

Zambia Against Apartheid
A Case on Apartheid-Caused Debt

A Study

by

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for

ACTSA-JCTR

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Contents

Acknowledgement

- Summary

1.0 **INTRODUCTION** - Moral and Universal

2.0 **ZAMBIA'S ROLE, CONFRONTING APARTHEID**

3.0 **COST**, Impact and causes:

3:1 Immediate, Long term:

3.2 **Economic and Financial**

. General: sanctions, alternative trade, diversification, capacity building, re-routing

. Infrastructure and utilities creation:

Transport,

Energy,

Other Utilities,

Sanctions and Trade

3.3 **Military and Defence**

3.4 **Human Cost and Humanitarian**

Death and Injury

Humanitarian:

. Displacement

. Refugees

3.5 **Political:**

4.0 **Counting the Cost**

4.1 How Zambia met the cost

4.2 Cost and Benefit

5.0 **The Debt**

6.0 **Apartheid and Debt**

7.0 **Legacy and Long-term Costs**

- Basic Needs

8.0 **Action, Outstanding Issues**

9.0 Conclusion

10.0 Box: A Story of Legacy

11.0 Appendix:

- . Time Line
- . Debt Figures

12. Notes and References

The Author

Based in Lusaka, Zambia, Gabriel C Banda has for over two decades been involved in development work and writing with various actors and situations. Gabriel Banda is involved in participatory processes, project analysis, development research, cultural work, and writing. This has involved contact with development projects and processes in various places, sectors, and persons. He has done much writing and field work on the interaction of basic needs, economic policy, and debt. The writing includes *Adjusting to Adjustment*, Oxfam Publications, 1991.

Acknowledgement

In early 2000, when people at JCTR mentioned to me the approaching focus on Apartheid-Caused Debt, it was a pleasing turn. I have for long followed the issue of Zambia's role in Southern Africa's politics and the effect that had on the economy and basic needs. In the 1990 study *Adjusting to Adjustment* (Oxfam Publications, 1991), I felt that a key cause of Zambia's economic stress and the eventual direction into debt and the resultant conditionalities had to do with the country's lead situation in the politics of apartheid and racism in Southern Africa.

JCTR, the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, arranged a preliminary workshop in Lusaka in March 2000 - where people from Zambia and others from Jubilee 2000 South Africa and KASA, Germany, shared their experiences. ACTSA, Action on Southern Africa, London, were also interested in the issue of the front-line states and apartheid-caused debt. Finally, in late August 2000, we finalised arrangements of our earlier plans for me to do a more detailed study on Apartheid-Caused Debt and Zambia.

Like most studies and research, the project was for me a point for further growth and learning in the issues of debt, basic needs, and the Zambia's role in Southern Africa. Various people helped support me in this project. They include:

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Thank You,

Gabriel C Banda,
October 2000, Lusaka.

SUMMARY:

Zambia's external debt continues to have great effect on the quality of life of people. By March 2000, external debt was some \$6.419 billion.¹ Zambia's Debt Service ratio has been high, with figures going to 25% of export earnings paid as annual debt repayment in the 1990s. This high debt service puts limits on important social spending like in education and health.

Under debt and economic liberalisation conditions, gains made after independence have slowed down or reversed. There has been a decline in the quality of life: Infant, Child, and Maternal mortality have worsened - an indicator of an uncertain future for many people. Life expectancy has declined from 54 years in 1990, to 40.5 years in the year 2000 – with 41 years for females and 39.9 years for males. The combination of impact on Zambia's people has led to a decline in Zambia's UNDP Human Development Index ranking - now, in the year 2000, standing at Number 153 of 174 countries.

A key factor in Zambia's debt has been the effect of the Southern Africa liberation struggle against minority Apartheid and racist governments upon Zambia and its economy. Since independence in 1964, Zambia was key in supporting the liberation struggle and world-wide measures taken to end racist rule. Zambia hosted most of the liberation movements of the region. Zambia's support was moral, political, material, and financial. Zambia used many platforms to support the freedom struggle. The platforms and networks included Frontline States, SADC, OAU, The Commonwealth, Group of 77, and the United Nations.

However, there were costs to Zambia's support. These costs were immediate and long-term. They include:

- Economic costs
- Death and Injury
- Other Humanitarian Costs: Displacement and Refugees
- Military-Defence
- Political
- Debt and Debt Conditionality Impact
- Lost Opportunities

Zambia incurred high costs in trade, economic action and de-linkage. Billions of dollars were lost as Zambia's economy tried to deal with both sanctions and basic needs. Infrastructure had to be built to deal with transportation and energy. Balance of payments were affected. There was declined investment in social services unlike what Zambia's development plans had aimed. In terms of lives and cost, thousands of Zambians, freedom fighters, and refugees were killed on Zambian soil by the forces of UDI Rhodesia - backed by South Africa - the Portuguese, and the South Africans. Thousands of people were killed by land mines and raids - air, land, and water.

In addition, many of Zambia's people, especially in rural border areas, were displaced and their livelihoods interrupted. Zambia had to also support hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled the effect of Apartheid and racism in the region. To defend against raids by the minority regimes, Zambia spent more on defence. Politically, Zambia played a big role whose effects were internal and external.

These costs of bearing the anti-apartheid struggle had great effect for Zambia. Zambia met the costs through diverting funds. Zambia also partially or otherwise got into loans in order to meet balance of payment. These loans were to meet economic and defence needs of Zambia - which had been affected by apartheid and racism in the region. Although Zambia was acting as part of international concern, there was little effort to reconstruct and re-build life after Zambia's people had been greatly affected. This study finds Zambia's apartheid-related economic cost is in excess of \$19 billion. At least \$5.345 billion is debt which can be linked to apartheid causes. Zambia's debt is indivisible.

Up to the year 2000, the cost lives on. Land mines and bombs still blow up and kill people. People in some border areas are still displaced. The debt accrued from economic and defence action against Apartheid and racism still affects Zambia's people. The debt conditionalities have contributed to the decline of Zambia's ability to meet the basic needs of people. The conclusion of this study reinforces the call for cancellation of Zambia's debt by placing it within the context of the role of Zambia's people in one of the great moral crusades of the 20th Century - the struggle against apartheid.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Moral and Universal

At various times, humanity is faced with challenging issues and events that have effect on individuals, peoples, and humanity across the globe. From independence in 1964, Zambia's issue of immediate and long-term effect was that of apartheid and racist rule in Southern Africa.

The events started earlier. The end of the Second World War in 1945 was a time of material reconstruction and an opportunity to reflect on human relations and the common future of humanity. It was a chance for reconstruction of human society. Racism had led humankind to a frightening depth of self-destruction. Through practical action, people all over the world had used politics and arms to fight the military forces fuelled by racial domination.

After the War, humans reflected over past events and the future of an inter-dependent society. The 1945 formation of the United Nations Organisation marked a new phase in humankind's resolve and action towards the elimination of causes of war and material poverty. It was a time for reflection and action towards global peace and development.

The peace sought is a peace which is wider than the absence of war. It was the peace of "Salaam," "Shalom," and in Southern Africa's languages, it is the peace of "Mutende," "Uhuru." It is a peace that deals with harmony and well-being of life and human kind through and amongst all components: individuals, communities, peoples, and nations. The United Nations programmes thus found policies, organs, and structures to use to fulfil peace and development.

The United Nations' landmark 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights sought to chart a new phase in human relations and the quest for peace and the common good for all the world's people. In 1948, also gathering in opposition to the forces of human integrity and goodwill was Apartheid. In 1948, the National Party came into government in South Africa and institutionalised racism through "Apartheid," discrimination and separation of the races.

Over the years, these opposing forces were to act on each other. Just as it is the concern of all humanity because it affects fundamental humanness and being, action on apartheid and

organised racism in South Africa and the Southern Africa region was a global one. Apartheid and racism were "crimes against humanity."

People all over the world, working as governments and civil society, acted for the integrity of life and against racial separation. In defiance, the Apartheid regime in South Africa acted to perpetuate racism through links with like-minded like Rhodesia, Portugal's colonies Mozambique and Angola, and other interests all over the world.

Zambia was the "spearhead" of countries which got independence later than Zambia's. Over decades, various actions were taken, Black Africa,ⁱⁱ later joined in the "Frontline States"ⁱⁱⁱ by neighbouring by people all over the world, to dismantle apartheid. It was both to help people in South Africa and also humanity. These actions took many forms. They ranged from mere moral support to political, economic, material, military, cultural-arts, and sports action. Some of these actions were effective while some were limited while other actions worked against removal of racism and apartheid.

Because action for and against apartheid-racism was world-wide, so too did the effects affect many all over the world. For Zambia and neighbouring countries, there were costs to the fight against apartheid and racism in Southern Africa.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported, in Volume Two, that from 1960 to 1994, the majority of the Apartheid regime's gross human rights violations "occurred not internally but beyond the borders of South Africa..."^{iv}

"The majority of the victims of the South African government's attempts to maintain itself in power were outside of South Africa. Tens of thousands of people in the region died as a direct or indirect result of the South African government's aggressive intent towards it neighbours."^v

The TRC also notes apartheid South Africa's effect on livelihood and infrastructure: "The lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of others were disrupted by the systematic targeting of infrastructure in some of the poorest nations of Africa."^{vi}

2.0 ZAMBIA'S ROLE IN CONFRONTING APARTHEID

In 1990, receiving a thunderous welcome on his first trip outside South Africa after release from prison, Nelson Mandela said of Lusaka and Zambia: "Because of the important contribution of this city in the freedom struggle of the people in South and elsewhere, it no longer belongs to Zambia alone. It belongs to our continent as a whole."^{vii} And Dr M Muhammad, Prime Minister of Malaysia observed: "We know that Lusaka has been the birth place of many struggles."^{viii}

By events of history, Zambia was bonded to Southern Africa's economies and politics. Colonialism and the later Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, from 1953 to 1963, bonded Zambia more and more to the Southern countries.

At independence in 1964, of the eight countries sharing borders with Zambia, three - Congo Kinshasa, Malawi, Tanzania- were independent. One, Botswana was on the way to non-violent independence from Britain, while four borders, totalling about 2,315 kilometres, were under control of hostile racist regimes - Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and South West Africa (Namibia). Also in the Southern Africa neighbourhood was South Africa with its policy of Apartheid.

The decision to support the liberation struggle was made before Zambia's independence by the UNIP (United National Independence Party), Central Committee in 1961. ^{ix} Zambia first President Dr Kenneth Kaunda says the support was because of "our belief that each one of us is God's child and must not be subjected to any form of oppression."^x

Zambia's freedom leaders had been involved in PAFMECSA, the Pan African Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa. Kenneth Kaunda was in 1962 PAFMECSA president. PAFMECSA had a focus for African liberation and union. The movement disbanded with the formation of the wider OAU in May 1963.^{xi} Even as Zambia was preparing for independence, in 1963 the OAU Liberation Committee helped support UNIP because Zambia would be strategically key in the Southern Africa liberation struggle.^{xii}

As key front-line actor, Zambia vigorously used the OAU, UN, and various international fora in formation of agenda and world-wide action against apartheid. To effect change in Southern Africa, Zambia worked with and used various organisations, platforms and networks at regional, continental, and global levels. The platforms included: The United Nations, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Mulungushi Club (Zambia, Tanzania, and Uganda under Milton Obote), Frontline States of Southern Africa, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), The Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement, and Group of 77. The platforms were used for circulation of anti-racism policies and actions. With critical input from Zambia, policies, projects and task forces were formed to deal with the Southern Africa racial situation.

Zambia was in 1969 a member of the UN Security Council. This timed in with the "Lusaka Manifesto," which arose from a meeting President Kaunda organised involving some twelve other representatives of Africa's governments. Urging universal action utilising various approaches, the Lusaka Manifesto states that without commitment to "principles of human equality and self-determination - there can be no basis for peace."^{xiii} The Manifesto was later adopted by the OAU and the United Nations. While the UN had institutions and projects in Zambia - such as the UN Institute for Namibia - dealing with the fight against apartheid, Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda was twice the Chairperson of the OAU, chaired the Frontline States, and hosted the Non-Aligned Movement world conference in 1970.

Dr Kaunda hosted the decisive 1979 Commonwealth Conference which led to the settlement of the Rhodesia question at Lancaster House, London, and the April 1980 independence of Zimbabwe. Zambia also played a key role in formation and maintenance of SADC, which sought to move away from dependence on South Africa. In 1984, President Kaunda co-chaired a

task force on Namibia's independence. There was much contact with the five member Western nations "Contact Group" on Namibia.^{xiv}

Zambia, in collaboration with others, influenced many UN resolutions on Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia. Frantic action was made to prevent the Southern Rhodesia "Unilateral Declaration of Independence," UDI, and the armed conflict which would arise. Resolutions 2012 (XX) and 2022 (XX) tried to pre-empt the rebellion. A few days before UDI, United Nations even urged the use of force by Britain. When UDI went ahead, other measures were made, using various international platforms, to have a non-violent resolution of the Rhodesia crisis. For the first time in UN history, through Security Council Resolution 253, "mandatory sanctions," which were obligatory for all UN members, were passed against Rhodesia in December 1966. Britain, the proposer, said the sanctions would end the Rhodesian rebellion "within a matter of weeks rather than months." This was not to be, thus creating a big cost on Zambia.

At the United Nations, various sanctions were made against Rhodesia and South Africa - South Africa for its Apartheid in South Africa and its illegal occupation of Namibia. Apartheid was declared a "Crime Against Humanity." In November 1973 was passed the International Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid, as Resolution 3068 (XXVII). In 1989, the UN Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (A/RES/S-16/1), recognised the impact of apartheid on Zambia and Southern Africa. The Southern African countries were to be supported in their struggle.

To remove UDI and racism, sanctions covered: trade, investment, oil, military, sports, and cultural collaboration. Sanctions ranged from "selective" to the wider "comprehensive", and Comprehensive *Mandatory* Sanctions, which can be enforced by international law. World wide, action gathered momentum and came through governments and civil society. Civil society actors, inside and outside South Africa, included churches - through continental and global religious movements - trade unions, town councils, artists, sports men and sports women, and individual protesters all over the world. Action by humanity was world-wide. By the 1980s, disinvestment from South Africa became big action at various levels. In USA, there was then the US Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Zambia's government believed that the cost of comprehensive sanctions was negligible when compared to the violent disruption that would arise from the racial conflict.^{xv}

However, in collaboration with South Africa working in South Africa and Namibia, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, multi-national and transnational businesses, and some governments in the Western hemisphere, Rhodesia and the racist regimes of Southern Africa were sustained for a long period through breaking sanctions - from arms^{xvi} to oil. The sanction violators were centres of government and commercial interests and banks^{xvii} in Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Asia. Even the World Bank and IMF, despite United Nations recommendations, lent money to apartheid South Africa. In the report *South Africa, The Sanctions Report*^{xviii}, the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1990 showed that although sanctions had been at an expense for South Africa, the measures were broken.

Portuguese official Jorge Jardim has explained the organised breaking of oil sanctions by individuals, communities, and institutions in the minority-ruled Southern Africa and beyond.^{xix} Jorge Jardim called Zambia "the main victim" in the Rhodesia oil sanctions saga. A naval blockade did not work. The circumvention, ineffectiveness, and failure of the various sanctions contributed to the huge losses in human life and Zambia's economy that followed for over two decades.

Due to cold war power and economic interests, efforts against South Africa were vetoed or acted against by Britain and USA. Various interests and factors affected the effectiveness of sanctions, thus leading to the wide support of use of force by liberation movements. Eventually, although political dialogue was preferred, the Southern Africa freedom fight took the lines of both force and political pressures.

In 1966, Zambia felt that the UN and OAU spoke much but did not practically do enough to support front-line Zambia.^{xx} However, Zambia continued supporting the Southern Africa freedom fighters in the twin faces of political dialogue and armed action. Julius Nyerere and Tanzania had supported Zambia's fight for independence. After independence, Tanzania and Uganda worked with Zambia to support the liberation struggle. Independent neighbour Malawi was involved as go-between between Zambia and racist governments such as Portugal when arranging for emergencies like transport. Malawi's support for the liberation struggles was instead limited - providing food and humanitarian logistics for Zimbabwe freedom fighters.^{xxi} Zambia was on the front-line.

Apart from the other international networks, Zambia used the OAU and the Liberation Committee as the practical arm of decolonisation. Strategies and international assistance were coordinated by the Liberation Committee. Following lack of advance by political method only, the armed struggle in Angola had begun in 1961, South Africa 1961, in Mozambique September 1964, Namibia 1967, and Zimbabwe 1966/67. Zambia had the Liberation Centre, based in Lusaka, which hosted the various liberation movements of the region. For protection, the heads of liberation movements lived at Zambia's State House.^{xxii}

Lusaka was a nerve centre of the liberation struggle. Zambia's role had a major effect on the direction of the freedom struggle. In turn the liberation struggle has had major impact on Zambia. The process affected Zambia's social, economic, and military life over decades and may continue to negatively affect future generations unless effectively dealt with.

. The key phases of Zambia's situation in the liberation of Southern Africa can be noted as:

- 1964-1970, foundation of support for liberation, including establishing infrastructure
- 1971-1974, intensification of struggle. Portugal yields Mozambique and Angola
- 1975-1979, height of Zimbabwe struggle. Rhodesia yields. Namibia intensifies
- 1980-1989, Zimbabwe independence, Namibia height, Namibia agreement,

South Africa intensifies

- 1990- Namibia independence, Nelson Mandela and detainees released.

Costs rose with the intensity of the struggles .

3.0 THE COSTS, Impact and Causes

For Zambia's people, the Southern Africa liberation struggle has had various inter-related effects - economic, military and defence, infrastructural, humanitarian, and political. As these aspects were inherent in the conflict, so too have their multiple effects manifested upon Zambia. Each aspect affected all other aspects in a complex and holistic interaction. Some were immediate while others have had more long-term bearing. Finally, the immediate and long-term combine to affect opportunities and future development of Zambia's people.

3.1 ECONOMIC AND FINANCE

The potential economic impact of Zambia's participation in the struggle was already inherent right at Zambia's independence. Trade was closely linked with Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. At independence, some 40% of Zambia's trade was linked to Rhodesia. Zambia was trained to be a producer of copper, Rhodesia the Federation's industrial base, South Africa manufacturer and supplier of consumer and mining goods.

Zambia needed the Southern neighbours for trade, road and rail routes to sea ports, and refined oil. But Rhodesia thrived from Zambia's inter-territorial transfers, of about nine million pounds a year, and earnings from Zambia's use of Rhodesia as route for import and export.^{xxiii} Some utilities, such as railways, airways, the Kariba Dam and hydro power station, were owned by the Federation. The federal airforce had base in Rhodesia.

Zambia, from copper earnings, contributed much to Rhodesia's material development as major federal projects were situated in Rhodesia.^{xxiv} It was estimated that during the Federation some 70 million pounds had gone to Southern Rhodesia from Northern Rhodesia.^{xxv} At the end of Federation in 1963, the Kariba dam electricity project remained jointly owned under CAPCO, Central Africa Power Corporation. But there were difficulties in distributing airways and railway assets - with many remaining in Rhodesia. At the Victoria Falls conference, where assets were split, Britain refused to give Zambia at least half of the aircraft of the federal airforce.

The Kariba power station control was on the Southern side and after UDI, the Rhodesians threatened to cut off electricity to Zambia. The unfair distribution of the various assets at Victoria Falls was later to affect Zambia in trade and economy, infrastructure, military and defence, politics, and humanitarian situation.

Thus Zambia was born with both assets and liabilities. There were the assets of rich natural and mineral resources, its people, and its optimism. Amongst the liabilities was its hostile neighbours who had racist policies. At independence, Zambia's government also inherited a debt of more than K50 million, then worth 25 million to 30 million pounds, from the British government.^{xxvi}

Although getting a lot from copper earnings, a debt of around 30 million pounds put the country in a bad position. Following international action, with the declaration of UDI, Zambia had to de-link from the Rhodesian and South African economies it was bonded to. At independence, besides the vital transit access of the route to the sea, around one third of Zambia's imports were related to Rhodesia.^{xxvii} Coal for copper smelting on the Copperbelt came from Rhodesia's Wankie Coal Mine.^{xxviii} Many adult males from Zambia and Malawi went to work in Rhodesia and South Africa^{xxix}. Potential economic effects on Zambia were thus great.

International action such as sanctions, by Zambia and the international community, with the Rhodesians and South Africans in turn imposing counter-sanctions, affected Zambia's access to imports and exports, routes to the sea, access to energy sources like electricity coal and oil, and defence and security. In addition, Zambia's military equipment worth 500,000 pounds, imported from Britain, was confiscated as it passed through Ian Smith's Rhodesia.^{xxx} Rhodesia also imposed a five pounds per tonne levy on coal imports destined for Zambia - thus raising the price of coal six times.

Thus Zambia had to seek de-linkage and disengagement and quickly find other effective, safe, trade and economic partners. This had both immediate and long-term effects. Zambia's actions taken involved trade and economic linkages, and development of infrastructure and utilities:

- **Sanctions**, cutting off some trade and economic relations with Rhodesia and South Africa. In June 1964, tariff concessions on goods from Rhodesia were abolished; 1965 trade agreements with South Africa and Portugal terminated; 13 November 1965 joined world wide UN (non-obligatory) sanctions against Rhodesia. From trade of 34% in 1964, by 1969, Zambia's imports from Rhodesia were around 7%.^{xxxi} By 1967, implementation of sanctions against Rhodesia cost Zambia an estimated K35 million, then \$49 million.^{xxxii} Britain gave Zambia K13.85 million to cover impact of sanctions.^{xxxiii} Some estimates of implementation of sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa show that in 1976-77 alone, it cost Zambia some \$932.3 million.^{xxxiv}

- **Establishing alternative trade and economic links**; Italy, Yugoslavia, and China began to feature in major projects. Supplies from Britain and Japan were increased. Italy was involved in the Zam-Tan Road Services, TAZAMA oil pipeline, Indeni Petroleum refinery, Livingstone Motor Assemblers, managing Zambia Airways, and providing aircraft to Zambia Airforce. Italy was also involved in constructing Kafue's Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia, which would produce fertiliser and materials for use at Kafironda Explosives. Alternative links also created big cost on Zambia.

- **Diversification of Aid**. There was also diversifying to establish alternative aid and collaboration links: these included Ireland, Canada, Israel, India, the Scandinavian and Nordic

countries. This became important in the support in the Southern Africa struggle as more assistance was given while traditional donors like Britain were thought of as weak or regressive on Southern Africa liberation.

- ***Establishing own capacity*** to fulfil some imports and needs. Zambia created short-lived Nkandabwe (1966) and long term Maamba Coal Mines, Nakambala Sugar Estates, Kafue Gorge and Kariba North Bank power stations, the 1,058 mile TAZAMA pipeline and Indeni oil refinery, Kafironda Explosives, Nitrogen Chemicals fertiliser plant in Kafue, and other enterprises. Later, after nationalising the mines, mineral industries increased technology. Many of Zambia's parastatal companies, from finance to production, were set up to strengthen Zambia's position against racist forces. Establishing and improving capacity was a big cost through loans and local funding, leading to billions of dollars worth of investment at 1998 values.

- ***Re-routing imports and exports***. With the assistance of Britain, USA, and Canada, at UDI, to some time in 1966, Zambia embarked on emergency airlift of oil imports and copper exports through Dar es Salaam. This cost some K30 million.^{xxxv} Oil was transported by road from Dar es Salaam. Eventually, with Malawi as the go-between and transit, Beira port, and in later years Nacala, in Portuguese Mozambique were used. Lobito Bay in Portuguese Angola was used for some time until Portugal stopped this when the Benguela railway was blown up by UNITA freedom fighters in late 1966 and early 1967.^{xxxvi} The disruption of the Benguela line showed that no trade and economic progress could be made if some areas of Southern Africa were still under colonial and racial conflict.

Zambia focussed on developing the North-Eastern route to independent and friendly Tanzania. The port of Dar es Salaam had to be improved to handle more Zambian cargo. In May 1966, the bilateral Zambia-Tanzania Road Service was created, with Italian support and Somali drivers, to run on the rugged and dangerous "Hell Run." The Great North Road had to be made, at a cost of 23 million pounds Sterling^{xxxvii} to transport goods. Zambia's Contract Haulage truck company was also put into form to deal with sea ports haulage. Then the 1,860 kilometre Tanzania-Zambia railway, under the Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority, TAZARA, was built to link Zambia's Kapiri Mposhi to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The World Bank had refused to finance the rail line because it had preferred the existing Southern routes - and as it had some 80 million pounds investment in Rhodesia Railways.^{xxxviii} Much of Rhodesia Railway cargo was from Zambia. The British were reluctant to finance the Eastern railway partly because Zambia's private mining companies RST and Anglo America, which had interests in Southern Rhodesia, refused to guarantee copper exports away from South to the East.

TAZARA's initial cost, an interest-free loan from China the contractors, was 988 million Chinese Yuan, or then K286,627,300 or around US\$455 million. Zambia and Tanzania were to repay 50% of the loan each - starting from the year 1983, completing December 2012.^{xxxix} The railway line cost \$55 million more and this China added on as a grant. During Zambia's Second and Third national development plans, hundreds of millions of dollars were allocated by to

TAZARA by government. TAZARA was a major cost for Zambia in the liberation struggle and the later external debt situation.

In this report, we have counted past costs to their 1998 values by using deflators. For Kwacha, the CSO Consumer Price Index is available. For dollars, deflators can be found in various materials, including publications by UN (through *International Trade Statistics Yearbook*, *National Accounts Statistics. Analysis of Main Aggregates*), OECD, and IMF - *International Financial Statistics* for various years, and *International Financial Statistics Year Book 1999*.

Zambia's economic responses took the critical sectors of trade, transportation, energy, and support infrastructure:

Transportation:

From 1966, Zambia was involved in emergency transportation, creation of transport infrastructure and utilities, and repair of infrastructure damaged by attacks from racist regimes. It involved the construction of transport ways - road, rail, and bridges. It also meant stocking the transport systems. Much of this was done through local resources, external grants, and loans from collaborating partners like Italy and China. During the struggle, Portuguese and Rhodesian forces bombed Zambia's bridges - Luangwa in 1968, and in 1978-1979, at the height of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, Chambeshi rail and road bridge, Kaleya^{x1}, and Chongwe Bridge. From 1979, government and citizens contributed to bridge reconstruction - which needed some K14.6 million Kwacha, or \$18.8 million at that time (\$38.3 million in 1998).

Transportation and infrastructure building and reconstruction, at 1998 values, cost Zambia in excess of \$1.716 billion. [a) Some costs such as levies and slowing down transportation by Rhodesia have not been costed and totalled.

Table 1.

Transportation Infrastructure and Utilities:

- Aims: - Survival route to Sea
 - Follow UN Sanctions
 - Build Local Capacity to withstand apartheid-racism
 Rebuild after damage by apartheid-racist forces

Period	Activity, Project	Source, Support	Current Cost,	1998 Cost \$, Millions
1965-66	Emergency Oil, Copper air lift	-Local, GRZ -UK, USA, Canada govts	K30 m (\$42 m)	\$197.2
1960s	-Rhodesia Levies on Coal, Copper movement	Rhodesia counter-sanctions	-	-
1966-	- Zambia-Tanzania Great North Road	- Loan, Italy.	23m pounds ^{xli} (K39 m), (\$55 m)	\$243
1966-	-ZamTan Road Services	-Tan, Zam, Italy	-.	-
1960s-1990s	-Contract Haulage	Zam, local -	- -	-
1970-75	-Maamba Rail -TAZARA Rail Construct	- Loan, China	-\$228 m for Zambia of	\$842.2

1970-80s	-more loans for TAZARA engines, tools	-Local, Partners	\$455 m	-
1971	-Zambia Railways Workshop	-Loan	.K10 m(\$14 m)	\$49.3
1978-79	-Bridges bombed	Rhodesian forces	-. \$20 m ^{xlii}	\$40.8
1979	-Loss due to damaged bridges	Rhodesia-RSA	-K70,000 (\$90,000) daily. 90 days=\$8.1m	\$16.5
1988	- Extra costs of Transport	Zam, Partners	-\$250.0 m ^{xliii}	\$327.4

Energy:

From UDI in November 1965, Zambia energy supply, linked to Rhodesia due to the Federation, was under threat. There were threats about cutting off Zambia from Kariba Dam electricity supply - which was controlled from the Southern side, in Rhodesia. Zambia had also been tied to import of coal from Wankie, Southern Rhodesia. Petroleum imports were linked to Rhodesia and Mozambique. Immediately after UDI, from 1965 into 1966, as Zambia airlifted petroleum from Dar-es-Salaam, petroleum was rationed. Later the ration ended as a 1,085 mile oil pipeline, with assistance of Italy, was built from Dar-es-Salaam to Ndola. This carried refined oil until the Indeni Petroleum Refinery was built 1970, again with Italian assistance.

To meet coal needs for the mines, Zambia opened the Nkandabwe coal mine, and later Maamba Mine, in Southern Province. To avoid problems of Kariba, Zambia increased the capacity of Victoria Fall power station, built its own hydro electricity power stations at Kafue Gorge, with the help of Yugoslavia, and Kariba North Bank, with loans from World Bank, Central Africa Power Corporation (CAPCO), and Britain's Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC).^{xliv} Other smaller hydro electric facilities were built at places like Lusiwasi.

Thus since UDI and Zambia's situation in Southern Africa sanctions and anti-sanctions, local capacity was increased in coal, petroleum, and electricity. Altogether, at least \$1.157 billion, at 1998 values, was spent in increasing energy capacity due to the Southern Africa political situation.

Table 2:

ENERGY Infrastructure and Utilities, Costs

Aim: - de-link from Rhodesia, South Africa energy sources
 - impose UN sanctions
 - increase national energy capacity to withstand pressure of racist regimes

<i>Period</i>	<i>Project, Activity</i>	<i>Cost, Current</i>	<i>1998 Cost, \$, Million</i>
<i>a) <u>Coal</u>,</i>			
1966	Nkandabwe, Maamba	K27.321 m ^{xlv} , \$38.25m	\$173.3m
<i>b) <u>Oil</u></i>			
1968,	TAZAMA Pipeline, (Italy loan)	\$38.0m ^{xlvi}	\$160.0
	(or 16 million pounds ^{xlvi})		
1970	Indeni Refinery, (Italy loan)	K27 m ^{xlvi} , \$37.8m	
\$139.6			
<i>c) <u>Electricity</u></i>			
1969	Victoria Falls 60 MW station,	-	-
1970	Kariba North Bank Power Project,	\$131.1	\$468.2m*
	loans ^{xlix} :		
	- World Bank, IBRD, loan: ^l	-	\$82.1
	(increased from earlier \$40m)		
	- CAPCO, K20 m	- \$28.0m	
	(from earlier K13 m)		
1974,Sept	- CDC loan to GRZ, K13.5 m - \$21		
	(made up of 4.69 million pounds Sterling and K4 million tranche)		

1970	Kafue Gorge Power Station:		
	Yugoslav loan	K37.0 m - \$51.8m	\$191.3m
	Itezhi Tezhi Dam	K714,000 - \$0.99	\$3.0m
1970	Lusiwasi Hydro Power,	K4.2 m - \$5.9m	\$21.8m

* Note: 1970 loans = \$406.7 m in 1998, + \$61.5 1974 loan in 1998 = \$468.2 m

OTHER UTILITIES:

To increase industrial and services capacity, in addition to energy, transport, and trade sectors, Zambia involved itself in "all areas of human endeavour"^{li} and other projects that would strengthen the economy against apartheid pressures. Some, such as the Nitrogen Chemicals fertiliser plant at Kafue, were linked to the support of food and farm production. NCZ also produced material that was used at Kafironda to produce items such as explosives for use in the mines. Through various programmes and incentives for the disadvantaged, by 1988, Zambia was producing almost all its basic food. We take for costing only two other projects - Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia, and Kabwe Industrial Fabrics, at total \$107.8 million. The costs for various projects are higher. Many others are relevant to the economy under pressure from apartheid and racism in Southern Africa. Indeed, many parastatals were formed as a way of surviving the Southern Africa political pressures. Support industrial projects included:

Table 3:

Other Industrial Support Sectors

- Aim: - reduce traditional dependence on racist regimes
 - increase local industrial capacity to withstand apartheid pressures
 - increase provision of basic needs

<i>Project</i>	Cost <i>Current</i>	Cost 1998 <i>\$, Million</i>
Nitrogen Chemicals, 1970	K18 m, (\$25.2m)	\$93
Kabwe Industrial Fabrics	K3 m, (\$4.2 m)	\$14.8

Other Relevant Projects:

Kafironda Explosives, Zambia Metal Fabricators, ZAMEFA (Zambia Metal Fabricators Limited) Zambia Sugar, Nakambala Estates, Kafue Textiles of Zambia, and Chinese Supported Mulungushi Textiles,

Transport, Energy, and other infrastructure have cost Zambia at least some **\$2.981 billion** almost \$3 billion.

Sanctions and Trade:

The cost to Zambia of implementing sanctions and effects of counter-sanctions from 1965 to 1990 has been in excess of \$9.630 billion at 1998 values:

Table 4:

Sanctions and Trade

- Aim: - follow UN sanctions
 - put international pressure on racist regimes
 - de-link economy from South regimes
 - establish alternative routes and trade sources

<u>Period</u>	<u>Action</u>	<u>Cost</u> <i>Kwacha, \$ million</i>	<u>Cost</u> <i>Milion \$, 1998</i>
1965- 1967	Sanctions Impact	K35, \$49 ^{lii}	216.6
Early	Sanctions Impact	K650 ^{liii} , \$910.0	3,069.0

1970s				
1975	Sanctions Impact	K560	, \$870.3	2,329.0
1976- 1977	Sanctions Impact	-	, \$932.3 ^{liv}	2,356.6
1973	Stand-by Loan	SDR19,	\$22.9	73.1
1973- 1976	New routing, de-link	K320 ^{lv} ,	\$497.3	1,331.0
1970s-1980s	Portion of Stabilisation borrowing		\$115.0	254.5

[The extra transport costs of \$250 million estimated by the United Nations in 1988 have been put under transport tables]

Infrastructure and services had to be established or strengthened in order for Zambia to survive its front-line role in the fight against apartheid and racism. Despite the effects of UDI, from 1964 to 1969 Zambia registered very high growth, some in double digits, in GDP and GNP^{lvi}. These would probably have been higher without UDI and apartheid. Meanwhile, economic pressures caused by Zambia's action against apartheid contributed to independent Zambia having a deficit in 1968.^{lvii} Balance of payments were being affected. This worsened in 1971 when copper prices were low. Meanwhile oil prices rose with the Middle East war of 1973. Rhodesia's border closure from 1973 to 1978, closed in response to increased Zimbabwean guerrilla action against Rhodesia, created further difficulties in balance of payment and the economy. Re-routing expenses again had a negative effect. In 1975, the United Nations estimated that the UDI had cost Zambia some K 560 million, at 1975 prices,^{lviii} or \$2.329 billion in 1998. The various costs have had long-term economic, social, and political effect on Zambia.

3.3 **MILITARY AND DEFENCE**

At independence, Zambia was surrounded by four hostile neighbours - Southern Rhodesia, Portuguese Mozambique and Angola, South Africa ruled South West Africa (Namibia). Also in the region as a major player was apartheid South Africa. In these countries, freedom movements found political resolution difficult and added on armed struggle. In return, the ruling regimes had harsh economic, political, and military reprisals against the freedom fighters and the countries supporting them. Quite early, FRELIMO, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, observed that as "two solid rear bases," support for FRELIMO created danger for Tanzania and Zambia, which were "continuously reinforcing their solidarity with us."^{lix}

Africans and many in the world preferred political dialogue to resolve the political situation of Southern Africa. However, author Waldemar A Nielsen then observed that Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa's racist regimes, using force, were unlikely to be moved by moral pressure and non-violent approaches.^{lx}

While Angola, in 1961, and Mozambique, September 1964, started earlier, in 1966 and 1967 ZANU and ZAPU liberation forces made their first armed attacks into Rhodesia.^{lxi} Fearing the armed fight as in the Portuguese Africa neighbours, Rhodesia and South Africa said the attacks were launched from Zambia and became more hostile towards Zambia.^{lxii}

From 1965, forces of the racist regimes raided Zambia many times. Major General Tom Fara, one time in charge of the Zambia Army Zambezi River front, says that the Portuguese had a "write-off" approach and would destroy people and villages suspected of aiding freedom fighters.^{lxiii} The main geographical areas of incursions, by various forces, where: ^{lxiv}

Areas of Incursions	
<u>Areas:</u>	<u>Invading Force</u>
Eastern: Chadiza, Katete, , Petauke	Portuguese
Southern: Chirundu, Siavonga, Sinanaze, Kalomo	Rhodesia
Western: Kazungula, Senanga, Sesheke, Imwisho, Shang'ombo	South Africa
North Western: Chavuma, Mwinilunga	Portuguese, Rhodesia
Lusaka Province: Luangwa Lusaka City	Rhodesia , South Africa, Portuguese
Central Province: Chikumbi, Mkushi	Rhodesia, South Africa

Observes first Zambian Army and Zambia National Defence Force commander Gen Kingsley Chinkuli: “In terms of cost, it was enormous.”^{lxv}. Major defence costs of Zambia's position in the Southern Africa struggle involved:

. *confiscated Zambian equipment*. In 1965, 500,000 Pounds military equipment imported from Britain was confiscated by Rhodesia while in transit

. *military incursions* by Portuguese, Rhodesia, and South Africa regimes

. *extra defence spending* (loans, aid, local resources), in excess of what would have been required without the apartheid threat.

. *more troops enlistment*:

- recruitment of home guards,

- school leavers, seven intakes(one,1974,voluntary), total around 28 battalions, upkeep minimum six months each battalion

. *intelligence*, higher military and civil intelligence costs

. *casualties*: Zambian and freedom fighter casualties, thousands killed by raids

. *surrogate forces* against Zambia, insecurity on rural communities

. *production of minor armaments and supplies*;

factory establishment and protection

. *land-mines and de-mining*

. *environmental*: effect of bombings on Environment. Phosphorous, napalm; In Chikumbi some trees only growing recently, in late 1990s, after decades.

The economy was affected. Lt Gen Benjamin Mibenge, former Zambia Army and Zambia National Defence Force commander, notes: “Our economic development was stunted because resources which we should otherwise have spent on development had to go into defending ourselves. We had to increase our defence force from a small defence force to a reasonably large defence force because we had to protect ourselves.”^{lxvi}

Military and defence costs and loans incurred included training and acquisition of equipment for army, Zambia National Service, airforce, and civil intelligence. This ranged from equipment like Rapier Anti-Aircraft Missiles system to MiG 21 jet fighters. The *SIPRI Year Book 1978*^{lxvii} records Zambia’s buying 100 Rapier Surface to Air Missile systems from Britain as "protection against Rhodesia incursions."^{lxviii} However, recorded Central Statistics Office figures on imports and exports tend to be civilian and do not show military and defence. Military and defence imports were paid for but will not be recorded in public statistics. Some purchases were not paid for at the time. The payments and deferred payments affect Balance of Payments and movement towards loans. Some of the military and defence payments Zambia made fell under loans from various countries. They affect the present loan and debt portfolio.

Table 6:

Military Expenditure 1964-1979^{lxix}

Aim: - defence against minority racist forces incursions

- build military capacity to withstand destabilisation by racist regimes
- counter-act surrogate forces against Zambia

Year	Kwacha Cost Millions	Dollar Cost Millions	Dollars 1998 Millions
1964	4.2	\$ 5.9	\$ 28.5
1965	12.0	\$ 16.8	\$ 78.9
1966	12.6	\$ 17.6	\$ 80.0
1967	14.6	\$ 20.4	\$ 90.3
1968	17.9	\$ 25.1	\$ 105.6
1969	13.3	\$ 18.6	\$ 72.6
1970	23.0	\$ 32.2	\$ 118.9
1971	54.0	\$ 75.6	\$ 226.1
1972	105.0	\$ 146.9	\$ 495.4
1973	90.0	\$ 139.9	\$ 446.0
1974	120.0	\$ 186.5	\$ 546.5
1975	175.0	\$ 272.0	\$ 727.8
1976	170.0	\$ 214.3	\$ 541.6
1977	195.0	\$ 256.6	\$ 610.4
1978	205.0	\$ 260.4	\$ 576.4
1979	235.0	\$ 301.9	\$ 616.0

Military spending began to increase as proportions of export earnings and GDP. Ratio of military to exports rose from around 1.3% at independence in 1964, to 3.2% at UDI in 1965, 3.3% in 1968, and in 1971, as the struggle intensified and copper incomes began to go down, some 11.1%.^{lxx} With intensification of the struggle in 1975, Zambia was spending some 33% of export earnings on the military. In 1979, 21.6% was spent. In the 1980s, defence expenditure, much of it against apartheid, was around 25% of export earning.^{lxxi} From 0.9% in 1964, Zambia's military expenditure as percentage of GDP rose to 1.8% in the year of UDI, 1.8% in 1970, 4.9% in 1972, and 12.8% in 1978 as the overall regional liberation struggle intensified.^{lxxii} Troops in Zambia's armed forces increased from 9,000 in 1965 to 12,000 in 1970, and 17,000 in 1977^{lxxiii} as the struggle intensified and Rhodesia and South Africa incursions increased. From 1975 to 1980, there was compulsory military service for all Form Five school leavers. In 1979,

due to incursions, Zambia even placed the military on full alert and mobilised the reserve force and thousands of the school leavers, “Green Army,” trained in military skills.

From 1964 to 1979, the current cost at the various times shows some \$1.990 billion. Through use of deflators, the values for the various years individually changed to 1998 values come to \$5.361 billion.

Towards the peak of the Namibia and South Africa liberation struggle from 1980 to 1990, when Namibia got independence, Zambia's estimated extra defence expenditure was \$1.250 billion. Taking the 1987 \$63 million as a minimum in the decade,^{lxxiv} with minimum \$630 million for the decade 1980 to 1989, and adding \$1.250 billion extra defence spending, we find a minimum of \$1.880 billion. This, working on 1984 as the mid, gives a 1998 figure of \$2.789 billion minimum spending on defence for that decade. For 1964 to beginning 1990, Zambia spent some \$3.870 billion at current costs. At 1998 values, the amount spent is a minimum \$8.150 billion.

How much was spent on defence because of Apartheid and the Southern Africa political situation? Had Zambia not been confronting apartheid, defence expenses would have been different. A country's defence and costs are affected by many factors - including the external threat, geographical size, terrain, and population size.

After comparing with neighbours like Malawi and taking a third of the cost, we may find that some \$5.433 billion can be said to be extra defence spending due to apartheid. At least half of these are linked to loans, such as buying MiG aircraft, Tanks, Surface to Air Missiles, and training of personnel.

Various countries were, to various degrees, partners in Zambia's military supply and struggle. They include:^{lxxv}

Table 7:

Suppliers of Military Equipment and Services^{lxxvi}

<u>Country</u>	<u>Field of Support</u>
Italy	training, aircraft,
Britain	training, anti-aircraft, missiles
Canada	aircraft
Yugoslavia	training, aircraft, anti-aircraft
China	training, aircraft, artillery

USSR	training, aircraft, tanks- armour
West Germany	troop carriers
India	training
Egypt	training

There were also other suppliers such as East Germany including motor vehicles, and Sweden (such as Volvo troop carriers).

Besides supplies, other support was provided. Yugoslavia helped to construct, as aid, the State House tunnels to protect from military raids.

3.4 HUMAN AND HUMANITARIAN COSTS:

Death and Injury. Death and injury resulted from the armed conflict of Southern Africa. Death was directly from military attacks. General Kingsley Chinkuli, first Zambia Army and Zambia National Defence Force commander, notes: "The cost was also enormous in terms of life which was lost by those who were bombed, those who were maimed by land mines along the border. We had to stop this by, for example, instituting, if you remember, the programme of homeguard training."^{lxxvii}

Also added are war-related deaths. The Rhodesians, South Africans, and Portuguese made incursions into Zambia from 1965 to 1989 - leading to deaths and injury. Between May 1966 and June 1969, 35 land and 24 air violations by the Portuguese into five of Zambia's then eight provinces were recorded.^{lxxviii} Just between March 1986 and March 1989, South Africa made at least 19 attacks and violations by air, water, and land. One was an air bombing of a Lusaka refugee centre in May 1986.^{lxxix} Many incursions by Rhodesia, Portuguese forces, and South Africa involved death. Just in one raid, in August 1978, 12 people in Sesheke were killed.^{lxxx} The Chikumbi raid killed hundreds.

Over the period 1980 to 1988, United Nations studies estimated that some 51,100 persons, of whom 50,000 were infants and children, died of war-related causes in Zambia.^{lxxxii} We would like to increase the figure into a more comprehensive 1964 - 1990 period. There are two additional periods - from 1964 to end 1979, when the ceasefire in Zimbabwe was concluded, and 1989 - 1990, when Namibia got independence and Nelson Mandela and other Freedom fighters left South Africa's prisons.

Many military deaths took place in 1964-1989, and war-related deaths must also be high. Peter Stiff's *Selous Scouts Top Secret War* book^{lxxxii} talks much about killings made by Rhodesia

forces in Zambia. There are other accounts, written and unwritten. In a few days alone in 1978, Rhodesian forces killed some 1,000 Zimbabweans and thirty Zambian soldiers, and injured 800 Zimbabweans.^{lxxxiii} The Portuguese had earlier, in 1965, started killing Zambians from their "hot pursuit" raids. The raids went on up to 1974. The Namibia front also registered many military deaths. From various records and testimonies of military attacks, we estimate that for the period 1964 - 1979, some thousands of people, both Zambians and non-Zambians, civilians and combatants may have died from military action in Zambia. To include *war-related deaths*, including deaths indirectly brought about by the Southern Africa war, the 1980 - 1988 figure of 51,100, can rise to some 80,000 to 100,000 for the period 1964 - 1990. However, right now, there should be more people still dying as a result of apartheid-related economic and debt after effects.

Displacement and Refuge. Besides death and injury, the Southern Africa race conflict created humanitarian situation in various parts of the region. It led to displacement and creation of refugees in the region and beyond. Locally, Zambia's people, especially those on border areas, were displaced due to armed conflict between freedom fighters and forces of the racist regimes.

The personal and communal *displacement*, as in the case of the building of the Kariba dam, continued way after the event that caused it. Displaced persons often have their access to basic needs disrupted for a long time. They lag behind and, in a situation of general economic stress, bear more hardship than more settled persons.

From the 1960s to the late 1980s, Zambia received, amongst others, many *refugees* running away from conflict in racist Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. In the mid 1980s, in accordance with international convention, Zambia hosted refugees then estimated to be some 300,000. Some refugees came unregistered and settled "spontaneously," amongst local people, especially in the rural areas. Some registered at refugee reception areas like Mayukwayukwa in Western Province. Zambia worked together with UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) and United Nations, NGOs like Lutheran World Federation, bilateral and multilateral organisations, to support refugees *morally and materially* - with all basic needs, and protection.^{lxxxiv}

Farming support was available. Some exiles were "urban refugees" and settled in urban areas. Training and education was also provided. Zambia hosted the United Nations Institute for Namibia which trained exiled Namibians in relevant skills for administering a future Namibia. Zambia provided travel and identification documents for refugees going to other parts of the world for training or exile. In one year, it cost \$50 million to look after refugees from Mozambique. Although costs are still being counted, the period 1964 - 1994 required a ***minimum \$500 million.***

Besides the moral feeling, there was some benefit to hosting refugees. In some *settlements*, like Meheba in North-Western Zambia, the refugees farmed and sold produce on the Zambian market. They also shared some facilities like schools and health centres with surrounding Zambian communities. The presence of refugees in Zambia also increased inter-African collaboration and networking - by institution and individual members of society. In solidarity

with the Southern Africa struggle, the "SOWETO" name was given to many residential areas and market places in Zambia. In return, some residential areas in South Africa have been named after Lusaka.

Although not much is known to have been done to permanently resettle local displaced persons, Zambia spent on local displacement. Some local persons still, in year 2000, are unsettled. Some are afraid of remnant land mines and bombs in their places. After the end of apartheid, while many refugees have returned to their homes outside Zambia, there still has been no organised national or international effort to deal with Zambia's persons displaced due to the Southern Africa race conflict. The deprivation of displaced persons has been aggravated by Zambia's declined national economic environment which has put many people on the margins.

3.5 POLITICAL

There were political efforts and costs. These involved organisation of meetings and contacts in Zambia and outside, and the internal security environment.

Zambia had to make an international political effort to support the struggle. This involved linkages with platforms all over the world. There was a cost to Zambia's political efforts. Often, the head of state or government officials travelled to various parts of the world on political assignment. An example of the cost of mediating in a conflict is Zambia's 1999 receiving financial assistance from the European Community to mediate in the Congo DR fighting. In the 1960s, through 1980s, Zambia many times paid for travelling of the head of state and officials in mediation assignments. Up to 1991, Zambia should have organised trips and meetings in hundreds - leading to huge cost. Including contributions to the OAU liberation effort, while the costs are still being counted, we estimate a *minimum \$500 million* in Zambia's political expenses related to Southern Africa.

Locally, the tense Southern Africa political situation affected Zambia's internal politics. The use of surrogate insurgent military forces against Zambia by South Africa and the Portuguese affected Zambia's internal politics. In the mid 1970s, action of the South African sponsored Adamson Mushala group, and its hunting by Zambian government forces, created public insecurity especially in rural North Western province.^{lxxxv} In Eastern Zambia, armed conflict of RENAMO (Mozambique Resistance Movement) and FRELIMO in Mozambique destabilised many areas when it spilled over across the border.

At UDI, there was also an effect on race relations as some white people were thought to be sympathetic to rebel Rhodesia and South Africa. A 1967 trial of five Europeans brought out the existence of an extensive Rhodesian spy network operating against Zambia.^{lxxxvi} While Zambia's active policy was non-racialism and in general had harmonious racial relations internally, following the Rhodesia and South African raids into Zambia, some Zambians became suspicious of white persons, some of whom had assisted the raiders.

The *State of Emergency*, inherited from independence, was maintained to protect Zambians from destabilisation by the racist South. The Southern Africa situation also contributed to the December 1972 creation of Zambia as One Party Participatory Democracy. Some what, under a unified Party structure, it was easier to drive ahead quickly on liberation of Southern Africa. For some people, the unified system was thought of as a constraint, while others found it useful in national cohesion, especially under threat of apartheid forces. While by and large most people supported the liberation struggle, there are those who were opposed to it, thinking it a drain on resources which could be used directly for Zambia's people.^{lxxxvii}

As the struggle intensified and some countries became free, Zambia's economy was under pressure. Together with the debt conditions, the debt, whose emergence was related to the freedom struggle, worsened the situation of basic needs for the privileged and needy. This contributed to the removal of the UNIP government in November 1991.

4.0 COUNTING THE COSTS

Zambia's financial costs of the liberation struggle were through: defence spending, economic costs of trade sanctions and counter-sanctions, political organisation, building and strengthening of utilities and infrastructure to make Zambia non-dependent on Southern Africa minority regimes.

We find that besides the thousands of human lives lost, the financial cost to Zambia in the global fight against apartheid is in excess of \$19 billion, at 1998 values:

Table 8:

Sanctions and Trade	\$9,630.0 m
Infrastructure and Utility development	\$2,981.4+ m
Defence	\$5,434.0 m
Humanitarian	\$ 500.0+ m
Political Organisation	\$ 500.0+ m
	\$19,045.4+ m

4.1 MEETING THE COST

The cost of the Southern Africa struggle upon Zambia from 1964 to 1990 is in excess of \$19.05 billion at 1998 values. This now extends the \$6.250 billion estimated by Joe Hanlon in a 1998 ACTSA study, as total economic cost in the fight against Apartheid to over \$19 billion for Zambia.

To meet the cost, Zambia first of all used local resources. Some of these should have gone to other sectors such as health, education, water and sanitation, and farming. Without the cost, the advances made since independence would have been sustained longer.

Says Dr Kaunda: “Obviously, that was a risk we had to take. It was either we decided to completely support the cause of liberation or go into it half-hearted and do nothing. And having decided to go full scale in support of the liberation movements, we had to take that risk. Indeed, as we all know, the Zambian people and the country of Zambia paid that high price.”^{lxxxviii}

Moreover, cooperating partners supported Zambia in military, social, economic, and other support. Some support came as grants. But other support came as loans which up to now have a bearing on Zambia and the debt stock and the quality of life of people. Some provided military support while others economic and political support. Among key early supporters were Italy, Yugoslavia, China, India, USSR, and the OAU in multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Japan was key in trade. There were also the wide body of governments, such as Scandinavian-Nordic countries, solidarity groups, and civil society members all over the world. But the impact on Zambia remained long and deep.

The struggle was beneficial for humanity. “I think we were fighting for the dignity of the people who were oppressed,”^{lxxxix} says Gen Kingsley Chinkuli. And Lt Gen Mibenge: “I harbour no regrets for the role that Zambia played in the liberation struggle... It is a moral responsibility we had to undertake in spite of the sacrifices.”^{xc}

Said Nelson Mandela in 1990, “when on freedom day we count the heroes of our struggle, the city of Lusaka would rank amongst our most gallant heroes.”^{xc}

4.2 THE DEBATE: COST AND BENEFITS.

There were costs and benefits in Zambia's support for the liberation struggle. Due to impact in various sectors, and due to Zambia's actions in the struggle, economic and human development was affected. This led to the indebtedness and harsh debt conditions of the 1980s through 1990s and the new millennium. The benefits of the role in the struggle include:

- . Zambia's role contributed to removal of human bondage
- . increased Pan-African and global collaboration: South-South, North-South over the common issue
- . UDI and apartheid contributed to Zambia's efforts for self-reliance, leading to creation of some infrastructure: rail, road, power stations, and others, used by Zambia's people. Some foreign exchange is even earned from electricity exports. Advances in basics like education and training were made in process of lessening dependency on apartheid
- . increased military preparedness, alert, test, and capacity

However, although useful, the fact still remains that much of the infrastructure arose in the process of acquiring debt. The infrastructure was created when under pressure, leading to opportunity costs which would not have been there had there not been the Southern Africa pressure. The infrastructure would have been developed more gradually and in a manner sustainable to the economy. As with the Second World War, racism and action against it often lead to conflict and war. Southern Africa was at war due to racism. Reconstruction from that war is required for people of Zambia and the region to stabilise.

DEBT AND APARTHEID

While supporting the Southern Africa liberation struggle, Zambia was hit by unexpected world-wide economic pressures. With the unexpected poor copper prices of the 1970s and high cost of imports due to the fuel price hikes following the Middle-East war of 1973 and the increase of 1979, Zambia experienced difficulties with foreign reserves and balance of payments. As copper prices lowered, and oil prices increased, Zambia's economy could not easily sustain a) the freedom struggle, and b) basic needs. To continue supporting both basic needs and the freedom struggle, and also to continue with a balanced economy, Zambia borrowed money externally.

By 1975, Zambia's external debt was \$1.465 billion, with a high debt service ratio of 23-25%.^{xcii} The debt was well below what the economic impact of apartheid and racism on Zambia had been since 1964. *The economic cost of Zambia's role in the liberation struggle is higher than the external debt at years 1990 and 2000.* Zambia had covered much of the impact through its own resources. The cost of the fight against apartheid pushed Zambia into borrowing and debt. It can be argued that even with low copper income and high fuel prices, without the fight against apartheid, Zambia would not have borrowed much. Local resources would have been adequate to cover basic development programmes.

In 1984, debt had reached \$3.5 billion, and \$5.1 billion in May 1987 at Zambia's suspension of the IMF programme for harshness. In 1989, debt was \$6.9 billion and by 1990, had reached \$7 billion. Economic and Southern Africa political pressures continued until 1990, with the release from jail of Nelson Mandela - leading to democratic change and universal elections in South Africa..

Zambia and IMF

Zambia's borrowing from World Bank started much earlier than from IMF. Zambia went to IMF, initially under soft conditions, and started on an SDR 19 million stand-by facility just when the economy was under pressure from the Rhodesia border closure of 1973. There after, Zambia involved itself with various economic reform programmes. In 1987, due to riots arising from the harsh IMF economic reforms, President Kaunda announced the suspension of Zambia's programme with IMF and embarked on its own "New Economic Recovery Programme", which was also used as an "Interim Development Plan." This registered high annual growth but did not receive support from many external partners waiting for IMF

conditionality. Dr Kaunda had proposed a maximum 10% debt service ratio. In 1989, without donor support, Zambia went back to the IMF programme.

Zambia's economic "stabilisation" and "adjustment" programmes with IMF and World Bank have since the 1970s intensified following agreements in 1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1986, and 1989. In the 1990s programmes have included the ESAF, Policy Framework Paper, and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Framework which was being followed by September 2000.. Since 1991, Zambia's government has had no long-term development plans but is just following IMF-World Bank programmes. Zambia's government is looking forward to being accorded debt relief under the HIPC, Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

However, there is no guarantee that joining HIPC will now provide a true relief from debt and its conditionality.^{xciii} Although there is now IMF and World Bank talk of tackling poverty through the national involvement of civil society, parliamentarians, and business in PRSP programme of the PRGF, the policy causes of poverty are not being focussed on. Zambia's particular situation affected by apartheid and the Southern Africa situation is yet to be considered. In 1999, while there were some minor debt cancellation, due to reschedules, more money was still being borrowed to meet debt service and balance of payments, Zambia's debt had reached \$6.507 billion. The March 2000 estimate was \$6.419 billion:

Table 9:

SUMMARY ZAMBIA DEBT, March 2000_

in Millions of Dollars

BILATERAL DEBT:		2,629.391
Paris Club	2,357.205	
Non-Paris Club	272.186	
MULTILATERAL DEBT		3,333.970
ADB/ADF	318.035	
World Bank	1,652.923	
IMF	1,219.164	
Others	143.848	
PARASTATAL AND PRIVATE DEBT		<u>455.883</u>
		<u>\$6,419.244</u>

Most of the debt, some \$5.963 billion, is owed to governments and multilateral lenders. This relates to the governmental aspect of cooperation in fields like defence. This provides an opportunity for debt relief.

Zambia had borrowed money for two main reasons: a) to cover costs of the Southern Africa liberation struggle as we have explained, and b) to continue to meet the cost of basic needs - schools, education, food, infrastructure, and other essentials.

At independence, while also fighting racism in the region, rapid programmes were developed to improve low basic needs access and increase capacity. Michael Sata, Minister without Portfolio and ruling MMD National Secretary in 2000 recalls: "... the money which came from copper went to build schools. When UNIP came into power, there was a reason why there was free education." ^{xciv}

Emmanuel Kasonde, first Finance Minister in the MMD government of 1991, who was also Finance Ministry Permanent Secretary after independence, says much borrowing was for basic needs and well used: "It was necessary to borrow very heavily... As far as I know, at least I was Permanent Secretary in the treasury, the funds went to the purposes for which they were intended. There was no misuse of public resources at that time." ^{xcv}

Former Bank of Zambia Governor David Phiri, outlining poor education and basic need situation at independence, says, "from what I recall, a lot of this money was borrowed from the World Bank at the time to build secondary schools." ^{xcvi}

High oil price increases, with poor copper prices, and the apartheid situation put pressure on Zambia. And Patrick Malambo, Ministry of Finance Director of External Resource Mobilisation notes: "You borrow because your own resources are not sufficient to meet your own perceived or programmed expenditures. We had various projects to carry out. We realised that for us to carry out these projects, we would need external assistance, to borrow from someone else." ^{xcvii}

While the general economic cost of apartheid is higher than the external debt, there are segments of Zambia's debt which are directly apartheid-caused borrowing. The loans and borrowing followed sectors of the costs: trade and economic sanctions, infrastructural and utilities development, and defence spending:

Sanctions, Trade and Loans:

While Zambia had been a member of IMF since September 1965, and while the copper and oil prices were stable, the country could afford its role in basic needs and the liberation.

The first stand-by facility from IMF, made in 1973, at 19 million SDR, (then K14.75 million, or \$22.92 million), was linked to the economic effects of the January 1973 Rhodesia border closure against Zambia. This first IMF borrowing in 1973 was worth around \$73 million, Zambia borrowed in order to stabilise the economy. Sanctions and trade costs made Zambia divert resources from more of basic needs and, to replace those resources, borrow. It is difficult

to know how much borrowing was indirectly to cover the billions of dollars of cost of economic impact of sanctions. From another IMF loan of SDR 229.8 million the late 1970s, we will assume half was to cover or remedy, directly or indirectly, apartheid causes. The half, was about \$149 million. In 1998, this was around \$304 million. From these two loans only, we have \$377 million. Many multi-lateral and bilateral loans were acquired as a way of dealing with the economic impact of apartheid.

Table 10

Infrastructure and utilities Loans:

Some utilities and infrastructure built from loans include:

Transportation

<u>Period</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Current Cost</u>	<u>1998 Cost</u> <i>Millions</i>
1970 -1975	TAZARA Rail	China	\$228m (of \$455m)	\$842.2
1967 Road	Great North	Italy	23m pounds (\$64.2 m)	\$263.3
1960s	Zam-Tan Road Services	Italy		
1971	Zambia Railway Workshop		K10 m (\$14m)	\$46.4

Energy:

Oil:

1968	TAZAMA Oil Pipeline	Italy	\$38 m	\$160.0
1970	Indeni Oil Refinery	Italy	K27 m (\$37.8 m)	\$139.6

Electricity:

1970	Kariba North Bank Total		\$131	\$468.2
	- Kariba North Bank	IBRD	\$82	
		CDC	K13.5m (\$19m)	
		CAPCO	K20 (\$28)	
1970	Kafue Gorge Power Station	Yugo	K37m (\$52 m)	\$182.5
	Itezhi Tezhi Dam	"	K714,000 (\$999,600)	\$3.0

Coal:

1966-	Nkandabwe and Maamba	K27.321 million (\$38.25m)	\$161.0
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TOTAL Current Cost of loans= \$604.2 million
TOTAL 1998 Cost in Loans= \$2,266.2 m

Relevant loans of this infrastructure mentioned here cost some: \$604.2 million at the various times of investment. At 1998 values, this money is around \$2.266 billion.

Taking a third of the Defence cost, we may find that some \$5,433.6 can be said to be extra defence spending due to apartheid. At least half of these are linked to loans, such as buying MiG aircraft, Tanks, Surface to Air Missiles, and training of personnel. This gives an estimate of minimum \$2.700 billion as Defence related loans.

TOTAL DEBT LINKED TO APARTHEID

In March 2000, Zambia's external debt was \$6.419 billion. Meanwhile without counting political organisation and humanitarian costs, we have found that from 1964 to 1990, at least \$5.345 billion, at 1998 values, can be linked to Zambia's situation against apartheid and racism:

Table 11:

Sector *\$, Millions, 1998*

Infrastructure and Utilities	2,266.2
Sanctions and Trade	377.0
Military and Defence	<u>2,700.0</u>
	\$5,345.2

Loans linked to *Political organisation* and *Humanitarian action* still need to be costed. In fact, it may well be that the total loans borrowed by Zambia in relation to apartheid are now valued beyond the present external debt figure of \$6.419 billion as at March 2000.^{xcviii}

Our analysis here extends a previous estimate, of \$3.143 billion^{xcix} (Joe Hanlon, 1988) which mainly covered 1975-1994. Our estimates have mainly been for cost and debt incurred 1964 - 1990. Our loans figures mostly cover 1964 to mid 1970s, when much of Zambia's borrowing for infrastructure and economic stabilisation happened. Merging our estimates of 1964-1990 to the \$3.143 billion of 1975-1994, we can in fact extend the total debt linked to apartheid to be over \$7 billion.

This apartheid-caused debt can cancel out Zambia's outstanding balances, with arrears, penalties, and interest, of \$6.419 billion. Without the contribution of apartheid events to the costs, today's debt is unlikely to have been there or to that level. The strain of Zambia's people would not have been heavy.

Indivisible Debt, Wholesome Debt

Zambia's debt has to be looked at as an indivisible whole. One aspect was linked to other aspects. One aspect enabled Zambia to cover other aspects. Resources from one vital sector are moved. Then money is borrowed to cover the money used. Whatever item the loan will be immediately attached to, the loan will be linked to various sectors. Sometimes moving or borrowing resources involving one need will subsidize some other function.

The apartheid related economic costs have effect on the economy, borrowing, and the present debt situation. Firstly, economic impact reduced the amount of money available for basic needs. Zambia's resources were locked up in the fight against apartheid.

The loans were being repaid over the period. It is not accurate to remove or reduce some loans because it appears payment has been done.

Through deflators the loans are projected to present values, and checked against present official debt values. To have an idea of present values, Zambia's export earnings of K766.5 million, or \$1.073 billion in 1969, will need to be equalled by earnings of around \$4.185 billion in 1998. Yet around 1999, due to economic decline, earnings were just below the \$1 billion mark.

There have been loan repayments just as there have been minor creditor write-offs and rescheduling of debt service. The re-payments also have an increased value. Thus we measure the loans against the year 2000 prices.

The total debt at present costs was high but some of it has been re-paid. Information on what amounts of present debt were principle, interest, and penalties is, by September 2000, still being worked on by Zambia's officials.

Governments still owed debt for apartheid-cost related infrastructure and utilities, defence, and trade include: Italy, Yugoslavia, China, Russia, and Japan. Indivisible debt means that borrowing is even got to pay for other borrowing. What may appear paid may actually be covered by further borrowing from other sources. It is merely changing the debtor or sector affected. This can be illustrated by the outstanding debt to some of the lenders Zambia had defence and economic links during the fight against apartheid:

Table 12:

	Outstanding at March 31, 2000	
	<i>Millions of Dollars</i>	
Italy		79.657
Yugoslavia	26.769	
China	131.422	
Russia	138.473	
Japan	674.434	
United Kingdom	351.651	

Some of the debt, especially related to trade, was acquired after 1990. Some of it, related to past military and economic defence against apartheid.

Most multilateral lenders have Zambia's debt whose borrowing was linked to the apartheid situation. As apartheid affected all sectors, most present loans outstanding are linked to the situation of Zambia during anti-apartheid effort and economic reconstruction and balancing post-apartheid. Apartheid had short-term and long-term effects on Zambia.

7.0 LEGACY AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS

The continued effect of the liberation struggle on Zambia and its people's access to basic needs is wide. Some effects include:

. *lack of infrastructure* in some areas, like Sinazeze and Lake Kariba area: a) Infrastructure was destroyed during the freedom war, b) Some infrastructure was not established in areas because

of intense armed strife there, c) due to redirecting of resources to the struggle and due to the various effects of the struggle, resources were inadequate to cover all areas.

. *Deaths and physical injury* continuing due to land mines, and bombs. The *Land Mine Monitor 1999*^c records at least 200 people died or maimed by landmines in Zambia in the 20 years since 1980, Zimbabwe's independence.

. *Land mines barrier*. No-go areas due to land mines. National authorities, civil society, and the international community still need to get organised and embark on a very organised effective land-mine clearing programme.

. *External Debt*. Due to Southern Africa struggle-induced economic and military pressures on resources, Zambia balance of payment problems - leading to debt. On the eve of the 36th anniversary of Zambia's independence, President Frederick Chiluba said that Zambia's debt situation is constraining growth.^{ci} We note that debt has led to the economic liberalisation policies which have affected the quality of life and:

. *People's access to basic needs* compromised - including food, health, water, shelter, education, energy, and incomes and livelihood. There was disturbance of the post-independence basic needs programme due to debt and effect of debt conditions. For development of the society, basic needs need special focus:

7.1 Basic Needs:

Zambia's Debt Service ratio has been high, with figures going to up to even 35% of export earnings in the 1990s.^{cii} This high debt service puts limits on important social spending on basics like education and health. Economic policy and debt service have a great effect on the quality of life. By 1996, according to the Central Statistics Office's Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, up to 89% of people in rural areas were in poverty - while urban areas had 60%, thereby averaging the national average for 16 to 78%.^{ciii}

People are having less and less. From the 1987's 13.4% of government spending used on education, which was also 4.15% of GDP, by 1997, spending had dropped to 10.8% of government spending and only 2.39% of GDP.^{civ} Many children are not attending school.

Access to safe water increased only from 51% in 1991, to 53% in 1995, with a decline in the urban safe water access ratio.^{cv} Malnutrition was related to continuing poor food access and quality. 15% of children under 15 years old were anaemic with 34% of child bearing-age women were anaemic.^{cvi} The Ministry of Health estimated that in 1994, some 30% of reported child deaths were linked to malnutrition. Government expenditure on health has also declined between 1980 and the mid-1990s. Drugs, facilities, and staff are on the decline as people keep more and more away from public facilities due to inability to meet user fees.

Basic needs gains made from independence are being reversed or slowed down. Its difficult to meet end of century goals. Under debt and economic liberalisation conditions, there has been a decline in the quality of life: Crude Death Rate which had gone down has risen again, Infant Mortality Rate has worsened from 109 per 1,000 births in 1970 to 112 in 1998. Under-five mortality has moved from 181 in 1970 to 202 in 1998. At 650 deaths per 100,000 live births, Zambia's maternal mortality is one of the worst in the Southern Africa region - an indicator of an uncertain future for many people.

In 1982, UNICEF figures show, Zambians' life expectancy was 51 years.

Table 13:

Zambia Life Expectancy ^{cvii}

<u>Period</u>	<u>Years</u>		<i>Average</i>
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	
1969	44.6	47.8	46.2
1990	52.0	55.0	53.5
1996	-	-	43.0
1998	39.9	41.0	40.5

The year 2000 UNDP *Human Development Report* shows that life expectancy in 1998 was some 40.5 years - 41 years for females and 39.9 years for males. The combination of impact on Zambia's people has led to a decline in the UNDP Human Development Index ranking - from 117 of 160 countries in 1992, to 136 out of 174 in 1996, and 153 out of 174 in the year 2000. HDI ranking 1 has the best and 174 is the weakest.

Year	Total Countries	Zambia HDI Ranking
1992	160	117
1994	173	138
1996	174	136
1998	174	146
2000	174	153

Present policies and the past political situation in Southern Africa have combined to negatively affect quality of life of Zambia's people.

8.0 AREAS OF ACTION ON APARTHEID-CAUSED DEBT and ECONOMIC IMPACT

It is established that Zambia suffered due to following an agenda of humankind for the common good. Zambia was the “spear-head” in support with others all over the world. However, in proportion to the racism forces, there was inadequate support for Zambia a) during the struggle, and b) no post-struggle reconstruction of communities and the nation. This was affected by the 1991 change in Zambia's governments. Some issues remain for coordinated effort local, regional, and global action:

- ***Land Mines and bombs*** still affect Zambia's areas of conflict. There is need for organised official and international efforts for land mine and bomb disposal. There is need for improved technology. Need to involve former military personnel, civil society, and the government of Zambia in issue of de-mining. However, in September 2000 a USA team followed on a UN team, and visited Zambia on a land mine study mission. The Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister mentioned that the land mines were mainly in the boundary areas facing previous racist regimes. Working with local efforts in many sectors, this USA team's visit may be a jump-start on resolving the apartheid legacy of land mines.

- ***Integrating Issue of Apartheid's Contribution*** to Zambia's economic difficulties and debt. Put on the agenda, this will help make approaches more in support of the development process.

- ***Debt relief needed:***

The national and world wide campaign for debt relief, in Zambia led by Jubilee 2000 and now involving civil society and government collaboration, has made advances. For Zambia, a component of the debt debate has to involve apartheid-caused debt. Relief will deal with a range of actors:

Bilateral:

a) from sympathising lenders and supporters who helped Zambia in the struggle - through economic support and defence/military support, through aid, sales, and training. These include, military: China, Russia, Yugoslavia, East Germany, West Germany, Italy, UK, India, and Canada. Economic and other support include Scandinavian-Nordic countries, Arab League nations, and, initially, USA. Bilateral relief is easier to effect than in commercial debt.

b) those who allowed omission and commission against world sanctions and collaboration with racist regimes:

i) governments: Britain

USA

Japan

Portugal

Germany

EU countries, as NATO proxy

Italy

France
Belgium
Spain
and others

ii. Multilateral:

1. World Bank and IMF:

- . World Bank loans assisted Zambia creation of schools and infrastructure
- . Kariba North Bank had World Bank loan
- . IMF, whose *first loan facility to Zambia related to Rhodesia and border closure 1973*.
- . IMF and World Bank contributed to prolonging Apartheid and racism by lending to South Africa. (World Bank also discouraged building of TAZARA because of World Bank investments in Rhodesia Railways).

2. the United Nations supported Zambia's stand and can further support the process of reconstruction

3. Institutions like Africa Development Bank

4. Parastatal Debt: for support utilities such as NCZ, IMAamba coal mine. Much of parastatal debt was guaranteed or supported by government.

iii. Commercial Debt: This ratio is insignificant but can also be tied to argument on parastatal debt

- ***Aid and Support for Reconstruction***, official and people-to-people links for rehabilitation: Demining, People's development programmes, rural and border areas; infrastructural development: Governments and peoples can include those from South Africa, Portugal, Canada, Scandinavian countries, former Warsaw Pact countries. Some sensitive cases can start with People-to-People and NGO collaboration. Official and bilateral support programmes may follow in some cases. The North-South civil society linkages that have helped in many campaigns need to be used so that there is a multiple, collaborated approach to this problem of humanity.

- ***Regional action***, by SADC governments and civil society, on reconstruction and rehabilitation due to apartheid-racism impact and apartheid-caused debt. There is need for both governmental and civil society networking at regional and wider levels. In 1989, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa estimated that between 1980 and 1988, some 1.5 million died and some \$60 billion was lost in economic losses amongst independent Southern African countries.^{cviii} The governments have got together before - in the Front-line States group, SADC, and COMESA. It is possible for them to work together again. Civil society groups working on the issue of debt and apartheid-caused debt need to strengthen bonds and networking.

Sensitizing local NGOs and Civil Society, especially those working in areas which had armed conflict, to the issue of reconstruction after apartheid-caused impact and debt.

CONCLUSION

Zambia played a key role in the struggle against racism and apartheid in Southern Africa. As racism is a crime against humanity, this was a global struggle for the whole of humanity. In the process of fighting apartheid, Zambia was greatly affected. The effects live on into the year 2000. There are some lessons from Zambia's experience:

- From independence, Zambia started off with a basic needs programme. There was heavy investment into the social sector. Many advances were made. Had it not been for the cost of apartheid, the basic needs programme could have strengthened. The quality of life of people is likely to have been much higher today than the achievements that actually have been made.
- Without apartheid, Zambia had the local capacity to meet much of its basic needs. Even with poor copper prices and high oil prices, Zambia would have met much of its social needs largely from its own resources.
- Considering the task and impact at hand in the struggle against racism in Southern Africa, although it was a concern for all humanity, international support for Zambia was inadequate. The inadequate support, commissions and omissions, led to Zambia's economic problems.
- Apartheid contributed to Zambia going into borrowing and high debt, - \$6.4 billion in year 2000. Without apartheid, debt would have been at lower levels
- Debt policies and conditions are slowing down or reversing movement towards fulfilment of basic needs and basic rights, essential components of integral development.
- *Indivisible Debt*. We have found that indivisible debt is debt where one component affects other components in terms of cause, effect, and continuity of debt. In a case like Zambia, debt is indivisible and whole. Money needed in one sector may be moved from other sectors – such as education or health- thereby depriving these sectors. These sectors will then have their needed resources covered through movement of resources from other sectors or through borrowing. In this case, one use of resources will trigger off flight from other sectors and eventually more loans will be acquired.. Secondly, loans are borrowed to cover other loans. A present debt may appear low while what may have happened is that parts of it have been repaid through further borrowing from other sources. A low debt figure may merely be a reflection of debt transferred to other lenders.

- *Zambia's Post-Apartheid reconstruction needs to be organised.* Reconstruction must involve all affected areas of life : economic and humanitarian. As part of economic reconstruction from apartheid, there is need for Zambia's immediate relief from debt. There is also need for strengthening the position of basic needs, at various levels, so that Zambia may move forward on the path of integral development.

* * *

- Gabriel C Banda, August - October, 2000, Lusaka

Box: LEGACY

A legacy of Zambia's role in the liberation struggle are land mines, bombs, and debt. Armed conflict and economic difficulties have contributed to poor quality of life in the year 2000. As the world-wide anti-land mine movement campaigned in the late 1990s, land mine use has moved from that of defensive deterrence to an offensive one leading to much deaths, injury, and economic disruption. Ideally, land mines are well plotted and identified by the user - with even warnings of mine fields posted around the minefield.

In the Zambian scene, anti-personnel and anti-vehicle land mines were planted, mainly at or near border areas, by both the freedom fighters and forces of the racist regimes to stop the movement of their opponents troops and vehicles for raids or supplies. Many freedom fighters, Zambian troops, and Zambian civilians died or were injured as a result of land mines. Economic and social life in many border areas was disrupted. People could not continue farming for food and livelihood. Infrastructure was destroyed by armed conflict. Civilian extension staff withdrew from some areas.

People shifted away from areas of intense armed conflict to areas where they were to take long to adjust to - thus affecting their food production and livelihoods for a long time -even up to the year 2000. Government services could also not reach these areas of intense armed conflict, thereby affecting people's access to basic needs like education and health services. People in these areas then lagged behind in basic needs. This legacy lives on long after the liberation struggles were over.

In 1998, near Maamba in Southern Province, a land mine blew up a motor vehicle - killing and injuring passengers of a development agency. The agency suspended their programme in the area. In 1999, it was reported another mine blew. Even as people prepared for the new millennium in the year 2000, a land mine incident involved district council staff in Southern Province.

The effects of apartheid live on. The Zambian NGO Women for Change works with communities in Southern, Western, and Central provinces. They also work at national level on policy issues. Women for Change, through popular approaches, seeks a participatory, gender balanced, development in the rural and national environment. Women for Change development

workers still encounter the effect of land mines in the development field. The effect is physical, economic, and social. Some areas lagged behind in infrastructure and basic services because of armed conflict of the liberation wars.

"People are in poverty," says Women for Change Executive Director Emily Sikazwe, "due to impoverishment as a result of Zambia's support for the liberation struggle....Women for Change has to pick up the pieces. It becomes a burden for an NGO like us. By ourselves, we don't have the capacity to deal with the problems at hand."^{cx}

Even in the year 2000, long after apartheid South Africa's transition in 1994, it is difficult in some areas for community members to move to organise themselves or have access to basic services. There are areas where development workers cannot move because the routes are mined. In Sinazeze, Kalomo, and areas of Southern, Eastern, Western, and North-western provinces, there are still some places which still have land mines. Says Elizabeth Mubiana, a field animator of Women for Change: " In Kalomo, there are some places which are still feared. People are telling us you can't go there. Local people have routes were to pass. There are no proper roads for vehicles. Development wise, there are people who want projects there but we can't access."^{cx}

Like other NGOs and development agencies, Women for Change members are faced with a difficult situation. They must work with communities, which have lagged behind because of the liberation wars, to build conditions which can support basic needs and services. The debt burden has meant that infrastructure and basic needs in areas of armed conflict are not easily fulfilled. It requires much more than an NGO and members of civil society. It requires some level of multiple support which can more easily be done at a scale of government or international action. For development to take place, the causes must be dealt with and outstanding problems, like economic and policy issues and land mines, need to be cleared.

Besides land mines, in some areas where freedom fighters and refugees were based, bombs and grenades are still being found. Near Lusaka town, at Chikumbi, were there is a mass graveyard of hundreds of Zimbabwe nationalists massacred by Rhodesian forces air raids in August 1978, some people have been casualties of grenades left behind years before. Amake Kankhondo mentions that in 1980, two young members of a family died while in June 1998 two other family members died and a friend was injured.^{cx} Even in their gardens, people in Chikumbi have continued to find grenades. They are now cautious and alert authorities to come and deal with bombs and grenades.

Due to problems of national debt, there has not been much organised reconstruction of the community. Residents of Chikumbi will still remain with the history of the Southern Africa liberation struggle. First having hosted Mozambican (FRELIMO) freedom fighters, Zimbabwean fighters then followed. Kankhondo, "the Little War," was born in 1978, a day before the Rhodesian Airforce raided the ZAPU centre at Chikumbi and killed hundreds of people. Because he was born at the time of the raids and survived, his grandmother then named him Kankhondo. Kankhondo's mother Jessy Phiri and other residents remember helping the wounded with water.

People of Chikumbi and areas surrounding the former Zimbabwean base have many children whose fathers were Zimbabwean freedom fighters. Zambia's external debt affects the ability to meet cost of social services. Due to the external debt conditions, many of these Chikumbi young men and women have not been able to meet the cost of basic needs like education. Farming does not yield much due to lack of support. In the harsh economy of the 1990s, they have difficulties in livelihood and basic needs. In 1998, through their own initiative, Kankhondo's mother, uncle Jason Phiri, and other community members were trying to meet the Zimbabwe government to find ways in which the children of Chikumbi could be supported in their basic needs. These daughters and sons of Chikumbi are a sign of the Southern Africa liberation struggle and the economic times that followed the struggle. Action is needed to lift the burden of debt and apartheid on the people of Chikumbi and Zambia.

Appendices:

1. **APARTHEID-CAUSED LIFE LINE**

- 1945, United Nations Organisation comes into life
- 1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared by United
- 1948, the National Party comes into government in South Africa and institutionalises "Apartheid," seperateness of the races
- 1953 Federation. Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland become the Central Africa Federation
- 1960 Sharpeville Massacres
- 1961, Angola freedom fighters start organised armed struggle following massacres of Africans by Portuguese military
- 1961, Umukhontwe we Sizwe, declaration for armed struggle in South Africa
- 1961 UNIP Central Committee Decision on forthcoming independent
- 1963, Organisation of African Unity, OAU, formed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. OAU Liberation Committee starts work
- 1963 Central Africa Federation dissolved
- 1964, September, Frelimo launches armed struggle in Mozambique
- 1964 October 24, Zambia Independence Day
- 1965 ZAPU and ZANU offices opened in Zambia

- 1965, armed raids into Zambia by Portuguese
- 1965, UN Resolutions 2012(XX) and 2022(XX) on the critical Rhodesia situation and action to pre-empt UDI from taking place
- 1965, November 11, UDI in Southern Rhodesia
- 1966, March. MPLA of Angola starts to use Zambia as base
- 1966, Rhodesia mandatory sanctions, Security Council Resolution 253
- 1966, UN revokes South Africa authority over Namibia, in Resolution 2145(XXI)
- 1966/67, Armed struggle for Zimbabwe launched
 - 1967, Zimbabwean freedom fighters raid Rhodesian forces
- 1967 Namibia freedom fighters, SWAPO, launches armed struggle
- 1967, UN establishes United Nations Council for Namibia, Resolution 2248.
 - 1967, SWAPO armed struggle starts
- 1968, Luangwa Brigade bombed
- 1969. Lusaka Manifesto signed by representatives of 14 states
- 1973, Oil price hikes arise from Middle East War. Decline of copper prices follows in the 1970s.
- 1973, First Zambia standby loan facility from IMF
- 1973, SWAPO recognised by UN, through Resolution 3111 (XXVIII)
- 1973, November 30, International Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid passed by UN General Assembly as Resolution 3068 (XXVII)
- 1974, Lusaka accord signed for independence of Mozambique
- 1974, Lusaka Unity talks and Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity on Accord by Zimbabwe's freedom movements
- 1974, Coup in Portugal
- 1974, Release of Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, and other freedom fighter in Rhodesia
- 1975, June. Mozambique independence
- 1975, Portuguese withdraw from Angola. Angola conflict rises,
- 1975, Emergence of Mushala Group armed uprising against Zambia's government

- 1975, Zambia's first compulsory school leavers military training intake
- 1976, through Resolution 31/146 of 1976, SWAPO given observer status at the UN
- 1976 Geneva Conference on Rhodesia breaks down
- 1977 Western Nations "Contact Group" over Namibia formed, leading to:
- 1978, UN Security Council Resolution 435 on the granting of Namibia's independence. South Africa does not implement, slows down transition to independence
- 1978, United Nations International Anti-Apartheid Year
- 1978,1979. Intensive Rhodesia Raids and massacres into Zambia: Kavalamanja in Luangwa, Lusaka West, Chikumbi near Lusaka, Mkushi, and other areas
- 1979, Zambia mobilises troops in view of Rhodesia incursions and situation of the South African regime.
- 1979, OPEC oil price doubled
- 1980, Zimbabwe Independence
- 1981, Reagan administration USA "linkage" for Namibia implementation of Resolution 435 to independence
- 1982, Adamson Mushala killed by Zambia security forces
- 1986, South Africa air force raids Lusaka refugee centre with bombers
- 1987, May 1. Zambia breaks off IMF economic programme
- 1989, Zambia back onto IMF programme
- 1989, UN Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa (A/RES/S-16/1)
- 1990, March. Namibia independence
- 1990, February, Nelson Mandela and South African freedom fighters released from prison, ANC unbanned
- 1991, November. UNIP leaves government in Zambia, and MMD, under Frederick Chiluba as President, takes over government. Complete economic liberalisation starts
- 1994, Universal Elections in South Africa, ANC in government under Nelson Mandela as President

2. Zambia Debt Figures, 1965-2000 *

<i>Year</i>	<i>Million \$, External Debt</i>	
1965	155	
1966	157	
1967	195	
1968	210	
1969	247	
1970	654	
1971	689	
1972	758	
1973	823	
1974	957	
1975	1,353	
1976		1,523
1977	2,341	
1978	2,585	
1979	3,047	
1980	3,266	
1981	3,633	
1982	3,709	
1983	3,805	
1984	3,826	
1985	4,639	
1986	5,700	
1987	6,508	
1988	6,709	
1989	6,873	
1990	6,600	
1991	7,190	
1992	6,986	
1993	6,361	
1994	6,236	
1995	6,441	
1996	6,571	
1997	7,144	

1998		-
1999		6,507
2000, March	6,419	

*For 1965-95 debt figures, after AFRODAD and Zambia Coalition on Debt and Development, "Zambia: Internal Issues on External Debt," a paper, June 1997, Lusaka. 1996-2000, UNDP Zambia Zambia Human Development Report 1998, + Ministry of Finance and Economic Development figures.

Notes and References:

i... Figures from Ministry of Finance Debt Unit figures, September 2000.

ii..."spearhead" term used in *The High Price of Principles, Kaunda and the White South* by Richard Hall, Penguin Books, 1969, p 17

iii..."Frontline Countries," "Fontline States" - "Frontline," a term implying foward front, contact, positions in a battle.

iv..."The Truth about the Region," by John Daniel a former Senior Researcher with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Vol 14 No 4, August 1999, p3 and quotes this view, written in the TRC Report Volume 5, p 257.

v... Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Volume 2, p 43, quoted in "The Truth about the Region," by John Daniel a former Senior Researcher with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Vol 14 No 4, August 1999, p 3.

vi...In the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, Volume 2, p 43, quoted in John Daniel, "The Truth about the Region," in *Southern Africa REPORT*, Vol 14, No 4, August 1999.

vii. Nelson Mandela on Zambia Information Services video "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

viii...Zambia Information Services video "Zambia, Birth Place of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka

ix... Dr Kenneth Kaunda in interview with author, Lusaka 1992, 2000

x- ZNBC 1994 Special Television interview, Dr Kenneth Kaunda speaking with Kenneth Maduma just after Nelson Mandela becomes South Africa's President, "The Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa, Kaunda's Role," 1994.

xi.. Sid Lemelle, in *Pan Africanism for Beginners*, Writers and Readers Publishing, New York, 1992, p 149 creates the link between OAU and disbanding of PAFMECSA to give way to the new OAU.

xii.... C O C Amate, *Inside the OAU. Pan-Africanism in Practice*, Macmillan, 1986. p 218. *Inside OAU* is an excellent deep narrative on the OAU and its inner workings.

xiii.... *Fifth Summit Conference of East and Centreal African States MANIFESTO ON SOUTHERN AFRICA*, Lusaka 14th - 16th April 1969. Government Printer, Lusaka. p1.

xiv.... *Africa South of the Sahara 1988*, p1081.

xv...Black Caucus-Africa Research Centre, *The Sanctions Weapon. A Summary of The Debate over Sanctions Against South Africa*, Buchu Books, Cape Town, 1989. p 63. Quoting Zambia President Kenneth Kaunda.

xvi..... George Crown, "Success of the Arms embargo," in Joseph Hanlon, (ed), *South Africa, The Sanctions Report*, A Report from the Independent Expert Group on the Evaluation of the Application & Impact of Sanctions against South Africa, prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa. Published by Commonwealth Secretariat, James Curry, and Heinemann, 1990. pp 168- 172.

xvii..... Coverage of the role of banks and financial institutions in sustaining apartheid includes *APARTHEID-CAUSED DEBT - The Role of German and Swiss Finance*, Jubilee 2000 South Africa, 1999. English Version.

xviii..... *South Africa, The Sanctions Report*, A Report from the Independent Expert Study Group on the Evaluations of the Application & Impact of Sanctions against South Africa prepared for the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa.

xix..... Jorge Jardim, *Sanctions Double-Cross, Oil to Rhodesia*, Intervencao, 1978, Lisbon.

xx..... Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1974, p 212 quotes President Kenneth Kaunda on August 10, 1966 Radio Zambia saying the OAU efforts were "most disappointing to say the least." Page 215 continues the discussion on similar disappointment with the United Nations.

xxi..... In the Government Printer book on the International Commission of Enquiry into the assassination of Herbert Chitepo.

xxii..... Kenneth D Kaunda in conversation with writer, 1992, produced in forthcoming *Inside KK*, Lusaka.

xxiii..... Mike Faber, *Zambia - The Moulding of a Nation*, Africa Bureau, London. p 11.

xxiv..... For instance, at 38 million pounds, a big portion of the local contribution to the 84.6 million pounds initial cost of Kariba dam came from Zambia through copper earnings and federal funds. The World Bank gave a loan of 28 million pounds, CDC and Commonwealth Development Finance Company provided 18 million pounds. Read Vincent Marko Tembo, *A History of Central and Southern Africa*, ZPC Publications, 1990, p 164

xxv..... Jan Pettman, *ZAMBIA, Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1974, p 169,

xxvi..... Figure from: 1) *An Introduction to Zambia*, UNICEF UK, 1992. p 2. And 2), on the other hand, a debt of \$96 million dollars is mentioned in Rabbison Chongo's "Borrowing as a Result of Pressure by Apartheid South Africa," presented at CCJP-JCTR Apartheid-Caused Debt Workshop, March 2000.

xxvii..... ZIS, *Birth of Freedom Struggle* video, Lusaka, 1997

xxviii..... ZIS *Birth of Freedom Struggle* video, ibid

xxix..... - with some two-thirds of employed men in Barotseland going to South Africa under WENELA mine labour enterprise. Check Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann, 1974, p 85

xxx..... Dr Kenneth Kaunda in conversation with writer, 1992, and recorded in forthcoming *Inside KK*.

xxxi..... Elijah Mudenda, *ZAMBIA: A Generation of Struggle*, SAPES Books, Harare, 1999. p 90, And Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann, 1974, p 120.

xxxii..... Elijah Mudenda, *ZAMBIA: A Generation of Struggle*, SAPES Books 1999, p 55.

xxxiii..... Elijah Mudenda, *ZAMBIA: A Generation of Struggle*, SAPES Books 1999, p 55

xxxiv..... Kenneth W Grundy, "Economic Patterns in the New Southern African Balance," in Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds, *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, Macmillan, 1979, p 293.

xxxv..... ZIS, *Birth of freedom Struggle* video, 1997

xxxvi..... Jan Pettman, *Zambia: Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann, 1974, p 165.

xxxvii..... Bertha Zimba Osei-Hwedie and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, *Tanzania-Zambia Railroad: An Analysis of Zambia's Decision-Making in Transportation*, Brunswick Publishing, Virginia, 1990. p 15

xxxviii..... Bertha Zimba Osei-Hwedie and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, *Tanzania-Zambia Railroad: An Analysis of Zambia's Decision-Making in Transportation*, Brunswick, 1990. p 12.

xxxix..... Osei-Hwedie, *Tanzania-Zambia Railroad*, p 54

xl..... ZIS video, *Birth Place of Freedom*, 1997, Lusaka.

xli..... Bertha Zimba Osei-Hwedie and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, *Tanzania-Zambia Railroad: An Analysis of Zambia's Decision-Making in Transportation*, Brunswick Publishing, Virginia, 1990. p 15

xlii Also quoted by Rabbison Chongo, former Finance Minister in the Second Republic, in his paper "Borrowing as a Result of Pressure by Apartheid South Africa," at CCJP-JCTR Apartheid-Caused Debt workshop, March 2000, Lusaka.

xliii..... *Art on the Frontline*, Mayfest Project, Frontline States/Karia Press

xliv..... GRZ, *Report of the Auditor-General on the Review of Operations of ZESCO limited and Kariba North Bank Company Limited for the Period From 1994 to 1998*, GRZ, 1999, Lusaka.

xl..... GRZ *Fourth National Development Plan*

xlvi..... Figures on TAZAMA differ according to sources. Osei-Hwedie indicate 16 million pounds Sterling, then equivalent to some K27.2 m and \$38 m.

xlvii..... Bertha Zimba Osei-Hwedie and Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, *Tanzania-Zambia Railroad: An Analysis of Zambia's Decision-Making in Transportation*, Brunswick, 1990. p 16.

xlviii..... *Africa Contemporary Record 1970-1971*, p B227

xlix..... GRZ, *Report of the Auditor-General on the Review of Operations of ZESCO limited and Kariba North Bank Company Limited for the Period From 1994 to 1998*, GRZ, 1999, Lusaka.

l..... All the Kariba North Bank loan figures from GRZ, *Report of the Auditor-General on the Review of Operations of ZESCO limited and Kariba North Bank Company Limited for the Period From 1994 to 1998*, GRZ, 1999, Lusaka.

li..... A common expression by President Kenneth Kaunda.

lii..... Elijah Mudenda, *ZAMBIA: A Generation of Struggle*, SAPES Books 1999, p 55.

liii..... ILO, *ZAMBIA Basic Needs in an Economy under Pressure*, ILO 1981

liv..... Kenneth W Grundy, "Economic Patterns in the New Southern African Balance," in Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds, *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, Macmillan, 1979, p 293.

lv..... Vincent Marko Tembo, *A History of Central and Southern Africa*, ZPC, 1990. p 174.

lvi..... Mike Faber, *Zambia: The Moulding of a Nation*, p 10.

lvii..... Zambia in Brief, ZIS Lusaka, c 1976. P 23.

lviii..... ILO, *Zambia, Basic Needs in An Economy under Pressure*, ILO-JASPA, Addis Ababa, 1981. p 1.

lix..... *Aspects of the Mozambican Struggle*, FRELIMO, p 2.

lx..... Waldemar A Nielsen, *The Great Powers & Africa*, op cit.

lxi..... Elijah Mudenda, *ZAMBIA: A Generation of Struggle*, SAPES Books, Harare, 1999.

lxii..... P D Oelofsen, in *Zambia's Support for Terrorists - Position Under International Law*, Inaugural Address Delivered at the University College of Zululand, 5th October, 1967, shows concern about Zambia's support for the freedom fighters being part of an OAU "grand plan" for liberation of Southern Africa.

lxiii.... Gen Tom Fara in discussion with writer, September 2000, Lusaka.

lxiv..... This was from various written and broadcast materials and confirmed in discussion with Major General Tom Fara, one time in charge of Zambia Army operations on the Zambezi. In discussion, September 2000, Lusaka.

lxv..... Gen Kingsley Chinkuli in Zambia Information Services video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

lxvi..... Lt General Benjamin Mibenge on Zambia Information Services video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

lxvii..... SIPRI, *SIPRI Year Book 1978*, Taylor and Francis Ltd, London.

lxviii..... *SIPRI Year Book 1978*, p 241.

lxix.....Current Kwacha Expenditure for 1964-1971 from *SIPRI Year Book 1978*, pp 50-51 and for 1972-1979 from *SIPRI Year Book 1982*, pp 146-148. SIPRI Year Books prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, are published by Taylor and Francis Ltd. The *Zambia, Birth of Freedom* Video production by Zambia Information Services, 1997, uses figures from T M Shaw and Douglas Anglin's *Zambian Foreign Policy Studies in Diplomacy and Dependency*, 1979. Shaw and Anglin's figures are based on 1979 values but are comparable to the early SIPRI figures.

We have shown our calculation of their equivalence in US Dollar at the time. In the last column, we have used deflators to show the value of those dollars in the year 1998, based on 1995 values.

lxx..... Figures we have computed from military expenditure and exports

lxxi..... Gabriel Banda, *Adjusting to Adjustment*, Oxfam Publications, 1991. p 10.

lxxii..... GDP ratio figures from *SIPRI Year Book 1978*, pp 52-53. Taylor and Francis Ltd, London.

lxxiii..... From ZIS video, *Birth of Freedom*, 1997, quoting from T M Shaw and Douglas Anglin *Zambia's Foreign Policy: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependency*, Westview, 1978.

lxxiv..... Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditure 1991*, World Priorities, Washington DC, 1991. p 53.

lxxv..... From SIPRI Year Books 1970s- 1982, showing some of Zambia's defence procurement.

lxxvi..... Suppliers can be found in various SIPRI Year Books.

lxxvii.. Gen Kingsley Chinkuli in Zambia Information Services video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

lxxviii..... Jan Pettman, *ZAMBIA, Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1974, p 166, gives these figures quoted from the Parliamentary Hansard. The ZIS Video *Birth of Freedom Struggle* refers to numbers close to this but slightly less but says "at least."

lxxix..... Phyllis Johnson, David Martin eds, *Destabilisation Report*, p 82, records 18 incidents in a table. We have included the May 19, 1986 raid on Lusaka's Makeni refugee residence.

lxxx..... Kenneth Kaunda, in "A Path of Revolution, Twelfth General Conference of UNIP - September 1978.P 14. ZIS, 1978. p 14.

lxxxi..... UNECA, *South African Destabilisation - The Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, UNECA 1989, and UNICEF's *Children on the Frontline* deal with war-related costs.

lxxxii..... *Selous Scouts Top Secret War*, a story by Lt Col Reid Daly told to Peter Stiff, Galago Publishing, South Africa and Kent.

lxxxiii..... Timothy M Shaw and Douglas G Anglin, "Zambia: The Crises of Liberation," in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crises*, eds Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Macmillan Press, 1979. p 222.

lxxxiv..... Major General Tom Fara, one time in charge of Zambia Army operations on the Zambezi River front, mentioned, in interview with writer in September 2000, that some refugee settlements in Eastern Zambia were attacked by Portuguese forces. Following such events, Zambia had to insure that refugees lived in safety.

lxxxv..... UN Security Council Resolution S/PV 1944, July 27, 1976 is referred to have recognised South Africa sponsorship of the Mushala group, in "Zambia: The Crises of Liberation," by Timothy M Shaw and Douglas Anglin, in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, ed Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Macmillan, 1979. pp 199-222.

lxxxvi..... Jan Pettman, *Zambia, Security and Conflict*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1974. p 29. And reported in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin *The Destabilisation Report*, p 83, One person of European race was sentenced to two years hard labour after pleading guilty to possession of a time bomb he was found assembling in Lusaka.

lxxxvii..... This also mentioned in Timothy M Shaw and Douglas G Anglin, "Zambia: The Crises of Liberation," in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crises*, edited by Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Macmillan Press, 1979, pp 199 - 222. The chapter is a good general introduction to Zambia's role in some events of the Southern Africa and the international stage.

lxxxviii..... Dr Kenneth Kaunda reflecting in 1994 ZNBC special television programme in interview with Kenneth Maduma, just after Nelson Mandela becomes South Africa President - "The Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa: Kaunda's role," 1994.

lxxxix..... Gen Kingsley Chinkuli in Zambia Information Service Video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

xc..... Zambia Information Service Video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka

xci... Zambia Information Services Video, "Zambia, Birth of Freedom Struggle," ZIS, 1997, Lusaka.

xcii... Timothy M Shaw and Douglas G Anglin, "Zambia: The Crises of Liberation," in *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crises*, edited by Gwendolyn M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, Macmillan, 1979. pp 199-222. Quoting *African Business* of May 1978, p 147, Note 20 gives debt stock and debt service ratio at 1975.

xciii... Oxfam's Kevin Watkins, Senior Policy Adviser, for instance has also in the year 2000 argued that HIPC might be unfavourable and that Zambia's interest payments may actually increase if IMF-World Bank decide in December 2000 that Zambia joins HIPC. Quoted in "Zambia's Debt Relief a Fraud," by Janet Ilunga, in *Business Times*, August 28 -September 10, 2000. P 1.

xciv... Radio Phoenix discussion programme "Let the People Speak," Friday 20th October, 2000. Lusaka.

xcv.... Emmanuel Kasonde speaking in ZNBC special TV programme, "Looking into Zambia's Debt," produced by Patricia Mulenga, 2000.

^{xcvi}... David Phiri speaking in ZNBC special TV programme, "Looking into Zambia's Debt," produced by Patricia Mulenga, 2000.

^{xcvii}... Patrick Malambo speaking in ZNBC special TV programme, "Looking into Zambia's Debt," produced by Patricia Mulenga, 2000.

^{xcviii}... Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, MOFED, Figures September 2000.

^c *Land Mine Monitor Report* 1999 quoted in "Land Mines, Curse of our Hospitality?" *Times of Zambia*, October 26, 2000, p 6.

^{ci}... Monday 23rd October 2000, Frederick Chiluba on ZNBC Radio and Television address on the eve of the 36th Anniversary of independence,

^{cii}... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*, UNDP.P22.

^{ciii}... *Living Conditions Monitoring Survey Report 1996*, CSO, p 126, mentioned also in *National Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework*, Ministry of Community Development and Social Services, May 1998, Lusaka, p 7.

^{civ}... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*, UNDP Lusaka. P 27.

^{cv}... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*. P 42.

^{cvi}... UNDP Lusaka, *Zambia Human Development Report 1998*. P 42.

^{cvii}... Compiled from figures from various State of the World's Children Reports, UNICEF, and *UNDP Human Development Report 1998*. From the late 1990s, it may be advisable to go back to statistics which were done at particular periods as there is now a tendency to cover decline in the quality of life by organisations to work on averages extending across good and poor figures for previous periods, which were better than the present - thus masking the present decline. Sometimes poorer figures are published retrospectively.

^{cviii}... UNECA's *South Africa Destabilisation: the Economic Cost of Frontline Resistance to Apartheid*, Commissioned by UNECA and the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for Economic Recovery and Development, UNECA, 1989. Quoted in *Art from the Frontline*, p 17.

^{cix}... Mrs Emily Sikazwe, in discussion with writer, September 2000, Lusaka.

^{cx}... In conversation with writer, September 2000, Lusaka. Elizabeth Mubiana has worked with Women for Change in Sinazeze, Southern Province, and, earlier, in Senanga, Western Province, areas which were greatly affected by raids by external troops.

^{cxii}... "Amake Kankhondo," Kankhondo's Mother Jessy Phiri and her brother Jason Phiri, in discussion with writer, September 2000, Chikumbi, near Lusaka.