Analysis
India and the upcoming
Druk democracy
After revising its longstanding ‘friendship’
treaty with India, Bhutan is now ready to wield its own agency.
How will it use it, and what will New Delhi think?
By I
Wasbir Hussain
BILASH RAI |
On 7 February this year, Bhutan’s
new king, Oxford-educated Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck,
began a six-day visit to India, marking his debut on the world
stage two months after his earlier-than-expected ascension
to the country’s throne. The following day, the 27-year-old
king signed a revised bilateral treaty with India that gave
Bhutan significantly greater freedoms in pursuing its foreign
and defence policies, areas tightly controlled by New Delhi
for nearly six decades in accordance with the 1949 India-Bhutan
Friendship Treaty. Not only has the signing signalled the
arrival of Bhutan’s upcoming democracy, with the stage
now set for a realignment of relations with its ‘closest
friend’, India; it has also opened possibilities of
significant, if not drastic, changes in Thimphu’s multilateral
diplomacy in the neighbourhood.
Tentative redefining of the
bilateral relationship began almost immediately. Following
the signing of the new treaty with Indian Foreign Minister
Pranab Mukherjee, King Namgyel Wangchuck stated: “From
a guiding role upon Bhutan’s first step to modernisation,
we now stand as close friends and equal partners in the global
arena.” From such a sentiment, it seems clear that Thimphu
is hoping now to deal with India on a level footing, rather
than to continue to look up to it as a ‘guide’.
But even as the two countries talk about a further consolidation
of their friendship, given Thimphu’s newfound autonomy
in foreign policy and military purchases, observers will have
to wait to see the full impact of the agreement.
The India-Bhutan Friendship
Treaty was signed in Darjeeling on 8 August 1949. One of its
most central tenants, Article 2, defined the following circuitous
relationship: “The Government of India undertakes to
exercise no interference in the internal administration of
Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be
guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard
to its external relations.” While over the decades the
hold of this clause was progressively weakened as Bhutan stepped
up its international diplomacy, it has nevertheless been a
canker and a source of discomfort for Thimphu’s nationalists.
This year’s revised
agreement has already come into force, with New Delhi and
Thimphu exchanging the treaty’s so-called Instruments
of Ratification in the Bhutani capital on 3 March. Apart from
the change in its relationship with India, the new treaty
will also mean significantly different – and potentially,
more vibrant – relationships between Bhutan and its
other neighbours, particularly China, Bangladesh and Nepal.
All of these will also have a natural bearing on India’s
security and diplomacy concerns – which is all the more
reason why New Delhi will no longer be able to take its small
northern neighbour for granted.
India’s hesitant
loosening
All of this is taking place against Bhutan’s transformation
from a monarchy to a parliamentary democracy – the country’s
first national elections, for instance, are slated for 2008.
The impact of the combined dynamic of these fast-paced changes
– on both the foreign-policy and electoral fronts –
will be widespread, for both Bhutan and India. When Bhutan
finally becomes a parliamentary democracy, the country is
bound to witness a power play, in which even external forces
could try to influence political parties or electoral behaviour.
Furthermore, when Thimphu eventually attempts to pursue its
own fully autonomous foreign policy, its actions could quickly
raise challenges for New Delhi. In agreeing on the transformation
of their relationship, New Delhi clearly seems confident that
its geostrategic interests will not be tampered with by Bhutani
authorities, including those of a democratic dispensation.
After the new treaty was signed,
an Indian External Affairs Ministry spokesman said that it
removed provisions that had become “obsolete”.
“The treaty commits both countries to cooperate closely
with each other on issues relating to their national interests,
and not allow the use of territories for activities harmful
to the national-security interest of the other,” he
said. New Delhi clearly hopes that Thimphu would not ignore
any future foray by Indian militants into Bhutan. Separatist
groups from the Indian Northeast had operated from well-entrenched
bases in southern Bhutan for more than 12 years before they
were expelled in December 2003 by Thimphu’s military,
with active support from Indian forces across the border.
Irrespective of the changes
taking place – or perhaps because of them – Indian
aid to Bhutan appears set to continue as before. On 29 March
this year, New Delhi announced assistance to Bhutan worth
INR 26.1 billion. An official statement following the cabinet’s
passage of the aid made clear the quid-pro-quo India expected
from the deal in letting Bhutan off earlier restrictions:
This decision will result
in continued strengthening of India-Bhutan relations based
on our strategic and economic interests in an area of high
geo-political sensitivity. We will support the new King
of Bhutan, and Bhutan’s transition to a constitutional
democracy. It will also generate the opportunities of Indian
companies to participate in major projects, and strengthen
goodwill for India in Bhutan by fulfilling our existing
commitments.
With New Delhi having agreed
to help Bhutan hold its upcoming elections, there has been
a formal tie-up between the Indian Election Commission and
the nascent Election Commission of Bhutan. An estimated 400,000
electors are to choose their representatives from 47 parliamentary
constituencies, which have been defined after the recent completion
of a delimitation process. While India is in the process of
exporting its ideology – that of democracy – to
Bhutan, it remains to be seen whether the darker add-ons to
electoral politics, such as money and muscle power, also take
hold in Druk Yul. With Bhutan’s first two (marginally)
private newspapers having come up following the July 2006
passage of the Information, Communications and Media Act,
a heady cocktail of media, politics and governance seems to
be in the offing in heretofore-staid Thimphu.
Some sections in Bhutan seem
wary of the perils of the country’s fast-paced transition.
An editorial in the government-run Kuensel recently noted:
It would be unrealistic to
believe that we will maintain a harmony of views throughout
the process [of democratisation] and avoid conflict. We
already know that there will be differences in political
views among the potential leadership and among voters. The
challenge is to accept those differences as a necessary
and useful element of democracy … We understand today
that democracy is not just elections but an entire system
of values that places the responsibility of governance on
the people. Our goal is not to introduce the structure of
democracy but to establish a democratic government that
will function well. Introducing democracy is the first step.
The real goal is to make it work.
If democracy fails to ‘work’
in Bhutan, the greatest ramification would of course be for
Bhutan’s expectant citizenry, long deprived of any say
in their governance. At the same time, India would have to
confront an unpredictable democracy, whereas earlier it only
had to talk to the king.
Bhutani Maoists
As the 2008 elections in Bhutan draw near, the most important
thing to watch from New Delhi’s point of view will be
the political forces that come into play. For obvious reasons,
New Delhi policymakers would like a politically stable Bhutan.
The Indian and Bhutani security establishments were stung
when they learned about the launch of the Bhutan Communist
Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) (BCP) in April 2003. At that
time, the BCP circulated pamphlets in Bhutan as well as in
the Lhotshampa refugee camps in southeast Nepal that spelled
out the new party’s objective as hoping to “smash
the [Bhutani] monarchy” and establish a “true
and new democracy” in the country.
The creation of the BCP also
brought focused interest from both New Delhi and Thimphu onto
the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), one of three
Indian militant outfits that were said to be operating from
within Bhutan for a while. Formed in December 1995 by some
radical members of the Koch-Rajbongshi tribe (from which is
derived the name for Cooch-Behar District), the KLO has been
fighting to carve out a separate Kamatapur state from parts
of Assam and West Bengal. Authorities quickly concluded that
the pro-Maoist KLO was active and had pockets of influence
in the strategic northern part of West Bengal; they also worried
that the KLO could eventually act as a bridge between Maoist
guerrillas in Nepal and the newly emerging Maoist force in
Bhutan.
The emerging militant threat
to Bhutan may ultimately have been the key factor that drove
then-King Jigme Singye Wangchuck into action during the winter
of 2003, to engage in the coordinated military mission with
India. Against this backdrop, it will be interesting to watch
whether a Maoist-backed or Maoist-linked political party emerges
in Bhutan, and whether any such group eventually takes part
in the country’s 2008 electoral exercise. As such, observers
have again started placing particular focus on the Bhutan
Communist Party. Whether the BCP has any level of actual strength
is not known; Bhutani authorities, however, have stated that
the party has formed an armed wing, called the Bhutan Tiger
Force. This outfit has been accused of planting a bomb near
the Bhutani trade hub of Phuentsholing this past March. As
of now, it is unlikely that the BCP will contest in the 2008
elections, but it could back a new, yet-to-emerge force. If
former king Jigme had been worried about the extended influence
of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) on Bhutani affairs,
he might be sleeping a little easier now that the Nepali rebels
are well on their way to becoming part of the ‘establishment’
in Kathmandu and are seemingly quite ‘sensitive’
to New Delhi’s views on geopolitical matters.
Sino-Bhutani tranquillity
Given Bhutan’s ostensible new foreign-policy freedom,
it will be particularly interesting to watch the course of
Sino-Bhutani relations in the days to come. Though the two
countries share a 470 km border, Thimphu currently does not
have diplomatic ties with Beijing. Although Bhutan never had
a policy of ‘equi-closeness’ or ‘equi-distance’
vis-à-vis China, in recent years there have been high-level
visits in both directions. This is due largely to direct border
talks, which from 1984 onwards tried to resolve various boundary
disputes.
It was in 1954, after the communist
revolution and subsequent integration of Tibet, that China
first laid claim over Bhutan. Four years later, Chinese troops
moved to occupy about 300 square miles of Bhutani territory
in the country’s north and northeast. In 1960, Chinese
claims on Bhutan resurfaced after Beijing openly declared
that, “Bhutanese, Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united
family in Tibet. They have always been subject to Tibet and
to the great motherland of China. They must once again be
united and taught the communist doctrine.”
Until the 1970s, Bhutan’s
border issues with China were incorporated under the rubric
of the Sino-Indian border dialogue. With the coming of the
Janata Party government in New Delhi in 1977, relations between
India and China showed some signs of improvement. In 1981,
a process was started to initiate direct dialogue with China,
and the Boundary Commission of Bhutan was established. Preliminary
border talks began in 1981, facilitated by the United Nations
and Indian diplomats. It was not until 1984, however, that
the first formal meeting between Chinese and Bhutani officials
took place.
Signs of Thimphu and Beijing
embarking on a road to friendship started appearing in 1990.
In addition to Bhutani delegations traveling to various international
events in China, since 1995 Bhutan has also shown a degree
of international support for China. For instance, Thimphu
representatives have helped to defeat various drafts perceived
to be anti-China sponsored by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR); they also voted against the draft for
Taiwan’s participation at the UN, and rejected Taiwan’s
bid to host the 2002 Asian Games. Since 1994, the Chinese
ambassador in India has regularly visited Bhutan, while Bhutan’s
ambassador to India visited Beijing in 2000. Both China and
Bhutan have now been talking of a territory exchange for some
time, and the chances of this happening have risen significantly
with the signing of the new Indo-Bhutani treaty.
In December 1998, the so-called
Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity in Bhutan-China
Border Areas was signed – the first ever inter-governmental
agreement between the two countries. In it, Beijing reaffirmed
that it “completely respects the independence, sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Bhutan”. That undoubtedly
offered some solace to Bhutan; the situation for New Delhi,
however, is less rosy. With China’s ongoing bid to establish
handholds throughout Southasia, Indian policymakers will surely
keep a close watch on Beijing-Thimphu relations in the days
ahead.
Just as interesting will be
the evolving relationship between Bhutan and Nepal, particularly
because bilateral relations between the two neighbours, whom
many consider ‘natural allies’, have been affected
by the issue of the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampa refugees, who
have been living in UNHCR-aided camps in southeastern Nepal
for the past 16 years. The Lhotshampa departure began in the
late 1980s as a result of the Thimphu government’s attempt
to impose Drukpa culture onto all the country’s ethnic
groups.
By mid-1990, Lhotshampa in
exile had formed the Bhutan People’s Party (BPP), which
demanded civil rights and drastic changes to the political
system. Thimphu dubbed the Lhotshampa as ‘anti-nationals’
and cracked down harshly, subsequently setting off a mass
exodus from Bhutan into Nepal. Today, there are roughly 106,000
Bhutani refugees living in seven camps in Nepal’s Jhapa
and Morang districts. Ironically, the democratic transition
demanded by the Lhotshampa activists is in the process of
being put in place in their absence.
Although the refugee issue
has shown possibility of resolution recently – with
the Kathmandu government for the first time allowing for the
possibility of third-country resettlement in response to the
United States’ offer to ‘take in’ 60,000
refugees – Kathmandu-Thimphu relations remain extremely
chilly. Last December, bilateral discussions between the two
capitals on the refugee issue – in their 16th round
– again broke down. Whether Nepal-based Lhotshampa political
forces with linkages into Bhutan can become a factor in the
country’s elections next year remains to be seen. It
will be important to watch, however, how Thimphu proceeds
in dealing with the problem with its newfound foreign-policy
freedom.
While India-Bhutan relations
remain firm for the time being, they will no longer have the
concrete assuredness on which Indian diplomats and policymakers
have for so long been able to count. New Delhi will now need
to keep in view external factors and influences that could
strain future ties. India’s security concerns aside,
however, on paper Bhutan has now been cut loose from India’s
influence if not munificence – largesse that always
came with strings attached. How both sides react to the new
situation in the coming years will go far in defining a whole
new dynamic in this land-locked corner of Southasia. |