PREFACE

This oral history of Governor Dan Walker's administration is a product of "Eyewitness Illinois," a program of the Oral History Office of Sangamon State University. The project was made possible in part by a grant from the Illinois Humanities Council in cooperation with the National Endowment for the Humanities. Additional financial support was provided by Caterpillar Tractor Company, Arthur Andersen & Co., Canteen Corporation, Shelby Cullom Davis Foundation, Susan Cooke House Trust and the MacArthur Foundation. Central to this program is a conviction that the business of the governor deserves larger and better public understanding, and that oral history offers a distinctive way of supplying it.

Governor Dan Walker held Illinois chief executive position from 1973-1977 after winning the 1972 election as the Democratic candidate who ran without Chicago's Mayor Daley's endorsement. He announced his decision to run in 1970 and began the famous "Walk" around the state of Illinois where he captured the votes of the people and publicity for his campaign. His love for campaigning and his one-on-one meetings with the people are captured in the memoir in the "Walk" stories.

Dan Walker was born in 1922 in Washington, D.C. His father was a navy man and Dan Walker followed in his footsteps by joining the U. S. Navy in 1939. Later, he entered the U. S. Naval Academy. After several years in the navy, he changed the direction of his career and entered law school at Northwestern University. There he helped organize the Young Democrats and made contacts that would prove helpful when he embarked on his political career. Upon graduation in 1950, his legal career began in Springfield, Illinois, where he worked on severaudy commissions. He was selected to be a clerk to the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. A tour of duty in Korea interrupted this position; however, his legal enpertise was tapped and he was appointed deputy chief commissioner to the Court of Military appeals.

Walker attributed his involvement with Adlai Stevenson's 1952 presidential campaign as the beginning of his political career. Walker continued to be active in Democratic campaigns for many years even while doing legal work for the firm of Hopkins-Sutter where he became a trial lawyer. In this oral history, former Governor Walker talks about his political life and gives us personal insight into the Walker administration and his political style.

Readers of this oral history should bear in mind that it is a transcript of the spoken word. Its informal, conversational style represents a deliberate attempt to encourage candor and to tap the narrator's memory. However, persons interested in listening to the tapes should understand that editorial considerations produced a text that differs somewhat from the original recordings. Both the recordings and this transcript should be regarded as a primary historical source, as no effort was made to correct or challenge the narrator. The conclusions and assertions do not necessarily represent the views of the Illinois Humanities Council, the National Endowment for the Humanities, Sangamon State University, or other sponsors, nor are these institutions responsible for the factual accuracy of the memoir.

The tape recorded interviews were conducted by Marilyn H. Immel during the summer of 1981 and in February, 1982. Ms. Immel was born in 1943 in Wichita, Kansas. She received a bachelor's degree in Russian language and literature from Northwestern University in 1965. While raising two children she was actively involved with the League of Women Voters in Springfield, Illinois, working primarily in the areas of election laws and government. In 1977 she returned to school in order to pursue a master's degree in political science. She was associated with the Oral History Office of Sangamon State University from January of 1981 until August, 1983.

Jackie Barnes transcribed the tapes and, after the transcriptions were edited by Ms. Immel and reviewed by Governor Dan Walker, Linda Jett prepared the typescript. Florence Hardin compiled the index. Francie Staggs and Carol Marshall assisted in the pre-interview research. Marilyn Immel supervised the artwork, photographic layout and production. The Illinois State Historical Library provided valuable assistance in the research effort.

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DAN WALKER

May 12, 1981, Tape 1, Side 1

A: I was born in Washington D.C. in 1922. My father was a chief petty officer in the United States Navy with a very strong sense of duty, discipline, self-discipline and family. He was raised in Texas, in west Texas to be precise, at a time in the early 1900's when men still carried guns to protect themselves and death from shooting was not an unusual phenomenon. He left home at a very early age and became a telegrapher. At one point he telegraphed for Poncho Villa in Mexico. Then he joined the navy in 1914, I believe it was, and went in to submarine duty. He was a very independent man, very tough man.

He was a very strict taskmaster with both my brother and myself. He insisted on hard work, imagination, discipline, duty, all of those things. He became an ardent New Dealer in the 1930's because he had then left the navy and was out of work. It was a very, very difficult time for the family during the depression years because he had no job and only sixty dollars a month I think it was, if that, from the navy. Those were very tough times and a high degree of interest in government and the political system was fostered by my father in me, particularly. He wanted me to become a lawyer to follow in the footsteps of my uncle Daniel Walker who was a judge in Texas. He wanted my brother to go to the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and become a naval officer. And it worked out that way so far as my brother was concerned and I was concerned, ultimately, although because of the war I got diverted from law, enlisted in the navy for two years and then went to the Naval Academy.

I would say that his dedication to hard work was something that played a real part in my life later on and also the feeling of independence. In high school I did very well scholastically, did not participate very much

in sports simply because it wasn't really feasible since we lived out in the country and I had to take the bus home immediately after school. And spent a lot of time on school work, again, at the behest of my father.

Q: Did you feel a lot of pressure from him to perform or were you really self-motivating?

A: I think it's a combination of both. He believed that Walkers belonged in the top 10 percent and you got there. And you got there by using your brain and hard work. And he inculcated that over and over and over again in my brother and in myself.

Q: And how old is your brother?

A: He's two years older than I and he spent his lifetime career in the navy for almost thirty years. My father participated in World War I and in World War II. He was called back to the navy when World War II started and stayed in until after the end of World War II. He and I were very, very close, extremely close.

After leaving the Naval Academy I decided to take a career in the navy. But, after a couple of years it paled simply because I found out that if you stayed out of trouble you were going to move up in advancement at the same pace as anybody else, and there was no bonus, if you will--I don't mean money--no incentive to do anything beyond stay out of trouble and do a decent job. If you were imaginative and resourceful, the navy didn't reward that and understandably so, at least not until you got up to the rank of commander or higher. And so I got tired of it and left the navy and went to law school.

Q: What made you choose Northwestern?

A: That was accidental. I was on a destroyer on the East Coast and we were headed for the Mediterranean when I applied for papers from Stanford, Harvard and Northwestern law schools. My first choice was Stanford. The only set of papers that arrived before we got underway for the Mediterranean was Northwestern and if I'd waited until I got to the Med to pick up mail, it would have been too late to apply for the fall entrance and so I applied to Northwestern and was accepted there. As it turned out, I made the best choice and was delighted with Northwestern. At Northwestern I was fortunate enough to reverse my academic record at the Naval Academy which was not all that good.

Q: It wasn't good?

A: No, no.

Q: You did so well in high school.

A: I started out as what they call a "star." It doesn't mean what you think it means. A star refers to midshipmen being able to wear a star if you're in the top 10 percent of the class. And I was the first year. From then on it was downhill. I got tired of studying--that thing that happens to a lot of young people in college. I joined the underground poker game and spent my nights playing poker (laughter) and I didn't

study all that much, and I learned that I could get passing grades without studying much, and so that's exactly what I did.

Q: Was that your rebellion? It doesn't sound like you ever really rebelled against parental authority through high school.

A: Perhaps so, perhaps so. I never really spent much time thinking about it. I wasn't stimulated except in the English and history courses which taught me something of course about myself. I found mathematics interesting but not terribly stimulating and I ran into trouble with it. But the English courses I loved and the history, the writing and that kind of thing, debating, which I did a lot of at the academy, and the oratorical contests, which I did a lot of. And I finally graduated, I think eight hundred in a class of about twelve hundred.

Then when I went to law school it was exactly the reverse. I was totally stimulated and you know what happened in law school. I enjoyed it thoroughly except for the third-year doldrums that I'm sure your husband has told you about. I almost got in trouble at the Naval Academy because I had a facility for escaping the academy at night time. What I did was join, as a sport, crew, rowing, you know. And I did it deliberately. I still had my sailor's uniform with me.

I mentioned earlier that I went into the navy as an enlisted man in 1939. I enjoyed being an enlisted man in the navy. It's a lot more fun being an enlisted man than it is being an officer. After a couple of years of it though I decided that this just wasn't, again, stimulating enough, and so I took the competitive exams from the fleet to go to the Naval Academy. And even though I had not taken in high school either chemistry or physics, two of the courses that were on the exams, and did not have any way to study them at sea except to look at books that didn't make much sense to me, I was fortunate enough to pass the exams, and I think I stood sixth or seventh out of the several thousand sailors who took the exams.

Q: As a sailor, as already an enlisted man did you have to have a sponsor as . . .

A: No.

Q: . . . as men coming out of high school do?

A: No. At that time there were no competitive exams for congressional appointments. Congressmen and senators, almost all of them chose people on the basis of just patronage, favoritism. But we were poor and we didn't have any access to a congressman or a senator, and the only way I or my brother could get into the Naval Academy was to take the competitive exams as an enlisted man. And they set aside at that time 50 appointments at the Naval Academy for the fleet sailors out of, in our class, a total of 1250 that went in. And, I was fortunate enough to get one of those 50 positions.

When I went into the academy, I kept my sailor's uniform. What I would do was go over to the boathouse after classes and get in a one-man scull. I would take my sailor's uniform with me and row up the river, beach the

scull, put on the sailor's uniform and go out on the town until midnight (laughter) or whatever, at the taverns and so forth; I had kept my identification card as a sailor. And then I would row back down to the boathouse and take off my sailor's uniform, and watching very carefully for the guards, sneak back to my room, crawl through the window and go to bed.

Q: Did your friends know you were doing this?

A: Oh, some of them did, sure. And, one night I had a near escape because this night I went over the wall. I didn't bother with the scull. And coming back I was tired and it was about two o'clock in the morning and I didn't feel like climbing the wall. The senior midshipmen could be out this particular night and if you were in summer uniform, "whites," the only way you could tell the difference between a plebe and a senior was the number of stripes that are on the shoulder board, and the guard at the gate from a ways away couldn't see that. There's no insignia on the sleeves at all. So, I walked up to within about twenty feet of the gate when I thought he might be able to see the shoulder board, and I just took off and ran at top speed through the gate (laughter) and across the grounds, and of course the "jimmy leg"--that's what they called the guards--was a retired chief petty officer. He took out the gun and, "Stop, stop or I'll shoot," and of course he couldn't chase me and I was very fast, and so they turned out the guard and searched all rooms but by this time I was sound asleep in my bed. Interestingly, while I was governor, the superintendent of the Naval Academy sent me a photograph of the side of the building where my window was, circled the window in red and put a big title underneath it, "Governor Dan Walker Memorial Window." (laughter) It was the window that I used to crawl in and out of when I was on these escapades.

Q: That's great.

A: But if I'd been caught I would have been kicked out immediately and sent back to the fleet. Because that was the kind of discipline they established at the academy during those war years.

Q: But even then you were taking chances.

A: Oh sure. I've been taking chances all my life. And I think I got that also from my father. He was an inveterate gambler and taking chances I've grown up with, and continued to do throughout my life. I am a gambler in that sense.

Q: Tell me about your law school experience. I know you went into trial work. Is that something you knew you wanted to do all along?

A: Furthest thing from my mind. I had absolutely no intentions of going into trial work. I was married just before I went into law school and by the time I graduated my wife and I had two children, and a third one on the way. I had very little money. I invested every cent I had saved in the navy in buying furniture to get an apartment, which was very hard to come by in 1947 in Chicago. And with the children and the medical expenses and everything--of course we had no medical insurance--it was a very tight living. And I worked at the same time I

was studying. I worked for the Veteran's Administration on campus doing typing work and doing typing for professors to earn money. And then I had a real problem the last year because I was fortunate enough to be elected editor-in-chief of the law review and that just requires so much time, I couldn't continue working. So, the law school was kind enough to give me a cash scholarship which they had not done up till that point, because tuition was covered under the GI bill, so that I could have enough money to live on that last year. But I enjoyed law school courses thoroughly except for that third-year boredom with the subject matters.

Q: Were there contacts that you made there that were important politically later on or . . .

A: Oh yes. While I was in law school I started, along with some other people, an organization called the Young Democrats which had been dormant during the war years. We reorganized it and I served, I think, as north side vice-president of the Young Democrats. And was very active in Paul Douglas's 1948 campaign for the U.S. Senate. I organized what was called the Veterans for Douglas organization. Also during law school I got to know Wally Schaefer very well who subsequently became counsel to Governor Stevenson, and also Carl McGowan, who was on the faculty, who subsequently relieved Wally Schaefer as counsel when Wally became a justice of the Illinois Supreme Court. And they introduced me to Adlai Stevenson, and Wally got me my first job in Springfield.

At that time I had planned to go to California and practice law but I got interested in politics, in government, in the state of Illinois, and decided to stay here at least for one job with the Commission to Study State Government, the "Little Hoover" Commission. And as an interim measure between February when I graduated from law school, and I think September, when I became law clerk to the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court.

Q: Okay, that was in . . .

A: Nineteen hundred and fifty.

Q: Nineteen hundred and fifty is the year you graduated.

A: That's correct.

Q: And then you moved your family to Washington?

A: Yes. We moved from Chicago to Springfield for a half a year where Julie Ann was born.

Q: And what were you doing in Springfield?

A: That's when I was on the staff of the Commission to Study State Government.

Q: Okay.

A: The Efficiency in Government Study. I specifically had responsibility for several commissions and boards--I don't recall which--

and the Department of Insurance. And then left there to go to Washington.

Q: What was that experience like in Washington?

A: It was fascinating. The Springfield experience was also fascinating. I had a good deal of exposure to Paul Powell, who was then a state representative, later became secretary of state, and is known for the "shoebox scandal," as you know. And Paul was a very interesting fellow about state government and politics and he was a good government guy, interestingly, in everything except something that involved him personally. And then he was, you know, for number one. But on many issues he was on Governor Stevenson's side, on good government positions. I learned a lot from Wally Schaefer, from Jack Isakoff who was executive director of the commission, and from the members of the commission, about Illinois state government which stood me in good stead in later years. The Washington experience was fascinating of course, working for the chief justice. And, taught me a lot about appellate court work.

Q: That must have been incredibly competitive. There must have been many, many people who wanted to be clerk to the chief justice of the Supreme Court.

A: Yes, it is. Fortunately another justice had a practice of picking every two years a law clerk from Northwestern Law School. And I was going to be his clerk and then he died. And so I automatically came under consideration by the chief justice. At that time, very close to the chief justice was a gentleman by the name of Willard Pedrick. He was on the faculty at Northwestern Law School, since dean and now professor at Arizona Law School. Pedrick and I got along very well and Pedrick recommended me to the chief justice. Also when you're--I'm not being pretentious I trust--when you're editor-in-chief of the law review of a leading law school you were automatically under consideration at that time for a clerkship at a high level. And I was second in my class and that of course helped. But anyway, I was very fortunate to have the clerkship.

Q: What did you gain from that experience?

A: An insight into how the United States Supreme Court works. A continuation of what I've had all my life--very high standards of performance in terms of the work product. Whether it was growing beans for my father or picking tomatoes for my father or whatever. High standards, very high standards. I maintained those, I trust, tried to anyway.

Q: Was there anything about that particular experience that surprised you?

A: Oh, there were some things that surprised me about the chief justice. He had a special telephone on his desk for communications with President Truman. And I was interested in the close relationship between the two. The kind of back and forth talks that the chief justice had with President Truman just would not be done today. And I found that fascinating. When that phone rang, by the way, we just automatically got up and left the office.

The chief justice was very good to his clerks because immediately after the weekly Saturday conference at which votes were taken, he would bring us into his chambers and tell us everything that happened. Why Justice Douglas voted this way, etc., etc. So, we were the fount of knowledge for the other clerks, they were very jealous of our inside information, if you will. We were very careful of course about how we handled it.

I very much decry what Woodward and Bernstein did in their book on the Supreme Court [The Brethren by Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong] and I think it's just terrible that the law clerks talked to those reporters the way they did about the personal lives of the justices. I feel very strongly that if you're going to work in a confidential capacity with a person in public life, you should not talk about what you've learned in confidence unless and until that person says it's okay. And this "what I learned while I was" kind of book or article--I just don't think it's very becoming.

Q: You started to talk earlier about how you got into trial work.

A: Well, I was not able to finish my term at the Supreme Court because I was recalled to active duty in the navy and went to Korea: And then a very interesting little story--Newt Minow whom you know of, of course, succeeded me as clerk for the chief justice, at my recommendation. And Newt was at a cocktail party in Washington at the same time that I was on the battle line, we called it, over in Korea, where you're lobbing shells over into the North Korean lines. And, they were then forming the United States Military Court of Appeals for the first time. It would be a review court for the court martial system in the military, a civilian review court. They were looking for a naval person to be a deputy commissioner because they had army, they had air force, they had marines. And Newt said, "I know just the guy," thinking he'd return a favor to me. And he mentioned me. The next week I got a letter from the chief judge of the Court of Military Appeals saying, "You've been recommended for the job of deputy chief commissioner. If you'll stop by my office I'll be glad to give you an interview." (laughter) Well there I am, eight thousand miles away, whatever it is. Anyway, the week after that I got what they call dispatch orders from the Navy Department ordering me to come back to Washington. I did and took the interview. They offered me the position. The navy wanted to have a former naval officer on the court and they released me from active duty so I could take that position. Then Newt went from the Supreme Court to become an administrative assistant to Governor Stevenson. Nineteen hundred and seventy-two campaign came along for the presidency and when Adlai became the candidate . . .

Q: Nineteen hundred and fifty-two.

A: I'm sorry. Nineteen hundred and fifty-two. Excuse me.

Q: That's all right.

A: They needed on the staff somebody who would help mind the shop while Newt, and Carl McGowan and Bill Blair were running around the country in the presidential campaign. So, Newt recommended me again and Adlai called me and asked me if I would come out. This was right after the

1952 convention as I recall. Anyway the first time he asked me I said I'd have to say no because I felt obligated to serve with the court for the two years that my classmates were serving in the United States Navy that I'd gotten released from. It was a kind of a moral thing with me. There was no legal obligation. So I declined. As soon as I had completed the two years with the court that I would otherwise have had to serve on active duty, I felt relieved of that moral obligation and then I joined Governor Stevenson on his staff. And, came up to Springfield leaving the family in Washington, D.C. Then that was only for about three months. The governor lost as you know very well. I went back to Washington for a few months and then came out to join Carl McGowan at a law firm in Chicago.

Carl asked me to come out, but it didn't work because this was a very large, rather conservative law firm and Carl was a new partner, and they weren't giving us much work to do. I got bored. So a friend of mine whom I'd worked with when I was in law school, writing legislation for the Chicago Crime Commission, Tom Mulroy, who was then a senior partner in a law firm, called me up one day and said, "Dan, do you know of anybody, at your age, who would like to come over and work for us? We're looking for a young fellow." Well, to help him out because he had helped me out when I was in law school, I looked around, asked all kinds of people, and Tom would say no for one reason or another. Finally after two weeks of this he said, "Dan, I'm really not interested in anybody else. I want you." (laughter) And I hadn't realized that. I hadn't gotten the message. So, I left the other firm and went with Tom. Tom was the head of the trial department at Hopkins-Sutter and I got involved in litigation. That's answering your question the long way around.

Q: Were you nervous about doing trial work? Lots of lawyers don't like to do it at all.

A: No, but you must understand, as your husband would tell you, when you're with a large firm and doing what we call "big case litigation," you will have two, three, four lawyers working on a case. And the man who's in the first chair, that's the expression that's used for the lead lawyer as you may know, was Tom Mulroy, a wonderful lawyer. At the beginning I did research and carried briefcases, that kind of thing, and would be in the third chair or the fourth chair. Then I would graduate to the second chair and then finally after, oh, I guess, two or three years I got my first trial and then went on to be in the first chair. But it's a gradual process. You kind of grow into it.

Q: You were probably really chomping at the bit by the time you got your opportunity.

A: Well, I think that's a fair statement. It bothers you a little--these are big dollar cases--when a client says to the senior partners, "Why are you assigning this young man to my case? I don't see any gray hairs there." And it's a hard thing to get over with a large firm. But, I enjoyed the work very, very much. I had learned something also from my father and that was, I think, the ability to work for somebody else, anticipate their needs in advance and supply those needs. So Tom and I worked very, very well together and then we became finally partners. I was independent of him on some cases of my own.

It was a lot of fun. Terribly long hours. Our firm was known as the "sweat shop," and I would work easily three and four nights a week and every Saturday. This was expected of young men. Not so today at most law firms. And I, at the same time had a very large family and undoubtedly did not spend as much time with my family as I should have, and I think that those long hours undoubtedly contributed to the domestic problem that arose later in life, as you know. Anyway, at the same time that I was doing this, I had this strong desire to get involved in extra-curricular activities which I had done at law school, joined all kinds of organizations, and all that kind of stuff.

Q: Do you have just boundless physical energy or, I mean, many people could not take on the kind of load that you have always taken on.

A: It never has bothered me.

Q: But you just never really feel like you're too tired to do something that's challenging.

A: Rarely. And I have found through life in terms of extracurricular activities or volunteer work, the best volunteer workers are the busiest people. They somehow find time to get the job done and maybe that's why they're volunteers to begin with because they have that inner drive. I will certainly confess that I've had lots of ambition in my lifetime, always have, and I see nothing wrong with ambition. I've always been hungry, always felt that I could make more money next year than I'm making this year and never had enough money. In fact, I was in debt literally all my life until the year before I left my job with Montgomery Ward to become a candidate for governor. It was the first time in my life that I was free of debt. And, that was a good feeling.

Anyway, I got involved in politics because of Adlai Stevenson, really; when he left office, Governor Stratton came in, whom I've since become very good friends with. I was, of course, not a friend of his at that time, and I formed something called the Committee on Illinois Government, which had as its purpose keeping the Stratton record straight. We clipped newspapers, all the newspapers in the state that had articles on the Stratton administration. We were building for the 1956 campaign and we did research on state governmental projects and worked very, very hard. It was an interesting group of people that were in it. All of them at the outset were people who had been inside the Stevenson administration. Adlai brought a lot of young people into state government and so we had this affinity. And we spent a lot of time on that. We had these clipping parties, pasted clippings into books, and did papers on different subjects; it was a fun project.

At the same time, every time there was a Democratic candidate for the United States Senate I would work on his staff. That would be, well, every two years. Douglas, of course, every time that he ran. The judge from Rock Island, Judge Stengel; when he ran I handled his finances, and, well, I just did that kind of thing every campaign.

I enjoyed politics and it was the Stevenson experience that caused me to be an independent in Illinois Democratic politics. I don't care for machine politics and never have from the very beginning. Part of the

reason for that is that I came from California which practices a totally different kind of politics than Chicago does as you know. What's a precinct committeeman? Who ever heard of a ward? What's patronage? Those things just didn't exist in California when I grew up. And I found this system in Chicago to be just totally alien to everything that I knew about a political system.

Now you can say I was naive; I'm sure I was naive. Ignorant, I'm sure I was ignorant, but I just plain didn't like it. I didn't like the way Stevenson felt obligated to kowtow. I worked very hard for Kerner and I saw him just turn the party over to Daley. I was very disappointed. In our talk at CIG and when I formed the Democratic Federation of Illinois, which was a collection of clubs throughout the state, our whole concept was to get an independent to run in the Democratic primary. And we finally got that when Joe Lohman ran but unfortunately the other gentleman, Steve Mitchell, who was former chairman of the Democratic National Committee also ran, and the two of them divided up the anti-machine vote, and of course Kerner was elected. When Kerner was nominated I then worked for him, as I said, very hard in the general election campaign, and then was disappointed at his alliance with Daley, subservience to Daley, I could almost say. So, we made up our minds then the only way that this job was ever going to be done--of doing something about the Democratic party in Illinois--would be to get a truly independent Democrat to win the primary. That's the only way you're ever going to do it--for the office of governor, no other office. And so, that was my quest for a number of years.

Q: Did you think at that time about working outside of the party as an independent, getting independent candidates?

A: Not really. Please remember that I was raised as a "yellow dog" Democrat. A yellow dog Democrat is a southern expression that means that you'd vote for a yellow dog if he was running on the Democratic ticket. (laughter) For my father, it would be heresy to vote Republican, for any Republican candidate. I was also raised very strongly in the belief that, sure you have to swallow a bad candidate every now and then but the important thing is to go with the party because you're not going to elect a Democratic president unless you elect a Democrat to be dog catcher, because it builds that way. And that's the way I always explained away my support for straight-ticket voting which was abhorrent to my civics teachers in high school and in college, and in law school it was abhorrent to my professors.

But all during this period I believed in straight-ticket voting, and no, I would never become independent of the Democratic party at that time for that reason. Now since then my views have changed a little, but at that time I was a Democrat through and through, and at that time liberal Democratic. As with a lot of other people, my liberalism waned as the years went by.

Q: Were you always an independent worker, not independent in a political sense, but do you think of yourself over the years as a team player or as a guy who was working on his own?

A: Well I'm perfectly capable of being a team player in the law firm or in the navy, in group efforts, in that sense very much a team player, but in terms of my approach to life, very much an independent. I've never believed, for example, in wearing a tag on tag day. I just don't believe in that. I'll give the money and put it in a can but I'm not going to put that tag on because I don't believe in hollering, "Hey, I gave." Now I know the other reason, which is so you won't get bothered by the lady on the next corner, but I'll bear with that. I will not let people who advertise put stickers on my automobile. I figure if they want to put a sticker on my automobile that advertises their product or camp or tourist attraction, they should pay me for it. I am fiercely independent in those kinds of areas and always have been, and I got that, I'm sure, from my father.

Q: Do you feel in most situations, if you could, you'd rather do it yourself rather than delegate?

A: Oh, no, no, quite the opposite. I'm a great believer in delegating and always have been.

Q: It's not difficult for you to do?

A: No, no. My independence is a totally different kind of thing. How should I put it? You'll hear me say, "my father" a number of times and I'm sure you've gathered the great influence he had on me. He taught me: "Be different. Don't be one like everybody else." Now I don't say that in denigration of other people, I'm just saying that that's the way I was raised. Over and over and over again, that was ground in. "Be different, be different, be yourself. Be a Walker. How do you spell your last name? W-A-L-K-E-R." I must have had that said to me thousands of times as I grew up, in a nice way.

Q: How old were you when your father died?

A: He died when I was governor, when he was about seventy-five.

Q: That must have been very difficult.

A: Yes, but I'd seen it coming for a long time. My father was an alcoholic. He was on the AA program for a number of years. And then there is the fact that geographically, we saw very little of each other because I was in the Midwest or the East Coast and my father always used to claim that he couldn't come visit me because he couldn't get a passport to cross the Mississippi River. (laughter) So, we were close, yes, but he had been in failing health and was totally blind in his latter years, and so it wasn't as much of a shock because it had been on the way for a long time. Having in mind how that man abused himself, I don't know how he ever lived as long as he did.

Q: Do you remember your mother?

A: Oh yes, very well.

Q: How old were you when she died?

A: She died just before I became governor.

Q: Oh, I thought it was earlier.

A: No, no. We were very close. I hadn't mentioned my mother but she was the other side. How should I put it? The supportive, "You can do it," affectionate side. She gave me, I'm sure, my feelings about people, my liberal positions on civil rights and other issues. And kept me, I'm sure from being as hard as my father was. He was tough as nails.

I remember one story--I wanted to put this in because it's part of the family lore. On one occasion I was home on leave from the Naval Academy and I was helping my father pack tomatoes in the packing shed which was about a mile from the house. My father was using green card labor which is Mexican immigrants--this was in San Diego where I was raised--who were legally crossing the river to work during the day time and go back to Mexico at night. A lot of the farmers were using wetbacks which is illegal, as you know. And, there was a report from the immigration authorities that my father was using wetbacks. A young immigration officer on this day visited the house and talked to my mother and, after identification, said to her, "I understand that your husband is using wetbacks." And my mother said, "Oh, absolutely not." And he called her a liar. So, he said, "Where is Lewis Walker?" She told him, "At the packing shed," and told him where it was. He left to go there. She called my father on the telephone at the shed and told him about the conversation.

Well, my father at this time had a very weather-beaten face and had no teeth and only wore false teeth on social occasions. He was a tall thin man and he had that ability which country people, Texas people, have to sit on their haunches, which I find very hard to do, but he could do it for long periods of time. He carried a pocket knife and a whetstone all the time. And he was sitting on his haunches in the shed after this telephone call, and he opened up his pocket knife and just started sharpening that knife and spitting on the whetstone while he was doing it. I didn't know what had been said in the telephone conversation because he didn't say anything to me.

Pretty soon this young immigration officer came in complete with uniform and Sam Browne belt and sidearm and everything and said, "Lewis Walker?" My father didn't say a word, not a word. He just sat there and spit and whet and spit and whet, and finally the officer, realizing that he could not get him to identify himself said, "Well, I know who you are." And at this point before he could get another word out my father stood up to him and took that knife and laid that blade up against his jugular vein and he said, "Young man, did you call my wife a liar?" And the fellow said, "Well, I don't think she was telling the truth." And the old man--that's what I always called him, the old man--he said, "Young man, have you ever seen a man with his throat cut?" And the guy got white, I mean literally white. I've never seen anybody get white like that before. And, the old man said, "Well, I'll tell you son, it ain't a pretty sight. That blood really spurts out." And he's just pressing that knife right against the throat and the old man said, "Young man, I think if I were you I'd leave here and go out and apologize to my wife." And with that he just turned away, folded his knife up, put it in his pocket and went back to work.

Well, the young man did go apologize and never came back. I often wonder if he would have gone through with it. I think he was capable, I think he was; I think he came very close to killing that man, very close.

Tape 1, Side 2

Q: Do you see your father in yourself as a father?

A: In some respects, yes, and in some respects, no. I was never able to spend the time or didn't spend the time with my seven children that my father did with me and my brother, because he was out of work for long periods of time. He literally lived for his sons. Really his whole life. And I had made up my mind, as a result of that experience, that I was not going to be the same way and so I was not that kind of a father. Sometimes to the detriment I'm sure of my seven--on the other hand maybe better that way. I have never been a believer--maybe this is self-defense--I have never been a believer in this buddy-buddy relationship between father and youngsters. I think, again maybe self-defense, that the quality of the relationship is more important than the quantity of the relationship. But I did hold the children to very high standards or tried to.

Q: So you really carried out your father's inspirational tone that he set with his children.

A: I tried to. I don't think I was as good at it as he was because I've never been as good at communicating. I'm much more a reserved person than my father, a much more quiet person, much less of a talkative person than my father was. A lot of people who know me as governor don't agree with that, but privately I am not a very communicative person.

Q: I'd like to know more about your political experiences and some of the people that you remember and who influenced you. I know Governor Stevenson did and Paul Powell. Who were some of the others that you remember?

A: Well, certainly Paul Douglas, Adlai Stevenson, and from afar, of course, President Roosevelt, President Truman and the other Democrats that were in leading positions. I followed current events very, very closely when I was at the Naval Academy and, to the extent that I could, aboard ship. And followed politics very closely and did a lot of reading, biographies and historical works involving politics. It always kind of fascinated me, but I never really thought seriously that I would run for a political office simply because of the system in Illinois where the only way you could do it really was to work up the ladder or be singled out of the blue like Adlai was by Jake Arvey back in 1952. But I enjoyed it. I really did enjoy it. The process fascinated me.

Q: In 1960 it's my understanding that you did want to run for attorney general . . .

A: Right.

Q: . . . and you did participate in the slatemaking process with Mayor Daley. Could you tell me about that?

A: Certainly. Slatemaking would have been in 1959 for the 1960 elections, and that's when I finally decided that I would take a try at public office. I was very close at that time with Vic de Grazia, with David Green, a businessman, with Mort Kaplan, Rich Blakley, with oh, a couple of other individuals, and we met on a regular basis because we were all involved in DFI (Democratic Federation of Illinois) and CIG (Committee on Illinois Government). And somebody suggested, "Why don't you try for public office?" and the only office that I had any interest in was attorney general. And so, Vic and I drove around the state and visited all the state central committeemen and I remember visiting Paul Powell down in his hometown. We realized it was a long shot but why not try it? I thought it would be a good opportunity to capitalize on the legal career and everything like that.

I appeared before the slatemaking committee. I did not like slatemaking but I knew at that time for attorney general, the only chance that I had to do it was this way. You will understand that at that time I had not gotten as totally frustrated with the whole party apparatus as I did as the 1960's wore on. And so I went before the slatemakers and made a presentation of what I would do with the office. Nobody was interested. Nobody was interested at all on the committee about what I would do with the office. What they wanted to talk about was, "How much money are you going to raise; how much money are you going to give to the party for the privilege of running, as a contribution; what about patronage; will you run if you're not slated?" Those were the questions they asked me. For me it was a total turnoff anyway.

It was funny though--when I left the room, the chairman of the Democratic party statewide, Jim Ronan--since deceased--he put his arm around me and said, "Oh, that was a wonderful presentation, Dan. That was just super." And I said, "Well Jim, what do you think my chances are?" He said, "Not really very good, Dan." And I said, "Well, why?" He said, "Well, a lot of us think Jack Kennedy is going to be the candidate and we've got Daley," and he went on and picked out some others, and he said, "There's just too many Catholics on the ticket." I said, "Well Jim, I'm not a Catholic; I'm a Methodist." Well, I destroyed his excuse. He dropped his hand from my shoulder, thought a minute, then put his hand back up on my shoulder and said, "Oh well, it wouldn't make any difference. With a name like Walker and seven kids everybody would think you're a Catholic anyway."

Well, anyway what happened was they had two sessions of the State Central Committee as they did in those days: one in Springfield where I appeared, and then they had one up here where they brought in the Cook County leaders. And, my wife was then in the hospital having a baby. I went to the hospital that evening and they were deliberating. I got a call at the hospital from, I think his name was Findley. He was a political reporter for the old Chicago's American, at that time was the name of it.

Q: Yes.

A: Later became what, Today? And he said, "Congratulations Dan." And I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "I just left the slatemaking session," and he said, "my good friend so and so slipped out of the room and told me that Dan Walker is going to be the nominee for attorney general." He said, "What's your comment?" I said, "I will have no comment until there's a public announcement tomorrow morning." He said, "Well, you can go home and draft your statement because," he said, "you've got it. You're set." So, I went home all excited and went to the office the next morning, the law office, and Vic joined me and we wrote out a statement, and talked with Dave and Mort on the telephone.

Q: Had he heard the same thing or were you the only one who had heard?

A: I was the only one that was told. No, I take that back. Vic had contacted a friend of his who was on the committee and was told the same thing. But that person wasn't present at the time the decision was made. Then I waited, and I waited, and I waited. Finally there came the public announcement and I was called by the mayor's office. I can't remember whether it was Mayor Daley or one of his assistants, I really cannot, who told me that they had decided that Bill Clark should be the candidate at the last minute for attorney general, and, that I was under consideration for secretary of state. And I was asked if I would consider any other office and I said, "No, I'm not interested; attorney general is the only thing I am interested in." So, when they said any other office, they meant of course below governor. And so that ended that.

Apparently a tremendous amount of pressure was put on Mayor Daley by Clark's mother who was the widow of the Clark who was the assessor for so many years. Bill did not want to run for secretary of state. They had me down for attorney general and him down for secretary of state. The incumbent secretary of state was a very popular Republican, and Bill Clark didn't think he could beat him, and so his mother insisted and Bill insisted on his being attorney general. That knocked me out, so that was the end of that. But the lesson I learned was how bad at that time the slatemaking procedure was. It has since been changed.

Q: But you also did not have the connections necessary to argue in your favor?

A: None. Absolutely none.

Q: Right.

A: Why Mayor Daley decided that I would make a good candidate for attorney general, I have no idea. I'd of course met with him and talked with him but anyway . . .

Q: Was that your first experience with Daley, the first time you met him?

A: I believe so. I believe so. That's my recollection, but it's hard to put together the years here. The riots came in the late 1960's. That's when I worked with Daley again. I had met him, sure, but I think it was probably the first time that I really talked with him.

Q: What was your initial reaction then?

A: He was very uncommunicative. His reaction was the stock reaction. If you want to be attorney general, well go out there and have a try at it. Talk to the people and get some support and then we'll take a look at it, that kind of thing. He had a remarkable facility though to give everyone the impression that he was a favored kind of candidate, not chosen but favored; he was very good at that. And yet he never committed himself. In all of our meetings, he was nonloquacious with me. I never had the feeling from the beginning that Daley was comfortable with me, never, in all of the encounters that we had.

Q: Did you have a sense of why that was?

A: Sure. Because I represented a life totally alien to his growing up. I was not a Chicagoan. I was not Catholic. I made no bones of my, you know, kind of feeling about being in some respects, certainly, a reformer. And what I planned to do with the attorney general's office went far beyond what had been done by the kinds of people that had been proposed by the Democrats before that. But he knew also that I had worked, as very few people know, as an assistant precinct captain in the Forty-eighth Precinct of the Nineteenth Ward from 1953 to 1958. I worked the precinct very, very hard. And went to the ward meetings and observed the whole system very closely and to me it was a learning experience. And the Nineteenth Ward was an interesting ward at that time.

Q: So, that's what Daley knew about you. That's what was important to him?

A: I don't know. I don't have any idea. Because I never talked to him really about it except this one kind of pro forma meeting. I had no idea where he was coming from. I went out there to try to impress him with the kind of job I could do and that I could handle myself easily and that kind of thing, and he knew of course that I was a reasonably successful lawyer on LaSalle Street.

Q: So you had this very disappointing experience with slatemaking . . .

A: Yes.

Q: And that had to have stayed with you.

A: Well, it certainly did. I never cared for slatemaking thereafter. When Adlai ran for the Senate I urged him not to go before the slatemakers. It was a part of the whole system.

Q: Could he have done it without them?

A: Could Adlai have done it without them?

Q: Yes.

A: I think so. In 1970, oh yes, I think so. A lot of people wouldn't agree with me, but I think so. He had such a great name. But then in 1960 also, I decided to make a try for the office of the United States

attorney. Kennedy is now president. Not 1960. What was the year that Kennedy was assassinated?

Q: Nineteen hundred and sixty-three.

A: Okay. Between 1960 and 1963 I continued to be kind of active in campaigns, doing that kind of thing like I said earlier.

Q: Excuse me. Did the slatemaking experience seem to sort of take the edge off your enthusiasm for a while; am I sensing that?

A: I don't really remember that as being true because I think that in the early 1960's--didn't we have a Democratic Federation of Illinois going in the early 1960's when I was president and so forth? The slate-making was in 1959, late 1959. I think I was still very active in political campaigns and certainly I was very active in the Kennedy campaign. As a matter of fact, Sarge Shriver asked me to take a leave of absence from the law firm and take over Wisconsin for Kennedy in the primaries. I often wonder what would have happened to my life if I had done so. I didn't do it, obviously.

Q: Were you tempted?

A: Yes, I was tempted but we decided, my wife and I, that we just couldn't afford it. Seven kids--how many did I have then? (chuckles) But there were a lot of them, and we were heavily in debt and I would have had to take a sharp cut in income and so we just decided I couldn't do it. The law firm made it clear that they would let me do it but it would not be a plus in my advancement at the law firm.

Q: I interrupted you. You were talking about the U.S. attorney.

A: I was going to say, in 1963--that's the year Kennedy was asassinated--I decided to try for the office of United States attorney and we worked on that very, very hard.

Q: When you say, "we," who worked with you?

A: The same group: Vic, Dave, Mort, etc. And I was told at high levels that, again, I had it and then Kennedy was assassinated and so that ended that because I was not an LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] guy. In 1966, I went with Montgomery Ward as vice-president and general counsel, and then I decided enough of politics. I just want out. I'm not going to give any consideration to doing anything more than helping somebody from time to time but in terms of my direct involvment to the extent that I'd been up to that time, I wanted out.

Q: And you got out of your precinct work?

A: I stopped that when I moved from the city to the suburbs in 1958. I did become the precinct committeeman in Deerfield and continued that through 1962 as I recall, but then I stopped that work. I really decided that I was going to start making money and stop spending all this time on politics. I'll undoubtedly get things out of order but then one day Dave Green called me and said, "Let's have lunch over at the Mid-America

Club." I remember that very, very well. And at the lunch he said, "Dan, why don't you plan to run for governor or senator in 1972." And I said, "Oh, come on now Dave." It had to have been in 1969 that we had this lunch.

Q: Was it in the summer or . . . The "Walk" began in July of 1970 was it . . .

A: In 1969 we formed the group formally. I said, "Okay" finally, after giving it a great deal of thought. I now have enough economic security so that I can run for office without organization support. Before I'd only thought about doing it with organization support which isn't as tough a job. This time I said, "Okay, let's start thinking about it." And we met regularly and thought and planned. I cannot remember when we made the decision that it would not be the senatorship but the governor that I would go for.

Q: Do you remember why you made that decision?

A: The major reason was the reason that I didn't run for senator in 1978: I don't get turned on by it. That's not denigration of the office; it's a wonderful office, but I don't think I'm the legislative type. I don't think I would enjoy it and I did not relish the idea of the large family bouncing back and forth between Washington and Illinois. So, that's the principal reason why I decided against it. The prospect of being governor, on the other hand, I found tremendously exciting and challenging, so anyway we finally made the decision.

This decision was made during the time when I was managing Adlai Stevenson's campaign for the United States Senate in 1970. It has been largely misunderstood and caused some bad feelings between me and the Stevenson people as a result of that because it was less than two weeks, as I recall, after Adlai's election that I announced for governor. And unfortunately it was on the day that he was sworn in. He was sworn in early and I didn't anticipate it. But we had this press conference set, all the work done and everything when he changed his mind about the day he was going to get sworn in, and I just couldn't undo it and so, we went ahead. He took it, I think, personally because he felt that the publicity that I got detracted from his publicity being sworn into the Senate. And I've always regretted that.

Q: Were you able to talk with him about it?

A: I tried to explain it to him, yes, but I think it took Adlai awhile to get over that. He thought that I should have waited, and then there was some strain between us in the course of the campaign too, about the handling of the campaign.

Q: Of his campaign or yours?

A: His campaign.

Q: His campaign. What was that about?

A: Well, some of it is matters relating to personalities--one of the reasons that I haven't done anything in the way of writing about my years in public life is that I really don't want to hurt people and if you're going to write you should be very frank. If you're not going to be very frank, you shouldn't write and so I don't want to get into that area involving personalities on the campaign staff. And for one reason or another, and I can't second guess him, Adlai decided he'd rather run his own campaign for all practical purposes so I took a less active involvement in the closing weeks of that campaign than I had at the beginning of the campaign.

Q: So you announced your intention to run. Now that was in the fall of 1969?

A: That was in mid-November of 1970. No, I'm sorry I'm one year off. You're right.

Q: Nineteen hundred and sixty-nine?

A: No, it's 1970 because that's when Adlai was elected, sure. It's in November, mid-November of 1970, of course, yes, yes. I called a press conference at the, then, Water Tower Inn or whatever it was called and made the announcement. The final decision with respect to "go," "no-go," was made at a meeting at this resort out here, out west of the city, the Wagon Wheel, is that the name of it? No, Pheasant Run.

Q: Pheasant Run.

A: Pheasant Run. We took a room there, the group of us, and spent all day and the night and the next morning and made the decision to go, and to announce. And we spent a tremendous amount of time preparing for the announcement because we realized what the odds were and what we were up against.

Q: This is probably a really dumb question. Did you believe that you could do it? Did you believe that you could win at that point?

A: Yes, yes. It came down to this. It's simple mathematics. We decided after a lot of study that if the vote turnout was one million five hundred thousand or more, we could win if we ran the right kind of campaign. We got at that figure by a lot of work and basically what it came down to is what is the maximum automatic vote that the machine can turn out. And once you decide on that figure, and if you assume you can run a campaign that will capture the imagination of the non-hard-core machine, and if enough of those people turn out, then you're going to win.

Q: And this was before you even had any idea about the crossover vote which we'll get into later.

A: We were well aware of that potential and one of the factors we took into account was could we win that legal battle to permit the crossover. But as I will explain to you later, there is a gross exaggeration out there on the part of the media as to the extent of the Republican crossovers' contribution to my victory in 1972. Indeed, I will say to

you something that you'll get very few people to believe but I believe it to be true. There was more Republican crossover, certainly in the city of Chicago, for Howlett in 1976 than there was for Dan Walker in 1972. If you want proof of that all you have to do is go look at the Nineteenth Ward, the southwest side wards that are very heavy Catholic Republican, and look at the vote, and the political reporters would never go look at those precinct returns but you can go precinct by precinct. Republican precincts that went for Howlett in 1976 had to be Republican crossovers, Catholic Republicans. Could we take this as a breaking point?

Q: Sure.

May 18, 1981, Tape 2, Side 1

Q: I'd like you to go into a little more detail on some of the things we talked about the other day. To begin, would you talk some more about your experience with the "Little Hoover" Commission, the Commission to Study State Government?

A: Yes. That commission was established by Governor Adlai Stevenson pursuant to enabling legislation that was adopted, as I recall, in 1949. Wally Schaefer who was counsel to the governor at that time was named chairman of the commission. He was also, had been a professor. I'm sorry, I have the time sequence wrong. At that time Schaefer was a professor at Northwestern University School of Law. He later became counsel to Governor Stevenson. Schaefer knew that I was going to become a law clerk later in 1950 at the Supreme Court and offered me a position on the staff of the "Little Hoover" Commission commencing on my graduation which would have been in January of 1950.

I went through law school on a two-and-a-half-year basis by going through the summers, which you could do at that time, having the early graduation in January instead of June. The executive director of the commission was a man by the name of Jack Isakoff. Jack was also the director of the Legislative Council at that time and a man very knowledgeable about state government. Well, we moved down to Springfield and one of my daughters was born there during this time, and we really enjoyed living in Springfield.

The work on the staff I found very interesting and that's when I fell in love with state government, as a matter of fact. I really got interested in it and how it could operate for the better. There were a lot of differences of course between state government then and state government when I ultimately became governor, but the fundamental framework of state government did not change. Basically the departments were the same and the agencies were the same and the way that state government functioned was basically the same. Now there were some changes made of course over the years but I did, as I say, learn a lot about state government and thoroughly enjoyed it.

The way the commission worked was, that a staff member was given a responsibility for a particular department, to study that department and to make recommendations as to how its efficiency could be improved and

how it could operate more economically. I did a couple of agencies and then the major department that I did was the Department of Insurance.

Q: Okay. You spoke the other day rather pointedly about Woodward and Bernstein and your disapproval of The Brethren, that kind of a tell-all, after the fact. Have you been the victim of that, do you feel that there has been any of that kind of . . .

A: No. I never have been. But, remember, wasn't it Lyndon Johnson that required the members of his staff to sign something that they wouldn't do that? One of the presidents did. I think it was LBJ. I thought about that, asking my staff to do that, but I decided not to. But no, I have not been the victim of that. I don't mind telling funny stories; I'll tell you funny stories if you want me to about Mr. Justice Douglas, for example. Now that's all right, but it's this business of revealing the innermost processes of the way that the court operates that you learn in a confidential capacity. That I decry. And of course anything you learn about the personal lives of the people you work for, in my opinion, that should be sacrosanct and confidential.

Q: You also said the other day that when you were in law school you helped Tom Mulroy to work on legislation for the Chicago Crime Commission. Tell me about that experience.

A: Yes. I don't remember how I got to know Tom. I think it was that he was a close associate with Fred Inbau, professor of criminal law at Northwestern Law School. That's right, that's it. And, he was active in the Chicago Crime Commission and Tom Mulroy was chairman of the legislative committee of the Chicago Crime Commission. In addition to being editor-in-chief of the Northwestern Law Review, I was also editor-in-chief of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology in my last year of law school. And that's how Tom came to me and asked me if I would help draft a series of five Crime Commission bills that achieved a great deal of notoriety at the time because they were aimed at the crime syndicate. And, I did help Tom on that. And then it was also that year as I recall, that I worked with Sam Shapiro. He would become lieutenant governor and then governor later. He was in the senate then, chairman of the Mental Health Committee, and I helped draft the Mental Health Code for the state of Illinois that was adopted, I think, in that year or the next year, and remained the basic code for Mental Health until I caused a new code to be drafted when I became governor.

Q: That must have been a wonderful experience for a law student to be helping draft legislation.

A: It was a lot of fun. I thoroughly enjoyed it.

Q: Did you feel comfortable just jumping right into it?

A: Well, no, I don't suppose I felt comfortable but there were other people working on it also, so it was a team effort. I didn't do it all by myself, but I did a lot of the basic research and the drafting of the legislation itself and I really enjoyed it. As I said earlier in the conversation, I was kind of bored with law school in the third year so all these other activities made up for the boredom that I felt with the studies. I didn't study much.

I remember I had one professor who didn't care for that. It's a tradition at Harvard and Yale that when you're the editor-in-chief of the law review, the professors leave you alone during senior year because they know how much work it takes. It's a seven-day-a-week operation. And, Northwestern professors, by and large, observed that tradition with the editor, me, but not this one professor. Your husband may have told you what they do in law school; you're called upon to recite cases, still the case method now as it used to be. And even though he knew that I had not read the cases, he would call on me, well not every day, but a couple of times a week. "Mr. Walker will you recite the cases?" And I would stand up and say, "I'm sorry, sir, but I'm not prepared." And we just went through that ritual that whole term.

Q: You talked about your first experience in a law firm. Well, your first one, you were unhappy with Carl McGowan and that situation, not with . . .

A: Not unhappy with Carl.

Q: Not with Carl, no, but with the lack of work. And then when you did go with a large law firm and you began in the fourth chair . . . Are there four or just three? You spoke about that, and I'm curious to know how you related to those young lawyers once you got to the first chair. Obviously you had to have some empathy there, having been the book carrier and the briefcase carrier. How did you relate to young lawyers coming up?

A: Very much the same way. Tom Mulroy had very high standards for me in terms of written product, work product, and I did a lot of research and memoranda for him, writing up briefs, and I expected the same thing in terms of hours of work and dedication of the associates that worked with me when I got into the first chair and became a partner. I found that when I made the transition to become a vice-president/general counsel at Montgomery Ward where I had a large staff of lawyers, I could not expect it of them because that tradition did not exist in the legal staff in a corporation as it did exist with, certainly our law firm on LaSalle Street. The young lawyers were expected to work nights. Since that time, more and more they've gotten away from that. That tradition still existed when I was a partner.

Q: Another thing that interests me--you spoke about the Committee on Illinois Government that you created in 1952, I guess, to watch the Stratton administration and to document that period of time, but we didn't go on and talk about what you did with that information and what happened in the 1956 campaign. Of course, it was right after the Hodge scandal. It had to have been a busy four years.

A: In 1956 CIG prepared a loose-leaf notebook for the Democratic candidate for governor that was about four inches thick and had a break down of state government, the problems of state government, department by department, what the Stratton administration was doing that in our opinion was wrong and the platform for change. We had a legislative program that we put in place, it was really very, very complete. A lot of us worked very hard on it. People like Jim Clement who went on to be on the school board and was an attorney, and Newt Minow worked on that

project. Hal Shapiro who's now a senior partner in one of the big law firms downtown. Vic worked on it, well just a lot of people.

And we gave that book to the first candidate who was Herb Paschen. He was slated by the slatemakers. He was then county treasurer. Herb got caught with some kind of a flower fund scandal. It really wasn't a big deal but it got a lot of publicity and Daley pulled the rug out from underneath him and made him quit, and Dick Austin, later a federal judge, then became the Democratic candidate. He was tremendously grateful for this book because he had a very brief time in which to put his campaign together. And I really think that if it had not been for a few bad decisions in the campaign, and if he'd had a little more time, Dick would have beaten Stratton. But anyway, we became very close as a result of that experience and he went on to go on the federal bench and always remained very grateful for what all of the people had done for him.

After then as I recall, CIG continued, but it became more and more a study group instead of a "Watch-the-Republican-Governor" group; it kind of changed its nature over the years. I stayed active in it to a lesser and lesser degree as time went on.

Q: Does it still exist?

A: I don't know the answer to that. It existed while I was governor. Then we despaired of getting CIG to become more politically active; this was after I'd stepped down as chairman. And so, that's when we decided to form the Democratic Federation of Illinois and start this network of clubs all across the state which would be political activist, as opposed to a study group. And I remember I was the acting chairman when it was first set up for the first constitutional convention and everything, and the acting president. And then we decided to elect--no, it's the other way around. Paul Simon was the acting president and then I ran the convention as chairman of the convention, and then they elected me the first president of DFI, that's the way it was.

Q: You talked the other day about being brought up as a "yellow dog Democrat," and really strongly believing in straight party voting and that that was the way to participate. You said your views had changed but you didn't say how or how it evolved or what your feelings are now about . . . .

A: My experiences with fighting the machine politics, which is a straight party ticket kind of machine, persuaded me that I was wrong. Now, I always have believed, even since then, in voting for a majority of Democrats because in general the philosophy of the Democratic party I found and find more comfortable than the philosophy of the Republican party, and let nobody tell me that there isn't a difference. There is a difference and always has been a difference. So I found myself, by and large, more comfortable with Democratic candidates, but then over the years I gradually would vote for selected Republican candidates whom I liked.

Q: And, are you uncomfortable with that or you really have come away from the straight party idea?

A: Yes, I have come away from the straight party idea.

Q: Another question I had was about your deciding to run and announcing right after Stevenson was elected in 1970?

A: Nineteen hundred and seventy, November 15, 1970.

Q: Would it have made any difference had Stevenson lost?

A: No.

Q: You would have still made the decision to go at that time?

A: Absolutely. It was a decision that had nothing to do with Stevenson. It was a decision solely on its merits with respect to the necessity of our having a two-year campaign. If you're unknown as I was, by and large, and if you're going to run against the machine, then you need all the time you can get. So, we wanted to announce as soon as we possibly could after the 1970 election. We would have done it earlier if we could have but we obviously couldn't do it before the election in 1970.

Q: What was your relationship with Arnold Maremont?

A: Oh, that's another chapter that I didn't go into. In the 1960's, I guess it was, I was named a member by Otto Kerner and was later elected secretary of the Illinois Public Aid Commission. At that time, as I recall, Victor de Grazia worked with Arnold Maremont. I think he was on Arnold's staff, and that's how I got to know Arnold. Otto Kerner had asked me to be a member of the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission which had been set up by the legislature to investigate crime; he knew of my work with the Chicago Crime Commission, but I declined that.

Q: Now when was that? Was that at the same time that he appointed you to the Illinois Public Aid Commission?

A: It was before that. It was before that. And I turned him down because my partners didn't want me to do it. It would take too much time. And so he then asked me, knowing of my interest in state government, to become a member of the Public Aid Commission. In state government at that time, welfare was run by the Public Aid Commission; you did not have an executive department like you have now. It was felt that the public aid should be administered by a board independent of the governor, except appointed by the governor, and that was the system. Arnold was the chairman; I became the secretary.

We got into some real difficult times. For example, Arnold proposed that people on public aid be given the right to obtain birth control information from public aid workers. And the Catholic church took a very strong position against that. I joined Arnold in that fight and it really was public; there was a lot of publicity about it and some very strong feelings came out.

I don't remember why, but Arnold had to step down as chairman of the Public Aid Commission, and then I became acting chairman of the Public

Aid Commission and ran it for a period of some months until the commission was abolished and its work taken over by a code department. That was my association with Arnold Maremont, and then later he ran for the United States Senate, and because of my relationship with Vic and knowing Arnold, I worked with him on that campaign.

That reminds me of another chapter that came along about the same time. I lived up in Deerfield. There was a proposal to build an integrated housing development in Deerfield. And the community got very upset about it. Certain leaders in the community decided that they would have a bond issue proposal put on the ballot to create a park district where they were going to build this housing unit, and thereby prevent the building of the integrated housing unit. I got involved in this--I have a way of getting involved in things like these (laughs)--and I took a strong position that this was really very bad and should not be done. And I became chairman of some organization--I can't even remember what the name of it was--that led the battle against the bond issue. Again I found myself getting involved in a lot of publicity.

Q: Was that the Governmental Relations Committee of the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities?

A: No, that's a different one. This one led to a lot of controversy in Deerfield, caused some of my neighbors to become enemies and remain enemies for years thereafter because they perceived us as trying to help the black people move into Deerfield. No, the Leadership Council came along later. That was after the Martin Luther King marches and riots in Chicago, and you'll have to help me remember the year because . . .

Q: Well, that was in 1966.

A: Right. As a result of the efforts of people in the business community and the black community, the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities was adopted and put in force and its aim was to bring about open housing, to get people to accept the concept that it was wrong to refuse to let blacks live in a particular neighborhood. And I took a very active role in that; I was a member of the board of directors. Al Raby at that time was a leader of the civil rights groups in the black community, working under Martin Luther King. And he was the spokesman for the black groups before the council. I worked with Al on a number of projects, and then I later brought him onto my staff when I became governor.

Q: What was Mayor Daley's participation in that whole thing? Had he sat down with Martin Luther King, Jr. and worked out some kind of agreements that he was willing to support?

A: Yes. Yes, he did to take the pressure off the city. One of the agreements was the creation of this Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities. And it may be--I don't remember the chronology--it may be that that's when I first talked and worked with Mayor Daley. But I simply cannot remember the year. And then I forgot another one too; there are so many of these. After the riots on the west side, was that in the spring of 1968?

Q: That was 1968, after King was assassinated.

A: Right after the assassination of Martin Luther King, I was named by Mayor Daley to become a member of the Riot Study Committee and became chairman of the steering committee of that organization. And, I spent a lot of time on that project, produced a report that has been made public of course, and worked very closely in shaping the final report because some people obviously wanted to whitewash. I worked with Ralph Metcalfe, then an alderman as I recall. He later went to Congress. He was very well known and thought of as being a supporter and follower of Mayor Daley. But, we worked together very closely and very well to make the final report turn out right and say some critical things about the operations of city government. That took a lot of time at that time too, and then later that year was when I did the Walker Report that created so much controversy. We discussed that last time, didn't we?

Q: Not really. I'd like to stay though with the Riot Study Committee long enough for you to give your impression of that time. Your sense of the volatility of the situation.

A: Well, the black community as you know, in retrospect, was very, very volatile at that time. There was a lot of feeling that they were being oppressed particularly by white businessmen who have small businesses within the black community, charged exorbitant prices and so forth, and also there was the terrific housing problem that was and remains very, very bad. Martin Luther King struck a spark and Martin Luther King acquired this tremendous respect on the part of the black community: "Let's do it the peaceful way. Let's go out and march and let's let the people know where we are, let the power structure [know], and let's negotiate to improve the lot of the black people." That was his reasoning. And then when he was assassinated, and particularly amongst the young black people, it was a devastating loss. "Here this man taught us the peaceful way and then what happens? He gets killed." And so, given all the deep-seated frustrations, this just sparked, of course, the violence that erupted here and elsewhere across the nation.

And, the police department simply was not prepared to cope with it. Many of them didn't understand what was behind it. Some did. And they didn't have the training, the ability to move to deal with a large-scale riot. It took the police departments a long time to learn, for example, that you never take on rioters unless you have the force to win. If you don't have the force to win you stay away and leave them alone until you do get enough numbers to move in and take care of it. That's one of the lessons that came out of the urban riots that was picked up by the police department. Of course, there were a lot of others and since that time as you probably know, there has been a lot more training, different kinds of units established, specialized equipment and so forth to deal with these kinds of situations. These were among many of the recommendations that we made at the time of the Riot Studies.

Q: Do you know why Daley chose you as a member of that committee?

A: Because, I think, of my role known within the establishment, as a leader of the Chicago Crime Commission, a highly respected commission, and the fact that I was a business executive. That combination I think, was appealing to the mayor.

Q: I'd like for you to talk about the Chicago Crime Commission and your participation over the years.

A: Well I was very active in the commission as a result of my association with Tom Mulroy. Tom Mulroy became president of the commission and then I served as chairman under him of the Legislative Committee and I told you about the bills that . . . or did I tell you about it? This is the second set of bills. When I was chairman of the Legislative Committee, I put together a series of bills, some of which were ones that I'd worked on when I was a law student that had never been passed plus some new bills, and we, as I recall, drafted eight [or] nine bills, and worked very hard, and got all of them passed. Every single one of them got through the legislature. I went down there constantly for committee meetings and really lobbied hard and with the help of other people too. Anyway we got all of them passed; we had a perfect batting average. And then I was on the board of directors, and then I became president of the Chicago Crime Commission. I guess that was in 1967.

Q: Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight I think.

A: Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight?

Q: Nineteen hundred and sixty-eight and nineteen hundred and sixty-nine?

A: All right, 1968. That was when I made up my mind to do that public Spotlight on Organized Crime and I went through that last time, didn't I?

Q: No, I don't think so.

A: Oh. Well, we had a very good executive director of the Crime Commission at that time, succeeding Virgil Peterson who'd been there for years and years. And his name was Harvey Johnson. I made him director of the Department of Law Enforcement when I was governor. I decided that the Crime Commission should try to concentrate on the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business in the Chicago metropolitan area and so, we mounted a study campaign and put a task force of the commission's employees to work on it. They did a lot of research and came up with the identity of some one hundred-odd firms that were infiltrated in one way or another by the crime syndicate--Austin Liquors, for example, was one of them--and persuaded the board to let me publish their names and the evidence. The newspapers printed the whole thing. I think it took two pages, two solid pages, in the Daily News and in the other papers; they had printed all the names after consulting with their libel lawyers and so forth, and there was a lot of excitement about it. I started getting some pretty bad telephone calls at home and some threats but nothing ever came of it. We had one libel suit and we got that one dismissed.

The next year I did the same thing. I did chapter two of the Spotlight on Organized Crime and picked up a number of more companies. And, as a sidelight to that, there was one company that I named in a speech that I gave before a Headliners Club out in Los Angeles. This firm had ties in Los Angeles as well as Chicago so it was newsworthy out there as well as here. And there was an individual who was chairman of the company who had crime ties and as a result of the publicity we forced him to resign,

forced him out of the company. He had had relationships with Toyota dealers. And I found it interesting that just a couple of months ago CBS or NBC did a big story on Toyota automobiles in the United States, and they put in a segment about my having exposed this man who was a Toyota dealer when I was president of the Chicago Crime Commission. That brought back a lot of memories.

I took a lot of criticism from the liberals for the Spotlight, and the Italian community didn't like it at all, because they said that I was using Italian names, you know, that kind of thing. And some liberals said it was guilt by association a la McCarthy. I just thought that the crime syndicate was such a cancerous body on the city of Chicago that at least the public, in deciding where to shop, had the right to know if that company had organized crime ties. They could go ahead and make their decision to shop there anyway but they at least had the right to know that. I don't know whether I hurt their business too much--like Austin Liquors; they're still going strong and I don't think they have those associations any longer. But we did force some of them out of business.

Q: But do you feel like you saw a real positive result from doing that?

A: Sure, sure. People became more aware of this whole problem of the syndicate laundering its money through legitimate business.

Q: Were you considered a real threat, do you think, or were the phone calls . . .

A: Well, I wouldn't know if it was a real threat but they sure as hell didn't like it. As you can tell the 1960's were a very busy and eventful period in my life.

Q: The one thing that you were going to go ahead and talk about was also in 1968, the violence at the National Democratic Convention and your part in the study after that.

A: Yes, that's an interesting story. After the Democratic National Convention violence, a number of us--well, my friends, I, a lot of others--were very concerned about what we saw on television. The brutality, at least it appeared to be brutality. At that time, there was going the President's National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence headed up by Dr. Milton Eisenhower, the brother of the president. Lloyd Cutler, interestingly one of Jimmy Carter's top legal staff guys, was the executive director of that commission. Lloyd contacted me and asked me if I would come down to visit with the commission about the possibility of doing the study on the violence in Chicago. I talked with him; I wanted to assure myself that I would be given a free hand because I knew this was going to be a toughy, and I didn't want anybody looking over my shoulder and telling me what to say. They assured me that I could have a free hand; they gave me a budget of some--I don't remember the amount, hundred thousand dollars, something like that--and said that I should put together a staff and go out and do the study.

I talked with the Crime Commission and they were agreeable to my doing it, and then I talked with my boss at Montgomery Ward, where I then was, and told him, warned him, that this was going to be a hot potato and he encouraged me to go ahead and do it and gave me some time. Unfortunately at that particular time as general counsel, I was helping to negotiate and putting together the merger of Montgomery Ward and Container Corporation of America, a very complicated transaction. And so for the fifty-three [I believe] days--it's in the report--that it took to do the job I would arrive at Montgomery Ward very early and work until noon, and then from noon until midnight or two in the morning I would work on the Riot Study.

It was important to the commission, they told me, that they have somebody who was respected by both sides; that is, by the demonstrators and by the establishment. And again because of what I had done in some liberal causes and, as you know, I was a Democrat, and because I held this position as president of the Chicago Crime Commission and was a corporate executive on the other side, I guess everybody thought that I was acceptable. And so, off we went.

I went to major corporations, law firms, accounting firms and prevailed on them to give me people on a lend-lease basis. We would pay their expenses, we would get full or part time; I think I asked for them for two months. We put together a staff of absolutely superb people. I hired some people too, of course, the secretarial staff and some investigative staff. And then I dived into the project. My top guy was Vic de Grazia. He was the top staffer on the job.

What we did was first go to get all of the FBI statements that had been taken. There were a couple of thousand of these as I recall. And I met with the top people in Washington of the FBI and finally persuaded them to let me have the reports, the interviews, on a confidential basis. I then went to the networks, television stations and got all of their film that they had used, that they had shot. Then I placed advertisements in newspapers all over the country asking for people to volunteer to send me pictures or accounts or film that they had of what happened. We put together a massive amount of information.

Then I broke the events of the week down and assigned them to different teams and had a team leader. One leader and his team had Lincoln Park. Another one had Grant Park. Another one had that very momentous march on the Hilton. Another one had the events preceding . . . the events afterwards. And so we approached it on that basis and it was a monumental job.

We finished it and I'll never forget the evening; I think it was about one o'clock in the morning--I took a hotel room downtown and lived downtown most of the time. Well, I was sitting there with Vic and we were going over the summary; I wanted a summary. In brief writing and everything I've ever done of a written nature that was long, I wanted a summary at the beginning so people could read that and get a quick capsule view of what happened. The summary, I wrote personally. The chapters on the individual events I edited and some parts of them I wrote myself but a lot of that was a team job. But the summary I wrote and I wanted it my way. And Vic and I were going over the draft which was

describing what happened and the really tense moments. I remember we were trying to decide whether we should describe it politely, the violence on the part of the police, or whether we should just be blunt. And I finally said, "Vic, let's just tell it like it was." And so, I used the phrase, "police riot" to describe, not all the policemen, but a minority of the policemen as I very carefully said.

I had done a lot of checking to verify my own judgments as to what had happened. I hadn't just relied on what we had done. There was a reporter whose name I shall not divulge who left Chicago and was very close to a lot of people in the police department at the lower levels. I finally tracked him down on the East Coast, got him to come back to Chicago and spend two weeks just going around to the cops themselves, and saying, "Hey, what really happened out there?" And not for publication. Based on what he told me the policemen told him, it was even worse than I'd reported, so that gave me a sense of corroboration. I talked off the record with some of my friends at high levels in the police department. And they said, "You're right, we can't say it, but you're right in that conclusion." So I felt comfortable with the conclusion.

I drafted the report, and Dem-Con 1968 was the title on it. I had insisted on using a printer because that's the way I like to work and we went through galley proof, page proof, and I got four final copies of the page proof and took it down to Washington and first showed it to the head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. And he read it; didn't read all of it--he read the summary and skimmed through the rest. And he said, "Right on." So then I showed it to Lloyd Cutler, I think it was the next day. Anyway, he consulted with some members of the commission. They came back and asked me to change the name and to kill the summary which they thought was too volatile. I said, "Okay, I'll change the name but under no circumstances will I change one word in the summary." And so, that's the way it ended up. I renamed it, Rights in Conflict, and then we released it. They wanted me to release it in Washington, just send it out and not hold a press conference, and I refused. It got a little sticky in there because they wanted to do it their way and I wanted to do it my way. So I held a press conference and interestingly it was at the hotel where we--now called the Radican something like that--where we stayed, or had our . . .

Q: Radisson maybe?

A: Radisson. Where we stayed, or had our rooms and everything on the night of the primary victory in 1972. It was a massive press conference. I was overwhelmed at the number of press that were there and the cameras and everything.

Q: Had information leaked out as to what was in there?

A: No.

Q: They just came to find out?

A: I had gone to the top editors of the Chicago papers in advance and gave them a twenty-four-hour briefing. I think I did the same thing with

the television stations. No, I didn't do it with the television stations; I think I just did it with the newspapers. You may recall--no, you're too young--that a lot of reporters were beaten up by the police.

Q: No, I remember watching . . .

A: The press was very upset about what had happened and they were waiting anxiously to see what I was going to say. Well, I was totally taken aback at the publicity. On the ten o'clock news that night two of the networks read the entire summary preempting their regular programs. I had no idea this was going to happen. I knew it would get publicity but not anything like this. Well, I was totally amazed at the reaction because within two weeks, a tremendous number of people had convinced themselves that they didn't see that which they saw on television. And that it was all the demonstrators, and the police were great guys. I got a lot of praise, but I also got a lot of criticism from the pro-police forces. And that persisted for a long, long time. As a matter of fact it was a real problem in the time of the 1972 campaign with the police department. I was a hero in the eyes of some liberals and I was a bum in the eyes of the police departments.

Q: There was some criticism about the timing of it. Did it come out right before the election?

A: Oh, no, no, no, no, no.

Q: When did it come out?

A: It came out in December. No, I don't think there was any criticism of the timing on that. As I recall, as a matter of fact, everybody was pleased that I got it done so fast. There may have been criticism that I should have taken longer--I don't remember this--that I should have let emotions cool and that kind of thing before I issued the report, but I was under a great deal of pressure from the commission itself in Washington to get this job done as soon as possible.

Q: There were also some newspapers that suggested that you had had some help from Washington in editing.

A: I remember that. No, that's not true.

Q: What was the criticism? It had something to do with some points that were left out because there was litigation pending or something.

A: Oh, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes there was; that's the third request that the commission made. You're absolutely right; I forgot that--that there were a very few incidents that were involved in grand jury investigations that I should omit that material. And I did finally agree to do that. Thank you for reminding me.

Tape 2, Side 2

A: I recall some interesting parts of that work. I called on a federal judge, a very prominent federal judge in connection with it--he was the

chief judge--and he said, "Don't do anything rash that's going to injure the reputation of the city of Chicago." That was Daley's concern. I called on Daley in the course of the investigation also to get his version of what had happened. He was very polite and didn't give me a lot of information; he turned me over to the staff people.

And then one of the things that I thought was so funny. After going to a lot of effort I finally persuaded the FBI to let me see the report that they had prepared for the president just before the convention and updated thereafter. I was told that I could only see it, but could not take it with me. The head of the Chicago FBI office delivered it to me with great fanfare, taking it out of his safe. You wouldn't believe that report. You really would not believe it. They took seriously the threats of the hippies that they were going to seduce the conventioneers with naked women, that they were going to poison the Lake Michigan water supply; all these put-ons that Abbie Hoffman had been playing around with in the public press, in a memorandum to the president of the United States. They said, "This we believe is what's going to happen." They didn't say, "Well, it might happen", or they didn't say that, "Maybe this is a put-on"; they treated everything with dead seriousness.

Q: This was FBI?

A: This was the FBI at the top level going to the president of the United States. After I saw that I said that I could understand why Kennedy got so upset at the intelligence sources for the material that he was given in connection with preparing for the Bay of Pigs because this was just terrible intelligence in my opinion. It wasn't balanced at all.

Q: Hoover was still FBI head then?

A: Oh yes, he was.

Q: What's your overall impression of that whole investigation when you think back on it, how does it fit into the times?

A: My investigation?

Q: No, well, the Rights in Conflict. You had this publication and you spent a couple of months working really diligently to come up with it. It is a product of that time. How do you see it as fitting into Illinois political history?

A: It's very hard to fit it in except on the basis that it gave me a lot of notoriety; it certainly gave me some name recognition, for good or bad. I would say that it was a negative, politically. I didn't think it would be, but it was a negative. The more time that went by the more people became convinced the cops were right and the demonstrators were wrong. I didn't think you could put it in that kind of a black and white context. It was gray. Yes, it was negative, no question about it.

I'm one of the few people, by the way, that had a best seller on which you never make a nickel. I remember it was two o'clock in the morning after the press conference when the head of one of the big paperback companies called me and woke me up. And I had taken a--I know it's kind

of a silly position now but--I had taken a position: I will not go to an unlisted number. So, he got me in the middle of the night and he said, "I want to fly you to New York tomorrow. I'm having my lawyers draft a contract. I want to publish the Rights in Conflict within a week and have it on the newsstands and I'm going to give you "X" dollars royalty and I don't want my competition to beat me, so how much money do you want?" And I laughed, and I said, "Sir, do you want the text to Rights in Conflict?" He said, "I sure do, and featuring you as the author." I said, "All you have to do is go down to Washington, D.C. to the Public Documents Section or the Department of Justice and you've got it, and you can print it and then you don't owe me anything. It's a public document." And he said, "Really?" (laughter) I said, "It hurts me to say it but, really."

Q: One thing we haven't talked about is in 1968 you were with the Cook County board and there was a jail bond issue and you were . . .

A: Oh yes. Dick Ogilvie was president of the board.

Q: Yes, yes.

A: And Dick asked me to go on the committee to support the bond issue that would renovate the Cook County jail. Yes, and I did do that. Another one that I got involved in.

Q: Did you work closely with Ogilvie on that?

A: I worked some with him, yes. I wouldn't say a lot.

Q: What is your history with Ogilvie? Did you work together? I don't know how active he was in extracurricular activities, as you call them.

A: I don't think I had much encounter with Dick Ogilvie, extracurricular. He was in prosecution as I recall and then became sheriff and then became president of the county board. I really didn't encounter him hardly at all.

Q: You were a precinct committeeman and often precinct committeemen have the opportunity to hand out jobs. Maybe not a lot, but there sometimes are things that they can do for the people within their precinct. Did you have any of that, did you do any of that?

A: No: (a) I didn't particularly believe in it; but (b) there wasn't any of it anyway. Lake County didn't get any jobs.

Q. Oh, I see.

A: And I lived in a precinct where even if there had been jobs available, the people in that precinct--professional, business executives--I mean they're not interested in the kind of jobs that are passed out through patronage.

Q: What about when you were involved in precinct politics in Chicago?

A: That was as an assistant precinct captain. I never got involved in that. The only thing that I did was to go out and work the precinct on election day for the precinct captain; that's all. And I wanted to learn how you worked a precinct and that's what I did. But, the other aspects of ward committee, precinct life . . . I went to a meeting every now and then and watched it and listened and learned something about . . . sure, they discussed those things at the ward meetings, but in my precinct work, as an assistant captain, no, I never got involved in favors.

Q: In Lake County, I don't know, is it a Democratic county or Republican?

A: Oh no, it's a heavily Republican county, heavily. In my precinct of 331 registered voters there were 35 registered Democrats. I was kind of proud of it. I ran ahead of Jack Kennedy; I got one more vote than Jack Kennedy did in that primary in 1960.

Q: Was that thirty-six votes? (laughs)

A: No, I think he got thirty and I got thirty-one. We didn't get out all of our Democrats.

Q: So, it was not one of the most exciting political jobs that you ever had?

A: Oh, no. It's hard work.

Q: Well, I'd like to get back to 1969 and 1970. You announced--and I'm not going to be confused this time--you announced in November of 1970 and then you began your "Walk" in July of 1971.

A: July 4.

Q: What happened between November of 1970 and July of 1971?

A: Well, I didn't quit my job at Montgomery Ward until May, as I recall. And so, up to that time I was making sporadic trips downstate, meeting county chairmen, that kind of thing. And, would take a long weekend, for example, and drive around the state. And gradually I wound down my activities at Wards and increased the tempo of the activities in the campaign. It was a time for fundraising; it was a time for trying to line up some early support downstate that we were involved in. The thing that we did not take into account sufficiently was the difficulty of fundraising. It was impossible. Absolutely impossible. Nobody thought I could win, nobody. And so why are they going to put their money into it? Oh, I'd get a few dollars here and a few dollars there. We enlisted the help of a gentleman out of Washington named Tom McCoy and the rumor got started--it was in the press; they treated it seriously--that I was raising lots of money from wealthy liberals in the East and the West. Well, I sure tried to get some money (laughs) from those wealthy liberals in the East and the West, but I sure didn't succeed very much. We spent a lot of time on that and it just never did come off the way . . . The Tribune particularly, used to write editorials about it and I thought it was funny.

Q: I don't want to miss anything but right now I'm curious to know when the dam broke. When you did start making some money.

A: Never did.

Q: Never did. There must have been a point . . .

A: Well, all right, that's an exaggeration. After the primary. It was like pulling eye teeth during the primary, and I invested a tremendous amount of my own money in the primary, loaning it to the committee. Ultimately got a portion of it back. Then we thought that after I got the Democratic nomination, the situation would change dramatically and they'd be knocking down our doors to contribute. It didn't happen. It didn't happen. We were broke for months after the primary.

Then in June-July, Ogilvie started television commercials. "He's been a good governor." Really took hold. We got very worried. We didn't have any money to go on television; it was about the first of October, we still did not have enough money for television advertising and, oh sure, we could maintain the staff but we were heavily in debt, borrowed the money. And then finally in October we began to get a little more money and I personally put another infusion in and we were able to put on a television commercial. But that was the break right there.

There was a break in the primary campaign that resulted from Paul Simon making a very bad mistake in a press conference about taxation which I'll come back to later. And then, the break in October when we were able finally to get enough money to mount a television campaign. The third key thing I should have mentioned, but I mentioned earlier, was the fact that the "Walk" turned out to be a success. Those were the three key things I think in the whole series of campaigns.

Q: Was the "Walk" in your mind at the time you were making the decision whether to run or not, or did that come later?

A: It came later. In 1971, in this period that you asked me what we were doing, we spent a lot of time thinking about how can we dramatize this campaign; how can we get people to take Dan Walker seriously; how can we get publicity; how can we get over to people that I'm not just a lawyer with a LaSalle Street background that doesn't know anything about people, or about state government; how can I get to be treated as a serious candidate in other words? We talked about the possibility of doing a canoe trip on all the rivers in Illinois. We talked about just all kinds of ways to do this.

And, in the wintertime, in Florida, a man by the name of Lawton Chiles, running for the United States Senate, walked the state. I'd known Lawton for some years and so I talked with Lawton about it and he recommended it. Our fear was that we would be treated as copycats in the press and they wouldn't take us seriously. And I think I indicated last time that my press secretary told me, "Dan you've got to realize that if the media doesn't say you're walking, you're not walking." It was a real risk. I mean a real risk, because if we'd been put down by the media and they hadn't covered it, I couldn't have quit. I would have had to just take a direct route and walk to Chicago as fast as possible and go on and do

something else. We were very fortunate though. The first day the Chicago Tribune, and the Chicago Sun-Times sent down reporters.

Q: And you started where?

A: In Brookport which is right across the river from Paducah, Kentucky. A lot of people think I started in Cairo, but I didn't.

Q: Why did they think you started in Cairo?

A: Because Cairo is actually the southernmost tip of the state. I didn't want to start in Cairo for two reasons. Number one, I had to get to Shawneetown by a particular time for a particular event, and I couldn't have done it if I'd started in Cairo. It's too far, by a day of walking. The second reason was that there was a lot of race trouble in Cairo as you may recall, since died down. Just not a good place to start off your campaign. So, anyway, we started and these two reporters came out and they treated us seriously because they saw what an agony we were going through. We were.

Q: Now when you say "we," who was with you at that point?

A: My son Dan, my son Charles and myself. And I had some massive blisters by the end of the first day and so did Dan. Charles didn't have any, lucky kid. And we walked too far. It was a very hot day and those reporters saw what we were going through. As a matter of fact--they were wearing tennis shoes--they tried to keep up with us and walk, and they saw it was just disastrous.

Q: Who were the reporters?

A: Gosh, I don't remember. I really don't. As a matter of fact, I didn't realize what an ordeal it was going to be. I was in good shape. I played a lot of tennis and I figured, well, anybody can go out there and walk. And I found out that it just is not that easy particularly on concrete in the middle of the summer. So we underestimated it very, very much. We had a lot of problems. If I get started on "Walk" stories I'll never stop.

Q: I want the "Walk" stories. (chuckles).

A: Well, okay. The first day was kind of fun the way it started out because there was this big sign down there on the river, "State of Illinois, Governor Ogilvie Welcomes You." And so I had my picture taken there pointing up at Governor Ogilvie welcoming me. And we had this big camper--they call them RV's now--that the boys were going to sleep in at night. It was planned that I would sleep with a different family almost every night of the way. And so, the first day we made it too long. I walked twenty-four miles. It was awful by the end of the day. I think it was nine o'clock at night when I finally got to this home that I was going to stay at. I had to walk to the home because I made it a rule on the "Walk"--we were very concerned about the media trying to trap us--we would never drive ahead of where I was walking. We would drive backwards, but then I always marked the place with a sign where I stopped for the day and then went back there the next morning and picked up there

and went on. We were very meticulous about that. Well, the reporters used to hide in the trees hoping they could catch me . . .

Q: Riding. (chuckles).

A: . . . riding in the car. And one of the devastating things . . . may I jump ahead on this because it may not come to my mind? In the primary of 1976 at the press conference Mayor Daley said, "You know, Dan Walker never walked the state. He drove a car between cities and he lied to the public. And then he'd get out of the car and greet the television cameras and walk through the cities." Well, that's just totally not true. And everybody who saw me knows it. And I got mad about it and lost my temper, but my sons, oh, they were outraged. Just absolutely outraged. It was all I could do to keep them from going down and personally taking on Mayor Daley.

Anyway, we went on that first night [to stay with] a gentleman and his wife, farmers in Bay City, a real small town. And I remember she made this special kind of pie, chess pie it was. And just a couple of weeks ago I saw an article in a southern Illinois paper where she was reminiscing. It was an anniversary of the night that I'd spent with them and she was reminiscing. Her husband is since deceased. The reporter asked her, "Did you vote for Dan Walker?" She was talking about what a great guy I was. She said, "No, no, no." She said, "I couldn't do that. I voted for nothing but Republicans all my life." (laughter) So . . .

Q: But she thought you were a great guy?

A: Yes. We had a lot of fun after I was elected; I invited all of my hosts and hostesses to come to a special party at the mansion. And I've made a lot of good friends with those people even though my contact with them was dinner at night and breakfast the next morning, but we had a lot of fun. Anyway the "Walk" went on, and then these fellows ran serious stories in the Trib and the Sun-Times with pictures. And at that time, particularly, television looked to the newspapers for what was news. What was in the newspapers, the TV would run that night at ten o'clock. They don't do that so much now, as I'm sure you know. They saw this; they sent down camera crews because they saw it was human interest.

Q: How soon was this?

A: This was the . . . a couple of days later when we got to Shawneetown.

Q: A few days after you began?

A: Yes, just a couple of days. Time for them to crank up and get down there. Two of the network stations sent down camera crews from Chicago. And they ran that on the ten o'clock news. Well, once network stations had done that, once the big metro papers, had done it, then all the other media in the state treated it seriously from then on. And we got good coverage. The political reporters like to think, and always have thought, that the reason why the "Walk" was so important in the campaign was because of all the publicity I got. That's not true. Sure it helped, sure it helped, but it was the psychological impact of the "Walk" that made the difference.

The public at that time was getting totally turned off on institutions. And I found that out early on on the "Walk," although this was not part of the political lore at that time. And they were getting turned off more and more on politicians, and the distance between politicians and people. There I was out there working and walking and being with people and doing that which they wanted politicians desperately to do: to come out there and talk to them and meet them. The public liked then and likes now this concept of a guy being willing to work to be elected. He wants to work to do it. People who've worked all their life equate with somebody who's working and it was that relationship factor--they could relate to me--that came out of the "Walk." I've never lost that with a lot of people around the state. I just did a parade Saturday in Benton and did my walk-run thing. "How are your feet, Dan?" "Still walking, Dan?" You know, and this is six years ago.

Q: Speaking of feet, this is a very mundane question, but you were terribly blistered by the end of the first day, how did you go out the second day with feet so blistered?

A: Well, unfortunately, nobody told me that you could put special preparations that athletes use on their feet to help ward off blisters. And nobody ever taught me how to break a blister. I learned, when I finally went to see a foot doctor, after two weeks of horrible pain, that you take a needle and puncture the blister but keep that callous there. I didn't know that. I just cut it open, you know, and so the callous would peel away and there it was.

In answer to your question, well, what are you going to do? You can't quit. You just took it. It was Ike Pappas who was then a TV correspondent, still is I guess for national NBC--national sent out a crew. And they did a thing, on national news, of my fixing my feet in the morning when I got up; it would take a half an hour. By the time I'd taken care of all the blisters, bathed them and put the medicine on etc., put the bandages on, put Vaseline on, pulled the socks on, the big socks and then finally put the boots on and laced them up, and then finally stand up and take a few steps. And it took a long time and it was very, very painful. And then the walking was just an ordeal.

We finally had to take Dan off the "Walk" just before we got to Harrisburg because we were afraid of infection, and he had to stay off the "Walk" for, I think ten days, until his feet got better. But mine after, oh, after about three weeks they started settling down and then I had no problems at all for the rest of the time.

The boys were great, though, because I would get towards the end of the day and there would be a little sign on the highway saying, "Scranton, 1 mile," in that direction and I would say, "Boys, it's getting late in the day, let's just pass this town. That's an extra mile to walk over there and back to the highway." And the boys would take me by the arm and say, "Dad, you're out here to meet people. Let's go." And it really was good having young people with you who have a lot more resilience, of course, than I did.

Q: But they probably were really caught up in this idea of the "Walk," your children.

A: It was a fantastic experience. It completely changed the younger son that was with me; it matured him. He really needed it, and made a tremendous impression on him. The boys were great. They really had a lot of fun. They frolicked around and you know, would do all kinds of things, but they worked hard too. It's wonderful to be able to have that much time with your sons by yourself, every day. So we enjoyed it.

Some things happened. We had some bad experiences, not a lot. I remember the day that a Hostess bakery truck drove by and the guy leaned out and threw about a dozen Twinkies at us. And we scrambled around on the road and picked them up and ate them like mad. People were always bringing things out. Women would bring out iced tea and lemonade on the highway because they'd hear on the radio that I was out there and it was a hot day. I'll never forget the day that--it was on a lonely stretch of road--this lady brought out a jug of lemonade, and I had some lemonade; it tasted good. And the lady, about two minutes later, brought out some iced tea and you got to drink it you know. I mean after all . . .

Q: Sure.

A: . . . they go to all this trouble. Then a lady brought out Coca Cola which I hated. The sweet stuff you just can't drink when you're doing that. I had to drink it, you know. By this time I'm beginning to look around, you know; the traffic is heavy and no gas stations (chuckles) so you did have problems like that out there on the highway.

I only had one scary time. This was after the boys left and I was walking by myself. It was in really wild country down below Springfield, between Springfield and Alton, over in Jersey County. I don't know whether you know that area over there. And I'm walking along this gravel road and this pickup truck comes by, and has the rifle up over the back window, you know. Mean looking guy driving it. Drove by and I did my wave bit and he turned and looked at me and gave me a glower, and I didn't pay any attention to it. A couple of minutes later he's coming back going the opposite direction. I thought, "That's funny." Well, maybe he went to visit somebody and was coming back. A few minutes later he comes by me again, and he came back this way, and then this way, and then this way. And I'm saying, "My God, do you suppose that guy has got violence in mind?" Well, a few minutes later, well an hour later I guess, I walked into town and there on the square is the truck parked and there he is. So I just walked over to him--I didn't know what was going to happen--and he said, "Oh Dan, I'm so glad you came over." He said, "I've been trying for three hours to get up enough nerve to stop and talk to you."

Q: (laughs) Oh, how wonderful. That's great.

A: And then another one was--this was the first few days of the "Walk"--we wore khaki trousers and blue shirts and a red bandana. Not some of the attire that history says I wore. You know, overalls or something like that. And at this particular time, unbeknownst to me, there were some prisoners that had escaped from a prison in southern Illinois and the prison attire was the same as what we had on. I didn't know that. We were walking along and a police car stopped on the other side of the road. So, I told the boys, "Keep on walking; I want to go

over and say, 'Hi,'" which I always did when a car stopped. Well, as the policeman later tells the story, I walked up to the car, he watched me coming up, he thought I was the escaped convict. He took out his gun and laid it on the seat beside him, like this, and he had his hand on the gun. And I walked up and stretched my hand through the window to say, "Hi, I'm Dan Walker." He started to lift his gun up off the seat and all of a sudden the name Dan Walker hit him and he said, "That's that guy who's walking." And he put down the gun and didn't say a word to me about it. But then I met him after I became governor and he told me this story of what had happened and how close he came to shooting me.

Q: Oh, my!

A: But we had lots of funny incidents. I remember the time when I came up to this little house over in Champaign, an iron worker. I always tried to stay with "people" people. Never with a banker, professional person, never with a leading Democrat, always with all-walks-of-life people. This fellow was an iron worker, a young man, and his wife opened the door--small house--and said, "Hi," and I introduced myself. She was very beautiful. I mean very young and beautiful. Had one of these Playboy necklaces around her neck, you know, and she said her husband would be along home from work pretty soon and invited me in and took me to the bedroom so I could put my little bag in there. And I looked and I saw immediately that this was the only bedroom in the house. You could tell, it was such a small house. I said, "Oh no, I won't take your bedroom, I'll sleep on the couch tonight." You know how you do when you're a guest. We went back and forth and back and forth. She was insistent. Finally she got in the last word. She said, "Dan, you've got to sleep in my bedroom. I want to be able to say for the rest of my life that a governor slept in my bed." (laughter) Well, what are you going to say? So she went into the kitchen and I went into the bedroom. This is a little salacious, forgive me please--real small room, and the whole wall opposite the bed was covered with--I counted them later--five years of the centerfolds of Playboy magazine. Naked women. Well, I'd been on the road for six weeks and I didn't sleep a wink that night. It was really . . .

Q: Did her husband ever come home?

A: Oh sure he did. (laughs)

Q: Oh, good.

A: Oh sure he did. I was properly chaperoned. (laughter) It was very hard though because in a lot of the families--they're working families--and the custom in these families, most of them, is when the man comes home he sits down to the table and he eats dinner. There's no interval in there. And the man gets quite cross if dinner isn't on the table when he gets home. Well, when I would come in from walking all day, the last thing in the world I wanted to do was sit down and eat right away. I wanted to be able to go take a shower, get washed up, relax for a few minutes and then come out and meet all members of the family and have dinner. So this was very, very, very, very, tiring and very, very difficult. I remember the lovely lady, Mrs. Logsden in Shawneetown. Her husband was a farmer. She met me at the door--she grew up in the city--

she met me at the door and took one look at me and said, "Dan, the bedroom's that-a-way; here's a pitcher of martinis; I'll see you in an hour and a half.

Q: Wonderful.

A: And, I always used to tease her about that. And then there was one bedroom I went into and guess whose picture was hanging over the bed? Beautiful autographed picture of Paul Simon, my opponent.

Q: Oh, wonderful. (laughs)

A: Isn't that something.

Q: Over the bed? On the wall or . . .

A: On the wall.

Q: On the ceiling? (laughs)

A: No, not up there. Place of honor. I converted them.

Q: Oh, good. Do you think you converted most of the people you stayed with?

A: I don't know, I think . . .

Q: Aside from the lady . . .

A: . . . you know how personal contact is. There was this one young lady in Peoria, walking along the street with her; she had greeted me when I walked into town and I was going to be there several nights staying in different people's homes and I said casually, not even knowing why I said it--the words just came out wrong; you've had this happen to you just trying to make conversation. She was kind of quiet and I said, "Mary, what night is it I'm going to be sleeping with you?"

Q: (laughs) Oh well, you're tired.

A: It got to be . . . oh I'll tell you. You want to hear another salacious one?

Q: Yes, yes, I love the salacious ones.

A: A small home up in northern Illinois and their bedroom and kitchen were between my bedroom and the bath. To go to the bathroom in the middle of the night I had to walk through their bedroom. Well you know, you don't want to do that, okay? And I'd been drinking a lot of iced tea that day; it was hot, and so I woke up several times. Well, what are you going to do? I looked around the room for something that I could use. (laughter) Finally I found some little dixie cups. Well, it took about eight dixie cups--I'm embarrassed--took about eight dixie cups, and then the next morning I, you know, go to the kitchen and my hostess is there in the kitchen. Well, how am I going to get the dixie cups from my bedroom to the bathroom? (laughter) So I would walk into the kitchen and

I would have one cup held behind me and I would say, "Hi, how are you this morning," you know and, "Excuse me," you know and I'd go on through. I made six different trips and she finally said, "What in the world are you going back and forth for so much?"

Q: That's a wonderful, wonderful story.

A: It finally got . . . I remember the day that I called Vic. It was south of Springfield. I'd been on the road I think about a month. And I said, "Vic, I can't keep this up any longer. I have got to be able to stay at a motel more. It is just too much of a drain to put out this kind of physical ordeal and then go meet strangers, and sit through dinner and then they have a reception and you don't get in bed until midnight or one o'clock in the morning, and then they all have early breakfast and you feel like you have to get up and have breakfast with the family, so you start the day out tired." And I just said, "I can't handle it anymore." I started out doing it (staying with different families) six nights a week and I finally ended up at two or three nights a week the last few weeks of the "Walk."

Q: What was going on this whole time behind the scenes?

A: Well the staff was working very hard preparing position papers, doing research. I had my wife and the kids going to meetings in my stead and of course other people on the staff going to meetings. They were just doing a lot of the mundane work. Collecting names, doing telephoning, as I said, issue papers, putting out press releases. All of that kind of thing.

Q: Was the camper around all the time?

A: No, no, the camper would come out about three times a day for me to have it for the bathroom and to get some iced tea or something and then I would have lunch. It settled down into a routine. I tried every kind of drink I could in terms of satisfying the thirst and nothing worked. I tried Gatorade and lemonade, and well, you name it. Finally settled on iced tea and I drank copious quantities of iced tea, and then I would have liverwurst sandwiches for lunch. And I remember Steve, went on to become a lawyer and now I think he's in the state's attorney's office, ran the camper. And he would pull up and say, "Well, I've got five items on the menu today. I have liverwurst with lettuce, liverwurst with onions, liverwurst with etc, etc."

Q: (laughs) Why liverwurst?

A: I just liked it.

Q: You never got tired of it?

A: Never got tired of it. I had it every day. Every single day. We had some other funny episodes. I remember a time when we had a radio telephone in the camper and Dan would go into the camper when we'd take a break and he'd call his girlfriend who lived out in Los Angeles. Dan was then going to college out in California. And you know, you don't have protection, you don't have privacy on those kinds of telephones.

So that night we were having dinner in a restaurant--Dan and Charles and I and my campaign guy--and, [there was] this big fat guy at the next table, he was huge. And I introduced myself to him as I did to everybody in the restaurant. I used to work restaurants like that. And when he met me he said, "You're Dan Walker? Is that your son?" And he started laughing. And he's quaking, you know, a big belly. Laughing, he lost control and then just almost fell off the chair and finally when he could get the words out, he was saying that he listened on his car radio telephone to Dan's conversation with his girlfriend and he was telling me that. He said, "Boy that son of yours has sure got some pent-up stuff there. You'd better let him off this walk for awhile."

But the boys met some nice girls and they would go back in the evening sometimes and have a date. And the things that you would do to pass the time of day: the number of honks and waves we would keep track of just to see if it was going up from day to day. And if we'd get a bad day, why, we'd really be upset. We worked on the signs. I realized the problem at the beginning. We're out there walking and nobody knows who the hell I am. There I'm walking along the road waving at them and they say, "Who's that?" This was before we got any publicity. So I finally figured out, we got to get a sign and put it up. Well I sent the guy running the camper back to Brookport or Paducah to get a sign and he came back with one that the wind knocked over almost immediately. So, we went through a succession of signs for about, oh, three weeks before we finally got a huge great big metal sign with a solid metal standard that says . . . what did it say? "Dan Walker Ahead, Honk and Wave." And then we would put that sign ahead of us like that, and then there would be one behind us for the traffic coming the other way.

For the longest time--this just shows you how dumb you can sometimes be--the camper, after I'd walked up to the sign facing this way, would take that sign and carry it up two miles ahead. Finally it came to Dan one day; he said, "Dad, all we have to do is take this sign, carry it across the street then turn it around and it will take care of the traffic going the other way. (laughter) And then they can bring the one way back there and put it up ahead and just save an awful lot of time and effort." Brilliant, but it lead to some of the worst fights between Dan and Charles over who was going to carry that sign across the street.

Q: How much difference in age is there between them?

A: Oh goodness, Dan's now thirty and Charles is . . . about seven years. Something like that. And oh, they would fight. And Charles was always picking up stray dogs and I didn't want any dogs with us. Just because you can't deal with them you know. So anyway, just a lot of things happened on that trip.

I remember the time in the television station when I'm being interviewed, and the guy who was interviewing me has a guitar and he also did interviews, and I'm on his program and at one point he said, "I'm going to sing a song, do you mind?" He reached down and picked up his guitar and he started singing about my feet. Have you ever tried to figure out what kind of an expression you should have on your face on television when somebody is singing you a song about your feet? (laughter).

Q: No, no I haven't had that problem.

A: I had a lot of things to do too. For example, at the beginning--we finally had to give it up--Dan and Charles would write down in a notebook the names of everybody I'd met and their address, and then every other day those would be mailed to Chicago and a letter would be written over my signature to that person saying, "Glad to have met you." Tremendous amount of work but we wanted to develop names also. It got to be so voluminous staffwise, we just finally had to give it up. Every day I would have a list of telephone numbers that I would call. Supporters from around the state, key people and also fundraisers and then I would have telephone interviews with selected people around the state all organized for me. By the way, I kept a journal.

Q: Oh, you did?

A: Oh yes. It's all written down. Every day I dictated the events of the day. It's called the "Walk Journal," and I also have a book of photographs that's arranged chronologically for the "Walk," that each one of the boys has that shows you the pictures. Do you want to look at it?

Q: I'd love to see it, yes.

A: Okay. It's a good breaking time anyway.

Q: Okay, yes.

June 2, 1981, Tape 3, Side 1

Q: I'd like us to go into some detail today on the "Walk," and of course a good place to start is southern Illinois. You talked the other day to me about some of the experiences you had staying in homes, and I guess I'd like to begin by talking about some of the concerns that you found that people in southern Illinois were particularly interested in.

A: When you say southern Illinois do you mean really southern Illinois or do you just mean downstate outside of the Chicago metropolitan area?

Q: I mean really south of Springfield, southern Illinois.

A: Well, southern Illinois proper is, as you know, I'm sure, south of Highway 50. Not south of Springfield. The area north of Highway 50 which runs east-west across the state is in central Illinois as Illinoisans perceive it. As a matter of fact, the people in southern Illinois don't even like to refer to Carbondale as being in southern Illinois because of the university and the kids and so forth. And, they also don't like to think of the East St. Louis area as being in southern Illinois. Very strong feelings run on that subject.

To put it in context, southern Illinois, the area of the state I'm now talking about, is very southern in its tradition. The people are from the South. Indeed, it was southern Illinois that was first settled in Illinois, not the rest of the state. And the people came by and large

from the Tennessee/Kentucky, Virginia/Carolina area, so there's a lot of southern sympathies, southern talk, southern food and southern feelings in southern Illinois. They feel cut off from the rest of the state; they feel poor; they feel economically deprived; they feel that because the area is sparsely populated that they don't get "goodies," if you will, from state government.

Interestingly, politically southern Illinois is very, very active. They play politics 24 hours a day, 365 days a year in southern Illinois. And lots of people, I don't mean just the politicians. It's unlike the Chicago metropolitan area where people only get interested in politics during a campaign. That's not true in southern Illinois. They're very patronage conscious, very job conscious because of the economy, I'm sure. And they have some different standards, many of them. They see absolutely nothing wrong with contract patronage and that kind of thing. They just have a totally different approach, really, to politics.

They have an alienation, they feel alienated from state government. That is true in many parts of downstate. I found that very deep feeling when I walked through the state. It's particularly true in downstate Illinois. You can't really, I don't think, understand the downstate feeling--now I'm going beyond southern Illinois to include all downstate--unless you talk face to face with people and lots of them. In ordinary campaigning you don't do that. You talk <u>at</u> people when you're campaigning. You give speeches on a platform, or if you do go into a town you shake hands and have idle conversation, but you don't <u>talk</u> with people.

And that was one of the beautiful things about the "Walk," because I had so much time to just stand there and talk with people. You learn what farmers really are concerned about. You learn what businessmen are concerned about in the small stores because you have time to talk to them. And more importantly, that word that I savor so much, listen. There are very few people that know how to listen. Very few people that are willing to blank their mind when they're listening to somebody else and just <u>listen</u> and savor what's being said. Most people when they're listening aren't really listening; they're thinking about what they're going to say when the other person stops talking. And listening was one of the things that I learned how to do a long time ago. And I honed that art in the "Walk" through the state.

Q: What about some of the issues? Well, to take a real basic one, Ogilvie was supposedly defeated by the income tax. And I get a sense from your journal that that isn't what you were getting from people from the very beginning.

A: No, no. The income issue was perceived much greater by the press than by the people. Most people can come to accept the income tax and realize that the state had to have it. Now that's not true of all people, and it's also true that many accepted it begrudgingly . But I did not find the income tax to be a big issue as I came through the state, and yet the media persisted in making it a big issue. Now increases in taxes, income or otherwise, is a big issue. And that's why during the primary I was able to take great advantage of Paul Simon's fundamental press conference error on the issue.

Q: What about--going back again to southern Illinois--the feeling that the governor did nothing for these people? That the state Department of Agriculture did nothing for the farmers in southern Illinois.

A: That's very true. I was surprised to learn that. I would ask farmer after farmer, "What does the state Department of Agriculture do for you?" And they'd say, "What?" You know, they didn't even know that there was a state Department of Agriculture . . . that's a slight exaggeration. But state government is not well known, and that's one of the reasons why I decided to spend more time, when I was governor, moving around the state, getting on television, talking about the issues, because otherwise you don't get the issues through to people and it's during the "Walk" that I learned that.

It's also at that time that the great alienation, the great movement away from the programs of the 1960's, the federal programs, began to be felt out there by the public. It's now reaching its peak. But that started in the early 1970's and I picked it up. People realized that you can't throw money at problems and solve them. They were painfully aware of the fact--they would tell me, "Public housing doesn't work, the war on poverty doesn't work, so why are the politicians talking about spending millions of dollars every time a problem comes up." And I heard that over and over again. Also the institutional alienation that came out of what happened during the 1960's, I began to pick up in the early 1970's. And I picked it up because of the "Walk."

Q: Early in the "Walk," Tom Foran made a statement that was later to haunt him about his belief that the reason you were appealing to people in southern Illinois was because they were so unsophisticated. And yet later on, you did several times comment that it <u>was</u> the unsophisticated people who were most empathetic with what you were trying to do.

A: That's correct because--when I was a kid I knew this; I had forgotten about it---unsophisticated people are much more likely to perceive the reality of politics and politicians than sophisticated people are. Now that's a statement that on the north side of Chicago will be laughed at. And in the corporate board rooms will be laughed at. But it is true. The well-to-do, upper income people are much more naive about the reality of what goes on in politics and government than the guy on the street is.

Q: You said that in southern Illinois you saw a real problem in the lack of long-range planning for that area of the state. Was that the case through all the state or was it particularly relevant to that area?

A: I think it was true throughout the state. We took some beginning steps. Actually Ogilvie started some long-range planning for state government that was very good. I didn't know that much about that at that time. Later on I learned of it, and we tried to continue it but I have also learned that, in government, as a result of my experience, planning is not what it's cracked up to be.

Q: There just isn't any way to really handle that, I would think.

A: Politics and the way that you have to handle government when you're an elected official makes planning mostly a paperwork exercise.

Q: I was fascinated as you walked at the reactions of regular Democrats to the "Walk," and to being seen with you and I wonder if you'd talk about that a little?

A: Well, at first it was painful but then I started to laugh about it. Inevitably, in the early days particularly, and through most of the "Walk," as a matter of fact, the mayor would leave town before I got there because he would be embarrassed if he sat in his office and didn't meet me, [a] candidate for governor after all. And on the other hand, he didn't want to meet me. The regular Democrats avoided me like the plague; I didn't expect it to be that bad but it sure was, and I encountered that again, and again, and again throughout the "Walk."

One of the things that I had made very clear was that I was not going to make any commitments with respect to patronage and that I was not going to follow the age-old patronage game of Illinois politics. Unfortunately that led to a great big problem because again, the media. I said that I would end the evils of the patronage system and I did so. The evils consist of selling jobs to county chairmen, and that was the practice. A county chairman would own a slot, that was his slot, and he could put into that job whomever he wanted to and that person was expected to kick back to the regular organization in the county some amount. Either in some counties a percentage or in others, regularly buy tickets to functions and so forth. It was a very pervasive system.

Well, I knocked all of that out. I said, however, all during the campaign, that so far as jobs are concerned, of course, if two persons are qualified, I'm going to give the job to the Democrat, to the person who worked for me. And I said that over and over again publicly. Well, unfortunately after I got elected, the media forgot the latter and remembered the former, and so then when I gave jobs to Democrats they said, "Oh, you lied. You didn't tell the truth. You said you were against the patronage system." And I would say over and over again, "That's not what I said. I said I was against the evils of the patronage system," but I might as well have been talking to a brick wall.

Q: How did you respond to people, voters, whom you needed when they said that because of the Hatch Act they couldn't get involved and they couldn't vote in the primary and . . .

A: Well, I'd tell them that was not true. But downstate there is a very real problem that I'm sure I must have referred to in the journal and that is, when you vote in the primary everybody knows which party you voted for; and downstate particularly, if your employer is a Republican and you vote in the Democratic primary, it can cause you a problem with your job. And that's one of the reasons why a lot of people downstate do not vote in the primaries.

Also they're different in this regard, and particularly in southern Illinois, there's a lot of reserve on the part of people. I first noticed this reserve when I would walk into a small store, and I'd look in the back of the store and there'd be lady customers in the back of the store and they would stay in the back of the store, and I would have to go up to them and find them in order to shake hands with them. And I then remarked one day to a fellow that ran a ladies' clothing store about

this. And I said, "I'm not making much progress because these ladies don't appear at all to be interested in meeting me." He said, "Oh Dan," he said, "You're totally wrong. They have come to this store because they have heard that you're coming to town. And they will cluster in the stores but they will never go up to you. They'll hang back and they're hoping that you will go shake hands with them." A lot of reserve on the part of people, and that's one of the reasons why it took me quite a while to learn again how to talk to people, that kind of conversation in those kinds of surroundings.

In Chicago we tend to talk rapidly. We get our business done. We're on the move. Downstate you just don't do that and particularly in southern Illinois. You've got to learn the art of the pause. You've got to learn that conversation stops sometimes. And if you're standing and talking with a farmer you kind of take your toe and scuff the dust a little and pull your ear and look up at the sky and talk about the weather, and if there's a quiet comes over the conversation, you just relax and let it be quiet for a few seconds and then talk about something else, and then finally get around to the serious stuff.

Q: I sense in you a lot of common sense and I think to me common sense means a realization that in any situation, we're dealing with people on a one-to-one and people need to be, stroked is the word that comes to me in transactional analysis terms, but people need you to let them know that they're important to you.

A: Exactly. You have to let them know that you care about them and their problems. I can't tell you how many people I met who would start telling me about their problems and frequently it would be something the state government had nothing to do with. At first, early on, I would interrupt them and say, "Gee, I'm sorry, but as governor I couldn't do anything about that problem. That's a federal problem, you should talk to your U.S. senator." And I learned that's the wrong thing to do.

Many of them, most of them, know that. What they want to do is talk about their problem to somebody who's in a high position. Whether that person can do anything about the problem is just secondary, which most people don't realize. You just have to let them talk and then talk with them about the problem, and then lead them, if they wish, to a solution as to where to go to do something about it. But don't turn them off.

People want to feel that they're cared about and that's age-old of course. And interpersonal relationships, that's one of the reasons, as I think I indicated the last time we talked, why the "Walk" was such a success. People saw me on television talking to people and they realized that I was communicating, to use that overworked word, I was relating to real people out there. Not to politicians but to real people.

Q: At some point you began to see farmers who were better off.

A: Oh, yes.

Q: You saw farming throughout the state from the clay dirt in southern Illinois to the richness of central and northern Illinois. How did all of that experience affect you and your relationship with the Department of Agriculture after you became governor?

A: Well, I determined early on to get a farmer-director of Agriculture who was a working farmer and had a working farm background. I wanted one from southern Illinois and did get one from southern Illinois, just because I didn't want to go the usual route. I wanted a farmer who had had a lot of contact with the small family farm operations as opposed to the big mechanized operations in central Illinois. Feeling that the latter can more easily get representation than the former at the state governmental level.

I think I learned the significance of agriculture to the state. I learned that it isn't the farm vote that counts, as so frequently politicians say. There aren't that many farmers compared to the rest of the population. It is all of the people who relate to the farming economy that are important in terms of your agricultural policies. That may sound like an obvious statement but there is a difference between those two groups of people.

Q: I know you met teachers along the way and teachers who were involved in teacher organizations. There was also a lot of discussion about "parochiaid" at the time and you had to respond to a lot of difficult questions in that area. Could you talk about teachers?

A: Yes. I developed--I always had it--but I developed a strong attachment to teachers and that stood me in good stead until the teachers got very upset at me in the last year of my administration because I didn't, in their eyes, provide enough money for education. But I wanted to learn about the public education problems as I came through the state and this, like in so many other areas, was just a wonderful way to learn it firsthand, out there, where reality is. What are the issues that the teachers are confronted with? And as you noted in the journal, I spent a lot of time talking with teachers. State government impacts on education much more than it does on many other areas as I'm sure you know. And that's why, early on, I realized how important it was.

Q: What about the "parochiaid" question?

A: Well, I always answered it the only realistic way that I could, even though I had seven kids that went to Catholic schools and had a parochial education. Nonetheless it's unconstitutional for the state to provide direct aid to parochial schools, and I believe in the Constitution, and that's what I would say over and over again. I also learned: don't be afraid to take positions that differ from people. Sure you'll turn somebody off every now and then, but a lot of people, I learned, really respect it if you tell them right out where you stand even if it's different than they. Now that's not true of the one issue people. They're the bane of my existence, the one issue people, and you will turn them off. But the people other than those, by and large, respect you if you tell them what you think and why you think it.

Q: You talked the other day about fundraising and how impossible it was for so long, but you did leave the "Walk" two or three times to go out of state for fundraising.

A: I had to.

Q: Tell me how that works. I don't have enough experience to know why out of state people would want to support you for governor of the state of Illinois.

A: Well, some of them were my friends that I'd known over the years who would just get together some friends and help me. Some of them were people who were anti-machine politics and recognized the problems with the Daley machine that I perceived because, after all, that machine had publicity from coast to coast. And I was perceived in some circles as a kind of a, you know, a little guy taking on this great big thing and that evoked some of those kinds of feelings that people have even if they're not from Illinois. But some of the people also were from Illinois and maintained an interest in Illinois politics and Illinois government. So, it was a mixture of all those things, but as I think I told you before, we really didn't raise much money at those events. As I recall there were three of them and the total income derived was . . . well, it helped, everything helped, but it certainly wasn't substantial.

Q: You talked along the way about your own feelings, not just about the people you talked to and the places you went, but you explored your own feelings, and you said that you had become more relaxed with people than you'd ever been in your life. And you also said that you knew this had changed you but you weren't quite sure how.

A: Well, I'm not sure to this day but I know it did change me; there's no question about that. I came away from that "Walk" with a much stronger feeling that democracy works, Jeffersonian democracy works. Developed a tremendous amount of respect for people, tremendous amount, and it used to kind of really hurt me when--oh, Mike Royko would do it and Mike Killian of the Tribune would do it--they'd write these columns and say, "Governor Walker uses that word 'peepul'," and they did it in a very critical way, that I talked about people as though I was George Wallace, if you will. And I could never persuade them that when I talked about people it's something I really meant and that it wasn't a put-down at all.

Q: On August 22, which was about a month and a half into the "Walk," you described it as being good for the human spirit, but in the same journal entry you talked about the inability to have time to do other things and the fact that that really weighed on you. What were the other things that you were feeling a need to do?

A: Well, I wanted to work a lot more on issues. I wanted to be able to do more reading. I wanted to be able to do more studying. I wanted to be able to prepare issue papers that would be issued in the course of the campaign, not just to have somebody on the staff pull it together. Those were the kinds of things that I had in mind when I said that I wished I had time to do so many things. It is such--as you saw from the "Walk" journal--such a totally time-, human energy-consuming, draining, way to live that its singleness, the totality of it, wipes out everything else.

Q: Were you able to have input into the position papers? Obviously you were picking up an incredible amount of information.

A: We just didn't issue any at that time. It was not until the next campaign year, and then of course I did, as a result of the information that I had picked up. But also remember that the journals were transcribed in the campaign headquarters and Mary Parrilli, who did all of that, worked closely with the issue people and so she could give them information that came out of the journal.

Q: Did you ever worry that you might be just wasting your time?

A: Certainly. Many times.

Q: Did you have nightmares?

A: (laughs) No, no. I didn't have any nightmares about that. I developed a kind of a fatalism about it. I think you have to in that kind of a situation. But, yes, I worried, I sure did worry, as to whether I was wasting my time. You can note in there [the "Walk" journal] how excited we would get when we were going to get some publicity. And that was something that occupied our time endlessly, "When are the cameras going to come down, when am I going to get an interview, does anybody know I'm walking," you know, that kind of thing.

Q: When Charles left to go back to school you were so sensitive to his leaving, his not wanting to leave, his wanting to have a temporary leave, his wanting to stay in his "Walk" clothes. Was that the father of old or had you developed a relationship with him over that time that made you more sensitive to him?

A: Oh, very definitely. He was a joy. And he was a pain when we started out on the "Walk," he really was. At that time he was being a very difficult young man. And the contact with people, with grown-up people, the physical part of it, the outdoors, really relaxed him and turned him into a totally different person. It had much more of an impact on him than it did on his older brother.

Q: There was one point during the "Walk" where a county chairman refused to allow you to talk before a group of--I think it was a Democratic women's club--and you said at that time in your journal entry that you would never forget that. What does that mean?

A: I did forget it.

Q: You did?

A: I don't remember it right now.

Q: Oh, okay. You were obviously really angry.

A: . . . so to that extent I did forget it. Oh, I was very upset and I . . . What that meant was that if that gentleman came to me to ask me for a favor after I was elected governor, if I was elected, why, he could go in the opposite direction. And, while I don't have any recollection of it at this moment, I'm sure that while I was governor I did remember it and I don't know whether he does or did, or not. Do you remember his name?

Q: No, I can't think who it was.

A: That's all right, doesn't matter.

Q: When you got to Decatur there was a lot of talk about the Oakley Dam project.

A: Yes.

Q: The conservationists against the people who wanted water and more recreation area. Tell me what your feelings were about that.

A: Well, I thought that was--even after I spent a lot more time on it as candidate, and as governor--a very tough issue, a very tough issue. And I did not make up my mind for, as I recall, a considerable amount of time. I finally came out in support of the project, as I recall, because on balance I felt that it would be a good thing for the area. It did not materialize for a lot of complicated reasons though.

Q: I was interested that you made the effort to go to Allerton Park and see what was there and what was in danger of being lost.

A: Yes. Yes, I did, and if I remember correctly, I had a lot of urging from the staff to duck until after the election, but I decided to make my views known before the election and that caused me some problems, particularly on the University of Illinois campus.

Q: At another point there was an incident where a precinct committeeman--I don't know whether he came up to you in town or during the "Walk"--but he said that he was sure you were cheating, and that you shouldn't be running around in a camper that was that expensive, and he was sure you were going to be slated as lieutenant governor. How do you deal with somebody like that?

A: Listen and try to hold your temper. That's really all that you can do.

Q: There must have been times that you were so tired that you couldn't hold your temper.

A: There were some times when I got upset but I like to think that they were rare. I have always been one of those who believes in holding your emotions in check. I don't buy this theory that you're better to blow off steam. I just don't accept that. I never have, all my life. I believe that the Oriental attitude, that you contain your emotions, is the correct way. What it requires is effort and self-discipline, and I believe in that and I try very hard to practice it.

And I think I did by and large on the "Walk," although I can remember a couple times when I did lose my temper, regrettably. You really learn how to read faces when you do this much of it. I can tell a "hostile" instantaneously just by the set of the face and the look in the eyes. And that's particularly true, by the way, of women. Hostile women's lips quiver and that's because they're caught in a social position where you're saying hello to them and they don't like you--they're a "hostile,"

that's what I call them--and they don't know whether to smile or not smile and so their lips quiver, and that doesn't happen with men. It does happen with women quite often.

Q: Were you able to read people before this?

A: No. The problem is that you're going too fast. You don't really pay that much attention to people. But when you have time you do. And that was the beauty of the "Walk."

Q: September 15 was the first day that I found in the journal that you actually said that you wanted it to be over, that you were really desperate for it to be over, and obviously you still had a long way to go.

A: That's right. About a month and a half.

Q: How did you keep yourself up? The kids were gone at that point back to school.

A: That's right, it was very lonely. Well, the staff helped of course and when you take on a task that everybody tells you is impossible you work and you work and you work, and I think I indicated to you earlier that one of the attributes that my father pounded into me from the time I was "yea high," is self-discipline. So you just do it because you believe very strongly in what you're doing, and you know that's the only course of action, you can't quit. So, what are you going to do? You just keep going and that's what I did. But you're right, I didn't remember the day but I do recall there was a time when I just said, "Please let this be over with."

Q: During the later part of the "Walk" there was in the papers all the time the talk of the race track profits . . .

A: That's right.

Q: . . . and the deals and all the public officials who owned race track stock and when you had news conferences and made statements, you talked about that a lot. Do you remember that as a big campaign issue at that point?

A: It was a symptom and, yes, it was a campaign issue but it was a symptom of the pervasive public distrust of government and people in government and politicians. People just were turned off on politicians and I know that Americans have always been cynical about politics and politicians, but the depth of feeling I found out there vented through the race track issue was just much deeper than I had expected it to be. And, of course, that fitted right in with my whole campaign which was nonpolitician; I am not a politician. And as a matter of fact while a lot of people kidded me about that . . . some more than kidded me about it, it is true and was true. I was not then, I am not a politician. And that's as much a criticism as it is a praise. I don't practice the arts of politics which perhaps if I'd practiced better I might have been reelected.

Q: As far as the race track deals were concerned, you asked the attorney general to file suit to recover the profits. What happened to that?

A: Nothing.

Q: Nothing?

A: That's my recollection, absolutely nothing.

Q: We mentioned before the speech making, and how different that is because you're talking to people, and yet you had to periodically put on a suit and go make a speech. How did you feel about doing that?

A: Well, I was not comfortable with it because I was so accustomed to the one-on-one, and my recollection is that I didn't do very much of it on the "Walk." I think there were very few speeches. I recall on a number of occasions--and forgive me if there's some repetition here--people would come up to me in a small town or when I was talking with them they would say, "Well, when's the speech?" And I'd say, "What speech?" "Well, aren't you going to speak?" And I'd say, "No." And they'd say, "Well, you're campaigning. Politicians always give a speech on the square or somewhere when they're in town." And I said, "It's just not my practice to do that." And early on in the "Walk," I made a determination that I was not going to do much speaking because I didn't want to convey the image of the ordinary kind of political approach to campaigning. This was a talking and listening experience, not a "I'm going to tell you what's what" experience.

Q: I guess when I think about the speaking that you did do, what's highlighted in my mind are the college campuses where you talked, but it really was a give and take.

A: Yes, I did a lot of Q and A. A lot of people have told me that when I speak, and I almost always follow it up with Q and A, that I'm better at that than I am when I'm speaking. And I hate prepared speeches with a passion.

Q: How did you find the young people?

A: I like young people. I've always liked young people. Of course, I have a lot of kids of my own. The kids of the 1960's didn't turn me off as much as a lot of other people. Sure the wilder youth turned me off but just because they had long hair, so what? And the questing that was going on during the 1960s. I was very sympathetic with, and so young people, I like to talk to them. And I never, or I tried very hard to never--and I think I pretty well succeeded--differentiate between a nonvoter and a voter. That is, a young person who was too young to vote and somebody who was old enough to vote. If he wanted to talk, I'll talk.

Q: What about the questions that came from, say, college-age people?

A: Damn good questions, damn good. Really very intelligent questions by and large. Even at the high school level, and I did a lot of Q and A's in the high schools.

Q: Some of those young people, or relatively young people, were Viet Nam veterans. Did you run into many of those along the "Walk" and much talk about Viet Nam?

A: Oh sure, sure.

Q: Tell me about that.

A: Well, it was much more fresh, of course, in people's minds then than now and young people, yes, wanted to talk about it, and I know that I had a metamorphosis myself in connection with the war in Viet Nam. I started out being very gung ho, I guess because of my military background and that kind of thing, and then I can't tell you when in the course of the war I changed my position completely and became an advocate of ending the war. So, yes, there was a lot of talk about, a lot of disillusionment amongst the Viet Nam veterans. Again, I find it interesting that fundamentally there was not much difference between the turn-off experienced by the Viet Nam veteran towards government and politics and the turn off experienced by their fathers and mothers, and yet there was this big gap between them. They didn't realize that for different reasons they were both rebelling against government, against the politics as usual; it's just because I guess they're looking at it through different glasses but the fundamental reasons for it, the disillusionment kind of thing, was true of both the old and the young.

Q: Have any of your children had military experience?

A: No. Which I regret.

Q: You do regret it?

A: Oh yes.

Q: What do you think they might have gained, that they didn't gain elsewhere?

A: I go back to that word discipline. Everybody should learn something about discipline and, if they don't get enough of it at home, they should get it from some other source, and the military does give discipline which everybody needs. And also, the other thing is learning how to live closely with other people, lots of other people, which I think is a very important thing to learn in life and yet a lot of people don't learn it.

Q: At one point when you were in Rock Island and supposed to speak at a government employee's union meeting, somebody had sent out a memo saying that the meeting had been canceled and only a few people turned up, others thinking the meeting was canceled. That sounds to me like a dirty trick.

A: It was.

Q: Were there other dirty tricks along the way?

A: Oh sure, sure. You would run into this. The turnouts, for example, it was not uncommon at all in state government for the boss to give the

workers little pieces of paper and excuse them from work to go to a rally or to go to heckle me at some meeting. And then they had to get a person at the event to initial the paper as proof that they'd been there, and then they had to turn that piece of paper back in to their boss when they went back to work. But yes, I encountered heckling and that kind of thing on a number of instances.

Q: Again, on October 9 you made an entry that indicated you were really, really ready to quit. Not to quit, but you were ready for it to be over. You said at that point that you never had gotten used to being dressed the way you were and wondering what people thought about it. Tell me about that feeling?

A: Well, I'm very much of a traditionalist and after all, dress, uniform, all my life, one uniform or another. Military and then out of military, a lawyer's uniform, if you will. And when you're about serious business, all my life, you're dressed to be in serious business. And to be out there in work clothes, when you're campaigning, seems strange. It's appropriate for where you are and what you're doing but it seems to be strange for a candidate for governor to be dressed that way. I really can't say it any . . . I don't know whether I'm making myself clear or not. It wasn't that I was uncomfortable being in work clothes because I grew up that way and had no problem at all. And I was dressed the way a lot of the people that I was with were dressed, not in overalls as the newspapers sometimes say, but as you know, in khaki trousers and a blue shirt and somebody would ask me, "Don't you think you should be dressed in a suit?" And I'd say, "How in the world do you think you're going to walk all day dressed in a suit?" You just can't do it.

Q: Wasn't a part of the problem though that you were often invited to dinner or to cocktails where everybody else was dressed up and you were in your uniform?

A: You're quite right about that. That would happen because I'd go to a reception and I'd have to continue in those clothes, and you're right, you remind me, that was a decision because I could have changed clothes but I made up my mind that I should stay in the uniform. Now you can say that was for image reasons or whatever, and I suppose it was for image reasons, certainly, I wanted people to know what I was doing, walking, and so I stayed in the "Walk uniform," as I called it, as you know, throughout the "Walk."

Tape 3, Side 2

Q: Toward the end of the "Walk," a little past a thousand miles, Lawton Childs [U. S. senator from Florida] did join you and walk with you. Tell me about that experience, that day with him.

A: It was really a wonderful experience. As I think I indicated to you earlier, Lawton and I were very good friends. And I remember calling him and asking him if he would come out and join me, I think it was at the one thousand-mile mark, and he was unable to do so because of a problem on the floor of the United States Senate, but he did come out when I got

to Beloit and I remember calling him the day before and saying, "Lawton, we've checked with all the newspapers and it's apparent that we're not going to get any television coverage or any metro newspaper coverage, so you won't get any good out of this at all, and if you feel that you're so busy and don't want to come, why, I would certainly understand it because there can be no plus for you." He said, "Dan, don't give it a thought." And he came anyway. And we didn't get a lot of publicity about it.

I don't think we got any in the Chicago metro area about Lawton Childs coming out but we told "Walk" stories is what we did. We traded our "patter" talk; I don't know whether I got into that before, but to preserve your sanity when you're doing this much one-to-one campaigning you have to develop a patter that comes out automatically so that you don't think about it and you go through your little patter as an introduction to people. You go up and say, "Hi, I'm Dan Walker. What's your name?" "Mrs. Smith." "Oh, come on now, you've got a first name. I think every woman should have her own identity. What's your first name?" "Jane." "That's a pretty name Jane. I like it. And those are really nice earrings that you have on." Or to a gentleman, "Gee, I admire that tie. Did your wife pick it out for you?" "Well as a matter of fact, she did." "Well, she certainly has great taste in neckties." That kind of thing. Now, it sounds kind of phoney I'm sure to you, but it's very real to people. And the reason is it gives some time to collect your thoughts.

It isn't every day that a candidate for governor comes up and grabs your hand and starts talking to you, and a lot of people just don't know what in the world to say, so you've got to do the talking for the first few seconds. Most people, you've got to have a patter that gives them an opportunity to relax and then let them talk. And so, what I did was pick up what, again, my father had taught me. He said, "As you go through life, Dan, one of the great things you can do is always compliment a woman on some article of clothing or her looks. Tell her she's pretty." He said, "I don't care how old they are or how ugly they are. Compliment them." And he said, "You'll get more dividends from that than you can imagine." And I have found that to be true and I'd do that even before I ran for office as much as I could. Sometimes you don't think of it but I made a practice of it when I was campaigning and you know, again, you can say it's phoney and it's politics, but why not brighten up a person's life with a compliment? Have you ever noticed that when somebody tells you that a particular item of clothing you have is very attractive, you'll tend to wear it more? It really makes an impression on you because so very few people give compliments and I think we ought to do more of it.

Q: That's interesting because you seem like--at least as I read the journal--you seem like a man who would not be comfortable in sort of cocktail party talk situations.

A: How did you figure that out? That's very true. Terrible at it.

Q: And yet . . .

A: Even worse before than now, although I'm a little better at it now simply because of the patter, but the patter doesn't come out in cocktail

parties like it does when you're out talking with people and it's just a different ball game. Yes, people don't think of me as, but I'm very reserved and very quiet and don't easily engage in small talk, in social surroundings.

Q: The experience had to have been incredibly wearing because you're a man who needs privacy and you had to constantly weigh that need for privacy against the good of the campaign.

A: That's right.

Q: And the campaign almost always won out it seemed. How did you keep yourself together?

A: I answered that earlier. Self-discipline.

Q: But do you psych yourself up or . . .

A: You just do it.

Q: You just do it.

A: You just do it. That's all I can tell you. I was raised that way; as I said, you just do it. You come home from the Naval Academy and expect to spend a lot of time on the beach and going out for thirty days, and you find your father with a tomato crop and no workers, and so you worked for thirty days. Well sure, you know, you don't like it but you do it. That's what life is all about. Doing.

Q: On October 3, which was very close to the end you had a long journal entry and you were very, very reflective--it was the eighty-second day--and you said that it wasn't possible to do any serious thinking with people honking and waving and with reporters; you had thought that it would be a time for reflection and contemplation and it didn't work out that way.

A: It sure didn't.

Q: And you referred to it as your mind "slipping into indolence."

A: (laughs) That's right.

Q: Talk about that.

A: That's very, very true. Early on--and my staff used to tell me I would have--I thought that I would have just a lot of time to really think things through. And what I am about to say almost defies common sense but it's true--there isn't that much time to think. There are a lot more interruptions, and then in the early days there were the boys; when I wasn't as well known I was talking with them just an awful lot. And then because you get bored . . . I like to think I have self-discipline but I don't have enough self-discipline, when I'm totally bored, to make myself think really serious thoughts. I can't do that. Now, I should be able to; if I had enough of the Oriental philosophy in me I'd be able to do that, but I don't.

And so when you're bored you're just blah, you know, kind of like that [his whole body sags], and you let your mind think about what's around you. The trees, and the grass and idle kind of thoughts and then as the pace picked up with more and more people involved then it just became too much. And then you get tired. Your mind gets tired. When you're with people you're on the up and that was one of the draining parts of the trip. I had to be up so much, on the stage, up, up, up, with every person that I met. Could not let down. Then when you got away from people, as I said, who wants to have serious thoughts at that time? So, it just didn't work out that way.

Q: At the same time a part of you was saying that your mind was slipping into indolence . . .

A: That's right.

Q: . . . another part of you, especially on this particular entry, on October 3, talked about the real joy that you experienced in becoming aware of the natural setting again; after you'd walked a section, of riding back in the camper and looking at where you'd been; and talking one day for a long time about the different kinds of clouds. Was this a new part of you that came out or had you always been able to enjoy those things?

A: I've always enjoyed the out-of-doors. And anybody who has spent as much time at sea as I did will have some idea of what you were just talking about. Nature becomes meaningful only when you have to confront it, I mean really meaningful, in my opinion, and you have to confront it good and bad. And at sea you do confront it, or it confronts you. And I grew up out-of-doors, so I've always felt that way to some extent. And as I'm sure I did remark in the journal, on a number of instances I felt my, really my childhood and younger days coming back to me because of the out-of-doors; the kind of people I was with, the conversations that I was having, just brought back what I'd forgotten about the joys of that kind of living.

Q: You talked about the dichotomy in the "Walk" between the very artificialness of what you were doing because it was so extraordinary, so unlike daily living, but the very naturalness of it as well. Can you talk about that?

A: Well, that's very true. Having in mind that it was a constructed event in the sense that I was doing something for a political purpose, and obviously I was, and had to keep in mind at all times that this wasn't a picnic, this was a campaign and I'm out here to do two things: oversimplifying, one is to learn and the other one is to make an impression. And that needed to be kept in mind all the time and that kept it structured, kept it in a sense artificial, kept it in a sense not what you do in your ordinary daytime life. You just don't do things that way. On the other hand, because of the physical part of it and the surroundings and the walking, it was a very natural thing, it was very relaxed, and there is a contradiction between those two things that I would feel very strongly from time to time, but on other occasions I got so used to it that it did not seem as remarkable.

Q: You said in your journal that you thought it was going to be very hard to readjust to ordinary living. Why did you think that or what were you thinking of and how did that turn out?

A: Well, the reason I thought that is because the experience was so alien to the way that I had been accustomed to living. Getting up in the morning, taking a commuter train, sitting in an office all day long or getting into an airplane and traveling, dealing with professional people and business people. Totally different way of life. And I thought it would be hard to adjust and it turned out not to be. I was so glad that the "Walk" was over. Not that I didn't like it, I loved parts of it and I look back on it as one of the really great experiences of my life, but you could tell as you read the journal how wearing it became, so I was really glad that it was over.

And then immediately after that the staff put me into a regimen that became totally consuming and totally wearing for November, December and January as I recall, although I guess it was just November, December. It was constant coffees from the time I got up in the morning until ten or eleven o'clock at night. Coffee after coffee after coffee. The same little talk, the same questions basically, the same kinds of people all over the Chicago metropolitan area. That became an even worse chore than the "Walk." But I was so preoccupied with that that I didn't have time really to feel the impact of not being on the "Walk." If I'd gone back to my former routine, I think it would have been much worse, much harder to adjust.

Q: You didn't have much money.

A: I sure didn't.

Q: That must have required incredible creativity on the part of your staff and yourself in deciding how to spend what little you had and how to get the most out of what you had. Can you talk about that?

A: Well, the "Walk" fortunately wasn't too expensive. That's one of the nice things about it. Not burning gas, and the motels on the few nights a week when I would stay in a motel were very, very reasonable, and so meal expenses weren't all that high. But even the budget that was created for that became a strain on the overall budget because we had to run the camper and pay the staff something. The worst part of the whole campaign from beginning to end was money. Never having enough money to pay bills. Other people had to do this more than I--dealing with the people who wanted to get paid and couldn't get paid. The trades people and all of that, it really drove us into the ground mentally, that whole fundraising part. We never had enough money, never. To this day it is a very distasteful subject for me to even talk about. I mean that.

Q: Everybody was giving it their all. Vic and Norty and so many other people. There had to have been times though when there was real disagreement on what was the right thing to do. For instance, I think there was a real controversy among the staff about planning the trip from Rockford on to Chicago. How do you plan it, when do we get there, what do we do about Chicago? How did those things work out? Was Vic the one who really finally had the final say?

A: As I recall it was really a lot of people. When I say a lot of people I don't mean hundreds of people . . . the staff, four or five people who came together on that. Vic certainly was providing the leadership because I couldn't do it out there on the road. I talked with Vic a lot on the telephone and gave him my views as to what we should do but he would frequently say, "You're too close to the road to have any overall feel." And I can remember spending a lot of time thinking and talking with Vic about what would happen when we got to Chicago. Would we get media attention or would I just be ignored when I walked into the city? What would it be like?

And I used to worry about what it was going to be like walking down Milwaukee Avenue or whatever street I'm on in these clothes dressed so differently than everybody else? What are the policemen going to say to the author of the "Walker Report" when I pass them on the street corner? All of these things used to worry me a lot, but, to repeat, Vic was the leader and I learned early on in the campaign, no candidate can be a successful campaign manager. You'd better be a candidate and spend your time doing that, give them your input, but let other people decide the tactics of the campaign.

Q: Can you think . . .

A: Not the strategy but the tactics, those are two different things, which I think you know.

Q: Can you think of an example of a time where you thought it should have been one way and Vic thought it should be another, and you <u>were</u> too close and he was right?

A: I think that with respect, as I recall, to planning the route coming into Chicago, we did have an argument about it and Vic turned out to be quite accurate and I turned out to be wrong. I wanted to come in much more directly and I fought hard for that view and he said, "I want you to swing up and down the suburbs and get out there in the suburbs and don't spend as much time wandering around the city." And in retrospect he was absolutely right.

We had another one that was more humorous. I was somewhere in southern Illinois, I forget where, and I said, "Vic, I am <u>not</u> going to spend five nights a week in people's houses anymore. I've had it." What did I want? I wanted three nights a week in a motel or something. That controversy must have been reflected somewhere in the journal. Anyway, it got so bad he had to come down and spend a weekend with me so that we could hash it out and I prevailed because I just dug in my heels on that one, and I knew that if I kept going the way I was going five nights in a home, one night after the other, that it would drive me into the ground.

Q: Did Vic ever walk with you?

A: No. Oh, I think that occasion when he came down he may have gone out for five minutes. I used to tease him about it all the time. No, he never walked with me, hardly at all. After the boys left, Norty would do some walking with me just to keep me company. And Bill Holtzman as you read in the journal would come out a lot and walk with me.

Q: On October 15 after you reached the Wisconsin border, your spirits seemed to pick up. Never after that was there mention of your wishing it were over. Part of that I'm sure was because it was almost over, but was it the thought of going into Chicago, was that what was . . .

A: No, no, it was mostly I think, psychological; I recall thinking about this. When I hit the Wisconsin border, from then on I was going home. Just as simple as that. Up until that time I was going away from home, but once I made that turn and headed back down towards Chicago then that had all of the last lap kind of feelings about it. Once I got on that last lap why, by golly, I can make it now.

Q: You had a lot of media coverage toward the end. I know there wasn't much at the beginning and you were just desperately looking for anybody (laughter) . . .

A: Anybody who would say something. Did I have in the journal the time we had a press conference in southern Illinois, in Shawneetown, and nobody showed up? And then there was another press conference, I can't remember where it was, where one person showed up and I answered all the questions and everything and I said at the end, "By the way, what newspaper do you represent?" "I don't represent a newspaper." "Radio station?" He said, "No, I'm the editor of the college annual," (laughs) which comes out after the election.

Q: When did it start to pick up? Well, what was happening in Springfield when you were in Springfield? The national news people were there anyway.

A: I don't remember what it was but, yes, they were there.

Q: There was something happening.

A: And they came out and picked us up on the five hundred-mile mark as I recall and then Ike Pappas, who still is a national TV reporter for NBC or CBS, picked us up between Springfield and Champaign, and that's where we got the best national coverage that we got throughout the campaign. And you know, that was just kind of fun. I wasn't running nationally but it's just kind of exciting to have the national coverage. And of course that meant the ten o'clock news which is the "biggy" as Bill Holtzman used to put it. The six o'clock is not as important as the ten o'clock news. And to make the ten o'clock news is really a score. Then when we got to Chicago and we found out that it was being treated as an event by the media and got really fine coverage all over, we were, of course, relaxed about it. But you see I had very little way of knowing except every now and then, what's going on out there in terms of--I saw myself hardly at all on television. I saw myself the first time [when] we stayed the night in Monticello near Champaign. I was on national news and I got to see myself, and I was really excited about it.

Q: You didn't see yourself because you were being entertained at somebody's home probably.

A: Well, I guess so and also remember that the camera crews that came downstate, a lot of them were from Chicago. The only time I would be on

television in a given community, I would frequently be gone from that community before it would appear on television. Anyway, for one reason or another I rarely did.

Q: You talked frequently in your journal, you mentioned the common practice in small town homes of having the television on constantly.

A: Oh, yes.

Q: This really has nothing to do with the "Walk" or anything, but where does that come from?

A: I don't like it.

Q: I got that. (laughs)

A: I really don't like it.

Q: But why do they do it? Do you know?

A: I don't know. I see that in homes every now and then. I can't answer that question. I really don't know. I've commented also on the fact that--I think I told you--you come into the house, you're expected to sit down and have dinner right away. That's another practice that, as I indicated before, is kind of bothersome but, yes, that television thing . . . well, let's think about it. I was tired. I really was tired and to try to carry on a conversation with strangers while a television set is blaring, and you're having a hard time being up anyway because you're so darned tired is, I think, a major factor.

Q: What was it like finally walking down Milwaukee Avenue in your uniform?

A: It was fun. People enjoyed it. People recognized me and so it worked out just fine. And it turned out to be absolutely no problem. Policemen would wave at me and I'd wave back and it turned out to be a fun experience. And knots of people would gather, and I would talk with them, and it was coming home again, and it worked out just super.

Q: What do you think of as the actual moment when it ended?

A: When I walked into the Midland Hotel.

Q: Midland?

A: Yes. That's where we had a rally at the end of the "Walk."

Q: What about the Sherman House? It didn't end at the Sherman House?

A: I don't think so. I think it was at the Midland Hotel.

Q: Okay.

A: I think that's where the rally was.

Q: And then what did you do?

A: I took the weekend off and then October 31 was my, then, wife's birthday. As I recall, on Monday morning I think I went to the headquarters, and then I think I dived immediately into the coffee functions that I mentioned earlier.

Q: You started flying, didn't you, right away?

A: Started flying?

Q: On November 1st, I think you began . . .

A: I may have done a fly around . . .

Q: . . . a tour, yes, yes.

A: Did I do a fly around?

Q: I think so at that point.

A: Okay, well, that's right, I went back and said "thank you" to people, that's exactly right. I went back and flew all over the state saying thank you to everybody who treated me so nicely on the "Walk." Yes, you're absolutely right.

Q: Did you wear your suit or your uniform?

A: I don't remember. I really don't remember.

Q: We've talked so much about so many details of the "Walk" and I suppose the natural question is, what was the overall impact?

A: I think it made me a different person in many respects. I think it made me a better governor than I would have been without it. I think it enabled me to understand the state. To understand what downstate is really all about, the people downstate. So that it isn't just a geographic area which it is to so many politicians from Chicago. It's a real live, vibrant, different-thinking, different-reacting group of people who have some very strong feelings about their turf and about Chicago. And a lot of people profess to know that, but it's one thing to know something intellectually, it's another thing to know something and experience something. And the latter was true as a result of the "Walk."

And then, of course, learning about the problems around the state. Bill Stratton I have a lot of respect for, because I learned as I walked through the state how many people recalled his being there. He knew his state. I knew my state. The present governor [James R. Thompson] in my opinion does not know the state of Illinois because he hasn't gotten out there and been around the state and felt the dirt and looked at the water and talked with the people. And I don't mean that critically. He just hasn't had the opportunity to do it.

Q: Can you think of examples of things you learned that made you a different governor?

A: Oh, sure. The one thing I just mentioned, that's understanding the downstate way of thinking which was very, very important. Understanding southern Illinois which I think was important, understanding farming which I had not understood before I took the "Walk." I'd been involved in farming in California but that's a lot different than farming in the state of Illinois. Understanding the issues that concerned people, understanding the highway system of the state which is so important to people downstate and a governor has to be on top of, understanding how downstaters perceive the public school issues and problems, the teachers and the parents. All of those things gave me the ability to look at a state governmental problem through the eyes of people instead of looking at it as a professional if you will, and I think those are two quite different ways to look at a problem. I like to think that as a result of the "Walk," I could do both.

Now I was accused of--when I say looked at through the eyes of the people--of being a demagogue. All right, and I always had great difficulty in getting over the point that there is an intellectual difference between, what I'll call a George Wallace approach to using people, and an understanding of how people are looking at government and the issue. Those are two quite different things. Even though they sound quite similar in terms of the way you relate it to a particular problem.

Q: What about a question like . . .

A: I'm going to have to draw to an end in a couple of minutes.

Q: Okay. What about a question like welfare? Obviously that question is very different in Chicago from what it is in Shawneetown or other areas.

A: That's very true and that's another thing--I haven't mentioned that. The depth of the feeling on the part of the people downstate particularly about welfare is well, it's very, very . . . I didn't appreciate it until I went out there. "Those people, those people use food stamps to buy steaks. Those people drive Cadillacs, those people don't work when they should be working. Let me tell you the story about the time when I stood in line behind a person and he used food stamps to buy steaks." I can't tell you how many times I heard that over and over and over again. Everybody had a personal story to relate. "That woman down the street who's on welfare and is on the ADC program. I know what goes on there. I see her man slipping into the house every night and sleeping with her and getting more babies so she can get more welfare and then he goes somewhere else during the daytime." Over and over and over again. The single most emotional issue, maybe only exceeded by gun control, that you will find on the minds of people downstate.

Well, taxes of course, but preoccupation with welfare, and you know, a lot of truth, there are a lot of abuses of the welfare system. Not all these stories, not all of them but there are a lot of abuses. People would say to me, "What do you mean there isn't any jobs? What do they mean when they say that black teenagers or black men ages twenty to twenty-five can't find any jobs? Let me show you the help wanted ad here. Waitress wanted, waiter wanted. Why won't they take that job?

What's wrong? They're too good for it." This is the kind of thing you hear over and over again.

Q: How did that go along with your liberal Democrat background?

A: You cannot help but go through downstate the way I did without having it move you to the right. You just can't. And I don't mean because you're responding politically, it just moves you that way when you talk to this many people. The values are there and I used to remark on this in talks and it's very true. They still are not abashed or embarrassed to talk about love, Bible, those kinds of things that are looked upon as kind of corny in suburbia and they talk out in the open about them, and they think that those values are very important; that made a deep impression on me. The fiber of people.

June 3, 1981, Tape 4, Side 1

Q: While you were walking there were a lot of things going on behind the scenes, and even by the end of the "Walk" you still didn't know who you would be running against in the primary.

A: That's correct as I recall.

Q: One of the possibilities was Tom Foran. Can you tell me about your thoughts about him and what you think the campaign might have been like had you run against him rather than Paul Simon?

A: In retrospect I think that I would have had a very difficult time beating Tom Foran. I did not know Tom at that time. I now know him very well. All I knew about him was his reputation as a prosecutor. A campaign with Tom would have been a much tougher campaign. Tom would have slugged. Paul Simon didn't. Tom would have paid less attention to the so-called government issues, and more attention to personalities and that kind of thing. It would have been I think a very much tougher campaign with Tom. And we thought so at the time, by the way.

Q: Wasn't he considered, like Howlett, to be a real Daley man?

A: Yes, we thought of him that way, but then if you think about the fact that Paul Simon was a downstater, Daley did not have any close attachments with Paul Simon. The ward committeemen and aldermen in the city of Chicago, particularly the hard-core machine politicians, didn't have any attachments with Paul Simon. As a matter of fact they didn't particularly care for his image. Tom Foran, on the other hand, with his Irish background and Chicago background, would have easily established a strong rapport with those people and I think they would have worked harder for him than they did for Paul Simon.

Q: Foran's argument in favor of slatemaking was that an open primary was divisive. Was that a common . . . did you run into that argument . . .

A: Oh, sure . . .

Q: . . . frequently?

A: . . . that was the common rationalization for slatemaking and I always used to respond, "Well, what makes Illinois different from the other forty-nine states?" Primaries are always somewhat divisive. But Democrats always have a way nationally, and in practically all states, of coming back together after a primary contest, then going on many times to win in the fall. A primary can be divisive, true, but it can also be a good testing ground. It can be a way to try out issues. It can be a way to form organizations and personal loyalties. I think primaries are very, very helpful.

Q: In May of 1971, even before you began walking, you disclosed your finances.

A: That's correct.

Q: And this was something that was clearly very important to you. And it became important during the period of time when you were governor because I think there were extensive ethics hearings, weren't there, to decide who should disclose and who should disclose what and . . .

A: That's right.

Q: Tell me about you and the ethics.

A: Well, I took a very strong position from the very beginning on ethics and the need for stronger legislation. At that time Illinois had no laws regulating campaign contributions. No election laws in this area at all, and I advocated for very strong laws, and I advocated for voluntary disclosure in the absence of such a law. And I challenged Paul to do it. I challenged Ogilvie to do it. I did it myself voluntarily. The one area that caused me trouble then and continued to cause me trouble throughout the governorship was this matter of disclosure of campaign contributions. I said in 1971 or 1972, I forget which, that I would disclose campaign contributions if my opponents would and they refused. And so I took the position that if they're not going to, why should I be placed at a disadvantage by doing it because people don't like that kind of disclosure and it hurts your fundraising. And if I'm going to get hurt they ought to get hurt, meaning my opponents. It should be an even kind of situation, and it wouldn't be fair it seemed to me to put myself under a burden that they didn't have.

Also there was an extra burden for me in the primary particularly. How do you think that Daley would feel when he would read in the newspaper that some businessman had contributed to Dan Walker's campaign, Dan Walker running against the machine? The machine doesn't hesitate to respond to that kind of thing by putting the arm on. It certainly did not then. And local businessmen would be scared to death to make a contribution to me in Chicago if they knew that it was going to be disclosed to the ward committeemen and the aldermen in their particular ward. And that was the basic problem with campaign contribution disclosure in 1971 and in 1972.

Q: Didn't you end up during your term in office in a law suit over disclosure?

A: I don't recall a law suit over disclosure while I was in office. There was a law suit after I left office. In 1976 we finally made full disclosure of all campaign contributions commencing in 1971, 1972. This is something that, in retrospect, should have been done much earlier. It would have saved me a lot of problems that I experienced. We did not want to do it simply because so many people said, "Please don't disclose, please don't." Not that they had done anything wrong, but they lived up here in Chicago and they just did not want to incur the wrath of people up here for having helped me out during the primary of 1971-1972.

Q: In July of 1971, I guess about the time you began walking, you announced that you had the backing of some national figures such as Ramsey Clark and Eugene McCarthy. How did that come about?

A: Well, I asked them to help me and they agreed. I have known Ramsey Clark for some time. His father was on the United States Supreme Court when I was at the Supreme Court as a law clerk and I met Ramsey then. And then Ramsey was in the Department of Justice and it was he that I talked to when I completed the "Walker Report" in 1968. So I knew him and he knew me.

The other individual you mentioned was Gene McCarthy. Some people on my staff knew Gene very well. Bill Holtzman had been an advance man for Gene McCarthy and he and Tom McCoy, who was a fundraiser for McCarthy and also did some fundraising for me on the East Coast, talked to Gene and I met him and he said that he would support me. Now, obviously that's a two-edged sword. It gets you some publicity, and that's helpful, and it means something to some people, but then a lot of people around the state were then using the argument that I was trying to muster out-of-state support, out-of-state financial support, and there's something wrong with that in their book. Actually, as you know, we didn't get that much.

Q: At some point in the--again while you were walking--Howlett seemed to come out as a candidate. Did you ever think that you might be running against him at that time?

A: No, no. I would have welcomed it, but no.

Q: Why would you have welcomed it?

A: As events proved in 1976 and I say this, well, I've said it before--I always hesitate to say it because I like Mike as an individual--but he typified the machine candidate and would have been a natural opponent for an independent to run against. But Mike didn't know then and didn't know in 1976 how to campaign for governor. He knew how to campaign for secretary of state but he didn't know how to campaign for governor. He just was not an issue-oriented or a people-oriented candidate. He would have been easier than Paul Simon and easier than Tom Foran.

Q: There were a number of things going on during that period of time that seemed to play right into your hands, as far as issues, that suggested the corruption in state government and the problems in state

government. The race track scandal we've talked about, the "shoe box" we've mentioned with Paul Powell . . .

A: Right.

Q: . . . and then there was another thing that you pointed to, and that was the legislature voting itself a raise.

A: Yes.

Q: Can you talk about those things and give me a sense of how you used those in your campaign?

A: Well, those kinds of issues, as you've indicated, fitted right into my overall approach. I was an outsider. I was not a member of the club. I was not a politician, and therefore when I struck out against politics as usual, all of these things that you've mentioned supported my thesis and that is: we've had enough of politics as usual; let's have somebody who is not a member of the club, who does not represent politics as usual.

Q: You say now that you are not a politician and you never have been.

A: I don't feel like one. Now when I say that, I mean the way politics is usually carried on. If you define politician in the sense of a person who is running for political office then obviously I fit that definition. But the aura that politics usually has, all of the images of it, I do not think of myself as having that kind of an image. But others probably would disagree with that.

Q: I think that when you say you're not a politician, I understand that to mean that you wanted to do it a new way. Yo wanted to try to break new ground in governing the state of Illinois and in the position of the Democratic party in the state of Illinois.

A: That's right, and little did I realize how difficult it was going to be.

Q: And of course you were referred to as governing by confrontation because you seemed to be constantly in conflict with someone, and yet you have also said that you believe that that is the way it should be.

A: Well, not necessarily confrontation. I think that's the wrong word. That's a media word, not a reality word. It's a convenient word to describe a very complicated kind of thing that went on while I was a candidate and while I was governor and it is a misleading word. I, as I have indicated to you before, am dead set opposed to "back room politics." I don't like it, I don't care for it. I have a great difficulty in practicing it.

My effort was to bring issues out into the open. To talk with the people of Illinois about those issues and to get them to react, talk to their legislators, be interested in and do something about state government. To do that you have to go out and do things like fly around the state. You have to talk about what your opponents want to do that you don't want them to get away with. And that came to be called confrontation. I

didn't mean it as confrontation; I meant it as "airing the issues" and getting them into a public forum so that people understand it.

Let's take the current RTA crisis. That's not being done now. Most of the people in the state almost without exception do not know what the issues are that are preventing a compromise from being reached on the RTA today. And that's in part because Thompson and Byrne and the other leaders aren't talking to people about it. They're talking to their cohorts about it. They're talking with other politicians about it. They're talking with community people about it, leaders, but they're not talking with the public about the real problem and I think that's unfortunate.

The difficulty is that when you do go to the public with a big issue, where there's a glare of publicity and you hold press conferences and the media always wants to say, "Who's fighting who?" then it gets caught under this label "confrontation" when it really isn't confrontation. Actually my style is not that--fighting. Never has been throughout my life one of, you know, coming on hard with somebody, confrontation, if you will. And why anybody who has studied my life--which people don't, of course, and that's understandable--could come to the conclusion that I would be a confrontationist by nature, when it's so alien to my own way of life, always puzzled me. But then I have to step back and say, that view is understandable because people don't know me that well to know that I'm not that kind of a person.

Q: Well, I think it's natural that that word might come out of the knowledge that you did not have a traditional feeling about the give and take and accommodation between the executive and the legislative branch of government, for instance.

A: Well, that's not accurate. I have a great understanding and feeling for the old art of accommodation. That's a totally different thing. In my first message to the legislature I said, "Let this be a partnership. Don't sit here and wait for me to send you programs. Develop your own programs at the same time that I'm developing programs and let's work together to make this state run better." That was the whole theme of the first message. It wasn't, as I recall, two weeks later before my own party was sending my cabinet nominees down the tube in the senate at a rate unprecedented in the history of the state of Illinois. I was never given, by my own party in the senate, the kind of "let him choose his own cabinet" that is a practice historically in government in Illinois and nationally. So, I have to say, every time I look back on that situation, I did not start the fight.

Q: I'd like to get back later to your relations with the legislature because obviously that's vital, but right now I'd like us to try to get through the primary campaign.

A: Please.

Q: Would you talk about the problems in getting the debates going?

A: Well, as I recall, understandably the person who is established is reluctant to debate the challenger because Paul Simon of course knew that

I was the underdog and that I did not have high name recognition, whereas he did. A debate would only increase my name recognition and, having in mind the nature of a primary election, would do practically nothing for him no matter which way it went. He had all to lose and nothing to gain. And as I recall that was the basic reason why we were not successful in getting a debate. As I remember we only had one encounter and that was on "Kup's Show." And I remember that one very, very well. Kup does not encourage a debate on his show but it turned into some segments of that. I had been warned by my staff to be very careful about not coming on too hard because I do have a tendency to do that because I am . . . I just come on hard even when I don't intend to.

Q: When was this in the campaign? How close to the primary, do you remember?

A: I don't remember. It was after Paul was slated. I think it was early in 1972, as I recall. We talked about things like patronage and that I go back to my former comment on. That's one where we agreed there was no difference between us, that we both were against the abuses but we were together on "I will hire Democrats ahead of Republicans if they're qualified." Anyway, I was totally convinced when I finished the program that I had been much too soft. That I just had not made points that I should have made.

And I remember afterwards going to the office of the pollster that we had arranged for. And what he had done was to set up an audience for polling by calling people and asking them to watch the program, and he polled them before the program as to how many were for me and how many were for Paul Simon, and then he polled them after they watched the program. I won in a landslide. Total landslide. And I was just absolutely amazed because, as I said, I thought I had come off very, very, very soft. Anyway it really had an impact on me in terms of how to handle myself in a debate or in any kind of a campaign kind of back-and-forth appearance, particularly with the electronic media.

Q: So you think in fact you were soft and that is what you continued to try to do?

A: I thought I appeared too soft but actually, as they put it to me, "Dan, when you think you're soft, you're coming on hard." At the time I think we had David Garth as media specialist. He's out of New York City and was very, very good. And I have no hesitation in saying that I looked to Dave Garth for advice on how to handle myself on television, and how to dress and things like that, because why not have an expert advise you in areas where you need advice?

Q: Did you look forward to the debates with Simon? Is that something you really wanted to do?

A: Oh sure, but we knew from the beginning we never would get them.

Q: So you eventually did the tape recorder debates, didn't you?

A: That's right, I'd forgotten that. Yes, we did the tape recording debates, that's absolutely correct. We were using every device that we

could to get public attention on my candidacy and as one columnist put it after the election, the reason that I won was we went around, through and over the media.

Q: Which means you used them very effectively.

A: Well, you can use the word "used," yes. And we didn't hesitate to . . . like the "Walk," for example, it was a way of going directly to people without regard to the media, although the media became involved. But there was a lot of word of mouth in connection with my campaign. And that word of mouth was just as effective as the media content.

Q: In February of 1972 Neal Eckert came into the campaign. Can you tell me about that?

A: I don't really remember how we happened to get Neal. I wanted somebody from southern Illinois, I remember that. But how I got to Neal, I'm sorry, I just do not recall. He was not the first one I asked.

Q: Can you tell me who some of the other possibilities were?

A: Oh, I remember asking the gentleman who is now on the federal court bench, Stanley Rostenkowski from Rockford. And I'm sure there were maybe--oh, yes, there was a gentleman, oh, what was his name? He was formerly in the legislature. Very, very active on tax issues from a small town in downstate Illinois. I'm sorry I cannot remember his name. And, there was one other. There were about three and then we settled on Neal.

Q: You hadn't known Neal beforehand?

A: No, I knew about him, but I don't believe I'd known him except to meet him on the "Walk," which I did.

Q: And you wanted him from southern Illinois to complement your Chicago businessman image?

A: Certainly downstate. Had to be somebody from downstate particularly because Paul Simon was a downstater.

Q: Did he seem to do that? Did he complement you?

A: Oh, I think so, but I don't think that Neal became a major factor in the campaign. Not because of him at all; he worked hard. He had no money and we couldn't give him any money and that was our problem.

Q: You mentioned the polls, the poll after the "Kup's Show." How important were those to you during those later days of the primary? Were you too busy to watch them carefully or is that what you were watching most carefully?

A: No, I never looked at a survey, never did. I can only recall one instance in all of the campaigns where I looked at a survey result and I don't even remember the occasion for that. Dave Green analyzed the surveys and Dave Green and Victor gave advice based on their analysis of

the surveys. I always felt that it was dangerous for me to try to do that. If you're doing good in the polls or bad it's going to inevitably affect your performance out there, and you don't need to have your performance be affected. Now if you're running a different kind of campaign, like running for the presidency where it's much more structured, then a candidate can do it. But where the whole campaign is based on face-to-face contact with people and press conferences and that kind of thing, your psychological appearance is so important that you just can't afford to let things like a poll get into your mind and affect your performance.

Q: I can't recall, but it seems to me you were ahead in some poll right before the primary. Do you remember that? Is that true?

A: The only poll that I was ahead in was WCIA, I think it is, a television station over in Champaign, and just shortly before the primary they announced, "We don't believe it but our poll is showing Dan Walker running ahead of Paul Simon," and that was exciting, of course, to us, but then you think twice and it doesn't become as exciting because even if I was running ahead of Paul downstate, what about Chicago? Where the great portion of the Democratic vote is in a primary.

Q: What about Chicago, I guess is my question? At one point in the campaign, in the clippings that I came across, you actually seemed to concede defeat; in March you said, "He," meaning Simon, "is threatening the Democratic party with defeat in the general election this fall by making this kind of outrageous proposal." And it must have been the tax.

A: Oh, sure. He was threatening the party with defeat in the fall election because of the position that he was trying to force the Democratic party to take. That's what I meant by that. The only occasion when I saw anything in the media that said that I conceded defeat was at an amazing press conference that I held in Springfield. I used to hate to go to Springfield because the press corps was totally pro-Simon, totally. And made it very clear to me that they didn't expect me to win and didn't want me to win because they felt that Paul Simon, who was their favorite, was entitled to be the Democratic candidate and I shouldn't be challenging him even. So I used to hate those press conferences.

On one occasion the reporters kept pressing me, and I was very, very tired. "What are you going to do if you lose? What is your living going to consist of?" And I kept saying over and over again, "I'm not going to lose, I don't expect to lose. I don't let that thought go through my mind." I got so tired of it, I finally said, "Well, all right, to put this line of questioning to an end, if I lost I'd undoubtedly go back to the practice of law." The next day the Chicago Daily News ran a headline saying, "Walker Concedes Defeat."

Q: Now, that's incredible.

A: It is incredible. We got the headline changed by screaming at the editors over the telephone but of course a large part of the damage had already been done.

Q: You know, in an editorial right before the primary, on March 12 in Chicago Today, the editorial said that your independence was a two-edged sword and then went into the problems of an independent candidate trying to be governor with a very partisan legislature. I think it's interesting that this came out even before the primary and you did indeed run into some serious problems later on.

A: Well, sure, the most frequently asked question at all those coffees I attended or out there on the campaign trail in groups where people were honing in on the issues was, "Being an independent and attacking the machine the way you are, how do you ever expect to deal with the legislature?" That was a question that was asked all the time.

Q: And what was your answer?

A: My answer was that, first, there is always a certain amount of divisiveness and contest between the executive and the legislature. Witness even a Lyndon Johnson that came out of the Congress, who ended up fighting the Congress. That happens all the time. Second, it's healthy that there be that kind of thing. Third, what counts is the ability of the executive to accommodate with the legislature on key issues to bring about a result, and that I felt that I could do that as well as anybody else. And witness RTA, I believe I did . . . not all of them but some of them.

Q: At about the same time--obviously there were a lot of editorials right before the campaign--the Tribune came out with an editorial that suggested that the "Walker Report," after the Democratic Convention aggravated the existing hostilities, that you had little grasp of issues, and went on and on in being incredibly critical of you, and they stood out alone in that criticism. To what do you attribute that kind of an editorial so close before the primary?

A: I never understood the hostility of the Chicago Tribune towards me from the very, very beginning. There I was out of the "old establishment," a business person, a lawyer in a prominent Chicago law firm--forgive me, I don't mean to be patting myself on the back--a sterling academic record, and yet the Chicago Tribune [attacked] with a venom that just amazed me from the very beginning, and they never stopped, never stopped throughout my campaigns and throughout my administration, and I never understood it. And I can't explain it to you today.

Q: What was their approach to Simon?

A: They liked Paul Simon. All of the media liked Paul Simon and that was one of the basic problems that I had from the outset. Once I beat Paul Simon I'd done something bad in the eyes of an awful lot of media people. That's not true of all of them but certainly a lot of them. Take the St. Louis Post Dispatch. A newspaper I always admired, a newspaper that used to attack machine politics in Chicago with regularity, and I thought that after I made the record here of independence I'd have support from the Post Dispatch . . . not at all. They never forgave me for attacking Paul Simon who was their darling.

Q: Who was the writer for the Post Dispatch at that time?

A: I don't remember. A gentleman who later . . . you mean editorial writer?

Q: Well, who was doing the articles that turned on you?

A: I don't have any idea. I finally gave up going to board meetings of the editorial boards. It just was doing no good whatsoever.

Q: We've talked a little about press relations. You talked about the press corps in Springfield and the Tribune. What are your other recollections of press experiences that stand out as typical or significant?

A: Well, I thought that the press in great part didn't take me seriously for a long, long time and that's understandable. I found the downstate press to be more willing to take a hard look. It was very hard to get anybody connected with any of the media to really get out of their offices and come out there and talk to people and find out what was going on. I could sense it, I could feel it, and I'd try to convey it to the reporters but it did not get through.

I remember one incident that occurred on a day about three weeks before the election, maybe two weeks, and I was campaigning in Chicago on the Near West Side. For the first time I felt: Really, by golly, I am going to win. I really am going to win. Because that morning on an "el" station platform, people came from all sides and practically mobbed me. It wasn't a matter of my seeking them out. They saw me and they were coming from all over. There was a whole group of people around me trying to shake my hand and saying, "Right on, Dan; go get 'em, Dan; you're going to win, Dan." And I had a reporter from the Chicago Daily News traveling with me. He was one of the few that ever did in the closing days of the campaign. He went back to the office; I read his article in the newspaper the next day. It didn't even refer to it, it didn't even mention it, and I asked him, "Well, why didn't you refer to it?" He said, "Afterwards, I didn't believe it had happened."

I do want to go back to that incident in the primary that was really the turning point in the primary in a great part, and that was Paul Simon's press conference, which I don't believe I've covered. I was in the car driving from Deerfield to Rockford for some kind of campaign appearance. On the radio I heard the report of Paul Simon's press conference and heard him speaking in which he advocated that the tax structure of the state of Illinois be changed so that the cost of public education would be borne by the income tax totally instead of by the, then, state property tax. I'd done enough research so I knew what the impact of that would be.

I got to the first telephone I could find and called--I think it was Bo Cutter, then doing the research in the campaign. He later became, by the way, deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget in the Carter administration. And told Bo that we have a dynamite opportunity here and we've just got to pick it up and run with it because what Paul is proposing here is a dramatic increase in the income tax.

And if anybody thinks that if you put in a huge increase in the income tax, even if you take over the cost of public education, the counties around the state are going to make up for that by reducing the property tax accordingly . . . absolutely not so, it's just not going to happen. The result is, the property taxes will go down some but income taxes will go soaring up.

Well, Vic and Norty went to work with Bo and they put together a chart that showed what would happen. And I took that chart and flew all over the state with it at press conferences and so that chart, showing what would happen to income taxes, was seen on the six o'clock and the ten o'clock news by most of the people in the state. And it had a very dramatic effect on the primary.

Q: Didn't you say that you wanted to reduce property taxes?

A: That's correct.

Q: And then how would you have funded education?

A: By, as I pointed out, trying to bring the state budget under control and reducing state expenditures.

Q: I'd like to get back to the press for a minute. There's so much talk about the press orchestrating the news, and you said yourself that you understood that if the press said you weren't walking, then you weren't walking. How much effect do you think that concept had on your campaign, given that in a nightly news report out of thirty minutes there are, probably, twelve minutes of news, and you need to get in there or the possibility is that people won't even know you exist. How did that affect you?

A: The press didn't orchestrate against me in the primary or in the general election. There were certain individuals. What happened was in the primary they tended to ignore me, thinking that I didn't have any chance. But they were, many of them, for Paul Simon, but what I was talking about earlier was not that that attitude toward Paul Simon and me affected the reporting so much when they did write in 1972, it affected their overall attitude towards me which continued on for a number of years. In the primary my problem was not a hostile press at all. My problem was to just get through and to get coverage and that was the whole thing. Not to avoid negative, but just to get on the news or the television news particularly in the Chicago metropolitan area. A lot easier downstate.

Q: And do you think if you hadn't been walking you probably wouldn't have had nearly as much coverage?

A: I don't think there's any question about that. But again, even though that is true, that doesn't detract at all from the point I made earlier that the dramatic effect of the "Walk" was not just the publicity, it was the meaning of the "Walk," which wouldn't have happened if it hadn't have been covered, true, but it isn't just name recognition, seeing that guy. It's understanding that guy because of what he was doing once you did see him.

Q: There were several factors that have been considered very important in your primary win. One is that you seemed to have a lot of popularity among eighteen to twenty year olds and this was the first year that they were registered. Another one is the ruling that allowed people to choose either primary. Anybody could vote in the Democratic primary. And the third one was that there were numbers of absentee ballots in the Chicago area that you looked to as a positive source of votes. How important were those things?

A: None of them was any substantial factor in the election. It's a myth that there was a huge Republican crossover in 1972. There was some, but there just simply wasn't that much. What happened was that people who had not voted in primaries before--Democratic or Republican--came out and voted in this primary in significant numbers. That was the big factor that made the difference.

Q: Why do you think the polls were so wrong?

A: Well, because polls can never be accurate with respect to a primary election. The problem with the primary is that you've got to first decide who's going to vote. And the mere fact that a person says he's going to vote in the primary election, which is the first question the pollsters ask, doesn't mean anything because nobody wants to say to anybody, "No, I'm not going to vote." It's kind of a non-thing to do. You're saying that you're not exercising your responsibilities as a citizen, so most people will say, "Yes, I'm going to vote," whereas they actually may have no intention of voting in the primary. So you don't get an accurate reading of the people who actually are going to vote. That's a very hard thing to do.

Q: How much did you spend on this primary campaign?

A: I would hesitate to even give a figure simply because I just don't remember that well, but I'll give you one. I think somewhere around five hundred thousand dollars.

Q: I seem to recall that Vic at some point said it would be between three-quarters of a million and a million. Is that too high, you think?

A: Right now my recollection is that that's high, but Vic would know much better than I.

Tape 4, Side 2

A: Financial problems started because we were not able to raise money for television advertising and we knew that we would not get the vote turnout if we didn't get on television with commercials. And so finally we were reduced to the only thing that we had left; I had to put the money in myself. And so I exercised stock options that I had on Montgomery Ward's stock in significant amounts, and obtained the stock and then immediately turned around and sold it, and raised the money for the television commercials. As I recall, it was something in the neighborhood of--again I'm terrible on memory of figures--two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

It was a traumatic thing to do because of course I had to sell within the capital gains period, so I had to pay the following year in income tax the ordinary income rates on every penny that I made there. And, although it was a loan to the campaign and I subsequently recouped the loan, I never recouped the taxes and the taxes . . . I think I paid something like two hundred thousand dollars in federal income tax in 1972 and 1973 because of that. It was just devastating financially and really almost wiped me out.

Q: How do you feel about public financing of gubernatorial elections?

A: It's hard to do because the public financing, to make it a meaningful payment of the campaign expenses that you need, would be a very, very heavy appropriation by the state legislature, and I just don't know whether you can do it. Today where a general election campaign is going to cost four million dollars, is the legislature willing, is the public willing, to appropriate eight to ten million dollars to finance campaigns for the various statewide offices? I just don't think it's practical.

Q: I have been hearing recently about New Jersey and I believe that in New Jersey, if you raise the first fifty thousand then the state will give you two dollars for every one that you raise over that, and they have an incredible number of candidates in the New Jersey gubernatorial election right now.

A: Well, I haven't looked at the figure but my guess is that no candidate in New Jersey for governor can afford hardly any advertising on New York television because it's so very expensive, and practically all of it is wasted going to people who don't participate, and therefore I doubt that campaign expenses are anywhere near as high there as they are in Illinois. Television kills you financially.

We did develop, I think, some good commercials in the 1972 primary, and just by way of a footnote, our commercials were much better in 1972 than they were in 1976. I could tell that by effect. Being out there as much as I was with people, I could tell about ten days after a commercial started running whether it was effective because people would start reading back to me the same expressions and phrases that appeared in the commercials, and if I wasn't getting that after ten days then there was something wrong with that commercial.

Q: There's a lot of discussion about whether or not television is the appropriate way to educate people. I guess the big question is, can we really provide election education to people in thirty seconds or a minute? Can we really give them anything other than a symbol?

A: Sure we can, and besides there's no other way to educate them. In today's world how in the world are you going to educate people except through television? They don't read the newspapers that much. What's left? They don't listen to the radio that much. You've got to do it through television, and to suggest five-minute commercials . . . it's just not going to happen. People aren't going to sit there and listen to a television political commercial for five minutes. So the short commercials are, from a practical standpoint, about the only way you're going to do it.

Nor do I believe that you cannot give people a grasp of what's going on in thirty or sixty seconds. You can. People perceived what I was as a result of television commercials in great part in 1972. It meant something to me. It wasn't shallow. It wasn't an image. We ran, sure, a lot of the "Walk" in the television commercials because that was a long time after the "Walk" had been completed and we wanted to remind people of it. But not to remind them of a gimmick or an image but to remind them of the reality of what the "Walk" really was which people actually perceived at the time. Although the media doesn't believe, most of them, that people did perceive what the guts of the "Walk" really meant.

Q: You talked the other day though about the Ogilvie commercials that really made you nervous because they began in the summer talking about Ogilvie having been a good governor.

A: That's right. It really got through.

Q: How can you believe that that's education, that those commercials are educational, that they really help people make an educated decision on who to vote for?

A: If you take those commercials, the programs that they talked about were very real programs that Ogilvie had instituted. Take the trauma center program, which was a good program and he had instituted it, and it was very desirable for the people around the state to know about the trauma program. I think they put in there his establishing the [Bureau] of the Budget, taking that away from the legislature. A very definite improvement in state government and educational. So he did in many respects use issues in those commercials. Even though they were thirty-second commercials.

Q: If you don't put the importance on those three things I mentioned before as far as your victory is concerned, how much of it do you think was due to Simon's mistake?

A: Oh, some of it, no question about it. That tax boo-boo is one that had an impact. I think that the impact of that, though, was not so much to convince people to be anti-Simon but to enable me to catch people's attention and get them to thinking about me. The critical thing was turnout. The critical thing was turnout. Once I had name recognition and cause recognition--that is, what I stood for in a general way--the only thing left was, are enough people going to vote?

Q: And you figured you had to have . . .

A: A million five.

Q: . . . a million and a half.

A: And as I recall it was one million four hundred and forty thousand. Something like that.

Q: Do you think that your campaign was unique in the way you figured things so, I don't know, mathematically? You went about it from the outset. Somebody in your group, was it Dave Green . . .

A: It must be Dave Green.

Q: . . . had a very analytical mind and he seemed to be able to know about polls and figures.

A: One half of Dave Green's mind is a computer, the other half is woman's intuition. Brilliant man politically, absolutely brilliant. I recall one time I had dinner with him at a restaurant up in Northbrook and it was not too long before the election. As a matter of fact it was just before I made the decision to put all that money in of my own. And I said to Dave after the dinner as we walked out to the car, I said, "Dave, what are my chances of winning? If I'm going to put two hundred and fifty thousand dollars--or whatever it was--in of my own money and leave myself with very little left, I don't want to do that if you're going to say to me as our resident expert that I'm throwing it away." And Dave rarely, rarely, rarely will give you an answer to a question like that. And I had to push him a long time and finally he said something to the effect that--he would remember the words better than I, "I think we can do it," or something like that that gave me the encouragement to say that, "If Dave says that then, by golly, I'll put the money in and we'll go all out." You have no idea, I think, of the very close relationship that existed amongst particularly Vic and Dave and I. It was really like brothers.

Q: What was it that Vic brought to that campaign that was so vital and unique?

A: Organizational ability, the ability to take Dave's brain conclusions and translate them into tactics. Victor is a brilliant tactician. Dave is a strategist, and if you've studied any warfare you know the difference between strategy and tactics. As I say Vic's forte is tactics. And I had the good sense to, in most instances, follow their advice on tactics. With respect to strategy and policy I always reserved the right to control, in the final analysis, but day-to-day tactics I stayed out of.

Q: There were certainly a lot of issues in the campaign and we've talked about the income tax and some of the other things. Do you remember other issues as being particularly important to you?

A: No, the central issues were none of those. The central issues were the general concepts that I've talked about: distrust in government, politicians versus nonpoliticians, alienation, independence. Those were the issues that affected the outcome most. Let me put it this way, issues are important in a campaign to a segment of the population. If it's a pocketbook issue it will be important to a lot of people. Rarely do you get issues in a campaign that are really determinative of the outcome. You can recall instances, I can too . . . the Viet Nam War and surely there are others, but by and large, a lot of politicians will say to you, "issues-schmissues." I'm not into that school, but a lot of politicians feel that way.

Q: I think Mike Howlett was of that school as I recall from reading about the 1976 campaign.

A: That's right. Going back to the primary--I think we're just about through with that--one of the things that really helped was the enthusiasm we were able to generate amongst organizers all over the state, and Vic deserves the credit for putting that organization together. They brought out the vote and that really made a tremendous difference on the outcome. You could condition people through television advertising, but if they stayed home on election day it's not going to do any good. You've got to get them out and the organizers did a fantastic job, absolutely fantastic. Our problem in 1976 was that some of our great organizational leaders by then were burned out. We didn't have anywhere near the organization in 1976 that we had in 1972, even though we had all those years of job opportunities and everything else to build an organization, which more people accused us of having than we actually had.

Q: You have expressed, I think, very clearly the problem of a person coming to your side because he is with you strongly on one issue, and then later on, when he finds he disagrees with you on other issues, he feels betrayed.

A: That's right, and it goes even beyond that because--I may have mentioned this before---a lot of people who were independent liberals looked at me through their own glasses and said, "Hey, he's an independent, therefore he's a liberal." They didn't examine or pay any attention to what I was really saying on a lot of issues. Actually I was not a liberal, I was a conservative and then when I got into office and started doing some conservative things, I was accused of double-cross whereas actually it was not a double-cross. The only issue of any significance that I changed on between the primary and after I became governor was on capital punishment.

Q: And you went from . . .

A: During the campaign, remember, we had the ratification of the constitution on the ballot then, the new constitution [1970], and they had a separate vote on capital punishment and the choice was between total abolition of capital punishment and totally keeping capital punishment. And I said I would support, as between those two, total abolition. The position I took after becoming governor was that for certain kinds of crimes, capital punishment is appropriate. I don't view that as a reversal of position, but some people do and they're entitled to that view. I also feel very strongly that there's absolutely nothing wrong [with changing one's mind]; indeed, if a person is going to be so rigid as to say, "Because I said that twelve months ago, I've got to believe it now," it is the wrong kind of thing to have in government. You've got to be flexible; you've got to listen to evidence, and if the evidence changes or the circumstances change then you've got to be willing to change your mind.

Q: It seems to me possible that one of the problems--and this is sort of off the top of my head--but one of the problems that you had in 1976 may have been that you had run such a personal campaign in 1972, had met so many people, and so many people had responded to you personally, and then this betrayal thing comes in because you don't fulfill the dream that they thought you represented. And they felt personally betrayed. Is that possible?

A: No, I don't think so. You have to open your mind, I think, to another possibility, and that is that most of the so-called liberals voted for Ogilvie and not for me in 1972, which the press doesn't believe, but if you look at the precincts I think you'll find otherwise. By that time the fight-the-machine stance had disappeared from the scene. I was a Democrat against a Republican and had the machine's support, so I just don't accept that conclusion. In 1976, in the primary, I received 69 percent of the vote outside of Cook County. My problem was not downstate; my problem was not on the North Shore in 1976; my problem was not with these independent liberals that they talk about; my problem was in the hard-core machine wards where Daley put on a turn-out-the-vote effort like he had never done before in a primary, and he got voters out unlike the machine had ever done before and that's what beat me.

He even put people out in the suburbs, which was the first time he'd ever done it to get out the vote, the regular Democratic vote in the suburbs. And that's what killed me. That's where I lost the election. On the day before the election our polls, Daley's polls, and Jimmy Carter's polls all agreed, and that is that I had 52 percent of the vote in Chicago. If it had been a general election I would have won . . . no question about it. Daley agreed that I would have won. What killed me was the fact that my voters didn't turn out in sufficient quantities. Now what caused that? That is attributable to the general malaise that I suffered from a lot of factors: the teachers getting turned off because of the aid to education issue, the fact that I was unable in the Chicago area, [let] alone throughout the state, to run those commercials that we paid for to explain the aid to education issue and the Chicago television stations would not let us run them--to the point where a lot of people in Chicago believed that I had actually cut funding for public education. Which is not true.

Q: Would you go into more detail on that now? I don't want to forget to pick it up later.

A: Well, what happened was that I cut back the budget recommendation for aid to education by 10 percent, leaving a very substantial increase for the next year over the prior year. So there was a substantial increase in aid to education. The problem was that it got shorthanded in the reporting all over the state to say that I cut funding for education. Not true--I cut the budget, which is a totally different thing. Well, we perceived through polling what had happened and what a dramatic impact this was having and so we prepared commercials which we paid for ourselves--raised the funds--to run, to inform the public as to what the true facts were with respect to money provided for education.

The Chicago television stations are owned by the networks. That's not true outside of Chicago. They are owned by local people and franchised by the networks. The people in New York, who make the decisions for the network-owned stations in Chicago, decided that they would not let me buy commercials on an issue, not during the campaign. And we fought it all the way and we lost, and so we never got our commercials on in the Chicago area although we did everywhere else in the state, and that really had an impact.

Another very significant thing was birth control. On the Sunday before the election, in Catholic churches throughout the Chicago metropolitan area, they distributed little green brochures that said, on the issue of abortion, vote for Howlett not for Walker, and they were put out by the Right to Life Committee. Many of the priests let these be circulated in their churches, not all of them. It was totally false because my position and Howlett's position on abortion was exactly the same. What happened is--and this we'll never be able to persuade anybody in the media to take a look at the precinct results on--Catholic Republicans went into the Democratic primary in many parishes to vote against me and for Mike Howlett. And if there ever was a crossover vote that had a dramatic impact on a primary it was 1976 and not 1972. The area that was most devastating to me in the comparison between the two primaries is the southwest side of Chicago which is heavily Catholic, and in great parts, in the Nineteenth Ward, heavily Republican.

Q: Did David Green come up with this information?

A: After the fact . . .

Q: After looking at the . . .

A: . . . after the fact. We didn't know it was happening at the time. It was too close to the election and we just did not pick it up. If we had picked it up, in a few days, could we do anything about it? I doubt it.

Q: I'd like to go back to a happier time.

A: Sure.

Q: I want to talk about the day after the primary election in 1972 but first I . . .

A: Let's talk about one more thing before the results were all in [election night 1972] because it's kind of an interesting story. I don't know what time of night. I am still slightly ahead but a lot of votes are coming in in Chicago and we're very, very worried. We had great concern about East St. Louis because we had reason to believe that I was going to run very strong in East St. Louis, and we began to get worried. And I remember having a meeting with Vic and Dave in which we said, "We're going to have to get out over the media the feeling that we are confident, we are going to win, because otherwise our workers [poll watchers] are going to go home and it's going to be stolen from us out there in the precinct voting places." But we said, "We can't go down there and claim victory unless we really believe we're going to win. I don't want to do it on a false basis," so I said to Dave, "Dave, all things being equal now, are we going to win or lose?" And he said, "I will have to retire to the bathroom and consult my entrails." Like in old Roman days. He went into the bathroom, and he must have stayed there for fifteen minutes and he came out and said, "Go make your victory statement." So I did and we caught them by that very narrow margin.

Q: I'd like to go back a few days before; what were you doing that week or that few days before the primary?

A: Intensive, absolutely intensive, dawn-till-dark campaigning. For the last couple of months we got onto bowling alleys, and I became the first candidate of consequence in the state, so far as I know, that spent a tremendous amount of time in bowling alleys. (laughs) You couldn't start the bowling alleys till about 7:00 P.M., as I recall, and they were good till about 11:00, and that was after campaigning from early morning on the commuter trains and at factory gates through the day. It was exhausting campaigning. And I can remember driving up to the bowling alleys and praying that it would be a three-laner, you know, and I'd look up on that sign and it'd say fifty-six lanes, (laughter) seventy-two lanes, and I'd say, "Oh, my God," and I'd want to quit, but I didn't.

And what you do is go into the bowling alley, try to persuade the guy running the bowling alley to make an announcement that you're present--some do and some don't--and then just work the lanes. Go from the--what do you call it--the pit where people stand all the way along the line shaking hands, kidding, talking, never discussing issues. In the last few months of the campaign where it's hot and heavy you learn never to discuss issues with people. You've got to come up to somebody and say, "Hi, I'm Dan Walker." And then you've got to put that line in, "I need your help," or "I want your help," or "I want your vote," or "I need your vote." "Please help me," is the message you've got to get over. And then outside of a few kidding kind of remarks, you've got to get going.

And if somebody asks you an issue question you've got to get out of there because you don't have the time to deal with that kind of thing. That's why you go through. . . it's a monologue in most instances. You go through your patter and then before they can say anything, you're moving right on to the next person and then right on to the next person. Terribly tiring.

Then I experimented with the downtown commuter station campaigning. Absolutely the hardest kind of campaigning that I have ever done. You station yourself in the evening when the rush hour comes, outside or inside the commuter stations where the waves of people are headed for the trains and it's just a mass of humanity. And you shake as many hands as you can.

The problem with it is that a key to effective handshaking campaigning is eye-to-eye contact. You've got to see that person in the eyes; he's got to see you in the eyes, he or she. When you do that and move rapidly you're looking like this, and then you go to this person, and go to that person, and to this person and that person, and pretty soon you get totally disoriented and your head starts swimming, really swimming. I could only keep it up for a maximum of ten minutes before I'd have to go over and lean against the wall and close my eyes and get my balance back again and then dive in. But did it pay off? To this day you have no idea how many people will say to me, "I met you in Union Station in 1972." Fantastic number of personal contacts.

Then we ran out of bowling alleys, we ran out of commuter stations, we ran out of factory gates. Where are you going to go? Suburbs. Very hard to campaign in the suburbs because people are in their homes; they're not out on the streets. I tried movie theatres after the show--no good. People are so wound up in what they've just seen that you're not going to

do any good with them. Athletic events--people resent politicians at athletic events.

So I decided, restaurants, and I did it with a great deal of trepidation. How are people going to react if I walk into a restaurant and go from table to table, in the evening now, and disturb their evening meal? Well, everytime I did it I did it with butterflies in my stomach, and it always worked out beautifully. For some reason, even in the fancy restaurants, people not only did not resent it, they liked it. And I finally figured out why. Particularly the twosomes. If you have two people--man, woman--unless they're very much courting and in love, they run out of things to talk about over dinner. Have you ever seen a couple sitting there . . .

Q: Yes. (laughs)

A: . . . and they're looking over each other's shoulder? You come up and talk to them--you'll give them ten minutes of conversation over their meal after you leave. And it took me a while to learn that. There was only one restaurant in the Chicago metropolitan area that wouldn't let me in and that was the White Fence Farm.

Q: The White Fence Farm?

A: That's right. It's a very popular restaurant down near Joliet. And they would let me in the waiting room where people were awaiting their seating, but they wouldn't let me in the dining room. But high and low, in terms of quality, that's the only restaurant that turned me down. I never had a bowling alley turn me down. I used to have problems in shopping centers because they would try to stop me from passing out literature or to stop me from coming in and I always faced them down on the Constitution argument. I sometimes, to propitiate them, would stop passing out literature, but I'd never stop handshaking and talking with people.

Q: Was the marathon of handshaking harder or less difficult than the "Walk"?

A: Oh, it was less difficult in terms of the physical wear. The thing that made it hard was the hours. That's what made it hard. From six o'clock in the morning, literally, until midnight with the people contact, day after day, after day, after day with no surcease. And in the last two months that's what it consisted of. I was totally exhausted by the time the election came. People have said, as you know, that I'm the most successful one-to-one campaigner that has been around in a long time. And if I am successful at it, it's because I really enjoy it. It's the kind of campaigning I like. I don't like speeches and rallies and that kind of thing anywhere near as much. I used to hate the appearances. Can you imagine, after running against the machine for over a year and then to make appearances in ward meetings after I got the nomination? That was hard.

Q: Well, and you obviously do understand the importance of shaking as many hands and looking into as many eyes as you can.

A: And it isn't phony either, as some people say that it is. People make up their minds about a person based on a lot of different things. Sure, some is what they read but a lot of people like to see a person and see the look on his face. Sure, it's not controlling, but it tells you something about a person. How he handles himself, what he looks like, whether he looks you in the eye or doesn't look you in the eye. I stress, not controlling, but certainly some factor that people are entitled to take into consideration. And well I remember--this was a farmer who said to me, "Gee, Dan, I'm glad you're out here." And I said, "Why?" He said, "Well," he said, "I like to meet my candidates." He said, "I like to see my candidates." He said, "I like to talk to my candidates." He said, "Hell, Dan, I like to smell my candidates."

Q: (laughs) Well, obviously it paid off.

A: Well, I enjoyed it. I really enjoyed it.

Q: Tell me about election day.

A: Election day was a total drag. I didn't know what to do. I got up that morning. Vic and I talked it over at great length the night before and we decided that I had to keep occupied and the best way then to spend the day would be to go around to our various headquarters and thank people; that's what I did. In case we forget it, in the general election campaign what I did was visit the precincts in the machine wards that were deserting me and going for Ogilvie, like Vito Marzullo--I went into his ward and visited all of his key precinct headquarters just to let them know I'm right here, I'm the Democratic candidate for governor and, by golly, I don't understand why you're helping a Republican out there. But anyway, in the primary I really got worried because in the afternoon it started raining and that could be devastating. Turnout was so important and that rain . . . I just got really down. I think I finally arrived at the hotel, oh, somewhere around five o'clock and then just sweated it out until it was over.

Q: What was it like? When did you know? Did you sleep that night?

A: Not much. I don't remember what time it was. I know it was very, very late. Extremely late. And I remember that we were concerned that maybe Paul Simon knew something that we didn't because he wouldn't concede defeat even after we really saw the handwriting on the wall, knew that we had it, and yet he wouldn't . . . . I found out later that he had spent the evening preparing his victory statement and was so confident of victory that he just couldn't believe it was happening to him and just was utterly and totally crushed because it never entered his mind that I could win.

What he did the week before the election was to go around the state and talk to the county chairmen and get their report on what the vote would be. And they were all wrong. Because county chairmen know very little about what's happening in their county. They talk to the precinct committeemen. Precinct committeemen aren't in touch with people. They're in touch with people who have jobs and that kind of thing. So he got totally false information.

Q: So when did you finally know?

A: I don't remember.

Q: What did you do?

A: We had a private celebration. Vic and Dave and Mort, the inner group, and then with the family. And then there was a series of interviews because there was a lot of clamor because it was such an upset victory. And so I gave some television interviews and other kinds of interviews and then went to bed. Then the big problem--what to do the next day. I have to hold a press conference, don't I? What am I going to say when the reporters ask me, "Well, you've attacked the machine, you've won, now what are you going to do? Are you going to accept the machine's support that you've been tearing apart for two years?" So we decided there was only one thing to do--leave town, and not hold a press conference. And so I did.

Q: (laughs)

A: I got on an airplane and went to Florida. So that we would have time--we were all desperately tired--to think through what our post-primary posture was going to be. It wasn't a matter of fear, it was just the matter of not being able to take enough time to get prepared for that all-important press conference. And so we sat on the beach in Florida and came up with a strategy.

Q: Did the press ever forgive you for that?

A: I don't recall. They were mad about it at the time, but I don't recall that that had any lasting impact. The solution we arrived at was to go on the offensive and say that, first, I would welcome the support of any Democrat. Let's put the party together again, let's put past issues behind. That a primary is the time to fight those things out, the party issues, now let's go on and fight the Republicans, the commonplace stuff.

Then, as a fillip, we put in that I did not believe that people who were ward committeemen should run for statewide office. They should disassociate their party role and their candidate role. This was intended to show that I was still opposed to machine politics. Therefore, Neil Hartigan should resign as ward committeeman or resign as Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor and the same was true of Tommy Lyons, who was running for attorney general, and Roman Pucinski, who was running for United States senator. All three were ward committeemen and we said they should resign. That position caused a great deal of strain between me and the other Democratic candidates from then until election day. They never resigned.

Q: Was that the beginning of the strain between you and Hartigan?

A: No question about it. The other thing was that traditionally the Democratic candidates had campaigned as a group. I forget what, but they had a name for it. And I wouldn't do that. I said: I'll appear on occasions with my teammates, and [it's] not a matter of being divisive

from them, it's just that we can maximize our impact. But I wanted to continue my style of campaigning. I didn't want to be captured by the kind of campaigning that the Democratic, regular candidates usually do. When I go into a town the traditional way is this: a Democratic candidate goes into town; he is met by the Democratic county chairman and a coterie of precinct committeemen--this was downstate; pictures were taken; the next day, there's the picture in the paper. By the way, loyal Democrats will hover around you. The people who are not loyal Democrats are off there at a distance; even if they like you they won't come over and mix with these people. And the picture in the paper the next day is going to be, "Dan Walker, Democratic Candidate for Governor Being Greeted by 'So and So,' Democratic County Chairman," frequently a guy who looked like exactly what he was. People don't relate to that kind of person.

I wanted those people who were out there and not joining the group. Those are the ones I wanted to see. These people are going to vote Democratic, straight Democratic. I don't have to worry about them. I want to reach out and get others.

So I would not do the traditional kind of campaigning and I would tell the Democratic county chairman, "Please don't meet me." I hurt a lot of feelings that way but I felt that it had to be done. That's why, by the way, I avoided in the summer of 1972 the county fairs. County fairs are a terrible way to campaign. You're surrounded by the loyal Democrats, the job holders, that kind of thing; people expect to see candidates at county fairs downstate. No surprise. But if you go to the town square and visit their town and shake hands in their community, then they're on the telephone saying, "Aunt Jemimah, you know who I just talked to? I talked to the Democratic candidate for governor." And if you plan it and hit, say, four or five small communities in a county, by the time you leave that county the word of mouth has reached out to a huge number of people in that county. And that's the way to campaign. As you can tell, I love campaigning.

Q: Did you love being governor as much as you loved campaigning?

A: Yes, in a different way. I loved the challenge of being governor. No question about that. I loved the managerial opportunities that the governorship presented and greatly decried the fact that it's just very tough to be a managerial governor, let me put it that way, and at the appropriate time we can get into more detail on that.

Q: Was there a point at which it actually hit you that you had accomplished what you had set out to do in 1970, when you had won the primary?

A: In 1972?

Q: Well, in 1970 is when you set out to win the primary nomination. When, after the election and the results were in and you knew for a fact that you were the winner, when did it sink in and what were your feelings?

A: Well, very much like . . . to tell a story. The president of a corporation whom I was riding in the corporate limousine with, and I

asked him, "Think back to the time that you first had a chauffeured limousine; how long did it take you to get accustomed to having a chauffeured limousine?" And he said, "Oh, Dan, about a half a block."

Q: (laughs)

A: Well, it's very much the same thing. When there's so much glare of publicity that you know it and it sinks in immediately then two things [occur]. You want to wipe everything out of your mind to try to get some mental cells restored, if you will. You want to get your physical energy back and then your mind starts getting totally preoccupied with the next task, which is to win the general election against the incumbent in what looks like is going to be a Republican year, as indeed it turned out to be.

Q: So tell me--once you got yourself together--how you began working in the summer of 1972?

A: I'm going to have some real memory problems here because the primary is much more vivid in my recollection than the general election campaign. I can give you highlights of it. I don't remember what we did in the spring of 1972; I frankly don't recall. Obviously I did campaigning constantly. Probably early on not that much. The first active campaigning I can recall was the jeep trip, and I don't remember when that began. But we wanted something to replace the "Walk." We knew that to walk again just would not work, or at least we felt so. After considering all kinds of alternatives we finally decided on the jeep trip with the boys, [my sons], which means that we must have started after school was out, and what kind of campaigning I did before school was out, I just don't recall.

The jeep trip--we had a red, white, and blue jeep. We had two of them. And we did downstate campaigning in the jeep. Our objective was to have that red, white, and blue jeep be identified on television with my campaign. It proved to be very, very hard to do because with the jeep trip we couldn't get the television cameras to come out. I had to go to the studio. If you go to the studio you can't drive a jeep in the studio, so we had a very difficult time getting the visual image of the jeep over in the course of the campaign.

But then we did what I suggested earlier. We took that jeep and we hit communities of all sizes, in county after county after county, to get the word of mouth campaign going. And the boys were with me practically all of the time and it was kind of fun. I enjoyed it. There wasn't that much evening campaigning. It was daytime. And I was doing the kind of campaigning that I liked and we didn't do, as I said, hardly any county fairs, and I just thoroughly enjoyed it. It was a great summer.

Q: What were the issues that people were interested in talking about?

A: Same things. Exactly the same things as in the primary, no difference. Taxes, education, crime. Crime--there's one difference. Crime was much more of an issue in the fall of 1972 than it was in the primary election. We made it an issue; that was when we picked up on the sixty-day trial law which we made a key issue throughout the campaign.

And you understand that one, a trial must be held within sixty days after the arrest. And I can recall having said it over and over and over again, the litany on that. And I used that everywhere, everywhere, and then we used it on television commercials very effectively. We continued to have massive money problems. Bill Goldberg, who became a key to the campaign, joined then on a full-time basis. Bill had worked on and done the legal work on that primary voting case, remember, that we won in the primary?

Q: Yes, yes.

A: But Bill was not on the staff then. After the primary I persuaded the law firm, which was my former firm, to let Bill have a leave of absence, and he joined us on a full-time basis and did a yeoman's job, became a real member of the inner circle on an equal basis with Vic and Dave.

Q: And what exactly was he doing during that time?

A: Legal and issues. He was in charge of all issues, of all research, all position papers. Everything having to do with issues was Bill Goldberg's domain.

Q: Did you ever appear with Ogilvie during that time?

A: Oh, yes. We had debates.

Q: Oh, okay.

A: Yes, they were very dramatic. The first one, as I recall, was in Springfield. I have a picture, as a matter of fact, taken from in front looking at us up on the stage and it looks like I'm standing behind the podium, he's standing behind the podium; we're of the same height. I also have a picture taken from behind that shows Ogilvie standing on a box.

Q: (laughs)

A: We got that picture published. It was a bad mistake on his part to do that. Those little things can have an impact on a campaign. We debated there. We debated once somewhere in the southern portion of the state, and then we debated before the IVI, I think it was, in a huge room in one of the hotels in the fall. There was one run by the Association of Commerce and Industry. And I think four debates, four or five.

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A: Well, I remember now, the Association of Commerce and Industry one was a television debate. The others were before live audiences but there was also television there. Debates pale after a while, and it takes a lot of preparation to do an effective job in a debate. It's a lot more cosmetic and appearance and how you are perceived than it is specifically what you say or what debating points you score.

Q: Was Ogilvie enthusiastic about doing them or did he do it . . .

A: I don't recall. I remember very difficult negotiations. I think he was reluctant to do it but thought that he had no choice except to do them.

Q: How did you feel about it after it was over?

A: The debates? I enjoyed them. I enjoyed press conferences, debates, that kind of thing. It's like a trial.

Q: What were the key issues in those debates?

A: I don't remember. I really don't remember.

Q: Did you talk about the income tax?

A: No, because we didn't have any difference of opinion on the income tax. We certainly talked about state government. I challenged him on overspending. I challenged him on being a liberal, which he was, by the way, more liberal than I, even though he was a Republican. And state spending was--yes, I do remember--state spending was a major issue in the debates. I would of course try to bring up things like the sixty-day trial law and issues is what I was talking about. I don't remember the sixty-day trial law was contested in the debates, but frequently in these debates you'd try to bring up things that are pluses, whether the other person is going to agree or disagree.

Q: Did you agree on merit selection of judges?

A: Yes. With respect to other issues on the constitution, I don't remember. The constitution was on the ballot in 1972, wasn't it, or was that 1970?

Q: 1970.

A: That was 1970, that's right, it was 1970. I just don't recall the issues any better than that. I'd have to go back and take a look at the newspaper clips to refresh my recollection.

Q: How did you feel about that? Obviously it looked like it was going to be a difficult race, a difficult campaign.

A: I got more and more worried as the year wore on. McGovern was the Democratic candidate. He was much too liberal for the populace. That became a real problem in going around the state because, of course, I supported the Democratic candidate for the presidency, and yet it was apparent that he was going to be of no help to my being elected.

The other problem in Cook County was Ed Hanrahan whom I refused to support for state's attorney. And that caused great difficulty at ward meetings where we tried very hard to plan it so that I would not arrive at the ward meeting at the same time as Hanrahan because that would be very embarrassing. And he was very brittle about the whole thing and we had some difficult encounters. It was hard to deal with, very hard to

deal with. The McGovern thing downstate, and particularly the Hanrahan thing in Chicago were uncomfortable things.

I didn't have the freedom that I had in the primary. I was much more tied to a party platform, the party on issues, the candidates that I didn't particularly care for. I couldn't go out there and, as the kids put it, do my thing like I wanted to do and increasingly it got uncomfortable as the campaign wore on. It wasn't anywhere near as happy a campaign for me as the primary, even though I now had all the panoply of being the Democratic candidate.

Q: Also that summer there was the delegate battle to the Democratic National Convention.

A: That's correct.

Q: How were you involved in that?

A: I campaigned downstate.

Q: You avoided it . . .

A: I really don't remember what position we took on that. I honestly can't tell you. If I had to guess it would be that we just stayed out of the fray and said, "I'm not involved in national politics, I'm involved in a state campaign." That's my best recollection.

Q: And Daley put out sample ballots with only the names of his delegates on but that wouldn't have affected your supporters, do you think?

A: And this would have been when? In the primary?

Q: No, no, oh, wait a minute. Was it in the primary? Yes, I guess it was in the primary.

A: Yes, that would have been in the primary. I don't recall that having any appreciable impact. The fight that counted came up over the challenges to the delegation that were fought out in the rules committee and so forth where Daley lost. That would have been in, what June? Somewhere, maybe July of 1976. I don't even remember where the convention was. Really, my recollection is [that I] just refused to get involved, in the whole rigamarole saying, "I'm candidate for governor."

Q: Didn't that though have an effect later on you because you wanted to appoint Mary Lee Leahy as a director . . .

A: Oh, sure it did.

Q: . . . in your administration and she had been a part of the fight against Daley, and she was not confirmed.

A: That's exactly right. She was one of the first ones that was shot down.

Q: And it was the Chicago Democrats that shot her down?

A: It sure was. My own party. I don't think that was a very nice thing to do.

Q: Who were the others?

A: Oh, gee the corrections director, I had to back away from him, but that was for different reasons. That was that one state senator who just raised so much cain that--that was David Fogel--and I had to back away from David. The most unfortunate thing that happened of course at the outset of the administration--we're now passing the campaign--was proposing Anthony Angelos as the director of the Department of Insurance, but we can come to that later. That's a chapter that really caused a lot of problems.

Q: Tell me, during that campaign did you find Ogilvie somebody that you liked campaigning against? Was he a gentleman?

A: Yes, I would say that Dick was a gentleman. I never had any personal feelings in that race. I gather that he developed personal feelings but I didn't. I thought it was a good solid campaign based on legitimate issues. At the time and after he lost I don't think that Dick thought so. At least, so I hear. And I'm sorry about that. I had a great deal of respect for Dick. I used to point out around the state some of the fine things that he did and then point out the areas in which I disagreed with him about state government.

Q: As you got more and more nervous toward the end of that general election, what were you doing to . . .

A: Doing the same kind of campaigning that I was before, and always had done, and desperately trying to raise money so that we could mount a television campaign that would be even close to that which Ogilvie was putting on. In early October we were really worried. It looked like we had been coming up on Ogilvie and all of a sudden we hit a plateau. I know this now. They didn't tell me so at the time, by the way. We hit a plateau which was short of catching up with Ogilvie. We had to have that television campaign to break through, and we had to have that money and day after day went by and we didn't get it.

I put the last of my resources in but that wasn't enough, and we finally were able to score a breakthrough and get some campaign contributions at the last minute and got on television and got on the uptrend again and we just barely caught him, just barely caught him. The timing was so close that Dave told me later--he was doing constant polling--that he was scared to death. If the election had been one day earlier I would have lost.

Q: What about the regular Democrats, were they supporting you financially?

A: No.

Q: Were they coming across . . .

A: Oh no. the Daley organization never supported statewide candidates to any appreciable degree. I will say that in my case, I probably got more than Democratic candidates usually did because I explained to Daley early on the terrible problem we had, and I think he gave me, or the regular organization gave me, a contribution of something like thirty-five, forty, fifty thousand dollars which was almost unheard of for the regular organization. But put that against a total budget of three, four, five million dollars why, that's not any really significant amount.

Q: When you did squeak through, were you really surprised?

A: Yes. I remember very, very well sitting there in the hotel room. I went off in a room by myself--I didn't even have the family with me--and sat there and watched the television for about oh, an hour and a half or two hours. And I didn't go down and bother . . . Dave and Vic operated in a different suite because the last thing in the world they needed was me hovering over them when they're trying to get their job done. And I watched the ax fall moving from the East to the West in state after state. Nixon was running a massive sweep and Democratic candidates were losing.

When the Democrats went down in Indiana I went into the other room and told my wife that I thought it was all over because I just didn't see how we could survive a Republican sweep of that magnitude. That I went down to see Dave and Vic, and they were very disturbed.

I told the story wrong a while ago; it was East St. Louis in the general election, not in the primary. They had learned that Ogilvie's campaign manager was saying, "We've got it in the bag because we got the St. Louis vote." As it turned out, they didn't have the vote as big as they thought they did in East St. Louis, and then we had a real problem out in DuPage County because the vote was not coming in at all, and we couldn't figure that out. We thought maybe some very substantial Republican votes were being held out out there, which happens with regularity. It's not the Democrats alone that do that, both parties do it. They hold our votes just to see whether it's going to be even. Not that they're not going to count them ultimately, but it's a psychological impact. Get the workers to go home and that kind of thing.

So, I remember, we got somebody to call out the police, or was it the state police? I don't remember; anyway we finally got the DuPage County vote in. It was neck and neck and as I remember very, very late at night before we finally decided that I was going to win.

Q: And then what?

A: Just the same thing all over again.

Q: Half a block? (See story, p. 89)

A: Yes. Well, then it really is devastating after that because, all of a sudden, no more campaigning. That's the part that was to me the most shocking change--from constant campaigning, constantly taking, in effect,

orders from downtown. What I'm going to do that morning, what I'm going to do. Ninety-five percent of my activities were decided on by others, not by me. And I'm just out there doing my thing. But all of a sudden I'm the governor. Now, I've got to take charge (laughs), you know; the campaign manager goes away and I've got to run it, every day. Now, that was a dramatic change, and it took me a while to get used to coming to the office and sitting down and being a manager again like I had been when I was an executive.

Q: Do you think that your experience as an executive prepared you as well or better than you might have been prepared had you come up through the party and other offices?

A: I think so, in a different way of course. You learn most political offices are not managed like they are in private enterprise and I had the advantage of having the managerial training to at least some degree. And that helped me, no question about it. It may have caused me to over-managed. That is, not overmanaged, to be more concerned about day to day management of government than a governor normally is. Certainly more than the incumbent governor, certainly more than Otto Kerner, for example, or even Dick Ogilvie, who was very concerned about it.

Q: What were the mechanics of the transition?

A: The transition proved to be very difficult. Ogilvie was not cooperative in terms of transition. It was a hard transition. We finally got through very, very late, to him and his staff, and we lost a lot of time because we couldn't get our people in; they couldn't get the information that they needed.

Q: You have about two months?

A: That's correct. It's not enough time. It really is not enough time to do a thoroughgoing, effective transition.

Q: Even if he had been tremendously cooperative?

A: That's right. At the federal level there's a good argument for looking at it the other way because the management of the government from the policy standpoint is so important on those big issues, particularly international, that it's dangerous to have a caretaker president. With respect to state government, on most things state government runs as well whether the governor is in Springfield or in Hialeah, on most things.

Q: When you say Ogilvie was difficult--he didn't encourage his people to be helpful?

A: We didn't get cooperation.

Q: Did you set up a transition office right away?

A: We sure did and the transition team and the whole bit, but took us a long time to get through. When we finally did get through, then Dick and his staff were cooperative but I guess it's just by way of saying that he's human, and it took him a long time to get over the defeat. He didn't expect to lose.

Q: So he was really not ready for that transition when it came?

A: No. He was not mentally prepared to cope with turning the reins of government over to somebody else. And as I say, that's a very human thing and I perceived this, not having talked to him about it; maybe I'm wrong but that was my perception. And I want to remind you again that I have a great deal of respect for Dick Ogilvie and things he did for state government. He really was a good governor.

Q: You of course were elected along with Neil Hartigan and you'd already had your problems with him. Tell me about that relationship.

A: It was very, very difficult. Neil wanted to be number two, in every sense of the word. He wanted to participate in policy formulation; he wanted to be in all respects as though we came out of the same school of thought. But I tried to explain to Neil early on, "Neil, your first loyalty is to the Chicago machine. How in the world do you expect me to bring you in on all policy decisions when your first loyalty is not to me?" And I never was able to adequately explain that to Neil. It was an impossibility to do it the way that he wanted to do it. It just would never have worked, would never have been possible.

I always tried to be friendly with Neil and work with him. I did give him some major responsibilities. I think that, again, the media misperceived that whole thing. They were never able to understand, most of them, why I could not do that which ordinary good government would require. The machine will run <u>you</u>, if you let it. Daley on key decisions called the shots when Democrats were governors. I was not about to let that happen. I didn't want to fight him, but I wasn't going to let him run me. I just wasn't going to let that happen.

Q: There was some suggestion in the press that you could have sort of patted Hartigan on the head and given him a few things to do and you would have ended up with less trouble, and you wouldn't have, sort of, made him politically viable.

A: That's exactly what I did. I patted him on the head and gave him some responsibility. Exactly what I did; it didn't work.

Q: But it seemed very often that the press thought that you were arguing all the time.

A: That's not true. I had a terrible problem with the Springfield press corps and I blame that in great part on myself. I don't blame that in great part on them. I did not work to establish good press relations. In my dumbness I said, "Look, there should be an adversarial role between press and chief executive," and I believe that to this day. That's the way America has always worked. Buddy-buddy, no, it is not right. Now, I probably carried it too far, and when I say adversary I don't mean fighting, I mean distance between the two. Respect, but, you know, they've got to be critical of me and do their own job; I've got to go do my job. That kind of relationship. I should have tempered that more, and Norty I could not get to work with the press in a relaxed way. And we didn't pay enough attention to it. It's not Norty's fault; we just didn't do it. And that was a bad mistake. I think that a lot of our

problems could have been overcome if I had been more conscious of the need for good press relations.

Q: What is that two months like when you're governor but not governor?

A: That's a wonderful two months. You don't have any of the responsibilities but you get to engage in that very pleasant job of trying to put together a team and trying to get your arms around the state budget, and spending a lot of time reading and talking with experts, and it's the kind of thing I like to do. And yet as I said, you don't have any of the responsibilities. And you're still basking in the glow of victory. Wonderful time, absolutely wonderful time.

Q: When you talk about putting together your team, you kept your team pretty much the same as it was during the campaign.

A: The staff.

Q: The staff.

A: Not the cabinet, the staff. Yes, that's true and that probably was a mistake.

Q: Why do you say that?

A: I think that you have become so accustomed, as a group of people, to operating in a campaign motif. It's very hard to shift gears to be governing instead of campaigning. It's just a different way of life, a different way of acting. We should have brought in more outsiders, and probably Vic should not have joined the staff, probably Vic should have stayed on the outside.

Q: How would you have envisioned a role for him on the outside?

A: Oh you know, being in business as a consultant or whatever. Not doing business with state government, but doing whatever, but being consulted constantly on strategy and tactics.

Q: Like a part of a kitchen cabinet?

A: Sure, absolutely.

Q: And did Dave Green continue to do that . . .

A: Oh yes.

Q: . . . even though he was not in the administration?

A: Yes. I never made an important governmental decision without talking with Dave Green about it and getting his input.

Q: How did you go about the tremendous job of appointments? How did you start that?

A: Well, I started at the cabinet level and I brought in Jack Foster. Jack was vice-president/personnel at Montgomery Ward and a very close friend of mine. I put Jack in charge of seraching talent for me, and he did it in a professional way and looked all over the United States to get prime people. That started one of the issues that people made of me constantly for four years and that is, "Don't we have Illinoisans? Why do we have to go outside the state?" An argument that I thought then and think now is utter nonsense. You get the best people to run government. The few jobs that you're going to give to people outside the state doesn't make that much difference so far as the state is concerned. It makes no difference at all.

More important is that you get really good people. And I believed then and believe now, you've got to have in Corrections, in Children and Family Services, and in Mental Health somebody who has been in that field in government in order for them to know it and do it. And there aren't that many people around in any one state who have had that experience. In Corrections, I wanted somebody who had run a department of corrections before--too volatile, difficult, dangerous a job to do any other way. Now that's not true of all. The toughest job to fill is Welfare, toughest. As I learned through experience, an unmanageable department.

Q: Tell me about that decision--who you chose and why it was so difficult.

A: Well, it's hard to get somebody who has a combination of managerial talent and knowledge of the many programs and the bureaucratic systems that are rampant in that particular department. Very tough. The gentleman that we brought in, Joel Edelman, did not work in the final analysis and the reason he didn't work is because he got co-opted. That is to say, the system took him over and he fell into that we/they syndrome. We, being the people in the department and they, being the governor's office. A very, very difficult management problem that has plagued all presidents and all governors. They get less responsive policywise, as soon as they get appointed. And that's true almost universally.

Now there were some exceptions to that in my cabinet. Pud Williams in Agriculture, never any problem. Never any problem. Joe Pisciotte, when he ran Business and Economic Development. Beautiful. Joel was a problem . . .

Well anyway, I got some outstanding people. I think I put together--and interestingly, and I don't say this in a petty way, never got credit for it--one of the best cabinets that has been assembled in terms of talent in the history of Illinois. It was less political than any cabinet that I had seen since I had been in the state, fewer political figures in the cabinet. They were men of expertise in their fields.

Q: They were people who were not partisan or . . .

A: Well, they didn't come out of a political system. They came out of governmental or private business.

Q: And you didn't care whether they were Democrats or Republicans or what?

A: Oh sure I cared because again, all things being equal I wanted a Democrat. I ended up with some that were both and some that were neither, so to speak, ambivalent on politics. Most of them were ambivalent on politics. Very few of the campaign people did I put in. Mary Lee Leahy, yes, did a fine job; Tony Dean did a fine job in Conservation; Pud Williams was active in the campaign but had not been traditionally active politically. But of course, neither had Tony Dean, for that matter. Then the others, as I recall, were all as I say, professional people and executive types. I was proud of that cabinet, very proud of it.

Q: Did you feel that you could offer them high enough salaries?

A: Real problem, particularly the positions in Mental Health and Public Health. Very, very hard and I got into a fight on that one, as I recall, because we worked out an arrangement whereby they continued to draw some pay from the institutions they had worked for before they became directors, and I got some criticism for that. But you just can't get people of that talent in those fields. And there are statutory requirements now; they have to have had so many years experience in that particular field. You can't just take somebody who hasn't had that experience. I brought in an outstanding director of the Budget, Hal Hovey from over in Ohio. Did an absolutely superb job. Super guy.

Q: What were the cabinet meetings like?

A: I didn't have many. Cabinet meetings are mostly a waste of time at the state governmental level. Each person is concerned about his own domain. What's Pud Williams going to advise with respect to solving the really difficult problems of day care in the Department of Welfare? What is a secretary of Transportation going to offer Children and Family Services? Your problems are not like they are in the federal government. Many of your problems are very basic. Your problems at state government level are much more localized to the individual department or agency and therefore the cross-pollinization of a cabinet meeting is not that fruitful.

Q: so how did you deal with cabinet members?

A: I dealt with them in a one-on-one and a what I call a cellular basis. I would take the human service agencies and bring them together--subcabinet groups, because there there is cross-pollinization. Mental Health has a direct relationship to Welfare and Children and Family Services. And so does Public Health. So, I brought those directors together in what I called my health cabinet. And then I had a regulatory cabinet: savings and loan institutions, the currency exchanges, the banks. That was another subcabinet group or subgroup of cabinet members, where they had some of the same kinds of problems and we would meet and tackle them on that basis. As time went on, what happens is the turf problems overcome almost everything else. Do you know what I mean by turf problems?

Q: No.

A: My domain, my empire. I am the director of Mental Health and I don't want Children and Family Services telling me what to do or taking some of my programs or infringing on my authority over my programs. This is my turf. And it's one of the greatest problems that stands in the way of effective governance in our system, turf problems.

Q: Did they feel that way about you too?

A: Well, sure. As they get that way more, then you go back and you develop that "we/they syndrome." The governor's office is trying to run our program. And my response was, "But, of course--I'm the governor. Why shouldn't we have an impact on your programs? I am the elected official that's responsible to people for your programs." Well, that is a very difficult problem.

At the end of his first term, Nixon decided to try to do something about that. I wish that Watergate had not come along because he was going to embark on some real experimentation in that area to see if he couldn't get away from that terrible problem. One of the things he was going to do was move the cabinet members into the White House so that they were not surrounded by the lifetime bureaucrats and, therefore, co-opted by them. And I don't mean that in a bad sense, it's just in a policy sense. Very hard to get new directions going when you've got people there controlling the director, the head of the department, and saying, "Hey, Walker's going to be gone in four years or eight years. We're going to be here forever." That's a hard thing to do. If you can get that person out of those surroundings and into the group where you're working together to try to make your imprint on government, [it] could work, I don't know. But it's something I would like to have seen him try. I never thought of that, unfortunately, and didn't learn about this until after I had the opportunity to try it out.

Q: There was a time, I know--I guess I know from reading--that directors considered themselves appointed by the governor and if they had a controversy with the governor they had it in private, and what came out in public was support of whatever the governor's decision was, and that the directors were there to run the department but it was up to the governor to decide what the policy was in that department.

A: That's the way it should be. One of the reasons we've gotten away from that is because of Watergate and the media has created this thought that cabinet members should be independent of the president in Washington. I think it's just a crazy notion. I don't know of any organization that can work effectively where the chief executive does not continue to control policy and the subordinates owe a debt of loyalty to him. That word loyalty has become a swear word because of the Nixon years, and yet I think something that every chief executive is entitled to is the loyalty of his subordinates. And if they're not going to be loyal to him, they ought to quit and go somewhere else. I don't mean loyal to the point of doing anything illegel. I don't mean that, but I mean within the bounds of legality, they should be loyal.

Q: Were there individuals within departments, bureaucrats, people who had been there for years, who could not be loyal to you and, therefore, decided that they would quit?

A: No, I don't know of any that quit that I recall. I know there were a number of instances where we couldn't break through the resistance of the middle level, and of course they would sit there and say they were right and I was wrong. And maybe they're right, but the middle level is the toughest level in any large organization. Most resistant to change, most resistant to modernization, most resistant to new ways of doing things, most concerned about turf.

Q: Didn't you get rid of a lot of those middle jobs?

A: Tried to. In Department of Children and Family Services, we totally eliminated the regional organization and left only the district and the top. We had a real problem in that department and, managerially, I blame myself for that. We tried to do too many things at once. We tried to deinstitutionalize the young people. Clearly needed to be done. Get them out of the institutions into homes, private homes. Number two, reorganize at the top level. Number three, get rid of the regional offices so both from a management standpoint, organization standpoint, a policy standpoint, we were instituting dramatic changes. I worked very closely with Jerry Millor on doing this. I thought we could pull it off. Jerry had done it in Massachusetts. Problem was he was dealing with a much smaller state, a much smaller department, and I learned that he just couldn't cope with as big a department as we had, doing that many big changes at once, and so we failed. The department came apart in terms of morale and organization and I had to ask Jerry to resign.

Q: Did it have an adverse effect on the children?

A: Well, the programs weren't as effective as they should be. I don't think it had an adverse effect; it just was we couldn't get done that which we wanted to do and internally it became apparent that we just had to have a change in leadership in order to bring it around. But no, I don't think it had an adverse effect. I think we caught it in time.

Q: Did you find yourself having to manage in different ways different departments?

A: Well, sure you do. Certain departments you can manage by exception. That is, do nothing until a problem comes along and then deal with the problem. The Department of Agriculture I could do that way, the Department of Business and Economic Development. By and large some others.

Q: Was that because of the director, of who the individual was. . . .

A: Combination of a number of factors. Who was the director, the volatility of the subject matter of the department, size of the department, the degree to which it's in the public spotlight, and all of those things are bound to have an impact on it. See, I instituted early on something that caused problems too, although I think it helped in the

end. I instituted both zero based budgeting and management by objectives, working directly with the directors and the Bureau of the Budget on those programs. I think they were good programs.

Q: Would you expand on that?

A: Yes. Management by objectives is a system where you quantify objectives and then hold the subordinate's nose to the path of meeting those objectives. For example, Department of Public Health. You're giving immunization shots to five hundred thousand people in the state against a particular disease. Your goal is quantified that in the next six months you will double the number of immunization shots. That's the goal. You negotiate with the director, the director says, "My God, I can't do a million more." And you say, "Got to do a lot more than you are now." You go back and forth, negotiate, and finally the director says, "Okay, I believe I can accomplish that. I'll commit to it."

Then you set up progress stages over the next six months. You meet with the director on a regular basis and say, "How are you doing?" You look at the figures. You don't listen to an explanation, you look at the figures and if he's not on target you say, "Flop." And if he can't give a good reason you say, "Okay, you go out there and you meet the target or else you're not going to have that job." If he does give you a good reason, something has intervened, then you adjust the goal. As you can tell, this requires a tremendous amount of time in meeting with individual directors.

The temptation--and this is what Jimmy Carter did--is to have the Office of Management and Budget do this for you and hire people to check with them. It doesn't work because the only person who can negotiate with a cabinet level guy is the governor, the chief executive; a budgeteer can't negotiate effectively with the director of the department. Impossible. Number one, the director of a department resents the money guy, the budget guy, having any impact on program and policy, and rightfully so, so it just doesn't work.

And we made great progress with MBO, although I couldn't take on all the departments. There just wasn't enough time to do it until the latter 1975 when I got so involved in so many other things, I just couldn't put the time in on it, and so the program just kind of succeeded only where the directors were able and mature enough to do it on their own, and there were some who did very well. Joyce Lashof in the Department of Public Health, Tony Dean in the Department of conservation and Joe Pisciotte in BED were notable examples of making the system work. The same thing with zero based budgeting. Do I need to explain zero based budgeting?

Q: Yes.

A: Zero based budgeting consists of departing from the age-old practice of sitting down with the head of the department and saying, "You got an appropriation of five million dollars to run your department for the current year. Now, what do you want for next year?" He says, "I want six million." You say, "No, no, no, no, that's too much." And you go back and forth and you end up giving him a 10 percent increase so he goes

away with five million five hundred thousand or whatever. This system departs totally from that. You require the director to arrange all of the programs of his department on a building block basis with the most important program at the bottom of the pile and the least important at the top of the pile, and dollars on each one of those programs so that you can visualize it. Once you have done that then the governor can sit there and do trade-offs. He can decide, "I can only fund this department up to this level." All the programs that are above that level then will fall out and if the pile has been constructed properly, they're the lowest priority programs that should fall out.

He can also do trade-offs. He can say to the director, "Now listen, I disagree with you. I'm going to draw the line right here, but this program you've got down here below the line, I think, is not as important as one you've got up here above the line." So you pull this one out down here and put it up there and put the other one up here, down here. That way the chief executive can make intelligent programmatic decisions on what he's going to get for the money he gives that department. It's a real valuable managerial tool. But again, it only succeeds when the governor does it in a one-on-one, with the assistance of his staff and experts dealing with the director.

If you turn that over to the Bureau of the Budget, it doesn't work because the operating departments perceive the Bureau of the Budget then as controlling program and policy. And they say, "No, that's not what budget people exist for," and they don't. And so they get into fights and all it does is just generate a tremendous amount of paperwork back and forth, and nothing is accomplished. And that's what happened to zero based budgeting at the federal level under Jimmy Carter, although he made it succeed when he was the governor in Georgia. He was the first governor to use it and because he had the time to do it, it worked. In Washington he didn't have time to spend on it and it fell apart.

Q: Obviously you couldn't be the only person dealing with directors.

A: That's right.

Q: Did you work out a liaison system?

A: Yes. It's been commonplace in Springfield to have liaison people on the governor's staff, each one of which will have responsibility for a group of departments or agencies. Under the Ogilvie administration--and this is one thing I was critical of--he gave the liaison person, together with the person in the Bureau of the Budget responsible for that department, a lot of power over program and policy within the department. And they could actually veto, they could actually tell the director what to do. I put an end to that and said, "No, we will not have that system. I will have liaison people but they are there to liaison. They are there to help. They are there to advise and they are there to problem solve. If at any time the liaison people and the director are not able to come into agreement on what ought to be done, then the director comes right here to my office and sits down and talks with me. I will not tolerate the liaison people speaking for me and telling the director to do something he doesn't want to do." And I observed that, I think very,

very well. There were sometimes, very few, when I was campaigning, totally unavailable, when, on lesser important matters, I'm sure that we fell out of bed on that. But I don't know of any instance where that occurred on any important matter.

Q: What was Vic doing in relation to the agencies?

A: Very little. Vic did not get involved in operations of agencies to anywhere near the degree that some of the commentators thought that he did. Bill was much more involved in that than Vic. Vic was a trouble-shooter is what Vic was. And Vic tried to keep an overall eye going; he was concerned about seeing if my programs were followed out with respect to the reduction and the size of state government, getting rid of employees, problem solving in personal situations, dealing with the whole patronage area which was his primary responsibility, and I got very little involved in. All political matters came to Vic's office. Those were the kinds of things that Vic dealt with. Not programs and policies unless it rose to a major level, and then I would have Vic sit in the meeting to get the benefit of his recommendations and advice. He also handled all relationships with the legislature which is a major time-consuming job.

Q: You mentioned that there was really a crisis within Children and Family Services. Can you think of other crises that you had to step into in agencies?

A: Oh sure, we had the deinstitutionalization crisis in the Department of Mental Health where I had to move in and ensure that we continued the program in a vigorous way of getting away from institutionalization. There were others. In the Department of Transportation . . . great difficulty in getting them to come down in terms of excess bodies and I had to work hard on that. The road program is something that demanded a major portion of my time trying to solve the problems of the supplemental freeway system. There's just a never ending stream of them that come up in the course of being governor, and I just can't recall all of them.

Q: Did you feel that most of the time you were managing crises?

A: Oh yes. I never had any feeling that things got out of control, never did. Now, I may not have been happy that I couldn't get things done the way I really wanted to, but I always felt that I was on top of the crises. I never felt any got out of control.

Tape 5, Side 2

A: I'll tell you the time that every governor in the United States breathes the hugest sign of relief--when the legislature leaves town.

Q: And yet you have said that you feel too much emphasis is placed on the governor getting his legislative package through.

A: Sure, I've always felt that way. It just isn't all that important in most instances. There are exceptions. Generalities are always dangerous,

as you know. But, by and large, except for the big things, people, as I have said repeatedly, are much more affected insofar as state government is concerned by what the operating departments do than they are by the legislation that goes through the General Assembly. Most of the bills have very little effect on people generally. Most bills have effects on cadres of people and special interests around the state. I have said repeatedly that we have too much preoccupation with the legislature and, you know, people know that. The ordinary guy knows that very, very well. One of my best applause lines outside the political circles in speeches was, "We ought to have a session every few years that is devoted exclusively to repealing laws instead of passing laws."

Q: When did the Sunset laws begin?

A: They began during that time. As they originally started out I refused to get caught up in the furor over them. It isn't agencies that need to be sunsetted, if I can coin a verb; it is programs that need to be sunsetted. And how in the world can you write legislation that will cause a sunset with respect to a program? That caught on because of the name and a lot of mystique associated with it. I think some of the accounts I've read indicate that it hasn't been anywhere near as meaningful in actuality as it was in the promise.

Q: Wasn't the intent a good one?

A: Oh, the intent's a fine one, absolutely.

Q: Is there any way to systematically accomplish the doing away . . .

A: Absolutely.

Q: . . . with rules and regulations.

A: That's a different problem. We're talking about programs now. With respect to programs the way to do it is zero base budgeting. Sift out the nonessential ones, put them above the line and don't fund them, is the best way to do it. That's a management problem, not a legislative problem.

With respect to rules and regulations that's a different problem. That's the problem, that bureaucrats and lawyers in government tend to spend too much time writing rules and regulations. And there needs to be a more effective mechanism to get rid of the ones that are not needed or go beyond the intent of the law from which they are derived. And that's an area that I didn't spend a lot of time on. You don't have that many rules and regulations in state government as you do in federal government. It's one that I should have done more on but it's not as pervasive a problem at the state level as it is at the federal level. If you stop and think about it, what regulatory agencies can you do away with in state government? The regulation of banks? No. Regulation of savings and loan associations? Currency Exchanges? Insurance? There just aren't that many.

Q: You have said that--I think this is what you said--if you had it to do over again you would have chosen a few areas to concentrate on and you felt you could have come out having accomplished more.

A: Correct. I feel that very strongly.

Q: What would you have done?

A: Well, I think that I would have concentrated much more time on the Department of Public Welfare. I recall one occasion when I sat there in my office with Vic and Dave and Bill [Goldberg] and Hal Hovey, the director of the Bureau of the Budget and I said, "There's only one answer for the Department of Public Welfare and that is for me to ask the director to resign and become the director myself and run the department." That's the only answer I could see. And everybody laughed and went on to something else. You just wouldn't have the time to do it. But, it required a special kind of effort and I have not seen anybody do it. An individual whom I saw try to do it at the federal level was Caspar Weinberger [Secretary of Defense], by the way, and he was under Nixon. Super guy.

Q: Why are the problems in Welfare so insurmountable?

A: Because of the combination of factors that exist. You have desperate human need, so you have a compassionate factor that is very, very great. You have social workers who are very mindful of the compassionate factors, and they are the ones that, on the battle lines, are controlling who gets and who doesn't get and how much they get. You have massive numbers and very complicated systems, and a department that was not adequately computerized to handle the systems. You have massive numbers of regulations which are mandated by the federal government, and you can't get rid of [them].

You have an interrelationship between the bureaucrats at the state level and the federal level who live together and work together, and if you move in on yours at the state level, then the feds are going to cut you off and make sure that you can't do that which you want to do. Because the state guy calls up the federal guy and says, "Hey, you know what that governor's trying to do?" So the federal guy issues some damn regulation that keeps you from doing that which you want to do. It's a massive interlocking private interest.

There's a great vested interest in what goes on in this department. The unions, the social work motif, the federal system which is horribly, horribly complicated, and the massive amounts of money that are from people that are involved. It needs to be torn down and the whole thing started over again.

Q: Can that ever be done?

A: Very, very hard. I've said that the department, in the sense of actually doing it in totally good fashion is unmanageable. Now you can problem solve and keep the rickety machine moving along and that's what we've done, but we certainly have not had great success.

Q: Has it become more and more impossible as the federal government has become more and more involved?

A: Absolutely. No question about it. The major problem in welfare is the federal government. I think Ronald Reagan understands that. Whether he can take the time and have the ability to move the levers to cause changes is quite another problem. I learned early on that the biggest problem a governor has is time, and management of time. Where do you put your time? It just isn't enough, and what proved to be a devastating problem, so far as I was concerned, was that my only power base was the public. I didn't have a power base made up of the Chicago machine or in the business community or any other. It was just the general public. When that's your power base you have to go to that base constantly in order to keep them interested and with you. That takes a tremendous amount of time.

That meant that I had to do the fly arounds, constant press conferences, out there all the time, personal campaigning, even when I wasn't campaigning, all over the state. And that was just so time-consuming as compared to spending that time on say, sitting there and receiving a stream of legislators, or pursuing my zero based budgeting and management by objectives or spending hours and hours and hours on problems like the Department of Public Welfare. Very wearing.

Q: Well, I'm not sure I'm clear on what you're saying, but it seems to me you're going to the people in order to get their support, but their support has to be translated into letters to their legislators.

A: Oh, not necessarily. I don't think that's a big factor. It's more a matter of keeping it there in reserve so that the legislators know you've got it. Psychological thing. If I'm not out there with people the legislators say, "Oh well, that guy, you know we don't have a campaign coming up for another year; we don't have to worry." But if I'm out there and they're in Springfield, they just get nervous.

Q: We've mentioned the RTA problem and I wonder if you can go back ten years and trace for me how we got where we are now.

A: In the year that that came up, Blair the Republican was the Speaker of the House; the president of the senate by then I think was Cecil Partee. Maybe I'm wrong, maybe it was still in Republican control. The key figures were Blair, Daley, and myself. Blair said early on in the session that this was going to be the session for a Regional Transit Authority for the Chicago metropolitan area. Public transportation was going to be the thing in the session. I wasn't sure that I agreed with them at the outset but forces beyond my control made it apparent that it was going to be the thing in the session. Blair advanced a program that I found totally acceptable and anyway, for a variety of reasons, it went into a total deadlock in the legislature. I had stayed pretty much out of it personally, although my staff had been very much involved in it.

Q: You found it totally acceptable or unacceptable?

A: Unacceptable. I don't remember the details but it was a plant that Daley found unacceptable for his reasons, I found unacceptable for my reasons. I think it required too much state money or something like that. Anyway, I decided that the only way we were going to resolve this was to get personally involved, and so I convened a series of meetings

with Blair and the Republican leaders in the seante. And I dealt personally with Daley; he didn't participate. But I dealt with him, discussed it with him constantly on the telephone, because I knew that we had to be in agreement in order to prevail in the house and the senate.

We finally hammered out a plan after a series of meetings that went through the legislature and was adopted. It was not perfect. I didn't like many aspects of it at that time but it was all we could do. The board was not properly constructed. The suburbs felt inadequately represented. But Daley certainly would not settle for anything other than what we ended up with. And the suburban/city differences have continued to be exacerbated ever since that time, and were really a very heavily contributing factor to the present situation.

But the RTA is an example. People said, "Why didn't you ever work with Daley?" Of course my first response to that was, "Why don't people ask the question, why doesn't Daley work with the governor?" My second answer was, "Look at RTA." I worked with Daley and we compromised and we got an effective package.

It really commenced in terms of issues in the first legislative session, interestingly [it] also involved public transportation, CTA; this was long before RTA. Daley proposed a difference in the subsidy funding by the state government of CTA. And I don't understand some of the comments I've seen in the press recently about the state not subsidizing the CTA. The state did subsidize the CTA long before RTA came along.

What Daley wanted to do was go from a one-to-one matching, one dollar to one dollar, up to a two to one with the state putting up two dollars for every dollar of the city. I said, "Absolutely not," for two reasons. Number one, this was the first legislative issue, as opposed to cabinet selection issue, that Daley had chosen to throw down the gauntlet on, and he threw it down. If we had just said, "Yes, Mayor," then that would have been the end of the ball game in terms of my having any real power with respect to what was going to happen on the Democratic side of the aisle in the legislature. Daley would have had the ball game.

We had to fight, from a political, practical standpoint, we had to fight. Even if we lost we had to fight. We had to show them that we were willing to fight. It was a good issue to fight on, I thought, because substantively we were right, and what he was proposing, a very dangerous precedent for state government, because once you go to a two to one match on one program you're going to get stuck with a two to one match on another program and so on down the line.

Mayor Daley had played a masterful game over the years of shifting costs of city to state government. Exactly the opposite of the game that Rockefeller played in New York state where he kept programs funded by the city of New York as opposed to the state. Both master politicians and at opposite ends of the power situation. For example, in New York City a large hunk of welfare is paid for by the city. In Illinois, Chicago is all paid for by the state. Community college programs: in New York City it's paid for by the city and in Illinois it's paid for by the state, totally. Public education: in New York while I was governor the state paid 30 percent. In Illinois the state paid 45 percent of the cost of public education in Chicago. Those are very dramatic dollars there.

And here's Daley trying to move in on public transportation in the same way. Interestingly, although I said it a hundred times, I was never able to get the substantive part of that issue across to anybody of consequence. It all became portrayed, as it was in part, as a political battle between Daley and me, with Daley wanting to establish the same role in Springfield with me that he'd had with Kerner. And I was drawing the line and saying, "You might as well realize early on, Mayor, I want to work with you and I'll work with you as a governor should with the mayor of the biggest city in the state, but I'm not going to let you run state government. I'm just not going to do it." And if I'd rolled over he would have run state government in the sense that he ran it under Kerner. Not totally but anything having to do with the city of Chicago.

Well, that is one of the fundamental problems that I was confronted with throughout the four years. I could never get--and I know, you say I use this too much and it sounds like I'm anti-media, I don't really think I am--I could never get that over to the media, the importance of that division of governmental power between the Democratic governor and the Democratic mayor of the city of Chicago. It's just a vital thing and yet it became played as pure politics without governmental overtones, whereas looked at through my glasses it had tremendous governmental overtones in terms of substantive policy affecting everybody in the state. My speech. (laughter)

July 28, 1981, Tape 6, Side 1

Q: What do you think of as the accomplishments of your first year in office?

A: I can't really recall what we talked about before with respect to the first year. There was the selection of the cabinet and getting that in place, and I've always been proud of the cabinet. I think it's one of the best that's ever been put together in the state, as I'm sure I've said. And for the first year things went along pretty well. There was the problem of getting the identity settled with the legislature and I think I covered that last time, and towards the end of the first year I had the hope that that was settling down a little bit. I learned to the contrary from time to time thereafter, but overall I had the feeling that we were settling into place, that some of the reforms that I wanted to make inside of state government were taking place and that we were off and running. I felt good about the first year; I really did, recognizing that there were some difficult points.

Q: Among the things that you accomplished in the first year was the Office of Special Investigation. How did that come about?

A: That came about because I remember very well that Adlai Stevenson had something very like that in place when he was governor. And to my knowledge nobody has done it since then. He brought in, as I recall, a former FBI man and gave him a lot of power to investigate and to ferret out wrongdoing in the administration in the executive branch. And I had made up my mind to do the same thing, and that's how we got the OSI started. It was different.

I never was able to understand, and to this day I don't understand why the Chicago Tribune disliked that office so much. They took after it again and again when I would think that any media would want that kind of thing in state government. The legislature didn't like it, and I can sometimes understand that on the grounds that they thought that here's the governor setting up a little agency that they didn't create. But I would think again any student of government, any observer of government--and having in mind particularly the danger of scandals--would welcome that kind of a unit. In any event they didn't. We never got much credit for that but it did a really fine job in my opinion.

Q: What kinds of things did it do?

A: Well, whenever any charge was made, either within or without the administration, of malfeasance by anybody in the executive branch, it was automatically turned over to that office and they conducted an investigation and made recommendations with respect to action. And I don't recall a single instance [where I did not follow] their recommendation.

Q: Was the criticism because it was as if the executive department were investigating itself?

A: Well, I suppose; I don't recall all the details of the criticism. I suppose there was some of that, but isn't that better than having no investigation? I just don't understand it; I really don't. It was called at one point by the Tribune and others one of my "pet" agencies. And I never understood that terminology either. The offices that we set up--the governor's action offices designed to be places where people could go to cut through the bureaucracy, the OSI, the one that we just talked about, and the collective bargaining which I put into effect by executive order--the same thing that Jack Kennedy had done as president, by the way, for the executive branch in the federal level. And I think there was one other that I can't recall. All of these were referred to as my "pet" agencies, and that was used in a pejorative sense, and I still don't understand it.

Q: The branch offices were never funded, is that right, or the appropriations were cut or . . .

A: Yes, they were cut. Well, I don't remember whether they were ever originally funded by the legislature. What we did was, as I recall, to fund them out of funds from the departments that the problems were involved with.

Q: By the time March of 1974 came around and another budget, there was an article in the newspaper, believe it or not, that said it looked like you were doing what you set out to do. You were curbing spending and that you had cut the bureaucracy. Did you feel that you got credit for that? You apparently felt good about it.

A: Yes, I did. I thought that was real progress and, yes, there were some signs of that type. I don't ever want to try to paint with too broad a brush that we didn't get credit for some of the good things we did; we did. No question about it. But there were just a lot of exceptions to that.

Q: What about fundraising in 1974? Nineteen seventy-four was a big election year and a very important one for you, a mid-term election.

A: That's right.

Q: That was the year of the creation of the Independent Democrat's Fund, isn't that right?

A: I think that's right. The IDF, the Independent Democratic Fund. I think that's right, and we set that up in order to raise funds for Democratic candidates around the state that we wanted to raise money for, and as I recall most of it went to candidates for the legislature. Actually in the election of 1974, thanks I think in considerable part to our efforts--money, help, my going around the state and leading the battle--we elected more Democrats downstate to county office than ever before, to my knowledge, in the history of the state since the depression. And certainly since then there have never been in an off year as many Democrats elected to county office as there were in 1974. So again, when I am accused, as I am repeatedly, of engaging in confrontation politics, well, one of the good by-products of that, in part at least, was generating enough excitement and interest to elect a lot of Democrats at the local level.

Q: That was a part of one of your main goals in being governor was revitalizing downstate the Democratic party.

A: Absolutely, and I think in great part we succeeded. Not as much as I would like to have but we certainly made progress.

Q: In 1974 did you still owe money from the 1972 campaign and were you able to pay that?

A: Yes, we still owed money and I don't recall the sequence there; I really do not. And when all of that was paid off--it was practically all paid off at one point including money that I had loaned to the campaign. When that was accomplished, I just couldn't tell you; I don't remember that sequence. I tried to stay away from that area, as I mentioned to you before, personally as much as I could. So the figures I didn't know at the time and do not, certainly, know now.

Q: In July of 1974 there was a big controversy. You and the attorney general were arguing who should appoint the technical assistants, the lawyers, to the agencies . . .

A: Yes, yes.

Q: . . . and he was determined that it was his right to do that and you believed that as executive you should. Can you tell me about that?

A: That was a long standing battle in state government; it certainly did not start with me. For years it had been a bone of contention between the attorney general's office and the governor's office--who has the power over the attorneys in the various agencies under the governor? To me it makes absolutely no sense to have the attorney general, who is a separately elected official, frequently of the other party, have that

much control over the agencies that report to the governor, and I resisted that very strongly all the way. And there was finally a court decision on it, but as I recall it ended up as kind of a draw. But that's my recollection. The details of it escape me but, yes, that was a bone of contention, and, yes, Mr. Scott and I did not get along.

Q: On that or any other thing?

A: Well, I wouldn't say on any other thing. Scott played politics all the time with every issue involving state government. I would call him up and say--when I could get him--"Bill, let's sit down and talk about this issue," and it always ended up political; the only progress we made there was when Bill Goldberg developed a very good legal relationship with some of the top lawyers in Scott's office and I just delegated it to Bill and we were able to work a number of things out. But to Bill Scott everything was politics.

Q: Do you think he was threatened by your legal background; did you feel like he wasn't on your . . .

A: I don't think it was that at all. I think that he's just that kind of a person in public office. He was very much of a loner. He rarely came to governmental or other kinds of affairs around the state; he went to things that were his own and that was about it. Very much of a loner and as I say, a very political man.

Q: In September of 1974 the full campaign disclosure bill was signed.

A: Yes, and you may recall that I fought very hard to get that bill through. I think it was once or twice that I called the legislature back into special session to deal with that specific issue, and that's something that I said throughout the campaign that I would do if necessary: call them back into a special session again and again until we got an ethics law, a campaign disclosure law. And we got one, the first in the history of the state.

Q: And you've never had second thoughts about the value of that?

A: Oh, absolutely not. As a matter of fact I would have gone much further and you may recall some of the statements that I made, or may have seen them; I wanted a much, much stronger law. I was very disappointed that my executive order was struck down. I think we've discussed that one. I think that a lot more can be done in that area than has been.

Q: The executive order to demand . . .

A: This is the one that would require the disclosure, by corporations regulated by or doing business with the state, of any contributions to state candidates for state office by persons who are officers, directors or owners of, I think, 10 percent or more of the stock of that particular company. The problem now is that, sure, campaign committees are required to list the names, but suppose you go down the list and you see John Jones. You have no way of knowing whether that John Jones is a director or an officer of the "ABC Paving Company," that does all kinds of business with the state, unless you just happen to run across that

information. There's no central place you can go to find that out. But if you require those companies doing business with the state to publicly disclose that information for each of their officers and directors and major stockholders, then you would know it right away.

Q: There was another executive order that required administrators making over a certain amount . . .

A: That's right.

Q: . . . to disclose, and that was challenged and was upheld, as I recall.

A: Yes, that one was challenged and upheld and went all the way to the supreme court. It required disclosure of income, assets, liabilities, and tax returns. That executive order, by the way, was substantially weakened by Thompson when to took out the tax return disclosure part.

Q: In that campaign of 1974, there were suggestions in the press that it was very important for you to deny Simon a return to political life.

A: Nonsense. Absolute nonsense.

Q: Was that ever a concern of yours?

A: Absolutely not.

Q: Well . . .

A: Neither I nor any of my people did anything, that I'm aware of, to help defeat Paul Simon.

Q: Well, it was suggested that you had not been strong enough to defeat him, but if you didn't try, then I guess it's a moot question.

A: No, no, we didn't even make the effort. What would be the reason for it? That again . . . and I have no hesitation in saying this and to this day you'll see it right now--Paul Simon for reasons I've never understood is a total pet of the media. They love him. I told him before, a lot of them said to me, "What are you doing taking the gubernatorial nomination away from Paul Simon? That was his right; that belonged to him." I don't understand it at all. And they nurtured the suspicion, the Springfield press corps particularly, throughout the time that I was governor, that I was going to do something, always do something, to hurt poor little old Paul Simon. Absolute utter nonsense.

Q: He's not one of the driving forces in your life?

A: (laughs) Well, I was never worried about him after I beat him, never.

Q: You've talked about your relationship with Bill Scott, and in 1975 you ran into a lot of problems with George Lindberg. There was the big controversy over whether or not the state was near bankruptcy or not. Can you talk about that period of time?

A: Sure. I had great problems with George. He correctly saw the comptroller's office as being a dead end unless you could find a way to get into the newspapers. And so he embarked on being a kind of fiscal hatchet man for the Republican party. There's no question about the fact that in 1975, we had some fiscal problems. We ran into the recession head on and it was a precipitous drop in state revenues. Exactly the same thing that Thompson is now confronted with this year, for the first time in his time in public office. The state of the economy is directly reflected in, particularly, the sales tax revenues, and it just went down like that (motioning). And we had some difficulties in having a carry-over of enough funds from month to month to meet bills because of the way money would come in and go out. There was never any time though, from an actual financial analysis standpoint, that the state was close to bankruptcy.

And I used to say to George, "George, I don't mind your playing some politics. That's part of this whole business. And you can criticize us for being short on cash and postponing things and bills and that kind of thing, but you use this word 'bankruptcy' with sheer exaggeration. All you're doing is hurting the state's credit standing. It does us no good whatsoever." Well, he kept doing it and the Chicago Tribune kept repeating it over and over again. But the state was never near bankruptcy, and, please, if you ever want to pursue this point, don't hesitate. You can talk with any of the people who really closely follow state finances, and they'll tell you that that was a wild exaggeration.

Q: Was it a question of where the money was? Did the bank account look like it was low?

A: Well, that is a very complicated business, and I'm sure that, again, if you talk with some of the people in the Bureau of the Budget, they'll go through it in detail. It's a question of money coming in and money going out, and having it in the right fund at the right time to meet this bill or that bill. There's so many different funds that you have to pay things out of and it's very, very complicated, extremely complicated. But again, difficulty in meeting particular appropriation requirements, yes. Near bankruptcy, no.

Q: Also in the summer of 1975 you were interested in the passing of the Accelerated Building Program.

A: That's correct.

Q: Can you tell me about that?

A: Yes, I can recall, I think it was in the spring of 1975, that the recession first really began to hit, if my memory serves me correctly. And we developed that program because Washington was saying that a way to meet the recession would be to get money out there into capital projects that would stimulate jobs. And you may remember, and I found this very interesting, that when the president announced a massive federal program along this line, the first person to applaud it was Mayor Daley, "Oh that's great," you know, "that's what the Democratic party ought to be doing," etc, etc, etc. Then I announced the Accelerated Building Program which he promptly put down, although it was exactly, exactly the same concept.

It was, I think, a very good program. It would have generated a lot of jobs, and I regretted it then, and I regret now, that it wasn't passed. We got a lot of the projects through. What happened in great part was that the legislature rejected the program in name but, because so many of those projects were near and dear to their own district's heart, they put in the appropriations for the specific projects. So we got a lot of the projects approved that were a part of the overall program even though the overall program was, in that legislative form, defeated.

Q: Was it the Daley group that defeated it?

A: Daley was against it and, of course, the Republican party.

Q: But as you said, there must have been lots of people, lots of communities, lots of representatives who . . .

A: Those ones that really had great solid local support went through on the basis of individual appropriation bills that were introduced by those particular legislators and adopted. So they got their cake and ate it too. In many respects, not all.

Q: By June of that year you must have been very aware of the reality of that recession, and that was when you asked for a 6 percent across the board cut in budgets.

A: I recall 10 percent but whatever it was.

Q: Yes.

A: It was a percentage cut because there simply wasn't time to take it program by program and do that which a number of people said I should do, and what I would like to have done; that is, reassemble the building blocks and assess priorities, eliminate old programs or cut certain programs. There wasn't time for that, in my opinion, and the only thing that we could do, that I thought had any chance of succeeding, was the across the board cut which was referred to by some people as meat-ax. And there's justice to the criticism; I grant them that, except what's the alternative at this time? I didn't see any.

Q: But you were feeling the pinch of the recession . . .

A: Oh yes, quite so.

Q: . . . and looking for creative ways to keep from raising taxes or reducing services.

A: That was the whole objective, and it's interesting that Thompson, who has had a little more time here to deal with it, has also recognized that when you have that terrific drop in revenues you've just got to go out there and cut the budget across the board. And he's been doing it too. And my hat's off to him.

Q: Was that successful? Did you get good cooperation?

A: Yes, we got the job done overall.

Q: Was there ever a deal between you and Daley that if you would sign the Congressional Reapportionment Bill that he wanted, he would not oppose you in the primary in 1976?

A: No.

Q: That was never, never talked about?

A: I don't recall any such discussion. I do recall a meeting with the mayor in 1975, and I do not remember all of it. Anyway he came away from that meeting with the feeling, I found out later, that I was not going to support any candidates at all against the regular organization candidates in Cook County in the primary, including legislative. And that was not my understanding of our discussion. My understanding was that I would not field a county ticket, which we were then considering doing. But I had always intended to--and I regretted it afterwards that apparently I didn't make it clear to him--that I always intended to support some independent candidates for the legislature because that's been a part of my whole record all the way along to elect some independents to the legislature. But apparently he felt that I had gone back on a commitment in that regard which I didn't believe that I had.

It's funny how we used to meet, for those meetings.

Q: How you and Daley met?

A: Yes. We never met in his governmental office. For two reasons: one, because our discussions were at least in part political and, therefore, as he liked to put it, with him as chairman of the County Central Committee instead of as mayor and second, because of the press being all over us if we did meet in his office as mayor, we would meet in the LaSalle Hotel which then was where the Cook County Central Committee had its office. His security people would call my security people and give them a suite number, and I would go to that suite in the LaSalle Hotel and either he would already be there or he would come in, and our security people would stand outside the door chitchatting, and here's this great big suite, and he and I sitting in the living room having a conference.

Q: Did he ever come to you? Did you ever meet with him in Springfield?

A: Yes, yes. I met with him in Springfield and then I met with him once at my home up in Deerfield and I was reminded of that just the other day by my former secretary. And that's a kind of dramatic thing, but do you know, I do not have the slightest recollection of what that meeting was about. But I remembered when my secretary reminded me, he came up to the house. I remember my, then, wife left the living room and he and I sat there and talked for an hour or so but what we talked about . . . It must have been an important meeting. It had to be.

Q: What meetings do you remember? What stands out in your mind when you think about him?

A: Oh, that meeting that I referred to earlier stands out in my mind. And then I did have a meeting I think with him in his office--was it in his office? I think so, about the negotiations over the creation of the Regional Transit Authority, which was a long series of negotiations in which I was in constant communication with him. And we hammered out all of the final plan that's been very much the subject of the events of the last couple of months.

Q: Could you talk about that in more detail?

A: Yes, but again details escape me. As I remember, then Speaker Blair--the Republicans had the house, Democrats had the senate--Blair came up with a plan which for reasons I don't remember, I found totally unacceptable and I rejected it out of hand. It almost got through the senate but at the last moment, as I recall, we stopped that plan and created a deadlock. I was convinced that a regional transportation plan of some kind was a vital necessity.

I called the leaders together in the conference room--Democratic and Republican legislative leaders--and we had a long meeting, and it really came down to a series of negotiations between me and Bob Blair. And we met there and then we continued the negotiations, for some reason I don't remember now, up in Chicago in the state office building, a marathon session. I remember being out of the room talking with Mayor Daley back and forth about the composition of the board, the division of taxes, the concept that as much would go back to the "collar" counties as they put it, etc., and at least one meeting with Mayor Daley in person. And all I can tell you is that it finally fell into place. Anyway, we finally hammered it together and got the support of the leaders, and it went through the General Assembly.

A key part of that package was the state subsidy. It was a given percentage of the sales tax collected in the Chicago metropolitan area, and I thought at the time and still believe that it was a bad mistake when Thompson negotiated with the city to give up that state subsidy in 1978 or 1979, at the time of the negotiations over the Crosstown Expressway. And since that time there's been no state subsidy. If that state subsidy had remained in place the RTA would not have had the very severe financial problem that it had, and we probably would not have had this last crisis.

Q: What about the other steps that you took to try to cope with the recession, to hold the line? Did you at one point seriously consider combining agencies?

A: Not very seriously. I gave some attention to it. I remember several meetings with the Bureau of the Budget in which we discussed putting together some of the housekeeping agencies, but I've never been a real fan of governmental reorganization. I don't recall whether we discussed this subject matter before or not. Although I served on the staff of the Illinois "Little Hoover" Commission which presented a complete plan of reorganization, my own studies convinced me that if you reorganize agencies, you lose time because functions are not being adequately performed while a reorganization is being carried out; the performance of services is largely a result of individuals doing a good job, not the

structure in which they work. It doesn't make much difference, if you take a particular program, whether that program is administered by the Department of Community Affairs or the Department of Natural Resources or the Department of "Film, Flam, Flo." What counts is whether you've got (a) a good program and (b) good people administering it. Usually governmental reorganization plans get great headlines and the public loves them and the media loves them, and when everything settles down, just a shuffling of bureaucracies is what it amounts to.

Look at the great reorganizations of the federal government. Does anybody really think that the individual programs in the human services area are better administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare? Well, they took a lot of small agencies and put them together in two big umbrella departments. Is it working any better than it did when we had them more fragmented? I don't see any evidence of that; as a matter of fact I can make out a case that it's worse.

Q: How else did you try to cope with the recession without . . .

A: Not much you can do. We tried to do a job on unemployment compensation which developed into one terrible headache, as I'm sure you're aware.

Q: No, I don't know about that.

A: Oh, that was a terrible headache. We tried to get them to expedite. We had some bad people at the head of that agency, had to replace them, and it just turned into a total snarl in terms of people getting their unemployment compensation when they should be. That was an outgrowth of the recession, certainly. Not one of my stellar achievements in terms of managing state government, and I'm quite free to point out where things went wrong there.

On coping with the recession, the Accelerated Building Program is one thing that we've talked about. Other than areas like that, there's just not much that a governor can do to deal with things like recession or inflation. Those things have to be met by the federal government rather than by the state government. Take housing: realistically what can a governor do about housing except, really, talk about it? Public housing or what you need in that area? It just isn't much. So, it's like the war on crime. How can a governor wage a really meaningful battle in that war on crime? What resources does he have at his disposal? He just doesn't.

Q: What about the education funding; in the fall of 1975, I believe, was when the General Assembly was talking about overriding your veto of the increase?

A: I think they did override my veto, didn't they in 1975? I believe they did. We cut education at the same time we cut everything else for that 10 percent level, and the figure ninety million dollars comes to my mind of the override. Wasn't that the override session when Mayor Daley came down and spoke to a joint session of the General Assembly and Bob Aboud of the First National Bank came down and delivered his speech.

Totally irresponsible, I thought, for the head of a bank to give a speech which said, in effect, "disregard the state's finances and do what's right for the school kids" kind of approach. Interestingly, I wrote him a long letter after that speech and said, "Dear Bob, can you imagine what your board of directors would say at the bank if you took that kind of a posture with respect to the operation of your bank?"

Q: That whole flap over education in 1975, wasn't that the time when you tried to go to the people on TV to explain the cut and the Chicago stations wouldn't allow it?

A: I don't remember the time sequence but, yes, that did occur. That was when the media around the state persisted in saying over and over again that I had cut educational funding by 10 percent, giving the people the impression that the amount that the state was providing for public education was 10 percent less than it had been the prior year. And that's the clear interpretation of that that most people had. That was totally untrue. The 10 percent was 10 percent off of the increased funding that was in the original budget. And so was a reduction of a request, not a reduction of an actual amount of money that was funded for the schools. And so, we found out the depth of the public feeling about this and decided that we would buy commercials, which was something unheard of in state government; I think it's the first time that it had ever been done in the history of the state.

We raised the money to pay for the television commercials to explain this error on the part--or the misleading statements I should say--on the part of the media. Those commercial were run all over the state except in the Chicago metropolitan area where two-thirds of the state population is. The difference is that the television stations up here in the Chicago metropolitan area are owned by the networks. But downstate they're owned locally and franchised, if you will, by the networks. Up here the decisions are all made in New York City by the lawyers for the networks and they adopted a very conservative approach, and didn't even really understand the problem out here in Illinois that we were trying to deal with. And it's a governmental problem. It wasn't a political problem; it was a governmental problem. It was having an impact on the legislature. Anyway, we failed; we took it to the FCC and lost. I did note a recent ruling by the FCC that moved the law more in our direction. No, it wasn't by the FCC; it was by the courts reversing the FCC.

Q: Do you think that that had an effect . . .

A: Oh, no question about it.

Q: . . . on your primary campaign?

A: The 1976 campaign? Oh, no question about it. Sure it had an impact. I would hear that over and over again up here that, "You cut the public schools." One of the things that was happening then that we were aware of, and any thoughtful observer, was that enrollment was going down statewide, enrollment in the public school system. The baby boom surge in public education had gone through the system, and it was apparent that in a few more years we were going to have to be closing schools because of declines in enrollment. My argument over and over again was that the

people in public education ought to start facing up to that and start cutting back, which they have now realized they've had to do.

And I find it significant that the same kind of action has been taken every year since I was governor, with respect to slowing down the funding for public education, but the flak has not been there and, of course, I understand that. the first time it's done, the first time the trend is reversed, the continual, every year increase, increase, increase, almost unlimited funding for public education, whoever does that the first time is going to get the most flak and I got the most flak for it; it's understandable.

Q: Where's the whole problem going? It seems as if public education has become a bottomless pit.

A: Well, it is for a lot of reasons and one of the reasons, of course, is the educational bureaucracy in the big cities; another reason is the teachers' salaries which have increased tremendously, and not without merit, [and also] increases in salaries for everybody else in the school system. A large part of it though has been faced up to, and I think around the state a lot of school districts have cut back.

In 1972, Ogilvie appointed a blue ribbon commission to study public education. It made a lot of recommendations as to how to save money. Most of them were ignored by the Chicago Board of Education. In 1975, wasn't it, I appointed a task force headed up by Billy Singer to go after the Chicago Board of Education. And they came in with a lot of recommendations, most of which were ignored by the Board of Education. You will find when it finally hit the fan recently and the system almost collapsed and Jerry Van Gorkum went in there the last couple of years, and they said exactly the same thing all over again as though they had rediscovered the wheel.

Q: So there isn't any . . . you don't see any immediate solution?

A: They have started making some of the changes, and very good friends of mine like Jack Foster, who was chairman of the Civil Service Commission while I was governor, a long-time friend of mine and a real expert in organization, is on the school board now. Phil Lifschultz was another executive at Montgomery Ward who is providing some very good financial advice to the board of education. So some changes, yes, are finally being made. They're long, long, long overdue.

Q: It's hard to think of you as a part of a slate but you were that in 1975. How did that independent slate, how was that created?

A: Fast.

Q: How do you go about doing that?

A: Talking to people and encouraging them to run.

Q: Were there many people who wanted to be a part of that, was it hard to find people willing to run?

A: Some of the offices, as I recall, it was hard. On the other hand, for others, there was, you know, an individual you knew was good.

Q: What about Roland Burris?

A: I don't recall whether it was hard to persuade him.

Q: How did you come across Joanne Alter to run for lieutenant governor?

A: I've known Joanne for a long time.

Q: Did she come to you or did you go to her and ask her to run?

A: I have no idea. Maybe Joanne would remember that better than I.

Q: How about Stackler for attorney general?

A: My common sense tells me, although I don't have a specific recollection, that he was asked to run. Didn't Joanne announce that she was interested in running for office? I don't know. I just can't remember. This was in 1974?

Q: Nineteen seventy-five. December of 1975 when you announced that you were running.

A: Oh yes. But didn't we have some that ran in 1974 for statewide offices?

Q: I don't know; I don't think so.

A: I think we did. We had the off-year elections. Didn't we support some statewide candidates or was that only in 1976?

Q: I think just 1976. Nineteen seventy-four was when you were traveling all over.

A: But, you know, some state offices were up then. Well, I just don't remember. Anyway, we felt, with respect to those that we asked, I'm sure, that it would be a good idea to field a ticket. You notice I don't use the word "slate." "Slate" has a technical kind of meaning. "Slate" is what the machine does, and "ticket" is something entirely different. At least in my mind there is a substantial shade of difference between the two.

Q: Slating is . . .

A: Slating is a whole process. It's a process whereby you have people come in and they will have to go through certain procedures, make certain commitments, give loyalty oaths--all that kind of thing--promise that they will not run if they are not slated, if you will. That word slate has come, to me at least and I think to thoughful observers of the Illinois political system, to mean all of slatemaking. Everything that goes with it. In almost every state in the union you have the process of putting together tickets, where the incumbent or some other group will put together a group of people who will run either very cohesively or

loosely as a ticket. And those are two entirely different concepts. That's why, to me, those two words do not have the same meaning. Although it's been pointed out in the press, some of this is semantics, "Well, what's with Walker criticizing slatemaking when he put together his own slate," you know. There's some validity to that, but in the context of the total political structure, there's a difference to me.

Tape 6, Side 2

Q: There was a lot of speculation in the press during that summer and fall of 1975 that you might not run for reelection. That you might run for president. Tell me how serious that was.

A: It was serious. We--by we I mean myself and my advisors--had given serious consideration in the fall of 1975 to the presidential campaign of 1976. And at one point Dave Green seriously proposed at one of these meetings that I should not run for reelection as governor, but rather that I should go to New Hampshire and declare my candidacy for the presidency. That proposal was discussed at great length and we finally rejected it. We decided that I would run again for governor, and if it was still possible, although we really didn't think it would be, consideration could be given, if I won the primary, to going into the late presidential primaries. But we recognized that would be awfully late and very unlikely. In the summer of 1975, independently of the presidency and having nothing to do with that, I gave very serious consideration to not running again for governor at all.

Q: That's what I was going to ask. Tell me about that.

A: Well, I was turned off. I was turned off by a lot of things that had happened, and I guess I was tired. I know I was tired. I was really sick and tired of picking up the newspaper every morning and seeing carping about this and carping about that and so I just said to my top people, "I've just had enough of this." And they talked me out of it.

Q: Was it just a low point that you reached? Did you . . .

A: Dispirited, totally dispirited.

Q: . . . did your enthusiasm come back?

A: Yes, I was having marital problems too.

Q: That campaign in 1976 with Howlett, who apparently didn't ever want to run against you, had to have been a difficult one because he wouldn't debate and he wouldn't deal with the issues, and you couldn't get ahold of him to campaign. Tell me about this.

A: It was a very hard campaign. Well, I wasn't--for reasons again I don't fully understand except being tired or whatever after four years of what seemed like constant fighting--as much as I still believe pushed upon me as I pushed upon other people. Not more. But it's hard for me to evaluate that. In any event, I was tired when that campaign started

and it got worse as it went on. And the weather was bad. The campaigning was difficult from the standpoint that you mentioned. And it became apparent a number of things happened that had an impact on the outcome of that primary that were not satisfactory.

Our organizational efforts were not that good; I think we've covered this before. The spirit was not there on the part of the volunteers. Probably some of that my fault, some of it, again, tiredness, etc.; some burnout. The television commercials were not good, in my opinion at the time, and we've speculated a lot since then as to why that turned out. Anyway they did not have the impact that they should have. There was the problem of dealing with Mike Howlett.

But I still thought I was going to win. I really did. I was really surprised at the outcome. I didn't really expect it. And what happened obviously was that, although we carried downstate over eighty counties, almost 70 percent of the vote, the percentage spread in many high populace counties was not great enough. In other words, we didn't get enough of our people out to build up huge margins as we did in 1972 in particular areas. And then in the Chicago area our voters just didn't come out and Daley got his voters out, and that was the ball game.

Q: Did the numbers show, do you remember, whether it was more a question of his getting out voters he hadn't gotten out in 1972 . . .

A: Oh, no question about that.

Q: . . . or was it more your people not getting out?

A: Oh, I think it was more of the former. For the first time that we could recall, Daley had workers out in the Cook county suburbs that he sent out from the wards in Chicago to get out there to do the get-out-the-vote bit. But don't put all this down to just organization. It also was that while I had support out there on the part of people who would have voted for me, if they had come to the polls, the plain fact of the matter is that I hadn't turned them on enough to get them excited enough to want to go out. So in part it's a reflection on me. Like education for example, somebody who if he'd come to the polls would have said, "Well, I don't like what he did on education but on balance, I like him better than Howlett so I'll give him a vote." That person just stayed home. And then there were other factors in that primary too that were very unfortunate.

The area where I suffered the most was the southwest side of Chicago. And while you will hear over and over again, which I don't greatly believe--have I touched on this before?--that it was Republican crossover votes that enabled me to win in 1972. There was some of that, but it certainly wasn't determinative. There sure was a Republican crossover vote for Howlett in 1976 in the southwest side of the city of Chicago in heavily Catholic Republican wards.

Q: Because he was Catholic or because of abortion issues and that sort of thing?

A: Well those two go together.

Q: Well, but they could have voted for him simply because he was Catholic.

A: Oh, sure, sure. But you know, both, let me put it that way. I mention both particularly because I know in my former wife's own church up in Deerfield and in other Catholic churches throughout the metropolitan area, not all, the minister permitted the Right to Life people to pass out little green pieces of paper saying, "Vote for Howlett over Walker because of the abortion issue," although actually there wasn't any difference at all between Howlett's position on abortion and my position--exactly the same, word for word practically, and yet the Right to Life people passed these out and the church let them be passed out. We didn't learn of that until too late. It was on the Sunday before the election on Tuesday, and by the time we learned of it on Sunday afternoon it was too late to do anything about it. I'm not saying it was determinative, but it was certainly a substantial factor in a lot of heavily Catholic areas.

Q: Were there other factors besides the education thing?

A: Oh sure. Education, abortion, and undoubtedly my fault, if you will, the general media image of me as fighting all the time--people tired of fights and that kind of thing. Sure, all of these things had an impact, no question about it. And I'm not at all saying that they weren't, many of them, my fault; some of them not my fault like this abortion thing. It's ridiculous. And the education thing I don't think my fault, but other things, sure, I did some wrong things in the sense of mistakes, that if I'd had it to do over again I might have been able to repair. So, I have to blame myself a considerable part for that defeat. I certainly don't blame it on the media.

Q: But you say that you really believed you were going to win. I assume that if you had believed that it was questionable, you would have done something else, other things, to keep from losing.

A: Well, by the time you're into a campaign in terms of the kinds of things that I'm talking about--that's the whole four-year sweep as being governor--you can't reverse all of that, so there's not much you can do at that point. Sure, the commercials could have been better, but by then the die had been cast. Daley made up his mind he was going to get me, and political people in the machine had told me that they'd never seen Daley go so all out. "Get him, get him, get him" were Daley's instructions to the precinct captains. "If you have to give away a vote for any other office, you give it away, but defeat Walker." That was Daley's message.

Q: If Vic had been on the outside at that point during that campaign, do you think the organization would have been strong enough for you to win?

A: No, I don't think it would have been.

Q: It wouldn't have made that much difference?

A: No, no. I don't think so, does Vic?

Q: I don't know. I don't (laughs) . . .

A: I thought maybe you asked him. I don't ever recall asking that question.

Q: No, I just wondered because you have made it clear that he was really the driving force in that 1972 campaign.

A: But remember that even in 1972 the extent of our organization in the city of Chicago was not as great as we hoped it would be. If you want to look at the suburbs, that's where we should be pointing to here. Our organizational effort was not as good in 1976 as it was in 1972, I think, for the reasons I gave. But, no, I don't think Vic could have turned it around.

Q: Bob Weidrich of the Tribune said that primary between you and Howlett was the dirtiest campaign in Illinois history.

A: One of the poorest observers on the political scene is Bob Weidrich. That's nonsense and I trust you realize that. Compared to an ordinary toughly waged political campaign . . . no difference. I heard him use that word "dirty" and I never saw anything to back it up. What was dirty about it?

Q: I don't know; I thought you might know. (laughs)

A: Well, that was a hypothetical question.

Q: Well, I assume he's talking about your attacks on Howlett because of the Sun Steel. . . .

A: Legitimate criticism, in my opinion.

Q: . . . and the home in Indiana and racetrack stock.

A: I think those are all legitimate issues. I don't understand why that's dirty.

Q: Did you think Howlett fought dirty in that one?

A: Only twice, only twice. There was something I would never do; he used some very bad language, terrible language, calling me a son of a bitch and that kind of thing.

Q: In public?

A: Yes. I think that is going beyond the pale. Thought, sure, that's okay. I mean, gee whiz, he was tough with me and I was tough with him. I see nothing wrong with that, absolutely nothing. I can recall some--well, you're too young to remember the Humphrey/Kennedy primary campaign in 1960. Very tough in West Virginia and Wisconsin, extremely tough.

I don't think that was a dirty campaign. I don't think it was dirty on Mike's part. A couple of times he slipped. I don't think it had any effect on the campaign.

Q: You told me that it didn't take you very long to adjust to being governor. How long did it take you to make the adjustment after losing the primary?

A: (laughs) I just got a letter from one of my sons this week in which he said I never did.

Q: Oh (laughs). He's heard about the new possibility?*

A: Yes, it's a very fascinating letter. He has a remarkable way with words, that son of mine does. Do you want me to read portions of it for you?

Q: Sure, sure.

A: You'll find it, I think . . . I loved it. He hasn't written me, in some time for a variety of reasons. He wrote: "My first words to paper so to speak began with the premise that you needed a new project, a new goal, like reenlisting in the United States Navy and attempting to become the oldest admiral ever. Something that would occupy you for years to come. Something that would make you driven insane with monomania as the navy is wont to do. As the drafts were completed, I abandoned the navy notion and after great difficulty and extensive discussions with God, I concluded what you needed to do was something to get you out of the house. After all, Roberta is awfully tired of you hanging around. It's tacky you know and besides a body needs some time alone. So, I came up with this marvelously constructed plan to run you for a political office, like maybe governor." Is that too much to put into this?

Q: No, I think it's marvelous.

A: (continuing to read from letter) "So, yes. I stand 100 percent behind your decision to seek the governorship. I believe you need to chase it, that elusive something out there which has been lacking from your life for several years. It isn't marital bliss. It really isn't even power. Perhaps it could be summarized as participation."

Q: That's wonderful.

A: Isn't that amazing.

Q: Yes. Now which son is this?

A: Charles.

Q: It surprises me that he says he's never seen you contemplative, because he was with you through the "Walk." (referring to another portion of the letter)

*Walker's 1981 campaign for the Democratic nomination for governor.

A: Yes, and that's one of the things I want to say to him, amongst other things. Just because I read it (his letter) doesn't mean I agree with it all. I was contemplative on large portions of the "Walk" and it gave me a real opportunity to acquire some perspective, which I'm sure he will admit when he thinks about it. But other than that interlude, he's right. I've never been one to sit back and contemplate my navel; I've always been driving, driving, driving. And he's right too that I need something now. I really have been kind of bored. I need something to do.

Q: So, back to my original question. You never really got used to not being governor.

A: That I think is true; yes, I think that's ture. I'm told by some of my contemporaries in public life that it takes five years. Don't ask me why but I've had a number of people come up with that period of time, five years.

Q: It takes five years to get used to it?

A: To get used to being out of it.

Q: It's been five years. (laughs)

A: I don't know what that proves. (laughs)

Q: You mentioned one time that you thought that that nine-month period after the primary and before you left office would be a good time, and then you became ill. I wasn't aware of that. Tell me what happened.

A: Yes, after the primary--that was in March--I had some physical problems and then the doctor told me that I had to have a gallbladder operation. I remember it was Charles graduating from Brown University; I went to his graduation in early June, came back, went into the hospital and had the operation . . . lots of complications, and I don't think I went back to work until almost September. It was a long period of time. Then there was a special session of the General Assembly, I think in September or October, and by then it was almost over. So I didn't get that nine months that I wanted.

Q: In October, Daley was quoted as saying that he would support you in a Senate race against Percy. Why did he say that, do you know?

A: To get me out of the governor's office.

Q: But you were out. That was October of 1976. You'd already been defeated in the primary.

A: Oh, I'm sorry, I thought that was October 1975 you were talking about. Nineteen seventy-six? I just don't remember it; I really don't remember that.

Q: Would you have considered that, running for the Senate?

A: I did consider it.

Q: And what happened?

A: I decided I didn't want to do it. It was a time of difficult marital problems; I had no desire to be a United States senator and that doesn't put down the office at all. I just am not a legislative type. It's great being a senator for some people but not for me; related to that, I did not like the idea of running back and forth on the airplane to Washington, between Washington and Illinois. I hate flying with a passion. That had been a very difficult year because of the illness and the primary and everything and I just said, "I'm going to get away from it all." I don't know what would have happened if I'd run, I really don't. Anyway, I didn't for the reasons I gave.

Q: How much did you participate in the campaign after you lost in the primary?

A: A considerable amount, as I recall. Mostly for--in the fall now after I got over the operation--for individual candidates for the legislature and for Jimmy Carter and certainly some for Mike Howlett, although it was apparent by then that it was a lost cause. I supported Jimmy--when was it? It was well before the convention and well before the time when Daley came out for Jimmy Carter, I announced my support for him. That had to be in something like April, May, somewhere along in there of 1976.

Q: I want to go back a minute; when you were thinking of running for president, Jimmy Carter had already announced, I mean everybody knew he was a candidate at that point, didn't they? And you had known him as a governor . . .

A: I think so.

Q: . . . Wasn't he still governor when you first came in?

A: Yes, yes he was.

Q: Did your decision not to run for president have anything to do with your knowledge that he was a candidate?

A: Not at all, nothing.

Q: You really weren't that aware of him?

A: Nobody gave him a chance.

Q: Were you as successful in 1976 in electing Democrats as you had been in 1974?

A: Oh, absolutely not because in 1976 we had the whole debacle of the state ticket. With Thompson just overwhelming Howlett. And that debacle of the state ticket, it hurt Democrats all over the state. I had warned Daley, as a matter of fact, in 1975 in a meeting; I had pointed out the consequences: If we had a primary fight and I lost the primary fight,

and if the Democrat running against me lost the general election, we stood a very real chance of losing one or both houses of the General Assembly and, with reapportionment coming up, it could take a long time for the Democratic party to come back from that kind of a series of events. And actually history turned out that way in great part. But, you know, part of that is our own fault too because we wanted a primary contest. I dared Daley to run somebody against me. Actually dared him.

Q: Would it have gone differently had he run anyone else?

A: Well, sure it would have gone differently. What would have made the difference, I can't tell you, but no question about the fact that Mike Howlett, given his position in the party, attracted tremendous support from the party regulars in Cook County who were led on by Daley to just do me in.

Q: Was it a personal disappointment to lose to Mike Howlett?

A: A personal disappointment?

Q: Yes.

A: I wouldn't say "to lose to Mike Howlett" because I never considered that I lost to Mike Howlett. I lost to Richard J. Daley; I didn't lose to Howlett.

Q: You considered Daley more the adversary . . .

A: Absolutely. The system embodied in Richard J. Daley. And Jane Byrne said when I saw her yesterday, "Nobody has any idea how many problems came out of the woodwork." This is the city that works. Nonsense, this was the city that works. It worked by plastering over all of the major problems and they all came out and heaped all over her, and she's had them. Transportation, schools, O'Hare Airport, the highway system: you name it and she's got it. The whole intrastructure of Chicago. It's like having an automobile that you haven't had really repaired inside but have fixed up on the outside for a period of ten years, and all of a sudden the damn thing falls apart because you haven't spent the money to take care of the inside. And that's what's happened to Chicago.

Q: What about the transition? I know that the transition from Ogilvie to your administration was not a particularly easy time.

A: Correct.

Q: What happened when . . .

A: I think, as far as I know, we had a good transition. I certainly worked at making it good.

Q: Is that really a significant period of time? Are you really able to get anything from it as someone new coming in?

A: Oh sure. I think it's particularly important in putting together the first budget. If you get into that early enough after the November

election you can have more of an impact than if you have to wait until January to get in. That three-month period there or two-month, I should say, is very, very, critical. And I didn't have that much. I tried to give that time to Thompson and I think it did make a difference.

Q: What is your relationship like with Thompson?

A: Oh friendly, I presume. We were very friendly . . . back when I was elected, I remember meeting with him when he was United States attorney and we said we would cooperate on matters involving law enforcement, and we did. I, of course, did not like his continual references to near bankruptcy when he took over, which was nonsense, and his effort to take the problems of the early days of administration and every time something would come up just say, "It's not my fault; it was Walker's fault," you know. "He left me with this," like the prison system, for example. I tried very hard in the first year as governor not to do that to Ogilvie. I think I succeeded in accomplishing it a bit differently. I'll have some fun with him (Thompson) next year though if I run against him.

Q: What about the day Thompson was inaugurated? Do you remember that? What were you feeling?

A: Well, I think that it's a difficult day. It was a difficult day for Ogilvie, difficult day for me. Mostly you just put your mind to it and go through the day. It's not a happy day, no question about it, because the curtain is coming down right there before your eyes on one of the greatest experiences of your life, so you can't exactly feel happy about it. The day got over.

Q: Did you ever think that day that you might ever reconsider and run again?

A: No, no.

Q: It was just over.

A: Over. The chapter was ended and as I said many a time thereafter, I climbed that mountain. I don't have to climb it again. And here I am starting out again. (laughter)

Q: (laughs) Oh well, it's been five years.

A: Well, I think five years, and I think also I made some bad mistakes in terms of structuring my life, in the professional life after I left the governor's office. If I had it to do over again, I certainly would have done it differently.

Q: For example.

A: Well I should have done better planning as to what I was going to do after I left office. I assumed that I could go out and do this thing that I wanted to do with respect to a statewide law firm, and that just didn't work. It just didn't work. I assumed, wrongfully, that I would get (for the firm) a good deal of business, legal work, and I didn't.

Q: Why?

A: I think in retrospect there were several reasons. Number one, a multi-city law firm was an entirely new concept and people didn't quite know what to make of it. There was some talk in the press about it being a franchise operation like the fast food business, which of course it was not. But that publicity didn't help, particularly. Second, I think that undoubtedly a lot of corporations--and I wanted to bring in corporate clients--had forgotten, if they ever knew, that I was a partner in a major Chicago law firm before I became governor. And they assumed that the kind of law that I would be practicing as former governor would be "influence" law, having to do with government. And they knew that the Republican administration was there in Springfield, and why should they turn to me to get legal things handled in Springfield?

A third factor was a very intangible one, that I had come to be regarded in the Chicago metropolitan area as being persona non grata to city hall, and therefore businesses that were very conscious of their relationships with the city officials would not want to take me on as an attorney for fear that there would be adverse repercussions. Next factor is somewhat similar: I developed an image while I was governor as being a confrontationist and also as being anti-establishment. The business community is very much pro-establishment and therefore this confrontationist, anti-establishment image did not help at all. Anyway there were a large number of factors.

Another one I want to mention is the fact that, repeatedly, when I left office as governor there were articles in the columns and news articles about investigations into my campaign fundraising. That went on constantly. And I know that that hurt severely. I can recall three specific good clients that I lost because of that kind of publicity. I really got quite bitter about that because there was nothing to it as events have turned out. While three individuals were indicted, the indictments were dismissed. I don't think there's anything to it, and certainly nobody has come up with anything suggesting that I did anything that violated the law. And yet the clear implication of many of these news articles was that I was personally involved, which I was not. So those are the problems. And I think the image one certainly was a part of it also.

Q: How would you describe the image the press had of you?

A: The image? Confrontation, fighter. You can see it right now; you've read the columns I'm sure since I've said that I'll think about running. "He'll tear Thompson apart."* How did Basil Talbott put it on the program today? Almost as a gladiator going into the pit and taking a sword and just hacking people up. That's the image that comes through. Maybe I'm too sensitive.

Q: Well, I think you are recognized to be a formidable adversary in a debate, but there is a difference between saying that and saying that you will tear somebody apart.

*Basil Talbott, political editor, Chicago Sun-Times, questioned Walker on Lee Phillip's noon TV show (7/28/81).

A: (laughter) That's what I think. But, no question about the fact that's my image, but it's not true, not true. And also controversial. Controversial. Controversial. It has slipped over into that in the minds of many people. And I evoke strong responses. I don't mean--I think I've said this to you before--I don't mean to put myself on the same level as Jack Kennedy, but he evoked strong responses. You liked the guy a lot or you hated the guy . . . Franklin D. Roosevelt the same. On the other hand you take an Eisenhower, nobody hated Eisenhower, nobody loved Eisenhower. Thompson. Nobody hates Thompson. Nobody loves Thompson. I'm exaggerating, but I think that paints the picture. I am of the polarization school. I polarize people, no question about it.

Q: That's true. I've never talked with anybody who is lukewarm about you.

A: Oh, there are some, I'm sure. But you're right; there are an awful lot that are not lukewarm. I am very intense . . . "He's a bastard," or "He's a great guy!"

Q: Your relationship with the legislature was . . .

A: Tempestuous.

Q: Yes.

A: Partly my fault. Partly justified.

Q: Okay. Who were the personalities in the legislature that you remember as important in that confrontation, either good or bad?

A: Oh, I can only answer that kind of at random. Some of this is responsive and some of it I'm sure is not. One of the mistakes I made was turning legislative relationships over totally to my staff and having very little to do with it. I regret that. And I should have taken more of a hand in it. I should have met more often with them; I should have socialized more often with them. I should have relaxed more often with them.

Yes. Just as I think I've learned a lesson with respect to the press, but a certain part of that is the kind of person you are. I'm a more reserved person in those kinds of relationships than, say, a Jim Thompson, but I recognize that part of that was my fault. In terms of the personalities, most of the legislators viewed me as the new kid on the block. "What the hell does he know about state government?" kind of thing. "We know a lot more than he does." And most of them are participants in what I have called to you the club system of politics and they're accustomed to it. And I was not a member of the club, deliberately, and that offended them. Some of them felt that I looked down on them, which I didn't at all.

Individuals--very hard to pick out individuals. The independents that I thought should have been more with me than they were, particularly in the first two years, disappointed me. But then they felt that I disappointed them because they didn't have immediate access to my office and [weren't] consulted on everything and so forth. They thought that's the way it was

going to be. Realistically, it could not be that way with the independent legislators because they didn't have the power, but I should have held hands more. I should have talked with them more. So the relationship, the personal relationship thing, in great part was my fault. In great part. So far as the issues were concerned, much of that was dictated by the government and political realities of the time.

Q: If you had to come up with a percentage, how great a percentage do you think of the legislative conflicts were a result of Daley's supporting one side and you supporting the other relation?

A: A percentage?

Q: Well, do you think a lot of the problems were because . . .

A: A significant amount, yes. But a part of that was because they (the Chicago regulars) played hard ball. On everything. I don't mean necessarily with me. On all legislation. To the Chicago organization at that time, this little old bill down here, to do some little thing, was a matter of "The Party," you know, and you went all out for it. And so when I say to a high degree, even on the insignificant things it was very much in evidence.

Q: What about Blair, your relationship with him?

A: It was at times good and times obviously tempestuous. But a very respectful kind of relationship. He was a brilliant guy and I think he had respect for my mind and my ability to deal with really substantive governmental issues. I paid a lot of attention to substance. I think I can safely say that in certainly less than 10 percent of the bills that I had vetoed or signed, a major consideration was politics, and [never] on any legislation of substance. I can say that with a clear conscience. That's very true.

Q: What about Jerry Shea? Was he important?

A: Jerry Shea. Oh, very important.

Q: Was that an important connection?

A: It depended. Jerry Shea has great loyalty. And he was loyal to Daley and the machine. And when my course of action was contrary to the mayor's, he was totally on the mayor's side. Totally. When that wasn't involved, then I had no problem with Jerry Shea. He was a brilliant man and did his homework; you could hardly name a bill that he wouldn't know the content of. I'd have a legislative conference with the leaders, and be talking with men that had higher positions than he, and I could tell after five minutes they didn't know what was in the bill. But Jerry Shea always knew. Bright man, very bright.

July 28, 1981, Tape 7, Side 1

Q: How about your relationship with Cecil Partee?

A: A very strange one. I liked Cecil and I think Cecil liked me. But again, you could never have a completely satisfactory relationship with any of the Democratic leaders out of Chicago because their first loyalty was to Daley. I will not soon forget the time when I had a breakfast meeting with the legislative leaders of my own party; at the conclusion of the breakfast I said to them--I think I told you this story. "Do I have any further problems today in the senate?" "None." "In the house?" "None." And it was one hour later that the leaders of my own party in the senate started tubing, one after the other, my nominees for the cabinet. So, there was that.

Q: You were around state politics years before you came to be governor.

A: To some degree.

Q: To a certain extent. I get a sense that that wouldn't have happened in the 1950's, in essence they were lying to you, and I have a feeling that the rules of the game were different twenty years ago.

A: No, I don't think the rules of the game were different; just that the situation was totally different. Before me there was never a Democratic governor that asserted from the outset his independence from the mayor of the city of Chicago. It never had happened before. And the Democratic leaders were totally unaccustomed to this kind of situation. What do you do? It was a first.

Q: And they felt that in order to be loyal to Daley they could never be loyal to you?

A: Oh, absolutely.

Q: Never be honest with you?

A: Oh, I'm sure they were honest when it didn't get in the way of doing that which Daley wanted them to do. It was totally an outgrowth of that strange kind of situation where I said from day one of my administration, "I am going to run state government. And even in areas where it impinges on Cook County, I'm going to run it. I will accommodate Cook County. I will accommodate the mayor just like I would accommodate any other mayor in the state, but no difference, absolutely no difference," and I made that loud and clear from day one. And you add that together with the feeling in the legislature that I was an outsider and did not understand or know anything about state government to speak of. You put those two things together and you had all the ingredients for a very difficult situation. Plus, my own mistakes, okay, of not sitting down with them and trying to work out, myself, a better kind of an arrangement. I thought that it would work the other way. It didn't, and I blame myself.

Q: How about your appearances before the House Democratic Caucus?

A: That happened rarely, rarely, and some of those were successful and some were not successful.

Q: Successful in long-term better relations?

A: No, I was thinking in terms of the immediate project at hand, whatever that was. But in terms of relationship, I don't think appearance at a caucus has anything to do with the relationship between the governor and the legislature. No, you can't do it very often and both sides recognize that in any administration. If the governor tries to do more of it, it becomes interference of the executive with the legislative branch and that's not good for either side. But when I say, working with them better, I mean not in caucuses but in having individuals and groups into the office, talking things through, relaxing with them at the mansion, that kind of thing; I did not do enough of it.

Q: You were always campaigning; did you use the mansion for campaigning and for those political . . .

A: Oh, to some degree. I think any time you have a gathering of people in the executive mansion it has political overtones and you're using it in that sense. Obviously you can misuse it. I don't think I misused it. As a matter of fact, I think we totally underused it in terms of using the social amenities of life as a way to grease the wheels of government in a good sense. I don't mean in a bad sense, but in a good sense. We didn't do enough of that and I blame myself for that. There was not a good relationship at all between the mansion staff and my staff. There was continual friction.

Q: Edgar Crane, a writer on state government, says in his new book, Illinois: Political Processes and Governmental Performance, that your very directness hampered your ability to function in a political system that is so very indirect.

A: Correct.

Q: Do you feel that this . . .

A: Oh yes, I don't think there's any doubt about that. But I am what I am. I think that in many, many instances I would be better off if I were not so blunt and so direct. But I don't know of any other way to talk to people, and one of the things I'm convinced of is that you cannot be that which you aren't, successfully. And I am what I am. I'm direct and I'm going to be direct, and I hope not undiplomatically direct, but in a conversation about a problem I'm going to go from A to B to C to D. That's the way my mind works and that's the way I work.

Q: One area that we haven't touched on at all is your relationship to the judiciary. Some governors have a very close relationship with individuals on the supreme court.

A: No, I never did because I felt very strongly about that. I feel very strongly the division of the three branches of government and the respect

each must have for the other. I remember that picture of Jim Thompson drinking a can of beer while presiding over the state senate and I thought that was horrible. I would never in a million years do that. I think it just is wrong. I think that with respect to the judiciary particularly there should be a sharp division.

And I guess the best way to describe it, although it's a small thing, is that I never called the chief justice anything else other than Mr. Chief Justice. Never by first name. It was always, Mr. Chief Justice. And I think I had, though, a good relationship with the judiciary. Probably in great part as a result of the fact that I refused to let politics get into that area.

Another one--this is the small one; take the state police. I absolutely refused to let any politics get into the state police, and I told this to the superintendent of state police, whom I had selected on a blue ribbon basis by a blue ribbon panel. I told the public in advance that I would pick someone who was on the list that that blue ribbon panel came up with. And I was hopeful that it would be somebody from within the department and it turned out that it was. One of them made the list and I appointed him.

I called him in my office and said, "Look, if anyone comes to you with respect to a political recommendation for assignment, enrollment or promotion of a state policeman, I want you to kick him out of your office no matter who it is even if it's my number one assistant, and if they persist I want you to pick up the telephone and call me and tell me." And I had two occasions where he did that. He was a member of my staff, and I just refused to put up with it.

I've been told that I'm the only governor in the history of the state to have such a strict policy. Maybe a more relaxed guy would, without ever hurting state government or doing anything evil, would do some little things that help grease the wheels as I say, in a decent way in the state police force. Maybe I was too uptight about things like that and too uptight about relationships and situations, but at least I could look in the mirror every night when I went home.

Q: I know you have mentioned that there were problems in the marriage during that time but I wonder about a family life while you're governor of the state of Illinois. Is it possible to have a family life, and what's it like for your kids?

A: Very hard. I think it is possible, but of course a very, very unusual situation for it to happen. If you work at being governor, you don't have much time for a family. The president has more time with his family than the governor does.

Q: He has Camp David on weekends.

A: Well, yes, but almost every night the president has dinner with his family or can if he wants to. How many nights is the president out giving a speech? Except during campaign time, hardly ever. The governor is or can be out every single night of the week going to some event somewhere around the state. And I did an awful lot of that for the

reason I indicated to you earlier, I thought that I had to in order to protect my base and that plays havoc with a family relationship, particularly. But it just didn't work out, all the way around, it just didn't, and I regret that it didn't.

Q: Do your children have fond memories of that time in the mansion?

A: Oh yes, I think the ones particularly who--well I think they all do. The ones who visited, it was always a gala occasion with lots of panoply, and state policemen picking them up, you know, and butlers and maids and, you know, (laughs) I mean that's bound to be exciting, and I think it was for them. I think they enjoyed it. And then Margaret and Will, they got spoiled, the two that lived there. They could ring the kitchen and the pantry and have things sent up to them and they had a ball, they really did, those four years.

That's not to say there weren't some real strains on them. And it certainly is to say that I didn't spend as much time with them in those difficult years as I should have, nor did their mother. So they got a little spoiled and a little out of shape as a result of it. And it's taken them awhile to come around. But no, I think, to answer your question, I think the kids had a ball while we lived in the mansion.

Q: Did you have a ball? Was it ever fun for . . .

A: Very little. That's one of the things I've said to Roberta. If I should run again and if I do get elected, I'm going to turn it into more of a fun thing. Have more pleasure out of it as opposed to just driving all the time.

Q: How could you do that?

A: Well number one, if I do it this time I won't come in the same way. I won't have the same pressures, I won't have the same dynamics. There won't be a Daley. Hopefully I'll have better relationships with the legislature. If I do my job and with Daley gone, and it'll just be a totally different ball game. I won't have to do as much running around the state as I did. Certainly, take Thompson now, well he doesn't. Most governors don't do it. So, I'll have more time and, therefore, hopefully, be able to enjoy it more. That's not to say it won't be difficult to find the time.

Q: People who write about the Walker administration and the accomplishments, list things like ethics legislation and roads and any number of tangible things like that. Do you look at it more broadly than that?

A: Oh, sure I do.

Q: What do you think of?

A: The total of state government. I really think that we did something in that department. Ethics--gee, an elevator operator after the first Christmas said to me up in Chicago, he said, "Hey Governor, you really changed things around here." And I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "You'd be amazed. There's just practically nobody going up and down

these elevators carrying presents and bottles of liquor and boxes to take to people in the different agencies." I took that as one of the nicest compliments that I received while I was governor.

The whole spirit and tone that I tried to create, and to some degree did create, was a higher standard of ethics, more attention to getting the job done and bringing state government more in touch with the real day to day problems of people. And I think in many areas of state government we achieved that. Nowhere near as much as I would like but I think we did; I certainly worked hard for it and I like to believe we achieved some of it. I've sometimes compared state government with a battleship which you, of course, have never been on. But I remember the first time that I was officer of the deck on the bridge of a battleship and you say to the helmsman, "Right hard rudder." And he takes that huge wheel on the bridge and just spins it like that to make the ship turn. And it seems like an interminable time before the ship even starts to come around. It's the momentum, the pressure of the water against a huge hull expanse. State government is very much like that. The momentum is fierce. The pressures of politics as usual, government as usual, the bureaucracy, are fierce. So, I can never say that I achieved, in the areas that I mentioned, certainly not ninety degrees, not forty-five degrees, not twenty degrees not, oh gee whiz, if it was five degrees or four degrees of change, then I'd be proud of it but it was as little as that.

Q: Did you think it would be that difficult?

A: No, absolutely not, absolutely not. I thought it would be a lot easier to bring about changes in those areas than I learned. It just--that really surprised me. It was the greatest surprise that I had in becoming governor.

Q: Do you have a sense now of how you might have done it differently or how you would do it differently to achieve greater change?

A: Oh sure, that's one of the things that moves me in the direction of running again. But again not twenty-five degrees or forty-five degrees, but more meaningful than before. Yes, I have some very solid ideas on that. And that's one of the attractions of having the time to do it. You see, I'm accused over and over and over again of being a confrontationist. Whether I am or not the mere fact that I had to spend so much time on those kinds of battles kept me from doing some of the things in this area that I would like to have done more of.

I would like to have set up a meaningful network of places around the state where people could go to cut through the bureaucracy. We had to wage such a fight to keep those action offices even going that we finally just had to give it up. It just wasn't worth it. And a part of the problem is because we allowed it to be perceived as a political agency as opposed to a governmental agency. And that was our fault. If you go about that in a different way, you can do it.

Let me give you one little example. If you walked into the state of Illinois building down on LaSalle Street, while I was governor, over near the elevators there's a kind of a booth there. We had that booth manned at all times so anybody who came in could go up there and say, "I've got

this kind of a problem." We had intelligent people there who could tell them where to go. Where in all those offices they'd go to do something about that problem. Is it there now? No, it's not there. It's a little thing, but that kind of thing you can set up and you can have around the state to really help people.

Those are the kinds of things . . . More policing of the people who regulate in the sense of going around and making safety inspections and that kind of thing to keep those people from selling tickets to fundraising events, a practice that has resumed. I think I pretty well stamped it out while I was governor. Not completely but to a great degree. All those things are things that I think that I have a better chance in accomplishing the next time around if I do get there.

Q: Is there one single disappointment, one great disappointment aside from not being reelected?

A: Well, I think the area I just talked about is perhaps the greatest and the other one is one that I referred to earlier: the inability--again for very much the same reasons--to spend the kind of time that I wanted to on just doing something about management in state government and making it more effective.

Q: How are you different as a person now than you were in 1972?

A: Oh, I have to leave that to an outsider. To use my son Charles's expression, I hope to be not as "constipated" a personality. (laughs)

Q: But that four years of the intensity and the tempestuousness, it must have made it a real time of growth for you as a person.

A: Again, I don't think I'm qualified to answer that question.

Q: You felt that you changed so much during the "Walk."

A: Yes, and I think I changed undoubtedly as a governor. Much, much more, I think, appreciative of people, individuals than I was before, but again, I'm just not good at that kind of self-analysis. I don't think any person really is. My son Charles wrote me a long letter not too long ago analyzing some parts of the change in me.

Q: Charles has helped. Well, I certainly appreciate your doing this with me.

A: Oh I enjoyed it.

Q: It's been a pleasure.

A: I enjoyed it. I'm sorry that I was not able to put things in better perspective, and I'm sure there's a lot of other things in there that we haven't covered that we should have.

Q: Well . . .

A: We didn't even talk about all the gossip: I had mistresses all over the state.

Q: Oh goodness, tell me about the gossip. (laughs) I didn't know I was supposed to ask about gossip. Nothing too exciting, or was it?

A: Well, I remember one that I thought was really kind of a funny story. I went to a great big dinner down in southern Illinois, a huge evening dinner, and I was met at the door by this rather attractive buxom lady and she introduced herself and she was the secretary of one of the party officials down there. And I thought to myself, gee, this is strange--what is she doing here? Because usually you have the officials themselves meet you at the sidewalk to take you into the gathering.

And I went in, I mean like two thousand people. This was a "biggie," as they say, and you usually come in the back of the room and walk through all the way up to the speaker's dais, and people recognize you and start applauding and that continues in intensity until you get up to the dais. Well, here's this lady leading me around, and she stopped at this table over here and introduced me to, as it turned out, members of her family; went over to another table and introduced me to more members of her family. Finally got up to the head table and I really wasn't paying all that much attention to it because you're taken up with everything, you're shaking hands and "Hi Jim," and "Hi Joe," and "Thank-you," and get up there and give the speech and everything.

I get back in the car and driving to the airport after the event was over. I said to Pete Wilkes, my chief of security, "That was an interesting evening. What was with that woman who met me and took me up to the platform?" He said, "Oh, that's your . . ." He said, "Don't you know her?" And I said, "Oh, I think I met her down here before." And he hummed and hawed and I finally said, "Pete, what in the world is going on here?" He said, "Haven't you heard the stories?" And I said, "What stories?" He said, "That's your mistress?" (laughter) I said, "My mistress?" He said, "Oh, yes, she openly brags about it. That's why she took you to meet her family at this affair. So that the family that she has talked to about the relationship would have this opportunity to meet you." Isn't that incredible?

Q: Yes, it is. Is it governors or you that get this kind of . . .

A: Oh, this must happen to all governors.

Q: I don't know. It's not in the clipping files. (laughs)

A: (laughs) I hope not, I hope not.

Q: Well, it's been really interesting.

A: Well I have enjoyed it. I hope I've perhaps given you some of the side of me that does not appear in all those clippings that you read. It's very hard, I've found, to really get to know a person in public life without having an opportunity to see them as a real three-dimensional human being, as opposed to the two-dimensional that comes from the media. But it was my privilege to have the opportunity to go through that.

Q: Well, good.

A: Thank you for doing such a thorough job of research.

February 18, 1982, Tape 8, Side 1

Q: Today I'd like to talk about the latest campaign, beginning with when did you first start thinking about it and why?

A: Well, I never really stopped thinking about it, Marilyn. I thought about running for the Senate. I can't really recall when I first started seriously thinking about running for governor. Turn it off for a second, would you? (tape turned off)

Sometime in 1981, I received a . . . well, I read in the newspaper about an investigation by a grand jury relating to my campaign fundraising that referred specifically to the liquor area. I could not image what was involved here, and I called my counsel, my former counsel while I was governor, and said, "Do you know anything about what this is that's appearing in the newspaper?" He said, "Yes, there is a grand jury investigation going on." And I said, "Well, that's the first that I knew of it." He said that a number of people in my administration were being investigated and that the government attorney was openly making threats that he was going to "get" people in my administration one way or another. And the way he talked about doing it was to get somebody persuaded that he might get indicted, and then get that person to give testimony under a grant of immunity.

I was told at about the same time that when the Thompson administration took over, Thompson caused to be sent to the United States Department of Justice a seventy-page memorandum outlining areas in which they urged the Department of Justice to investigate my administration, to try to get some dirty stuff on me.

Q: This is right after he took office?

A: Correct. Apparently that is what lay behind the grand jury investigations that started in 1977, and at the conclusion of those investigations they said there was nothing there except that one incident involving Mr. Tsoumas, T-S-O-U-M-A-S. And then for reasons that I still don't understand they reopened the whole investigation in 1980 or 1981, plowing exactly the same ground.

I contacted the attorney involved who was out of Washington--it was not the United States attorney's office here--and told him bluntly that I thought this was harassment pure and simple and that it was politics, that the Republicans were trying to prevent me from being a candidate in 1982. At that point I decided after consulting with some of my friends that I would announce my candidacy, because if I was going to have this done to me, then the only way I could think of to smoke them out was to say publicly as soon as possible, "All right, I'll be a candidate then," since I was already considering it anyway.

Therefore, I announced and got started. And the more I got involved the more serious I got about it. When it became apparent that Jane Byrne wanted me to be the Democratic candidate for governor that put an entirely different light on everything. Because if she and the regular organization, responsive to her that is, decided that I should be the candidate, then the likelihood of a primary contest would be very small and there would be an excellent prospect that I could go unopposed in the primary and only have to raise money for a general election campaign against Thompson. So we geared up.

Vic de Grazia worked with me and we brought Olga Corey in from Washington, who had run my Washington office when I was governor, to deal with press relations. We hired one other person to work in the organization, advance, scheduling areas. And we went to work. We raised some money and spent some money and it did not work out. Jane Bryne said repeatedly and privately that she liked me as the candidate. I recall the evening when she was having a very large cocktail party fundraiser. This was in . . . I don't remember, in the late fall. It got a lot of publicity anyway. There were thousands of people there. And she was going up to the place where she was going to speak and her husband Jay was walking along beside her and I was standing there. Jay left her side to come over and put his arm around me and pulled my head down and said, "You are her candidate, Dan."

A few days later I saw Jane in her office and she gave the clear implication that I would be the candidate and said, "Let's talk about putting together the rest of the ticket. Whom would you like to have run with you for attorney general, lieutenant governor, etc.?" And we talked about some names. At this point I thought that it looked like it was going to happen.

Then at that same time Adlai stepped up his campaign and got a lot of the county chairmen to announce for him, and made the statement that he would not promise not to run, if he didn't get slated. It became apparent to us from intermediaries that the mayor was very concerned about Adlai running a primary contest and believed that he might very well do that. A primary contest of that magnitude would seriously disrupt the party in the year before her reelection campaign and she desperately did not want that. We tried to say to her that Adlai, in our opinion, if he didn't get the slating of the state central committee, just wouldn't run a primary contest. Where is he going to get his money? He's even having trouble raising money now without an opponent in the primary.

So in any event I think largely because of Adlai's threat, she decided at the last minute that she'd let the state central committee make the decision without her intervention. And therefore Adlai was chosen because he had all the downstate state central committeemen supporting him, and [there was] no unified force up here. If the mayor had held the Cook County committeemen then that's a majority, and she could have called the shots. But she chose not to. And that ended it.

Q: Why do you think Adlai came in when he did? Do you think he didn't want you to run or he really wanted to run?

A: Oh, I think he really wanted to run. I think he'd been planning this for a long time.

Q: Who were some of the other real possibilities or were there any?

A: There never was really any other possibility except for Phil Rock. I think he could have had the endorsement simply because his closeness to the organization and Cook County. But when he decided not to run then the only other possibilities were Adlai, myself, Alex Seith who was not really taken seriously and Mike Madigan, who did not want to run and didn't have the name recognition to run. That was Phil Rock's problem also. To have any chance of winning the only two candidates that were feasible were Adlai Stevenson and myself.

Q: Did Simon ever indicate an interest?

A: No. At least so he told me.

Q: How did you find fundraising?

A: Difficult.

Q: As hard as ever?

A: Oh boy!

Q: Or worse?

A: Worse. Worse. Absolutely worse. No question about it, Marilyn. I think we raised something like $40,000.

Q: So initially you wanted to run to sort of settle this investigation once and for all, to get it . . .

A: That's a little too strong a statement. That was certainly a motivating factor.

Q: That was a part of it?

A: A motivating factor. Another motivating factor was just to see what would happen if I indicated serious interest in running, because I didn't have it out of my system.

Q: What about taking on Thompson? How did you feel about that?

A: Oh, I'd love it. I'd love it. He'd be tough to beat, but I think I could beat him.

Q: Do you think Adlai can beat him?

A: I hope he does, but it's going to be difficult.

Q: Basil Talbott said you were the one candidate that really got under Jim Thompson's skin and therefore probably you were the one that would give him the best run for his money.

A: Well, I'm prejudiced, but I think I could have. Take as an example that drinking episode where Thompson, in very poor form I thought, drank publicly with the students up at Northern Illinois University's football game. Governors just should not do that kind of thing. It's a line you don't cross if you're a governor. You can do it if you're a mayor, or a state senator, or lower office. But not the chief executive officer of the state, the chief law enforcement officer of the state, in a context where it's plainly illegal and where the students, if they were caught doing it by an authority of the university, it would be grounds for expulsion from the university. I criticized him for that and I received some interesting letters, by the way, from students up there who said, "Hurrah, we'd be kicked out of the university if we did that. And how come the governor can get away with it?" And I also received letters from parents applauding what I did.

That got to Thompson. It was very apparent. And he did it a second time. And I stuck it to him again. And he then went on the defensive about it. It made it very clear to me that he cannot take . . . he has great difficulty in taking personal criticism that aims directly at him as a human being, and he goes off balance. In a really tough campaign you can't afford the luxury of letting your opponent get to you.

Q: What about the press reaction to that incident and to Thompson's drinking at Northern Illinois? How did you feel about that?

A: I thought the press . . . I didn't think there was anything wrong with the way the press handled it. They took both sides. There was an editorial in the Tribune criticizing Thompson for doing what he did. And I understand that downstate there was some critical stuff. And then there was some poking of fun at me for doing that kind of thing. And I think that's probably a fair comment. I don't have any difficulty with that.

Q: When you ran the first time, you had some real basic goals in mind, strengthening the Democratic party downstate and reducing the size of the bureaucracy and making a stab at managing the state. What were your goals this time along those lines?

A: Politically, a perfect opportunity exists to reform the Democratic party in the state of Illinois right now in view of the fragmentation that's going on within the regular organization, the Byrne forces, the Daley forces, the Dunne forces, etc. It's an opportunity that has not been present in a long, long time. And a strong Democratic governor could really do something to open up the party. There is a better opportunity now to get some meaningful changes in the election laws, to move the primary election closer to the general election, to go for a total open primary system like the Wisconsin system, some deep reforms in our whole political process. We have a better chance of getting those through the legislature now than ever before. On the governmental side it's just a continuation of some of the things that I worked on before. Like the climate is good for even tougher ethics laws than we have right now. That's one example. There are others like that.

Q: You have been quoted as saying that Thompson takes an issue and pits one group against another rather than trying to get down and solve the problem. What's an example of that?

A: I don't remember saying that, Marilyn. In what context did I say it? Maybe that'll bring back what I had in mind.

Q: Well, let me see if I can find the column. It would have been a Sun-Times column. I'll find it. (tape turned off)

A: What I had in mind were the specific examples that I gave there. That is, on the economy he has developed that kind of a tactic of pitting the business leaders against the labor leaders. In the transportation area, there we definitely have the upstate/downstate thing. That's when Thompson obviously came to the conclusion that he was in trouble in the suburbs of Chicago with his transportation actions causing, particularly, the train fares to go up dramatically for everybody who lived in suburbia and so he weighed in to try to make up for that by talking this language about upstate against downstate.

And then the same criticism can be made in the area of education with respect to the tax problem where property taxes are involved in supporting education and also the state taxes are involved. His handling of the multiplier and the assessment issue has pitted the school boards against the educational people at the state level.

Q: And this is the kind of thing that you're talking about when you say there is no leadership?

A: No, not so much. Although that's a part of it. Leadership I refer--take the transportation area--to his failure to come up with a plan, a program, and present it to the legislature. He tossed out a couple of suggestions for financing public transportation and roads. And then when those were knocked out in the legislature, he just threw up his hands and said let the legislature deal with it. Well, he had the obligation as governor to come up with a plan.

When he talked about coupling a subsidy for the Chicago area with a road program downstate he didn't spell out a road program downstate. So the legislator in Peoria didn't know what Peoria was going to get, Mattoon didn't know what Mattoon was going to get, etc., and so he couldn't bring together the downstate support. If he'd had a detailed transportation plan early on in the session and said this is what we're going to do here, this is what we're going to do there, all over the state, I think he could have mustered the support to put it through. And there's absolutely no question about the fact that a state subsidy for public transportation in the Chicago metropolitan area is an absolute necessity for survival of the system.

Q: Who were some of the other people you consulted aside from Jane Byrne when you began to test the waters?

A: All over the state. I talked with people that worked with me before. I talked with media people, editors around the state. I talked with labor leaders and farm leaders around the state. I was very disappointed in the labor leadership not taking a stronger position because as among Thompson, Stevenson and myself, there's absolutely no question about who has the best record on labor legislation. And all the labor leaders would quickly concede that. That was not an issue. But they wouldn't

stand up for me as the candidate. They just wouldn't stand up. Downstate labor leaders did. They communicated with Jane Byrne and other people with the state central committee. But the state leadership of the UAW and the AFL-CIO, both while expressing their opposition to Adlai, would not stand up and support me.

Q: What about Mike Howlett, did you talk to him?

A: Yes. Mike was very supportive throughout, very supportive.

Q: He thought you should be the candidate?

A: Well, I think it would be unfair of me to quote Mike because he preferred not to say anything publicly, but I think I can very safely say that he was sympathetic to my candidacy.

Q: What about Alan Dixon?

A: I don't think Alan got involved at all one way or the other. I didn't ask him to and outside of a courtesy call telling him what I was doing we never discussed it.

Q: When you talked before about your deciding to run in 1972 you talked to Montgomery Ward to let them know what you were planning. What was the reaction of the Butler Company when you . . .

A: They thought it was just fine, they thought it was just fine. I told Frank Butler that if I was elected, I'd make him chief of protocol for all state visitors from abroad. He has spent a lot of time abroad and actually would have been very good at that.

Q: You must have talked to Adlai somewhere along the way in the middle of this to try to get a feel of where he was.

A: No.

Q: You didn't talk to him?

A: No. No. No, the last time I talked to Adlai was at the Lincoln Academy thing back in, was it May, June, big party down in Springfield when he as much as said from the platform that day that he was not going to run for governor. I'd chatted with him afterwards and privately about that, and he indicated very negative feelings about running for governor. Thompson, whom I talked to at the same party, said he was convinced Adlai was not going to run for governor. Interestingly, we were both wrong.

Q: August 28, after you had indicated that you were thinking about running, was the day that the indictments came down. Epstein [Elliot S.] who was your director of finance and Touhy [Robert K.] and was it Filan [John B.]. We all know that there are a lot of people indicted who are never convicted of anything. Indictments can be timed. Do you think that that timing was meant to embarrass you?

A: Yes, I really do. And I don't think I'm being paranoid. I know all those individuals involved very, very well. And I can assure you that if

you knew individuals that you knew real well and they got indicted like this, you would be totally shocked. I was totally shocked. These three men are not of a political type at all. They're just outstanding individuals and there's just no way those three men would have violated the law by shaking people down for campaign contributions. There's no way. I have total confidence that they are never going to be convicted of anything, and it just boggles my mind how the prosecutor could come to that conclusion. When I think of the number of crooks that there are walking around in the political/governmental field never being touched by the law, and three decent individuals like this had this happen to them, I have to wonder.

I'd like to go back a little bit if I may. I was just talking with my wife on the telephone, and it reminded me that I didn't mention that she went along with my getting involved again in running for governor because I said I wanted to. But she was very, very relieved when I said that I was not . . . when I withdrew and said I would not run.

Q: Well, I'm sure it's a tremendous family commitment.

A: It is, no question about it. And she's been burned here. Going back to what I said earlier about the publicity surrounding fundraising, I remember late last summer a headline appeared in the late editions of the Chicago Tribune saying, "Walker, Aides . . ." or "Grand Jury Investigates Walker, Aides." Clearly saying in so many words that I'm under investigation by the grand jury. Not true. We contacted the Tribune about that. They jerked the headline, but the problem with it was that the headline hit the commuters' edition that the commuters would buy on the way home.

Two weeks prior to that, for that whole two-week period, Roberta had been under consideration and actually was on the point of receiving an offer from a large bank in Chicago to be a vice-president at fifty thousand dollars a year to take over their personal banking department. That was on a Friday. The following Monday the executive that she had been interviewing called her and said, "We just can't handle that kind of publicity. You will not be receiving an offer."

Q: She was touched without your even . . .

A: Yes, that really hurt her. So she saw firsthand what can happen when you're in this limelight business that I was. And that caused her great concern about my running again. She said, "They're just going to start it all over again." And they did.

Q: The Epstein case--I don't want to belabor the point, but there was a new investigation of old stuff in 1977 and then just now August of 1981 this comes up. What was the gist of that? There was eighty thousand dollars in contributions that . . . what, supposedly were sold, supposedly to this Bahn [Allen K.] or whatever his name is?

A: As I understand it, and this is of course hearsay, the allegation is that Allen Bahn was solicited for campaign contributions with an understanding that he would get a state contract. And then after . . . he did get a state contract but the evidence, as I am told, shows clearly

that it was purely coincidental. That he was never offered any state contract, they had no testimony that he was offered a state contract in connection with a solicitation for a contribution, and that the entire government case rests on the coincidence of (a) a contribution, and (b) a contract. If that was enough evidence to convict somebody of corruption, 95 percent of the contractors in the state of Illinois who do business with the state would be in jail because most of them do contribute to both sides and obviously they have contracts. Just because a man gets a contract, it does not follow that he got it because of the contribution.

Q: The article, the newspaper account that I read said that he and his wife, Bahn and his wife, were the largest contributors to your campaign. Do you know if that was true or not?

A: I don't know. But I doubt it seriously. I'd be very surprised if that were true. I wasn't even aware, by the way, that Allen Bahn had a contract from the state.

Q: In September, about a month after the indictments, of the Epstein indictments, the attorney general announced that he was going to appeal the dismissal of the case against you and Vic de Grazia. The timing is very interesting.

A: I think so, too. Particularly since I saw him at a cocktail party about a month or so earlier and I said, "Why in the world are you going to appeal this case?" He said, "What case?" He didn't know anything about the case, never heard of it. Said he would look into it and contact me, but he never did.

Q: What happened, anything? Did he appeal it?

A: Yes, he appealed it. And it's pending on appeal. I just read the reply brief the other day.

Q: And that was supposedly de Grazia had . . .

A: Received an anonymous campaign contribution. And anonymous contributions are prohibited under the Illinois law.

Q: Why is that? You can't do anybody a favor if you don't know who he is. (laughter)

A: Well, that is the law or was the law. Although none of us thought that that law when just passed was applicable at that time. And there was a substantial legal argument about that. But the point, so far as I'm concerned, is that I was not involved at all in the fundraising, in the contributions, and it's only because I was the candidate that they're trying to make the law apply to me. Whereas, it's very clear that the law applies to the campaign committee, not to the candidate.

Q: What was Jack Touhy's reaction? Was his an important voice?

A: What, in government?

Q: To your running.

A: No.

Q: Did he support it?

A: No, I never talked to Touhy.

Q: Oh, you didn't talk to Touhy.

A: I think he's in Florida now. He's not living up here.

Q: He's not the state Democratic chairman?

A: Oh, I thought we were talking about the gentleman who got indicted, Bob Touhy.

Q: No, Jack.

A: Oh, Jack Touhy. Neutral. Neutral. Totally neutral.

Q: You said you talked to farm people around the state. Was anybody willing to actually come out and endorse you?

A: Oh, sure, there were some down in central Illinois and southern Illinois who did. And there were some county chairmen, a number of labor leaders, as I indicated early in the downstate area that supported me. But you understand I was not playing that numbers game like Adlai was. I wasn't running around trying to get people to sign up. I played it from the beginning as a public thing and aimed at the leaders of the regular organization because I felt that that's where the decision was going to be made. That the only way to run without a primary contest would be to get the regular organization support. And really everything we did was coordinated around persuading Jane Byrne. She had the sole decision. It was an audience of one, if you will.

Q: When you ran in 1972, you found a tremendous amount of discontent. People really unhappy with state government, not feeling that they were getting any help from state government. What was it like this time, given the economic situation with so many people out of work?

A: I didn't do enough one-on-one with people out there to be able to answer that question, Marilyn. I did some visits to other cities but I did very little street campaigning. And the only way you get answers to that kind of question is by getting out there and talking to whole lots of people. I didn't do that this time. Didn't have time to and besides it wasn't that kind of a campaign. Again it was a campaign with an audience of one.

Q: Talbott, Basil Talbott also said that . . . he described it as the fatalist theory, which was that he didn't think you could beat Thompson, but that you would keep him so busy that he wouldn't have time to support other Republicans on the ticket and the Democrats could win a lot of races.

A: That's one man's view. I think at the least I would have accomplished that. Of course, as you know and would expect, I think I could have beaten Thompson.

Q: Talbott's been around a long time and watched a lot of races. Why would he think that you couldn't beat him?

A: Well, I think legitimately, he thought in terms of money. He thought that Thompson would get a lot of editorial support, and he will. Talbott is more impressed with the pencil press than I am in terms of the weight of endorsement. He has the typical political writer's view of politics which quite often misses the dynamics of the campaign. Particularly when you have a nontraditional type of campaigner like I am. And I don't think he attached enough importance, although he referred to it, to my ability to keep Thompson off balance. I also felt, and disagreed with Basil on this, that a year of Reaganomics is going to have so much fallout that any Republican is going to be running into some trouble out there on the campaign trail.

Q: Dave Green has a history of having a good sense of what's going on out there and being able to test the waters pretty accurately. Was he pretty supportive all along?

A: Oh, yes.

Q: He felt that you should give it a try, you should run?

A: Yes.

Q: And Vic felt the same way?

A: Yes, absolutely. Absolutely.

Q: You withdrew before the slatemaking. A few days before the slating occurred. Why did you choose that time?

A: As soon as I found out that Jane was going to support Adlai, or more accurately was going to stay hands-off and not support me affirmatively, then I knew the game was over. There was just no point in staying in.

Q: And there just was no convincing her that . . .

A: No convincing her that there wasn't a serious risk of a Stevenson primary fight. She could not be convinced of that. She just would not run that risk. Can't argue with her really. She had as her number one priority her reelection, not the election of the governor.

Q: You said that if you were slated, you would not pick your running mate?

A: That's right.

Q: You had done that in 1972 and felt now that was not your right.

A: Yes, I think that's about the right way to put it, Marilyn. If I am going to go the State Central Committee route then it seems to me I can't say, "Well, I want the State Central Committee to pick me, but I don't want the State Central Committee to have any say with respect to the other people." I don't think that's consistent. Before, when I ran, I did not go with the State Central Committee and so there was no reason for me to do anything other than to put together my own ticket.

Q: Did it feel odd to you working within the regular Democratic system?

A: Sure it did. I hadn't done that before. Really, here I am calling up ward committeemen and all that kind of thing which I'd never done before in a primary, I mean in a nongeneral election context. Yes, it did feel unusual.

Q: Were they receptive?

A: Oh, they were very friendly. Not everybody. But I think people who are in ranks of politics in that way tend to be very realistic. Yesterday's yesterday. Today's today. It's a different ball game. Let's forget about what happened in the past. I didn't run into hardly any opposition although I'm told--and I'm sure there are--there are some ward committeemen out there that still dislike me very intensely and did not want me to get the nomination this time.

Q: Did you raise enough money to cover your expenses for what you did do?

A: No.

Q: You didn't.

A: Got a deficit.

Q: How are you going to make that up?

A: I don't know. (laughs) I wish I knew the answer. I don't know why I'm laughing. Boy. I don't know what I'm going to do.

Q: That's just one more deficit. It isn't as if you hadn't faced it before.

A: That's true. But it will have to be compromised and paid out of my own pocket somehow. If I can't get somebody to help. And I don't know whom I can get to help. Defeated candidates or not-selected candidates, however you want to put it, are not very viable fundraisers. I don't think Adlai's going to help me.

Q: No, I doubt it, not right now. How do you feel about this recent run for the governorship?

A: Oh, I feel . . . I'm not at all upset. I'm totally realistic about it. It would have been great fun, and if I'd gotten the nomination I would have given it my all. But you pay one devil of a price in campaigning and so forth. And it's very easy to go home at 5:00, 5:30

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