Deutsche Akademie (German Academy), an organisation active in NPD circles (cf. Section VI).

**Anti-Semitism**

Anti-Semitism plays an important role in all areas of right-wing extremism. In addition to open verbal attacks and incitement against Jews – primarily by skinheads and neo-Nazis – right-wing extremists increasingly use implicitly anti-Semitic comments, speculating on potentially anti-Semitic attitudes among the general population and attempting in this way to gain influence (cf. Section VII).

**Internet as a key medium**

The Internet has become the most important medium of communication for right-wing extremists, who use it to present themselves, make verbal attacks, carry on internal debates, and to mobilise attendance at their rallies and demonstrations. The number of websites maintained by German right-wing extremists fell slightly to 950. Instead, right-wing extremists increasingly used interactive Internet services for information or discussion. Along with mailing lists and newsletters, discussion forums are gaining importance for the right-wing extremist scene (cf. Section IX, 3).

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## II. Statistical overview

### 1. Organisations and following

#### Further decrease in right-wing extremist following

At the end of 2003, there were 169<sup>ii</sup> right-wing extremist organisations and associations in Germany (2002: 146). Membership of these groups, together with right-wing extremists who are not members of any organisation or group, fell to 41,500, down about 8% from the previous year (45,000).

#### Fewer violent right-wing extremists

The number of subculture-oriented\* and other right-wing extremists with a propensity to use violence has fallen by nearly 7% to 10,000 (2002: 10,700). This number has fallen for the first time in nine years. This category includes right-wing extremists who support the use of violence but have not yet committed any violent crimes. The largest group by far is made up of right-wing skinheads whose subculture orientation clearly distinguishes them from other violent right-wing extremists, such as neo-Nazis.

#### Increase in number of neo-Nazis

By contrast, the number of neo-Nazis increased by about 15% to 3,000 (2002: 2,600). The degree of organisation within the neo-Nazi scene also increased: 95 groupings demonstrated at least a minimum of organisational structure (2002: 72). This also included a significant proportion of the roughly 160 *Kameradschaften*.

#### Drop in right-wing extremist party membership

Only about 25,500 people (2002: 28,100) are currently members of any right-wing extremist political party. This figure includes members of the party Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans), although not every member of the party should be considered a right-wing extremist. The drop of about 15% is due to further membership losses of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany; approx. 1,100), the REP (approx. 1,000) and the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union; approx. 1,500).

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\* Not only skinheads are willing to use violence or actually behave violently. To a minor extent, neo-Nazis and – to a still smaller extent – members of right-wing extremist parties also demonstrate such behaviour. Therefore, willingness to use violence cannot be the only criterion for distinguishing between skinheads and neo-Nazis. The subcultural aspect, i.e. the fact that skinheads disassociate themselves from society's general standards, is much more important. This includes wearing military clothing, listening to aggressive music and drinking excessive amounts of alcohol.

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The number of other right-wing extremist organisations has decreased only slightly to 69 (2002: 70); some 4,600 members/activists (2001: 4,400) belong to this spectrum.

<sup>1</sup> Right-wing extremist following <sup>1</sup>						
	2001		2002		2003	
	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
<b>Subculture-oriented and other violence-prone right-wing extremists</b> <sup>2</sup>	1	10,400	1	10,700	2	10,000
<b>Neo-Nazis</b> <sup>3</sup>	65	2,800	72	2,600	95	3,000
<b>Political parties</b>	3	33,000	3	28,100	3	24,500
of which REP <sup>4</sup>		11,500		9,000		8,000
DVU		15,000		13,000		11,500
NPD		6,500		6,100		5,000
<b>Other right-wing extremist organisations</b>	72	4,300	70	4,400	69	4,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>50,500</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>45,800</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>42,100</b>
<b>After deducting multiple memberships</b> <sup>5</sup>		<b>49,700</b>		<b>45,000</b>		<b>41,500</b>

<sup>1</sup> Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.

<sup>2</sup> Most of the subculture-oriented and other violent right-wing extremists (mainly skinheads) are not organised in groups. The statistics list not only those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those right-wing extremists presumed on the basis of pertinent indicators to be prepared to use violence.

<sup>3</sup> After subtracting multiple memberships within the neo-Nazi milieu: This figure includes only those neo-Nazi groups and those of the 160 *Kameradschaften* that demonstrate a certain degree of structure and permanence.

<sup>4</sup> Not all REP members can be assumed to pursue or support right-wing extremist aims.

<sup>5</sup> Instances of multiple memberships of political parties and other right-wing extremist organisations were subtracted from the overall figures (2003: 600).

## 2. “Politically motivated crime”

### 2.1 Defining politically motivated crime

**Definition of  
“politically  
motivated crime”**

At the decision of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers of the *Länder* (IMK), a new system for defining “politically motivated crime” was introduced effective 1 January 2001. Political motivation is the central criterion for identifying such offences. An offence is defined as politically motivated if the circumstances of the offence or the attitude of the offender lead to the conclusion that it is directed against individuals due to their political beliefs, nationality, ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, ideology, origin, sexual orientation, disability, appearance or social status. This information is evaluated from various perspectives, paying particular attention to the nature and seriousness of the crime, the motive, and whether it has any international or extremist elements. At the same time, the catalogue of violent crimes was expanded and standardised nation-wide.

With this differentiated presentation, data can be analysed according to specific needs, providing a foundation for targeted use of appropriate measures for deterrence and prevention.

The figures quoted in this Annual Report on criminal and violent offences by extremists are based on information from the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). The new definition of politically motivated crime also affects the figures quoted in this report. In accordance with the legal mandate of the agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution, these figures concentrate on offences of an extremist nature.

## 2.2 Politically motivated crime and violent acts

The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) recorded 20,477 politically motivated criminal offences in 2003 (2002: 21,690). This figure includes 10,669 (52%) propaganda offences (2002: 11,749, or 54.2%); another 1,870 of these (9.1%) are categorised as politically motivated violent crimes (2002: 1,930, or 8.9%).

### Classifying politically motivated crimes

In 2003, 11,576 criminal offences (2002: 12,933) were classified as “right-wing”, 3,614 (2002: 3,639) as “left-wing” and 1,743 (2001: 845) as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners”. In 3,544 cases (2002: 4,273) it was not possible to assign the offence to a particular category.

### Extremist criminal offences

In 2003, 13,903 (67.9%) criminal offences were classified as extremist (2002: 12,758, or 58.8%). Of these, 10,792 (2002: 10,902) were classified as “right-wing”, 1,459 (2002: 1,137) as “left-wing” and 1,473 (2002: 573) as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners”. In 179 cases (2002: 146), there were indications of an extremist background, but the offences were recorded without further classification.

The renewed rise in the proportion of extremist offences among politically motivated offences in 2003 indicates that the guidelines for reporting politically motivated crime are being applied consistently. In 2001, the year the new definition of politically motivated crime was introduced, major differences were found between the *Länder* in their classification of extremist crimes. In some cases, comparable case information was evaluated and recorded differently in different *Länder*. With the help of detailed guidelines, the *Länder* standardised their procedures for defining extremist crime in 2002.

## 2.3 Right-wing extremist crime and violence

### 2.3.1 Overview

#### Drop in right-wing extremist crime

Crimes and violence motivated by right-wing extremism constitute a subset of right-wing politically motivated crime. In 2003, 11,576 criminal offences were classified as right-wing politically motivated crime (2002: 12,933). Of these, 7,951 (2002: 8,538) were propaganda crimes pursuant to Sections 86, 86a of the Criminal Code (StGB) and 845 (2002: 940) were violent crimes. In the area of right-wing politically motivated crime, 10,792 (2002: 10,902) criminal offences were classified as having an extremist background. Of these, 759 (2002: 772) were violent crimes. The number of criminal offences with a right-wing extremist background thus fell by 1%, while that of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background fell by 1.7%. Violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background made up 7% of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background (2002: 7.1%). Of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background, 86.1% (2002: 86.4%) were either crimes involving illegal propaganda activities (7,551; 2002: 7,294) or incitement to hatred and violence against individuals or certain segments of the population (1,744; 2002: 2,122). Overall, 141 offences (2002: 150) fell into the category of violent crimes against actual or supposed left-wing extremists, and 70 offences (2002: 57) fell into the category of violent crimes against other political opponents.

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<b>Overview of violent and other crimes with a right-wing extremist background*</b>		
	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
<b>Violent crimes:</b>		
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	8	7
Bodily injury	646	637
Arson	26	24
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	1	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorders	32	28
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship and road transport	11	2
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	2
Robbery	6	12
Extortion	5	2
Resisting public authority	36	45
Sexual crimes	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>772</b>	<b>759</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	178	225
Coercion, threat	115	93
Illegal propaganda activities	7,294	7,551
Desecration of cemeteries	30	26
Other criminal offences, esp. incitement to hatred	2,513	2,138
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,130</b>	<b>10,033</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>10,902</b>	<b>10,792</b>

\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).  
This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

In 2003, there were no homicides with a right-wing extremist background.

In their investigation of what initially appeared to be an attempted homicide, security authorities succeeded in making a significant breakthrough:

On 19 July, a group of skinheads, including members of the Aktionbüro Süd (Action Office South), began to fight among themselves following their visit to a pub in Unterschleissheim, Bavaria. During the fight, at least two persons wearing combat boots intentionally kicked the head of another, who apparently wanted to leave the right-wing extremist milieu. Everyone involved was heavily under the influence of alcohol. The police arrested five suspects. Further investigations into this case resulted in the dismantling of the right-wing extremist group Kameradschaft Süd (cf. Section III, 2). On 15 March 2004, the Munich municipal court sentenced the two principal offenders on the charge of serious bodily injury; one was sentenced to a prison term of two years and eight months, while the other was sentenced to three years and four months.

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
### 2.3.2 Targets of violent crimes with an extremist background

Most politically motivated violent crimes with an extremist background were directed against foreigners: 430, or 56.7% (2002: 440), of all violent crimes were motivated by hatred of foreigners. Another 141 (18.6%) violent crimes were directed at real or supposed left-wing extremists (2002: 150, or 19.4%), while 35 (4.6%) were motivated by anti-Semitism (2002: 28, or 3.6%).

<b>Violent crimes with a xenophobic background*</b>		
	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
<b>Violent crimes:</b>		
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	6	5
Bodily injury	388	377
Arson	20	19
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorders	12	12
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship and road transport	3	1
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	1
Robbery	3	6
Extortion	0	1
Resisting public authority	7	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>430</b>

\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by type*




\* The graph is based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).  
Only the most important types are included.

### 2.3.3 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land*

In absolute terms, the highest number of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background occurred in North Rhine-Westphalia (95 registered offences); in terms of crimes per 100,000 residents, however, North Rhine-Westphalia lies in the middle of the scale. It is followed by Brandenburg (87, at the top of the scale as a proportion of total population), Lower Saxony (80, in the middle of the scale as a proportion of total population) and Saxony and Berlin (each with 69). A significant proportion of such crimes continues to be carried out in the eastern *Länder*. With an average of 2.08 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, the rate was more than three times that in the western *Länder* (0.62).


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**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by Land*



\* The graph is based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*per 100,000 residents and land*



\* The graph is based on data on populations in the *Länder* supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Statistical Office .

### **III. Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence**

#### **1. Violent right-wing extremist following**

##### **Violent scene stagnant**

At a total of 10,000 persons, the number of right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence fell slightly in 2003 (2002: 10,700). The vast majority of these are right-wing extremist skinheads. In 2002, this group grew by less than 3%; since then, the growth trend appears to have stopped, above all in the area of skinhead music (cf. 3.2 below), in part due to rigorous measures taken by the state.

#### **2. Weapons and discussion of the use of violence**

##### **Suspicion of forming a right-wing terrorist association**

For the first time in years, the Public Prosecutor General charged several members of a right-wing extremist group on suspicion of forming a terrorist association. Charges against further members of the group are being prepared. The charges are based on activities of the circle around Martin WIESE, the leader of the Munich neo-Nazi group Kameradschaft Süd. During searches in August and September, the police found 1.2 kilos of TNT, a hand grenade, a number of long and short firearms and ammunition, among other things. According to the latest results of the investigation, starting in autumn 2002, WIESE built up a completely separate, tightly structured leadership group made up of his closest followers within the Kameradschaft Süd. This organisation, known internally as the Schutzgruppe (SG, protective group), held weekly paramilitary training exercises to prepare for combat operations. According to the latest findings of the investigation, its goal was to overthrow the free and democratic state using violent attacks. In spring 2003, the group decided to set off an explosion on 9 November to prevent the cornerstone-laying ceremony for a new synagogue, Jewish community centre and Jewish museum in Munich. To do so, WIESE acquired weapons and explosives via his contacts in the militaria scene in Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The group changed its original plans when police investigations into a different matter led them to fear discovery. They then considered attacking other targets in the centre of Munich. But WIESE and others in the group were arrested before they could make more specific plans. WIESE also maintained contacts to other right-wing extremist groups, above all in Bavaria; however, these were not involved in the attack planning.

There are no indications of terrorist activity by other right-wing extremists in 2003. In particular, there was no evidence of terrorist activity by Combat 18 groups in Germany (cf. Section VIII, 3).<sup>iii</sup>

**Combat 18 (C18)**

Right-wing extremists invoke the name of Combat, an organisation that first attracted notice in the UK, in printed publications and on the Internet to advocate covert (terrorist) activity against all those who are seen as a “threat to the white race” or who oppose National Socialism. This battle is to be carried out by individual fighters (“lone wolves”) or in the form of a “leaderless resistance”.<sup>iv</sup> In Germany, individuals and groups have used the name C18 for years in order to underscore how dangerous they are. Like earlier publications, the neo-Nazi *Totenkopfmagazin* (Death’s head magazine), which first came to the attention of the authorities in mid-2003, calls for the formation of armed cells on the model of C18.

The Flensburg public prosecutor’s office investigated neo-Nazis calling themselves C18 Pinneberg on suspicion of forming a criminal association. The suspects attempted to take over regional trade in right-wing extremist audio recordings and intimidate the competition. Searches found a firearm in the possession of the group’s leader. There is no evidence to indicate that the group was planning any terrorist attacks.

However, neo-Nazi publications such as *Stormer – Die deutsche Fassung* (Stormer – The German version) used the C18 symbol in calling for actions bordering on terrorism. Such actions were intended to create a climate of threat against outsiders and to increase the significance of the group carrying out the actions. For example, *Stormer* mounted an “activist contest” in which participants were to paste C18 stickers on synagogues and monuments. The nature of some criminal offences shows that concepts of this kind were indeed put into practice.

**Vandalism of memorial**

For example, on 4 May unknown persons vandalised a memorial in Neustadt, Schleswig-Holstein, for Jewish victims of World War II. After defacing the memorial stone by writing “C18” on it, they left a dead pig at the site. A group calling itself Combat 18 Deutschland later took credit for the act, making serious threats against Jews and political figures who had condemned the act of vandalism, apparently intending to create an atmosphere of intimidation and fear.

On 31 January and 2 February, swastika flags were found on bridges in the Rems-Murr district of Baden-Württemberg. The flags bore the marking “C18” and carried threats referring to certain police officers by name. This marked the start of a series of 43 right-wing extremist criminal offences which included three arson attacks. In about half of the cases, the perpetrators used the name Combat 18 or the abbreviation C18. On 27 April 2004, the Stuttgart regional court sentenced four right-wing extremists as principal offenders on charges of aggravated arson concomitant with serious bodily injury and property damage, among others; they were given prison sentences ranging from two and a half to six years. The court found that, when committing the offences, the group used C18’s reputation as an especially violent and dangerous organisation to create a climate of threat in their region of origin and to increase their own importance without however actually following strategy borrowed from C18.

**Wargames**

There was increased evidence of right-wing extremist groups participating in wargame-like exercises. In one case, the police confiscated a former East German army lorry, four air rifles and a crate containing eight practice hand grenades. According to the latest investigation results, members of the circle around Martin WIESE also met on a regular basis for paramilitary training exercises. In addition to physical conditioning and military drills, the training programme included target practice using so-called airsoft firearms. In the view of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, these training exercises were intended to prepare for future combat operations using real weapons.

**Possession of weapons**

Weapons possession by right-wing extremists poses an abstract threat. Many right-wing extremists are highly fascinated with weapons and explosives and therefore attempt to acquire these items and the knowledge needed to use them – and to make bombs. Such items are frequently confiscated from suspects.

For example, in late July the police searched the home of a suspected right-wing extremist in Grünwald, Bavaria, as well as his workplace in Munich. Along with diverse weapons, they found ammunition, pipe



bombs already fitted with fuses, and chemicals used in making bombs. The suspect was arrested.

And when searching the home of a 19-year-old suspect in Ohrdruf, Thuringia, in late November, the police found a private chemical laboratory with explosive substances.

**Nearly unanimous rejection of terrorist strategies**

In 2003, the right-wing extremist scene in Germany showed little interest in terrorist strategies. There was no evidence of any intensive discussion of violence within the scene. There were only a few statements in favour of the systematic use of violence. A climate conducive to the rise of terrorist structures did not exist. However, the notion of “leaderless resistance” continues to have a certain fascination for right-wing extremists. The idea of waging large-scale “war against the system” as part of a larger movement could increase the willingness of certain right-wing extremist individuals or very small groups to commit serious crimes.

**Potential threat from lone persons and very small groups**

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### 3. Right-wing extremist skinheads

<b>Vague nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic worldview</b>	Most right-wing extremist skinheads have only a vague nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic worldview. Skinheads rarely develop a firmly held ideology or targeted political efforts in a more specific sense, even though the relevant skinhead music groups promote such awareness (cf. 3.2 below). The skinhead subculture appeals to many, predominantly male, youths due to a lifestyle oriented largely on entertainment and action (skinhead music, consumption of alcohol, attendance at concerts and demonstrations) as well as spontaneous violence.
<b>Concentration in eastern Germany</b>	As it has been for several years, the right-wing extremist skinhead scene is concentrated in eastern Germany, where nearly half of all right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence live. The most activity took place in the greater Berlin area, western Saxony and southern Saxony-Anhalt, but larger skinhead groups also exist in other regions such as the Ruhr and the greater Hamburg area.
<b>Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz sentenced</b>	On 22 May, the Dresden regional court sentenced five members of the banned group Skinheads Sächsische Schweiz (SSS, Skinheads of Saxon Switzerland) on charges of forming and belonging to a criminal association; the five were given from one and a half years to two years' suspended sentences. In a second trial, on 12 November eleven more members were given suspended sentences ranging between six and 24 months. A third and final trial is currently pending. The group SSS was a criminal association created by skinheads who took violent action against their political opponents in the region of Saxony known as Saxon Switzerland. The interior minister of Saxony banned the SSS and its auxiliary Aufbauorganisation (SSS-AO), or development organisation, on 5 April 2001.
<b>Relationship to neo-Nazis</b>	Although neo-Nazis and right-wing extremist skinheads have worked together for years, their relationship remains ambivalent. Usually having only a vague neo-Nazi worldview, these skinheads mostly lack the will to long-term political efforts. Though they frequently take part in neo-Nazi activities, they are most interested in those that include music groups and alcohol and do not focus primarily on the political aspect. When skinheads and neo-Nazis find themselves belonging to the same local groups, their motivation for membership is likely to be different. Skinheads seek social contacts in the subculture, while neo-Nazis strive after targeted political activity.
<b>Relationship to right-wing extremist</b>	Skinheads are suspicious of right-wing extremist political party structures. This is true especially of the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU,

**political parties** German People's Union; cf. Section V, 2) and Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans; cf. Section V, 3), which distance themselves from the spectrum of right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence. However, there are connections between the right-wing extremist skinhead scene and the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany; cf. Section V, 1), which for a number of years has been more open to both neo-Nazis and skinheads; they are welcomed not least as potential followers who can be mobilised for demonstrations and other activities. But this does not yet extend to any ongoing cooperation between the spectrum of subcultural groups and the NPD.

### 3.1 Nation-wide skinhead organisations

**No nation-wide organisation** Since the Federal Minister of the Interior banned the Blood & Honour Division Deutschland and its youth organisation White Youth in September 2000, the only groups with membership in more than one German *Land* are the internationally active Hammerskins and the skinhead grouping Furchtlos & Treu (F + T, Fearless & Loyal).

**Hammerskins** In Germany, the Hammerskins have about 120 members (2002: 120). The group, which is oriented on National Socialist and racist ideology and has existed in Germany since the early 1990s, hardly appeared in public. A few persons active in the leadership of regional Hammerskin chapters helped organise skinhead concerts in Germany and neighbouring countries.

**Furchtlos & Treu** Founded in 1999, the skinhead grouping Furchtlos & Treu says that it consists of two divisions, one each in Germany and Croatia, which are made up of several sections. Their aim is to unite all skinheads on the basis of what they call the "idea of race". Concerts, ballad evenings, wreath-laying ceremonies and classes on the organisation's legal rights are intended to aid and support young, purposeless comrades.

**Blood & Honour largely dismantled after the ban** Former activists of the banned skinhead organisation Blood & Honour continue to remain in – sometimes very close – contact. However, there was no longer evidence of any nation-wide organisation. In southwestern Germany, individual former members continued to organise skinhead concerts and other activities, but these were not used to attract new members to the banned association. In a few cases, former German Blood & Honour members attending concerts in other European countries wore T-shirts bearing the banned organisation logo.

In March, the authorities became aware of dissemination of the unlawful recording *Blood & Honour Deutschland – Trotz Verbot nicht tot* (Banned but not dead), likely produced by former members from Thuringia. The Gera public prosecutor's office then began investigating on suspicion of supporting and/or continuing a legally banned, anti-constitutional association. As part of this investigation, searches related to 22 persons were conducted in Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt and Lower Saxony on 25 November. The suspects are accused of having been involved in producing and distributing the recording. The investigation is still under way.

### 3.2 Right-wing extremist skinhead music

#### **Skinhead music very important**

Right-wing extremist skinhead music is an important source of group identity for the right-wing extremist subculture. Such music appeals particularly to youths who feel socially and economically disadvantaged and attracts them to the skinhead milieu. Young people are exposed to this music via the Internet or by exchanging CDs among friends and acquaintances. They accept the racist and anti-Semitic stereotypes conveyed by the lyrics. The political worldview of most right-wing extremist skinheads is a vague mixture of nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes influenced by skinhead music.

Concerts by skinhead bands play a special role for the otherwise highly fragmented scene: They constitute its primary meeting-place and create a feeling of community and strength among those attending. As something out of the ordinary and not open to everyone, these concerts are especially appealing to young people.

#### **Slight increase in right-wing extremist skinhead concerts**

In 2003, the number of right-wing extremist skinhead concerts in Germany remained high at 119 (2002: 112). However, only two concerts had attendance of more than 500 people (2002: 7). Average attendance thus fell from about 180 persons in 2002 to 160 persons. Using bans, intensive investigative measures, and checks of those travelling to the concert venue, the authorities were able to prevent 22 concerts from taking place (2002: 17). Another 17 were broken up by the police (2002: 21). There were only a few instances of resistance.

#### **Secretive organisation**

Most skinhead concerts in Germany continue to be organised in secret. In most cases, only a few members of the scene are informed of the concert venue ahead of time. Potential audience members are told only which bands are to perform and where they can get further

information. Then they are guided from the pre-concert meeting point to the concert venue. Concert organisers often conceal the real nature of the event from those renting out the space where the concert is to be held. Once these lessors find out, however, they try to withdraw from the rental agreement. For this reason, right-wing extremists increasingly use venues owned or controlled by right-wing extremists or sympathisers, in order to avoid having rental space withdrawn at the last minute.

**Conjunction of concerts and demonstrations**

In many cases, right-wing extremist concerts and demonstrations were organised to take place at nearby locations on the same day in order to draw the greatest number of participants to both events. Some bands also performed as part of or directly following rallies.

**Right-wing extremist skinhead bands**

The number of right-wing extremist skinhead bands in Germany actively performing or recording rose to 95 (2002: 90). About one-third of these have been active and popular within the scene for a number of years.

Again in 2003, German right-wing extremist bands produced recordings with inflammatory, often anti-Semitic and/or xenophobic content, and/or content attacking the state and its institutions. For example, the song *Volk steh auf* (People rise up) by the band Rassenhass contains the following lyrics:<sup>9</sup>

“Then every nigger will be home in Africa or hanging on a tree, and Europe will be white again, because there’s no room for monkeys here ... We’ll burn down all the Judas churches, because we don’t need Christianity here ... Every hook-nose’s grave will be exhumed, because we don’t have nothing to do with anti-humans ... We’ll get rid of black-red-gold and the swastika will fly again ... We’ll overthrow the Federal Government and the Chancellery will be in flames.”  
(translated from the original)

**Investigations of right-wing extremist music groups**

The prosecuting authorities initiated proceedings against members of several music groups. For example, searches were carried out in connection with members of the bands Oidoxie, Race War, Skalinger, Weisse Wölfe and Stahlgewitter. Investigations were still under way at the end of 2003.

On 22 December 2003, Berlin’s higher regional court for the first time sentenced three members of the cult band Landser on charges of forming and belonging to a criminal association (Sect. 129 StGB). In its judgement, the court stated that the three had worked together not only to produce music, but that the real reason for their cooperation was to secretly disseminate their “collectively right-radical” ideology

through music with highly punishable content, in particular inflammatory and slanderous content directed against the Federal Republic of Germany.

The skinhead scene responded to some of the investigations by mounting activities to show their support for those being investigated. By setting up bank accounts for donations, organising solidarity concerts and publishing CDs whose profits were to help those under investigation, right-wing extremists provided not only moral support for their comrades.

**International contacts**

The number of concerts by foreign right-wing extremist bands in Germany fell to 12 (2002: 19). Music groups from the UK and Austria were especially popular. And German right-wing extremist bands performed at numerous skinhead concerts in other European countries.

**Right-wing extremist singer-songwriters**

As in the previous year, 18 right-wing extremist singer-songwriters (2002: 18) performed at 33 other right-wing extremist concerts (2002: 33).

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### 3.3 Distribution of right-wing extremist skinhead music

**Distribution structures**

Right-wing extremist music is not available in stores. For this reason, an independent distribution network has developed. Interested persons can buy such music from more than 50 mail-order distributors active nation-wide. In addition, numerous cult shops stock music and also serve as meeting-places for the regional scene. At concerts, mobile dealers offer their wares.

**Importance of the Internet**

The Internet plays a major role in the distribution of music and allows interested persons access to right-wing extremist music whether they have contacts within the scene or not. With numerous sellers in Germany and abroad, it is possible to compare selection and prices. Like foreign sellers of right-wing extremist music, nearly all of the larger distributors active in Germany use the Internet to offer their products audio-visually to a broader clientele.

But distributors are not the only ones advertising these CDs; information about new releases and where to get them can be found in Internet forums and scene publications.

**Trade in unlawful recordings**

The majority of sellers based in Germany derive most of their income from trading in legal CDs. Recordings punishable under German law are largely the domain of foreign sellers, who are subject to other national laws and are allowed to advertise and trade in these CDs openly. But German music dealers also sell unlawful CDs “under the table”, and some even participate in the production and distribution of such CDs in and from other countries.

**Criminal proceedings**

Again in 2003, law enforcement authorities confiscated numerous CDs with inflammatory content, sometimes on tips from the authorities for the protection of the Constitution. On 15 February, customs officials at Frankfurt Airport seized a shipment of 5,000 recordings. The shipment was consigned by a German neo-Nazi in Thailand and was to be sent on to Sweden, to be distributed by mail-order in Germany and elsewhere. The German who consigned the shipment was charged.

### 3.4 Skinhead fanzines

**Waning importance of fanzines**

The number of right-wing extremist fanzines in printed form continued to drop in 2003, numbering only 17 (previous year: 28).

This was in line with the trend in recent years. Particularly because it is more up-to-date and less expensive to produce, the Internet has clearly replaced fanzines as a medium of information and communication (cf. Section IX, 3). Concert information and reviews, CD reviews, information about new releases and news are published on the various homepages of right-wing extremist bands and music distributors and are available in the numerous Internet forums.

Online fanzines have not been successful, as they – like print fanzines – are often not as current as other sources.

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## IV. Neo-Nazism

### 1. Overview

<b>Worldview based on National Socialism</b>	Neo-Nazis base their worldview on the political currents of historical National Socialism. They regard themselves as fighters for a political cause and strive for a “German Reich” without any foreigners or Jews, led by a Führer and one party overseeing all policy areas. Racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia are all characteristic of neo-Nazis.
<b>More neo-Nazis</b>	The number of neo-Nazis grew in 2003 to roughly 3,000 active participants (2002: 2,600), the highest level in nine years. Most neo-Nazis belong to one of the roughly 160 groups known as <i>Kameradschaften</i> (2002: 160).
<b>Hardly any female members</b>	Men make up nearly 90% of the neo-Nazi scene; women play only a subordinate role, often as “helpers”. The few attempts at founding groups for women had little success.
<b>Ambivalent attitude towards violence</b>	Neo-Nazis reject activities of a predominantly militant nature. However, this rejection of violence is usually for tactical reasons: The scene fears the reaction of law enforcement authorities and resulting restrictions on their political activities. Neo-Nazis also fear that violent actions would endanger their – so far vain – efforts to win public support. This was evident from discussions within the neo-Nazi scene after planned attacks by a group with the Kameradschaft Süd around Martin WIESE were made public (cf. Section III, 2). Only a few comments were in favour of WIESE’s planned attacks.
<b>Anti-Americanism and solidarity with Iraq</b>	The United States of America is one of the neo-Nazis’ primary targets of hate. For them the US symbolises the multi-cultural or multi-ethnic society they hate, the centre of Jewish power (“USrael”), and the proponent of a globalisation trend destroying individual peoples and aimed at US hegemony. In much of the neo-Nazi scene, this anti-Americanism influenced by anti-Semitism is the driving force behind solidarity with Iraq.

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<b>Kampfbund Deutscher Sozialisten</b>	<p>The neo-Nazi group Kampfbund Deutscher Sozialisten (KDS, Combat Alliance of German Socialists) in particular was active in this effort: On its homepage, the KDS praised Saddam HUSSEIN as a “revolutionary socialist of the Volk” and described the defeat of Iraq as an hour of national humiliation, during which they stood even more steadfastly by the Iraqi people, whose struggle deserved the highest respect. The KDS and its roughly 50 members (2002: 50) promoted a “national socialism” and attempted to serve as a link between left- and right-wing extremists. Its publications <i>Der Gegenangriff</i> (Counter-attack) and <i>Wetterleuchten</i> (Sheet lightning) appear at irregular intervals.</p>
<b>Organisation</b>	<p>Following numerous bans on neo-Nazi associations, most of them between 1992 and 1998, the neo-Nazi scene largely organised itself in groups known as <i>Kameradschaften</i>. These groups typically have 17 members, at most 25, and have few structures in common with other kinds of clubs. They are usually run by an authoritarian leader (<i>Kameradschaftsführer</i>). Names such as Kameradschaft Sturmfront or Kameradschaft Kitzingen/Würzburg and flags and T-shirts with their logos are intended to convey a sense of cohesiveness. Nearly all the 3,000 neo-Nazis are associated with one of the roughly 160 <i>Kameradschaften</i>.</p>
<b>Skinheads</b>	<p>Some right-wing extremist skinheads also belong to these groups. One example of this is the Kameradschaft Süd: About two-thirds of its members belong to the skinhead scene. In such mixed groups, neo-Nazis typically set the tone. Skinheads who belong to <i>Kameradschaften</i> are usually more politically active than those belonging only to the loose cliques typical of the local skinhead milieu. Because they continue to behave like typical skinheads, they often add to their <i>Kameradschaften</i> an element of spontaneous violence that should not be underestimated.</p>
<b>Varying potential for activity</b>	<p>The activities of <i>Kameradschaften</i> differ greatly: Some limit themselves to holding activities that have more in common with a regular pub evening than with political action; others organise lectures on National Socialist topics, offer classes on legal issues (such as “your rights vs. the police”), offer trips to cult destinations such as the former SS site at Wewelsburg in North Rhine-Westphalia and take part in demonstrations.</p>

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<b>Demonstrations</b>	<p>Neo-Nazi activism is expressed above all through demonstrations. The number of demonstrations in 2003 rose to 84 (2002: 68). The large number of demonstrations resulted however in a certain fatigue, so that the number of participants, ranging from 70 to 150, failed to come close to organisers' expectations. This led to criticism and debate in the neo-Nazi scene. In its <i>Leitfaden für freie Nationalisten</i> (Guidelines for free nationalists) published on its website in autumn 2003, the neo-Nazi Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland (Action Office Northern Germany) stated:</p>
	<p>“The trend in recent years makes unequivocal and obvious to all that the enormous number of national demonstrations ultimately brought no significant increase in followers. Instead of trying to win over Germans locally on the strength of their arguments, the leadership, of all people, travelled around the republic weekend after weekend like professional demonstrators, usually failing to demand that those responsible provide preparation and follow-up to the demonstration.”</p>
<b>Alliances and networks</b>	<p>It is mainly leaders of several <i>Kameradschaften</i> in a single region who have established action alliances and offices to coordinate action, demonstrations and campaigns. They should have taken on the role of coordinating demonstration activities in order to coordinate the fragmented neo-Nazi scene and increase its capacity for action and mobilisation.</p>
<b>Nationales und Soziales Aktionsbündnis Norddeutschland (NSAN, National and Social Alliance of Northern Germany)</b>	<p>This structure is based on the concept of “free nationalists” developed by neo-Nazis in the mid-1990s after the neo-Nazi group Nationale Liste (National List) was banned. The concept aimed at bringing together the northern German neo-Nazi scene, fragmented after the association bans, and organising it like a club in order to restore its capacity for action while avoiding a further ban. The NSAN, based on this concept, has been active since 1997. The NSAN is made up of neo-Nazis and <i>Kameradschaften</i> from Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.</p>
<b>Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland as mouthpiece</b>	<p>The NSAN's coordinator and mouthpiece is the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland (Action Office Northern Germany). It is noted above all for its administrative support in organising demonstrations, but it does not itself apply for police permits to hold demonstrations. The Aktionsbüro promoted campaigns such as the “Popular movement to stop foreigners – don't immigrate, go home” and positions on topical issues, such as the travelling exhibition on the German Wehrmacht's involvement in atrocities during World War II, a memorial march in honour of Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess, and the Iraq war. The Aktionsbüro's regularly updated Internet website, which contains</p>

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press releases, a calendar of events, extensive propaganda and “operational reports” on its activities, attracted a neo-Nazi audience in the northern German region and beyond.

**Internal dissent**

The Aktionsbüro even provided an Internet forum for internal debate among neo-Nazis. Most of the criticism expressed was of a highly personal nature, leading to disagreements within the neo-Nazi camp.

**Central “Rudolf Hess Memorial Event” in Wunsiedel**

Neo-Nazis view their demonstration in Wunsiedel, Bavaria on 16 August to commemorate Hess, organised by lawyer Jürgen RIEGER with support from the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland, as a major success. Most of the roughly 2,600 participants were not neo-Nazis however but right-wing extremist skinheads. Numerous persons from other European countries also took part in the “memorial march”, for example from Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Slovakia and Bulgaria.

**“Legal battle” through every level of the court system**

Neo-Nazis successfully waged what they call their “legal battle” to overturn numerous bans on their demonstrations. For example, the local county government had banned the demonstration in Wunsiedel, and the ban had been confirmed by the administrative court in Bayreuth and the Bavarian Higher Administrative Court in Munich before being overturned by the Federal Constitutional Court.

**Themes and campaigns**

Many of the demonstrations focused on current political issues. For example, with the motto “Don’t immigrate, go home – the country needs German children”, neo-Nazis attempted to link family policy and immigration law in a way that got public attention. Other rallies focused on work with local youth and the neo-Nazis’ own situation: “Don’t criminalise nationalist youth work – Support freedom for self-determination”. But also in 2003, they were unable to achieve their primary goal of gaining more public support. Carried over from 2002 and particularly strong in the early months of 2003, their campaign against the US and its war on Iraq had just as little public impact as their thematisation of globalisation and unemployment (“Jobs, not globalisation – Support a world of sovereign states”).

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- “Anti-anti-fascist” activities** Another area of neo-Nazi activity was opposing their political enemy on the left, which calls itself Antifa (for “anti-fascist”). Like other neo-Nazis, members of the Kameradschaft Süd led by Martin WIESE collected personal information on their political opponents. One member of the Kameradschaft Süd was found by the police to have notes containing information on a leading candidate for the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany) in the elections to the Bavarian state parliament. There were no specific plans for an attack in the case.
- Intimidating political opponents** Neo-Nazis calling themselves anti-anti-fascist activists tried at least to intimidate their opponents by publishing such information about them. For example, the publication *Brauner Partisan – Stimme der braunen autonomen Untergrundbewegung* (Brown partisan – voice of the autonomous brown underground movement), which came to the attention of the authorities early in 2003, contained eight pages of address information, mainly of members of the party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance 90/The Greens) and the Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes – Bund der Antifaschisten (VVN-BdA, Union of Victims of Nazi Persecution – Alliance of Anti-Fascists). The foreword declared the founding of the Revolutionäre Anti-Antifa-Zelle (RAAZ, Revolutionary Anti-Anti-Fascist Cell).
- Internet publications** In particular, the neo-Nazi Fränkische Aktionsfront (F.A.F., Franconian Action Front), which was banned by the Bavarian Interior Ministry on 22 January 2004 and its assets confiscated, used the Internet for publishing such information. It published photographs and political biographies of “leftists” on its website. One of its Internet publications, noted by the authorities in late April, listed 89 persons who the F.A.F. claimed were members and users of a left-wing extremist archive in Nuremberg.
- No right-wing extremists are known to have committed any criminal acts of violence directly connected to such “anti-anti-fascist” publications.
- Relationship to NPD** The discontinuation of proceedings to ban the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) provoked only a minimal reaction among neo-Nazis. Their relationship to the NPD continues to be marked by a certain ambivalence. Some neo-Nazis sharply criticise the party, accusing it of handling informants with excessive laxity, and reject any further cooperation on the grounds that the party was not doing enough to deal with possible efforts to infiltrate it. Other neo-Nazis are willing to work with the NPD on specific occasions, giving priority to their common goal. Relations
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with the NPD are good wherever there are personal connections between the two groups, or where NPD members with a neo-Nazi orientation have an influence on regional party policy. Just how strong this rejection can be, however, was shown when neo-Nazis scheduled a demonstration in Halle, Saxony-Anhalt, on 1 May to compete with an NPD rally in Berlin; the Halle demonstration drew 1,200 participants, the Berlin rally 1,300.

## 2. **Hilfsorganisation für nationale und politische Gefangene e.V. (HNG, Relief Organisation for Nationalist and Political Prisoners and Their Families, reg'd society)**

Founded:	1979
Headquarters:	Frankfurt (Main)
National chairwoman:	Ursula MÜLLER
Membership:	600 (2002: 600)
Publications:	<i>Nachrichten der HNG</i> (HNG News Circulation: about 700 monthly)

### **Overarching character of the HNG**

The number of HNG members remains stagnant, although it continues to be the largest neo-Nazi organisation in Germany, with membership including mainly neo-Nazis and skinheads as well as some NPD members. This gives the HNG an overarching character in terms of ideology and organisation within the milieu. However, its activities were largely confined to its annual meeting in Alzenau-Wasserlos, Bavaria, on 15 March, with 300 attending, and to publishing its monthly *Nachrichten der HNG*.

### **Support for "nationalist political prisoners"**

Led by Ursula MÜLLER since 1991, the HNG aims to provide support for what it calls "nationalist political prisoners". This goal is served in particular by the publication *Nachrichten der HNG*, which is sent to "comrades" in prison, among others. The publication contains a "list of prisoners", which is also printed in many other right-wing extremist publications, and is intended to help initiate contacts to "nationalist prisoners" and keep them involved with the milieu. The numerous letters to the editor printed in the publication show that this milieu recognises the HNG's efforts. In an interview, one notorious neo-Nazi said of the HNG:

“There is no doubt that the HNG is one of the most important resistance organisations in Germany. Its charitable and integrative work has enormous significance in ‘today’s Germany’. The HNG’s work stands in opposition to re-education measures and mental terror in penitentiaries of the Federal Republic of Germany. The goal of the judiciary in the Federal Republic of Germany is to cut nationalist political prisoners off from the movement and to wear them down with harassment. The HNG is able to counteract this by providing legal support, contact addresses, etc. Of course, it’s up to the person in question to decide. Yes, I too support like-minded persons behind bars.”

*(Ratatösk - Das Fan-Zine aus der Wartburgstadt (Ratatösk – The fanzine from the Wartburg city) 1/2003, p. 1)*

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## V. Political parties

### 1. Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)

Founded:	1964
Headquarters:	Berlin
National chairman:	Udo VOIGT
Membership:	about 5,000 (2002: more than 6,100)
Publication:	<i>Deutsche Stimme</i> (German Voice) monthly, Circulation: 10,000
Subsidiary organisations:	Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund e. V. (NHB, National-Democratic University Union, reg'd society)

#### 1.1 Objectives

The Federal Constitutional Court discontinued proceedings to ban the party on 18 March 2003;<sup>vi</sup> the NPD regards this as “a signal for Germany to act” and sees itself as “the nationalist alternative the country is waiting for”.<sup>vii</sup> The NPD asserts that “the end of the Federal Republic of Germany is near” and that the “decline of the FRG system” is becoming apparent to all. According to the NPD, its “theory of social-revolutionary nationalism” makes it the only party able to provide the German people with “real perspectives”.<sup>viii</sup>

#### Notion of Reich directed against free and democratic basic order

The party continues to maintain its openly aggressive antagonism towards the free and democratic order. It continues to strive for the “restoration” of the “German Reich”. For example, Jürgen SCHWAB, party theorist and chairman of the party executive task force Volk und Staat (People and state), asserted in the party organ *Deutsche Stimme*<sup>ix</sup> that Germany was no longer a (sovereign) state, because “our country is under military occupation ... and although the German



Reich has continued to exist under international law since 23 May 1945, the day the Reich government of Dönitz was arrested, it is no longer capable of action.” Based on this, SCHWAB argues that

“The main task of German nationalism therefore lies in restoring the German Reich to full capacity for action. We support a state which excludes every form of foreign rule, as well as party or class dictatorship, and is instead oriented towards the common good, towards creating a German *Volksgemeinschaft*”.  
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 10/2003, p. 21)

**Further agitation  
against the free and  
democratic basic  
order**

The NPD explains its basic views, which are in opposition to the view of the individual stated in the Basic Law, in greater detail in its “pocket calendar of nationalist resistance 2004”.<sup>x</sup> For example, the NPD regards the “Christian, liberal and Marxist view of humanity” as “moral utopias” in contrast to its “scientific view of humanity” which accounts for the “biological basis, sense of community and traditions of humans and their natural forms of order, as well as the different peoples”. The party also distances itself from the universal validity of human rights, that is, the notion that “every person has an innate right to dignity and certain basic rights.” According to the party, the idea of human rights, which it says are interpreted “in strictly individualistic terms”, is “an important lever of internationalism to create ‘One World’ by destroying traditional cultural and economic structures.” In the same vein, the NPD also rejects what it calls the “misguided teaching that ‘all people are created equal’ ”.

For the NPD, the “Western community of values” is an “empty phrase, which American East Coast liberals<sup>xi</sup> and their parrots in Europe use in their attempt to convince others that their teaching is not only correct, but universally valid and unchanging.”<sup>xii</sup> The NPD singles out “individualism, internationalism and ‘human rights’ ” along with “the dominance of the economy and capital concerns” as the “core of the Western community of values”, which it claims leads “through the disappearance of borders and national differences to a global system based on the market, priority of profit and egalitarianism.” The NPD, which has declared that its world view is based on anti-imperialism,<sup>xiii</sup> refers in its “pocket calendar of nationalist resistance” to the “current imperialism of ‘Western values’ ”; in its view, only “inter-regional cooperation between nationalists of related peoples” can defend against this “imperialism”.<sup>xiv</sup>

**Race collectivism/  
“new order” as  
*Volksgemeinschaft***

The NPD associates racist-collectivist notions with the “new order” it strives to set up. For example, party chairman Udo VOIGT stated in *Deutsche Stimme*<sup>xv</sup> that the “new order” was “nationalist democracy” and that the NPD would provide “a sense of belonging to a *Volksgemeinschaft*, as opposed to the unfeeling and me-first society of the FRG.”<sup>xvi</sup>

In an article entitled “*Volksgemeinschaft* or parliamentarianism?” in the July issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, party theorist Jürgen SCHWAB described the fundamental opposition between parliamentary democracy and *Volksgemeinschaft*, a National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics, which the NPD party programme clearly endorses, according to SCHWAB.<sup>xvii</sup> SCHWAB finds “absurd” even the mere thought that in a “parliamentary system like that of the FRG ... anything remotely resembling a *Volksgemeinschaft* could be created.” Initial signs of this kind of racial community were seen in Germany at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and during the period from 1933 to 1945, according to SCHWAB. However, he wrote, “shortcomings and contradictions” arose, resulting from the “insufficient awareness” of those in power. Under the headline “Parliamentary democracy – a double-edged sword”, SCHWAB comes to the following conclusion:

“Parliamentarianism allows the Allied victors to block a policy by the defeated government oriented on the common good of the people. The parliament is the instrument of the international oligarchy, the site where members of the ‘Western community of values’ who have forgotten their country bow to the victors’ demands. With the overthrow of American global hegemony, ‘democracy’, which knows no sovereignty of the people [Volk], will finally disappear.”  
 (“Danaergeschenk parlamentarische Demokratie”, *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/2003, p. 15)

***Volksgemeinschaft*  
and positive attitude  
towards National  
Socialism**

In an article entitled “From the Red revolt to national revolution” in the January issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, a frequent contributor looks at the “significance of 30 January 1933 in German history”. With particular reference to National Socialism and the “idea of *Volksgemeinschaft*”, the author writes:

“Before World War I, the Reich lacked a political leader and a party willing to put an end to the activities of the special-interest parties. The Weimar Republic possessed these elements in the form of Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP ... On 14 July, the government passed a law forbidding the founding of new parties, which raised the NSDAP to the

status of sole legal political party. This step meant the failure of the national revolution to create a *Volksgemeinschaft* ... Adolf Hitler's dominating personality overshadowed the German people's great dissatisfaction with the NSDAP and its caste of functionaries ... If the German people had internalised the idea of *Volksgemeinschaft*, if the NSDAP had politicised the people instead of controlling them, it would have been much more difficult for the Allied soldiers to create such a thing as the Federal Republic of Germany."  
 ("Von der roten Revolte zur nationalen Revolution", *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 1/2003, p. 20 f.)

In a letter to the editor published in the March issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, Sepp BIBER, deputy chairman of the NPD in Baden-Württemberg, disagreed with the article's criticism of the NSDAP and the alleged failure of *Volksgemeinschaft* under National Socialism. BIBER wrote:

"The *Volksgemeinschaft* really existed! We experienced it. The amazing accomplishments of the German soldiers and of people in the homeland would not have been possible without it."  
 (*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2003, p. 22)

**Hero-worship of Nazi figures; playing down crimes of the Nazi regime**

The similarities between the NPD and National Socialism become obvious when one looks at the hero worship of leading representatives of the Nazi system. In an article with the headline "Rudolf Hess Memorial March: Neither Law nor Humanity", *Deutsche Stimme* reported on demonstrations in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, on 16 August commemorating the "murder (of peace pilot) Rudolf Hess on 17 August 1987."<sup>xviii</sup> With his "dramatic and selfless flight to England in 1941", the article stated, Hess became a "unique role model for German youth and gained a special place in the history of the 20th century like few others."

In the May issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, neo-Nazi Ralph TEGETHOFF paid tribute to "Fritz Witt, SS-Brigadeführer and Major General of the Waffen SS", who joined the SS and NSDAP as early as 1931 in order to "free Germany from the chains of Versailles and return the Reich to a respected place in the community of nations ... with the aspiring National Socialist movement". TEGETHOFF describes Witt as a "promoter of idealistic youth" who organised the SS tank division "Hitler Youth", thereby creating a "young team – courageous and confident" which successfully "resisted the USA's claim to world hegemony" following the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944.<sup>xix</sup>

**Aggressive agitation  
against political  
opponents**

Party statements use aggressive, even militant language. For example, in its *Taschenkalender des nationalen Widerstandes 2004* (Pocket calendar of nationalist resistance 2004) the NPD published so-called guidelines for “political soldiers”. In the foreword, the party states:

“Today, all nationalist resistance fighters must serve as an example and work to bring about the Reich and the *Volksgemeinschaft* we strive for. You should be aware that the German people’s struggle for survival will become harder and harder and in the future will demand of us all even more sacrifices than it already does. Our enemies are working systematically to bring about a multi-cultural society, which is ultimately intended to destroy our people. So if we want to save our people, we must unconditionally accept our orders for battle, and that at every level and in every aspect of life ... Free yourselves from the evil spirit of the time, renounce all behaviours and habits which may harm our people directly or indirectly.

Our enemies are far ahead of us. That also means that we can learn from them. Observe the activities of our enemies and take advantage of them.”

(error in the original text)

(*Taschenkalender des nationalen Widerstandes 2004*)

The NPD also calls on readers to

“Join target-shooting clubs, go to martial arts schools, learn how to defend yourselves! The militance of our enemies demands the capability to defend ourselves. Take part in orienteering and tent camping. Organise patrols.

Use the possibilities offered you by the Bundeswehr, as decrepit as it is. Train to become qualified leaders and learn military leadership.

(error in the original text)

(*Taschenkalender des nationalen Widerstandes 2004*)

In an article entitled “Achieving success with a strategy of speaking out” published in the August issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, VOIGT writes of “taking the intellectual offensive in public” and calls for “speaking out all the time, everywhere”, especially at “official events” and “opponents’ events”.<sup>xx</sup> On its website, the NPD praised the disruption of a podium discussion on the topic “Fight the seducers: How seductive are right-wing extremist organisations in Saxony?” held on “Saxon Day” in Sebnitz on 6 September, calling it a “highly successful” application of the “idea of speaking out”. About 25 to 30 members of right-wing extremist parties and associations took part in the

discussion, including the deputy NPD party chairman Holger APFEL. According to the website, at the “insistence of many in the audience,” APFEL was included in the podium discussion as a “representative of the nationalist opposition”. But, the NPD website stated, the “anti-discussion ‘discussants’ ” left the stage just as APFEL started talking about the “criminal activities of the Antifa” and the “criminalisation of German patriots”.

On the NPD website, a frequent contributor to *Deutsche Stimme* combined his review of “Saxon Day” with a threat directed at “traitors to the people”:

“With stalls of numerous nationalist parties and organisations, distributing thousands of flyers on current political issues and disrupting a political discussion, this year’s Saxon Day raises the question: ‘Traitors to the people, do you hear the signals?’ ”  
(error in the original text)

On the party’s website, NPD national manager Frank SCHWERDT on 27 August called on supporters all over Germany to practise “civil disobedience” and oppose public housing for asylum seekers:

“Every home for asylum seekers that is closed is a victory for Germans’ right to self-determination. Every home for asylum seekers that is closed increases pressure on those responsible to finally stop the flow, and every home for asylum seekers that is closed saves money for German taxpayers.”

### Racism and xenophobia

In 2003 the NPD continued to agitate with undiminished, aggressive racism and xenophobia. For example, in January *Deutsche Stimme* described the 2002 edition of Jacques de Mahieu’s book *Volk – Nation – Rasse: Grundlagen der Biopolitik* (Volk – nation – race: Foundations of biopolity), published by the Deutsche Stimme Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, as a “treasure trove of arguments for all opponents of excessive foreign influence and mixing between the races”:<sup>xxi</sup>

“The vitality of human biology triumphs over all ideologues of equality, who believe that humans’ biocultural roots and racial identity can be erased through education and improvements in social milieu ... Informed by profound insights into the nature of human life, the French author outlines a policy based on biology and thus one that accurately reflects life. The book thoroughly investigates the concept and origin of race and racial equality with scientific precision and in easily understood language, and explains the existence of races as the product of an evolutionary process of optimisation. The book also

illuminates current threats such as racial impurity, mass migration and demographic crises in a knowledgeable and critical manner.”

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 1/2003, p. 19)

In its small *Lexikon der politischen Grundbegriffe* (Lexicon of basic political concepts), the NPD declares that “humanity” is made up of three “major races”: “the Mongoloid, the Caucasoid and the Negroid race.” The “various typical combinations of sub-races” gives the European peoples their “unique national characteristics”, according to the lexicon. It goes on to say that “nationalism” is “the political form of territorial behaviour” which serves “to preserve the species, thus a basic biological principle”. Nationalists are opposed to “allowing foreign cultural and racial elements to enter the national culture”.<sup>xxii</sup>

In the July issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, deputy NPD party chairman Holger APFEL wrote an article on Turkey’s entry into the EU; entitled “For Germany’s life or destruction”, the article stated that the only thing Europe and Turkey had in common was the “history of Turkish conquest”. APFEL continued:

“If the multi-cultural pharisees with their mad teachings of a society without borders have their way, the continent of the white races will face disintegration and decay on an unimaginable scale ... With their forced Germanisation, the fanatics of racial hybridisation intend not only to uproot (the) Germans, but also to destroy the identity of foreigners living here ... As nationalists who support the preservation of language, culture, tradition and identity of all people, we have always made it clear that we oppose the integration of foreigners, because our goal is that foreigners living in Germany should one day be returned to their traditional homelands.”

(error in the original text)

(“Um Deutschlands Leben oder Untergang”, *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/2003, p. 19 ff)

### Anti-Semitism

In spreading anti-Semitic propaganda, the NPD uses current political events to take advantage of anti-Jewish feeling. For example, an article on the Iraq war in the May issue of *Deutsche Stimme* bore the headline: “Beaming war profiteers under the Star of David: ‘Neo-conservative’ US warmongers are themselves Jews or serve the state of Israel”.<sup>xxiii</sup>

In an article with the headline “US imperialism: Lust for world power in philosophical debate” published in the September issue of *Deutsche*

*Stimme*, a member of the NPD party executive wrote the following policy assessment of influential members of the US government:

“Under the slogan of a ‘new world order’, the ‘neo-conservatives’, on the other hand, want to use force of arms to bring about a new creation of the world without races or cultures. Wolfowitz, Perle and Shulsky (intelligence specialist at the Pentagon) have other intellectual sources and motives. They read the Torah as the original document of Jewish race hatred, and imagine a secularised Jewish claim to being the chosen under the protection of a global apparatus of capitalist power. This is the crux of the matter.”  
 (“US-Imperialismus. Weltherrschaftsgelüste im Philosophiestreit”, *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 9/2003, p. 24)

In its 2003 campaign to attract new subscribers, *Deutsche Stimme* ran the following article excerpts in several issues as advertising.<sup>xxiv</sup>

No topic is censored or taboo – whether the outrageous financial demands of the Zionist lobby, ... the American East Coast’s increasingly unscrupulous lust for world power,<sup>xxv</sup> Israel’s state-supported terrorism ... If you’re tired of Michel Friedman and Paul Spiegel always having the last word, then act now – and help *Deutsche Stimme* every way you can.”

## Revisionism

The NPD continues to use revisionist arguments in attempting to replace the historical representation of the National Socialist period with views that range from favourable to offering justification for the regime. The party does so because it sees its vision of an authoritarian and ethnically homogeneous state incriminated by the historically correct representation of the “Third Reich”. That is why the party denies the Hitler regime’s responsibility for starting World War II, denies atrocities committed by some Wehrmacht soldiers during the war, and seeks to relativise the mass murder of Jews.

Per Lennart AAE, a long-time member of the NPD party executive and currently a member of the NPD executive in Bavaria, wrote an essay entitled “Imperialist plundering or an act of national self-defence? A historical comparison between George W. Bush’s Iraq war in 2003 and Adolf Hitler’s Polish campaign of 1939”. Printed in *Deutsche Stimme*, the article stated:

“On 16 October 1946, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister of the German Reich, was executed in Nuremberg by hanging. He was one of about 500 political and military leaders of the Third Reich who were murdered after 8 May 1945 following show trials by the victorious Western forces. This was intended to demonstrate that Germany alone

was responsible for the Second World War, which was also needed by the governments responsible for the executions. Because they themselves were the ones who intentionally brought about the largest genocide world history had ever seen, in order to bring the German Reich to its knees and wipe out its economic, social and cultural achievements, which threatened the existence of international high finance.”<sup>xxvi</sup>

(“Imperialistischer Raubzug oder nationaler Notwehrakt? Ein historischer Vergleich: George W. Bushs Irakkrieg 2003 und Adolf Hitlers Polenfeldzug 1939”, *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2003, p. 20 f.)

AAE concludes that the German attack on Poland in 1939 “did indeed [serve] to defend the Reich against an obvious military threat”, adding:

“Although Hitler did wage a war of aggression against Poland, he had done everything humanly possible to solve the German-Polish conflict peacefully, but failed due to his enemies’ documented desire to go to war.”

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2003, p. 20 f.)

**Agitation against  
parliamentary  
democracy and the  
rule of law**

In 2003 the NPD continued to agitate in a polemical, defamatory and derogatory manner against the democratic system based on the rule of law. This is clear from assertions regarding the alleged re-education of the German population and accusations that the country was being ruled from abroad. In addition, the party continues to make denigrating statements about representatives and institutions of the free and democratic order and criticises the democratic state based on the rule of law in a derogatory fashion. The party thereby aims to portray the parliamentary system as illegitimate, incompetent, corrupt and opposed to the interests of the people; it also questions the democratic state based on the rule of law as a whole, with the ultimate goal of abolishing the state and replacing it with a different system. For example, an article in the May issue of *Deutsche Stimme* asserted that it was well-known that the “FRG” did not have a constitution, but “merely a basic law dictated by the Allies”.<sup>xxvii</sup>

In an article with the headline “Crisis of the system: Targeting the Basic Law – Open fire!” published in *Deutsche Stimme*, party theorist Jürgen SCHWAB described the “source of the problem”:

“After so-called de-Nazification, the issuing of licenses for political parties and the media, and the installation of the programme of American re-education, on 23 May 1949 the Basic Law was passed and promulgated by the parliamentary council and approved by the Allied high commissioners. Before that it was drafted in an ominous



‘constitutional convention’ that lasted only 13 days, meeting in the summer of 1948 on the Bavarian island of Herrenchiemsee. The Allied victors dictated the basic structure of this would-be constitution to both the constitutional convention and the parliamentary council, which meant above all parliamentary democracy and a federal state. About 50 years later ... the NPD was supposed to be banned, among other things because its representatives criticise the foreign role in the creation of this Basic Law and the resulting circumstances that are so harmful to the common good.”

(“Systemkrise. Das Grundgesetz im Visier: Feuer frei!” *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 6/2003, p. 4)

In his speech at a demonstration by the Junge Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen (JLO, Young *Landsmannschaft* of East Prussia) on 13 February remembering the World War II bombing of Dresden, party chairman Udo VOIGT declared that Germany was not a “sovereign state”. He called on supporters to “throw off the yoke of foreign dominance which is still present everywhere in the FRG even a half-century after the war.”<sup>xxviii</sup>

## 1.2 Organisation and development

### Further drop in membership

The Federal Constitutional Court decision to discontinue proceedings to ban the party, announced on 18 March, did not result in a renewed sense of purpose, as the NPD had hoped, nor did it bring an increase in membership. In the May issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, NPD national party chairman Udo VOIGT conceded that the number of members had fallen to 5,500:

“In the final year of proceedings to ban the party, we were unable to ‘escape unscathed’, losing about 1,000 members nation-wide ... Our current membership of 5,500 persons nation-wide organised in 16 *Land* associations and 187 district associations constitutes a cadre tested by adversity for a decisive new beginning!”<sup>xxix</sup>  
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 14)

By the end of the year, the number of NPD members had dropped further to about 5,000 (2002: more than 6,100).

The campaign “1:0 for Germany”, an immediate reaction to the Federal Constitutional Court decision, met with little response, neither within the party nor in the surrounding right-wing extremist milieu.

### Uncertain financial situation

The NPD’s difficult financial situation has worsened. This is due to increased expenses connected with the proceedings to ban the party and to a drop in donations, requiring the NPD to reimburse the federal

administration for public matching funds.

**Priority of  
“educational  
efforts”**

The party is currently in a phase of political and strategic reorientation. But the NPD party executive continues to adhere to its “three-point”<sup>xxx</sup> strategy:<sup>xxxi</sup> the “battle for the streets”, “battle for the parliaments” and “battle for the minds”. In view of the increasing autonomy of the neo-Nazi scene, however, the “battle for the streets”, once the NPD’s top priority, is losing significance. The “battle for the minds” and “battle for the parliaments” are gaining priority. The NPD hoped to use 2003 for “training and a structural and association reform”.<sup>xxxii</sup> Here education efforts (“battle for the minds”) assumed “special significance” for the party executive.<sup>xxxiii</sup> In summer, the party began building a “national-democratic training centre” on the property of party headquarters in Berlin-Köpenick; the centre is intended to enable young Germans “to provoke an intellectual revolution in the FRG”.<sup>xxxiv</sup> With inter-regional events and seminars – such as the “Free Convention” in Leipzig in May and the “Summer University” in Saarbrücken in August – and speakers not affiliated with the party (Pierre KREBS, Horst MAHLER), the NPD attempted to “use educational measures to actively combat ... the consequences of anti-German policy and convey an alternative nationalist policy”.<sup>xxxv</sup> In 2004, the party intends to “increase its efforts in the ‘battle for the parliaments’ to overcome the 5% hurdle at state level”.<sup>xxxvi</sup>

**Demonstrations as  
sign of alliance  
policy success**

NPD attempts in 2003 to gain publicity with larger, media-friendly events and demonstrations as part of its “battle for the streets” were less successful than in previous years. For example, the NPD put on only about 50 demonstrations (2002: 100<sup>xxxvii</sup>), in which an average of 150 persons took part, including persons from the neo-Nazi spectrum. In spring, the central focus was the war in Iraq. Only about 1,300 demonstrators took part in the Berlin rally for 1 May. In 2002, the NPD organised six regional rallies for 1 May, with a total of about 3,000 participants.

In addition to organising its own events, the NPD again took part in neo-Nazi demonstrations, in particular those protesting the travelling exhibition on the German Wehrmacht’s involvement in war crimes during World War II, “Crimes of the Wehrmacht”. The neo-Nazis’ increasing ability to organise their own demonstrations in competition with the NPD was demonstrated on 1 May in particular: A neo-Nazi demonstration in Halle, Saxony-Anhalt, attracted 1,200 participants, nearly as many as attended a similar NPD event held in Berlin. The growing distance between the “Free Forces” and the NPD is

expressed in a commentary on the NPD's European party convention, published on the "Störtebeker Network" on the Internet. According to the commentary, it would be quite unlikely for the non-affiliated nationalist scene to close ranks and support the NPD in upcoming elections as had happened in the past. Although they still cooperate here and there, the commentary stated, this is less from inner conviction than out of fear of remaining entirely unnoticed by the public.

Party chairman Udo VOIGT's criticism of reactions from the "nationalist camp" to the end of proceedings to ban the NPD also offers insight into what the NPD regards as its tense relationship to the neo-Nazi scene. VOIGT refers to "egomaniacal 'nationalists' " who "probably would have been as pleased by an NPD ban as the system's henchmen in Berlin".<sup>xxxviii</sup> VOIGT calls the leading Hamburg neo-Nazi Christian WORCH a "killjoy".<sup>xxxix</sup> But the message of solidarity given by NPD deputy chairman Holger APFEL at the Rudolf Hess memorial event in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, on 16 August demonstrates the ambivalence of the relationship between NPD party leaders and the neo-Nazi scene (cf. Section IV, 1). APFEL conveyed greetings from the NPD party executive to those attending and assured them "that the NPD is on the side of those who stand up for truth and justice".<sup>xl</sup> The party leaders are no doubt well aware of the fact that neo-Nazis and skinheads continue to represent an important pool of potential activists for the party.

**Overtures to REP,  
DVU and DP**

In view of the increasingly problematic relationship of the NPD to the neo-Nazi scene, the party leadership is again showing interest in working more closely with parties from the right-wing extremist spectrum. In August, the party executive agreed on a "Leipzig Appeal" calling on the leaders of the Republikaner (REP), Deutsche Volkunion (DVU, German People's Union) and the Deutsche Partei (DP, German Party) to overcome divisions within the nationalist camp and to draft a joint list of candidates for the European parliamentary elections in 2004; the DVU and DP responded only after a long delay, whereas the REP did not respond at all.

**Cooperation with  
other right-wing  
extremists in  
"Dresden Nationalist  
Alliance"**

On 24 April, current and former members of the NPD, REP, DVU and representatives of the Freie Nationalisten (Free Nationalists) met to create what they called the "Dresden Nationalist Alliance" in order to "combine nationalist forces" for Saxony's local elections in June 2004.<sup>xli</sup> Holger APFEL, the NPD's deputy national chairman, was elected to chair the alliance. The group announced its intention to "send an effective signal reaching far beyond Dresden ... that at a time

when the nationalist opposition is increasingly stigmatised and criminalised, it is possible to make effective policy ... only if all Germans close ranks today with renewed vigour.”<sup>xlii</sup> The alliance receives most of its support from the NPD, but some also comes from the party executive of the REP association in Saxony.<sup>xliii</sup> But the REP national party executive expressly rejects cooperation with the alliance (cf. 3, below). The national party executive of the DVU has not yet expressed a reaction.

**Participation in elections**

The NPD did not participate in any state parliamentary elections in 2003. It took part only in local elections in Bavaria and Brandenburg. In the district election in Lower Bavaria on 21 September it did not gain any seats. In the Brandenburg elections on 26 October, the party ran in only three rural districts and the community of Wittstock/Dosse, winning three district council seats and one city council seat, respectively.

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### 1.3 Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats)

Founded:	1969
Headquarters:	Riesa, Saxony
National chairman:	Stefan ROCHOW
Membership:	400 (2002: at most 500)
Publications:	regional only

The NPD is the only right-wing extremist party to have a youth organisation with a significant number of members. According to the NPD statutes, the Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) is an “integral part” of the NPD. By virtue of his office, the JN national chairman is an ex officio member of the NPD executive.

The JN views itself as the “nationalist-revolutionary spearhead” of the NPD, according to its national chairman Stefan ROCHOW.<sup>xliv</sup> In his view, major problems today and in the future can be overcome only by “revolutionising all aspects of politics and suppressing liberal ideology in favour of nationalist-revolutionary ideals”. Only “revolutionary nationalism” is willing and able to take on this great political task, he says.<sup>xlv</sup>

Although the JN has lost its earlier importance as an autonomous link between the NPD, neo-Nazis and other right-wing extremist groups, it was able to make its public appearances more effective than in 2002. For example, with support from the NPD and unaffiliated persons the JN organised a demonstration in Hanau on 29 March with the slogan “Down with US tyranny! Freedom for all peoples”; about 150 persons participated. The JN supervised a demonstration in Schwäbisch-Hall on 21 June to protest the travelling exhibition on the Wehrmacht’s involvement in World War II atrocities; about 300 persons took part.

For the first time since 2000, the JN put on a European convention, which used to be an annual event. About 200 persons, including guests from a number of other countries, took part in the event, held in Gremsdorf, near Erlangen, Bavaria.

## 2. Deutsche Volkunion (DVU, German People's Union)

Founded:	1987 *
Headquarters:	Munich
National chairman:	Dr. Gerhard FREY
Membership:	11,500 (2002: 13,000) **
Publication:	<i>National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (NZ)</i> Circulation: 41,000 ** weekly
* founded 1971 as a registered society; constituted 1987 as political party; 1987 – 1991 DVU Liste D	
** estimated	

The DVU continues to have the largest membership of any right-wing extremist party. Since its founding, it has been led in a centralised, autocratic fashion by its national chairman, Dr. Gerhard FREY, who also provides most of its funding.<sup>xlvi</sup> FREY owns the DSZ – Druckschriften- und Zeitungsverlag GmbH (DSZ-Verlag) publishing house and is chief editor of the weekly *NZ*, which has the largest circulation of any right-wing extremist publication in Germany.

### 2.1 Goals and methods

In its anti-constitutional efforts, the DVU essentially takes up the typical right-wing extremist issues from an exaggeratedly nationalistic perspective. It places special emphasis on xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism and a comprehensive revisionism. The party condemns all foreigners and Jews, who are mainly portrayed in negative stereotypes as anti-German.

Due to FREY's unlimited authority within the DVU and the lack of a party newspaper, the *NZ* can be regarded as accurately reflecting the party's programme. This "free and nationalist" newspaper prefers to focus on political issues and events which it presents in a biased way – often marked by conspiracy theories – to serve as propaganda for the party's classic right-wing extremist views. The same is true of the DVU's and DSU-Verlag's smaller Internet presence. Many *NZ* articles are ultimately advertisements for books put out by FREY's publishing

businesses that are recommended as providing more extensive information on the same topic; these publications are often little more than collections of earlier *NZ* articles.<sup>xlvii</sup> Numerous *NZ* articles refer to books currently in preparation.<sup>xlviii</sup> In both cases, *NZ* articles are recycled and resold. One of FREY's main interests is using political agitation and intensive advertising for his publishing business to maximise revenue and profit.

*NZ* devotes much of its attention to the subject of foreigners in Germany. It also focuses on topics intended to allow a one-sided treatment of the National Socialist past. Stereotypes in headlines and subliminally anti-Semitic articles encourage resentment of Jews; other articles attack the democratic state under the rule of law and its representatives.

The large number and constant repetition of such articles, written according to simple right-wing extremist models of agitation, show that the *NZ* is not interested in presenting problems or encouraging a democratic debate, but instead uses generalisations and denigration to attack the essential principles of the free and democratic order.

#### Xenophobia

The DVU's xenophobic attitudes are apparent in the *NZ*'s biased and stereotypical reporting on foreigners, crime caused by foreigners and asylum fraud. The constant repetition of headlines such as "Crime by foreigners trivialised? Mild sentences don't deter",<sup>xlix</sup> "Horribly high rate of crime by foreigners",<sup>l</sup> and "Nearly half of all jailbirds are foreigners"<sup>li</sup> is intended to imply that foreigners living in Germany are generally criminals.

Statistics and original graphics are added to increase the visual impact of such articles and make them appear to be confirmed by official sources. Sensational headlines consciously foster prejudice and fear of foreigners and imply that foreigners living in Germany are a threat to the security and existence of the country and of every individual.

In its numerous xenophobic articles on the subject of asylum and policy on foreigners, the *NZ* invoked the supposed threat of *Umvolkung*, or replacement of the German population by other ethnic groups. For example, an article entitled "Open door just for foreigners? New campaign against ethnic German immigrants" contained the following statement:

"The current nonsensical immigration policy can be summed up in the following slogan: Open the door to foreigners from all over the world, slam it shut on Germans! ... Ethnic German immigrants, who could

add to the shrinking proportion of Germans and thereby help stabilise the pension system, are being kept out using methods which are downright nasty. But foreigners from every corner of the earth – whether their claim is justified or not, whether they can speak German or not – are welcomed with open arms and praised as an ‘enrichment’!”  
 (“Freie Fahrt nur für Fremde? Neue Kampagne gegen deutsche Aussiedler”, *NZ*, No. 38/2003, p. 10)

Articles with headlines such as “Should Germans be replaced by foreigners?”<sup>liii</sup> and “Jobs for foreigners instead of Germans?”<sup>liii</sup> are intended to fan fears of mass immigration and excessive foreign influence in Germany. The party also appealed to instincts of self-defence in articles on the EU’s eastward enlargement bearing headlines such as “ ‘Human exchange’ to change the face of Europe – EU wants to undermine ethnic origin of the European population”.<sup>liv</sup>

#### Anti-Semitism

In a context of xenophobia and racism, the party promotes an anti-Semitism typical of right-wing extremism; this is usually expressed implicitly, although sometimes it is quite obvious. In 2003, the *NZ* was full of headlines and articles containing subtly anti-Semitic content. These suggested that Jews in particular were identifying the German people exclusively with the Nazi past and thus preventing Germans from gaining equal standing within the international community. These articles asserted that members of the Jewish faith or of Jewish origin were disproportionately represented in politics, the economy and the media; they discredited Jewish organisations, condemned German restitution payments and commented critically on events in Israel and the occupied territories.

Criticism of Jews was often apparent only by reading between the lines, but the sheer number of articles with headlines such as “Germany: #1 destination for Jewish immigrants”<sup>lv</sup> and “Israel’s secret influence: Its undercover agents all over Germany”<sup>lvi</sup> is intended to suggest the supposedly threatening influence of “anti-German Jews” and a conspiracy directed above all against Germany. These articles always ended by recommending the two-volume anti-Semitic standard work *Wer ist wer im Judentum* (Who’s who in Jewry) published by the FZ - Freiheitlicher Buch- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH (FZ-Verlag)<sup>lvii</sup> for further reading.<sup>lviii</sup> The FZ-Verlag also offers the book *Jüdische Kriegserklärungen an Deutschland* (Jewish declarations of war on Germany), which takes up and perpetuates the right-wing extremist myth of a massive threat posed by “Jewry”. Another book of this kind is *Das Netz - Israels Lobby in Deutschland* (The network: Israel’s lobby in



Germany) published by the FZ-Verlag in 2003, which – according to the publisher – reveals the names of organisations and their members with significant influence “behind the scenes” to “control politics and the media”.

### Relativising the Holocaust

The DVU continued its efforts to relativise the Holocaust. The *NZ* repeatedly implied that the notion of the Holocaust as a historical fact was actually exaggerated and false. The *NZ* cast doubt on historical facts about the genocide of European Jews by mixing them with accusations of falsifications and long-refuted assertions presented as current information. The newspaper also did its best to obscure the meaning of the term “Holocaust” and the historical circumstances by using it over and over in a variety of contexts. It also frequently asserted that having the “wrong opinion” on the historical event of the German mass murder of the Jews and on other Nazi wrongdoing was being treated as a crime. In this way, the *NZ* questions the reliability of historical accounts and thus indirectly relativises the extent of the Jews – despite all protestations to the contrary and without violating any laws.

Numerous *NZ* articles sharply criticised the planning and building of new Holocaust memorials. These articles argued that such memorials were negative symbols of a supposedly one-sided process of coming to terms with the past that, by manifesting German guilt, failed to do justice to the actual course of history. Articles with headlines such as “Boom in commemoration of Nazi victims”<sup>lix</sup> and “Yet another memorial to Nazi victims”<sup>lix</sup> criticised the number of existing memorials. An article with the headline “Are we supposed to do penance forever? The real meaning of the Holocaust memorial” accused democratically elected politicians, currently engaged in “their biggest project yet” in Berlin, of taking a “one-sided approach to facing the past”.<sup>lxi</sup>

### Relativising other Nazi crimes

A standard element of the weekly newspaper is the relativising of other Nazi crimes. In order to present the ‘Third Reich’ in a more positive light, the *NZ* lists atrocities committed by other groups, from antiquity to the present, in a global catalogue of wrongs. Further, the crimes committed in Nazi Germany are trivialised in historically false reinterpretations or even questioned.

The DVU’s right-wing extremist orientation is also apparent from its revisionist attitude towards representatives and institutions of the Nazi regime. The FZ-Verlag offered its wide range of media products attesting to their “true” greatness and achievements as a corrective to the supposedly false historical account.<sup>lxii</sup> Numerous *NZ* articles about familiar Wehrmacht personalities and German military tactics and strategy in World War II served the same purpose. Articles with

headlines such as “Defamation of Wehrmacht legend: What Günther Prien was really like”<sup>lxiii</sup> and “‘Unshakably brave’: On the passing of Kurt Baberg, submarine commander and writer”<sup>lxiv</sup> are intended to keep alive the myth of a heroic and honourable defence of the fatherland against the Allies’ “war of annihilation”.

The *NZ*’s agitation against the travelling exhibition on the Wehrmacht’s involvement in war crimes during World War II should also be viewed in this context.<sup>lxv</sup> Articles with headlines such as “Tax money wasted on Reemtsma show”<sup>lxvi</sup> and “Disgusting defamation of the Wehrmacht”<sup>lxvii</sup> attacked the exhibition’s organisers.

**Opposition to principle of democracy**

In numerous *NZ* articles, the DVU again attacked the democratic state and its representatives. The party used polemics and defamation in the hope of damaging the reputation of institutions and individuals and weakening citizens’ trust in politics and the values anchored in the Basic Law. The DVU constantly and unjustly accused democratically elected politicians of insisting on Germans’ collective guilt for the genocide of the Jews as a means of retaining power. According to the DVU, political leaders allegedly used this constant reproach to demoralise the population in order to make it easier to govern and to ensure that these leaders would remain in power. The DVU uses such agitation in its attempt to discredit democracy.

**Increased agitation against the US**

The DVU took advantage of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent reactions of the international community of nations to continue its own attacks on the US.

An article entitled “Iraq 2003/Poland 1939 – (No) comparison? Or: Bush is allowed to do what no one else is” compared the war in Iraq to Hitler’s attack on Poland.<sup>lxviii</sup> According to the article, the US president used the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 to justify military action against Iraq. But, the article argued, if previous wrongs justify numerous wars, then should the Wehrmacht’s invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 not be viewed in a different light? After all, the article went on, the ‘Third Reich’ attacked in response to the allegedly aggressive intentions of its neighbouring country, discrimination against “ethnic Germans” (*Volksdeutsche*) and the unlawful occupation of German territory.

In the same way, the DVU intensified its anti-Semitic campaign associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and linked it to attacks on democratically elected politicians. *NZ* articles with headlines such as “Iraq – ‘a war of the Jews’?”<sup>lxix</sup> and ‘Is Israel behind America’s wars? – First Iraq, then Syria, then Iran”<sup>lxx</sup> created the impression that Jews living in the US were ultimately responsible for the Iraq war.

## 2.2 Organisation and development

<b>Organisation</b>	<p>Within the party, the power of chairman Dr. Gerhard FREY remained unchallenged. He continued to set the party's ideological positions and goals, oversaw important personnel decisions, including those made by the <i>Land</i> party associations, and decided whether to take part in <i>Land</i> parliamentary elections. The other members of the national party executive, which has been reduced to the smallest possible number, play only a minor role. The 16 <i>Land</i> party associations have no freedom to undertake their own initiatives or independent political work. There is a complete absence of democracy within the party. FREY's leadership style allows him to keep the party largely closed off from the influence of the NPD, REP and neo-Nazis. However, this leaves the DVU more or less isolated within the right-wing extremist camp. It also kept the party from attracting young right-wing extremists from other parts of the milieu to make up for age-related membership losses.</p>
<b>DVU activities</b>	<p>The DVU's major rally, once an annual event held in the Nibelungen hall in Passau, was originally rescheduled from September 2002 to June 2003 and then cancelled entirely. The party concentrated instead on four regional events. Their locations were chosen to allow the party conferences of several <i>Länder</i> to be held concurrently; a total of eight new DVU <i>Land</i> party executives were elected. In addition to FREY, who was the main speaker, DVU members of <i>Land</i> parliaments and top DVU functionaries also gave speeches.<sup>lxxi</sup> Their presence was intended to demonstrate the success of the DVU's parliamentary and party work.</p>
<b>Participation in elections</b>	<p>In 2003, the party ran only in the elections in the city-state of Bremen on 25 May and in the Bremerhaven city council election on 28 September.</p> <p>In the first, the DVU received 2.3% of the overall vote (1999: 3.0%). But because it gained 7.1% of the vote in Bremerhaven, the party once again won a seat in the city-state's parliament.<sup>lxxii</sup> Starting in autumn 2002, FREY authored columns in the <i>NZ</i> calling on readers to donate to the party. Before the election, the DVU spent a lot of money on direct mail advertising and a broad poster campaign. The party used aggressive, mainly xenophobic slogans such as "Let in even more foreigners? NO!" and "Jobs for Germans first!".</p> <p>In the Bremerhaven local election in September, the DVU did even better than in the city-state election in May: The party received 8.1% of the votes (1999: 5.2%), increasing the number of its seats on the</p>

local council (where the DVU has been represented since the party's founding) from three to four.

**DVU representatives  
in the Brandenburg  
parliament**

In response to the poor image of earlier DVU parliamentary groups in various *Land* parliaments, the five-person parliamentary group in the Brandenburg parliament has gone to great lengths to present itself in a serious light. The group regularly produces a publication available in print and on the group's own website, where videoclips featuring some of the representatives are also available.

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### 3. Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans)

Founded:	1983
Headquarters:	Berlin
National chairman:	Dr. Rolf SCHLIERER
Membership:	approx. 8,000 (2002: around 9,000)
Publication:	<i>DER REPUBLIKANER</i> Circulation: 12,000 every two months
Subsidiary organisations:	Republikanische Jugend (RJ, Republican Youth), Republikanischer Bund der öffentlich Bediensteten (RepBB, Republican Union of Public-Sector Workers), Republikanischer Bund der Frauen (RBF, Republican Women's Union), Republikanischer Hochschulverband (RHV, Republican Higher Education Association)

#### 3.1 Objectives

The REP's activities continue to show tendencies to right-wing extremism. Although not every party member pursues anti-constitutional aims, influential persons – particularly those below the level of the party executive – make no secret of their opposition to the free and democratic order. Nor do the efforts of the current party leadership around the national chairman, Dr. Rolf SCHLIERER, to portray the REP as a purely democratic party manage to hide this. Taken all together, the nature of their criticism of the status quo reveals a basic rejection of essential principles of our constitution, and finds varying degrees of expression in xenophobia, anti-Semitism, revisionism, agitation against the principle of democracy and cooperation with other right-wing extremists.

#### Xenophobia

The REP's xenophobic activities, which violate the constitutional principles of equality and human dignity, are carried out largely on the premise that foreigners are threatening to destroy the German people. The REP's activities include sowing discord based on envy, fanning fears of an excessive number of foreigners, and condemning

foreigners in general, accusing them of causing social problems and conflicts.

An issue of the party organ *Der Republikaner* published ahead of the *Land* parliamentary elections in Hesse and Lower Saxony is a good example of xenophobic agitation. Focusing on policy towards immigration and foreigners, the publication's campaign issue obviously hoped to take political advantage of public fears and resentment at the expense of minorities, portraying the party as the only protector of national interests, as is obvious from the articles' slogan-type headlines: "Keep Turkey from invading!", "Millions migrating into ghettos", "Islam courses taught in our schools?" "Will Christmas soon be a thing of the past?" "Dual citizenship – Chronology of an electoral swindle", "Defend the Christian West!" and "Deportation, not immigration – We keep our word!"<sup>lxxiii</sup>

The fact that the REP regards social conflicts and problems as especially suitable for misuse in stirring up xenophobic feelings is clear from statements by its national chairman, SCHLIERER, who regards social and domestic peace as being threatened and speaks of a "civil war scenario in the multi-culti society".<sup>lxxiv</sup>

For example, REP campaign posters for the Bavarian parliamentary and district elections on 21 September polemicised the discussion of health care costs: "Gold teeth for asylum seekers? Gap teeth for Germans!? Not if we have anything to say about it!"<sup>lxxv</sup> A campaign publication entitled "Do you know what your taxes and social security contributions pay for?" described, sometimes falsely, the scope and legal implications of the social security agreement with Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. In particular, the publication asserted that a foreign worker's family members living in their country of origin ("that is, first and second wife etc. including all children, grandparents and possibly brother and his family") were also insured by German health insurance funds free of charge.

In a press release dated 31 July, the REP's national office noted:

"While employed persons and taxpayers are hard at work, creating the conditions necessary to maintain our welfare state, numerous asylum fakers in Germany are lying around lazily, celebrating in grand style." (Press release issued by the REP national office, "Gutmenschen-Terror in Rastatt" (Do-gooder terror in Rastatt), No. 34/03 of 31 July 2003)

The racial underpinnings of the REP's notion of *Überfremdung*, i.e., the excessive influence of foreigners, are demonstrated in exemplary

fashion in a statement published on the party's national website for the 54th anniversary of the Basic Law:

“Essentially unchangeable basic rights have been increasingly undermined. The concept of the German people as a sovereign entity is currently being replaced with the notion of population ... A misguided liberalism in every area is destroying shared basic values and replacing them with tolerance towards those who ultimately wish to do away with this democracy. For example, towards Islam. Political correctness is taking the place of basic rights.”

As a political solution to the problems supposedly caused by foreigners, the REP demands: “Close the borders.” Specifically, they demand the “re-introduction of effective controls at the German and Bavarian borders, returns instead of immigration and rigorous deportation of foreigners who have turned to crime.” Otherwise, they claim, Germany will commit “suicide”.<sup>lxxvi</sup>

The party also issues “recommendations” for foreigners to return to their countries of origin, sometimes with cynical undertones emphasising its xenophobia. For example, an article about the birth of a Muslim boy, entitled “Flörsheim celebrates Mohammed's birth”, contains the following text:

“How many more Mohammeds, Alis and Mustafas are likely to be born this year in our country? ... In the hope that a few German children will also be born this year in Flörsheim and elsewhere in our country, we Republikaner congratulate Mohammed's proud parents and wish them and him a pleasant journey back to the Orient as soon as possible, and a happy life in the land of their fathers.”  
 (“Flörsheim feiert Geburt Mohammeds”, *Groß-Gerauer Kreis-REPort*, newsletter of the REP representatives on the Gross-Gerau district council, 1/2003, p. 4)

### Anti-Semitism

In response to a petition to a Düsseldorf district council to investigate the deportation of Jews from that city during the Nazi era, a REP council member was quoted in an REP press release as saying:

“If this keeps on, the memorials will eventually outnumber the murdered Jews. And that isn't going to bring them back to life.” (Press release of the REP association of North Rhine-Westphalia, Münster press office, 19 November 2003)

The party used the circumstances surrounding the former vice president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany for purposes of anti-Semitic agitation. A statement by the REP association of Saarland, published on the Internet, clearly expresses an anti-Semitic

sense of satisfaction at the “Friedman affair”. Bearing the headline “Cocaine, prostitutes and hatred of Germans!” the article calls Michel Friedman a “model Jew” and condemns the supposed double standard of public opinion regarding the affair. The article states that whereas “rightists” were quickly pre-judged, especially if the victims were Jews, this was “not the case if one is a Jew in Germany” despite clear evidence. Thus, the article argues, German society is made up of “two classes: the socially acceptable ‘Judas’ and the free-thinking citizen. Woe to those who belong to the second class” (“Kokain, Huren und Deutschenhass!” Internet article published by the REP association of Saarland).

### Revisionism

The party’s revisionist efforts centered on relativising the crimes of National Socialism - sometimes stepping over the line into historical misrepresentation - and questioning the current German borders.

REP arguments relativising the crimes of National Socialism are often based on the premise of comparing alleged or actual war crimes committed by the Allies during World War II. The following statement by national party chairman SCHLIERER serves as an example: “The constantly repeated reference to Nazi wrongs must not be allowed to reduce the seriousness of the Allies’ war crimes.” In line with this attitude, the REP demands a “memorial to all German victims of bombing terror”, because, according to SCHLIERER, the mass murder of women and children by systematic bombing from the air was an original invention of British and American military strategists.<sup>lxxvii</sup>

In the party publication *Der Republikaner*, SCHLIERER added:

“The servile attitude of Merkel and Schäuble, who still cannot or will not understand that gratitude is just another word for vassalage, is just as nausea-inducing as the claim that it was only thanks to the US Air Force bombardment in World War II that we were readmitted to the community of civilised nations. The only liberation brought about by American Air Force bombs was freeing bombing victims of their lives and worldly goods.”

(*Der Republikaner*, No. 3-4/2003, p. 11)

At the party’s Ash Wednesday meeting in Geisenhausen, Bavaria, on 5 March, SCHLIERER declared: “We must put an end to the German guilt complex, as though Nazi crimes were unique and Germans were a nation of criminals.”<sup>lxxviii</sup>

A campaign flyer for the Bavarian elections on 21 September bore the revealing subhead “Central Germany is not eastern Germany is not



Poland!” and criticised the fact that Germany had recognised the Oder-Neisse-Line as its eastern border in the 1990 Two-plus-Four Treaty restoring full sovereignty to reunified Germany. According to the flyer, in view of “the international ban on annexation and the inviolable right to self-determination”, this fact was cause for “serious concern with regard to international law”. For this reason, the flyer stated, the REP was pursuing the “aim of a peaceful completion to German unity, with the inclusion of eastern Germany” in order to achieve a “lasting and peaceful order in Central and Eastern Europe”.<sup>lxxix</sup>

The party publication *Der Republikaner* also refers to the “Polish theft of land from Germany’s eastern territories” and to “unrepentant expelling states like Poland and the Czech Republic”.<sup>lxxx</sup>

#### Defamation of the democratic rule of law

By attacking the democratic state under the rule of law and its institutions and representatives in a targeted and defamatory manner, the REP hopes to weaken the public’s trust in its ability to function and thereby in the value system anchored in the Basic Law. To do so, the REP typically disparages the “established political parties” as a whole, i.e. ultimately disparaging the multi-party system. For example, the REP accuses both “SPD and CDU, along with their helpers [of carving] this country up like a Christmas goose.”<sup>lxxxix</sup> Elsewhere, the REP refers to “corrupt parties no matter where you look”<sup>lxxxii</sup> and asks polemically “Germany - Corruptistan?”<sup>lxxxiii</sup> The newsletter of the REP representatives on the Gross-Gerau district council also adopts this tone:

Like everywhere else in Germany, in the district of Gross-Gerau the only thing that still works perfectly is making taxpayers’ money disappear into other people’s pockets and the political caste helping themselves. The old parties have turned Germany into a nearly bankrupt, multi-cultural Augean stable filled with the stink of corruption, nepotism and bribery.”  
(*Groß-Gerauer Kreis-REP*ort, newsletter of the REP representatives on the Gross-Gerau district council, 1/2003, p. 4)

### 3.2 Organisation and development

#### Continued decline in membership

In 2003, the party saw its membership continue to drop to about 8,000 (2002: 9,000; 2001: 11,500; 2000: 13,000). As in previous years, the party kept a low public profile apart from its election campaigning. About 500 persons took part in the annual Ash Wednesday meeting in

Geisenhausen, Bavaria on 5 March (2002: about 600).

#### Continuing decline

The party continued to decline following years of internal conflict over national party chairman SCHLIERER's policy of distancing the REP from other right-wing extremist organisations, as well as its losses again in the 2003 elections. The party leadership ignored demands for a change of course and was unmoved by criticism of the national party chairman's leadership style, which resulted in further personnel losses. Bernd BERNHARD, REP chairman for the city-state of Berlin, resigned from all his party offices on 26 May to express his criticism of SCHLIERER's go-it-alone policy. In his resignation letter, BERNHARD wrote that the REP had become a "party of losers" and was "in free fall". The letter stated that it was necessary to send an unmistakable signal – also to the media, which would be possible only "if the two largest German right-wing parties, the DVU and Republikaner, agreed to cooperate, in whatever form." The smaller parties could "be brought on board later", the letter stated.<sup>lxxxiv</sup>

#### Cooperation with other right-wing extremists

While some frustrated REP members have joined the Deutsche Partei (DP, German Party), some state party associations are considering whether to join the Freiheitliche Initiative Deutschlands (FID, Freedom Initiative of Germany), a grouping of nationalist-conservative and right-wing extremist parties and organisations across party lines.<sup>lxxxv</sup> Contrary to the wishes of the national party executive, the REP *Land* associations of Rhineland Palatinate<sup>lxxxvi</sup> and Saarland<sup>lxxxvii</sup> joined the FID. On 28-29 June, the REP national executive ruled that the Rhineland Palatinate association's membership in the FID violated party regulations – it did not rule on the membership of the Saarland association – and declared its fundamental opposition to any FID membership by REP party organisations. At the same time, however, deputy national chairman Haymo HOCH was directed to "establish contact [with the FID] and explore the possibility of cooperation".<sup>lxxxviii</sup>

In addition to these efforts at creating unity within the FID, REP members in Saxony tried to achieve a political reorientation. Under the leadership of Frithjof RICHTER, ex officio member of the state party executive and chairman of the Dresden district association, Saxony REP members joined the "Dresden Nationalist Alliance" electoral coalition founded by right-wing extremists on 24 April (cf. 1, above).<sup>lxxxix</sup> The chairwoman of Saxony's state association, Kerstin LORENZ, expressly supported this move. In a statement published on the Internet, LORENZ went so far as to say she was aware that she would probably not remain the REP state chairwoman for long, due to

her support for the “Dresden Nationalist Alliance”. But, she stated, “I don’t really care”. On 28-29 June, the REP’s national executive decided that REP members who belonged to the “Dresden Nationalist Alliance” were not acting on behalf of the party, that membership in the alliance was not compatible with REP membership, that continuing to cooperate with the alliance would be viewed as conduct damaging to the party and that persons who did so would be kicked out of the party.<sup>xc</sup>

Despite SCHLIERER’s policy of not working with other right-wing extremist organisations, the following examples demonstrate the continuing contacts between numerous REP members and functionaries and right-wing extremists:

- Party members took part in the so-called 1st Freedom Convention, organised by the NPD-owned press *Deutsche Stimme-Verlag* and held near Leipzig on 23-25 May.<sup>xc</sup>
- On 17 June, Oskar ATZINGER, chairman of the REP district association of Lower Bavaria, district council member and leading candidate for the upcoming district council elections in Lower Bavaria, and Gisela BÖHMER, chairwoman of the NPD district association of Lower Bavaria, held a vigil together in Passau commemorating the victims of the 1953 East German uprising.<sup>xcii</sup>
- The NPD party publication *Deutsche Stimme* reported in its special supplement for the *Deutsche Stimme* press gathering in Meerane, Saxony, on 9 August that “activists from the NPD, DVU, Republikaner and unaffiliated *Kameradschaften*” came together across party lines “to reaffirm their desire to overcome what has divided them in the past and together seek to close ranks with all forward-looking nationalists and patriots.”<sup>xciii</sup>
- REP members again took part in the annual demonstration put on by the right-wing extremist *Junge Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen* (JLO, Young *Landsmannschaft* of East Prussia) on 13 February to commemorate the Allied bombing of Dresden in World War II. In 2003, participants included REP deputy chairman for North Rhine-Westphalia, Reinhard RUPSCH (who also spoke at the 2002 demonstration) and the party chairs for Saxony and Saarland, Kerstin LORENZ and Andreas THIES, respectively.<sup>xciv</sup>
- The REP, “Dresden Nationalist Alliance”, NPD and JLO all had information stands at the “Saxon Day” state festival, held 6-7 September in Sebnitz, Saxony. The NPD published an Internet article on the “successful representation of the nationalist opposition at ‘Saxon Day’ in Sebnitz”, which noted that “the

alliance's new T-shirt calling for 'Nationalist Unity Now', worn by 15 comrades at the information stands of the NPD, Republikaner and JLO, [was] a visible expression of the sense of community".

- A press release by the Deutsche Partei (DP, German Party) association of Baden-Württemberg stated that the REP district association of south Württemberg had issued invitations to its traditional non-partisan event at Lake Constance on 7 September 2003. The press release stated that "active political supporters of the REP, DP, Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat (DLVH), Schill-Partei, DVU and persons not affiliated with any party" had attended the event. The press release went on to say that, before taking leave of each other, all those attending agreed "that the REP of south Württemberg ... has ended its self-imposed isolation and has no interest in circling the wagons".<sup>xcv</sup>

**Participation in elections**

The party ran candidates in the *Land* elections in Hesse, Lower Saxony and Bavaria and in local elections in Bavaria and Brandenburg, in each case without competition from other right-wing extremist parties.

The party suffered serious losses in the elections in Hesse and Lower Saxony on 2 February. In Hesse, the party gained 1.3% of the votes (1999: 2.7%); in Lower Saxony, it gained 0.4% of the votes (1998: 2.8%). The REP suffered another painful defeat in the Bavarian *Land* elections on 21 September, receiving only 2.2% of the votes (1998: 3.6%). The party also did poorly in the Bavarian district council elections held the same day, winning only a single seat (1996: 6). In the Brandenburg local elections on 26 October, the REP unsuccessfully ran one candidate in the Oder/Spree rural district.

**Administrative court proceedings**

Proceedings brought by the REP association of the city-state of Berlin against monitoring of the party by government intelligence services are still pending appeal.

## VI. Efforts to foster intellectual right-wing extremism

In order to be successful politically, movements, organisations and parties must have attractive programmes. The necessary theoretical background is provided by certain intellectuals, whose conclusions have central significance for political actors' identity and practice. German right-wing extremism continues to be lacking in this area, as even those belonging to this political camp repeatedly acknowledge. As a result, a number of more educated right-wing extremists have been trying since the early 1980s to raise intellectual standards in the right-wing extremist milieu. Reading groups have been organised, new journals founded, symposia carried out and relevant books published – all evidence of such efforts. Already by the mid-1990s, however, it was clear that these efforts were failing: Many of their initiatives stagnated or were discontinued. And they had little apparent impact beyond the right-wing extremist camp. Right-wing extremists never even came close to achieving the “cultural hegemony” in public discourse they desired.

Nor did efforts to raise the intellectual standards within their own political camp make any headway, as the parties' example demonstrates: Attempts by the party Die Republikaner (REP, Republicans) in the early and mid-1990s to attract intellectuals and to make the party publication more intellectually demanding both failed. The Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union) did not even try for a more intellectual image. Instead, it limited itself to simple-minded and stereotypical statements in its “*National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung*” (NZ) newspaper and its election campaigning.

### Intellectual approaches in the NPD

By contrast, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany) has displayed a more intellectual and theory-oriented approach ever since a number of younger, university-educated right-wing extremists joined in the late 1990s, in the course of ideological, strategic and organisational change within the party. As writers and editors at the party organ *Deutsche Stimme* (German Voice), they had a certain influence and increased the number of articles devoted to ideology and strategy. In 2003, these included theoretical articles in the series “Battle for the Minds” on the concepts of “Europe”, “sovereignty” and “the nation-state”; fundamental critiques of the West as “decadent” and “contemptuous of the world's peoples”; thoughts on a nationalist environmental policy; calls for a strategy of oppositional alliance – encompassing non-German “fundamentalists” and “patriots”; and portraits of classic political figures regarded as role models.<sup>x<sup>cv</sup>i</sup> Compared to previous years, however, the importance of such articles has diminished. One of the most important

figures in the effort to make the NPD more intellectual is Jürgen SCHWAB, who studied German literature at university and now heads the working group Volk und Staat (The people and the state) of the NPD party executive. The working group has announced plans to offer seminars and publications on the following topics: the economy and the state, the media in the Federal Republic of Germany, the family as the nucleus of the people, and foundations of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. In addition, SCHWAB intends to expand his seminar series on political theory into a training course for party activists.<sup>xcvii</sup>

**Deutsche Akademie** Along with right-wing extremist intellectuals such as Dr. Pierre KREBS, Horst MAHLER and Dr. Reinhold OBERLERCHER, SCHWAB is a co-founder of the Deutsche Akademie (German academy). This institution active in NPD circles is intended to strengthen education in state theory and develop alternatives to the system in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) which emphasise the notion of a Reich. Further, the Deutsche Akademie, together with the NPD group Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund e.V. (NHB, National-Democratic University Union) hopes to bring intellectuals together outside of party activities and win their support for the NPD's "battle for the minds", "battle for the streets" and "battle for the parliaments" (See Section V, 1). With this in mind, the Akademie offered seminars again in 2003, such as the summer programme with speakers including book editor Dr. Rolf KOSIEK and SCHWAB himself. The conference invitation contained among other things the statement that defining political terms played an important role in "theorising nationalist policy", given the fact that "de-Nazification" and "re-education" after 1945 had brainwashed the population into accepting "empty words such as democracy and human rights".<sup>xcviii</sup> For this reason, the conference dwelt at length on an ethnic rather than political understanding of "the people" (Volk) and attempted to lend new significance to the concept of *Volksgemeinschaft*.<sup>xcix</sup>

**Deutsches Kolleg** Led by two former left-wing extremists, Horst MAHLER and Dr. Reinhold OBERLERCHER, along with NPD activist Uwe MEENEN, the Deutsches Kolleg (German seminar) is another organisation active in NPD circles. This organisation also sees its chief task as training the "nationalist intelligentsia" and publishing theory-oriented writings. For example, the Kolleg organised a seminar on the topic "Hegel's concept of God: An approach to re-starting and completing the German revolution of 1933". Its flyer entitled "Germany will become German again!", first distributed in late 2002 and still available on the Deutsches Kolleg website, calls for a general

“uprising by the German people” as the first step on the “path to Germany, Kaiser and Reich”. An Internet article commemorating the 50th anniversary of the uprising of East German workers on 17 June 1953 called this event one of a series of “German struggles for liberation”, which included the start of the Nazi regime in 1933 and violent attacks on foreigners in 1991 and 1992.

MAHLER’s public reading of the revisionist Verden Manifesto (see Section VII) at the former Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp in Poland on 30 July was intended to be a major media event. After MAHLER was refused permission to leave the country, however, he performed the reading at Wartburg Castle near Eisenach on 30 July. About 20 right-wing extremists attended the event; some of them displayed banners bearing slogans such as “The Holocaust never happened”. But the reading failed to gain the public attention MAHLER had hoped for. In general, the impact of the Deutsches Kolleg remained limited, even among right-wing extremists, as its protagonists became caught up in far-fetched notions which they presented in a manner difficult to follow.

#### **Thule Seminar**

More or less the same applies to the Thule Seminar, founded in 1980 by Dr. Pierre KREBS as a German offshoot of the French “New Right” movement. Like the proponents of that movement, KREBS hoped to use a strategy of “cultural revolution from the right” to exert intellectual influence on public discourse and gain supporters for his idea of reviving a “European spirit” opposed to Western thought. However, after breaking with his former ideological role model Alain de BENOIST, KREBS became even more isolated within the intellectual right-wing extremist camp. At the same time, he was hardly able to get any publishing projects off the ground: The Thule Seminar’s most important publication, the journal *Elemente*, last appeared in 1998; its new journal *Metapo* ceased publication in 2001, after only four issues; and only two issues of the *Thule Brief* (Thule letter) were published, consisting of just a few pages. The only publication still produced with any regularity is *Mars Ultor* (Mars the avenger), an annual “pocket calendar of the avant-garde”, which appeared in early 2004 for the fourth year in a row.

#### **Fewer independent publications**

There was also a noticeable decline in theory-oriented right-wing extremist publications not affiliated with any organisation. For example, the *Staatsbriefe* (State letters) edited by Dr. Hans-Dietrich SANDER ceased publication in January 2002. SANDER’s publishing activity centered on his regularly updated website, which disseminated among other things articles by authors who had been frequent contributors to the *Staatsbriefe*, Gerhoch REISEGGER, Wolfgang STRAUSS and Josef SCHÜSSLBURNER. The journal *Sleipnir*.

*Zeitschrift für Kultur, Geschichte und Politik* (Sleipnir: Journal of culture, history and politics) now appears only at irregular intervals; two issues were published in 2003. Nor did publisher Manfred ROUHS manage to print his theory-oriented quarterly *Signal - Das patriotische Magazin* (Signal: The patriotic magazine) on a regular schedule. One issue, much smaller than previous ones, was published in spring; in particular, it took an anti-American tone in its focus on the US-led war in Iraq. A press gathering in the Kassel area announced for the weekend of 28-29 June was cancelled; no reason was given. ROUHS' publication appeared in autumn with the new title *nation24.de – Das patriotische Magazin* (nation24.de – The patriotic magazine). According to the editor in chief, the new name was intended to express the closer link between the printed version and the website of the same name.<sup>c</sup>

**The weekly *Junge Freiheit***

At times, right-wing extremist intellectuals only hint at their extremist positions in their writings and strive to tone down their rhetoric in order to obscure the line separating them from legitimate conservatives. In this way, they attempt to lend their opinions a certain seriousness and reach a broader audience. They are aided in this effort by essay collections and journals that publish texts written by right-wing extremists together with those by legitimate conservatives. One such example is the weekly newspaper *Junge Freiheit* (*JF*, Young freedom) which again in 2003 contained interviews with a number of well-known representatives of democracy from the media, politics and academia. At the same time, however, individual right-wing extremist authors continued to use *JF* as a forum. Further, the editorial staff and regular contributors sometimes use standard right-wing extremist arguments and write favourable commentaries on right-wing extremist figures and organisations. For example, writer Günter MASCHKE, who has described himself as “an enemy of the constitution” and the constitution as a “prison”,<sup>ci</sup> condemned democratic values as “cannibal humanity and gypsy liberalism”.<sup>cii</sup> At the death of writer Armin Mohler, a long-time contributor to *JF* who described himself as a fascist, saying the free and democratic order made him “vomit”,<sup>ciii</sup> and who was considered the intellectual father of the German “New Right” movement, *JF* printed an obituary notice remembering Mohler as a colleague and mentor.<sup>civ</sup> The following excerpt from an article published in *JF* contains examples of revisionist statements denying the Nazi regime’s responsibility for starting World War II and justifying the war of annihilation in the Soviet Union: “As Hitler’s statements demonstrate, he clearly recognised that Germany was far too weak to fight a major war and sought to act accordingly. As records of his



private speeches show, he was not principally interested in a war of conquest. He found himself forced to declare a war of annihilation on the Soviet leadership cadres – not the Soviet people.”<sup>CV</sup>

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## VII. Anti-Semitism

The anti-Semitic nature of right-wing extremism gained renewed attention, also from the public, after plans by the neo-Nazi group Kameradschaft Süd to bomb the construction site of a Munich synagogue and community centre on 9 November were discovered (see Section III, 2). The number of reported acts of vandalism against Jewish cemeteries, synagogues and memorials also rose, from 78 in 2002 to 115 in 2003. And violent crimes with an anti-Semitic background saw a significant increase, from 28 in 2002 to 35 in 2003, even though the overall number of crimes with an anti-Semitic background fell, from 1,515 in 2002 to 1,199 in 2003. In this context, it is necessary to ask what forms anti-Semitism takes and what significance and status it has for the right-wing extremist camp. In general, it is possible to say that anti-Semitism continues to play an important role in German right-wing extremism as a topic of agitation.

**Definition of the term** Anti-Semitism means attributing negative characteristics to Jews in general in a defamatory and discriminatory way, in order to “justify” in ideological terms their denigration, discrimination, persecution or even destruction. In addition to the religious, social, political and racist strains of anti-Semitism which have existed for centuries, newer and ideologically based forms can be found today. These include “secondary anti-Semitism”, which consists in accusing Jews of exploiting Germany’s moral burden as a result of the Holocaust. Familiar anti-Semitic stereotypes can also be found in an “anti-Zionist” strain, expressed in defamation of the state of Israel.<sup>cvi</sup>

Because anti-Semitism is generally condemned in public discourse, right-wing extremists frequently use innuendo in their anti-Semitic agitation. However, certain groups (particularly within the neo-Nazi and skinhead milieu) continue to express their anti-Semitism openly.

**Open anti-Semitism** In its 2003 recording *B.Z.L.T.B.*, the skinhead band Hassgesang advocates killing Jews and destroying Israel.<sup>cvi</sup> The song “Final Fight” contains the following lyrics:

“For an Aryan world we will give our lives our people will be free when the last Jew dies”. (original text in English)

According to the song “Israel”,

“The best solution is this: Destroy this country ... Let the following command be sacred to all peoples: Fire nuclear missiles at Israel”.

The reason for advocating the destruction of Israel is given in the following lyric:

“Their shameless lies are known all over the world the six million dead want our money again”.

**Open anti-Semitism among neo-Nazis**

The combination of racist, political and anti-Zionist elements of anti-Semitism is even more obvious in an article printed in the publication *NS Kampfruf* (Nazi call to battle), published in Lincoln, Nebraska by the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei/Auslands- und Aufbauorganisation (NSDAP/AO, National Socialist German Workers’ Party/Overseas and Development Organisation; see Section VIII, 2) and circulated in German neo-Nazi circles.<sup>cviii</sup> The article stated that the “need for a final solution to the Jewish question” arose from the “strong Jewish influence on the intellectual life of the Aryan race” and the resulting “demands for racial separation between Jews and Aryans”. As is typical for the political strain of anti-Semitism, the article referred to the existence of a conspiratorial “disproportional, world-wide dominance of Jewry in politics, business, high finance, the mass media and culture” aimed at “taking over the world”. According to the article, the desired “final solution” did not consist in exterminating the Jewish people, but in relocating them to a “closed settlement” in the US. This however required liquidating the “pirate state of Israel”.

Horst MAHLER, the right-wing extremist intellectual who is a co-director of the Deutsches Kolleg (see Section VI) repeatedly made openly anti-Semitic and revisionist statements. In the so-called Verden Manifesto of 5 February 2003, he wrote:

“The peoples are suffering under the chokehold Israel and its reinforcements have on public opinion – the worst to suffer are the Palestinians and the German people ... It is finally time to stop the murder of the German people’s soul, the genocide by Israel and the persecution of those who do not believe in the Holocaust ... The Holy German Reich lives to demand that Jewry face the world’s judgement!”<sup>cix</sup>

MAHLER’s various commentaries on the founding of the Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocausts Verfolgten (Association for the rehabilitation of those persecuted for disputing the Holocaust) at his initiative also combine anti-Semitic and revisionist elements in an aggressive way. For example, in an e-mail message to a member of a *Land* parliament, MAHLER wrote:

“Without exception, Jewry believes it has finally disposed of the Jewish question in the Auschwitz lie, a lie it was able to plant in

people's minds using its financial and media dominance and on the condition of the German Reich's absolute defencelessness. But unfortunately for liars, lies have a way of falling apart."

### Implicit anti-Semitism

The differences between explicit and implicit anti-Semitism are apparent in right-wing extremists' conspiracy theories regarding the death of Jürgen W. Möllemann, a politician from the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP, Free Democratic Party). For example, *Das neue National Journal* (The new national journal), a right-wing extremist publication mailed from the UK to the Federal Republic of Germany, asserted: "Jürgen W. Möllemann's death reveals definite parallels to the Mossad's assassination of Uwe Barschel."<sup>cx</sup> By contrast, the headline in the NPD party organ *Deutsche Stimme* (see Section V, 1) was more discreet: "Execution of an Israel critic?"<sup>cx</sup>

The *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ, National newspaper/German weekly newspaper) also uses innuendoes in its headlines to stir up anti-Semitic feeling (see Section V, 2). In doing so, the newspaper avoids making assertions in favour of asking apparently open-ended questions. At the same time, however, the NZ implies an affirmative answer, even if the relevant article does not provide conclusive information. Headlines such as the following illustrate this practice: "Is Israel behind America's wars? First Iraq, then Syria, then Iran"; "Israel's lobby in Germany: Its power - its influence - its main figures"; and "The Israel lobby is so powerful – Can it destroy every politician?"<sup>cxii</sup> With phrases like these, the NZ implies the existence of an influential Jewish power behind the scenes and uses arguments taken from anti-Semitic conspiracy theory.

Similar references can be found in the NPD publication *Deutsche Stimme* (German Voice), which repeatedly ran the following advertisement with anti-Semitic content as part of a campaign to attract new subscribers:

"No topic is censored or taboo – whether the outrageous financial demands of the Zionist lobby, ... the American East Coast's increasingly unscrupulous lust for world power, Israel's state-supported terrorism ... If you're tired of Michel Friedman and Paul Spiegel always having the last word ... then support *Deutsche Stimme!*"<sup>cxiii</sup>

The term "East Coast" is used here, as in many right-wing extremist texts, as a synonym for Jewish bankers who allegedly control the US.<sup>cxiv</sup> And the term "Zionist lobby" suggests the existence of a

powerful Jewish special-interest organisation; here, elements of both political and social anti-Semitism serve the purpose of agitation.

A further variant of implicit anti-Semitism is emphasising the Jewish background of persons described in negative terms. An example of this is an article which appeared in the publication *Nation & Europa* (Nation and Europe) commemorating the East German uprising on 17 June 1953; the article describes functionaries of the ruling communist party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) and intellectuals sympathetic to the party as follows:

“One was ... Kurt Barthel ... member of the SED Central Committee ... He had ... been active in the Jewish Liberal Youth organisation ... Another ... was beaten up by Berlin workers: the American-Jewish writer Stefan Heym ... The 17th of June 1953 hit Stephan Hermlin, whose real name was Rudolf Leder and who, like Heym, came from a German-Jewish bourgeois background, like a thunderclap.”<sup>CXV</sup>

For no apparent reason, the Jewish origin of all three persons is mentioned, while no reference is made to the religious background of other persons mentioned in the article.

In such cases, criticism of individual persons of Jewish background or faith is generalised to apply to all Jews. A very obvious and typical example for this kind of technique appears in an article in *Deutsche Stimme* on Michel Friedman, the former vice president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, and his connections to the drug and prostitution scene. The article stated:

“Friedmann seems symptomatic of the current state of some Jewish intellectuals. Outwardly extremely priggish, and inwardly morally bankrupt. The professional chosen one ‘Mischu’ ... reveals the moral negative selection of leading Jewish organisations in particular, and of the society of the Federal Republic of Germany in general.”<sup>CXVI</sup>

Numerous right-wing extremists saw their notions of conspiracy confirmed during the public debate over a speech by Martin Hohmann, a member of the Bundestag, containing anti-Semitic insinuations. REP chairman Rolf SCHLIERER saw it as a staged media campaign to beat a conservative politician with the “anti-Semitism club”.<sup>CXVII</sup> The *NZ*, published by DVU chairman Dr. Gerhard FREY, asserted that in Germany, only the “regurgitation” of politically correct opinions determined by the dominant politicians and a submissive opinion industry was allowed.<sup>CXVIII</sup> NPD national manager Frank SCHWERDT commented that the events surrounding Hohmann’s speech showed who had the say in “this

republic". SCHWERDT said it was impossible to swim against the tide set by the "Jewish Central Council".<sup>CXIX</sup>

Anti-Semitic propaganda within right-wing extremism today is not a new development, neither in terms of its content nor in terms of its intensity. As on earlier occasions, current political events are used as an opportunity to articulate anti-Jewish attitudes. Such propaganda primarily targets an audience with latent anti-Semitic attitudes. According to various long-term sociological studies, up to 20% of the population has such attitudes.<sup>CXX</sup> Whether anti-Semitic propaganda has an effect on such persons, and if so, what kind, has not yet been studied. In any case, it is impossible to prove a causal relationship between the development of anti-Semitic agitation, latent anti-Semitic attitudes and crimes with anti-Semitic background.

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## VIII. International connections

German right-wing extremists maintain extensive contacts with like-minded people in other countries. Meetings in various European countries help participants exchange information, organise joint activities and get to know each other better. In some cases, foreign organisations help disseminate right-wing extremist ideology in Germany, particularly by mailing propaganda material. More foreign activists are appearing as speakers at right-wing extremist events in Germany.

### 1. International events/foreign guest speakers

The following are examples of events with international attendance:

- Constantijn KUSTERS, chairman of the Dutch right-wing extremist party Nederlandse Volks Unie (NVU, Dutch People's Union), spoke at neo-Nazi demonstrations against the travelling exhibition on the German armed forces' involvement in war crimes during World War II, "Crimes of the Wehrmacht" in Halle on 1 May and in Dortmund on 20 September.
  - Swiss right-wing extremist Bernhard SCHAUB and Austrian revisionist Dr. Walter MARINOVIC were guest speakers at the "1st Free Convention" put on by the Deutsche Stimme-Verlag publishing house and held near Leipzig on 30-31 May. SCHAUB is a former member of the right-wing extremist party Partei National Orientierter Schweizer (Party of Nationally Oriented Swiss People) and puts out numerous publications on revisionist topics. MARINOVIC writes for the National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung (NZ, National newspaper/German weekly newspaper; see Section V, 2) and *Deutsche Stimme* (German Voice; see Section V, 1). SCHAUB also attended a demonstration in Schwäbisch-Hall on 14 June protesting the exhibition "Crimes of the Wehrmacht".
  - At the *Deutsche Stimme* press gathering in Meerane, Saxony, on 9 August, John TYNDALL, former chairman of the "British National Party" (BNP), read a speech (translated by former NPD chairman Günter DECKERT) on German-British relations. According to the NPD, the event was attended by guests from Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US.
  - About 2,600 right-wing extremists took part in the main memorial event in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, on 16 August for the 16th anniversary
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of the death of Rudolf Hess (see Section IV, 1). Attendance exceeded that of 2002 (2,500) and 2001 (900). More than 200 right-wing extremists travelled from Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, England, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland to attend (2002: 60). This event is apparently becoming more and more attractive for foreign right-wing extremists in particular.

- Only a few right-wing extremists from Germany took part in the “international evening of cameraderie” held by the Belgian right-wing extremist organisation Voorpost in Steenstrate, Belgium, on 24 August. Interest in the event had dropped significantly in previous years. For the first time, the event was not held on the date or location usually associated with the *Ijzerbedevaart* (Yser pilgrimage), a celebration at which patriotic Flemings remember their soldiers who died in World War I.
  - Roughly 80 right-wing extremists of various nationalities, including 40 Germans, met on the fringes of the traditional Ulrichsberg memorial celebration, held near Klagenfurt, Austria, on 20-21 September to commemorate soldiers killed in the two world wars (total attendance in 2002: approx. 70; German attendance in 2001/2002: 10-15).
  - About 150 persons from Austria and Germany took part in the “27th guests’ week” held in Rosenheim, Bavaria, on 17–22 October by the right-wing extremist groups Freundeskreis Ulrich von Hutten e.V. (Friends of Ulrich von Hutten registered society) and Deutsche Kulturgemeinschaft Österreich (German Cultural Community of Austria) (2002: 165). Speakers included Austrian right-wing extremists Herbert SCHWEIGER and Lisbeth GROLITSCH.
  - A small delegation from the NPD also attended memorial ceremonies in Madrid on 22-23 November in honour of Francisco Franco and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera.
  - In Salem, near Stockholm, Sweden, the Daniel Wretström March was held on 6 December; the international attendance of 1,500 included about 200 German right-wing extremists. In 2002, about 1,600 right-wing extremists from Sweden and other countries attended this memorial event to honour the death of a 17-year-old skinhead.
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## 2. **Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei/Auslands- und Aufbauorganisation (NSDAP/AO, National Socialist German Workers' Party/Overseas and Development Organisation)**

Founded in 1972 by Gary LAUCK, a US citizen, and based in Lincoln, Nebraska, the NSDAP/AO supplies neo-Nazis around the world with propaganda materials of all kinds. LAUCK has largely relocated his activity to the Internet and away from his earlier emphasis on printed publications calling on followers to form autonomous cells to carry out propaganda activities and even armed struggle to set up a National Socialist system. Available in 21 languages, his website offers a variety of anti-Semitic articles and right-wing extremist memorabilia. He offers right-wing extremists from other countries - including Germany – storage space on his server for a fee. This ensures their anonymity, allowing right-wing extremists to present unlawful – typically seditious – material on their websites without fear of interference from law enforcement authorities in their own countries. In 2003, the print version of the German-language NSDAP/AO publication *NS Kampfruf* (NS Call to Battle) was published quarterly. Every issue is a reflection of LAUCK's ideological position. For example, a column called "Lexikon" (dictionary) explains terms which arose from National Socialist usage, such as "biological humanism" and "final solution".

German neo-Nazis largely distance themselves from LAUCK's personality cult focused on Hitler.

## 3. **Combat 18 (C18)**

For many in the German right-wing extremist milieu, the name "Combat 18" continues to stand for militant activism (see Section III, 2).<sup>cxxi</sup>

Combat 18 (C18) was founded in 1992 as the militant wing and security organisation of the British National Party (BNP). But already in 1993, it split off from the BNP, which no longer wished to tolerate the group's violent activities and its disregard for the party's authority. C18 then increasingly evolved into a gang of thugs terrorising its political opponents in greater London.

Tired of C18's lack of activity and the resulting loss of income, a group calling itself the Racial Volunteer Force (RVF) split off from C18 in

2002. In its fanzine *Stormer* and on the Internet, RVF advocated race war and concepts such as “leaderless resistance” (see Section III, 2). These efforts were above all aimed at gaining a certain reputation within the milieu in order to increase sales of right-wing extremist merchandise of all kinds. Following large-scale police operations in the spring of 2003, the RVF seems to have been crushed in the UK.

C18 and the RVF largely lived off their violent reputations, but were hardly heard from again. Nor were they active in pursuing a strategy of terrorism or acquiring weapons.

In Germany, individuals and smaller groups go by or invoke the names C18 and RVF, not least in order to project a certain sense of menace and seriousness (see also Section III, 2).

#### **4. Holocaust deniers outside Germany**

One of the most important areas of activity with regard to Germany for right-wing extremists outside the country continued to be revisionist denial of the Holocaust.<sup>cxvii</sup> Because such statements are a punishable offence under German law (pursuant to Sections 130, 185, and 189 of the Penal Code), a number of revisionists relocated their activities outside the country following several successful prosecutions in the 1990s. From countries in which Holocaust denial is not a punishable offence, they supply books, brochures and other propaganda materials on this topic to interested persons in the Federal Republic of Germany. Many of these revisionists have since ceased their operations abroad.

For example, Ernst ZÜNDEL, a German Holocaust denier long active in Canada, was no longer able to carry out his propaganda activities on the same scale as previously. After relocating from Canada to the US in late 2000, he was arrested by US immigration officials in Knoxville, Tennessee, on 5 February 2003 and deported on 19 February to Canada, where he applied for asylum. The Canadian authorities took him into custody until his legal status was clarified. His supporters continue to distribute his *Germania-Rundbrief* (Germania circular) which however mainly consists of complaints about his situation in custody.

The only Holocaust denier who continued his activities unabated was Germar RUDOLF, who fled the country after receiving a prison sentence in 1995 for incitement to hate and violence. He owns Castle Hill Publishers, located in the UK, which prints his *Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung* (Quarterly journal for independent

historical research) and books such as *Treblinka. Vernichtungslager oder Durchgangslager?* (Treblinka: Death camp or transit camp?), which appeared in late 2002 and was written by Jürgen GRAF, a Swiss citizen, and Carlo MATTOGNO, an Italian. Now living in the US, since 2003 RUDOLF has published the English-language magazine *The Revisionist*, in the hope of consolidating his standing within the international revisionist scene.

In general, the volume and importance of Holocaust denial by right-wing extremists has decreased. Already in 2002, the best-known French revisionist, Robert FAURISSON, spoke of a crisis among revisionists, who had lost their orientation because “ ‘Holocaust’ historians” concerned themselves only with their own arguments, leaving the revisionists to feel like “Don Quixote” or “Sisyphus”.<sup>cxxiii</sup> Nor can the newly founded Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocausts Verfolgten (Association for the rehabilitation of those persecuted for disputing the Holocaust; see Section VII) and its activities in Germany hide the fact that Holocaust denial is no longer as important as it once was. The association’s founder, Horst MAHLER, is primarily interested in attracting public attention to himself.

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## **IX. Means of agitation and communication**

### **1. Periodical publications**

In 2003, the number of right-wing extremist publications dropped to 102 (2002: 109). The total number of copies printed was around 4.4 million, down from 4.7 million in 2002; 50 of these publications appeared at least four times a year (2002: 44).

### **2. Unaffiliated publishing houses and distributors**

In addition to party-affiliated publishing houses and distributors, within the right-wing extremist camp there are 38 independent operations of this kind not affiliated with any organisation (2002: 42). They hope to help spread their political message by producing and disseminating books and magazines as well as audio and video recordings. These publications help propagate right-wing extremist ideology and values, trivialise the “Third Reich” and denigrate democratic institutions and principles. In recent years, calendars, clothing, posters and jewellery have been added to the selection of merchandise. Those who sell such items do so for commercial reasons, while those who buy them do so to satisfy their growing need for symbolic integration into the right-wing extremist camp. Everyday objects bearing the appropriate markings are understood as elements of a “counterculture” and are supposed to express the consumer’s political identity.

The spectrum of right-wing extremist publishers and distributors ranges from a few larger publishers with a broad selection of titles, to a number of small operations. There are also distributors which are only engaged in marketing other publishers’ products. Although most of these operations are competing for the same customers, they do cooperate in their advertising: In order to expand their product range, many publishers and distributors include other right-wing extremist companies’ advertising with orders shipped to customers. Orders are then supposed to be placed directly with the company responsible for the advertising.

Arndt-Verlag in Kiel, Grabert-Verlag in Tübingen, Nation Europa Verlag in Coburg and Verlagsgesellschaft Berg in Inning am Ammersee are among the larger publishing companies. These companies, which have existed for decades, are well-known within the right-wing extremist camp and have an established clientele. Their

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products are recommended through advertising and reviews in right-wing extremist publications.

#### Arndt-Verlag

The traditional programme of the Arndt-Verlag publishing house, run by Dietmar MUNIER, includes books of cultural criticism by the late Gustav Sichelschmidt positing the general decline of society, as well as revisionist works by the late Bolko von Richthofen disputing the Hitler regime's primary responsibility for starting World War II. Books by British Holocaust denier David IRVING on the life of Joseph Goebbels, the so-called secret weapons of the Third Reich, and Hermann Göring's intelligence service are also in the press's programme. In recent years, however, the importance of such products has waned. But the press continued to put out books which take an uncritical look at the Nazi state, in particular large-format photographic collections appearing in the series *Zeitgeschichte in Farbe* (Recent history in color), including *Die großen Militärparaden des Dritten Reiches* (Major military parades of the Third Reich), *Führerhauptquartier Wolfschanze* (Wolfschanze, the Führer's headquarters), *Hitlers Neue Reichskanzlei* (Hitler's New Reich Chancellery) and *Reichsautobahnen* (Autobahns of the Reich). Based on the idea that "a picture is worth a thousand words", such books are intended to convey to readers and browsers the supposedly impressive and aesthetic aspects of Hitler's regime.<sup>cxxiv</sup> Arndt-Verlag did not publish any new books of note in 2003. The same is true of the other presses that belong to the company: Bonus-Verlag and Orion-Heimreiter-Verlag, as well as Pour le Merite-Verlag, which also publishes writers who are not right-wing extremists. Arndt-Buchdienst and Europa-Buchhandlung, also owned by Arndt-Verlag, produce an annual catalogue of books, recordings and videos, pictures with Teutonic themes, calendars with Nazi-era photos, copies of Nazi-era sculptures, and videos of 1930s and 1940s feature films.

#### Grabert-Verlag

Run by Wigbert GRABERT, Grabert-Verlag used to concentrate in particular on revisionist works, such as books denying the Nazi regime's responsibility for starting World War II. In 2003, however, the press focused more on contemporary topics. For example, Grabert-Verlag and its sister company Hohenrain-Verlag published Claus NORDBRUCH's book *Der Angriff* (The attack) criticising supposed and actual failings of society and the state. His criticism leads to the demand for replacing the current political system with an alternative which can be described as a "German Reich".<sup>cxxv</sup> Another book with a contemporary focus is *Wir werden schamlos irregeführt* (We are being shamelessly misled) by Gerhoch REISEGGER, a regular contributor

to the right-wing extremist journal *Staatsbriefe* (State letters), which was discontinued for a time but has since been revived. In his book, REISEGGER describes the official account of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks as the result of a planned and intentional deception.<sup>cxxvi</sup> Apart from such books, Grabert-Verlag also publishes the bi-monthly newsletter *Euro-Kurier* (Euro courier), containing short editorials and press news; and the quarterly journal *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Germany in history and the present), now in its 51st year. This journal, which originally had a predominantly revisionist focus, increasingly examined current political issues from a right-wing extremist perspective and raised questions about how right-wing extremism viewed itself in political and strategic terms. For example, editorial staff member Karl RICHTER described democracy and the multi-party system as lying at the heart of current troubles and advocated forming an anti-US alliance with non-German fundamentalists and nationalists.<sup>cxxvii</sup>

#### **Nation Europa-Verlag**

The importance of Nation Europa-Verlag in the right-wing extremist publishing world is due not to its book publishing, but to its journal *Nation & Europa. Deutsche Monatshefte* (Nation & Europe: German monthly). Now in its 53rd year and with a circulation of 20,000, according to the press, this subscription publication has developed a devoted readership and is highly respected in right-wing extremist circles. Each issue contains in-depth articles on current affairs and commentaries on strategic and theoretical issues. For example, Karl RICHTER, who is on the editorial staff also at this publication, published an article on the Iraq war criticising the German peace movement for its perpetually helpless combination of indignation and whining, and calling for a multi-lateral world order based on the sovereignty of peoples. A similar proposal for a world order “based on continental regions” was developed in 1944-45 by a high-level SS planning office.<sup>cxxviii</sup> In 2003, numerous articles and commentaries contained implicitly anti-Semitic content suggesting in particular that Israeli- or Jewish-led conspiracies were behind certain events. For example, articles on the October Revolution of 1917 and the East German uprising of 17 June 1953 repeatedly referred for no apparent reason to the Jewish backgrounds of communist figures described in negative terms. Other articles referred to the alleged involvement of the Israeli intelligence service Mossad in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and in the death of Jürgen W. Möllemann, a German politician from the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP, Free Democratic Party).

The former national chairman of Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans) party, Franz SCHÖNHUBER, has his own column in

*Nation & Europa*, called “Aus meiner Sicht” (In my view). There, he also expressed his position on strategic issues, for example calling on supporters to give up their “camp mentality”: The world can no longer be divided into political left and right, but only into those on top and those at the bottom, SCHÖNHUBER wrote. As a result, he went on, the right-wing extremist camp must ally itself with all the other currents “at the bottom”, since as enemies of the US they are all on the same side. Patriots can be found not only on the political “right”, he wrote, but even in the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism).<sup>cxix</sup> However, apart from a few individual right-wing extremist participants at protests against the Iraq war, the political left as a rule rejected such overtures from the right. SCHÖNHUBER also repeatedly used his column to express revisionist opinions, stating for example that Hitler should not have let himself be forced into war.<sup>cxix</sup> This apparent criticism of the Nazi dictator implies that it was not Hitler who insisted on war, but that other forces lured him into aggressive military action.

**Verlagsgesellschaft  
Berg**

Headed by Dr. Gert SUDHOLT, Verlagsgesellschaft Berg mbH was formed by the merger of three independent presses, Druffel, Türmer and Vowinckel, whose imprints are still occasionally used when publishing books. Verlagsgesellschaft Berg publishes mainly military history and revisionist works; in recent years, the number of new books has steadily declined, so that it is possible to speak of a company in crisis. The only books published were about the Nazi era and World War II, such as works about Adolf Hitler’s horoscope, the SS, or the career of a German U-boat. Publications this fixated on the past can offer no substantive impetus to the right-wing extremist camp. The same is true of the bi-monthly *Deutsche Geschichte. Europa und die Welt* (German history: Europe and the world), advertised with the following text: “For more than half a century, German history has been stolen by victors, re-educators and established historians, who have turned it into a rogues’ gallery. Now we are returning German history to its rightful place.” Verlagsgesellschaft Berg’s revisionist focus corresponds to SUDHOLT’s weekend seminars on “experiencing history”. Regular speakers at these seminars are well-known right-wing extremist authors who deny that Germany was primarily responsible for starting World War II. Only the yearbook *Deutsche Annalen* (German annals) contains in-depth articles on the current and theoretical orientation within the right-wing extremist camp.

**Gesellschaft für  
Freie Publizistik**

Along with other right-wing extremists, SUDHOLT spoke at the Deutscher Kongress convention held in Bayreuth on 4-6 April and

organised by the Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik (GFP, Free Journalism Society), founded in 1960. The event's theme was "Protect freedom, preserve the Volk". The GFP, which claims to defend the freedom and truth of the written word, has about 500 members and is the largest right-wing extremist cultural organisation. Its members are predominantly publishers, editors, writers and booksellers. Its chairman since May 1992 has been Dr. Rolf KOSIEK, the NPD's former "chief ideologist".

The many smaller publishing companies have specialised in certain areas. For example, the Verlag für ganzheitliche Forschung (Press for holistic research) based in Viöl, North Friesland, publishes reprints – supposedly for documentary or research purposes – of racist-nationalist writings originally published in the 1920s to 1940s. In fact, publisher Roland BOHLINGER, known from his own writings as a right-wing extremist, hopes by reprinting such texts to win support for their political content. The same is true of Klosterhaus-Verlag located in Wahlsburg-Lippoldsberg, a press directed by Holle GRIMM, the daughter of nationalist writer Hans Grimm (1875-1959). She mainly publishes works by her father, who made a name for himself with colonialistic publications during the Weimar Republic and revisionist publications after 1945. The press also markets works published by other right-wing extremist presses through an associated bookseller service. In some cases, right-wing extremists have started up new businesses – with less political ballast – in order to market certain publications. One example is the press Editio de facto in Kassel, founded by Pierre KREBS, a Franco-German writer and the director of the Thule Seminar. It published the German translations of two books by French writer Thierry MEYSSAN, *11 Septembre 2001: L'effroyable imposture* (published in German as *11. September 2001. Der inszenierte Terrorismus – Auftakt zum Weltenbrand?* and in English as *9/11: The Big Lie*) and *Le Pentagate* (published in German as *Pentagate. Foto- und Fragenkatalog zu einer Inszenierung* and in English as *Pentagate*). MEYSSAN argues that the attacks cited in the books' titles were in fact planned and carried out by the US government. Similar conspiracy theories are found in numerous extremist publications.



### 3. The Internet

#### 3.1 A communications medium for right-wing extremists

The World Wide Web (WWW) has long since developed into a platform allowing right-wing extremists to reach a broad audience with relatively little effort. In terms of its impact on young people in particular, such seditious propaganda on the Internet is likely to far overshadow other media typically used by right-wing extremists such as flyers, magazines and direct mail.

**No change in high number of websites**

The number of right-wing extremist websites operated by Germans fell slightly in 2003 to about 950 (2002: 1,000; 2001: 1,300). This is likely due above all to website operators moving into other Internet areas (e-mail and discussion forums) after police started taking action against operators of websites with unlawful contents and Internet service providers shut down right-wing extremist sites.

One of the most active German websites was Störtebeker-Netz (Störtebeker network). In its own words, the site aims to provide an Internet base for the “extraparliamentary nationalist opposition” so that it is not forced to rely on the “co-opted state media”. New postings on events across the entire right-wing extremist scene as well as general political issues were added to the site almost daily. The latter frequently contained anti-Semitic comments.

**Efforts to improve content and visuals**

Operators of right-wing websites have recently made more effort to improve the visual and technical design and contents of their sites. By including multimedia elements, graphics and audio and video clips, they aim to make sites more attractive, especially to a youth audience.

**Unlawful content provided anonymously via the US**

The proportion of German websites with unlawful content continued to fall in 2003. About 10-15% of German-operated right-wing extremist websites contained material punishable under German law. This decline is likely the result of increased pressure by German law enforcement authorities. The majority of such websites are run anonymously from servers located outside Germany, mainly in the US. Right-wing extremists take advantage of the fact that in many cases, US laws allow the dissemination of such content. However, commercial US Internet service providers have started blocking right-wing extremist websites in certain cases. The legal basis for doing so is the prohibition of hate speech found in most providers’ terms of agreement.

<b>Use of all Internet services</b>	Right-wing extremists also attempted to spread their message and influence political opinion using other Internet services.
<b>Right-wing extremist mailing lists</b>	<p>For example, the use of e-mail became more important. E-mail is used not only to exchange information among individual users, but also to disseminate information automatically by means of mailing lists and newsletters. For example, event dates and calls to action can be sent to a large number of addresses at the same time. The number of recipients varies; in some cases, only persons known within the milieu have passwords to access such information.</p> <p>But the general public also found themselves increasingly confronted with propaganda e-mails from right-wing extremists. For example, in January unknown persons sent a large volume of spam using obviously falsified return addresses appearing to be those of government or left-wing organisations, such as <code>regierungua325@bund.de</code>, <code>ns@antifa.de</code> and <code>InternetPostue634@bundesregierung.de</code>.<sup>cxxxix</sup> The spam messages contained advertising for a right-wing extremist demonstration in Lübeck on 25 January with the slogan “Jobs for Lübeck” and listed sources for more information.</p>
<b>E-mail calls to violence</b>	<p>In mid-September, an anonymous right-wing extremist sent an e-mail message to numerous comrades calling on them to use violence against foreigners in order to provoke civil war and overthrow the system. The e-mail was sent from a free e-mail account which the sender had set up using false information.</p> <p>Right-wing extremists find it attractive to send e-mail – sometimes with unlawful contents – via anonymous accounts set up for that purpose because it poses a lower risk of prosecution than setting up a website.</p>
<b>Discussion forums on the rise</b>	<p>Discussion forums are becoming increasingly popular within the right-wing extremist Internet community. Up to several hundred Internet users come together in these forums, which are more than just a substitute for websites. The possibility for interaction results in lively discussions as well as sharing of insider information, right-wing extremist music and computer games.</p> <p>Right-wing extremists also used file-sharing services to disseminate their music, text and video files.<sup>cxxxix</sup> Films listed as restricted material, such as <i>Der ewige Jude (The Eternal Jew)</i>, and numerous banned songs by right-wing extremist bands can be found and downloaded there.</p>

### 3.2 Right-wing extremist parties on the Internet

- NPD on the Internet** As in the previous year, in late 2003 about 80 active NPD and JN websites were found. Along with the NPD national association, numerous NPD *Land* and district organisations and JN subdivisions are represented on the Internet. These sites offer reports and commentaries on current events, announcements of demonstrations, press releases, programmatic statements and other information about the party organisations. Most of the sites are only sporadically updated, however.
- DVU on the Internet** The DVU also uses the Internet as a forum for self-representation and agitation. It has had its own domain since 1997. The DVU central office in Munich is responsible for the website. The once-elaborate site, which used to boast video clips, now has a simpler structure. It contains basic information on the party's programme and current issues, announcements of regularly scheduled meetings and planned events, and lists of DVU contact addresses. In addition to party-related material, the site contains links to the publisher DSZ – Druckschriften- und Zeitungsverlag GmbH (DSZ-Verlag; see Section V, 2) and to 74 websites of various DVU state-level associations.
- REP on the Internet** The number of REP websites fell in 2003. There were about REP 120 websites overall, including those of the national, *Land*, district and local REP associations, party functionaries and representatives in local and district governments (2002: more than 140). The website of the national party association, which runs its own server, contains current news, press releases, the party programme and the Internet edition of the party publication *Der Republikaner*.

#### **4. Unaffiliated right-wing extremist information hotlines**

- Declining significance** Right-wing extremist information hotlines not affiliated with any party continued to decline in significance. Today they are an important source of information only for those persons within the milieu who do not yet have Internet access. In late 2003, only four information hotlines were still in regular operation (2002: 8).

## **Left-Wing Extremist Activities**

### **I. Overview**

#### **Left-wing extremist developments**

Left-wing extremists oppose the free, democratic constitutional and societal system, which they vilify as capitalistic/imperialistic and based on racist and fascist ideas. Instead they want to establish a totalitarian socialist/communist society or one which they describe as “a system without rulers” or anarchy; their political activities are based on revolutionary-marxist or anarchist ideologies.

There is a wide range of left-wing extremist action. It ranges from public rallies and open agitation (flyers, placards, periodicals, electronic means of communication) to attempts to gain influence in committees and institutions in society to participation in elections. Some groups see violating the law, including acts of violence committed openly or covertly (e.g. vandalising property, violent riotous assemblies, bodily injury) as a means by which to achieve their political objectives.

In this way, violent left-wing extremists, in particular those from the anarchistic "autonomist" scene, constituted a threat to the internal security of Germany in 2003. The number of acts of violence with a left-wing extremist background increased by more than 25% compared to 2002; the high number of 192 cases of bodily injury is especially worth noting (2002: 152).

Some of these militant groups again carried out attacks that crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence. On the other hand, violent left-wing extremists in particular lacked the commitment and ability to mobilise the public in connection with current conflicts and to influence public protests. They lack even a minimum of organisational capabilities and systematic work. Apparently, recruitment of new members cannot compensate for the high fluctuation rate. Democratic powers dominate the areas of action traditionally claimed by left-wing extremists, such as opposition to what they consider “fascist”. The police successfully used strategy and tactic to prevent certain activities of violent left-wing extremists before they were carried out. In

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2003, as in the previous year, conflicts between autonomous 'anti-racist' groups and immigrant groups seriously interfered with "anti-racist" activities.

Representatives of individual Trotskyist currents were able to participate actively in social protest campaigns and fields of action traditionally dominated by left-wing extremists. For example, they played an active, if not dominant, role in the anti-war and anti-globalisation movements.

As in 2002, the trend towards fewer incidents related to the campaign against nuclear energy continued; the same tendency was observed for protests against shipment of radioactive waste by rail (CASTOR) from France to the interim storage site near Gorleben (Lower Saxony). The protests did not cause any significant difficulties. Overall, the anti-nuclear movement saw its ability to mobilise public support continue to drop.

The debate within the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism) was particularly relevant in terms of their constituting a potential threat to the free, democratic order. Adopted in October 2003, the party programme, continues to pursue the aim of establishing a socialist order that overcomes the boundaries of the existing societal order (i.e. capitalism) and of abolishing the capitalist distribution of power and property which, according to the PDS, is the cause for bondage and exploitation. As in previous years, the PDS cooperates with extremists in Germany and abroad and allows openly extremist forces to work within the party.

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## II. Statisticals overview

### 1. Organisations and following

**Slight increase in the number of followers of left-wing extremists**

In 2003, the structures and forms of organised left-wing extremism hardly changed compared to those in 2002. The overall number of supporters and active members increased slightly.

At the end of 2003, after deducting multiple memberships, around 31,300 persons (2002: 31,100) were found to be members of organisations and other associations at least suspected of pursuing left-wing extremist objectives. The figure also includes supporters of the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (KPF, communist faction of the PDS), which probably has up to 1,500 members. The PDS claimed to have some 71,000 members at the end of 2002 (at the end of 2001: 78,000).

At the end of 2003, the spectrum of left-wing extremists prepared to use violence comprised up to 5,400 people (2002: 5,500) (mainly organised in anarchist groups), including – as in the previous year - around 5,000 persons describing themselves as autonomists.

With 26,300 persons the membership of Marxist–Leninist, Trotskyist and other revolutionary Marxist associations has slightly increased (2002: 26,000) and is nearing the level of 2001. Some of these are supported by organisations which are influenced by left-wing extremism. At the end of 2003, they had approx. 19,000 members (2002: 15,200).

Left-Wing Extremist Following <sup>1</sup>									
	2001			2002			2003		
	Groups	Persons		Groups	Persons		Groups	Persons	
Violence-prone left-wing extremists <sup>2</sup>	55	7.000 <sup>3</sup>		56	5.500 <sup>3</sup>		55	5.400 <sup>3</sup>	
Marxist-Leninists and other revolutionary Marxists <sup>4</sup>									
– Core and subsidiary organisations	42	26.300		43	26.000		49	26.300	
– Organisations under their influence	31		12.000	30		15.200	33		19.000
<b>Total</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>33.300</b>	<b>12.000</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>31.500</b>	<b>15.200</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>31.700</b>	<b>19.000</b>
<b>After deduction of multiple membership cases</b>		<b>approx. 32,900</b>	<b>approx. 10,000</b>		<b>approx. 31,100</b>	<b>approx. 11,700</b>		<b>approx. 31,300</b>	<b>approx. 14,500</b>
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism) <sup>5</sup>		approx.84,000			approx. 78,000			approx. 71,000 <sup>6</sup>	

<sup>1</sup> Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.

<sup>2</sup> The statistics list not only those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those left-wing extremists presumed, on the basis of pertinent indicators, to be prepared to use violence. Only groups which have firmly established structures and have been active for some time have been included.

<sup>3</sup> The scene can potentially mobilise an additional several thousand people.

<sup>4</sup> Including the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (KPF, communist faction of the PDS) as well as members of other left-wing extremist groups in the PDS.

<sup>5</sup> The PDS is listed separately in the table due to its ambivalent status.

<sup>6</sup> Membership is the same as at 31 December 2002. See end note 154.

## **2. Left-wing extremist crime and violence\***

Crimes and violent acts motivated by left-wing extremism constitute a subset of left-wing politically motivated crime. In 2003, 3,614 offences (2002: 3,639) were classified as left-wing politically motivated crime; of these, 803 were classified as violent crimes (2002: 806). In this area, 1,459 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2002: 1,137), including 483 violent crimes (2002: 385). Violent crimes motivated by extremism included a total of 21 offences (2002: 16) assigned to the category “campaign against nuclear energy”, 1 offence (2002: 7) to the category “anti-globalisation” and 226 offences (2002: 202) to the category of “crimes against actual or supposed right-wing extremists”.

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\* Cf. Section II, paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 for the definition of ‘politically motivated crime’ and ‘politically motivated crimes and violent acts’ in the chapter on Right-Wing Extremist Activities.

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<b>Overview of politically motivated violent and other crimes with a left-wing extremist background*</b>		
	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
<b>Violent crimes:</b>		
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	0	1
Bodily injury	152	192
Arson	35	36
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorders	124	118
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship and road transport	16	29
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	0
Robbery	6	5
Extortion	0	0
Resisting public authority	51	102
Sexual crimes	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>483</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	410	510
Coercion, threat	11	35
Other criminal offences	331	431
<b>Total</b>	<b>752</b>	<b>976</b>
<b>Total number of criminal offences</b>	<b>1,137</b>	<b>1,459</b>


\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

This overview includes both actual and attempted crimes, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime \*

by type

- Against right-wing extremists
- Against nuclear energy\*)
- Against globalisation




\*) including activities against CASTOR transports

\* The graph is based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).  
Only the most important types are included.




**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by Land*



\* The graph is based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background  
related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime\***  
*by 100,000 residents and Land*



\* The graph is based on data on populations in the *Länder* supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and the Federal Statistical Office.

<b>Overview of violent crimes committed by left-wing extremists against actual or supposed right-wing extremists*</b>		
	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
<b>Violent crimes:</b>		
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	0	1
Bodily injury	114	134
Arson	8	6
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorders	57	53
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship and road transport	6	1
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	0
Robbery	6	3
Extortion	0	0
Resisting public authority	10	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>202</b>	<b>226</b>

\* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

### III. Violent left-wing extremism

Left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence belong primarily to the autonomist scene. As in the previous year, they constituted a threat to the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany in 2003. However, they continued to demonstrate ideological and conceptual weakness as in previous years, which was most obvious in their inability to mobilise supporters.

Using insider publications, the Internet and 'thematic activities', militant groups continued their discussion begun in 2001 about the use of more drastic measures that go beyond mere property damage. Sometimes, militant groups carry out attacks that cross the line of what constitutes terrorist violence. However, there is no terrorist<sup>CXXXIII</sup> structure in Germany comparable to the former Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF, Red Army Faction) which is ready and willing to plan and carry out serious attacks or even murder.

Structure:	Groups exist in almost all larger cities, above all in large conurbations such as Berlin, Hamburg, the Rhine-Main area, but also in smaller university towns such as Göttingen.
Supporters:	approx. 5,400 (2002: approx. 5,500)
Publications:	More than 50 insider publications; <i>INTERIM</i> , published in Berlin, is particularly influential; various youth magazines, usually distributed free of charge, are also well known in the scene.

## 1. Autonomists

### 1.1 Following and self-definition<sup>cxxxiv</sup>

**Autonomists represent the largest share of left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence**

With a following of up to 5,000 persons, autonomists represent the largest nation-wide share of all left-wing extremists prepared to use violence. Militant autonomists are suspected of being responsible for almost all violent crimes with a left-wing extremist background, including arson, bodily injury, and dangerous disruption of road and rail transport.

The autonomist movement is characterised by more or less independent structures which have no uniform ideological concept; a leader or hierarchy is alien to the movement. This is illustrated in a book written by five autonomists, entitled *Autonome in Bewegung – aus den ersten 23 Jahren* (Autonomists on the move – the first 23 years). The book says:

“There is no such thing as the typical autonomist group. Instead, various constellations are possible: friends form more or less short-lived gangs or temporary cells that can be activated on short notice; people who first met at a rally form rather chaotic groups which act spontaneously; what started as a political plenum becomes a permanent group prepared to take action and cooperate with other groups; some of these groups exist for several years, others consolidate themselves over the years, some maintain their loose structure, others change and become theoretical seminars or self-help groups.”

(A.G. Grauwacke: *Autonome in Bewegung*, Berlin, Hamburg, Göttingen, no year, p. 143)

Autonomists propagate the idea of resistance to every kind of authority and of disregarding norms in general; this is reflected by various protesting attitudes (anti-fascist, anti-capitalist, anti-patriarchal). Diffuse fragments of anarchist and communist ideologies form the basis of their often spontaneous activities.

**United in their preparedness to use violence**

Like all left-wing extremists, autonomists strive to overthrow what they see as the “ruling system”. Autonomists consider the use of violence to be a legitimate means for achieving this aim. They justify violence as an allegedly necessary means of fighting the “organised violence” of a “system of coercion, exploitation and oppression”.



“In our view, militant activity is a necessary element of radical left-wing policy, in terms of both steadfast commitment as well as political violence. It goes without saying that this requires more responsibility than holding hands and lighting candles. But those who rule out the option of militant action altogether rob themselves of the means necessary to fight against a ruling system which has shut its ears to opposing viewpoints.”  
(*Autonome in Bewegung*, p. 380/381)

## 1.2 Forms of action

There is a wide range of left-wing extremist action, including arson and bomb attacks, militant protests against nuclear power plants, and violent demonstrations where stones and other missiles are thrown. Such activities are directed against both people and property. Targets include those whom left-wing extremists consider “henchmen” and “profiteers of the system” as well as (supposed) right-wing extremists and their structures.

Autonomists typically choose their targets and type of action based on the extent to which the motives and intentions behind such action can be communicated to the public. In the case of topical controversial issues, for example, they expect the backing of large parts of the public, including parts of ‘bourgeois’ society. For example, actions against cuts in social benefits are to be planned so that:

”not only the usual radical left-wing scene, but also the 45-year old lady next door is disloyal to the ‘society of consensus’ and welcomes the fact that some guys recently broke a few windows at the ...job agency.<sup>cxxxv</sup> The propaganda that accompanies our actions must refer to the everyday experience of the people.”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 576, 10 July 2003, p. 15)

### Street riots

Street riots are a typical form of violence committed by autonomists (they also call it “mass militancy”). On such occasions activists often cover their faces and dress in uniform “combat gear” to form what is known as “black blocks”.

In the past, street riots often broke out during protests against right-wing extremist rallies as well as during demonstrations to mark the “Revolutionary 1<sup>st</sup> May”, particularly in Berlin. As in the previous year, clashes began already the night before during the walpurgis night celebrations and developed into riots on the evening of May 1. After the demonstrations, which had attracted many left-wing extremists prepared to use violence, heavy riots broke out in the city district of Kreuzberg.

Some 1,300 violent rioters were involved, among them persons with no left-wing extremist background. They acted in groups of up to 200 persons and threw stones and bottles at the police, set cars on fire, built barricades and set them on fire, and caused severe property damage (e.g. at a post office and a car dealer). Despite a large deployment of officers, the police were not able to get the situation under control after midnight. The police arrested 139 people, 175 police officers were injured.

For example, the following relates to the motives behind such acts of violence:

“Riots have become a general form of political expression not intended to achieve a particular aim but to ‘raise the price’ which the ‘system’ has to pay – e.g. for a nuclear power plant, the police storming a squat, the police apparatus, our dead.”

(*Autonome in Bewegung*, p. 142)

#### Clandestine activities

In contrast to mass militancy, clandestine militant actions, i.e. attacks prepared and carried out covertly, require much more planning. Such attacks often border on terrorist activity (cf. 1.3, below); in many cases, they are followed by letters claiming responsibility which attempt to justify the attacks. In order to mediate their intentions, perpetrators relate their attacks to topical issues and campaigns.

In the night of 27/28 January unidentified offenders carried out an arson attack on the building of the rural county office (*Landratsamt*) of the Werra/Meißen county in Eschwege, Hesse. They set fire to several tyres in front of the entrance area. The heat of the flames broke two large double glazed windows. The perpetrators also threw eggs filled with red ink on the part of the building housing the foreigners office. Total damages amounted to around €20,000. A group calling itself Schneewittchen + die 7 Feuerzeuge (Snow White + the seven cigarette lighters) wrote a letter of confession which stated:

“Foreigners offices are an expression of the institutionalised racism of the state. Racism is one of the basic principles of the Federal Republic of Germany, it has infiltrated all areas of our society and there exist authorities practicing this racism: the foreigners authorities. Therefore, all foreigners authorities must be attacked.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 569, 3 April 2003, p. 22)

Finally, the letter lists the names of the director of the foreigners authority and his deputy, adding:

“We must put a stop to them and to many others.”

In connection with the war against Iraq, the regional recruiting office (*Kreiswehrrersatzamt*) in Wetzlar, Hesse, was the target of an arson attack on the early morning of 21 May. Unidentified perpetrators broke several windows and threw incendiary devices into several rooms. Only one incendiary device ignited, and the fire went out by itself.

In a statement with the title “militant action against patriarchy and militarism” a group called Feministisch-Antimilitaristische Zelle (feminist-militarist cell) claimed responsibility for the attack:

“We are aware of our powerlessness, but we still are full of anger and hope that things will change to the better and we won’t allow this powerlessness to win.

Immediate decommissioning of the state-run war machinery! No peace with Germany! Fight against patriarchy and militarism ... everywhere in the world!”

In the night of 4/5 July unidentified perpetrators placed several fuse cords and incendiary devices at the future headquarters of the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (Federal Academy for Security Policy) – a building on the grounds of the stately home Schloss Niederschönhausen, under reconstruction at that time. The incendiary devices did not ignite.<sup>cxxxvi</sup> In a letter claiming responsibility for the attack, the perpetrators, who signed the letter with Revolutionärer Aufbau (revolutionary development), stated that the academy played a central role in Germany’s new ‘aggressive’ security policy.

#### The media

Autonomists have always used their own media to communicate: Along with the tried-and-tested methods of exchanging information via insider publications,<sup>cxxxvii</sup> “information shops” and clandestine meetings, autonomists are increasingly using the Internet<sup>cxxxviii</sup> and mobile phones.

Modern information and encryption technologies such as the free encryption program Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) benefit the left-wing extremists’ mainly covert activities and increase their ability to act, making it more difficult for them to be investigated.

### 1.3 Autonomist structures with proto-terrorist elements

#### Boundaries to terrorist campaigns blurred

Organisations have developed within the militant autonomist scene whose attacks have crossed the line into terrorist violence.

#### 'No name' militancy

The members of these small, clandestine groups live a life that looks perfectly normal to the rest of the world. They leave behind few traces that could help the authorities identify them and as a rule sign each of their letters claiming responsibility for an attack with a different name in order to avoid criminal prosecution ('no-name' militancy). The following is taken from an insider publication:

"We should not make it too easy for them and even supply them with the means to apply 129 a [Note: refers to § 129(a) of the Criminal Code]. The security aspect should prevail, just in case something goes wrong. For us, theoretical and practical coherence is more important than a 'brand name'.  
(*INTERIM*, No. 552, 20 June 2002, p. 25)

Some groups do operate under the same 'brand name', though. Members of such groups see their militancy as an essential and direct expression of their opposition to the "system" as well as a fixed component of their own way of life.

The arson attack on the Hildesheim employment office on the early morning of 24 November is a typical example of an attack where a group name was used only once.

Unidentified perpetrators set fire to a car tyre in front of the office's Internet center. Initially, the fire spread to the entrance, but went out by itself. The new Internet facilities and adjacent rooms of the employment office were damaged by the smoke. Damage totalling around € 500,000 was done. A letter signed "autonom bestimmte maßnahmen" (abm, self-determined activities) was found at the scene. In it, the authors protested against the deep cuts in social security and the government programme of labour market reforms known as the Hartz concept. The letter went on:

"Even if we must now firmly denounce current 'reforms', the overall aim of the radical left must be to oppose the concept of wage labour in general and the related logic of exploitation.  
Stop the terror of work!!!  
Individual opposition must become a collective uprising!!!"

**The militante gruppe (militant group) intensifies the militancy debate**

A group called militante gruppe (mg, militant group), active since mid-2001, has continued its efforts to engage the militant autonomist scene in a debate about the use of “more effective means capable of causing more than just property damage.”

With two arson attacks within a short period of time at the beginning of 2003, the mg underlined their preparedness to take action. In the night of 31 December 2002/ 1 January 2003 the group committed an arson attack against the Berlin-Neukölln tax office. The attack destroyed a storage room, and numerous records were damaged by both the flames and water used to extinguish the fire, causing considerable property damage. The letter claiming responsibility for the attack stated:

“With our arson attack we continue to pursue a militant approach towards the institutions of impoverishment and downward mobility.”

The authors of the letter called on sympathisers to:

“Attack social technocracy and organise class struggle!  
For a militant platform – for revolutionary development – for communism!”  
(*INTERIM*, No. 564, 23 January 2003, p. 21)

In the early morning hours of 26 February, members of the mg set fire to two sport utility vehicles of the federal armed forces parked on the premises of a Mercedes garage in Petershagen, Brandenburg. The motor vehicles were destroyed completely; total damages amounted to around €100,000. In a letter claiming responsibility for the attack, the mg reviewed its “career”. The group underlined its “political” approach which it called a synthesis of social-revolutionary and anti-imperialist elements, and stressed the importance of the militancy debate which the group claims to have launched.

In the course of the year, the mg carried out two additional attacks:

- on 18 September, arson attacks on the building of the higher regional court of appeal in Naumburg and a staff car of the public prosecetur’s office of Halle/Saale in Naumburg, Saxony-Anhalt;<sup>cxxxix</sup>
- on 30 October, an arson attack against a truck from the fleet of a recycling company in Berlin-Reinickendorf.

At the same time, the group continued the militancy debate in position papers and press releases. Overall, however, their concept and strategy did not change significantly.

As in the previous year, the left-wing extremist scene commented critically on the debate and the manner in which it was held. Among other things, those involved in the debate were criticised for failing to present an in-depth analysis of the current societal situation and instead hoping to build up a militant opposition in Germany in 2003 using a 1960s- and 70s-style revolutionary discourse. Critics went on to say that:

"in view of worsening social circumstances this reflects the lack of substance of the radical left."  
(*INTERIM*, No. 576, 10 July 2003, p. 16)

In response to these accusations, the *Militante Antiimperialistische Gruppe – Aktionszelle Pierre Overney* (militant anti-imperialist group – Pierre Overney cell) admitted that the militancy debate was progressing more slowly than they had hoped; they said this was due to the current situation within the revolutionary left which made it impossible to carry out a targeted and constructive debate in just a couple of months. They went on to say that they had made only first steps towards an organised militant structure which, according to them, still lacked a clear militant platform and stable basis of organised groups.

"This means that at the current stage of organisation key tasks include the establishment and successive strengthening of a militant platform in the context of developing a political-military strategy."  
(*ibid.*, p. 16)

**Inevitable  
confrontation with  
the system**

They went on to say that the envisaged fundamental societal changes would inevitably result in a "violent clash" with the apparatus of the state and capital:

"All the visions of a peaceful and smooth transition to an era of solidarity are built on sand and must be clearly rejected in view of our historical experience and the prevailing conditions."  
(*INTERIM*, No. 579, 18 September 2003, p. 10)

Quoting Lenin, they stated that changes in the existing social conditions inevitably lead to new forms of struggle.

Although the groups involved in the militancy debate have emphasised that an immediate transition to "armed struggle" is out of the question, the security authorities will continue to observe very closely to what extent these positions meet with acceptance in the violent autonomist scene, especially the *militante gruppe* (mg), and whether a new threat will arise as a result.

## 2. Traditional anarchists

The spectrum of traditional anarchists in Germany includes various groupings of the “grass-roots movement” and the anarcho-syndicalists organised in the Freie Arbeiterinnen- und Arbeiter Union (FAU-IAA, Free Workers Union) which is associated with the International Workers Association (IAA). The aim of anarchists is to overthrow the existing constitutional and social system and to establish what they call a society without rulers instead, based on the principle of self-government.

With a stable membership of about 200 members, the “grass-roots movement” wants to substitute a “self-organised, socialist” society for “hierarchy and capitalism” and a “federalist” society for the state. They use “non-violent actions” in order to “contain, and destroy structures of violence and control<sup>cxl</sup>. The followers of the “grass-roots movement” describe themselves as “non-violent”. Although they consider violence against property as a legitimate form of action, they reject violence against people. In their eyes, “non-violent activities” include what they call “civil disobedience”, such as sit-ins as a form of protest against the peaceful use of nuclear energy and as “anti-militaristic” protest against nuclear weapons based in southern Germany.

In the recent past, activities and agitation of the “grass-roots movement” focused on the war against Iraq. Prior to military intervention in Iraq, the anarchist monthly *graswurzelrevolution* (grass-roots revolution) published a supplement in which it called upon all “men and women soldiers of the Bundeswehr” to desert, saying that in the case of German participation in the war the Federal Government would act illegally and “yet again” violate the constitution.<sup>cxli</sup>

The aim of FAU-IAA, which has more than 300 followers (2002: some 200) organised in numerous local groups, is to establish a “society without rulers which is free of exploitation and based on self-government”. In this context, the FAU-IAA explained on the Internet:

“In the long term, we actually want to bring down the pillars of our current society, in particular the private ownership of the means of production.”

The followers of the FAU-IAA reject both active parliamentary work and the representation of their interests in “reformist labour unions”. In order to achieve its aims, the FAU-IAA favours “direct action” (e.g. occupation of buildings/premises, boycotts, strikes, etc.).<sup>cxlii</sup>

Such actions focused on issues such as the effects of globalisation and the increasing cuts in social spending in Germany, especially in

the context of the government's reform programme "Agenda 2010". Primarily, the FAU-IAA showed its solidarity with the interests of the workers, but in an appeal<sup>Cxliii</sup> published on the Internet the group also explained its further goals:

"We won't emancipate ourselves from capitalist power by waving flags, no matter if these flags are black and red. Demonstrations are at least a possibility to show that we are there. What matters most, is to pose alternatives to the inhumane absurdities of capitalist economy. Because: whether 5 more minutes of rest or world revolution – we only get what we fight for!"

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#### IV. Political parties and other groups

##### 1. Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and its circle

###### 1.1 Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party)

Founded:	1968
Headquarters:	Essen
Chairman:	Heinz STEHR
Membership:	4,700 (2002: 4,700)
Publications:	<i>Unsere Zeit</i> (UZ, Our Time), Circulation: 7,500 (2002: 8,000), weekly

The DKP's membership remained at the same level as in 2002.<sup>cxliv</sup> Nevertheless, the party was not able to resolve its internal tensions between party structures in eastern and western Germany. The party's central organ, *Unsere Zeit* (UZ, Our Time), had to further reduce its circulation, this time to 7,500,<sup>cxlv</sup> and was sometimes only published every two weeks.

The party continued to follow its orthodox Marxist–Leninist ideology, the key objective of which is to “overthrow the capitalist system”. The DKP party executive declared that crises and unemployment could not be avoided in a capitalist system, saying that it was necessary to overcome the economic and political power of the multinationals and banks, i.e. to establish a socialist system:

“Let us fight capital and the cabinet! Let us today begin to fight for the future.”  
(*DKP-Informationen* (DKP Information), No. 3/2003, 12 July 2003, p. 29)

The DKP chairman, Heinz STEHR, stressed that

“We cannot allow capitalism to have the last word in history, otherwise humankind as a species is in real danger of extinction. Rosa Luxembourgn was right when she said the alternatives were ‘socialism or barbarism’.”

*(junge Welt (jW, Young World), 27/28 September 2003, p. 11)*

The party tries carefully to distance itself from political concepts which it sees as “revisionist”. For that reason it further distanced itself from the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism). At the same time the party’s executive committee refused to work with the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD, Communist Party of Germany). The decision to formally break with Stalinist tendencies is in line with its tactic of adhering strictly to the principle of legality since its “reconstitution” in 1968. This tactic is now quite controversial within party organisations in the five eastern German *Länder* and continued to cause tensions with neo-Stalinist members of the DKP associated with the magazine *Rot-Fuchs* (Red Fox).

The most important party event in 2003 was its 13th UZ press gathering in Dortmund from 20 to 22 June. The event is organised every two years and in 2003 its motto was “Another world is possible – bring about peace”. Individual district organisations presented themselves at information stands; also present were “friendly organisations” with which the party traditionally co-operates.

It was not possible in 2003 to reach unanimous agreement in the debate surrounding a new draft party programme (the current version dates back to 1978).<sup>cxlvi</sup> In contrast to the proposal by the secretariat of the party executive committee, the committee responsible appointed its own group of authors which is now working on a new draft programme.<sup>cxlvii</sup>

Intense controversy arose regarding the party’s “concept of socialism”. For example, different explanations for the failure of socialism as actually practised in the GDR were put forward. Above all, however, the “state and democracy issue” has not yet been resolved between DKP comrades in eastern and western Germany – a euphemism to describe the fact that those sections of the party originating in the former GDR advocate using terms like “dictatorship of the proletariat” in the programme text.<sup>cxlviii</sup>

Along with such internal activities, the party continued to participate in activities involving other left-wing groups. It was involved in “anti-war demonstrations” in the spring and campaigns against “cuts in social

services". It took part in the 2nd European Social Forum held in Paris from 12 to 16 November and was hoping that the anti-globalisation movement would develop into an "extra-parliamentary opposition" like that founded by students and trade unions in 1966.<sup>cxlix</sup> According to the party such movements and alliances have "strategic significance";<sup>cl</sup> the aim is to bring a "Marxist point of view" to bear.<sup>cli</sup>

The Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend (SDAJ, Socialist German Workers' Youth) maintains its traditionally close links to the party. This former "reserve cadre" has more than 300 members (2002: around 350). On 15 March the SDAJ, the Assoziation Marxistischer StudentInnen (AMS, Association of Marxist Students) and the DKP staged a "Youth tribunal against war, cuts in social services and robbery of education" in Düsseldorf. The mock "trial" was staged before only a handful of comrades and went unnoticed by the general public. Afterwards, SDAJ Chair Tina SANDERS criticised the lack of support from the DKP party leadership.<sup>clii</sup>

## 1.2 Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes – Bund der Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten in der Bundesrepublik e. V. (VVN-BdA, Union of Victims of Nazi Persecution – Alliance of Anti-Fascists, reg'd society)

Founded:	1947
Headquarters:	Berlin
National secretariat:	Berlin
Chairpersons:	Cornelia KEHRT Fred DELLHEIM (until 9 October 2003), Prof. Heinrich FINK (since November 2003)
Membership:	less than 9,000 (2002: around 9,000)
Publications:	<i>antifa</i> , bimonthly

The October 2002 merger between two traditionally orthodox communist anti-fascist associations, the VVN-BdA in western Germany and the Verband ehemaliger Teilnehmer am antifaschistischen Widerstand, Verfolgter des Nazi-Regimes und Hinterbliebener - Bund der Antifaschisten (VVdN-BdA, Association of

Former Participants in the Anti-Fascist Resistance, Victims of Nazi Persecution and Survivors – Alliance of Anti-Fascists) in eastern Germany, did not provide any new impetus for the work of the new nation-wide association. Fewer activities were organised on all levels. The organisation now has only a very plain and simple website and struggled to continue producing its national publication *antifa*. This reduced presence is above all due to the organisation's ageing membership. As well as losing one each of its two chairmen and two honorary chairmen with equal rights, the organisation also lost a large number of long-term activists. The organisation used these usually very elderly persons and actual victims of the Nazi regime as "historical witnesses". They were able to report more authentically (usually from a communist perspective) than subsequent generations of anti-fascists on the terror carried out by the National Socialists against political opponents.

The association's political profile has not changed. The executive committees are still dominated by orthodox communists, most of them active and former members of the DKP and former members of the GDR's ruling communist party, the SED (who today usually belong to the PDS).

The organisation continued to view the activities of violent "anti-fascists" positively; despite its reduced presence in 2003 it continued to co-operate with violent left-wing extremists in line with its "policy of openness to alliances". For example, an article published in *antifa* contained the following statement about *Fight Back*, published by autonomists in Berlin:

"Berlin has a lively, active anti-fascist youth culture ... In their informative articles and interviews in *Fight Back* authors are trying to lay the foundation for concrete anti-fascist work in Berlin."  
(*antifa*, October/November 2003)

The organisation still disapproves of the anti-totalitarian consensus set out in the Basic Law rejecting all forms of extremism. It regularly accuses state institutions of favouring right-wing extremists and at the same time of taking repressive measures against "anti-fascists". For example, an article in *antifa* described an initiative by the North Rhine-Westphalia VVN-BdA Association as follows:

"The VVN-BdA *Land* Association suggests setting up a state-wide alliance against the right and against state favouritism of neo-Nazis in North Rhine-Westphalia ... The authorities entrusted with the protection of the constitution and the criminal prosecution authorities

are mainly concerned with ensuring that neo-Nazi activities are not disrupted. ‘Protecting Nazis has practically become a constitutional matter.’”

(*antifa*, October/November 2003)

One of the few activities which came to the general public’s attention was directed against the traditional annual meeting of the Bundeswehr mountain troops in Mittenwald, Bavaria. The organisation accused former soldiers of the Wehrmacht taking part in the event of having been involved in war crimes during World War II. With reference to the traditional meeting Ulrich SANDER (DKP), a member of the National Committee, declared in Dortmund in September:

“Even nearly 50 years after its founding, the Bundeswehr is proving to be a club for preventing the punishment of murderers.”

(*antifaschistische nachrichten* (Anti-fascist News), No. 21/2003, 9 October 2003, p. 9)

### 1.3 Bundesausschuss Friedensratschlag (German Peace Forum)

Founded:	1996 as Arbeitsausschuß Friedensratschlag (Working Committee Peace Forum)
Headquarters:	Kassel
Membership:	50 (2002: 50)
Publications:	<i>Friedens-Journal</i> (Peace Journal)

The Bundesausschuss Friedensratschlag (German Peace Forum) is influenced by left-wing extremism and carries on the tradition of an orthodox communist “struggle for peace”. According to its analysis of the causes of war, “capitalist” countries are mainly to blame for military conflicts. Following the downfall of socialism as practised in the GDR, the organisation offered organisational and ideological services which it hoped would move the renascent “peace movement” in an “anti-imperialist” and “anti-capitalist” direction.

As part of an “international day of action against the war in Iraq” organised by British Trotskyites, a large-scale demonstration took place in Berlin on 15 February. The organisation created what it called

the Campaign Alliance 15 February to mobilise supporters together with other left-wing extremists and even democratic organisations. After the dictatorship in Iraq was overthrown, the popularity of protest events steadily declined. The organisation failed in its attempt to network and consolidate a primarily anti-American “anti-war movement”.

Once major combat activities in Iraq had ended, the organisation sided with the violent Iraqi “resistance” against the occupying forces. During the 10th Peace Forum held in Kassel on 6/7 December, participants were recorded on camera as stating that in their opinion the fatal attacks in Iraq committed by Islamists and supporters of the ousted dictatorship constituted “legitimate resistance”.<sup>cliii</sup>

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## 2. Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism)

Founded:	1989/90 Name was changed from Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) to PDS
Headquarters:	Berlin
Party Chairman:	Lothar BISKY
Membership: <sup>cliv</sup>	Around 71,000 (2002: around 78,000), of which on the territory of the former West Germany: around 4,700 (2002: around 4,000)
Publications: (selection)	<i>DISPUT</i> (Dispute), monthly; <i>PDS-Pressedienst</i> (PDS Press Service), weekly; <i>Mitteilungen der Kommunistischen Plattform der PDS</i> (Bulletin of the Communist Faction of the PDS), monthly; <i>Marxistisches Forum</i> (Marxist Forum), at irregular intervals; <i>PDS International</i> , at irregular intervals

After the party's defeat in the general election on 22 September 2002,<sup>clv</sup> increasing internal conflicts over strategy and tactics left their mark on the party's public image and diverted its energies for some time. The conflicts centred on factional disputes about the party's political profile, which is still ambivalent. On the one hand, it wants to be involved in existing social structures, for example as a coalition partner in *Land* governments. On the other hand, its long-term aim is to overthrow the system in order to establish a socialist society. The newly elected executive, headed by chairman Lothar BISKY, has the task of resolving this conflict.

After a five-year debate the PDS adopted its new party programme at its party conference in Chemnitz on 25/26 October. Despite the programme's verbal echoes of the Basic Law, the party has not completely reoriented itself in political terms; the programme continues to provide firm indications of left-wing extremist ambitions as defined in the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution.

There is still room for openly extremist forces to be active within the party. The PDS also continues to co-operate with left-wing extremists in Germany and abroad.

## 2.1 Ideology and party programme

### New party leadership

A new party leadership was elected at an extraordinary party conference held in Berlin on 28/29 June. The previous leadership under chairwoman Gabriele ZIMMER had only been appointed in Gera in October 2002, but following intense internal disputes most of its members did not stand for re-election.

Lothar BISKY had already led the party from 1993 to 2000 and was elected new party chairman at the party conference. For the first time in the party's history BISKY proposed a long list of candidates for election to the party leadership and asked leading representatives of the disputing factions not to stand. He succeeded in having all but two of his own personal favourites elected. Of the acknowledged representatives of the traditional faction only Sahra WAGENKNECHT, a member of the national co-ordinating council of the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (KPF, Communist Faction of the PDS), was elected.

### Party conference in Chemnitz

The party conference in Chemnitz on 25/26 October voted with a surprisingly clear majority to adopt the new party programme.<sup>clvi</sup>

Before the vote, BISKY expressly warned against the party moving towards a social democratic policy:

“I am tired of continually hearing the reproach that we are trying to adopt a social democratic programme. Coming from within the PDS, that reproach does not exactly demonstrate good knowledge of the text of our programme or of the actually existing SPD.”

(DISPUT/PDS-Pressedienst, joint edition, November 2003, p. 6)

### The goal: socialism

The party's goal as defined in its programme is still to establish a socialist order that reaches beyond the borders of existing society. As in its 1993 programme, the party acknowledges socialism as a necessary goal, as a movement and value system, therefore defining it as follows:

“For us socialism is a necessary goal – a society in which the free development of each individual has become the prerequisite for the free development of all ...<sup>clvii</sup> For us socialism is a movement ... For us socialism is a value system ...”



**Overthrowing  
the system**

(PDS party programme, quoted in a special issue of *DISPUT*, No. 11/03, p. 3)

The programme makes it clear that

“We are fighting to overthrow capitalism.”  
(PDS party programme, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 22)

Taken in context, the PDS’s plan thus includes the free democratic basic order of the Federal Republic of Germany. Earlier in the text, the PDS reiterates its derogatory opinion of the development of this free basic order of the FRG compared to “establishing a better social order” in the GDR:

“The anti-fascist and democratic changes in eastern Germany and the subsequent attempt to create a socialist society were in legitimate opposition to the perpetuation of capitalism in western Germany, which had been weakened and discredited by German fascism, a crime that is unique in history.”  
(PDS party programme, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 20)

In the PDS’s analysis, the current “stark contrasts of capitalism” have become “a global threat to global society”.

Elsewhere in its programme the party refers to the “profit and power interests of the most powerful international capital” as responsible for threatening human civilisation, for violence and war, among other things. The party aims to “drive back these social structures and, finally, to overcome them”. The programme unambiguously states that:

“Socialism is born out of democratic struggles fought to drive back and overcome the structural foundations of a lack of freedom, inequality and exploitation and the power base and property relations on which these are based.”  
(PDS party programme, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 3)

As regards the issues of strategy and tactics for establishing socialism, when presenting the party programme BISKY explained that democratic socialism was to be understood as a “process of social reforms in the midst of a bourgeois society with the prospect of overcoming the boundaries of capitalism”, a “process of small and larger changes and breaking with tradition”, a process which “through what is possible today picks up on the far-reaching changes that reach beyond the boundaries of capitalism”.<sup>clviii</sup>

One member of the policy committee stated the following on the PDS website:

“No mention at all of the fact that this programme is to accept the current property relations and the balance of power! ... And driving back the dominance of profit always means having a far-reaching effect on property relations. There’s no other way to go about it. It is futile to imagine one without the other and to pretend that a change in ownership of the means of production would not change property relations. Socialism is both, namely a process of fighting for each political and social improvement in the midst of a bourgeois–capitalist society and transgressing its boundaries.”

## 2.2 Extremist structures in the PDS

Among other things the party sees itself explicitly as upholding the tradition of the communist workers’ movement and obligated to fight anti-communism, the latter clearly a concession to the traditionally communist forces within the party. The new party programme likewise permits open co-operation with extremists within the party:

“Various left-wing, democratic forces are at work within the PDS. The party has room for both those who oppose capitalist society and fundamentally reject the current state of affairs, as well as those whose resistance is combined with the will to bring about positive change step by step.”

(PDS party programme, quoted in a special edition of *DISPUT*, No. 11/03, p. 21)

The extremist structures in the PDS include the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (KPF, Communist Faction of the PDS), the Marxistische Forum der PDS (MF, Marxist Forum of the PDS), the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Junger GenossInnen in und bei der PDS (AGJG, Working Group of Young Comrades In and With the PDS),<sup>clix</sup> which still exists in two *Länder*, and the Forum Kommunistischer Arbeitsgemeinschaften (Forum of Communist Working Groups), formerly the Bund Westdeutscher Kommunisten (BWK, Union of West German Communists).

Such groups are still represented on important party bodies (including the party executive, party council and the committee responsible for drafting the party programme). In accordance with the PDS statutes, as party-internal groupings they are given a certain number of delegates at party conferences according to a predetermined

distribution plan. As far as the party publicises its financial planning, they also receive financial support.

#### The KPF

The KPF upholds Marxist–Leninist traditions and is still represented on important party committees. For example, Sahra WAGENKNECHT was confirmed in the party leadership at an extraordinary party conference in Berlin on 28/29 June, in which she gained over 60% of the votes. Despite intense criticism of the new party programme, the KPF’s national conference voted in Berlin on 2 November not to dissolve the association, but rather to continue its proactive role within the party.<sup>clx</sup>

With respect to the KPF’s goal of establishing a socialist/communist society, Sahra WAGENKNECHT reiterated that

“left-wing politics must as a matter of course analyse and understand reality as it is in order to be able to change it. We must also as a matter of course change the current political and social balance of power.”

(*Mitteilungen der KPF* (KPF News), No. 5, March 2003, p. I, centrepiece)

#### Marxistische Forum der PDS

One representative of the Marxistische Forum der PDS (MF, Marxist Forum of the PDS),<sup>clxi</sup> a group of orthodox communist members and supporters, unambiguously described in a discussion paper the scenario of the fundamental, i.e. revolutionary, reorganisation it was working towards:<sup>clxii</sup>

“Let me add: A socialist party that does justice to the name should likewise make no secret of the fact that overcoming the capitalist system requires taking away not only the rulers’ economic power bases, but also their political power, removing them from the levers of state power and using these to bring about a fundamental change in social circumstances.”

(*Geschichtskorrespondenz* (Historical Correspondence), No. 2/2003, April 2003, p. 17)

#### Youth organisation solid

The name of the youth organisation solid is an acronym of the German words for socialist, left-wing and democratic. The group claims to have 800 to 900 members (2002: around 1,300) and has been officially recognised by the party as a youth organisation.<sup>clxiii</sup>

At its fourth plenary meeting in Braunschweig from 4 to 6 April, intensive discussions arose<sup>clxiv</sup> between members of the “reform-oriented” and those in the “traditionally communist” factions, leading to

a change in leadership. The group's new national speakers' council is dominated by the more communist-oriented movement.

The plenary meeting also approved a motion entitled "Capital needs war – war needs capital!" For example, the website of solid in North Rhine-Westphalia contained the following:

"Since capitalism is based on striving for expansion and power, permanent and world-wide peace is not possible in this social order ... Today, more than ever, it is clear that no future is imaginable without socialism in harmony with individual freedom, without international solidarity and ecological responsibility ... solid says NO to the capitalist system which jeopardises the survival of humankind through retaliation, war and militarism ... solid says YES to a socialist future as a precondition for peace and justice for all people."

Solid also works with other German left-wing extremists. For example, on the Internet the North Rhine-Westphalia *Land* association praised its good co-operation with the SDAJ in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Solid also maintains contacts with left-wing extremists abroad. In February the youth organisation was admitted to the European Network of Democratic Young Left (ENDYL). In August/September a member of the national working group "International" attended a summer camp run by the *Giovani Comunisti/e* (Young Communists) in Italy, which was also attended by several hundred members of the *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (PRC, Italian Refoundation Party).

### **2.3 Co-operation with German left-wing extremists outside the party**

#### **Relationship with the DKP**

On account of their shared traditions, the party maintains a critical relationship based on solidarity with the DKP. DKP Chairman Heinz STEHR was a guest at the PDS party conference in Chemnitz on 25/26 October.<sup>cixv</sup> The parties mainly co-operate on a local and regional level, often through communist forces and in particular those in the KPF. For example, the KPF's national speakers' council declared at the second meeting of the 11th national conference in Hanover on 25 May:

"At the same time we are collaborating more closely with the DKP. Just as we were actively involved in the DKP conference on the party programme in September 2002 and the DKP party conference last

December, we will also take part in the *UZ* press gathering in June and co-operate in various ways at the *Land* level – particularly in alliances – with our comrades in the DKP.”

(*Mitteilungen der Kommunistischen Plattform*, No. 6, June 2003, p. 12ff.)

DKP members took part in the 11th national conference of the KPD in Berlin on 2 November.<sup>clxvi</sup> One member of the PDS *Land* executive stood for the Hesse *Land* parliament elections on 2 February on the DKP's list.

**Co-operation  
with autonomists**

Some of the party's representatives, organisations and structures continue to work in campaign alliances with left-wing extremists who are prepared to use violence. One PDS member of the Thuringia *Land* parliament organised a so-called anti-fascist bus trip on 5 July: About 50 people (mainly from the autonomist spectrum) rode a bus around Thuringia “looking for places where the right-wing scene gathers” in order to mobilise “the local population to protest against these gathering places”. There were violent clashes with supposed members of the right-wing scene during the event.<sup>clxvii</sup>

**Solidarity with  
socialist Cuba**

The party lays particular store by its solidarity with Cuba. The main group involved in this work is the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Cuba Si beim Parteivorstand der PDS (Working Group ‘Cuba Si’ of the Party Executive of the PDS), founded in 1991.<sup>clxviii</sup>

The working group's magazine *Cuba Si revista* (‘Cuba Si’ revisited) commented on the sentencing of more than 70 Cuban dissidents to long prison terms and the execution of three people who had hijacked ships to express its solidarity with Cuba:

“No-one needs to justify or defend the recent convictions in Cuba. However, before condemning them, one should ask under what life-threatening conditions a country like Cuba has to survive and under which such judgements are therefore made ... Despite our fundamental opposition to the death penalty we at ‘Cuba Si’ will not reduce our solidarity with socialist Cuba in the slightest ...”  
(*Cuba Si revista*, No. 2/2003, p. 1, 3)

Leading party members, including honorary chairman Hans MODROW<sup>clxix</sup> and PDS national chairman Rolf KUTZMUTZ,<sup>clxx</sup> stressed the need for solidarity with socialist Cuba.

**Solidarity  
with Kurdistan**

For years the party – both individual representatives and party organisations – have taken up the concerns of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party), which is banned in

Germany, and of its successor party the Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan)<sup>clxxi</sup> in order to provide political support.

For example, a PDS member of the European Parliament opposed the EU's adding the PKK to its list of terrorist organisations in 2002:

“The PKK has already renounced violence as a means to achieve its political goals. The fact that it has been added to the list even after it was dissolved indicates that the fight against terror is being used as an excuse to criminalise irksome movements.”

(*Kurdistanrundbrief* (Kurdistan Circular), 15 February 2003, pp. 29, 32)

## 2.4 International links

In accordance with its self-image, the PDS is committed to internationalism; it continues to maintain various contacts with communist parties abroad, for example by sending delegations to their party conferences, attending conferences and talks and taking part in press gatherings organised by party newspapers.

### Guests at party conference

At its party conference in Chemnitz on 25/26 October, the party welcomed “in solidarity and brotherliness” foreign members of 38 “parties with which we have close links and friendly relations” from 34 countries. They included mainly high-ranking representatives of communist parties from Austria, Belarus, China, Cuba, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, India, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Moldavia, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sudan, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam.<sup>clxxii</sup>

### European co-operation

The party has six seats in the European Parliament; the MPs are part of the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL).<sup>clxxiii</sup>

With an eye to the European Parliamentary elections in June 2004, the party stepped up efforts to found a European left-wing party. Along with the PDS several other European communist parties took part in meetings to further this initiative.<sup>clxxiv</sup>

### **3. Trotskyist groups**

Seventeen international Trotskyist umbrella organisations continue to have active sections or splinter groups in Germany, with a total of around 1,800 (2002: around 1,700) activists. These are organised in groups ranging in size from very small to viable structures with several hundred members.

Ideologically rigid groups such as the Spartakist-Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SpAD, Spartakist Workers' Party of Germany) and the Partei für soziale Gleichheit (PSG, Party for Social Equality) remained insignificant and isolated even within the left-wing extremist spectrum. As the self-appointed guardians of orthodox Trotskyism, they largely restricted their activities to agitation and the ideological fight against competing Trotskyist groups.

However, large numbers of members of the action-oriented Trotskyist movements participated in social protests and other typical areas of left-wing activity. As they often have young supporters, are tightly organised and co-ordinated on an international level, their activities were at times considerably more prominent than those left-wing formations with more members.

#### **3.1 The group Linksruck**

The group Linksruck remained the most agile and largest Trotskyist organisation in Germany. It is the German section of the London-based international Trotskyist umbrella organisation International Socialist Tendency (IST). The largest national section of IST, which also dominates the umbrella organisation, is the British Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The SWP plays an active role in various areas through organisations that are set up specifically for each purpose. For example, it maintains the Globalise Resistance group for anti-globalisation protests and the Stop the War Coalition for the "anti-war movement". In line with the Trotskyist principle of "democratic centralism", the remaining IST sections are required to take over responsibility for such organisational and political subjects in their own countries. The main field of action of these Trotskyist umbrella organisations since the beginning of 2003 was an aggressive, clearly anti-American and "anti-Zionist" campaign against the US- and British-led intervention in Iraq and against the methods used by Israeli security forces against Palestinian terrorists.

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The German section Linksruck played a key role in organising and mobilising members and supporters for a large-scale demonstration in Berlin on 15 February during protests usually described as the “anti-war movement”. The roughly 500 members of the organisation participated under their organisation’s name or as members of the Working Group on Globalisation and War of the anti-globalisation network ATTAC in Germany. Linksruck used its influence in this working group, for instance to organise an “ATTAC peace tour” with supporters of extremist Palestinian groups. For example, the *Jungle World* newspaper reported on 5 February that a British speaker had welcomed the “heroic fighters of the intifada” during the first event on the “peace tour” in Göttingen, Lower Saxony, on 18 January. Apparently on orders from London headquarters, Linksruck continued its efforts to gain support from Islamist organisations for the “anti-war movement”. This is unusual for left-wing extremists, since they typically criticise Islamist movements for being reactionary and for discriminating against women; they reject suicide attacks on principle. Accordingly, the reactions of other left-wing extremists were negative.

The following is taken from a statement posted on the Internet:

“A well-known member of Linksruck who had made several attempts since the beginning of the year to get a Palestinian front to spearhead an anti-war demo in Frankfurt is obviously so pissed off that he has dropped his cover. At a co-ordination meeting of the Frankfurt alliance against the war last Tuesday in St. Catherine’s Church he demanded that a Hamas speaker take part in future demonstrations. The call again met with strong opposition.”

During the year the organisation reduced its involvement in the “anti-war movement” and increasingly concentrated on a broad-based campaign against the Federal Government’s reform of the social security system.



### 3.2 Sozialistische Alternative (SAV, Socialist Alternative)

This organisation aims to overthrow the capitalist system and replace it with a socialist democracy. According to the organisation, however, this will only be possible after a global revolutionary-socialist mass party is established. To do this the SAV has appointed itself as the German section of the international Trotskyist umbrella organisation, the Committee for a Workers International (CWI, with headquarters in London). The CWI aims to oppose “global capitalism with global resistance” by setting up sections in more than 30 countries around the world.

The organisation increased its membership to 380 (2002: around 350). It has local groups or “bases” in more than 30 cities across Germany and aims to expand its cadre to 500 members by the end of 2004.

The SAV occasionally participates in elections, although its candidates in the Hesse *Land* parliament elections on 2 February and in the Bremen city-state parliament elections on 25 May did not gain many votes. In addition, the organisation operated under its own name as a corporate member of ATTAC Germany and at its traditional, annual “Socialism days”, attended by more than 400 visitors (2002: 450) to Berlin over the Easter period.

The campaign activities of the CWI and its sections do not fundamentally differ from those of its rival British umbrella organisation IST (cf. 3.1 above). For example, the SAV also has various groups associated with different campaigns: widerstand international! (wi!, international resistance) is responsible for “anti-globalisation” and the “anti-war movement”. This group aims mainly to win over young supporters who have not yet joined any other groups. It also helped set up local groups of young people against the war as part of the “anti-war movement” against the US-led intervention in Iraq.

As in the past, one main focus of the organisation is undercover work in individual trade unions within the German trade union federation Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB); such work again gained in importance following protests against the Federal Government’s reform of the social security system in autumn 2003. Since 1996 the SAV has been building its “network for an aggressive and democratic” union of service occupations, initially within the trade union for the public service and transport sector Öffentlicher Dienst, Transport und Verkehr (ÖTV)

and, since 2001, within its successor, the independent multi-service union Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di). At its 14th national meeting at the DGB offices in Kassel on 14 May, participants confirmed their intention to oppose the “trade union leaders’ policy of conforming”.<sup>clxxv</sup>

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### **3.3 German followers of the IVth Internationale/Secrétariat Unifié**

The most traditional Trotskyist umbrella organisation, IV. Internationale/ Secrétariat Unifié (the IVth International/United Secretariat), with headquarters in Paris, has only two small splinter groups in Germany, the Revolutionär-Sozialistischer Bund (RSB, Revolutionary-Socialist Union) and the internationale sozialistische linke (isl, International Socialist Left).<sup>clxxvi</sup> However, the umbrella organisation is very firmly integrated in anti-globalisation associations such as ATTAC or the so-called social forums (cf. Chapter V, 1); its members are important spokespersons for this scene in many countries. They are also the main organisers of a project called “European Anti-Capitalist Left-Wing”, which held several meetings during EU summits and hoped to assemble for the European Parliament elections in June 2004 a Europe-wide faction based on anti-capitalist and revolutionary policies. Other Trotskyist currents and the traditionally orthodox communist parties were invited to participate.

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## 4. Maoists / Stalinists

### 4.1 Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist–Leninist Party of Germany)

Founded:	1982
Seat of Central Committee:	Gelsenkirchen
Chairman:	Stefan ENGEL
Membership:	around 2,000 (2002: less than 2,000)
Publications:	<i>Rote Fahne (Red Flag)</i> , weekly; <i>REBELL (Rebel)</i> , magazine of the youth organisation of the same name), bimonthly; <i>Lernen und Kämpfen (Learn and Fight)</i> , several times a year

The Maoist/Stalinist-oriented party believed it could focus its agitation on problems concerning social welfare systems and community services. In ideological terms it declared this to be the “fifth phase of the general crisis of capitalism” and reiterated that the response to the “overall intensification of all the fundamental contradictions” must be the “international revolution of the proletariat”.<sup>clxxvii</sup> The party justified its participation in protests against the US- and British-led intervention in Iraq with the “current destabilisation of the entire imperialist world system”.<sup>clxxviii</sup> The party clearly hoped to benefit from this development. It stepped up its efforts to become known in its regional strongholds as a point of contact for those affected by cuts in social benefits. To do so, it invested considerable financial resources in buying a fairly large office building in Gelsenkirchen and an extensive former SED holiday property in Truckenthal, Thuringia. Part of a new strategy that is unusual for the party was to build up “independent” community alliances in six cities in North Rhine-Westphalia. The party denied that it was clearly playing a dominant role in this effort<sup>clxxix</sup> and described its electoral alliances as “independent and non-partisan”.

From the party’s perspective this effort seems to have paid off. The party chairman announced various successes in an extensive directive published in the party’s central organ. He stated that the

MLPD's influence on society had increased approximately tenfold since the last party conference in 1999, and that membership had risen by 15%. He also stated that Rebell had become the biggest left-wing youth organisation, although he regarded the widespread influence on youth of "modern anti-authoritarianism" as problematic due to its worship of spontaneity, its resistance to the theory behind the international workers' movement and its rejection of more fixed forms of organisation – like those propagated by the party in the form of "democratic centralism". The MLPD chairman also tentatively lowered his sights regarding qualitative expectations of new members and thereby underlined the party's authoritarian internal structure:

"We must in future concentrate more on the difference between the party's cadres and members without special functions."  
(*Rote Fahne*, No. 37/2003, 12 September 2003, pp. 11 - 18)

Nearly all the other left-wing extremists remained hostile towards the MLPD. In its key publication the party described in detail how it had been excluded on purpose from preparations for a large-scale demonstration against radical cuts in the social security system (held in Berlin on 1 November) by a coalition of Trotskyists, trade union functionaries with close links to the DKP and the PDS, and ATTAC representatives.<sup>clxxx</sup>

#### 4.2 **Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD, Communist Party of Germany)**

Founded:	1990
Headquarters:	Berlin
Chairman:	Werner SCHLEESE
Membership:	200 (2002: 200)
Publications:	<i>Die Rote Fahne (The Red Flag)</i> , monthly

The KPD was formed in 1990 in what was then still the GDR mainly by former members of the ruling communist party, the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany). It sees itself as the only legitimate successor to the original KPD which was formed in late 1918/early 1919. It uses its monthly *Die Rote*

*Fahne* to portray itself as a party represented across the five eastern German *Länder*, although in reality it only has around 200 supporters. The party's ideology is strictly neo-Stalinist. Numerous texts by Lenin, but above all texts by Stalin and Kim Il Sung have appeared in its publication series, along with ideologically similar expositions by former SED academic cadres. Its agitation is oriented to the KPD's class struggle from the 1920s up to the heyday of Stalinism. Those contributions that are nostalgic for the GDR period are, however, limited to the Ulbricht era (1945 - 1971); the activities of the GDR Ministry for State Security and the GDR border guards are openly justified as necessary for suppressing counter-revolution. The party expresses especially servile affirmations of loyalty to the regime in North Korea.<sup>clxxxix</sup> By contrast, political opponents such as Trotskyists are implicitly dismissed in classic Stalinist manner as "vermin".<sup>clxxxii</sup>

#### **5. Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society)**

Founded:	1975
Headquarters:	Göttingen (national secretariat)
Membership:	more than 4,600 (2002: more than 4,300)
Publications:	<i>DIE ROTE HILFE (RED AID)</i> , quarterly

In accordance with its self-description, in 2003 Rote Hilfe e. V. (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society) continued to provide political and material support to members of the left-wing spectrum whom it regards as victims of political and state persecution.

The organisation gave particular prominence to its support for three people held in custody in Magdeburg.<sup>clxxxiii</sup> For example, RH opened an account for donations, helped organise events to express solidarity and reported on these on the Internet and in its publication. RH also organised various solidarity campaigns for two suspected supporters of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA who were detained in Germany and Switzerland; the organisation wanted to prevent their extradition to Spain, which was ultimately carried out in January and November.

The organisation also focused on providing financial and political support to anti-globalisation activists arrested during large-scale demonstrations such as those during the NATO summit in Prague, the G8 summit in Genoa, the EU summit in Gothenburg and the NATO security conference in Munich. In a press release posted on the Internet on 3 April 2003, RH protested against the German authorities' subsequent criminal prosecution of those who had taken part, stating that

“Rote Hilfe will do everything in its power to drive back state repression, which in the worst case can lead to several years in prison – so that it will still be possible in future to take part in protests that are critical of the system.”

In an article entitled “Big Brother has already moved in” published in *DIE ROTE HILFE* the organisation also looked into new technical means of surveillance of people or places.<sup>clxxxiv</sup> Given such means of surveillance, the article stated, under certain political conditions “Big Brother” would no longer be merely a vision to warn people about, but bitter reality.<sup>clxxxv</sup>

In October a book on “the history and activities of the proletarian aid organisation for prisoners in Germany (1918 – 1938)” was published under the title *Schafft Rote Hilfe!* (Give Red Aid!). The marketing of this book and the lavish advertising in its own publication bear witness to the organisation's celebration of its communist roots. Accordingly, the book's author finds that, despite considering itself an independent organisation providing protection and solidarity, the RH today consciously upholds the tradition of Rote Hilfe in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s (at that time a subsidiary organisation of the KDP) through its name alone.<sup>clxxxvi</sup>

The organisation's more than 4,600 members are active in around 40 local groups and four regions in nearly all the *Länder*. Its growing membership and restrictive budgeting has further stabilised the organisation's financial situation.

## **V. Areas of activity**

### **1. Evolution of the anti-globalisation movement**

In 2003 militant left-wing extremist globalisation critics were again involved in riots, some of them intense, that coincided with international summit meetings in Europe. People with no clearly defined political demands also increasingly tried to disrupt summit meetings. In late January more than 1,000 militants went on the rampage in the centre of Bern, Switzerland, after being denied free access to Davos, the venue of the annual World Economic Forum. During the G8 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, in early June several hundred hooligans vented their aggression in Geneva and Lausanne, Switzerland, setting fire to petrol stations, looting shops and vandalising buildings. Total damages ran to several million Swiss francs. Mainly local violent criminals battled with police in the streets of Thessaloniki on 20/21 June, where the EU summit to mark the end of Greece's EU presidency was being held. They were also responsible for numerous arson attacks and property damage. In general, German autonomists did not mobilise in large numbers; they were only marginally involved in riots during the 2003 summits.

Left-wing extremists prepared to use violence still represent only a small minority in the extraordinarily heterogeneous anti-globalisation movement. Their militancy on the streets seemed increasingly anachronistic. By contrast, supporters of traditional revolutionary Marxist organisations or those influenced by them pursued the ultimate goal of a fundamental and radical change in the existing state and social order. They and the majority of those in the protest movement choose democratic forms of protest. The movement has now begun to move away from the fixed dates and venues for international summits and create its own independent events, which it calls social forums.

For example, in January as many as 100,000 globalisation critics from around the world met for the 3rd World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Up to 50,000 people, including thousands of activists from Germany, took part in the 2nd European Social Forum (ESF) in Paris in November. In addition to these large-scale, regular meetings, numerous ongoing regional and local social forums were established – including some in Germany. A Founding Committee for a Social Forum in Germany convened for the first time in Kassel on 6 April.

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In an article entitled “Forging new alliances – On the nature and tasks of the social forum movement”, two influential left-wing extremists explained that by setting up the social forums the global movement had created an important arena for sharing experience, fine-tuning analyses, developing strategies and co-ordinating their resistance.<sup>clxxxvii</sup> The Initiative Berliner Sozialforum (Berlin Social Forum Initiative), for example, is supported by various left-wing extremist groups. In an interview published by *Indymedia*<sup>clxxxviii</sup> a member of the initiative said that the increasing “networking of social forces from the bottom up” was based on the insight that “everyone [was] affected by the forced brutalisation of working and living conditions caused by neo-liberalism”.<sup>clxxxix</sup> As one Trotskyist who is well-known in the anti-globalisation scene announced euphorically in late October:

“This new movement has given the left wing in Germany many new starting points to contemplate a social project that can provide an alternative to capitalism. Not in abstract but concrete terms and based on the social struggles and the needs of the mass population that are being voiced by the grassroots.”

(“Linke und das ESF – Neue Möglichkeiten in der Bewegung offensiv nutzen” (The left-wing and the ESF – Pro-actively using the new opportunities available in the movement), *junge Welt* (jW), No. 252, 29 October 2003; in: ESF special supplement, p. 3)

In fact, however, the anti-globalisation movement in Germany has not established itself as a mass phenomenon as it has in Italy, France and Spain. Only a few people are willing to take part in protests, which makes it easier for left-wing extremists involved in the scene, particularly orthodox communists and Trotskyist groups, to bring their influence to bear.

## 2. Anti-fascism

Left-wing extremist groups have traditionally participated in the “anti-fascist struggle” but in 2003 there was a lull in this area, as members showed little or no willingness to get involved or form alliances; many of them felt insecure and frustrated. The broad-based alliances of democratic organisations fighting right-wing extremism which often dominated the scene (and which autonomists call “state anti-fascism”) in combination with appropriate police measures made it more difficult for left-wing extremists to make their mark in this field.

The actual target of the “anti-fascist struggle” is the free democratic social order described by left-wing extremists as a “capitalist system” in which fascism is supposedly rooted. Differences of opinion in the autonomist scene regarding the main thrust of the “anti-fascist struggle” led to a further reduction in activities and a drop in the number of autonomists supporting protests against marches by right-wing extremists. The scene has declared openly that the “radical left wing” is in crisis:

“the state of the former antifa movement is still somewhere between dissolution and stagnation.”

(Online edition of the autonomist publication *Phase 2 zeitschrift gegen die realität* (Phase 2 magazine against reality), No.6, January 2003)

Despite the “antifa” movement’s failure to organise in recent years, a minority of autonomist groups still clings to the notion of binding and co-ordinated co-operation, demanding that agitation and activities above all be directed against the system and civil society which endorses it.

For example, autonomists from Nuremberg wrote the following concerning the “current state of affairs” in the scene:

“And another thing we cannot repeat often enough: Fascism is no more than the capitalist system in its most extreme form. We must fight its root causes, for a world beyond fascism and war and therefore beyond capitalist exploitation and oppression.”

(*barricada - zeitung für autonome politik und kultur* (barricada – newspaper for autonomist politics and culture), June 2003, p. 3)

More “traditional” autonomists continued to focus primarily on fighting those they call “faschos”, or fascists. They sought confrontation mainly in the streets, bent on preventing right-wing extremist marches by means of mass militancy or “small-group tactics”, or at least on limiting them spatially or temporally.

The editorial team of the newspaper *INTERIM* stressed:

“Incidentally, the following still holds true for fascists: Strike them wherever you find them. And make sure you hit them each time you strike.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 569, 3 April 2003, p. 3)

In addition, autonomist groups carried out “antifa research” into the structures and logistics behind the right-wing extremists’ groups and organisations. The information on people, meeting places, training

facilities or “Nazi shops” they uncovered was published in newspapers, journals and on the Internet or helped in preparing militant activities.

The following are examples of militant actions by left-wing extremists directed against right-wing extremists:

On the anniversary of the Allied air raids on Dresden around 170 members of the left-wing extremist scene protested in Dresden on 13 February against a march by the Junge Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen (JLO, Young *Landsmannschaft* of East Prussia; see Note 94). After the JLO meeting ended, around 70 people attacked march participants in a tram with stones and fireworks. The police took 18 people into custody.

In the run-up to this event the Autonome Antifa Dresden (Autonomist Antifa Dresden) published a call on the Internet to stop the march from taking place:

“We too want to go to the city centre on 13 February and will not let those candle-wielding, ‘concerned’ Germans spoil our fun ... We have to put a stop to yet another neo-Nazi march ... The city centre will again be full of ‘concerned’ Germans who will make the day feel like a pile of monster mob shit.”

On 15 April left-wing extremists carried out an arson attack on a building in Trebnitz, Saxony-Anhalt, belonging to right-wing extremists. An “Anti-Fascist Citizen’s Group” claimed responsibility. In an interview the perpetrators explained the mechanism of the detonator they had used and justified the attack on the “planned training and event centre ‘Trebnitz Castle’”. They claimed that “free *Kameradschaften*” promoting “racism with boots” were especially dangerous and attractive and said their aim had been to hamper the Nazi centres’ work:

“We decided on specific action to inflict specific damage on the Nazis without there really being a broad-based anti-fascist movement. The goal was, among other things, to show that resistance need not only be symbolic but can also produce results. This should also encourage other groups to resist in whatever form they can. We will continue our resistance. For multi-coloured instead of brown!”

(*INTERIM*, No. 575, 26 June 2003, p. 10)

On 24 May around 1,500 people protested in Hanover against a march by the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany). The protest was led by a

“black bloc” comprising around 250 violent left-wing extremists. Demonstrators threw bottles, stones and other projectiles and shot fireworks at police officers. The police detained more than 300 people.

An appeal posted on the Internet prior to the event stated:

“It is essential that anti-fascist action be taken, beginning with standing up for one’s convictions in everyday life and leading to organised political protest and resistance against fascist developments. Neo-Nazis will not be driven back by social work or by pretty speeches and appeals.”

### **3. Anti-racism**

Conflicts over the issue of “anti-racism” observed already in 2002 within autonomist “anti-racist” groups and groups of immigrants represented in the border camp movement continued in 2003 and proved a hindrance to activities in this area.

It was agreed in 2003 that a joint border camp would take place (as it has done annually since 1998) in Cologne from 31 July to 19 August. However, discussions held during the forum “Anti-Racism Spelt Out” before the border camp started and feedback sessions after it ended showed that differences of opinion had become more bitter.

Some members of the autonomist groups again called for the camps to expand the scope of topics addressed, arguing that “anti-racism” should be dealt with in more detail not only in theoretical but also in practical terms and should also include radical criticism of the current system. Various representatives of autonomist groups accused the immigrants’ associations of instrumentalising the border camp movement for their own purposes. It is necessary to ask, they said, whether “anti-racist” politics must necessarily include co-operation between immigrants and non-immigrants.

A total of around 500 people took part in the 6th Anti-Racist Border Camp in Cologne. The police broke up the camp on 9 August, one day before the official end of the event, as various individuals had committed a considerable number of criminal offences while preparing for protests against a right-wing extremist demonstration, and further criminal offences were anticipated. Militant protests were held in several cities in response to the police measure.

On 24 August, for example, several people wearing masks threw bottles filled with paint and bitumen at the building housing North

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Rhine-Westphalia's permanent mission to the Federal Government in Berlin. Serious damage was done to the property. In a letter claiming responsibility, signed "Autonome Campistas" (autonomous campers) and sent to the DDP news agency and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* newspaper on 26 August, the signatories declared their solidarity with "those affected by the brutal (police) attacks" and called on others to follow their lead:

"What we want others to know ... is that despite it being broad daylight, despite the security personnel, the gawping passers-by and the CCTV cameras, we were able to engage in militant activity in the heart of the capital. Others should heed this example (and follow suit)."

In the journal *INTERIM* published in Berlin, representatives of the border camp movement provocatively claimed that they felt they were not being criminalised without good reason. They said they were glad to be criminal in the current sense of the word:

"We believe we need to break the law in manifold ways ... An emancipatory critique of and a practical approach to attacking the state with its racist constitution and racist social structure has to go beyond the bounds of the law and feelings about what constitutes a crime. That is why anti-racist politics cannot settle down in its allotted place in the democratic plurality of civil society."  
(*INTERIM*, No. 578, 4 September 2003, p. 6ff.)

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#### 4. Campaign by left-wing extremists against nuclear energy

Protests against the peaceful use of nuclear energy are supported mainly by citizens and environmental pressure groups with no extremist intentions. However, left-wing extremists continued their efforts to use the actions to protest against the system and to give them an anti-capitalist undertone:

“We do have a very serious agenda, which is directed against the existing system of government ...

We not only want to put a stop to nuclear energy – in the belief that everything will be all right after that. We want a society in which, among other things, there is no place for this inhumane technology. Atomic energy is not a mistake but a consistent expression of the current state of affairs. The corporations’ interests in making profits are placed above the interests of the people and people are increasingly classified and selected according to their utility.”

(Solidaritätsgruppe Goldene Hakenkralle (Solidarity Group Golden Claw Hook), July 2003, in: *INTERIM*, No. 579, 18 September 2003, p. 22)

Nevertheless, again in 2003 fewer left-wing extremists took part in such protests. This continued the trend first observed in 2002, namely a decrease in disruptive activities by various initiatives against nuclear energy and a drop in direct or indirect support for them by left-wing extremists.

There were hardly any disruptions to the 11 shipments of radioactive waste (CASTOR transports) from Germany to the La Hague reprocessing plant in France and to Sellafield, United Kingdom. As in previous years, the main activities were protests against the shipment of radioactive waste from the reprocessing plant in La Hague to the interim storage site at Gorleben, Lower Saxony, between 10 and 12 November. Up to 4,500 people from all over Germany took part in these protests, including around 250 to 300 left-wing extremist activists, some of whom were prepared to use violence. Despite several months of attempting to mobilise supporters via the Internet, an anti-atomic energy group with anarchist leanings managed to mobilise only around 150 supporters to block railway tracks. Other activities, such as two instances in which protesters chained themselves to railway tracks, a street blockade and one instance in which protesters washed away part of a minor road on the lorry’s route, caused no significant disruption to the planned transport.

Shortly before the transport of radioactive waste by rail, protesters hung metal hooks on railway overhead power-supply cables, carried out arson attacks and blockaded railway tracks.

Some anti-nuclear energy initiatives had expected support in particular from the anti-war and the anti-globalisation movements, but this failed to materialise. Contact between German and French opponents of nuclear energy was limited to co-ordinating joint protest activities on a regional level.

Overall the anti-nuclear movement has lost much of its ability to mobilise supporters in recent years. As a result left-wing extremists and above all autonomists have lost interest in the movement. Nevertheless, supporters of the movement can still be expected to use violence and to continue to target activities against shipments of radioactive waste in CASTOR containers – primarily those destined for the interim storage site in Gorleben.

For example, autonomist groups declared that there was a stable base of supporters opposed to shipments of radioactive waste to the Wendland region of Lower Saxony. In the groups' view, the local population had increasingly come to accept the "embedded militant activities". The groups claimed it was their job to forge even closer links among themselves and with local activists and to "set new trends" in opposing further transports "by using our imagination, by being subversive and unpredictable".<sup>CXC</sup>

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## **VI. Means of agitation and communication**

### **1. Publishers, distributors and periodicals**

In 2003 more than 30 publishers and distributors serving left-wing extremist audiences disseminated newspapers, journals and books. There was no significant change in the total number of periodical publications issued by these publishing houses and distributors (around 220) or in their total print runs (nearly eight million copies) compared to 2002.

### **2. Internet**

For left-wing extremists, using the Internet, especially the World Wide Web, has become a matter of course. They primarily use it to disseminate and document information; it also serves their attempts to link various groups within the scene.

The author of an article published in *INTERIM* in late 2003 stated that the Internet was a “very good medium” for networking. At the same time, the author criticised the fact that people in the left-wing scene had become “a little careless” about the “matter of security” when using mobile phones and computers. In view of the “threat of repressive measures” it is still necessary, the author added, to take precautions:

“To give you a rough idea: If you’re online now and again, the police may know what else you use your computer for – in more detail and more than you can tell from what’s left on your hard disk, at least at first glance.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 585, 18 December 2003, p. 9)

The article went on to say that the only safe way of doing things was to have one PC with Internet access for private use and a physically separate one used for “political purposes”:

“one (should) be careful where activities threatened with repressive measures are concerned and take certain security measures to heart.”

Well-established information portals such as nadir, Partisan.net, gipfelsturm and LINKE SEITE compile the large amount of “relevant” information available on the Internet so as to categorise it under



headings such as “anti-fascism”, “anti-globalisation” or “anti-imperialism” (the campaign against the US-led intervention in Iraq) and make it easier for users to find.

Left-wing extremists are increasingly setting up “campaign sites” on specific topics or events. These sites post calls to take part in demonstrations and specific campaigns or provide comprehensive and up-to-date information on other events – such as legal proceedings which might be of interest to those in the scene.

The format of these websites is rather basic and most do not integrate any special visual or acoustic elements. Those that do include audio and video files usually use them for documentary purposes. The information portal [indymedia.de](http://indymedia.de), for example, is increasingly being used by left-wing extremists and often provides pictures to accompany reports on demonstrations and campaigns.

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## **Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State**

### **I. Overview**

In 2003 extremist and terrorist groups of foreigners continued to pose a real threat to Germany's internal security. The most potent threat remained that from Islamist terrorists, who preach the doctrine of jihad (defined as a violent struggle or "holy war" against the West). Germany was and continues to be under threat; German nationals fell victim to terrorist attacks abroad.

The types of activities carried out by extremist groups of foreigners in Germany were again dictated by current affairs and political developments in their respective countries of origin.

#### **Ideology of militant Islamists**

In the eyes of militant Islamists, the jihad against those who have "fallen away from the true faith" and against "unbelievers" is a Muslim duty. They believe it serves to defend and disseminate Islam; it will not end until Islam as they understand it has become the dominant religion and governing power worldwide. This form of jihad is fought by the mujahidin, or "holy warriors". These people have had military training and have sometimes been involved in fighting in trouble spots, in particular Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and most recently Iraq. They have also been given ideological training, in Afghan, Sudanese and Pakistani training camps, amongst others. Arab Muslims in particular – members of nearly all the Islamist organisations from the Maghrib region, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Middle East – have spent some time in such training camps.

Personal contacts forged in these training camps form the basic links in the multinational network of Arab mujahidin. This network – of varying density – spans all five continents and enables assignments to be carried out anywhere the Islamists feel "holy war" is necessary. Religiously motivated fanaticism, hatred and contempt for humanity, a rigorous choice of targets and means, a high level of mobility and conspiracy are all characteristic of the danger emanating from the Arab mujahidin.

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**Al-Qaeda  
and Arab mujahidin  
networks**

This wide-ranging group includes al-Qaeda, the network founded by Osama BIN LADEN, the networks of Arab mujahidin which co-operate with it, and individual regional Islamist organisations. They have declared “holy war” on the United States and its allies. They accuse the United States of aspiring to worldwide supremacy, of interfering in the affairs of Muslim states and of one-sided partisanship in the Middle East conflict in favour of Israel. In their eyes the United States symbolises the “decadence” and “immorality” of Western culture and lifestyle.

After having to relinquish Afghanistan, the key location of al-Qaeda training camps, the Arab mujahidin moved to Pakistan, Iran, northern Iraq, Chechnya, Yemen and South-East Asia, among others. Wide-ranging police efforts and a number of arrests of high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders (e.g. Khalid SHEIKH MOHAMMAD, suspected of planning the 11 September 2001 attacks, among others; and Riduan BIN ISAMUDDIN, a.k.a. Hambali, one of the leaders of the South-East Asian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community) responsible for the Bali attack) also affected both al-Qaeda and regional groups and their ability to carry out attacks. Nevertheless, one must assume that the Arab mujahidin continue to plan and prepare future attacks. Specific political events or calendar dates are not what determines when terrorist plans are translated into action; this largely rests on how high the terrorists believe their chances of success to be. Following the attacks in Riyadh on 12 May and 8 November, in Casablanca on 16 May and in Jakarta on 5 August which targeted housing compounds, restaurants and a hotel, as well as attacks in Iraq on aid organisations and United Nations facilities (by unknown perpetrators), it is feared that Islamist terrorists will in future continue to choose so-called soft targets, which are difficult to protect. The attacks on two synagogues, the British consulate and a British investment bank in Istanbul on 15 and 20 November back this up.

Initially the conflict in Iraq did not play a particularly important role in the Arab mujahidin’s motives for carrying out terrorist attacks. However, it took priority over other motives after Osama BIN LADEN issued statements calling on his followers to carry out suicide attacks and declaring that jihad was the duty of all Muslims. Mujahidin groups are becoming increasingly active in Iraq, indicating that the fight against US troops deployed there could develop into a rallying point for an international jihad aimed at ending the US military presence not only in Iraq, but also in the entire Middle East.

Despite increased police efforts and successful operations by the security authorities, the all-clear cannot yet be sounded in Germany. On the contrary, numerous arrests of Islamists suspected of violent crimes in western Europe, including Germany, indicate the widespread presence and networks of Arab mujahidin in Europe. Documents and materials found during investigations again and again indicated that further attacks were being planned. One must assume that the Arab mujahidin have followers in Germany (although no exact figures are available) with international connections. Not only is Germany considered a likely place for preparing attacks to be carried out elsewhere, but facilities in the Federal Republic could also be targeted. Islamists view Germany as one of the so-called crusaders, a helper of the United States and Israel, and it is also involved in Afghanistan. US, Israeli, Jewish and British facilities in Germany continue to be under a very serious threat. Facilities belonging to other Western countries must likewise be seen as under threat.

**Islamist extremism**

Islamists hold the view that Sharia law (the Islamic legal system) – i.e. the provisions set out in the Koran, the Sunna (the accounts of the prophet Mohammed's daily practice) and the Hadiths (a collection of acts and sayings of the prophet Mohammed) – constitutes a divine order which regulates all spheres of life and should be imposed all over the world. They believe that forms of state authority can only and exclusively be derived from God and His will as revealed in the Koran, not from the will of the people. Basic democratic principles such as the sovereignty of the people, the multi-party system and the right to education and to engage in parliamentary opposition are incompatible with this claim to the absolute truth; Islamists therefore reject them.

The majority of other Islamist groups of foreigners represented in Germany, for example the Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party), banned on 15 January, and the Caliphate State, banned in December 2001, pursue the primary goal of replacing Western-oriented regimes in their countries of origin with an Islamist state and a social system based on Sharia law. Some of them openly acknowledge that their declared aim is the worldwide rule of Islam. Their members have often gained entry to Germany as political refugees and support the sometimes violent activities in their home countries from their vantage point here. These include, for example, the Lebanese Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, "Party of God") and Hamas (the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement). Other Islamist groups pursue a broader strategy. Although they too hope to replace the current systems of government in their countries with an Islamist

state, they also endeavour to create enclaves for their supporters within Germany so that they can lead their lives according to Sharia law.

The Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e.V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society) is the largest Islamist organisation in Germany and still the most important. The IGMG continues to have links with the Turkish Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party), which like its predecessor is under the considerable influence of Necmettin ERBAKAN. In 2003 the IGMG continued its effectively anti-integrative Islamic educational efforts focused primarily on Turkish children and adolescents. With its model of a society essentially formed solely by religion, it promotes establishing and spreading Islamist milieus in Germany. Simultaneously it attempts to represent itself as an organisation that believes in the free and democratic basic order and is striving to fully integrate its members.

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in part operates in the same way as the IGMG. Its ideas are propagated by the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD, Islamic Society in Germany, reg'd society) and affiliated Islamic centres. Islamic education is likewise one of its core activities.

<b>Left-wing extremism</b>	With varying levels of intensity, left-wing extremist groups of foreigners continue to pursue the “revolutionary” destruction of the existing social order and the establishment of socialist or communist systems in their countries of origin. The ideologies of these mainly Turkish groups are usually rooted in Marxism–Leninism and Maoism. The “anti-imperialist” attitude of these organisations – which is fairly pronounced in some cases – again led to protests against the United States in 2003.
<b>Turkish left-wing extremist organisations</b>	Turkish left-wing organisations, furthermore, continued to focus on the topic of “political prisoners” in Turkish prisons who had been moved from large cells into single occupancy cells.
<b>PKK / KADEK / Kongra Gel</b>	The Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan) sees itself as the successor to the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which has been banned in Germany. Despite repeated ultimatums issued to the Turkish government, KADEK continued to pursue its self-imposed policy of pursuing a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue. KADEK rejected the so-called Resocialisation Act passed by the Turkish parliament in July, which envisages reduced punishment for members of terrorist organisations under certain circumstances; the law was the

topic of several KADEK propaganda campaigns. At its 9th Party Conference held in northern Iraq at the end of October, KADEK decided to disband. Shortly afterwards, on 15 November, the People's Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gel) was formed. According to its statements, the Kongra Gel intends to pursue KADEK's policies, although it will not be working to establish an independent Kurdish state.

**Nationalism**

Nationalist and nationalist-oriented groups of foreigners – primarily Turkish groups – attach particular importance to the nation in both political/territorial and ethnic/cultural terms. This ideology disregards the rights of other nations and measures a person's value based on his/her membership of a nation or race. This is in fundamental opposition to basic human rights and the principle of international understanding.

**Iranian opposition groups**

The activities of extremist Iranian opposition groups continued to be directed primarily against the government in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran) also focused on agitation related to the MEK's inclusion in the international list of terrorist organisations and to police measures against MEK members and property in France.

**Asian separatists**

Separatist organisations from South-East Asia such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from Sri Lanka, and Sikh organisations striving to establish the independent state of Khalistan in India, continued to focus on propaganda and fund-raising activities.

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## **II. Statistics**

### **1. Organisations and followers<sup>cxci</sup>**

Around 7.3 million foreigners, including 3 million Muslims, were registered as living in Germany at the end of 2003. The majority practice their faith within our free social order; only a minority (around 1%) belong to Islamist organisations.

The offices for the protection of the constitution estimate that in 2003 around 30,950 (2002: around 30,600) people were members of the 24 (2002: 22) active Islamist organisations. However, the influence of these organisations is much larger. Through their mosques and Islamic centres they reach not only their members but also several thousand Muslims who regularly visit these facilities.

The largest organisation is still the Turkish Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society), with around 26,500 members (unchanged since 2002).

The number of supporters of Islamist organisations from the Arab region rose to 3,300 (2002: 3,150). The Egyptian and Syrian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) together have over 1,300 members (2002: 1,200). Membership of the Lebanese Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, "Party of God") remained constant at around 800. No figures are available for the number of supporters of Arab mujahidin networks in Germany.

In 2003, the 41 (2002: 42) non-Islamist extremist foreigners' organisations and foreigners' organisations constituting a state security risk dropped to 26,450 (2002: 26,750). The left-wing extremist or left-wing extremist-oriented foreign groups were most severely affected; their numbers dropped to 17,470 (2002: 17,850).

Membership of nationalist groups of foreigners dropped slightly to 8,880 (2002: 8,900).

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<b>Groups of extremist foreigners and their followers <sup>*)</sup></b>									
<b>Nationality or ethnicity</b>		<b>Left-wing extremists</b>		<b>Extremist nationalists</b>		<b>Islamists</b>		<b>Total</b>	
		Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
Kurds <sup>**)</sup>	2003	21	11,850					21	11,850
	2002	22	11,850					22	11,850
	2001	22	12,350					22	12,350
Turks <sup>**)</sup>	2003	12	3,370	1	8,000	6	27,300	19	38,670
	2002	12	3,650	1	8,000	5	27,300	18	38,950
	2001	12	3,950	1	8,000	5	28,650	18	40,600
Arabs	2003	4	150			14	3,300	18	3,450
	2002	4	150			14	3,150	18	3,300
	2001	4	150			12	3,100	16	3,250
Iranians	2003	2	1,200			1	50	3	1,250
	2002	2	1,300			1	50	3	1,350
	2001	1	900			1	100	2	1,000
Others	2003	2	900	4	880	3	300	9	2,080
	2002	2	900	4	900	2	100	8	1,900
	2001	2	900	4	900	1	100	7	1,900
<b>Total</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>17,470</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8,880</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>30,950</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>57,300</b>
	2002	42	17,850	5	8,900	22	30,600	69	57,350
	2001	41	18,250	5	8,900	19	31,950	65	59,100

<sup>\*)</sup> The figures refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded off.

<sup>\*\*)</sup> Banned groups are also included in these figures.



## **2. Extremist criminal offences and acts of violence committed by extremist foreigners \***

Extremist criminal offences and acts of violence committed by foreign extremists constitute a subset of the class of “politically motivated crime by foreigners”. In 2003, 1,743 (2002: 845) criminal offences, including 122 (2002: 103) acts of violence, fell into this category; 1,473 (2002: 573) criminal offences were classified as motivated by extremism, of which 88 (2002: 61) constituted acts of violence.

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
\* Cf. Section II, 2.1 and 2.2 in the chapter “Right-Wing Extremist Activities” for the definition of “politically motivated crime”.

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<b>Overview of acts of violence and other criminal offences based on extremist activities by foreigners in the category "Politically motivated crime by foreigners"</b> <sup>*</sup>		
	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
<b>Acts of violence:</b>		
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	4	0
Bodily injury	20	32
Arson	2	4
Causing explosions with intent to injure or damage property	0	1
Contributing to rioting or civil disorders	7	9
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship and road transport	1	6
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	8	4
Robbery	2	2
Extortion	16	20
Resisting public authority	1	9
Sexual offences	0	1
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Other criminal offences:</b>		
Property damage	22	28
Coercion, threat	23	17
Other offences	467	1,340
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>512</b>	<b>1,385</b>
<b>Total number of offences</b>	<b>573</b>	<b>1,473</b>

<sup>\*</sup> The figures are based on data provided by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).  
The overview includes both actual and attempted offences – with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if during a case of contributing to rioting or civil disorders an assault was committed at the same time, only the instance of contributing to rioting or civil disorders was included in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

**Acts of violence with a foreign extremist background  
in the category “politically motivated crime by foreigners”  
*per Land***



\* The graph is based on data supplied by the BKA.

### III. Goals and main activities of individual groups

#### 1. Arabs

##### 1.1 Al-Qaeda (The Base) / Arab mujahidin (Fighters for Allah's Cause)

<b>Al-Qaeda</b>	
Founded:	In the mid-1980s
Leader:	Osama BIN LADEN
Membership/Supporters:	No exact figures available
<b>Arab mujahidin</b>	
Founded:	In the early 1980s in Pakistan / Afghanistan
Membership/Supporters:	No exact figures available

The Arab mujahidin are characterised by a pan-Islamic ideology calling for the defence of the Muslim world against so-called unbelievers, combined with a militant rejection of Western society and its values.

#### Paramilitary training camps

Islamists of Arab origin make up most of the global, amorphous network of Arab mujahidin. Along with other mujahidin, they have often taken part in international jihad in military operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya and – since spring 2003 – in Iraq, or have had military or terrorist training there. Personal contacts forged during such missions constitute the links in a network whose members also have or can establish links to regional Islamist organisations, for example in northern Africa, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

Despite the US military intervention in Afghanistan in autumn 2001, Osama BIN LADEN's cadre organisation al-Qaeda still constitutes the core of the Arab mujahidin movement.

The collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan forced al-Qaeda members and other mujahidin to move to Pakistan, Iran, the Arabian Peninsula, South-East Asia, Chechnya and northern Iraq. This has made it much more difficult for Osama BIN LADEN and his deputy, Dr Ayman AL-ZAWAHIRI, to lead the movement, although it has not completely stopped them doing so.

**Khalid SHEIKH  
MOHAMMAD  
arrested**

When Khalid SHEIKH MOHAMMAD was arrested near the Pakistani capital Islamabad on 1 March, al-Qaeda lost one of its key leaders and one of the most important organisers of terrorist attacks. He is believed to have masterminded plans for the 11 September 2001 attacks and to have been involved in planning the attack in Djerba, Tunisia, on 11 April 2002, which killed 23 people, including 14 Germans.

Ramzi BINALSHIB was arrested on 11 September 2002 in Pakistan.

The arrest of these two men seriously weakened the al-Qaeda organisation in Pakistan, which had been very active. Until then Pakistan had been regarded as having the most extensive al-Qaeda organisation after Afghanistan.

**War in Iraq**

The beginning of the war in Iraq on 21 March mobilised Islamists worldwide, in particular those involved in al-Qaeda and the Arab mujahidin. Islamists typically oppose the military presence of the United States and its allies in Iraq and call on supporters to fight the “occupying forces”.

This opposition remained unaffected by the announcement on 2 May that military operations had officially ended for the foreseeable future. Al-Qaeda and other networks of Arab mujahidin took advantage of the situation in Iraq to recruit new fighters for the jihad, saying that their arch enemy, the United States, had attacked a Muslim country and left behind soldiers as “occupying forces” who needed to be driven out. Many mujahidin did in fact follow the calls to go to Iraq to fight the “unbelievers”. Against this background, in 2003 Iraq became the most important location for jihad.

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**Role of the  
Ansar al-Islam  
group**

Until the US-led intervention in Iraq, the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam) controlled a small area around the city of Halabja in northern Iraq. The AAI's goal was to establish an independent Islamic state in the Kurdish part of Iraq. In the months leading up to the war, there were increasing signs that al-Qaeda fighters were using the AAI-occupied area as a refuge. Al-Qaeda is believed to have set up a training camp in the Kurdish part of Iraq.

There are also signs that the fugitive Jordanian Ahmed Nazzal Fadhil AL-KHALALIYAH, alias Abu Mosab AL-ZARQAWI, leader of his own mujahidin network and close al-Qaeda associate, spent some time on AAI territory.

It has been established that there were groups of individuals in Germany who at the very least provided the AAI with logistical support. These networks are now being used by non-Iraqi Islamists to support mujahidin activities in Iraq.

On 2 December four suspected members of the AAI were arrested in Munich on suspicion of smuggling foreigners professionally and in gangs. Three of those arrested were released after having their fingerprints and photographs taken for police files. The main suspect, Amin Lokman MOHAMED, alias "Lokman", was held on charges of human smuggling. The Algerian Abderrazak MAHDJOUR was arrested in Hamburg on 28 November 2002 during an internationally co-ordinated operation. He is believed to be a contact of "Lokman" and provider of logistics for the AAI.<sup>cxcii</sup>

**Perceived enemy /  
statements**

In 2003 al-Qaeda propaganda concentrated on hostile stereotypes of the United States, Israel and Western countries. Against the background of the war in Iraq, concrete threats were directed in particular against countries participating in the US-led coalition. Al-Qaeda also issued threats against every country which had taken any special action in the fight against terrorism since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Al-Qaeda claimed that the ostensible fight against terrorism was in fact a fight against Islam. As expressed in numerous statements by BIN LADEN and AL-ZAWAHIRI, the al-Qaeda leadership focused on governments in those Islamic states which, in their opinion, were too Western and too co-operative with the "enemies of Islam". For example, in BIN LADEN's statement of 11 February, the governments of Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were described as "despots" and "lackeys" of the United States, of which the *Umma*, the community of believers, had to rid itself.

Other statements referring to the war in Iraq were directed at the *Umma* and called on believers to join in fighting the United States. Support for the United States and its allies was denounced and the purported negative effects of such support – especially for Muslim states – highlighted. One such statement announced, for example, that the United States was planning to found a “Greater Israel”, to the detriment of its neighbouring Arab states.

Videotaped and audiotaped messages by al-Qaeda leaders BIN LADEN and AL-ZAWAHIRI repeatedly served as proof that they were still alive. The videotapes – often using old footage – and audiotapes were often leaked to the Arabic TV stations *Al Jazeera* and *Al Arabica* so that the messages would reach as large an audience as possible.

In addition, a large number of videotaped messages by smaller, unknown groups from Iraq were broadcast. Representatives of these groups were usually shown masked and armed as they declared war on the United States and its allies.

**Terrorist attacks by  
Arab mujahidin**

Terrorist attacks by Arab mujahidin / al-Qaeda claimed numerous lives again in 2003: On 12 May, 35 people were killed and 194 injured in a series of attacks on residential and business compounds used by Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Four days later, on 16 May, 41 people were killed and around 100 injured in bombings in the centre of Casablanca, Morocco. The perpetrators simultaneously detonated three car bombs in the city’s entertainment and financial district. Some of the suicide bombers blew themselves up in front of Western and Jewish facilities. Three suicide bombers detonated explosives attached to their belts in the middle of a crowded restaurant in the Spanish cultural centre.

On 5 August the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, was bombed. Thirteen people were killed and around 150 injured. An Indonesian newspaper received a call from a suspected member of the Indonesian Islamist Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community), who claimed responsibility for the attack. The attack may have been connected with the impending sentencing of one of the persons responsible for the terrorist attack on the resort island of Bali on 12 October 2002. The Abu Hafs al-Masri brigades also claimed responsibility for the attack, although the existence of this group has not yet been verified.

Seventeen people were killed and 122 injured in another suicide attack on Western residential compounds in the Saudi capital Riyadh on 8 November. Although this attack showed parallels with that of 12

May, most of the victims were Saudi, Sudanese and Egyptian nationals. The suicide bombers forced their way into the guarded residential compound under gunfire and detonated explosives hidden in at least one vehicle.

Two serious double bombings occurred in Istanbul in late 2003: On 15 November two suicide bombers blew themselves up almost simultaneously, one in front of the Neve Shalom synagogue in the European district of Beyoglu and the other near the synagogue in the neighbouring district of Sisli. Twenty-four people were killed and around 300 injured in the explosions. There were more suicide attacks just five days later: Two car bombs exploded within moments of each other, one in front of the British consulate and the other at the headquarters of a British investment bank, killing a total of 31 people and injuring around 450.

The methods used in these attacks (car bombs, large quantities of home-made explosives, suicide bombers, co-ordinated explosions) and the choice of targets (synagogues, British facilities) are similar to those of the Arab mujahidin. However, the suicide bombers were Turkish nationals. Following both double attacks, the Turkish Islamist group Islamic Great Eastern Raiders' Front (I BDA-C) sent letters to a Turkish news agency claiming responsibility for the attacks. In these letters the group claimed that it had co-operated with al-Qaeda. However, subsequent investigations have not yet confirmed this claim, nor a claim made by the Abu Hafs al-Masri brigades.

**Mujahidin activities  
in Germany / arrests  
and sentences**

Ahmed Nazzal Fadhil AL-KHALALIYAH, alias Abu Mosab AL-ZARQAWI, is regarded as one of the most important organisers of terrorist activity. From his various places of residence in the Middle East in 2003 he commanded a mujahidin network that also extended to Germany. Its members are believed to have been involved in recruiting mujahidin, procuring and forging personal identity documents and procuring technical equipment (e.g. mobile/satellite phones, night-vision aids). There are indications that members of this network, often referred to as al-Tawhid (Unity of God) in the media, had at AL-KHALALIYAH's instruction begun planning terrorist attacks on Jewish and Israeli facilities in Germany. For this reason, 12 suspects were arrested on 23/24 April 2002 on warrants issued by the Federal Public Prosecutor in Germany. The Jordanian national Shadi ABDALLAH, a member of AL-KHALALIYAH's network, was also arrested. ABDALLAH is suspected, amongst other things, of attempting to acquire a firearm and hand grenades. On 26 November the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced him to four years in



prison for membership of a terrorist organisation.

As a result of investigations into the attacks of 11 September 2001, Moroccan nationals Abdelghani MZOUDI, who was arrested in October 2002, and Mounir EL-MOTASSADEQ were both charged with having helped the attackers from within Germany.<sup>cxci</sup> EL-MOTASSADEQ was given a 15-year prison sentence on 19 February by the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg.<sup>cxci</sup> Both men had undergone training in an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan in 2000.

On 10 March the Frankfurt (Main) Higher Regional Court sentenced four Islamists to between 10 and 12 years in prison, amongst other things for preparing to bomb the Christmas market in Strasbourg, France, in 2000. The accused included three Algerians and a French national of Algerian descent. The court's verdict stated that the accused had intended to target Christian symbols such as Strasbourg Cathedral and the Christmas market in order to punish France for supporting the Algerian government. The verdict described as "absurd" the defendants' initial claim that they had not been targeting the Christmas market but a synagogue that would have been empty at the time of the attack. The verdict stated that the bomb prepared by the defendants (a pressure cooker filled with explosives) would have been unsuitable for destroying a building.

On 20/21 March police officers searched seven properties in Berlin and Gelsenkirchen and the al-Nur mosque in Berlin as part of an investigation initiated by the Federal Public Prosecutor on suspicion of the founding of a terrorist organisation. The searches turned up several items which confirmed the suspicion that attacks were being prepared.

Ihsan G., who was arrested during these searches, is believed to have been an al-Qaeda trainer in Afghanistan and to have intended to carry out an attack in Germany in the next few months, possibly a suicide bombing.\* Moreover, the head of the "Islamic Department" of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Berlin was suspected of having had close links with this group of Islamists committed to violence. The Saudi diplomat returned home prematurely in March.

In Paris on 1 June the police arrested Moroccan national Karim M., previously resident in Duisburg, Germany. He is suspected of

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\* In January 2004 the Federal Public Prosecutor charged G. before the Berlin Court of Appeal with attempting to found a terrorist organisation pursuant to Section 129a of the Criminal Code (StGB).

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intending to scout out potential targets on the French holiday island of La Réunion for attacks similar to those on Bali. M. stated that, together with others, including the German national Christian GANCZARSKI, he had founded a mujahidin cell. Based on this statement, GANCZARSKI was arrested on 3 June during a stopover in Paris as he was returning to Germany from Saudi Arabia.

GANCZARSKI had contacts with the al-Qaeda leadership. In addition, he is suspected of having known about the plans for the Djerba attack on 11 April 2002.

Both Karim M. and Christian GANCZARSKI remained in police custody in France at the end of 2003.

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## 1.2 Egyptian Islamist groups

### **al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GI, Islamic Group)**

Founded: 1971 in Egypt

Leadership: Shura (a consultative council comprising 8 to 10 people, most of whom do not live in Egypt)

Membership/Supporters in Germany: Only a few individuals

### **Jihad Islami (JI, Islamic Holy War)**

Founded: 1973 in Egypt

Leadership: Shura (a consultative council comprising 8 to 10 people, most of whom do not live in Egypt)

Membership/Supporters in Germany: Only a few individuals

A small number of members and functionaries of both the GI and the JI live in Germany. They maintain contacts with like-minded individuals in their countries of origin and in Europe.

The GI was not actively involved in any acts of violence in 2003. Since its November 1997 attacks on foreign tourists in Luxor, Egypt, the organisation has abided by its public declaration (made in 1999) that it would in future desist from any armed operations. After a long-running debate within the Shura on whether to continue the cease-fire, the majority now seems to have agreed to this policy. The Egyptian authorities apparently believe this shift in attitude to be credible, as GI members and functionaries were released from prison in Egypt throughout the year. It is not clear whether the GI leaders living in exile will continue to feel bound by the policy of non-aggression.

The JI's situation remained unchanged in 2003. Whilst one section of the JI joined al-Qaeda (cf. 1.1 above) under its long-time leader Dr Ayman AL-ZAWAHIRI, Tharwat SHEHATA, a member of the Shura, continued his efforts to establish an organisation independent of al-Qaeda, thereby attempting to shift the focus of JI activities back to Egypt. There are as yet no indications as to whether supporters living

in Germany will subordinate themselves to the new JI structure, to al-Qaeda or to one of the other local Arab mujahidin networks.

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### 1.3 Algerian Islamist groups

#### **Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front)**

Founded: 1988 in Algiers; in 1989 officially sanctioned as a political party in Algeria; but banned there since 1992

Leadership: Chairman of the National Executive Authority of the FIS Abroad (founded in 2002): Dr Mourad DHINA (Switzerland)

Membership/Supporters: Around 350 (2002: around 350)

Publications: *Al-Ribat* (The Link), weekly

#### **Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamist Group)**

Founded: 1992 in Algeria

Leader: Rachid UKALI

Membership/Supporters: Included in the FIS figures

#### **Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group for Call and Combat)**

Founded: At the end of 1997 in Algeria as a splinter group of the GIA; known as the GSPC since 1999

Leadership: Hassan HATTAB, alias Abou HAMZA, and Nabil SAHRAOUI, alias Abu Mustafa IBRAHIM (since August 2003)

Membership/Supporters: Included in the FIS figures

Quarrels amongst supporters of the FIS in Europe continued in 2003. FIS supporters loyal to Mourad DHINA, the former leader of the Co-ordination Committee of the FIS Abroad (C.C.-FIS), firmly reject the moderate policy towards the Algerian government pursued by the long-term leader of the Executive Committee of the FIS Abroad (IEFE), Rabah KEBIR. The purpose of the "European Congress" held in Belgium in August 2002 was originally to settle this conflict. However, after the conference, FIS supporters elected DHINA, who lives in Switzerland, as chairman of the newly founded National Executive Office of the FIS Abroad.

Nevertheless, some FIS supporters – including some in Germany – do not recognise this “Executive Office” as representing the FIS abroad since it was founded under the considerable influence of former supporters of the C.C.-FIS. DHINA’s leadership remains uncertain, particularly since the two founders of the FIS, Abassi MADANI and Ali BELHADJ, were released from prison and house arrest, respectively. Discussions between MADANI and the Algerian president led to a rapprochement between the government and the FIS.

Some FIS supporters in Algeria and Germany reacted to these discussions with a lack of understanding. Since MADANI’s and BELHADJ’s release they have been primarily hoping to unite the competing FIS camps abroad.

**32 tourists  
kidnapped in  
Algeria**

The GIA and the GSPC were not active in Germany in 2003. However, the kidnapping of 32 European tourists, including 15 Germans, in Algeria can be attributed to the GSPC. The regional GSPC emir, Saifi AMARI, alias Abderrazak le PARA, is believed to have been responsible for this operation, which was intended to extort a large ransom.<sup>CXCV</sup> There are signs that the kidnapping of Western tourists has also caused conflict between GSPC members over the organisation’s goals and strategies.

Nabil SAHRAOUI, formerly a GSPC regional head (emir), succeeded Hassan HATTAB as leader. In a press statement issued on 23 October, SAHRAOUI stated that he was endeavouring to move away from the GSPC’s current policy focused on bringing about regime change in Algeria, and to orient the group more on international jihad and on co-operation with al-Qaeda.

## 1.4 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) / Islamic centres

<b>Muslim Brotherhood (MB)</b>	
Founded:	1928 in Egypt
Leader:	Ma'moun AL-HUDAIBI in Egypt (since January 2004: Mohamed Mahdi AKEF in Egypt)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 1,300 (2002: around 1,200)
Publications:	<i>Risalat ul-Ikhwân</i> (Circular of the Brotherhood), <i>Al-Islam plus Al-Islam aktuell</i> (Islam), <i>Al-Raid</i> (The Scout)

After its founding in Egypt by Hassan AL-BANNA in 1928, the Islamist MB spread to nearly all the Arab states and those countries in which Arab Muslims live. The MB sowed the seed for numerous Islamist organisations, including militant ones, such as the Algerian FIS (cf. 1.3 above), the Tunisian En Nahda (Movement of Renewal) group, the Egyptian GI and JI (cf. 1.2 above) and the Palestinian Hamas (cf. 1.5.1 below). The MB opposes most of the regimes in Muslim countries as un-Islamic. Its main objective is to establish a state system in these countries which is “truly Islamic” according to its definition and oriented exclusively on the Koran and the Sunna (accounts of the prophet Mohammed’s daily practice):

“That is why we do not recognise any system of government which is not founded on and does not draw on Islam. We will work to establish an order based on the rule of Islam in all its manifestations and to form an Islamic government based on this order.”  
(Hassan AL-BANNA, *Letter to Young People*, p. 2)

After the US-led coalition forces invaded Iraq, the supreme leader of the MB in Egypt, Ma'moun AL-HUDAIBI,<sup>cxvii</sup> called on all Arab Muslims to “hoist the banner of jihad”. In the 20 August issue of *Risalat ul-Ikhwân*, he stated that Iraq had been attacked by the “forces of evil and heresy”.

According to the MB, the Koran legitimises jihad as an armed struggle:

“He (God) allows us to kill for only one reason, namely when there is no other alternative – and that is the fight for God’s cause (jihad). He very clearly distinguished between the intentions of the believers and of the unbelievers: ‘Those who believe are fighting for God’s cause, and those who do not believe are fighting on the side of evil. Therefore fight Satan’s friends! Surely, Satan’s strategy is weak’. (Koran, Sura 4, verse 77)”  
 (Sayyid Qutb, *This Religion of Islam*, p. 134)<sup>cxcvii</sup>

The MB in principle supports the use of force to realise a “truly Islamist state”, since those in power will not relinquish their privileges of their own free will. This concept of jihad as a component of MB ideology can thus be understood as a declaration of war on the entire world:

“In fact Islam has the right to take the initiative. Islam is not the legacy of an individual race or an individual country. It is God’s religion and meant for the whole world. Islam has the right to destroy all obstacles which in the form of institutions and traditions restrict human freedom.”  
 (Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones*, 1964, Chapter 4, p. 59)

#### Role of the IGD

The Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V. (IGD, Islamic Society in Germany, reg’d society) is the largest organisation of MB supporters in Germany and has its headquarters in Munich. By its own account, the IGD runs 12 centres of its own and co-ordinates activities with more than 50 other mosque communities.<sup>cxviii</sup>

Along with the Palestinian uprising (intifada) and Israel’s strategy in the occupied territories, discussions at Friday prayer meetings held in IGD centres and mosques centred on the war in Iraq and the conduct of the US administration. In a lengthy Internet posting in the summer, the IGD criticised the attack on Iraq as a breach of international law.

Since Ibrahim F. EL-ZAYAT was elected IGD president in 2002 efforts have been stepped up to court the generation of young Muslims of Arab descent now living in Germany. This policy was continued in 2003. For example, by setting up and expanding training facilities in Islamic centres, the IGD aims to help adolescent Muslims find their identity in a “German-speaking Islam” and take an active role in shaping German society. The topic of “integration” was also a leitmotif of the 25th Annual Conference organised by the IGD and held from 19 to 21 September. For the first time the event was held at three different locations (Munich, Berlin and Hanau, in Hesse) and more than 10,000 people took part. The IGD invited the popular Muslim TV preacher Amr KHALED, who proved to be a major attraction not only



for Muslims with close links to the MB. He received rapturous applause from the young people attending his lecture on the advantages of a life based on Islam.

## 1.5 Islamist groups from the Middle East

### 1.5.1 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Founded:	In early 1988 in the Gaza Strip (currently part of the Israeli-occupied territories)
Leader:	Sheikh Ahmad YASSIN (spiritual leader); the leadership lives outside the territories (headquarters: Damascus, Syria)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 300 (2002: around 300)

In response to the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987, Palestinian supporters of the MB led by Sheikh Ahmad YASSIN founded Hamas in early 1988. The organisation's goal is to establish an Islamist state covering the entire territory of "Palestine".<sup>cxix</sup> Its military wing, the Issedin-el-Kassem brigades,<sup>cc</sup> carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Israel and the occupied territories again in 2003. The organisation provides financial support to local social welfare agencies and thus has considerable backing from the Palestinian population. This is also where Hamas recruits its so-called martyrs for suicide attacks, amongst other things.

During the war in Iraq the Hamas leadership called on all Muslims to protest against the "tyrannical and crusading aggression" of the United States and the United Kingdom and to boycott products from these countries.<sup>cci</sup> Hamas spokesman Abdel Aziz AL-RANTISI appealed to the Iraqi population to provide tens of thousands of martyrs and belts of explosives so that they could blow themselves up in the midst of the "American tyrants".<sup>ccii</sup>

In June a Middle East peace deal negotiated a cease-fire between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and militant Islamist groups. However, in August an attack in Jerusalem, for which Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility, ended the

**Increase in political pressure on Hamas**

cease-fire. The renewed escalation in the conflict led to a significant increase in international political pressure on Hamas. The United States and United Kingdom took steps to stop financial transactions benefiting Hamas and called on Syria to close a Hamas office located in the country. And the foreign ministers of the EU member states agreed to put Hamas on their list of terrorist organisations.<sup>cciii</sup> In an interview,<sup>cciv</sup> Khaled MASHAAL, a leading Hamas functionary in Syria, said this was a serious mistake, “a sort of complicity with Israel and submission to American pressure”. He described the EU’s step as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people rather than against Hamas itself.

The approximately 300 Hamas supporters living in Germany are not members of any established organisation. Only a few individual Hamas supporters took part in demonstrations against the war in Iraq which took place across Germany at the beginning of the year. They did not use public propaganda to propagate Hamas’s goals and opinions.

On 2 August 2002 the Federal Minister of the Interior banned the al-Aqsa registered society based in Aachen. Amongst other things the organisation is accused of providing financial support to Hamas.

The al-Aqsa society lodged an appeal in order to gain time before the ban took effect. On 16 July 2003, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the ban would not take effect until legal proceedings against the organisation were completed and that the al-Aqsa society could continue its fund-raising operations, on the condition that the society regularly report to the Federal Ministry of the Interior on how the funds were being used. A decision by the Federal Administrative Court on the main issue, i.e. the legality of the ban, is still pending.

### 1.5.2 Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, “Party of God”)

Founded:	1982 in Lebanon
Leadership:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 800 (2002: around 800)
Publications:	<i>Al-Ahd</i> (Commitment), weekly (only in Lebanon), amongst others

Since it was founded in 1982, Hezbollah has gradually emerged as a political force in Lebanon. Under the political influence of Iran, which also provides financial support, Hezbollah has been represented in the Lebanese parliament since 1992. Along with the political wing of Hezbollah there is also a military arm, the al Muqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance Movement), which continues to threaten Israel with military operations. It has, at irregular intervals, carried out small-scale military operations along the northern Israeli border, particularly in the area known as the Shebaa farms.

Hezbollah’s political stance regarding the situation in the Middle East has remained unchanged for years: The organisation supports the Palestinian intifada and denies Israel’s right to exist. Hezbollah always stresses the Israeli army’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000, for which it takes credit, as an example of its successful fight against Israel. The leaders of Hezbollah therefore fear that, after Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States could also take military action against their own organisation in the fight against global terror. In August its general secretary, Sheikh Hassan NASRALLAH, warned the United States that any attempt to destroy the organisation’s armed forces would be followed by an attack on US interests in various countries around the world. At the same time he made it clear that Hezbollah was a movement in Lebanon directed against Israel, that it did not carry out attacks anywhere else in the world and was thus not comparable to al-Qaeda. However, he said that if Hezbollah’s existence was threatened, it had the right to defend itself anywhere, at any time and with any means. At the same time, NASRALLAH also left open the possibility that the military wing of Hezbollah would be disbanded if lasting peace is achieved in the Middle East.<sup>ccv</sup>

Hezbollah’s anti-Israeli position is expressed not only in its regularly occurring verbal attacks. In spring the organisation made a computer game available on the Internet in which players train for single combat by shooting Israeli tanks or Israeli politicians. The game, which had an

initial print run of 100,000 copies, is also available in Germany and can be played in Arabic, English, French or Persian.

**Further decrease  
in number of  
activities in  
Germany**

Members of the Hezbollah community in Germany were not as active in 2003 as in previous years. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Hezbollah supporters living in Germany have gradually been losing interest in taking an active part in mosque associations or events. The number of Muslims visiting mosques during religious festivals such as Ramadan or Ashura (commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein) again declined. This also led to a drop in income from donations which these associations use to finance their operations. Even the anniversary of the withdrawal of the Israeli army from southern Lebanon ("The Day of Liberation", 23 May)<sup>ccvi</sup> was observed only by a few Lebanese Shiites living in Germany. Only a few "victory celebrations" took place, with small numbers of participants. Planned visits by Lebanese clerics and functionaries were cancelled, amongst other things due to entry restrictions imposed by the German authorities.

Hezbollah supporters in Germany followed the military intervention by allied troops in Iraq with reserved interest. Since the Hezbollah leadership in Beirut had publicly declared that it was against getting involved in the political process of establishing a new order in Iraq, Hezbollah supporters in Germany neither organised nor participated in protests, organised activities or public expressions of opinion.

Only a few Shiites from Hezbollah circles took part in a demonstration to mark al-Quds day (Jerusalem Day),<sup>ccvii</sup> which took place in Berlin on 22 November. The police estimated that a total of around 650 people (2002: around 1,000 people) from all the various Muslim camps participated. Around 500 people took part in an alternative commemorative event organised by Hezbollah supporters in Bottrop, North Rhine-Westphalia.

### 1.5.3 Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party)

Founded:	1953 in Jordan
Leader:	Ata Abu AL-RASHTA, alias Abu Yassin (since April 2003)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 200 (2002: around 150)
Publications:	<i>Al-Khilafa</i> (The Caliphate; English/Arabic), <i>Hilafet</i> (Caliphate; Turkish), <i>Al-Waie</i> (Arabic), <i>Explizit</i> (Explicit; German/Dutch)
Banned:	Since 15 January 2003

The pan-Islamic movement<sup>ccviii</sup> Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) was founded in Jordan in 1953 by Taqi ud-din AN-NABHANI, a former member of the MB. The organisation views Islam as a spiritual system which definitively regulates all areas of human life, in particular political, economic and social issues. Denying national state structures, its objective is to unify the Islamic community, or *Umma*, in a worldwide Islamic state headed by a caliph:

“Furthermore, Islam is to be represented as that which it is, namely a comprehensive set of rules for life and, in comparison to existing social systems, the only practicable way forward ... According to the Prophet’s plan, the caliphate represents the only system of government which in fact corresponds to human nature and its needs.”

(*Explizit*, No. 30, March – June 2002)

Hizb ut-Tahrir opposes what it views as “blasphemous” Islamic states and their governments for standing in the way of its goal of re-establishing a worldwide caliphate. All forms of secular (“unbelieving”) social systems and forms of government are rigorously rejected. In addition, its purpose is to “rid the ‘Holy Land’ of the Zionists”.

The organisation says that Hizb ut-Tahrir units (so-called *wilayat*, “administrative districts” or “provinces”) have been established in

Egypt, Europe, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Abdul Qadim ZALLOUM, alias Abu YUSUF, who had been leader (emir) of the party since 1977, died on 29 April. Ata Abu AL-RASHTA, alias Abu YASSIN, the former chairman of the Jordanian *wilaya*, was appointed his successor.

#### Ban imposed

Supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Germany – often Muslim academics and students – are active in small groups, usually located in university towns. The anti-Semitic and anti-Western content of Hizb ut-Tahrir propaganda induced the Federal Minister of the Interior to ban the party in Germany with effect from 15 January, since it was against the idea of international understanding.<sup>ccix</sup> The organisation had also endorsed violence as a means to achieve political aims:

“As Muslims we must realise that the problem of ‘Israel’ is not a question of borders, but rather a question of existence. This Zionist foreign body in the heart of the Islamic world can on no account be allowed to continue to exist. The entire Palestinian territory ... belongs to the Islamic *Umma* ... The solution is jihad ... Allah, the Sublime, commands: And kill them wherever you lay hands on them and drive them out of all the places from which they have driven you out!”  
(*Explizit*, No. 30, March – June 2002)

After the ban was imposed, more than 100 apartments across Germany were searched on 15 January and 10 April and large quantities of propaganda materials, among other things, were seized.

In February *Deutsche Stimme* (German Voice), the party organ of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party), published an interview with Shaker ASSEM, who up until then had published the magazine *Explizit*. In the interview, which was several pages long, ASSEM underlined his uncompromising call for the establishment of an Islamist caliphate state.

#### Subsequent activities

*Explizit* has not been published since Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami was banned. Nor has the group made any further appearances, either in public campaigns or at other events.

## 2. Turks (excluding Kurds)

### 2.1 Turkish Islamists

#### 2.1.1 Hilafet Devleti (The Caliphate State)

Founded:	1984 in Cologne
Headquarters:	Cologne
Leader (prior to ban):	Metin KAPLAN
Membership:	800 (2002: 800)
Publications:	<i>Beklenen ASR-I SAADET</i> (The Promised Century of Bliss), Turkish, weekly; D.I.A. (Islam is the Alternative), German, monthly
Banned:	Since 12 December 2001, confirmed as of 27 November 2002

The ultimate goal of Hilafet Devleti (The Caliphate State) was the worldwide rule of Islam. The organisation was led by the self-appointed “Emir of the Believers and Caliph of the Muslims”, Metin KAPLAN, but it is now banned in Germany. The first step towards achieving its original goal was to have been overthrowing the secular system in Turkey and replacing it with a society based exclusively on the Koran and Sunna. The organisation strictly rejected democratic forms of government. Metin KAPLAN called on members of the organisation to prepare for jihad in order to achieve these goals.

Despite the ban on the organisation itself (in December 2001) and several of its sub-organisations (in September 2002), former members attempted both to maintain organisational structures and to continue disseminating the teachings of their “Caliph”. The organisation has continued to agitate, though to a lesser degree, against Western forms of government and society and against Turkey from abroad since the ban. The newspaper *Beklenen ASR-I SAADET* (The

Promised Century of Bliss), which is available online, still provides a forum for opinions. The following is an extract from the newspaper:

“Islam is such a perfect order that everything about it is absolutely perfect, that it has no faults or flaws whatsoever! Likewise, Islam has not been sent so that it can adapt to our times, but that our times might adapt to it! The Islamic order, which brings people bliss in both this and the next world if they live by it, provides a model for worldly peace of mind – in contrast to the other revelatory religions. That model is to be a state, that is an Islamic state! The road to such a state has been predetermined by Islam: Preaching, exodus, jihad and state!”

(*Beklenen ASR-I SAADET*, No. 54, 8 January 2003)

The publication, which until December was sent to a long list of subscribers, including some in Germany, also contains anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist statements. In addition to this publication a weekly TV programme is transmitted via satellite, also to viewers in Turkey.

**Executive measure linked to subsequent activities**

On 13 December approximately 1,200 properties across Germany were searched as part of preliminary investigations by public prosecutors on suspicion of a breach of the ban. The executive measure was primarily directed against subscribers to *Beklenen ASRI-I SAADET*.

**Metin KAPLAN released**

In 2000, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced Metin KAPLAN to four years in prison on charges of public incitement to murder a rival within the organisation. After serving this sentence and subsequent provisional arrest pending deportation, Metin KAPLAN was released following the Higher Regional Court’s decision of 27 May that KAPLAN’s extradition to the Turkish legal authorities was unlawful and that he should be immediately released from detention.

The Cologne Administrative Court ruled that an obstacle to deportation existed in the case of KAPLAN and the destination state Turkey. But the Münster Higher Administrative Court accepted an appeal, and on 4 December confirmed the lower court’s ruling that KAPLAN had no right to asylum.



### 2.1.2 Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society)

Founded:	1985 in Cologne (as the Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europa e. V., [AMGT, Association of a New World View in Europe, reg'd society])
Leader:	Osman DÖRING, (known as Yavuz Celik KARAHAN)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 26,500 (2002: around 26,500)
Publications:	<i>Millî Görüs &amp; Perspektive</i> , (National Newspaper & Perspective) amongst others, at irregular intervals

Among Islamist organisations, the IGMG has a special significance due to its large membership and following as well as its numerous mosques and facilities, some of them in other European countries. In contrast to most other Islamist organisations the majority of its followers are not refugees or asylum-seekers but immigrants residing permanently in Europe.

#### Organisation and facilities

The Europe-wide interests of the IGMG are also reflected in the organisation's structure: The headquarters (European association) in Kerpen, North Rhine-Westphalia, oversees 30 subordinate regions (regional associations – of which 15 are in Germany and 15 in other European countries) with several hundred local mosque communities.

The organisation has more than 300 facilities in Germany and claims to have more than 2,000 across Europe, used by around 300,000 people. Since 1995 the Europäische Moscheebau- und Unterstützungsgemeinschaft e. V. (EMUG, European Mosque Building and Support Society, reg'd society) has been responsible for administering the organisation's extensive property holdings.

#### Close links with Islamist parties in Turkey

As is evident from the organisation's name, the IGMG upholds the tradition of the Millî Görüs movement inspired by Prof. Necmettin ERBAKAN.<sup>CCX</sup> The aim of this movement is to re-Islamise society, the state and politics in Turkey. Necmettin ERBAKAN has been politically active since the 1970s, attempting to realise his idea of a "just order" (*Abdil Düzen*), in which all areas of life (education, training, trade and industry, legal system and state action) are based on the commandments and traditions of Islam. ERBAKAN founded or co-

founded several Islamist parties which were all banned by the Turkish constitutional court for violating the principle of secularism.<sup>ccxi</sup> In the Turkish parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002, the Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party) only gained 2.5% of the votes and thus failed to achieve the required 10% to enter parliament.<sup>ccxii</sup> ERBAKAN, the party's chairman, had to step down after he was sentenced to several years in prison and banned from political activity for life in December 2003.<sup>ccxiii</sup> Recai KUTAN, formerly chairman of the Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party), is currently the interim chairman of the SP.

Since ERBAKAN lost political influence in Turkey it has not been possible to say whether there have been any effects on the relationship between the IGMG and the SP. Leading SP functionaries such as deputy chairmen Sevket Kazan, the former Turkish minister of justice, and Temel Karamollaoglu again spoke at IGMG events in 2003. IGMG members and functionaries view the political activity of the AK Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) with a mixture of hope and concern about the future of the Millî Görüş idea. Demands were again made that the IGMG break away from political forces and developments in Turkey and that it concentrate on the concerns of Turkish Muslims in Europe. However, no open discussion was held regarding the organisation's programme.

During the organisation's annual conference in Cologne on 22 June, the IGMG's chairman, Osman DÖRING (known as Yavuz Celik KARAHAN), emphasised the exceptional importance of the Millî Görüş movement not only for Turkey but also world-wide:

“Nevertheless we believe that it is possible to remove all oppression, inequality, injustice, senseless disputes and wars which we can currently observe in the world – through a movement of unity emanating from the Islamic world, spearheaded by Turkey, as well as by bringing together cultures, in which Turkey will also act as a builder of bridges. And we believe with our whole hearts that only those people who have the Millî Görüş mentality can envisage and realise this goal.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 25 June 2003, p. 14)

**IGMG seeking recognition as representative of Turkish Muslims in Germany**

Based on the Millî Görüş idea, the IGMG is endeavouring to enable its supporters to live their lives in Germany according to its interpretation of the Koran and Sunna. To this end the organisation is trying hard to be recognised as the legitimate representative of Turkish Muslims in the political sphere and as a point of contact for all state authorities. Since 1990 it has been active as the largest member organisation in

the Muslim umbrella organisation, the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany). The current chairman of the Islamic Council is the long-time IGMG functionary Ali KIZILKAYA.

#### Goals of IGMG

As for the organisation's declared aims, there is an apparent discrepancy between what is proclaimed in public and what members are told. In public the IGMG presents itself as willing to integrate and as promoting dialogue between cultures. In this vein the chairman of the IGMG outlined the organisation's goals at the annual conference as follows:

"Our goal is ... to serve Muslims in Europe and to be of help so that they can keep and develop their own values. By bridging the gap between Europe and the Islamic world in this multicultural European society through our social and cultural activities, our religious and cultural richness, we are supporting the dialogue between societies and cultures and contributing in our own way to a life in peace and tranquillity."

(*Millî Gazete*, 25 June 2003, p. 14)

Internal statements by IGMG functionaries, however, reveal that integration and communication between "societies and cultures" is not seen as a process of understanding in order to establish a new unified society including both Muslims and non-Muslims. Rather, this is to be restricted, if at all possible, to a majority and a minority living side by side and equal before the law. Therefore, the IGMG condemns the federal government's integration policy as a policy of assimilation. It also always emphasises the value of the cultural identity of Turkish Muslims. This discrepancy is evident, for example, in a "call to be observed by the community" made by an imam working for the IGMG:

"Some of our brothers are buying houses and apartments located far from mosques. They are thus neglecting to visit the community ... They themselves are slowly losing interest in the community. Because they live far away from mosques, their daughters and sons have to do without Muslim friends and a Muslim environment ... They are forced to make friends with people who do not fit in with their faith and their mentality. That is why I urgently draw your attention to the fact that Muslims should live near a mosque. They should live in an Islamic environment and not move away from the mosques and communities. We have had a lot of experience with this. If we do not pay particular attention to this situation, we are in grave danger of losing touch with our [young] generation and our faith."

(*Millî Gazete*, 27 December 2002, p. 15)

Assurances by IGMG functionaries that they can fully respect the fundamental order set out in the German Basic Law should be viewed with scepticism. As regards the compatibility of the German legal system with his own ideas on the law, chairman Osman DÖRING, said:

“We orient ourselves, our institutions and our activities on the Koran and the Sunna, and this does not constitute a hindrance to integrating them into the prevailing legal system.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 25 June 2003, p. 14)

**IGMG’s social and youth work**

In contrast to many other Islamist organisations and groups, the IGMG does not see violence as a means of achieving its goals.

The IGMG gives top priority to its wide-ranging activities in youth and educational work. Here, too, the focus is on teaching an “Islamic identity” in order to prevent “assimilation” into German society – which the IGMG views as morally inferior. For example, a column in the *Millî Gazete* urges young Muslims to remember what they learned in Koran courses taught by the IGMG during school holidays. Adults also have an important role to play in this:

“God has entrusted these innocent children to us. It is our duty to teach them God’s religion. Dozens of perverse institutions, primarily Jewish and Christian committees, are lying in wait for a good opportunity to lure away our children. Let us not feed our children to those lost monsters!”

(*Millî Gazete*, 5/6 July 2003, p. 12)

On the subject of “raising children” a journalist in the *Millî Gazete* warns:

“Parents must know and understand that they should give their children sufficient love imbued with faith. Then you will see that the dirty fortresses of the West will no longer stand firm before our children, but one after the other will crumble and fall.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 6/7 September 2003, p. 2)

***Millî Gazete*  
(National  
Newspaper)**

Although formally independent of the IGMG, the Turkish daily newspaper *Millî Gazete* continues to play a key role in disseminating the Millî Görüş ideology. An imam working for the IGMG in Bremen underscored in a speech that the newspaper was “the only advocate and spokesperson of the Millî Görüş idea and the eyes and ears of the believers”. That is why, he went on, a campaign to increase

subscriptions should be launched among IGMG members.<sup>ccxiv</sup>

The newspaper itself also leaves no doubt as to its ties with the Millî Görüş movement:

“Since it was launched, *Millî Gazete* has neither relinquished its goal nor deviated from its course and has not compromised on its values in any way ... It has remained true to its motto, namely that ‘Truth has arrived, the trivial is past’. It has always been a fearless defender of Millî Görüş concerns.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 14 January 2003, p. 13)

Statements published in the *Millî Gazete* are thus seen as representative of the way Islam is understood in the Millî Görüş movement and thus also for the IGMG. In the year under review *Millî Gazete* columnist Mehmed Sevket EYGI again propagated an uncompromising interpretation of Islam. Religion, he wrote, can never be a private matter for Muslims, but is always political and social:

“Some say that religion should not interfere in secular matters or get mixed up in them ... However, when we consider our religion’s commandments, we see that they also provide us with rules for dealing with worldly matters. The freemasons, the sabbatarians, all manner of ideologies or philosophies interfere in secular affairs, propagate numerous perspectives on dealing with them. Why should religion not also do that? Religion and secular matters cannot be separated, are interwoven. ...

Is a Muslim revival and progress possible using methods that go against the commandments and principles of the Koran, the Sunna, the Sharia and mysticism (ethics)?

Never! Islamists whose services and actions are not oriented on God’s book, the Prophet’s Sunna, the commandments and principles in the Sharia and mysticism, are on the wrong track”.

(*Millî Gazete*, 11 July 2003, p. 4)

## 2.2 Left-wing extremists

The common goal of all Turkish left-wing extremist groups is to destabilise society and ultimately to overthrow the existing social system in Turkey by means of a “revolution”. This goal also determines the agitation of Turkish left-wing extremists in Germany. One main focus in 2003 was again the continuing protest by the Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front) against single-occupancy cells in Turkish prisons. In addition, the group took up German domestic affairs and world events, such as the war in Iraq, and used them for its propaganda purposes. The DHKP-C stepped up its agitation, which it regards as “anti-imperialistic”, and publicly acknowledged responsibility for bomb attacks in Turkey. However, the DHKP-C’s long-time rival, the Türkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi – Devrimci Sol (THKP-C-Devrimci Sol, Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front – Revolutionary Left), was largely absent from public view. The Türkiye Komünist Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party / Marxists-Leninists), which is split into two factions, and the Marksist Leninist Komünist Partisi (MLKP, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party) used “anti-imperialist” propaganda to criticise the United States.

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### 2.2.1 Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front)

Founded:	1994 in Damascus, Syria, after a split in the Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), which was founded in 1978 in Turkey and banned in Germany in 1983)
Leader:	Secretary General Dursun KARATAS
Membership/Supporters:	Around 700 (2002: 750)
Publications:	<i>Devrimci Sol</i> (Revolutionary Left), at irregular intervals; <i>Ekmek ve Adalet</i> (Bread and Justice), weekly, amongst others
Banned:	Since 13 August 1998

The DHKP-C is oriented on Marxist-Leninist ideas and aims to destroy the existing Turkish state and social system and establish a socialist society. As a means to this end the organisation, especially its military wing, the Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKC, Revolutionary People's Liberation Front), advocates armed struggle:

"The struggle against the state, which is the enemy of the people, is the duty of all those who side with the people."

(Statement No. 311 by the DHKC, 31 August 2003)

"And today the validity of and the necessity for the alternative, namely socialism is again on the global agenda. The people's struggle for liberation is the universal route of liberation. There is no other path to liberation from imperialism and oligarchy than the people's struggle for liberation. The only alternative is socialism."

(Statement No. 25 by the DHKP, the political wing of the DHKP-C, published by the DHKC, 30 March 2003)

**Bomb attacks  
in Turkey**

The DHKP-C is involved in terrorist activities in Turkey and in 2003 again launched several bomb attacks, including attacks on a McDonald's restaurant, Turkish state facilities, and members of the Turkish security forces. At the same time the DHKC threatened to carry out further attacks and explicitly named its targets as those political parties and decision-makers in the police, army and bureaucracy who were responsible for introducing single-occupancy cells in Turkish prisons.

In May a bomb detonated ahead of time in an Ankara cafe, killing the would-be bomber, a DHKP-C activist. The DHKC announced that the attack was to avenge the martyrs who had fallen as a result of the death fast in Turkish prisons and was also directed against the policies of the United States.

**Hunger strikes**

The hunger strike and the situation of "political" prisoners in Turkish prisons was again the main topic of DHKP-C agitation in 2003. The hunger strike which began in October 2000 is especially directed against the transfer of prisoners from larger cells into smaller or single-occupancy cells. Since May 2002 those continuing the strike have almost exclusively been supporters of the DHKP-C.

The group Solidarity with Political Prisoners and Their Families in Turkey (TAYAD), via the TAYAD-Komitee e.V. (TAYAD Committee, reg'd society) in Hamburg and the Solidaritätskomitee mit TAYAD (TAYAD Solidarity Committee) in Bielefeld tried to draw attention to the hunger strikes by staging demonstrations and rallies – with the agreement of the DHKP-C. In July the TAYAD Committee in Hamburg called on followers to take part in a hunger strike lasting several days in various German cities (Cologne, Berlin, Frankfurt (Main), Dortmund). TAYAD distributed flyers referring to the hunger strike in Turkey which stated:

"European policy shares responsibility for the death of these 107 people.<sup>CCXV</sup> Despite the apparent criticism of human rights abuses, Germany in particular supports and legitimises this policy of the Turkish state ... We appeal to all Europeans not to support the inhuman and two-faced policy of their governments. Criticise Europe's support for Turkey's policy of contempt for human beings. Being silent in this matter is tantamount to a hush-up."

Along with the Turkish state and its institutions, the DHKP-C sees its main enemy as the United States. In its view, Turkey has



**Reactions to the war in Iraq**

subordinated itself to “US imperialism” and is now politically, economically and militarily dependent on the United States.

The DHKP-C sees the invasion of Iraq by US troops as an “attack by the American empire” and also as the “turning point for the whole world”:

“Since 11 September 2001 the people of this world have faced more imperialist terror and intimidation than ever before. The attack on Iraq has taken this form of terror to the highest level seen in our time.”  
(Statement No. 25 by the DHKP, 30 March 2003)

The DHKP also agitated against the decision by the Turkish parliament of 7 October (which ultimately was not implemented) to send troops to Iraq. Using the slogan “Fighting against the AKP government means fighting against America!” the organisation argued that the decision was a betrayal of the Turkish people by placing the country under the hegemony of imperialism and declaring war on its Iraqi brothers. The DHKP said that with this decision, the government aimed to continue its “policy of slander and destruction” of the Kurds and would sow enmity between the Turkish, Kurdish and Arab people:

“Our young people are being forced into an unjust and illegitimate war. They will become murderers of our Iraqi brothers and will, in the end, die for American interests.”

The organisation said it was now necessary to build up resistance to oppose the deployment of armed forces in Iraq:

“People of Turkey! Patriots, democrats, revolutionaries, Islamists! We will fight imperialism and oligarchy at every level, in all areas. Only then can we stop Turkey from becoming a country which kills other people and oppresses its own people.”  
(Statement No. 27 by the DHKP, 11 October 2003)

**Search of DHKP-C property**

On 9 and 15 July, police in Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saarland and Thuringia searched approximately 45 apartments and offices of people suspected of having links to the DHKP-C. They confiscated personal computers, mobile phones, propaganda material, documents and a firearm. During these searches the police also took into custody a DHKP-C activist wanted on an arrest warrant. On 18 November the police searched a further property in Cologne and confiscated large quantities of evidence. A group calling itself a TAYAD committee posted a statement (very much in line with the DHKP-C position) on the Internet regarding these searches; the statement said that, in the

name of the United States and Turkish fascism, Germany was following a policy of repression and intimidation against revolutionary, democratic and anti-fascist people in order to satisfy the United States and Turkey.

On the anniversary of its founding and in memory of “those who gave their life for the revolution” the DHKP-C held its annual festivities in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on 26 April. Around 3,500 people attended.

In 2003 DHKP-C activists were again indicted and convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation:

In February, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced a 32-year-old DHKP-C functionary to two years and six months in prison for membership of a terrorist organisation and attempted aggravated arson. The court found that the man, as a member of a terrorist group which existed at that time within the DHKP-C leadership, had amongst other things been involved in two attempted arson attacks against Turkish banks in Duisburg and Cologne in 1995.

Three further DHKP-C functionaries were indicted on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation.

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## 2.2.2 Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party / Marxists–Leninists)

Founded:	1972 in Turkey
Membership:	Around 1,400 (2002: around 1,500)
The organisation is split into the:	
<b>Partizan group</b>	
Leadership:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 850 (2002: around 900)
Publications:	<i>Yeni Demokrasi Yolunda Isci Köylü</i> (Workers and Farmers on the Road to a New Democratic State), fortnightly; <i>Bülten</i> (The Bulletin), monthly; <i>Komünist</i> (The Communist), bi-monthly
and the	
<b>Maoist Communist Party (MCP) (until December 2002 called the East Anatolian Area Committee)</b>	
Leadership:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 550 (2002: around 600)
Publications:	<i>Halk İcin Devrimci Demokrasi</i> (Revolutionary Democracy for the People), fortnightly

Since 1994 the TKP/ML has been split into two competing factions, the Partizan group and the Maoist Communist Party (MCP). Both factions have adopted the ideology and objectives of their parent organisation. The teachings of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism thus comprise their ideological framework. The groups propagate an armed “popular struggle” in rural areas of Turkey following the example of Maoism, in order to bring about a “democratic, popular revolution” and, ultimately, to establish a society based on communism in Turkey.

One of the numerous propaganda papers outlines their strategy as follows:

“It was called to life during the 7th Conference with help from the science of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism and the strategy of a popular struggle, to create a future that benefits the people. It thus renewed its promise of expanding the war ... Long live the democratic popular revolution! Long live the popular struggle!”

(Partizan flyer, August 2003)

To achieve its political objectives in Turkey, both factions advocate armed struggle:

“The oppressed and exploited millions had to organise and arm themselves against organised and armed imperialism ... and against the fascist Turkish Republic. We promise those who have been killed in action that we will develop the party and extend our fight to cover all areas and will gain power. We have promised those who were killed in action the revolution! Long live Marxism–Leninism–Maoism!”

(Partizan publication, *Yeni Demokrasi Yolunda Isci Köylü*, No. 1, 31 January - 13 February 2003)

“Fortify yourself through Maoism, stride forth with the popular struggle! If we want to topple all imperialists .. the fascist dictatorship ... and instead establish the democratic power of the people in Turkey and northern Kurdistan, the best way is to fight for it: Under the ideological leadership of Maoism and the political leadership of the Maoist Communist Party which is fighting in the ranks of our People’s Liberation Army.”

(MCP flyer, April 2003)

To achieve their objectives both wings maintain separate and independent armed guerrilla groups in Turkey. The Partizan’s guerrilla group calls itself the Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army (TIKKO); the MCP has the above-mentioned People’s Liberation Army (HKO). Both engaged in armed clashes with the Turkish security forces in Turkey.

Partizan and the MCP both have a following in Germany which has, amongst other things, formed a series of committees and societies.

As in previous years both wings of the TKP/ML held separate large-scale events in memory of the founder of the organisation, Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, who died in 1973: The MCP organised an indoor event in the ice stadium in Frankfurt (Main) on 17 May, attended by approximately 4,000 people from across Germany and neighbouring European countries. Around 4,000 people from across Germany and

western Europe took part in an event organised by Partizan and held in the main hall of Wuppertal University on 24 May.

Other Turkish groups with apparently close links to the two groups adopted the topics of TKP/ML and MCP agitation. For example, the Confederation of Workers from Turkey in Europe (ATIK) argued against the war in Iraq:

“US imperialism will again shed blood in the Middle East ... September 11 has created a breeding ground for the United States on which to expand and reinforce its dreams of empire with military attacks.”  
(ATIK flyer, February 2003)

The Föderation der Arbeiter aus der Türkei in Deutschland e.V. (ATIF, Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany, reg'd society) also expressed this kind of “anti-imperialist” ideology:

“German imperialism, which would like to play an even more aggressive role in the fight for international markets, is behaving more anti-democratically at home and militarily and aggressively abroad.”  
(ATIF flyer, May 2003)

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### 2.2.3 Marksist Leninist Komünist Partisi (MLKP, Marxist–Leninist Communist Party)

Founded:	1994 in Turkey
Leadership:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 600 (2002: around 600)
Publications:	<i>Yeniden Atilim</i> (Venture Forth in Life), weekly; <i>International Bulletin of the MLKP</i> , monthly; <i>Partinin Sesi</i> (The Voice of the Party), bi-monthly

The MLKP's declared aim is to abolish the Turkish system of government by violent revolution and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat. Ideologically the group is founded on the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. The MLKP sees itself as the political vanguard of the proletariat in the Turkish and Kurdish nation and of national minorities.

#### Debate on the war in Iraq

In the period under review the MLKP was involved in no public activities of note in Germany. It largely restricted itself to disseminating statements on controversial political issues, mainly the war in Iraq. In doing so, the MLKP attacked the United States above all and called on followers to

“Let the United States have another Vietnam, this time in the Middle East ... set up barricades against the imperialist war and fight. The United States, the biggest enemy of the working class and the peoples of this world, is negotiating with its accomplices on how to divide up energy resources.”

(Flyer, Foreign Committee of the MLKP, March 2003)

In this context the MLKP called for resistance and argued that

“In order to break the will of warring aggression and provocation and to fight back we must plan activities which can halt production, bring traffic and communications to a standstill, actions which have a direct influence on society. Production, transportation and communications can be brought to a halt by strikes. Transport by air, sea and land can be brought to a standstill. Traffic routes, airports and ports can be besieged and occupied to this end ... Embassies, consulates and

trading centres of those countries that are provoking the war or their partners in crime can be besieged and occupied”.

(Special issue, No. 1 of the MLKP's *International Bulletin of the MLKP*, February 2003)

The Föderation der Arbeiterimmigranten aus der Türkei in Deutschland e.V. (AGIF, Federation of Immigrant Workers from Turkey), an organisation which is apparently close to the MLKP, discussed the military intervention in Iraq and called on all immigrants in Germany to resist the war and to show international solidarity:

“Workers are bringing production to a standstill and taking their future into their own hands. Everyone is refusing to do military service and is thus putting a spanner in the works of the machinery of war. Only the masses can break the power of the corporations, banks and their government by means of civil disobedience on the streets ... Long live international solidarity! Against war and capital and German peace hypocrisy!”

(AGIF flyer, 20 March 2003)

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### 3. Kurds

#### 3.1 Overview

The activities of extremist Kurdish organisations in Germany are significantly influenced by the situation in the Kurdish settlements in Turkey and Iraq. Propaganda and activities by these groups focused on demands for more political and cultural independence in their countries of origin. Of the approximately 500,000 Kurds living in Germany, around 12,000 are affiliated with extremist organisations. Of these the Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), the successor to the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) founded in April 2002, continues to have the largest number of supporters and members. In early November 2003 KADEK announced that the organisation had been disbanded. Shortly thereafter, The People's Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gel) was founded.\*

#### 3.2 Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) / Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan)/Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gel)\*

Founded:	1978 as the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey
Leadership:	Leading functionaries of the Yekitiya Demokratik a Gêlê Kurd (YDK, Kurdish Democratic People's Union), who are subordinate to the chairman of KADEK, Abdullah ÖCALAN, and the General Presidential Council)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 11,500 (2002: around 11,500)
Publications:	<i>Serxwebûn</i> (Independence), monthly
Banned:	Since 26 November 1993 (The ban on the PKK also includes a ban on KADEK)

\* Kurdish name: Kongra Gel(e) Kurdistan



### 3.2.1 General situation

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was banned in Germany because of its involvement in terrorist attacks and numerous violent demonstrations, among other things. The ban also covers organisations like KADEK, which have taken over and carried on the organisational concept and activities of the PKK, albeit under a different name.

In 1984 the PKK began a guerrilla war against the Turkish military, mainly in south-eastern Turkey, with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state.

After the PKK chairman, Abdullah ÖCALAN, was arrested in Kenya in 1999 and later sentenced to death in Turkey for high treason (the sentence was later commuted to life in prison), he declared an end to the armed struggle the same year. The PKK's guerrilla groups ceased their operations in Turkey and retreated, mainly to northern Iraq, taking their weapons with them. ÖCALAN also announced that the PKK would in future only use peaceful and political means to push for their demands to be met. He said that the PKK had relinquished its goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state and instead aimed at cultural autonomy for the Kurds within the borders of a democratic Turkish state.

#### **KADEK issues ultimatums to the Turkish government**

The peaceful strategy continued even after the PKK had decided at its 8th Party Congress in spring 2002 to give up the organisation's old name and to found its successor, KADEK. Nevertheless, there was increasing doubt as to whether the peaceful strategy, announced four years previously, would last. KADEK issued an ultimatum to the Turkish government, threatening to reconsider its previous strategy and possibly return to terrorist activities in Turkey if no progress were made on the Kurdish issue by 1 September. This deadline and that of a further ultimatum demanding that Turkey guarantee a cease-fire and end all military operations against KADEK by 1 December went by without the organisation carrying out its threat of returning to armed struggle. However, there were several small-scale clashes with the Turkish military. KADEK views its guerrilla forces involved in these clashes as part of a "people's defence army" which it claims is still necessary for self-defence purposes.

#### **KADEK disbanded / Kongra Gel founded**

On 11 November, KADEK announced its decision, made at a party congress in northern Iraq, to disband. Shortly after that, on 15 November, the People's Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gel) was

formed. According to KADEK statements, this decision had been made against the background of US intervention in Iraq and the resulting fundamental change in the political situation. KADEK said the aim was to open the way to restructuring the organisation in line with a democratic, ecological system, and to replace the previous party, organised in cadres and influenced by Leninist theories, with a democratic, large-scale organisation of a civil, political nature. Kongra Gel's stated aim is to solve the Kurdish issue by peaceful means. Zübeyir AYDAR was elected chairman of the Kongra Gel. Abdullah ÖCALAN, the former chairman of KADEK, was appointed "Kurdish National Leader" by the People's Congress.

The short time that elapsed between the disbanding of KADEK and the founding of the Kongra Gel, the fact that the leadership cadres switched from one organisation to the other, and that there are conceptual similarities between the two demonstrate considerable continuity. This is also apparent when one considers that the Kongra Gel adopted the "road map for democratic change" previously published by KADEK to provide a solution to the Kurdish issue.

The organisation sees this as a road map for negotiations with the Turkish government; in case of agreement, it could lead to the disbanding of the guerrilla forces. KADEK included in this road map a number of demands directed at the Turkish government which were to be fulfilled step by step within a year. However, the Kongra Gel has distanced itself from this strict timetable.

### **3.2.2 Organisation**

The disbanding of KADEK announced in November and the founding of the Kongra Gel have not yet brought with them any obvious structural changes in the organisation in Germany. KADEK supporters welcomed the founding of the Kongra Gel, although they have not shown any particular expectations of the announced democratisation within the organisation. Given its hierarchical structure and centrally controlled group of functionaries, KADEK's earlier declarations of intent to introduce more democratic co-determination did not result in any marked improvements.

Within KADEK's organisational structure, Germany is split into three sections, the so-called northern, central and southern serits, which comprise a total of 22 districts. Orders and guidelines from the leadership are passed on along various organisational levels down to

local levels, where they are then usually implemented by local clubs, in which most KADEK supporters are organised. The umbrella organisation of these local clubs is still the Föderation kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland e. V. (YEK-KOM, Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany, reg'd society). The large-scale associations supported by KADEK, in which various professional and pressure groups champion the organisation's goals and interests,<sup>CCXVI</sup> also continue to exist.

KADEK also has organisational units whose activities are subject to special secrecy. These include the so-called Homeland Office (ÜLKE Office), which helps smuggle functionaries from the Middle East to Europe and vice versa. The necessary papers are acquired by the organisation's supporters, often in Germany, and then falsified, for example by switching photographs or changing dates of birth.

### **3.2.3 KADEK propaganda**

KADEK used a number of activities to show the organisation's politics to advantage in Germany. The main emphases were renewed demands for recognition of the political and cultural identity of the Kurdish people in Turkey, as well as conditions in which Abdullah ÖCALAN is being held in prison. Active participation in a wide range of campaigns and numerous events again demonstrated the organisation's ability to mobilise all its supporters and sympathisers.

On 15 February 2003, the fourth anniversary of Abdullah ÖCALAN's arrest in Kenya, KADEK supporters staged a peaceful, large-scale demonstration in Strasbourg, France, attended by around 10,000 people from several European countries.

As in previous years, Kurds organised torchlight processions and rallies in numerous German cities in celebration of the Kurdish new year festival Nevroz on 21 March. Many KADEK supporters took part.

The highlight of this year's Nevroz festivities was a central, pan-European demonstration on 22 March in Frankfurt (Main) attended by around 27,000 people – mainly Kurds from Germany and neighbouring countries. YEK-KOM had called on followers to take part in the event, the motto of which was "NEVROZ – Festival of peace, freedom and international understanding". The rally was held against the backdrop of the war in Iraq as well as pan-European protests by

KADEK which called for an improvement to Abdullah ÖCALAN's prison conditions.

**Call for  
"general amnesty"**

The Turkish parliament passed a law reducing punishment for convicted members of terrorist organisations up to remission of a sentence under certain conditions. This led KADEK to launch a Europe-wide propaganda campaign demanding general amnesty for all of its supporters including the imprisoned Abdullah ÖCALAN. About 3,000 people, including many Kurds from Germany, travelled to a central protest rally held in Brussels on 11 June. The campaign ended with demonstrations in Stuttgart, Cologne and Hanover on 12 July, each attended by up to 4,000 people.

On 25 and 26 July, YEK-KOM in Cologne organised the 6th Mazlum Dogan Youth, Culture and Sports Festival, held for the first time in Germany. Around 6,000 young Kurds who had travelled from all over Germany and neighbouring European countries took part. In a welcome address, the General Presidential Council of KADEK called upon young Kurds to play an active role in "fighting for democracy and freedom".

The motto of the 11th International Kurdistan Cultural Festival held in Gelsenkirchen on 13 September was "For a democratic Middle East and a free Kurdistan". Around 40,000 people from across Germany and neighbouring European countries took part in the event. As in previous years, the programme included performances and political speeches calling amongst other things for equality and freedom for the Kurdish people as well as improved prison conditions for Abdullah ÖCALAN.

In an address to the participants, the KADEK General Presidential Council emphasised that, as the foundation of the Kurds' life and struggle, peace was the only basis for democracy, equality and freedom. A message of greeting from Abdullah ÖCALAN was also read, in which he called on followers to continue the "democratic struggle" in all areas of life.

**KON-KURD's  
"Democratic solution  
for peace" campaign**

From 20 September to 27 November the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD)<sup>CCXVII</sup> initiated a campaign with the motto "A democratic solution for peace". As part of this campaign, KADEK supporters across the whole of Germany carried out activities such as hunger strikes, vigils and torchlight processions. Their main objective was to draw attention to the "road map for democratic change" which KADEK had published in August to provide a solution to the Kurdish issue, and to ÖCALAN's health and prison conditions.

Supporters of the Kurdish youth organisation Movement of Free Young People in Kurdistan (TECAK)<sup>ccxviii</sup> set fire to petrol canisters and car tyres, amongst other things, in Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg. Traffic was temporarily disrupted. Leaflets which these supporters left behind drew attention to the Kurdish issue and ÖCALAN's prison conditions. Similar activities had taken place in Berlin on 9 January and in Hamburg on 6 December.

KADEK supporters staged events in several European countries on the fifth anniversary of Abdullah ÖCALAN's so-called expulsion<sup>ccxix</sup> from Syria on 9 October 1998. Rallies also took place in numerous cities in Germany. Black funeral wreaths were laid in front of some Turkish diplomatic missions in Germany. In Hamburg young KADEK supporters clashed with the police following a rally in front of the Turkish consulate-general.

KADEK continued to use the MEDYA-TV station, available in Germany via satellite, to publicly disseminate its political ideas. MEDYA-TV regularly reports on activities by KADEK and its supporters, for instance the 11th International Kurdistan Cultural Festival held on 13 September in Gelsenkirchen. It also broadcast discussion programmes in which leading KADEK functionaries commented on current affairs. The Turkish-language daily *Özgür Politika* regularly quoted leading KADEK functionaries and repeatedly referred to KADEK events.

The two media also provide a forum for the Kongra Gel.

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### 3.2.4 Financial and business activities

#### Fund-raising campaign

As in the previous year, KADEK in Europe drew most of its income from annual fund-raising campaigns amongst its supporters, from monthly membership fees and from profits from events and the sale of publications. The organisation used this income to finance its expensive propaganda apparatus, its full- and part-time management staff and other structures. However, the fund-raising campaign did not achieve KADEK's target; the result was comparable to that of previous years.

KADEK also continued its efforts to pool and promote the economic potential of Kurds living in Europe through the Association of Kurdish Employers (KARSAZ), a registered society with headquarters in Frankfurt (Main). KARSAZ held its 3rd Ordinary Congress in Raunheim, Hesse, from 31 January to 2 February. According to reports in *Özgür Politika* 165 delegates from four continents took part. KARSAZ issued a statement criticising the "solitary confinement" in which the KADEK chairman Abdullah ÖCALAN was being held and announced its support for the campaign entitled "Freedom for Öcalan".

There were indications that KARSAZ was endeavouring to set up branches in other countries (in addition to its headquarters in Frankfurt) and to increase its membership.

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### **3.2.5 Criminal proceedings against former PKK/KADEK functionaries**

A former PKK functionary was arrested in Mannheim on 13 January on an arrest warrant issued by the Federal Court of Justice. The man was accused of membership of a criminal organisation. Between April 2001 and February 2002 he had been the Berlin area PKK representative. On 18 December the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court sentenced him to two years in prison.

On 13 February the Koblenz Higher Regional Court sentenced a former regional representative of the YCK youth organisation (now called TECAK) to 18 months in prison for attempted arson in conjunction with supporting a criminal organisation. The court found that he had ordered and overseen an arson attack on rooms belonging to the German-Turkish Friendship Society in Bad Kreuznach on 21 May 1997. On 14 May the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court imposed a 30-month prison sentence on a former deputy PKK regional leader for membership of a terrorist organisation. On 20 October the Celle Higher Regional Court sentenced two former PKK regional representatives to three years and three months and two years and nine months in prison, respectively, for membership of a criminal organisation.

On 3 December the Hamburg Higher Regional Court sentenced a former PKK functionary to two years and six months in prison for membership of a criminal organisation, civil disorder and incitement to aggravated unlawful entry. The court proved that he had been responsible for the PKK north-western region between 1998 and 1999 and had ordered the occupation of the SPD's Hamburg offices in February 1999 to protest Abdullah ÖCALAN's arrest.

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#### **4.     Iranians**

The activities of Iranian opposition groups in Germany are mainly oriented on current political events in Iran, as in the case of the student protests in Teheran in summer 2003. Iranian opposition groups used domestic tensions in Iran as an excuse to organise rallies to show solidarity and protest against human rights abuses. The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran) organised numerous protest rallies in response to police searches in Paris in mid-June which targeted members of the organisation and various properties – amongst other things on the suspicion of forming a terrorist organisation.

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#### 4.1 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran)

Founded:	1965 in Iran
Headquarters:	Baghdad
Leader:	Massoud RADJAVI
Publication:	<i>Modjahed</i> (Religious Fighter), weekly
Outside the home region represented by the	
<b>National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)</b>	
Founded:	1981 in Paris – represented in Germany since 1994
Headquarters:	Berlin
Leader:	Spokesperson for Germany: Dr Massoumeh BOLOURCHI
Membership:	Around 900 (2002: 900)
Military wing:	
<b>National Liberation Army (NLA)</b>	
Founded:	1987 in Iraq
Headquarters:	On the border between Iraq and Iran (until May 2003)
Leader:	“Commander-in-Chief” Massoud RADJAVI

The revolutionary Marxist-oriented MEK is still the largest and most active group within the Iranian opposition abroad.

The MEK has a globally active political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which also represents the organisation in Germany. In 2003 the NCRI's activities were increasingly geared to representing its political agenda, with the key objective of having the MEK struck off the list of international terrorist organisations, thereby

creating a more stable basis for its political activities against the Iranian leadership. In particular, the EU's decision to include the MEK on its list of terrorist organisations in May 2002 was the subject of repeated protests. The group carried out a number of petition drives opposing this policy in a variety of locations in 2003. The organisation's propagandistic activities were aimed at presenting itself as a freedom-loving and "democratic" movement in exile.

On 19 April approximately 1,000 MEK supporters gathered for a peaceful demonstration in Cologne, one of 14 events taking place simultaneously around the world which were directed against alleged attacks by Iran on the organisation's camps in Iraq. During the second half of the year, MEK supporters protested in front of diplomatic missions in Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and Düsseldorf. On 18 October the group put on a concert in the Westfalenhalle in Dortmund, attended by approximately 5,000 supporters and others from Germany and abroad.

**European  
headquarters and  
other properties  
searched**

On 17 June French security forces searched the organisation's European headquarters and other properties in Auvers-sur-Oise near Paris and took 156 people into custody, including Maryam RADJAVI, wife of the MEK leader Massoud RADJAVI. However, she was released on bail after a few days on condition that she keep the police informed of her whereabouts. During the searches – based on the suspicion that a terrorist organisation was being founded and that terrorist activities were being financed – quantities of cash totalling millions of euros were confiscated, amongst other things. In reaction, MEK / NCRI supporters around the world gathered to stage spontaneous protest rallies at French facilities in Paris, Bern, London, Rome and Washington, where some protestors set fire to themselves; two people died in London and Paris. Only a few people took part in the protest rallies in front of French facilities in Hamburg, Munich, Düsseldorf and Berlin.

Fund-raising activities like the nationwide, large-scale street collections organised in the past were not noted in 2003. In order to disguise the use to which donations were to be put, the NCRI acted under the names of various cover organisations, in particular the Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e.V. (FHI, Aid Project for Iranian Refugees, reg'd society), which had its headquarters in Hamburg but disbanded in October. In the past the organisation approached its potential donors in a targeted and systematic fashion, also when going door-to-door.

Until recently, the MEK relied on its armed wing, the National Liberation Army (NLA), for help in achieving its goal of toppling the Iranian government by force. MEK leader Massoud RADJAVI regarded the guerrilla army (latterly comprising approximately 5,000 fighters) as playing a key role. The NLA was trained and armed with the support of the former Iraqi regime and was responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in Iran between 1997 and 2001. During the Iraq war the NLA was disarmed by the US armed forces. The remaining NLA fighters were placed under US supervision in Iraq in Camp Ashraf, once the MEK's largest base.

Massoud RADJAVI attempted to boost the political importance of MEK negotiations with the US forces. For example, in a statement posted on the Internet on 19 April he declared:

“We hereby announce to all those who sympathise with the mujahidin and the resistance in Iran that the mullahs have no reason to describe the Mujahedin-e Khalq as a terrorist organisation. Those in international circles must plead to have the organisation's name removed from the list of terrorist organisations.”

At the end of 2003 the future of the NLA was still unclear. It is doubtful whether it would be capable of carrying out any acts of terror after it was essentially disarmed in Iraq.

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## 4.2 Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI)

Founded:	1991 as a splinter group of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI)
Headquarters:	London
Leader:	Kourush MODARESI
<b>In Germany:</b>	
Name of organisation:	Arbeiterkommunistische Partei Iran (API, Worker-Communist Party of Iran) or Auslandsorganisation der Arbeiterkommunistischen Partei Iran - Sektion Deutschland (Foreign Organisation of the Worker-Communist Party in Iran – German Section) or Exilregierung der iranischen Arbeiterpartei (Government in Exile of the Iranian Workers' Party)
Headquarters:	Cologne
Leader:	Nassan NOUDINIAN Chairman of the German Section of the WPI
Membership:	Around 300 (2002: 400)

The WPI was founded by Mansour HEKMAT in 1991 as a splinter group of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI). HEKMAT, the WPI's former chairman, died on 4 July 2002. The highest level of the party hierarchy consists of the Central Committee (CC), but party policy is determined by the CC's politburo. The WPI is working towards a revolutionary coup in Iran and has outlined its political goals as follows:

“The immediate goal of the Worker-Communist Party is to organise a social revolution of the working classes ... Our manifesto declares that we want to immediately establish a communist society, a classless society without private ownership of the means of production, without wage-based labour, and without a state.”  
(WPI party manifesto, July 1994, p. 24)

Following HEKMAT's death, the group's public activities steadily declined. Demonstrations and rallies were peaceful, as in the case of a protest at the Iranian consulate-general in Frankfurt (Main) on 14 June; its motto was "Constitution and torture in Iran" and it was attended by approximately 150 supporters. On 9 July around 150 WPI supporters again demonstrated in front of the consulate-general during the student uprisings in Iran.

The political work of the WPI is supported by several groups in Germany which have close links with the organisation and whose members are also active in the WPI. These include the Internationale Föderation der iranischen Flüchtlings- und Immigrantenräte (IFIR, International Federation of Iranian Refugee and Immigration Councils; in Farsi: *Hambasteigi*) and the Internationale Kampagne zur Verteidigung von Frauenrechten im Iran e.V. (International Campaign to Defend Women's Rights in Iran, reg'd society).

### **4.3 Islamic centres under Iranian influence**

Perpetuating the idea of the "Islamic revolution" in Iran, as propagated by the revolutionary leader Ayatollah KHOMEINI, and disseminating it internationally is still a key element of Iranian policy. Iran thus supports numerous Islamic and Islamist movements and organisations, particularly in the Middle East, for example in Lebanon, Afghanistan and Egypt. "Exporting the revolution" to these countries, which have to learn "to bring about a revolution with God's help", is laid down in the Iranian constitution. Islamic centres and mosques in Germany are also targets of this "export of the revolution" and provide a forum for Iran's attempts to gain influence.

The Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg (IZH, Islamic Centre in Hamburg) plays a key role in this effort, acting as a multiplier for Shiite ideology within Muslim communities in Germany. It is also one of the most important points of contact for Shiite Muslims in Europe and an active propaganda centre. One goal of the IZH is to influence Muslims of other nationalities to join the Iranian "revolutionary idea" in order to have an indirect influence on politics in their country. In addition to Iranians loyal to the regime, visitors to the IZH and other centres for Iranian Shiites, such as those in Berlin, Münster and Munich, typically include members of other nationalities, for example Iraqis, Lebanese, Afghans, Pakistanis, Turks, North Africans and German Muslims.

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The IZH publishes numerous brochures and newspapers in various languages. Its monthly organ is the brochure *AL-FADSCHR* (light of dawn). It publishes articles on Koran-related topics, reports on regularly scheduled events, excerpts from Friday sermons and “news from the Islamic world”.

The former director of the IZH, Dr Seyyid Reza HOSSEINI NASSAB, gave an overview of the IZH’s activities when he stepped down from his post in September 2003.<sup>ccxx</sup> He said that a major focus of IZH activities was founding new Islamic centres in Germany and providing support for similar projects, for example purchasing the necessary real estate. He also stated that there were various forms of co-operation between the IZH and other groups and institutions in Germany and other European countries. Along with taking part in inter-faith dialogue – with German religious teachers, university professors and students – IZH activities are aimed at bringing together Shiites living in Germany and Europe, he added.

## 5. Tamils

<b>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)</b>	
Founded:	1972 in Sri Lanka
Leadership:	Cadre for German section
Membership/Supporters:	Around 750 (2002: around 750)
Publications:	<i>Viduthalai Puligal</i> (Liberation Tigers), fortnightly

No significant violent confrontations have occurred since the cease-fire agreement of February 2002 and the official start of peace negotiations between the Tamil LTTE separatists and the government of Sri Lanka in September of the same year. Nevertheless, at the present time it is not clear when both parties might agree on a peace treaty nor when the constitution could be amended to guarantee greater autonomy for regions in the country inhabited primarily by Tamils. In April the LTTE broke off the peace negotiations, accusing the government of breaching previous agreements. Shortly after the LTTE presented new proposals in November 2003 the Sri Lankan president broke off the negotiations for fear that the government would

have to make too many concessions. In view of this situation, it is not clear what the future holds. The LTTE do not rule out a return to armed conflict, even though the organisation initially signalled it was willing to negotiate.

This ambivalent situation is also reflected in activities planned by the range of LTTE groups in Germany, mainly propaganda and fund-raising events. For example, the LTTE continued its efforts to use aid and cover organisations to move Tamil compatriots to donate money, for instance at cultural, sporting and commemorative events. As in 2002, the main reason given was that funding was required to rebuild Tamil settlements, provide humanitarian and cultural aid and establish the organisation's own administrative structures. At the same time, however, in view of the possible breakdown of peace negotiations the organisation drew attention to the continuing threat of war and the resulting need to remain ready for action. In doing so, the organisation indicates that its logistical needs also include armed units.

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## **IV. Means of agitation and communication**

### **1. Periodical publications**

In 2003 groups of extremist foreigners put out a total of 71 publications on a regular basis (2002: 74). Of these, 47 promoted left-wing extremist views (2002: 50), 21 Islamist views (2002: 21) and three nationalist views (2002: 3). As in previous years, most of these publications, namely 24 (2002: 25), are produced by left-wing extremist Turkish groups.

### **2. The Internet**

More and more foreign extremist groups are using the Internet as a medium to represent themselves, to disseminate propaganda and party material, and to communicate. Almost all the extremist organisations represented in Germany now have their own increasingly professional and multi-lingual websites for propaganda purposes. The websites are usually published in the groups' mother tongues; many also provide an English- or German-language version.

Mujahidin groups have numerous Arabic- and English-language sites on the Internet:

For example, the English-language website *Jihad Unspun* is aimed at Arab mujahidin all over the world. It reports on individual jihad regions and publishes statements by jihad commanders. The site offers texts and articles by and about BIN LADEN, and a forum for other militant Islamists, for instance posting statements from the Taliban leader Mullah OMAR and BIN LADEN's deputy Ayman AL-ZAWAHIRI.

Arabic websites also focus on the topic of jihad. For example, they report on activities by mujahidin in Afghanistan, describe military operations by mujahidin against US troops and their allies and disseminate speeches by BIN LADEN and AL-ZAWAHIRI.

These websites also publish communiqués by Iraqi Abu Hafs al-Masri brigades (thought to have close links to al-Qaeda), including the group's statements on the attacks on UN headquarters in Baghdad in August and two Istanbul synagogues in November.

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Groups with names like The Army of Sunna Supporters or Brigades of Mujahidin of the Fighting Salafiya Group, Iraq, have published statements on the jihad in Iraq.

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has also been the subject of discussion within extremist organisations:

The Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) provides daily reports and news from the Palestinian perspective. The Palestinian Hamas also posts its communiqués and other articles on this site. It no longer has its own website and now publishes its material exclusively on the PIC's site.

The dominant topic on the website of the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) this year was the release on 2 July of its two leaders, Sheikh BENHADJ and Sheikh MADANI.

The website of the globally active Islamic organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) is available in a wide variety of languages, including Arabic, English, Persian, Turkish and Uzbek. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami took advantage of the Internet during its August conference in London by posting conference speeches on its website. With the right technical equipment, users were able to view a video version of the speeches; audio files were also available. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami thus provides an example of how effectively Islamists are using the Internet to disseminate their ideology.

Islamists involved in the fighting in Chechnya can also access the Internet for information on jihad – from the mujahidin perspective.

The Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e.V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society) has not changed its website significantly. Press releases and dates of events are publicised exclusively in German. The site receives a large number of visitors. The radio station which has been available via the site since 2002 is still only a "test version".

The Caliphate State's site was initially withdrawn from the Internet after the organisation was banned, but it later reappeared with a new layout. It offers an online version of the organisation's weekly newspaper, *Beklenen ASR-I SAADET* (The Promised Century of Bliss). Reports and news items dating back to before the ban are still available on the website.

The Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan) uses the Internet to disseminate its

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political views and demands, and to draw attention to the organisation's activities and campaigns. At the end of 2003 the website of the newly founded People's Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gel) was still under construction.

The Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front) continues to intensively use the Internet to provide information on current affairs via press releases and news items. The main topics were the current situation in Iraq, in particular criticism of Turkey and the United States, and the renewed death fasts of "political" prisoners in Turkish prisons.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) maintains a website which publishes up-to-date reports, statements and pictures, in particular of police operations targeting the organisation, carried out in France in the middle of the year.

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## V. Overview of other noteworthy organisations and their most important publications

Organisation	Membership / Supporters (partly estimated)		Publications (including frequency)
	2003	(2002)	
<b>Turks (excluding Kurds)</b>			
Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/- Cephesi – Devrimci Sol (THKP/-C, Turkish People's Liberation Party / Front – Revolutionary Left), now called Devrimci Cizgi (Revolutionary Left)	A few members	(50)	<i>Devrimci Cizgi</i> (Revolutionary Left), sporadically
Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (ADÜTDF, Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Hearths in Europe, reg'd society)	approx. 8,000	(8,000)	<i>Türk Federasyon Bülteni</i> (Bulletin of the Turkish Federation), monthly
Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (DİİDF, Federation of Democratic Clubs of Workers from Turkey in the FRG, reg'd society)	650	(700)	<i>Tatsachen</i> (Facts), bi-monthly
İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncıları- Cephesi (İBDA-C, Islamic Great Eastern Raiders' Front)	A few members	(A few members)	<i>Furkan</i> (Salvation), <i>Akademya</i> (The Academy), <i>Haberci</i> (The Messenger), all at irregular intervals, amongst others
<b>Kurds</b>			
Iraqi organisations: – Democratic Party of Kurdistan – Iraq (DPK-I) – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)	total of 350	(total of 350)	

Organisation	Membership / Supporters (partly estimated)		Publications (including frequency)
	2003	(2002)	
<b>Arabs</b>			
Hizb al Da'Wa al Islamiya (DA'WA, Party of the Islamic Call/of the Islamic Mission)	100	(150)	www.daawaparty.com
Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya (AMAL, Lebanese Resistance Detachments)	200	(200)	<i>Al Awassef</i> (The Storms), weekly, and (www.amal- movement.com)
<b>Iranians</b>			
Union of Islamist Student Associations (U.I.S.A.)	50	(50)	<i>Qods</i> (Jerusalem), at irregular intervals, amongst others
<b>Sikhs</b>			
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)	600	(600)	
Babbar Khalsa International (BK)	200	(200)	
Kamagata Maru Dal International (KMDI)	40	(50)	



## **Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities**

### **I. Overview**

<b>Germany continues to be a preferred intelligence target</b>	The Federal Republic of Germany continues to be a preferred target of the intelligence services of a number of foreign nations. In addition to the services of a number of republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) <sup>ccxxi</sup> - mainly those of the Russian Federation - these include services of countries in the Middle and Far East and in North Africa.
<b>Presence of foreign intelligence service staff</b>	Varying numbers of intelligence staff are assigned to the official or semi-official missions of these countries in Germany. From their cover posts at so-called legal residencies, these so-called "diplomats" engage in - overt or clandestine - information-gathering activities or support intelligence operations directed by the central headquarters of these services. If such "diplomats" are shown to have engaged in activities incompatible with their status, they may be expelled from Germany, as was done most recently in the case of Iraq (cf. Chapter IV, no. 3, below).
<b>"Classic" espionage; spying on opposition groups</b>	The intelligence targets of foreign services range from "classic" espionage - i.e. information-gathering activities in the fields of politics, trade and industry, the military, etc. - to the investigation and infiltration of organisations and individuals in Germany that are opposed to the current regime in their countries of origin ("spying on opposition groups") (cf. Chapter IV, no. 1, below). Foreign services engage in intelligence activities directed against German interests not only in Germany but in their own countries as well (cf. Chapter II, no. 3.3, below).
<b>Proliferation</b>	Finally, a number of countries are continuing their efforts to gain possession of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of the related delivery systems, and/or to acquire the material and the know-how required for producing such weapons and systems ("proliferation"). The question of proliferation is still high up on the agenda, as could be seen when a weapons delivery destined for North Korea was prevented in April 2003 (cf. Chapter V, no. 2, below).

## II. The intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation

### 1. Structural developments, and current situation and tasks of the services in the Russian Federation

**Dissolution of FAPSI and FPS** The structure of Russian intelligence and security services has undergone incisive changes in 2003. In particular, this affected the special communications agency FAPSI<sup>ccxxii</sup> and the federal border service FPS<sup>ccxxiii</sup> which both lost their autonomy.

By a presidential decree, the Russian President in March ordered reorganisation of the tasks and responsibilities of the Russian services. As of 2003, the FPS was fully integrated into the domestic intelligence service FSB<sup>ccxxiv</sup>. In addition, the FAPSI's tasks were in part transferred to the FSB, to the civilian foreign-intelligence service SVR<sup>ccxxv</sup> and to the President's security guard service FSO<sup>ccxxvi</sup>. This restructuring is aimed at optimising state control in the security field of the Russian Federation and increasing the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.

**Consolidated position of the FSB** As a result of the transfer of the staff, the powers and responsibilities of the dissolved services to other institutions of the state security machinery, these latter profited from the reorganisation and see their position consolidated. This implies, however, that the split-up of the former KGB into different independent intelligence and security services - which took place in Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union - has in part been reversed. The reorganisation bolstered the FSB's power, in particular.

**Germany continues to be a preferred intelligence target** Notwithstanding the positive development, over the past few years, of political relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation, Germany continues to be seen as a relevant intelligence target by the Russian intelligence services and accordingly is given high priority.

**SVR** – The External Intelligence Service (SVR) is a civilian foreign-intelligence service. The SVR's main activities include procuring information in the classic fields of politics, science and technology, and industrial espionage. Furthermore, the SVR is tasked with contributing to containing proliferation and fighting international terrorism. In addition, the SVR has a counterespionage mission with the

aim of investigating and monitoring the activities and MOs of Western intelligence services and security agencies.

As a result of the restructuring of the Russian services, the SVR was allocated part of the tasks of the dissolved special communications service FAPSI. To this end, the service's staff is being increased. Prior to the assumption of extended functions, the SVR had a staff of around 13,000.

**GRU**

- The GRU<sup>ccxxvii</sup> is the military foreign-intelligence service of the Russian Federation, with an estimated staff of around 12,000.
- The intelligence-gathering activities of the Directorate, which is subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defence, cover the entire military spectrum. Therefore, the GRU's information-gathering activities focus on security policy, strategic and tactical matters, logistics and geographic data in order to obtain intelligence on the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and the western defence alliance, especially NATO. Furthermore, the GRU seeks to gain access to scientific research findings which might be exploited for military purposes, and to military technology or product information from the area of armaments technology. It is also interested in civil-sector products suited to military applications ("dual use" commodities).

**FSB**

- The domestic intelligence service FSB (Federal Security Service) has many and various tasks and wide-ranging powers. Following the recent reorganisation, its staff of 100,000 is likely to have been augmented to a personnel strength of 350,000 to 400,000 persons.

The main tasks of the FSB, which also has extensive law enforcement powers, include civilian and military counterintelligence, monitoring political extremism, and fighting terrorism and organised crime. In addition, this service is responsible for protecting Russian industry against industrial espionage and organised crime, and foreign investors against economic crime. For purposes of combating terrorism, organised crime and proliferation, the FSB may also carry out transborder operations in order to obtain intelligence on international interconnections.

In other fields, too, the FSB is authorised to engage, in co-ordination with the foreign-intelligence services, in external intelligence activities in a counterintelligence context. Thus, in order to obtain information on the targets and objectives of the intelligence services of foreign countries and their methods of work, the FSB can, as part of its counterespionage activities, recruit foreign nationals



- e.g. staff members of diplomatic missions, company representatives, visiting businessmen or tourists, etc. - who make frequent journeys from their home countries to Russia and are suspected by the FSB of co-operating with foreign services.

**Extended powers of the FSB**

Following the integration of the border service FPS, the FSB's powers were considerably extended. Consequently, the FSB now also is responsible for protecting the Russian national borders and controlling persons entering or leaving the country. In addition, a number of tasks previously performed by FAPSI, the dissolved special communications service, have been assigned to the FSB. Presumably the responsibility to ensure communications security in the telecommunications field was also transferred to the Service. The FSB may therefore be expected to assume responsibility for allocating RF channels and granting licences and to act as the licensing agency for the use of encryption technologies in trade and industry.

The FSB's counterintelligence activities also involve intensive monitoring of the Internet in Russia. In this context, all Russian providers of Internet portals must provide the Service with permanent access to data transferred via the Internet; and thus, also foreign nationals using the Internet in Russia inevitably come to the FSB's attention and can be placed under specific surveillance.

Already in January 2001, a Presidential Decree had established an Operational (Main) Staff and, under its command, an Operational Regional Staff for directing the counter-terrorism operations in the northern Caucasus region. Under this decree, the head of the Operational Staff is the FSB Director who, in this capacity, also took over the command of the military "counter-terrorism operation" in Chechnia.

## 2. Intelligence targets and priorities

### 'Classic' intelligence targets

The core activities of the Russian intelligence services concern procuring information in the classic fields of politics, trade and industry, science, and technology, and the military spectrum. The Russian government's current information requirements dictate the priority given to specific intelligence-gathering activities.

In the political field, for instance, the positions taken by Germany with regard to the Chechnya conflict, other flashpoint regions around the world and the Kaliningrad issue were of interest.

Further, the services' information-gathering activities focussed on the developments regarding the EU and independent European security initiatives, NATO and its eastward enlargement, and Germany's role within the Alliance. This implied that the structural reform, budgetary planning and logistics of the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and their operations abroad also were matters considered significant by the Russian intelligence services. Also, efforts were made to gain information on the German armaments industry.

## 3. Methodical approach

### Overt and clandestine information gathering

These methods include, in particular, overt information collection, e.g. through conversations with contacts and use of open information sources such as the Internet. For security reasons, this is the approach most frequently used in information-gathering activities.

However, members of the secret services also continue to use methods of clandestine intelligence gathering and, for this purpose, employ undercover agents.

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### 3.1 Activities under central control

#### Late repatriates (ethnic Germans) as a target group

Both the SVR and the GRU continue to monitor the various target countries directly from their headquarters in Moscow. For this purpose, for example, residents of the given target country who have been recruited for intelligence activities are used as undercover agents. Therefore, the Russian services focus their interest mainly on foreigners or Russian nationals living abroad who, for professional or family reasons, make frequent journeys to Russia and thus must expect to be approached by intelligence services. The Russian intelligence services traditionally extend their recruitment attempts also to late repatriates of German descent (ethnic Germans). Some repatriates are already approached before their departure for Germany.

The services' covert agents assigned to posts in foreign countries communicate with their headquarters in various ways. Among the means employed are radio intelligence communications, secret writing (s/w) methods and "dead letter boxes" (DLBs)<sup>ccxxviii</sup>. Also, intelligence officers holding cover posts at Russian missions in target countries are assigned to help with the handling of agents who are controlled by headquarters.

#### Involvement of other groups in information-gathering activities

When intelligence-gathering activities are centrally controlled, the intelligence services also send regular staffers or former intelligence officers - posing as individuals on private or business travel - on intelligence missions in target countries, or involve Russian informants - recruited from certain occupational groups, e.g. scientists or journalists - in intelligence activities abroad.

### 3.2 Legal residencies of Russian intelligence services

#### Legal residencies as a local intelligence foothold

In addition to centrally controlled agents, the diplomatic and consular missions of the Russian Federation and the foreign offices of Russian news agencies play an important role in the SVR's and GRU's intelligence-gathering activities in Germany. In these establishments, a large number of posts are available to the secret services for the placement of intelligence officers in diplomatic or journalistic cover positions. Within these establishments, the intelligence staff constitute the so-called legal residency. This provides the Russian services in Germany with permanent bases for all types of intelligence operations.

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<b>Massive presence of intelligence staff</b>	Members of the intelligence services also in 2003 had a large share in the overall number of the staff of Russian missions in Germany, and their presence even tended to increase slightly.  Thus, the Russian intelligence services are clearly overrepresented at the legal residencies in Germany, as compared with other European countries. The cover positions for staff of the intelligence services are filled mainly by the SVR and the GRU. The largest intelligence base operated by the Russian services in Germany is the Russian Federation's Embassy in Berlin. The massive presence of intelligence staff at this embassy clearly shows that the SVR and GRU focus their intelligence efforts on German and foreign institutions in Germany's capital.
<b>Overt information gathering</b>	The residency officers primarily engage in overt information collection. This includes conversations with unwitting contacts, e.g. politicians, military personnel, staff members of scientific institutions, public authorities, etc. In addition, residency officers meet much of their information requirements by gathering publicly accessible information. For this purpose, they attend political meetings, symposiums, industrial fairs, etc., or make use of open information sources such as media reports, specialist libraries or academic information centres.
<b>"Confidential contacts"</b>	However, the intelligence activities pursued by legal residencies also include clandestine methods which might be termed "semi-overt information gathering" and which in part already meet the criteria of covert agent handling. For these contacts, residency members will, from the start, lay down the modalities for further meetings with their contact partners and thus obviate the need for getting in touch once more for the sole purpose of arranging later meetings. Generally, the meeting will be held on "neutral ground", e.g. in restaurants. As a rule, the aim of these contacts - which must be considered "confidential contacts" - clearly is to obtain supply of information in exchange for money or other rewards. However, both sides avoid talking openly about the intelligence nature of their contact. This approach, which is more restrained than strictly covert collection, is at present applied mainly by the SVR.

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**"Classic"  
clandestine  
collection**

Covert agent handling employing "classic" methods and means is practised mainly by the residency staffers of the GRU. Such agent management comprises security measures designed to ensure the clandestinity of meetings and communications. In addition to communications technologies, use is also made of traditional means of communication, such as "dead letter boxes" (DLBs).

**3.3 Increased activities by the domestic intelligence service  
FSB against German missions abroad**

The FSB's MOs continue the methods of its predecessor, the domestic State Security Committee (KGB) of the former Soviet Union. One of the Service's aim is to spot foreign target persons for recruitment as agents. Thus, German diplomatic missions in Russia and their staffs are intensively monitored by the FSB and are subjected to aggressive intelligence activities. The staff of these missions must - as in the KGB's time - expect that recruitment approaches will be made with the inclusion of compromising material or compromise operations (frame-up).

**Recruitment pitches  
aimed at two  
German nationals**

Proof of such FSB activities was furnished in two cases which occurred in two CIS republics in 2003. In both cases, attempts were made to recruit a staff member of a German mission in the respective country as an agent working for the FSB. However, both recruitment pitches failed because the individuals concerned informed their superiors.

Monitoring or surveillance activities of the FSB are also aimed at visiting businessmen, company representatives or tourists of foreign nationality who visit Russia.

### III. Intelligence and security services of other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Apart from Russia, other member republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) also have a number of intelligence and security services. In many CIS countries, counterintelligence and intelligence collection are combined in one service. However, some republics have also established national military intelligence services patterned on the structures of the former Soviet GRU.

The Commonwealth of Independent States no longer is the homogeneous community envisaged at the time of its founding as the successor of the former Soviet Union. The political and economic interests of the various republics often vary greatly. Only Armenia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Belarus are still members of the Collective Security Treaty concluded in 1992 by all of the CIS republics. In April 2003, these countries formed the Organisation of the Treaty on Collective Security (ODKB, Organizatsiya Dogovora o Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti).

#### Intelligence targets

The intelligence services of these other CIS republics basically have the same intelligence targets as the Russian services. In these countries, too, the focus of intelligence collection is on political, economic and scientific matters and the military spectrum. However, the scope for intelligence activities abroad, in particular, is limited by the funds available to these services. A number of services of CIS republics nevertheless also post staff members to legal residencies in Germany.

#### Ethnic German repatriates

In the CIS republics with an ethnic German population, repatriates to Germany are a target group of the external intelligence activities of these republics. At home, the focus of counterintelligence is on the organisations representing the interests of ethnic Germans living in the CIS republics. In interviews with the representatives of these organisations, staff members of the intelligence services elicit information, inter alia, on activities pursued by them, on their members wishing to be repatriated to Germany and relatives who have already left the country. Some time after their move to Germany, many repatriates make visits to their former home countries and thus provide the intelligence services with an easy opportunity to establish contact with them.

#### Aid and relief organisations

Apart from ethnic Germans and the organisations representing their interests, the intelligence services of the CIS republics target their activities at foreign relief organisations operating in these republics,

e.g. the Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) which is commissioned by the Federal Government to work in the field of technical co-operation and has close contacts with the organisations representing the interests of ethnic Germans in the CIS republics.

Monitoring of foreign companies and their staff is focused on gathering economic and technological information. Already at the time of applying for a visa in Germany, relevant individuals are identified as interesting target persons by the intelligence services, and thus their observation can be taken up already at the time when they cross the border. The diplomatic missions of Western nations are also under observation by the intelligence services of most CIS republics.

**Co-operation with  
Russia**

The services of a number of CIS republics work closely with the Russian intelligence services. In instances, such co-operation even extends to carrying out joint operations.

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#### **IV. Activities of intelligence services of countries in the Middle East and North Africa**

Also in 2003, the services of a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa pursued intelligence activities in Germany. The focus of these activities continues to be on monitoring compatriots living in Germany and, among these, particularly anti-regime groups and dissidents, and on infiltrating their organisations. In addition, gathering of information on international networks of Islamistic terrorists has been intensified over the past few years.

##### **1. Iranian intelligence services**

**The primary objective: spying on opposition groups**

As in the preceding years, the focus of the activities of the Iranian intelligence service VEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is on observing opposition groups within the Iranian community in Germany. The service is interested in the entire anti-regime spectrum, with a special focus on the most militant group, the People's Mujahidin of Iran (Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, MEK) which also employs terrorist means, and its political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

Relying on agents planted in these organisations or in their environment, the VEVAK manages to gain information on their anti-regime activities, their structures and leadership cadres. For agent recruitment, the VEVAK in instances also brings psychological pressure to bear on the targeted persons, e.g. by threatening them with reprisals on their relatives living in Iran.

**Conviction of an agent in Berlin**

On 29 September, a 65 year-old German Iranian, who had lived in Berlin for many years, was sentenced by a non-appealable decision of the Berlin *Kammergericht* (Supreme Court of Berlin *Land*) to a prison term of 2 years and six months for intelligence activities pursued by him for the Iranian intelligence service over a period of 12 years. He confessed to having systematically gathered information on Iranian monarchist organisations, their members, meetings and plans and having supplied that information to his handlers in Tehran and, for a time, also to a member of what then was the Iranian Consulate-General in Berlin.



## 2. Syrian intelligence services

As before, the Syrian intelligence services are interested in the entire anti-regime spectrum both within the country and abroad, which is considered a potential threat to the Syrian regime.

For the achievement of their objectives, the Syrian services can rely on intelligence structures and on organisational structures of the Syrian Ba'ath party in Germany; these structures are used particularly for monitoring Syrian nationals living in the Federal Republic. Activities of this type were observed also in 2003. For recruitment of new agents, Syrian intelligence services continue to apply pressure by threatening to take repressive measures against the prospective agents themselves or their relatives living in Syria.

When Syrians living in Germany visit their home country, many of those identified as opponents of the regime and therefore investigated by the services or those denounced as dissidents are detained, questioned and maltreated in order to induce them to engage in intelligence activities.

## 3. Iraqi intelligence services

The war in Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam HUSSEIN's regime also entailed the dissolution of Iraq's secret service and security apparatus.

Before these events, the Iraqi intelligence services operating in Germany showed a keen interest in political information, the activities of Iraqi opposition groups in foreign countries, and obtaining know-how and goods which were not allowed to be exported to Iraq on account of the embargo imposed for many years. Above all, products of use in the military field were of particular interest.

### **Expulsion of staff members of intelligence services**

In early March 2003 - shortly before the outbreak of the war - the staff members of Iraqi intelligence services posted under cover, as "diplomats", to the Iraqi Embassy in Berlin were expelled. As a result, Iraq's intelligence structure operating until then in Germany was smashed.

#### 4. Libyan intelligence services

##### Integration efforts

Libya is making intensive efforts to achieve its re-acceptance as a member of the international community. It is against this background that Libya endeavours to deal with the legacy of its past as a country engaged in state-sponsored terrorism.

A case in point was the compensation agreement reached in August 2003 by the Libyan negotiators with the lawyers of the victims of the LOCKERBIE attack<sup>ccxxix</sup>. Also with regard to the bombing of the LA BELLE discotheque in Berlin<sup>ccxxx</sup>, Libya agreed to make compensation payments. However, the negotiations with the victims' lawyers are still going on. In all of these cases, Libya put the al-Qaddafi International Foundation for Charity (QIF) in charge of conducting the pertinent negotiations. Following the Lockerbie compensation agreement, the UN sanctions against Libya were lifted in September 2003.

##### No changes in the domestic situation

Irrespective of this foreign-policy shift, which also includes refraining from possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the internal power structures are unchanged. Anti-regime activities are not tolerated in Libya; Libyans living in foreign countries are under observation. This applies both to Libyan students and other Libyan nationals staying in Germany for professional or other reasons. Dissidents with a laicist or religious background are being systematically spied on. These activities involve members of the Libyan missions in Berlin and Bonn, especially staffers of the Libyan intelligence and security services who are posted under cover to diplomatic missions.

## V. Far East intelligence services

The intelligence services of a number of Far East nations also are developing activities affecting German interests. Primarily these include the services of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea).

### 1. Chinese intelligence services

**Intelligence targets** As before, extensive intelligence activities of the Chinese security services are targeted against the democracy movement inside China, separatist movements such as the Islamic Uighurs in China's western border areas, who are striving for self-rule, and the Falun Gong movement (a spiritual sect).

Monitoring such activities within Chinese communities in foreign countries is the responsibility of the Chinese intelligence services. In order to induce Chinese nationals living abroad to adopt pro-regime attitudes, and to discourage undesirable anti-regime activities, the Chinese Embassy in Berlin and the two Consulates-General in Hamburg and Munich help to set up clubs and associations in the Chinese community in Germany. Also on visits to China, this group is closely monitored by the country's security services.

**"Charm offensive"** In addition to monitoring and observation, the Chinese intelligence services continuously collect information on political, economic, scientific and military matters in all areas of public life in Germany. Priority is given to reducing the country's technological lagging behind the leading industrialised nations. Intelligence officers posted to China's official missions abroad exploit their diplomatic cover for information-gathering purposes. In the same way, journalists accredited to Germany are employed for intelligence collection. Continuing China's global "charm offensive" that was initiated years ago, staffers of intelligence services establish contacts with academic and political institutions and with foundations and public authorities. By attending seminars or other events, they aim at getting to know persons that are of interest to their intelligence services. These contacts are followed up by intelligence officers who, as a rule, are very proficient in the German language. The aim is to obtain information – including that of a confidential nature – unobtrusively and without the knowledge of the person in question.

## 2. North Korean intelligence services

Since 1 March 2001, when full diplomatic relations were established between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and following the accreditation of the North Korean Ambassador in Berlin who is also accredited to other European countries, the Korean Embassy has an overall staff of 13 diplomats and administrative personnel.

### Large number of services

In support of the country's present regime, North Korea operates six intelligence services which directly report, or are indirectly subordinate, to the Chairman of the Defence Committee and party leader, KIM Jong-il. In addition, there are a number of organisations that are organised and operated like intelligence services, e.g. "Bureau 39" which is responsible for procurement tasks on behalf of the *nomenklatura* [bureaucratic élite, leadership clique].

### Legal residencies

The intelligence services "State Security Directorate", "United Front Directorate" and "Intelligence Bureau of the Armed Forces Directorate" maintain legal residencies at the North Korean Embassy in Berlin.

### Activities

Also in 2003, priority activities of these services were the organisation and guidance of dissident groups working against South Korea; ensuring personnel and physical security at North Korean establishments in Germany and other European countries coming within the purview of the North Korean Embassy in Berlin; and procurement of goods for the People's Armed Forces. Also, there have been intensified efforts to procure computers and second-hand communications equipment.

The conflict between the international community and North Korea became increasingly critical in 2003 on account of the continuation of the country's nuclear weapons programme, especially when North Korea repeatedly claimed to have reprocessed all of the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods of the reactor at Yongbyon to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

There are also clear indications that North Korea is interested in gas ultracentrifugation technology. This is evidenced by the attempt to procure special aluminum tubes via Germany:

### Last-minute action at sea to prevent exports

Although a South German company had been previously warned by the German export authorisation authority that exports of such aluminum tubes would not be authorised and that non-compliance was a punishable offence, the company in April 2003 tried to export the tubes, allegedly to China. However, the exporting vessel was stopped

while still at sea. The criminal proceedings instituted against the company's executives for infringement of the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (*Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz, AWG*) are still pending.

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## VI. Proliferation \*

### Countries intent on proliferation

North Korea's statements on continuing its nuclear weapons programme as well as the concern expressed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEO) about the Iranian nuclear programme have underlined the topical interest and importance of the problem posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the related delivery system technology and rocketry. As before, it is assumed that certain countries - e.g. North Korea, Syria - already possess WMD or continue their efforts to procure such weapons. It remains to be seen whether Libya will actually fulfil its undertaking to renounce possession of weapons of mass destruction. After the events in Iraq, it must be assumed that Iraq's authorities will, for the time being and under U.S. control, refrain from any proliferation activities.

Although a number of countries already have - and even offer on the world market - the know-how and production facilities required for the production of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and missile systems, they still see the need for additional procurement activities on the international market. Such activities are aimed at acquiring products (e.g. machinery, spare parts, primary products) intended to ensure the continuation and further development of an existing production programme or needed for the development of new WMDs or missile systems.

### Procurement efforts

Over the past few years, the European nations have effectively tightened up their export legislation and controls. However, a number of countries interested in proliferation goods also use clandestine methods of procurement. In instances, this includes the involvement of intelligence services or the procurement organisation relying on intelligence methods. Direct procurement by the actual end user from the producer or supplier in a foreign country is rather the exception. In most cases, use is made of intermediary suppliers or cover firms, or deliveries are made via third countries in order to conceal from the business partner concerned that the given product is actually intended for ultimate use under a proliferation programme. An assessment of whether, and to what extent, an identified business transaction is indeed of relevance in a proliferation context will be more difficult in those cases where the demand is for a "dual-use" commodity, i.e. a product that can be used for both civilian and proliferation-specific purposes.

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\* Proliferation refers to the spread of NBC weapons and of the related delivery system technologies.

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- Knowledge transfer** Countries that are intent on proliferation are also interested in gaining know-how from the fields of research and technology. For this purpose, the information-seeking individuals occasionally proceed on a clandestine basis; an example is a student or scientist who conceals from a German university or research institution that he/she is working for a proliferation-specific establishment.
- Co-operation among security agencies** The Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, BAFA), the Customs Criminological Office (Zollkriminalamt, ZKA), the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) and the Federal and *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution co-operate closely on uncovering procurement activities related to proliferation and on matters related to export control. Public information activities are aimed at informing, and raising the awareness of, industry and educational and research institutions on the subject of proliferation and the risks entailed for the persons concerned - e.g. loss of reputation, financial losses.
- Brochure** In support of these awareness-raising measures, the Federal and the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution published a brochure entitled *Proliferation - Das geht uns an!* (Proliferation concerns us!). This brochure is also available on the Internet: ([www.verfassungsschutz.de](http://www.verfassungsschutz.de)).

## VII. Arrests and convictions

In 2003, the federal public prosecutor general (*Generalbundesanwalt*) instituted 14 preliminary proceedings: 13 on suspicion of activity on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and one on a charge of treason. Warrants were issued for the arrest of two persons. The Berlin *Kammergericht* (Supreme Court of Berlin *Land*) sentenced one defendant for activity on behalf of a foreign intelligence service (Section 99 of the Criminal Code).

## The Scientology Organisation (SO)

Founded:	in the USA in 1954; first Church of Scientology of Germany founded in 1970
Headquarters:	Los Angeles (Church of Scientology International, CSI);
Membership:	Federal Republic of Germany (estimate): between 5,000 and 6,000 (2002: between 5,000 and 6,000)*
Publications:	<i>FREIHEIT, IMPACT, SOURCE</i> , among others <i>INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS, ADVANCE!</i> <sup>ccxxxii</sup>
Subsidiary organisations:	In Germany, ten „churches”, among them (selection) two „Celebrity Centres” and ten „Missions” <sup>ccxxxiii</sup>
* Number claimed by SO: 30,000	

### 1. Introduction

At its meeting in Bonn on 5–6 June 1997, the Standing Conference of the Ministers and Senators of the Interior concluded that there was enough evidence that the Scientology organisation (SO) was involved in activities directed against the free democratic order to satisfy the legal prerequisites for having the SO monitored by the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. This conclusion remained valid in 2003.

### 2. Bases

The founder of the organisation, L. Ron Hubbard (1911–1986), saw himself as the fulfilment of a prophesy by Gautama Siddharta (called Buddha), according to which „at a time of worldwide degeneration, a man from the West will appear with a liberating technology in order to bring about a spiritual Golden Age on Earth”.<sup>ccxxxiii</sup>



The SO sees its doctrine, as developed by Hubbard, as a „church of redemption“<sup>ccxxxiv</sup> in the tradition of Eastern religions – especially Buddhism; it allegedly wants to convey full mental freedom from the endless cycle of birth, death and rebirth to human individuals, and to free them from their bonds in the material universe.<sup>ccxxxv</sup> In the SO's view, anybody's "person" or "identity" is, for instance, not his/her body or name, but the "thetan"<sup>ccxxxvi</sup>, which has no mass, no wavelength, that is to say nothing concrete. In its ideal state as an "operating thetan",<sup>ccxxxvii</sup> it is entirely the "being at cause over matter, energy, space, time and thought", and was not in a body.

In order to reach this state, the first objective of Scientologists is to become "clear"<sup>ccxxxviii</sup>, i.e. "as a result of Dianetic therapy, free of any actively or potentially existing psychosomatic illnesses or *aberrations*". According to the definition used by Scientologists, an "aberration"<sup>ccxxxix</sup> is a departure from rational thought or behaviour. Such departure from rationality can be caused by what they call „engrams“. Scientologists define the term "engram"<sup>ccxl</sup> as a "mental image picture which is a complete recording of every perception present in a moment of partial or full 'unconsciousness' ". "Auditing"<sup>ccxli</sup> is designed to discover these "engrams" and to eliminate their effect.

Under this procedure, the "auditor" ("one who listens", one who is called a "minister of the Church of Scientology" and who is thus designated or someone trained as such)<sup>ccxlii</sup> helps the so-called "preclear" ("one who is not yet clear")<sup>ccxliii</sup> to detect areas of grief or pain through a fixed sequence of questions or instructions.<sup>ccxliv</sup> The auditor uses what Scientologists call an E-meter<sup>ccxlv</sup>, or electropsychometer, for this. The device is used to measure "the body's resistance and its variations due to spiritual interaction" against an electric current while the preclear being questioned by the auditor holds both electrodes of the device in his/her hands. The movements of the E-meter needle are caused by the current flow and are supposed to help "the auditor and preclear locate areas of spiritual distress and travail".<sup>ccxlvi</sup>

In addition to "auditing", the organisation offers a number of other seminars in Germany.<sup>ccxlvii</sup> Above all, these seminars give instructions for a successful way of life as understood by Scientology. The seminars and accompanying publications are offered for sale in a business-like manner. This selling activity is the main task of the "churches" and "missions" in Germany.<sup>ccxlviii</sup>

### 3. Objectives

#### Hard intelligence of anti-constitutional efforts

On 31 March 2003, the Scientology Kirche Deutschland e.V. (SKD, Scientology Church of Germany reg'd society) and the Scientology Kirche Berlin e.V. (SKB, Scientology Church of Berlin reg'd society) filed an action before the Cologne administrative court against being monitored by the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. As a reason for their action, the plaintiffs claimed that they belonged to an allegedly globally recognised religious community and as such did not pursue any political aims. At the end of 2003, the action was still pending before the administrative court in Cologne.

The claims made by the Scientology organisation are in stark contrast to their activities. The organisation exerts an anti-constitutional influence on its members' political beliefs. The organisation publishes one edition after the other<sup>ccxlix</sup> of the writings of its founder L. Ron Hubbard, which are regarded as immutable, and sells them without qualifying their content in any way.<sup>cci</sup> These writings contain passages which call for abolishing the main principles of a free democratic order and creating a "new OT civilization"<sup>ccli</sup> instead. In addition, the SO trains its functionaries and members in German institutions in seminars where participants learn how to think and act in an anti-democratic way, based on the writings of the SO's founder.

A summary of writings by Hubbard used as course material<sup>ccli</sup> for a functionaries' seminar contains passages calling for the abolition of parliamentary democracy and its replacement by a Scientological system:

#### Rejection of parliamentary democracy

"A totally democratic organisation has a bad name in Dianetics and Scientology despite all this talk of agreement. An actual experiment (Los Angeles, 1950) demonstrated that groups of people called on to select a leader from among them by nomination and vote routinely select only those who would kill them. If you ever have occasion to elect a leader for your group, don't be 'democratic' about it. Take the person who is a good auditor. Beware of those ladies and gentlemen who advocate parliamentary practices and know all those legal and time-consuming procedures. Democracies hate brains and skill. Don't get into that rut. Democracy is only possible in a nation of Clears. When the majority rules, the minority suffers. The best are always a minority.

Scientology offers us our first chance of having a real democracy."<sup>ccliii</sup>  
(Organisational Executive Course *Grundlegender Mitarbeiter-Hut*<sup>ccliii</sup>  
(Basic Member Hat), Volume O, p. 123 f. and p. 652)

**Restricted validity of basic rights and no equality before the law**

In one of his other publications, Hubbard described the system he envisaged as a legal order under which the existence of the individual is subject to the SO's arbitrary discretion. Basic rights can be enjoyed only by those people who, after selection under the auditing procedure, are considered "honest" in the SO's view:

"In order to obtain help, you must be honest with your auditor. This is the path to mental health and true freedom. A person's right to survival is directly linked to his honesty. Freedom is for honest people."

(See *Einführung in die Ethik der Scientology* (Hubbard, Introduction to the Ethics of Scientology), Copenhagen 1998, p.36 f, p. 46)

According to other writings by Hubbard also used as course material,<sup>cciv</sup> in particular alleged foes of the SO shall have no rights:

"Suppressive actions are clearly those covert or open actions aiming directly at diminishing or destroying the influence or activities of Scientology. Since those individuals or groups of individuals who would commit such actions would only do so for their own good and for the bad of all others, they cannot be granted the same rights as normal and reasonable human beings."

(Hubbard, *Wie man Unterdrückung konfrontiert und zerschlägt* (How to Confront and Shatter Suppression, PTS/SP), Copenhagen, 2001, p. 138 f.)

Under the legal regime the Scientology organisation aspires to a person who is successful according to the SO's criteria cannot be punished for any misconduct:

"We reward production and up statistics and penalize nonproduction and down statistics. Always.

Never even discipline someone with an up statistic. Never accept an ethics report<sup>cciv</sup> on one – just stamp it 'Sorry, Up Statistic' and send it back.

(Hubbard, *Wie man Unterdrückung konfrontiert und zerschlägt* (How to Confront and Shatter Suppression, PTS/SP Course), Copenhagen, 2001, p. 86 f.)

**Intelligence service which has absolute rule**

The organisation's own intelligence service, which is not bound by laws and legislation, has the task of investigating potential wrongdoing and of taking preventive and repressive measures considered necessary by the SO, while the person concerned has no protection from independent courts:

"We know our enemies before they strike. We are keeping them from important positions. If we happen to get somebody in a key position and he then starts making mistakes, we will shoot quickly and administer justice afterwards."

(Hubbard, *Handbuch des Rechts* (Handbook of Law), Copenhagen, 1979, p. 2 f.)

**Long-term changes  
in the political  
system to be  
achieved by SO's  
„expansion“**

According to Hubbard, the SO is to achieve its long-term political aims by participating in the process of developing policies but rather by continuing to expand and increasing its income:

"Hitler (just like Caesar) did not consolidate the territory he conquered. It was impossible to do so – not because he didn't have any troops, but he had no real demand for German technology and German social philosophy before he started on his conquests. This is why Hitler lost his war and fascist Germany perished. You can stimulate demand. You can create it. Since we have a product that liberates in the highest sense of the word and de-aberrates. Anyway, we do not conquer the country in the way governments do."

(Organisational Executive Course *Grundlegender Mitarbeiter-Hut* (Basic Member Hat), Volume O, p. 45 f.)

"This is achieved by freeing individuals of their aberrations and by preventing suppressers diminishing demand and people aberrating once more; and this is the method of expansion."

(Organisational Executive Course *Grundlegender Mitarbeiter-Hut* (Basic Member Hat), Volume O, p. 50 f.)

#### 4. Appearance in public

##### Brochures and public advertising campaigns

The organisation has not changed its behaviour in public. It has continued to distribute publications, brochures and flyers in the pedestrian precincts of German cities. Such publications focus on social issues, such as drug and alcohol abuse, or on what they consider the deplorable state of psychiatry. Moreover, the organisation organised public events, such as the Crusade of Honorary Priests (a presentation of the “auditing” procedure in yellow tents)<sup>cclvi</sup> in several German cities in order to gain the public’s attention from the public and recruit new participants for its courses.

##### The SO on the Internet

As in previous years, the SO presented comprehensive and technically sophisticated sites in several languages on the Internet<sup>cclvii</sup> containing information on its aims, subsidiary organisations and current publications. In addition, Scientologists, including a constant number of some 600 German members, have continued to promote the organisation on their own Internet sites professing their faith in the SO.

##### Little response among the general public

As in previous years, the SO's publicity campaigns were generally not very successful. The SO had very little success in recruiting and retaining new members for any length of time. The majority of new members cancelled their membership within a short time. Public advertising events were attended by very few people and attracted little media attention.

##### Distribution of membership and activities remains uneven

In Germany, the most important regions, in terms of membership and activities, are the greater Hamburg area and the *Länder* of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. In addition, significant numbers of members can be found in the *Länder* of Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate.

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## Security and Counter-Sabotage

<b>Security tasks</b>	Security is absolutely essential to a democratic state governed by the rule of law. Security ensures that information and procedures remain secret and protected against unauthorised disclosure, when their publication could threaten the existence, vital interests or security of the Federal Government and its agencies ( <i>Bund</i> ) or of any of the states ( <i>Länder</i> ).
<b>Classified material</b>	Irrespective of their form, sensitive facts, objects or intelligence to be kept secret are classified material and must be marked with one of the following classifications: <i>STRENG GEHEIM</i> (Top Secret), <i>GEHEIM</i> (Secret), <i>VS-VERTRAULICH</i> (Confidential) or <i>VS-NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH</i> (Restricted).
<b>Physical security</b>	Physical security provides the organisational and technical prerequisites for the protection of classified material. The Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI) has primary responsibility for this task. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) must co-operate, pursuant to Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 3, of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution ( <i>Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz</i> ), by providing intelligence of possible relevance to the physical security of classified material.
<b>Personnel security</b>	<p>The central task is to protect classified material. The instrument used for the purpose is security screening of persons to be entrusted with tasks of a sensitive nature.</p> <p>The security screening procedure is regulated in the Security Clearance Check Act (<i>Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz, SÜG</i>). The BfV's participation in this procedure is based on Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 1, of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution in conjunction with Section 3 (2) of the Security Clearance Check Act.</p>
<b>Jurisdiction</b>	<p>The fact that personnel security is assigned to the BfV as a “participatory task” means that the BfV does not have primary jurisdiction; responsibility for security measures lies with the competent authorities. In the federal public service, this generally is the employing authority.</p> <p>Classified government material requiring protection is handled not only by public institutions but also by private-sector enterprises,</p>

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among others. In this case, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour assumes responsibility for ensuring the security of such material.

**Personnel-related counter-sabotage**

The instrument of preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage was introduced in the Security Clearance Check Act (SÜG), in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on the basis of Article 5 of the Counter-Terrorism Act (*Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz*) of 9 January 2002.

**Security clearance checks**

Security clearance checks, which have proved an effective instrument in personnel security, are now being used to ensure that persons presenting a risk to security are not employed in key positions in sensitive areas. Persons actually employed, or planned to be employed, in vital or defence establishments are subject to security vetting.

**Vital establishments**

Establishments are considered vital if their disruption could seriously threaten the health or lives of large segments of the population, due to the risk inherent in the nature of their operations. 'Risk inherent in the nature of operations' refers to risk inherent in the working process itself or in the employed production or working materials (e.g. danger of fire, explosion or contamination).

Vital establishments also include those that are essential to the functioning of the community and whose disruption would cause panic or distress among large segments of the population, thus threatening public order or security. This includes public provision of postal and telecommunications services, among others.

**Defence establishments**

Preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage also applies to important defence establishments beyond the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence. These include establishments involved in establishing or maintaining defence preparedness and whose disruption could seriously jeopardise the functioning of the federal armed forces (*Bundeswehr*), allied forces or civil defence. Such establishments also include key manufacturers in the defence industry and supplies industry as well as central transport and telecommunications facilities.

**Security-sensitive positions**

For reasons of proportionality, measures to prevent personnel-related sabotage apply only to security-sensitive positions within vital and defence establishments, i.e. the smallest organisational units working independently and protected against unauthorised access. Only persons employed in such positions must undergo security vetting. For counter-sabotage purposes, a so-called 'simple security check' is required, i.e. a form of vetting that causes as little inconvenience as possible to the person being vetted.

- Statutory ordinance** The Federal Government adopted the Ordinance establishing Security Vetting Requirements for Vital and Defence Establishments (*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsfeststellungsverordnung, SÜFV*) which entered into force on 9 August 2003. It gives a legally effective list of vital and defence establishments. The Ordinance is published in Part I of the Federal Law Gazette (BGBl I), 2003, p. 1553. The Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour drafted a Guide to personnel-related counter-sabotage in industry. It can be accessed on the Internet: [www.bmwa-sicherheitsforum.de](http://www.bmwa-sicherheitsforum.de).
- Consent** Finally, it should be emphasised that security clearance checks may only be carried out with the express prior consent of the persons affected.
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## Notes

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- i Jesse, Eckhard: *Der Verfassungsschutzauftrag der abwehrbereiten Demokratie: Theorie und Praxis*, and Lange, Hans Gert: *Verfassungsschutz in der Demokratie - ein Instrument zur Sicherung des inneren Friedens*, both in: Federal Ministry of the Interior (eds.), *Wehrhafte Demokratie and Rechtsextremismus* (Series: *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit*), Bonn 1992, pp. 7 seqq. and pp. 19 seqq.
  - ii This figure includes only those neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften* that demonstrate a certain degree of organisation.
  - iii The British neo-Nazi group "Combat 18" (C18) was suspected of having initiated a series of letter bombings in 1997. Although hardly any militant acts can be attributed to it more recently, C18 is highly regarded among violent right-wing extremists not only in Germany but also in other European countries, particularly in Scandinavia.
  - iv "Leaderless resistance" refers to a strategy formulated in the early 1990s by Louis BEAM, an American right-wing extremist. This strategy is based on potentially violent activity by covert resistance cells linked only by a common ideological foundation; they have no unified leadership, nor do they have to be connected or networked for organisational purposes.
  - v This song appeared on the recording *Lasst sie ruhig kommen* (Just let them come). This CD was listed by the Federal Review Board for Publications Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) (Federal Gazette No. 243 of 31.12.03).
  - vi The Federal Constitutional Court decided on 18 March 2003 to end the proceedings. The court's Second Senate, which ruled on the proceedings, was unable to reach the two-thirds majority needed to continue, as set down in Section 15 (4) of the Act on the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGG). Three of the seven judges voted to end the proceedings. Among other things, these three judges argued that, as a rule, monitoring a party by using informants at the executive level immediately prior to and during proceedings to ban was incompatible with the requirements of the rule of law, and that exceptions could be made only if the party represented an extraordinary threat.  
  
The four judges who voted to continue proceedings argued that monitoring the party to gain intelligence did not constitute an obstacle to the proceedings, neither on the basis of the principle of political parties' freedom from state interference, nor on the basis
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of questions of attribution of the evidence presented, nor on the basis of the obligation to ensure a fair trial. The majority judges particularly stressed the Federal Constitutional Court's obligation to examine all circumstances bearing on a court decision and opposed ending proceedings without clarifying the facts relevant for deciding on the existence of an obstacle to the proceedings. The majority judges argued that the issue of preventive protection of the constitution, among other things, had not been adequately considered.

- vii *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 4/2003, p. 1f.
  - viii See *Deutsche Zukunft* (German Future), publication of the NPD association of North Rhine-Westphalia, Summer 2003, p. 3.
  - ix *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 10/2003, p. 21.
  - x *Taschenkalender des nationalen Widerstandes 2004* (Pocket calendar of nationalist resistance 2004), Deutsche Stimme Verlag, Riesa 2003.
  - xi Right-wing extremists, including the NPD, often use the phrase "American East Coast" as a synonym for the alleged power of Jewish-American bankers.
  - xii See *Taschenkalender des nationalen Widerstandes 2004* (Pocket calendar of nationalist resistance 2004), Deutsche Stimme Verlag, Riesa 2003.
  - xiii Cf. the interview with NPD party chairman Udo VOIGT on Radio Freiheit (Freedom Radio) of 30 April 2003.
  - xiv See *Taschenkalender des nationalen Widerstandes 2004* (Pocket calendar of nationalist resistance 2004), Deutsche Stimme Verlag, Riesa 2003.
  - xv *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2003, p. 2.
  - xvi *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 14.
  - xvii "Volksgemeinschaft oder Parlamentarismus?" *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/2003, p. 15.
  - xviii "Rudolf-Heß-Gedenkmarsch. Weder Recht noch Menschlichkeit", *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 9/2003, p. 11.
  - xix *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 21.
  - xx "Mit Wortergreifungsstrategie zum Erfolg", *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2003, p. 10.
  - xxi De Mahieu, a former member of the Waffen SS division "Charlemagne", died in 1990; the Deutsche Stimme Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, which also publishes the party organ *Deutsche Stimme*, brought out a new edition of his book in 2002.
  - xxii See *Taschenkalender des nationalen Widerstandes 2004*, Deutsche Stimme Verlag, Riesa 2003.
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- xxiii “Strahlende Kriegsgewinner unterm Davidstern. ‘Neokonservative’ US-Kriegstreiber sind selber Juden oder dienen dem Staat Israel”, *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 15.
- xxiv For example, *Deutsche Stimme* 7/2003, unnumbered page.
- xxv See Note 11.
- xxvi Like many other right-wing extremists, AAE here uses the term “international high finance” to refer to supposedly Jewish-controlled international financial capital.
- xxvii *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 6.
- xxviii *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2003, p. 1, 10. *Landsmannschaft* is the name given to welfare and cultural associations for Germans born in the eastern territories of pre-1945 Germany, such as East Prussia, now part of Lithuania, Poland and Russia [translator’s note].
- xxix At its party conference in March, the association of Berlin-Brandenburg decided to split into two independent associations.
- xxx *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 14.
- xxxi First propagated by the party leadership in 1997 as a guide to action, the three-point concept contains as its strategic elements the “battle for the streets” (demonstrations and public events), the “battle for the minds” (influence on political opinion and indoctrination of followers) and the “battle for the parliaments” (participation in elections).
- xxxii *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 14.
- xxxiii NPD call for donations to build a nationalist-democratic training centre, dated 23 July 2003.
- xxxiv *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 10/2003, p. 11.
- xxxv *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 10/2003, p. 11.
- xxxvi *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 5/2003, p. 14. A political party must get at least 5% of the vote to enter the parliament at state or federal level [translator’s note].
- xxxvii The figure for 2002 includes information stands and smaller election campaign events, some of which were registered as demonstrations.
- xxxviii *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 4/2003, p. 10.
- xxxix *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 4/2003, p. 10.
- xl In the article “Wunsiedel: Gedenken an Rudolf Heß” (Wunsiedel: Commemorating Rudolf Hess), by NPD national manager Frank SCHWERDT, 17 August 2003, on the NPD website.
- xli The “Dresden Nationalist Alliance” was founded on 24 April 2003; those attending included Kerstin LORENZ, chairwoman of the REP in Saxony; Klaus MENZEL, deputy chairman of the
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- NPD in Saxony; and Hans-Joachim LEWIN, deputy chairman of the DVU in Saxony.
- xlii Statement of the “Dresden Nationalist Alliance” entitled “Gemeinsam sind wir stark - Nationales Bündnis Dresden!” (Together we are strong: Dresden Nationalist Alliance!) published on the alliance’s website.
- xliii Press release by the NPD association for the state of Saxony, dated 3 November 2003; *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 11/2003, p. 10.
- xliv Press release by the JN association of North Rhine-Westphalia on 3 August 2003.
- xlv Press release No. 4/2003 of the JN national executive, dated 30 May 2003.
- xlvi For example, FREY largely covered the DVU’s deficit dating from 1989. With support from the NPD, the party hoped to win seats in the European Parliament and ran in the elections under the name “DVU – Liste D”, ending up with an enormous deficit. FREY stated that he had spent about €9.2 million on numerous spectacular campaign events. Winning 1.6% of the vote, however, the DVU received only €1.89 million in public funding to reimburse campaign expenses. The DVU’s debts remain at about €3 million; to help reduce this deficit, FREY supports the party with an annual contribution of about €500,000.
- xlvi As in the case of the following books: *Helden der Wehrmacht – Unsterbliche deutsche Soldaten* (Heroes of the Wehrmacht: Immortal German soldiers), *Schweinejournalismus? Wenn Medien hetzen, türken und linken* (Dirty journalism? When the media incite, manipulate and con), and *Lexikon der antideutschen Fälschungen – 200 Lügen und populäre Irrtümer von A – Z* (Dictionary of anti-German falsifications: 200 lies and popular misconceptions from A - Z).
- xlvi For example, the following books: *Alliiertes Luftterror - Von Dresden bis Bagdad* (Allied air terror: From Dresden to Baghdad), *Amerikas falsches Spiel - Die Irak-Lüge und kein Ende* (America’s false game: The never-ending Iraq lie), and *Das Netz - Israels Lobby in Deutschland* (The network: Israel’s lobby in Germany).
- xlix “Wird Ausländerkriminalität verharmlost? – Milde Strafen schrecken nicht ab”, *NZ*, No. 3/2003, p. 10.
- i “Erschreckend hohe Ausländerkriminalität”, *NZ*, No. 31/2003, p. 2.
- ii “Fast jeder zweite ‘Knacki’ Ausländer”, *NZ*, No. 31/2003, p. 10.
- iii “Sollen Ausländer die Deutschen ersetzen?” *NZ*, No. 22/2003, p. 1.
- iii “Arbeitsplätze für Ausländer statt für Deutsche?” *NZ*, No. 6/2003, p. 2.
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- liv For example, the *NZ* also attempted to fan fears of excessive foreign influence (“‘Menschenaustausch’ soll Europas Gesicht verändern – EU will ethnische Herkunft der europäischen Bevölkerung durch brechen”, *NZ* No. 29/2003, p. 12):  
“But the desired change has not yet been fully realised, so that ‘advocates’ of the new Europe are working feverishly to achieve their goal as quickly as possible: using increased immigration to subvert the ethnic homogeneity of the native population, to be replaced by a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural conglomerate.”
- lv “Deutschland: Einwanderungsland Nummer 1 für Juden”, *NZ*, No. 21/2003, p. 7.
- lvi “Israels (un)heimliche Macht – Wo überall in Deutschland seine V-Männer sitzen”, *NZ*, No. 45/2003, p. 1.
- lvii The FZ – Freiheitlicher Buch- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH (FZ-Verlag) publishing house is run by FREY’s wife.
- lviii For example, in an article entitled “ ? Uralter Hang zur Barbarei – Licht und Schatten im Lexikon ‘Wer ist wer im Judentum’ ” (‘Ancient tendency to barbarism’: Light and shadow in the lexicon ‘Who’s who in Jewry’), the *NZ* endorsed the updated and expanded 2003 edition: “There one can find honest persons who vehemently opposed anti-German incitement ... And there are figures absolutely bursting with hatred of Germans.”
- lix “Hochkonjunktur für NS-Gedenken”, *NZ*, No. 29/2003, p. 5.
- lx “Und wieder eine NS-Gedenkstätte ...”, *NZ*, No. 32/2003, p. 2.
- lxi “Sollen wir ewig büßen? Der wahre Sinn des Holocaust-Mahnmals” *NZ*, No. 35/2003, p. 1.
- lxii For example, books such as *Goebbels - Macht und Magie* (Goebbels: Power and magic), *Deutsche Soldaten - Mörder oder Helden?* (German soldiers: Murderers or heroes?), *Die Waffen-SS und die Polizei 1939-1945* (The Waffen SS and the police 1939-1945), photo collections such as *Führerhauptquartier Wolfsschanze 1940-1945* (Wolfschanze, the Führer’s headquarters 1940-1945), *Hitlers Berghof 1928-1945* (Hitler’s court in the mountains 1928-1945), *Auf den Spuren des Westwalls* (In search of the Western Wall), videos and DVDs such as *Mythos Rommel* (The Rommel myth), *Die Geschichte der Deutschen Panzerwaffe 1914-1945* (History of German anti-tank weapons 1914-1945), *Die Geschichte des deutschen Afrikakorps* (History of the German Africa Corps), and CDs and cassettes such as *Lieder unserer Fallschirmjäger* (Songs of our paratroopers) and *Soldaten, Helden, Vaterland* (Soldiers, heroes, fatherland).
- lxiii “Hetze gegen Wehrmacht-Legende – So war Günther Prien wirklich”, *NZ*, No. 17/2003, p. 12.
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- lxiv “‘Unerschütterlich tapfer’ – Zum Ableben des U-Boot-Kommandanten und Publizisten Kurt Baberg”, *NZ*, No. 16/2003, p. 12.
- lxv The Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (Hamburg Institute for Social Research) first launched a travelling exhibition on this subject in 1995, entitled “Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944” (War of annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmacht 1941 to 1944). Due to inaccuracies in the texts and photographic documentation, the organisers closed the exhibition in November 1999 for substantial reworking. It reopened in 2001 under the title “Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskriegs 1941 bis 1944” (Crimes of the Wehrmacht: Dimensions of the war of annihilation 1941 to 1944) [translator’s note].
- lxvi “Steuergeld für Reemtsma-Schau missbraucht”, *NZ*, No. 32/2003, p. 3.
- lxvii Vgl. *NZ* Nr. “Widerwärtige Anti-Wehrmacht-Hetze”, *NZ* No. 23/2003, p. 7.
- lxviii “Irak 2003/Polen 1939 – (kein) Vergleich? – Oder: Was Bush darf, dürfen andere noch lange nicht...”, *NZ*, No. 14/2003, p. 15.
- lxix “Irak – ‘ein Krieg der Juden’?”, *NZ*, No. 14/2003, p. 4.
- lxx “Steckt Israel hinter Amerikas Kriegen? – Erst Irak, dann Syrien, dann Iran ... “ *NZ*, No. 18/2003, p. 1.
- lxxi See the article “ ‘Den Nutzen des deutschen Volkes mehren’: Harmonische DVU-Landesparteitage in Brandenburg und Berlin” (‘To promote the well-being of the German people’: Harmonious DVU state party conferences in Brandenburg and Berlin”), *NZ*, No. 8/2003.
- lxxii In the city-state elections, votes are counted separately in the two electoral districts of Bremen and Bremerhaven. In the former, the DVU got 1.4% of the vote (1999: 2.5%); in the latter, 7.1% (1999: 6%). Due to a peculiarity of Bremen’s electoral law, a party may gain a seat in the state parliament if it gets at least 5% of the vote in either district. The previous DVU representative and leading candidate for the party in Bremerhaven continues to represent the party in the city-state parliament.
- lxxiii “Stoppt den Durchmarsch der Türkei!” “Millionenwanderung in die Ghettos”, “Islam-Unterricht an unseren Schulen?” “Wird Weihnachten bald abgeschafft?” “Die doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft – Chronologie eines Wahlbetrugs”, “Das Christliche Abendland verteidigen!” and “Rückführung statt Zuwanderung – Wir halten Wort!”, *Der Republikaner*, electoral campaign issue, No. 1-2/2003.
- lxxiv *Der Republikaner*, No. 5-6/2003, p. 1.
- lxxv Campaign advertising for the Bavarian state parliamentary election 2003, REP state association of Bavaria.
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- lxxvi *Der Republikaner*, No. 7-8/2003, p. 4.
- lxxvii Press release No. 33/03 of the REP national office, dated 23 July 2003.
- lxxviii Press release No. 11/03 of the REP national office, dated 11 March 2003.
- lxxix "Heimatvertriebene wählen Republikaner" (Expellees vote for REP), campaign flyer published by the REP association of Bavaria.
- lxxx *Der Republikaner*, No. 5-6/2003, p. 5.
- lxxxi Press release of the REP association in North Rhine-Westphalia, No. 1/2003 dated 16 January 2003. SPD = Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany); CDU = Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union).
- lxxxii *Der Republikaner*, No. 1-2/2003, p. 8.
- lxxxiii *Der Republikaner*, No. 7-8/2003, p. 9.
- lxxxiv Resignation letter of Bernd BERNHARD, chairman of the REP association of the city-state of Berlin, dated 26 May 2003.
- lxxxv The Freiheitliche Initiative Deutschlands (FID, Freedom Initiative of Germany) is a grouping of parties and organisations from the "nationalist-conservative" and right-wing camp. It was founded in Bavaria on 12 May 2001. In its own words, the FID strives "to campaign in the upcoming European parliamentary elections as a single, free, populist and conservative German party in cooperation with European parties that share its views." On page 49 of its June 2003 issue, *Nation & Europa* stated that current and former members of the right-wing extremist DVU, DP and FDVP had joined the FID.
- lxxxvi Press release by the REP association of Rhineland Palatinate on 16 April 2003.
- lxxxvii Press release No. 06/03 of the REP association of Saarland.
- lxxxviii *Der Republikaner*, No. 7-8/2003, p. 1 (internal).
- lxxxix *Deutsche Stimme* (No. 11/2003, p. 1) reported that proceedings to ban RICHTER from the party had been initiated.
- xc *Der Republikaner*, No. 7-8/2003, p. 1 (internal).
- xcI Internet article by Frithjof RICHTER on the REP Forum of the Saxony state association, dated 25 May 2003.
- xcii *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/2003, p. 11.
- xciii Special supplement on the *Deutsche Stimme* press gathering, p. 1. On *Kameradschaften*, see Section IV, 1.
- xciv *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2003, p. 10. *Landsmannschaft* is the name given to welfare and cultural associations for Germans born in the eastern territories of pre-1945 Germany, such as East Prussia, now part of Lithuania, Poland and Russia.
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- xcv Press release of the Deutsche Partei association of Baden-Württemberg on the “Non-Partisan Lake Constance Day Experience 2003”, undated. Deutsche Liga für Volk und Heimat = German League for Volk and Homeland; the Schill Party is named after founder Ronald Schill, a former interior minister for the city-state of Hamburg.
- xcvi For example, see Jürgen SCHWAB, “Der Nationalstaat als gesamteuropäische Kulturleistung” (The nation-state as European cultural achievement), *Deutsche Stimme (DS)*, No. 9/September 2003, p. 20; Karl RICHTER, “Amerika - Weltbrandstifter auf tönernen Füßen” (America: Global arsonist with clay feet), *DS*, No. 5/May 2003, p. 17; Hauke NANNINGA, “Nationales Ringen um die Lebensgrundlagen” (National struggle for basic needs), *DS*, No. 2/February 2003, p. 4; Karl RICHTER, “Willige Vollstrecker der Globalisierung” (Globalisation’s willing executioners), *DS*, No. 9/September 2003, p. 7; Jürgen SCHWAB, “Volksgemeinschaft oder Parlamentarismus?” (*Volksgemeinschaft* or parliamentarianism?), *DS*, No. 7/July 2003, p. 15 (about Carl Schmitt); Jürgen W. GANSEL, “Die dritte Partei für das neue Deutschland” (The third party for the new Germany), *ibid.*, p. 16 (about Arthur Moeller van den Bruck) *Volksgemeinschaft* is a National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics; see also Section V, 1 [translator’s note].
- xcvii See also Florian GEYER, “Was bedeutet Volksgemeinschaft?” (What is *Volksgemeinschaft*?), *DS*, No. 9/September 2003, p. 9.
- xcviii The e-mail version of the conference invitation is reprinted in *Politische Hintergrundinformationen* (PHI, Political Background Information), No. 20, 20 May 2003, p. 149 f.
- xcix See also “Wir-Gemeinschaft statt Ich-Gesellschaft” (A we-first society, not me-first society), *DS*, No. 9/September 2003, p. 14.
- c See nation24.de, No. 144/2nd quarter 2003, p. 3.
- ci “Der Raum der geistigen Freiheit ist geradezu verdampft” (The space for intellectual freedom has evaporated), interview with Günter MASCHKE, *JF*, No. 6, June 1991, p. 3; Günter MASCHKE, *Das bewaffnete Wort. Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1973-93* (The armed word: Essays 1973-93), Vienna/Leipzig 1997, p. 74.
- cii Günter MASCHKE, “Der Engel der Vernichtung” (The angel of annihilation), *JF*, No. 15, 4 April 2003, p. 17.
- ciii “Ich bin ein Faschist” (I am a fascist), interview with Armin Mohler, *Leipziger Volkszeitung* (weekend supplement), 25-26 November 1995; Armin Mohler, *Das Gespräch. Über Linke, Rechte und Langweiler* (A conversation: On leftists, rightists and bores), Dresden 2001, p. 41.
- civ *JF*, No. 29, 11 July 2003, p. 19.

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- cv *JF*, No. 35, 22 August 2003, p. 15.
- cvi On the history and manifestation of anti-Semitism, see among others Werner Bergmann, *Geschichte des Antisemitismus* (History of anti-Semitism), Munich 2002; Armin Pfahl-Traugher, *Antisemitismus in der deutschen Geschichte* (Anti-Semitism in German history), Opladen 2002.
- cvi Hassgesang, *B.Z.L.T.B.*, Maple Shade (USA), no year (2003). The initials stand for “Bis zum letzten Tropfen Blut” (down to the last drop of blood). This CD was listed by the Federal Review Board for Publications Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) (Federal Gazette No. 41 of 28 February 2004).
- cvi *NS Kampfruf*, No. 143/autumn 2003, p. 6, 11.
- cix Website of Horst MAHLER as of November 2003.
- cx “Der Tod von Jürgen W. Möllemann” (The death of Jürgen W. Möllemann), *Das neue National Journal*, No. 66-67/2003, p. 6.
- cx Claus NORDBRUCH, “Hinrichtung eines Israel-Kritikers?”, *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/July 2003, p. 1, 5.
- cxii “Steckt Israel hinter Amerikas Kriegen? – Erst Irak, dann Syrien, dann Iran ...”, *NZ*, No. 18, 25 April 2003, p. 1 f; “Israels Lobby in Deutschland – Ihre Macht – Ihr Einfluss – Ihre Hauptpersonen”, *NZ*, No. 20, 9 May 2003, p. 1, 3; and “So mächtig ist die Israel-Lobby – Kann sie jeden Politiker vernichten?”, *NZ* No. 21, 18 May 2003, p. 1, 4.
- cxiii *Deutsche Stimme* 7/2003, unnumbered supplement.
- cxiv This usage is rarely made explicit. The following statement by Horst MAHLER is an exception: “From this we can see that this century is in reality the century of the East Coast Jews. Because the centre of power of the imperialism of the dollar – which recently assumed the euphemistic name ‘globalism’ – is the Jewish-controlled US banking system.” Horst MAHLER, *Guten Tag, Herr Friedman ... Unter Berufung auf Christus, Marx und deutsche Philosophen lädt der Vordenker Horst Mahler führende Köpfe zu erstem kritischen Dialog* (Hello, Mr. Friedman: With reference to Christ, Marx and German philosophers, the prophet Horst Mahler invites leading minds to a first critical dialogue), Malmö, Sweden, no year (2002), p. 58.
- cxv Wolfgang STRAUSS, “Der 17. Juni 1953” (The 17th of June 1953), *Nation & Europa*, No. 6/June 2003, pp. 58-63, here: pp. 60-62.
- cxvi Kirsten FRISCHE, “Moraltrompeter mit Drogen- und Nuttenvorliebe” (Preacher of morals with a taste for drugs and prostitutes), *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/July 2003, pp. 1, 4. “Mischu” is a nickname for Friedman [translator’s note].
- cxvii Press release No. 47/03 of the REP national office, dated 31 October 2003.
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- cxviii Bruno WETZEL, "Das Unrecht an MdB Hohmann und General Günzel" (How MP Hohmann and General Günzel were wronged), *NZ*, No. 47, 14 November 2003, p. 3.
- cxix NPD website as of November 2003.
- cxx For a summary of the results of individual studies, see Werner Bergmann, "Wie viele Deutsche sind rechtsextrem, fremdenfeindlich und antisemitisch? Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1990 to 2000" (How many Germans are right-wing extremist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic? Results of empirical research from 1990 to 2000) in Wolfgang Benz, ed. *Auf dem Weg zum Bürgerkrieg? Rechtsextremismus und Gewalt gegen Fremde in Deutschland* (On the way to civil war? Right-wing extremism and violence against foreigners in Germany), Frankfurt/Main 2001, pp. 41-62.
- cxxi The numerals 18 refer to the first and eighth letters of the alphabet, A and H, i.e. Adolf Hitler's initials.
- cxcii This does not refer to historical revisionism as one current in academic discourse, but rather to attempts motivated by right-wing extremism to revise the representation of the "Third Reich". See the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (ed.), *Rechtsextremistischer Revisionismus. Ein Thema von heute* (Right-wing extremist revisionism: An issue for the present), Cologne 2002. On revisionism in general, see Wolfgang Benz, Peter Reif-Spirek (eds.), *Geschichtsmyschen. Legenden über den Nationalsozialismus* (Historical myths: Legends about National Socialism), Berlin 2003; on Holocaust denial: Deborah E. Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*, Free Press 1993.
- cxixiii Robert FAURISSON, "In Los Angeles fand die 14. reversionistische Konferenz statt" (The 14th revisionist conference took place in Los Angeles), *Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung*, No. 3/2002, p. 259.
- cxixiv Peter Reichel, *Der schöne Schein des Dritten Reiches. Faszination und Gewalt des Faschismus* (The Third Reich's attractive facade: The fascination and violence of fascism), Munich/Vienna 1991.
- cxixv Claus NORDBRUCH, *Der Angriff. Eine Staats- und Gesellschaftskritik an der „Berliner Republik“* (The attack: A political and social critique of the "Berlin Republic"), Tübingen 2003, p. 14 and 383.
- cxixvi Gerhoch REISEGGER, *Wir werden schamlos irrefgeführt! Vom 11. September zum Irak-Krieg* (We are being shamelessly misled! From Sept. 11 to the Iraq war), Tübingen 2003.
- cxixvii Karl RICHTER, "Die falsche Rechte: oder: Die Lakaien der Globalisierung" (The wrong right, or: The lackeys of globalisation), *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, 51 (2), June 2003, pp. 17-18.
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- cxxviii Karl RICHTER, "Pazifismus ist keine Lösung" (Pacifism is not the solution), *Nation & Europa*, No. 6, June 2003, pp. 22-27; here: p. 25.
- cxxix Franz SCHÖNHUBER, "Verpasster Rücktritt" (Missed chance to step down), *Nation & Europa*, No. 6, June 2003, pp. 36-40; here: p. 38.
- cxxx See "Panoptikum des Absurden" (Panopticum of the absurd), *Spiegel*, No. 37, 8 September 2003, pp. 58-76.
- cxxxii "Spam" refers to unsolicited, usually commercial, e-mail. Special software allows such e-mail to be sent cheaply and automatically in huge quantities.
- cxxxiii File-sharing services allow users to link their PCs to a server using special software. Different servers are linked in turn to a network in which users can make certain file directories on their PCs accessible to other users. The servers simply provide a link between users and do not contain any files themselves. With the appropriate software, users can search for information in the accessible files of all other users connected to the network.
- cxxxiiii As defined by the authorities for the protection of the Constitution, terrorism is the sustained fight to achieve political aims by means of attacks against the life, limb and property of other people, especially serious criminal offences such as those named in Section 129a (1) of the Criminal Code (StGB), or offences that aid in their preparation.
- cxxxv In addition to autonomists, traces of another movement still exist within the left-wing extremist spectrum whose supporters are willing to use violence. They comprise, in particular, groups and individuals with an anti-imperialist and internationalist orientation, including activists from former groups with close links to the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF). They primarily focus on supporting political prisoners. However, groups from this spectrum organised no major actions in 2003.
- cxxxvi The text refers to several cases of property damage committed in Berlin in the night of 31 April/1 May 2003: unknown perpetrators broke the windows of six offices of a temporary employment agency and spread paint and a strong smelling liquid on the floor. A group called Die fröhliche Nachtschicht (The jolly night shift) claimed responsibility for the offences in an article published in *INTERIM*, No. 572 of 15 May 2003.
- cxxxvii The preparation of the arson attack proves that there was high criminal energy behind it. According to the police, even if the incendiary devices had ignited this would not have caused the whole building to burn down, but it would indeed have endangered lives.
- cxxxviii Several insider publications, some of which are produced and distributed clandestinely, publish letters of activists claiming responsibility for an attack, position papers, calls for
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demonstrations, so-called “handcraft instructions” (instructions on how to build arson and incendiary devices) as well as other articles discussing theoretical and practical issues relevant for the left-wing movement. Most of these publications – e.g. *S wing* (Frankfurt/Main), *EinSatz* (Göttingen) or *incipito* (Leipzig) – are mainly of regional importance. The biweekly magazine *INTERIM* published in Berlin has nation-wide influence.

- <sup>cxxxviii</sup> For example, some websites of the left-wing extremist milieu are hosted by providers abroad to avoid criminal prosecution in Germany.
- <sup>cxxxix</sup> With this action the mg referred to executive measures ordered by the Public Prosecutor General at the Federal Court of Justice against suspected militant left-wing extremists in November 2002 and April 2003. In the course of these executive measures, three alleged members of the Kommando Freilassung aller politischen Gefangenen (commando for the release of all political prisoners) were detained on suspicion of participating in two arson attacks against police premises in Magdeburg on 18 March 2002 and in further criminal offences of the same kind. On 16 December the higher regional court of appeal of Naumburg sentenced two of the defendants to prison sentences of two and half and two years for four arson attacks, two committed and two attempted ones. The third defendant was acquitted. The court had already dropped the charge of being a member of a terrorist association. The judgement is not yet final.
- <sup>cxl</sup> From the masthead of *graswurzelrevolution* No. 280, June 2003.
- <sup>cxli</sup> Special supplement of the monthly *graswurzelrevolution* No. 276, February 2003.
- <sup>cxlii</sup> Description by the FAU-IAA of its stance towards anarcho-syndicalism, among others in the anarcho-syndicalist newspaper *Direkte Aktion* (direct action), autumn 2003.
- <sup>cxliii</sup> Appeal of the Allgemeine Syndikat der FAU-IAA Ortsgruppe Berlin (general syndicate of the Berlin group of the FAU-IAA) calling for joint participation in a nation-wide demonstration on 1 November 2003 in Berlin.
- <sup>cxliv</sup> The average age of members is 58; cf. *DKP-Informationen*, No. 3/2003, 12 July 2003, p. 21.
- <sup>cxlv</sup> Heinz STEHR, in: *junge Welt* (jW, Young World), 27/28 September 2003, p. 10.
- <sup>cxlvi</sup> *DKP-Informationen*, No. 4/2003, 30 September 2003, p. 11.
- <sup>cxlvii</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- <sup>cxlviii</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.
- <sup>cxlix</sup> *UZ*, 22 August 2003, p. 12.
- <sup>cl</sup> Leo MAYER, a member of the DKP party leadership, in *UZ*, 12 September 2003, p. 9.
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- cli *UZ*, 22 August 2003, p. 12.
- clii *DKP-Informationen*, No. 4/2003, 30 September 2003, p. 15.
- cliii *Panorama*, a TV programme aired by the ARD on 11 December 2003. When asked about the contradiction between pacifism and supporting terrorist “resistance” in Iraq, one person interviewed during the Peace Forum declared that his definition of pacifism was “just a bit different”. According to communist doctrine developed by Lenin, collective and strategically applied terror is a legitimate means in an anti-imperialist struggle for liberation, regardless of whether human rights are violated in the process.
- cliv The membership figures are as at 31 December of the previous year and are quoted from the party leadership’s report. They were last published at the extraordinary meeting of the 8th party congress held in Berlin on 28/29 June 2003.
- clv At the general election on 22 September 2002 the PDS failed to gain the 5% of votes needed to enter parliament, gaining only 4% of the second votes. The party has only two seats in the 15th German parliament – these being direct candidates from Berlin constituencies.
- clvi The previous party programme dates from 1993. The PDS agreed at the first meeting of the 6th national party congress on 16/17 January 1999 to begin debating a new programme. During the five years of sometimes heated debate which followed, the party leadership proposed three drafts, each a slightly amended version of the previous one.  
The programme was approved by 77.8% of the delegates (333 out of the total of 381 votes cast), an unusually clear signal; there were only 38 no votes and 10 abstentions. A two-thirds majority was required. Among those voting no were representatives of the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (Communist Faction of the PDS), the Marxistische Forum der PDS (MF, Marxist Forum of the PDS) and the Ökologische Plattform (Ecological Faction).
- clvii The definition of the goal of socialism in the 2003 and 1993 programmes is based on the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, where attaining socialism is dependent on a revolution:  
“If the proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organise itself as a class; if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” (English translation by Samuel Moore in
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- co-operation with Friedrich Engels, 1888; quoted from Marx/Engels, Selected Works, Moscow 1969.)
- clviii *DISPUT/PDS-Pressedienst*, joint edition, November 2003, p. 6ff.
- clix Although the AGJG's national organisation was dissolved some years ago (replaced by the PDS youth organisation solid), AGJG groups are still active in at least two *Länder*, namely Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt.
- clx Statement by the national conference of the KPF, printed in a supplement to the magazine *junge Welt*, 8/9 November 2003.
- clxi The MF was founded in June 1995. According to its own understanding, it brings together people who apply Marx's legacy to carry out a deeper analysis of capitalist society in the Federal Republic and increase the role of theory in PDS policy. The MF aims to disseminate its Marxist philosophy in leading committees within the PDS and at the grassroots level, including among supporters and voters (*Hefte des Marxistischen Forums* (Magazine of the Marxist Forum), Issue 3, November 1995). The MF currently has around 60 members.
- clxii During a discussion held in Berlin in late March and organised by the Marxistischer Arbeitskreis zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung bei der PDS (Marxist Working Group on the History of the German Workers' Movement in the PDS), the representative of the MF gave a talk entitled "Sozialistische Programmatik und Regierungsfrage, Geschichtliches und Aktuelles" (Socialist political objectives and the question of government: historical and contemporary aspects).
- clxiii The PDS party executive formally recognised solid as a PDS youth organisation on 25 March 2002 (*PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 14, 5 April 2002).
- clxiv There were intense personal disputes during the national conference between former members of the national speakers' council and several delegates. The latter accused the previous council of depoliticising youth work and not coming up with any new ideas for activities. There have been conflicts for some time now between the eastern German *Land* associations, which belong to the moderate "reform wing", and the western German *Land* associations, which are dominated by traditional left-wing extremism and even by communism.
- clxv *UZ*, 31 October 2003, p. 7.
- clxvi *Mitteilungen der Kommunistischen Plattform* (Bulletin of the Communist Faction of the PDS), 11/2003, p. 37
- clxvii Three people were taken into custody and several charges brought, including one against a member of the *Land* parliament for aiding a perpetrator after the fact. Source: Publication available on the Internet.
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- clxviii According to its own reports, Cuba Si comprises 39 regional groups which, among other things, organise collections of material goods and donations for Cuba.
- clxix In a press release of 13 September 2003 posted on the Cuba Si website, MODROW cautioned the European Union against further restricting its relations with Cuba, saying that, although the “moral indignation at the capital punishment of the three kidnappers, who had endangered the lives of others, and repressive measures against the opposition” was understandable, many innocent people were among the hundreds executed by the United States.
- clxx *PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 25/2003, p. 5.
- clxxi On 11 November 2003 KADEK declared that it would be dissolving. On 15 November 2003 the founding of the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gel) was announced.
- clxxii Welcome speech by the honorary chairman of the PDS, Hans MODROW, in: *DISPUT/PDS-Pressedienst*, joint edition on the special party conference of the PDS, p. 5; *PDS-Pressedienst*, No. 46, 14 November 2003, p. 18.
- clxxiii The parliamentary group has, according to its own information posted on the Internet, 49 members of parliament from 10 countries and 13 member parties, including members of parliament belonging to communist parties from France, Greece, Italy and Portugal and from the Izquierda Unida (IU, United Left) in Spain, which is dominated by communists.
- clxxiv Among those represented at meetings held in Athens on 22 March and 3 May were the communist Anorthotiko Kómma Ergazomenou Laou (AKEL, Progressive Party of the Working Population in Cyprus), the Parti Communist de France (PCF, Communist Party of France), the Italian Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (PRC, Italian Refoundation Party), the communist-dominated Spanish Izquierda Unida (IU, United Left), the Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ, Communist Party of Austria), the Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (PdCI, Party of Italian Communists) and the Partido Comunista Português (PCP, Portuguese Communist Party).
- clxxv This language is reminiscent of the KPD’s strategy in the 1930s of establishing a “revolutionary trade unionist opposition”, whose aim was to cause a split between the trade unions’ grassroots and their alleged “right-wing leaders”.
- clxxvi Formerly the Vereinigte Sozialistische Partei (United Socialist Party) or Verein für Sozialistische Politik (Union for Socialist Politics).
- clxxvii *Rote Fahne*, No. 7/2003, 14 February 2003, p. 18, which contains a presentation of a new book by the chairman of the MLPD: Stefan ENGEL, *Götterdämmerung über der „neuen*
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*Weltordnung*“ (Twilight of the gods above the ‘new world order’), Essen 2003.

- clxxviii *Rote Fahne*, No. 10/2003, 7 March 2003, p. 3.
- clxxix For example, a representative of the AUF (Let’s Go) alliance based in Gelsenkirchen declared that critics were aiming to “deny us, as independents, the right to co-operate with the Marxist–Leninists”, *Rote Fahne*, No. 50/2003, 12 December 2003, p.13.
- clxxx *Rote Fahne*, No. 45/2003, 7 November 2003, p. 3ff.
- clxxxI For example, in *Die Rote Fahne*, December 2003, p. 12: “On the occasion of the 12th anniversary of the appointment of our friend and comrade Kim Jong Il, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and Chairman of the National Defence Committee of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as commander-in-chief of the Korean People’s Army on 24 December 1991, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany would like to offer its most heart-felt congratulations.”
- clxxxii For instance, a Stalin-era cartoon entitled “Genosse Lenin säubert die Erde vom Ungeziefer” (Comrade Lenin rids the earth of vermin) appeared on the title page of *Die Rote Fahne* under the heading “Trotzkisten auf gefährlichem Weg” (Trotskyists on a dangerous course).
- clxxxiii Cf. endnote 139
- clxxxiv Including electronic barcodes, so-called quiet SMS text messages, IMSI catchers to locate mobile phones, DNA databases and surveillance using biometric features; “Der große Bruder ist schon eingezogen”, *DIE ROTE HILFE*, 3/2003.
- clxxxv *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- clxxxvi Nikolaus Brauns, *Schafft Rote Hilfe!* (Give Red Aid!), Pahl-Rugenstein-Verlag Nachfolger GmbH, Bonn 2003, p. 9.
- clxxxvii “Neue Allianzen schmieden – Zum Charakter und zu Aufgaben der Sozialforumsbewegung,” *junge Welt* (jW, Young World), No. 252, 29 October 2003, ESF special supplement, p. 3.
- clxxxviii More and more information on current topics is being disseminated via the indymedia.de website, which left-wing extremists are increasingly using. The German indymedia.de website is an offshoot of the global network of self-appointed “independent media centres” which was founded in March 2001.
- clxxxix *Indymedia Spezial* Ø 1.11., printed special edition, 1 November 2003, p. 4.
- cxc *INTERIM*, No. 583, 27 November 2003, p. 14.
- cxcI Figures quoted in the following are based on estimates. Changes in membership compared to the previous year may also be due to new information and thus do not always signify an actual increase or decrease.

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- cxcii MAHDJOURB is currently in custody. A warrant for his arrest has been issued in Italy.
- cxciii On 5 January 2004 MZOUDI was acquitted after being indicted for membership of a terrorist organisation in conjunction with aiding and abetting 3,066 counts of murder. The appeal lodged by the Federal Public Prosecutor is still pending.
- cxciv In a decision by the court of appeal of 4 March 2004, the Federal Court of Justice overturned the verdict by the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in EL-MOTASSADEQ's case and ordered a retrial.
- cxcv The hostages were kidnapped on 22 February by a group of GSPC members headed by PARA. On 13 May, 17 of the hostages were freed by the Algerian army; the remaining 14 hostages were freed in Mali on 18 August. One German hostage died during her captivity in the desert.
- cxcvi Ma'moun AL-HUDAIBI died on 8 January 2004 at the age of 82.
- cxcvii Source: *This Religion of Islam*, Kuwait, 1992, p. 134, ed. International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations (IIFSO).  
Sayyid Qutb (1906 – 1966), an Egyptian national, is regarded as one of the most important Muslim Brotherhood (MB) theorists. He developed the MB's social theory and his writings today still serve as the intellectual tools used by many Islamist groups.
- cxcviii Programme of the IGD Annual Conference 2003, held from 19 to 21 September 2003.
- cxcix The organisation defines this as the area between the Mediterranean and Jordan, i.e. including the territory of the state of Israel.
- cc Named after the Syrian Issedin el-Kassem, who was killed in the 1930s while fighting against the British Mandate in Palestine.
- cci Call by Hamas to the Islamic and Arab *Umma* of 22 March 2003 which was posted on the website of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB).
- ccii As quoted in *al-Hayat* (Life), 11 January 2003, p. 2.
- cciii Hamas has been on the EU's list of terrorist organisations since 22 December 2003.
- cciv Interview with the AP news agency of 14 September 2003, published on 15 September 2003.
- ccv *Asharq al-Awsat* (The Middle East), 2 August 2003.
- ccvi This has been celebrated annually since 23 May 2000.
- ccvii Al-Quds day: a day of remembrance initiated by Ayatollah KHOMEINI in the early 1980s following the Israeli occupation of holy sites in Jerusalem.
- ccviii Aimed at uniting the Islamic *Umma*.
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- ccix A decision by the Federal Administrative Court regarding the appeal lodged by Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami against the ban is still pending.
- ccx “Millî Görüş” means “national/religious point of view”; the movement combines nationalist and Islamist elements.
- ccxi Millî Nizam Partisi (MNP, Party of National Order; banned in 1971), Millî Selamet Partisi (MSP, National Party of Salvation; banned in 1980), Refah Partisi (RP, Islamist Welfare Party; banned in 1998), Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party; banned in 2001).
- ccxii The SP’s forerunner, the Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party) gained 16% of votes in elections held on 18 April 1999. Numerous parliamentarians who formerly belonged to so-called ERBAKAN parties went on to join the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party), which gained 35% of the votes in the last Turkish national assembly elections.
- ccxiii A doctor certified that ERBAKAN’s health was so poor that the start of his prison sentence had to be postponed for one year.
- ccxiv *Millî Gazete*, 15 September 2003, p. 3.
- ccxv Of the 107 deaths, 67 can be attributed to the direct consequences of the hunger strike. The remaining 40 occurred in connection with violent clashes with Turkish security forces (e.g. during prison riots).
- ccxvi These organisations are as follows:  
Kurdistan Youth Union (YCK), renamed the Movement of Free Young People in Kurdistan (TECAK) in August 2003  
Party of Free Women (PJA)  
Union of Students from Kurdistan (YXK)  
Union of Kurdish Teachers (YMK)  
Union of Journalists from Kurdistan (YRK)  
Union of Lawyers from Kurdistan (YHK)  
Union of Writers from Kurdistan (YNK)  
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (KIH)  
Union of Yazidis from Kurdistan (YEK)  
Union of Alawites from Kurdistan (KAB)
- ccxvii The Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD) is the European umbrella organisation of Kurdish associations with headquarters in Brussels. YEK-KOM is also a member of KON-KURD.
- ccxviii Called the Kurdistan Youth Union (YCK) until August 2003.
- ccxix Following massive pressure from Turkey, the Syrian government withdrew its support for ÖCALAN and persuaded him to leave
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- his exile in Damascus on 9 October 1998. KADEK saw this as the beginning of an “international conspiracy” which finally led to ÖCALAN’s arrest and sentencing in Turkey.
- ccxx His successor had not yet been named at the end of 2003. Seyed Abbas GHAEM-MAGHAMI has been the new director since the beginning of 2004.
- ccxxi The CIS consists of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
- ccxxii FAPSI: Federalnoye Agentstvo Pravitelstvennoy Svyazi i Informatsii (Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, ФАПСи - Федеральное агентство связи и информации (FAPSI))
- ccxxiii FPS: Federalnaya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba (Federal Service for Border Protection, ФПС - Федеральная пограничная служба (FPS))
- ccxxiv FSB: Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service, ФСБ - Федеральная служба безопасности (FSB))
- ccxxv SVR: Sluzhba Vnyeshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service, СВР - Внешняя разведка (SVR))
- ccxxvi FSO: Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany (Federal Protection Service, ФСО - Федеральная служба охраны (FSO))
- ccxxvii GRU: Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie (General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate, ГРУ - Главное разведывательное управление (GRU))
- ccxxviii Caches (in the ground or elsewhere) for the exchange of information and material or making payments to secret operatives.
- ccxxix On 21 December 1988, a PAN-Am commercial aircraft crashed over the Scottish town of Lockerbie (after the detonation of a bomb planted on board). The attack killed a total of 270 persons.
- ccxxx On 5 April 1986, three people were killed and over 200 injured in an attack on this discotheque in Berlin, which was mainly visited by US soldiers.
- ccxxx1 Scientology publishes a plethora of books and other publications. *FREIHEIT*, *IMPACT*, *SOURCE*, *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, *ADVANCE!* and *THE AUDITOR* seem to be important for the German speaking area. Circulation figures are made public only occasionally, e.g. with regard to special editions of *FREIHEIT* (Freedom).
- ccxxx2 The number of “missions” active in the period under review is based on findings of the offices for the protection of the constitution. On its website, Scientology itself claims to have only nine “missions” in Germany (as at 11 November 2003).
- ccxxx3 See *ADVANCE!*, 140/2000, p. 9: *The Auditor*, 290/2001, p. 15.

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- ccxxxiv According to a decision by the Federal Labour Court of 23 March 1995 (*Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1996, p. 143 ff.), the Scientology organisation in Germany is not a religious or ideological community within the meaning of the Constitution (Basic Law). In its decision the court said that the religious and ideological teachings of Scientology were merely used as a pretext for pursuing economic aims.
- ccxxxv See § 3 of the Statute of the Scientology Kirche Deutschland e.V. (SKD, Church of Scientology of Germany, reg'd society) of 21 March 2002 (Local Court Munich, VR 6322); § 3 of the model statute of an SO Mission.
- ccxxxvi For the term "thetan", cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung für Dianetics und Scientology* (Glossary of Dianetics and Scientology Terms), 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Copenhagen 1985 (in the following quoted as HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*), p. 98; HUBBARD, *Scientology - Die Grundlagen des Denkens* (Scientology: The Fundamentals of Thought), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Copenhagen 1973, p. 37.
- ccxxxvii For the term "operating thetan", cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung* (Glossary), p. 67.
- ccxxxviii For the term "Clear", cf. Hubbard, *Dianetik – Die moderne Wissenschaft der geistigen Gesundheit* (Dianetics - The Modern Science of Mental Health), 8<sup>th</sup> edition, Copenhagen 1984 (in the following quoted as HUBBARD, *Dianetik*), p. 215.
- ccxxxix For the term "aberration", cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 1.
- ccxli For the term "engram", cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 27.
- ccxlii For the term "auditing", cf. HUBBARD, *Das Scientology-Handbuch* (The Scientology Handbook), Copenhagen 1995, p. XX.
- ccxliii For the term "auditor", cf. *Was ist Scientology? (What is Scientology?)*, Copenhagen 1998, pp. 164 ff.
- ccxliv For the term "preclear", cf. *ibid.* p. 164 ff.
- ccxlv For more information on the "auditing procedure, cf. *ibid.* p.164 ff.
- ccxlvi For the term "E-meter", cf. *ibid.* p. 165 ff.
- ccxlvii Cf. *ibid.* p. 164 et seqq.
- ccxlviii Cf. the seminar list of the Scientology Kirche Hamburg e.V. (SKA, Church of Scientology in Hamburg, reg'd society) as at July 2003.
- ccxlviii The brochure *Die Scientology Organisation – Gefahren, Ziele und Praktiken* (The Scientology organisation – risks, aims and practices) (November 1998), published by the Federal Office of Administration on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Family
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Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, warns people of the possible risks which attending courses or applying Scientologist methods may pose to the individual.

ccxlix Cf. one of the websites run by the SO designed especially for selling books via the Internet (as at 12 November 2003).

cci See § 2 (3) and § 5 (3) of the Statute of the Church of Scientology of Germany of 21 March 2002 (Local Court Munich, VR 6322): “The Church of Scientology shall present, spread and practice the Scientology religion, make it popular and preserve and protect its purity and virginity, to enable every person ... to follow the path of redemption shown by L. Ron Hubbard, as he describes it in his writings about the Scientology religion or the Churches of Scientology – generally known as 'the writings' ...” (§ 2(3)); Dissemination of basic writings of the Scientology religion. The writings include all written works and all tape recordings or recordings on other media by the founder of the religion, L. Ron Hubbard, that deal with the teachings and the Churches of Scientology.” (§ 5(3)).

See *IMPACT*, 105/2003, p. 1; In this publication, the International Association of Scientologists (IAS) says that the main purpose of its organisation is “to unite, support and protect the Scientology religion and Scientologists around the world to ensure that the aims of Scientology as defined by L. Ron Hubbard be achieved.” See *Was ist Scientology? (What is Scientology)*, Copenhagen 1998, p. 405 ff.: “They (SO members) know that they will reach the stages of spiritual redemption which they are striving for with a hundred percent certainty, if they exercise the teachings exactly as set out in the writings of L. Ron Hubbard.” The Religious Technology Center is determined to ensure this in line with the original writings of the founder.”

The organisation explicitly promotes this tenet on its website: “Spanning all churches is a system of international management that supports, coordinates and assists to ensure that the mental and spiritual philosophy and technology of Dianetics and Scientology developed by L. Ron Hubbard is available to everyone who wishes to receive it and that Scientology services are applied precisely as Mr. Hubbard set forth.” (SO website, 12 November 2003).

“The religious philosophy and the technologies of Dianetics and Scientology were discovered and developed by L. Ron Hubbard alone. A key belief of Scientologists is that the teachings are universal if they are applied exactly as set out in his writings and hence can improve the conditions or lead to a more advanced state of spiritual consciousness and improve a person's abilities. Therefore Scientologists emphasise the orthodox and standard application of Scientology writings, to the effect that they never strive for new interpretations of the writings, but always refer to the original sources.” (SO website, 1 August 2003)

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Moreover, according to the “creeds and codes of Scientology”, the individual Scientologist has the duty “to insist upon standard and unvaried Scientology as an applied activity in ethics, processing and administration in Scientology organizations” (SO website, 1 August 2003).

ccli For the term “new OT civilization”, see *Freewinds – FSM Newsletter*, 38/2003, title page.

cclii Cf. an advertisement for a course by the SKH, July 2003.

ccliii For the term „hat“ see *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 47; the term is “a Scientology slang term for a particular job, taken from the fact that in many professions, such as railroading, the type of hat worn is the badge of the job. The term hat is also used to describe the write-ups, checksheets and packs that outline the purposes, know-how and duties of a job in a Scientology organization”

ccliv Cf. the seminar list of the SKH as at July 2003.

cclv For the term “ethics report” see Hubbard, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 29; it means a record (“entry”) about wrongdoing – according to Scientology’s criteria - of persons or groups of persons.

cclvi See *IMPACT*, 104/2003, p. 6 ff.

cclvii The organisation itself claims to run “one of the largest sites in the World Wide Web.” On more than 40,000 pages every Internet user “can obtain information on every aspect of the Scientology religion.” See article in the special edition of *FREIHEIT* with the title *3000 Kilometer für Religionsfreiheit* (3000 kilometres for religious freedom), 1998, p. 4.

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