As
with many facets of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the extent of the
country's military space program remains unclear. Seeming insight into its space
program was first offered on August 31, 1998, upon the DPRK announcement that it
had successfully used a version of its Taepodong-1 ballistic missile to insert
into orbit the "Kwangmyongsong No. 1," a rudimentary satellite designed to
broadcast revolutionary anthems.[1] However, the missile carrying the satellite
apparently suffered a technical problem in its third stage, failing to insert
the satellite into orbit.[2] Given this failure and that the satellite itself
had no foreseeable application for military use, the 1998 launch revealed little
about North Korea's military space capabilities or plans for developing such
capabilities in the future.
Although North Korean intentions remain opaque, the DPRK space program appears
to be a response to the developing space program in South Korea. Initiated in
1989, the South Korean space program has already succeeded in constructing
several satellites and intends to demonstrate an independent satellite launch
capability by 2007.[3] Despite the fact that all but the most recent of South
Korea's satellites have been ostensibly civilian in nature, North Korean
officials have been openly critical of their dual-use potential. South Korea's
launch of the photoreconnaissance satellite Arirang-2 in the summer of
2006, for example, was decried as a "grave provocative act," which North Korea
alleged was "aimed at spying on the north."[4] While it may very well someday
seek a rudimentary reconnaissance satellite of its own, available evidence
suggests that the DPRK space program today is more prestige-oriented, seeking,
as under the evident motivations for Kim Il-song's decision to initiate the
program in 1994, to gain some of the international esteem that Seoul had
achieved following the launch of South Korea's second successful satellite in
September 1993.[5]
Irrespective of the benign nature of its cargo, the Taepodong-1 missile that was
used for the unsuccessful 1998 satellite launch attempt has become a focal point
of international concern. Although the missile undoubtedly has military
applications, the extent of this utility, as well as the reliability of the
missile, remain debatable. Some analysts, including parts of the U.S.
intelligence community,
have conjectured that advanced versions of the Taepodong may be able to deliver
a nuclear payload to the continental United States in the foreseeable future,
while others have argued that the North Korean missile threat has been greatly
exaggerated.[6,7] While, again, the lack of transparency makes such calculations
especially difficult, the failed July 2006 Taepodong-2 test flight would appear
to suggest that the Taepodong missile program is still a long-term concern.
The
Clinton administration adopted some active proposals in an attempt to mitigate
the motivations driving the Taepodong program. Since the DPRK space program has
been viewed as a cover for a clandestine ICBM program, an effort was made to
co-opt North Korea's need for a long-range, multi-stage rocket by providing
North Korea access to foreign space launches. In 2000, preliminary negotiations
between the United States and North Korea produced a proposal in which the
United States would launch North Korean satellites in exchange for a freeze on
DPRK missile programs.[8] Although there remained unresolved issues regarding
compensation and verification, the proposal was effectively terminated in 2001
by the incoming Bush administration, which cited irreconcilable differences on
verification.[9] However, in light of North Korean missile tests in the summer
of 2006, some have proposed that this deal should be revisited as a possible
solution to halting DPRK missile and possible space military efforts.[10]
[1] "North Korea Space Guide," Federation of American Scientists website, September 8, 1998, http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/dprk/index.html.
[2] Joseph S. Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occaisonal Paper, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, p.29, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf.
[3] Daniel A. Pinkston, "North and South Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and Conflict," Astropolitics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Summer 2006), p. 213.
[4] KCNA News, "S. Korea's Launch of Spy Satellite under Fire," Korean News Service website, August 2, 2006, http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
[5] Joseph S. Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occaisonal Paper, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, p.29, at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf.
[6] For an example of U.S. intelligence estimates, see "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015," National Intelligence Council, December 2001, http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm.
[7] For example, see Joseph Cirincione's "The Exaggerated Ballistic Missile Threat;" presented in the "Forum on the Missile Threat and Plans for Ballistic Missiles Defense: Technology, Strategic Stability and Impact on Global Security," January 18, 2001, http://www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/NMD/cirincione.pdf.
[8] Gary Samore, "U.S.-DPRK Missile Negotiations," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92samore.htm.
[9] Alex Wagner, "Bush Puts N. Korea Negotiations on Hold, Stresses Verification," Arms Control Today, Vol. 31, No. 3 (April 2001), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_04/korea.asp.
[10] For example, see John Feffer, "Negotiating Space with North Korea," Boston Globe, July 7, 2006, http://www.fpif.org/fpifoped/3351.
{Updated 12/3/2006}
[Top]
