



Off to a Chilly Start: two views on TranSantiago, Chile

A consultant's perspective

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
Transforming Transportation, January 2008

Public Transport in Santiago in 2005:

- Almost 6 million people, low car availability (~85% of users without a car).
- Most PT trips are radial: outskirts of Santiago to activity centre(s)
- Demand for PT is “peaky”
- Some 8,000 buses and a similar number of less formal shared taxis, etc
- Most PT services are end to end with very long routes
- High frequency, poor quality buses, aggressive driving to gain passengers that provide most of the income for drivers
- AM peak hr:
 - 500.000 bus trips, with 30,000 are bus-bus and 25,000 bus-metro
 - and shared taxis 40,000 trips of which 16,000 feed Metro
- Flat fare of US\$ 0.50 , no subsidies

Santiago Metro: 85 kms and 5 Lines

- Moved 1.3 million passengers per day in 2006



TranSantiago

- A multi-modal Transport Plan
- Part of this plan is the introduction of a new Public Transport system, also called TranSantiago
- Inspired in Transmilenio and Curitiba, based on a trunk-feeder system; it also uses Metro as a strong structuring element
- Designed by Chilean specialists and consultants
- Implemented in 2006-2007, in full from February 2007

Reality has been a disappointment during 2007: Extreme crowding, especially in the Metro, frustration, low quality of service and a high political cost



Buses



Metro, carries over 2 million passengers per day

Demonstrations, Official Inquests



What went wrong?

Market and Attitudinal Research on Public Transport services, pre 2005

Public Transport Users

■ Stated that main problems were:

- Informality
- Rude drivers
- Accident risk
- Uncomfortable and poorly maintained buses
- Dangerous driving to capture passengers at stops

■ Did not perceive as a problem:

- Travel times
- Wide coverage, end to end services
- High frequency
- Seat availability

Car users

■ Stated that main problems were :

- Too many buses on the streets
- Empty buses during off-peak
- Dangerous driving
- Accident risk
- Poorly maintained and polluting buses
- Informality

■ Did not perceive as a problem:

- Low cost, no subsidy
- Wide coverage
- Travel times

Design objectives for Transantiago

I Design a system that:


- Offers new buses, professional operators and new labour contracts with drivers
- Minimises operating costs without subsidies
- Satisfy known demand
- Implicitly: without major investment in infrastructure

I This led to a system that:


- Has trunk-feeder structure and feeds metro too
- Adjust supply very closely to known demand
- Uses short running to match supply better to “known demand”
- Low floor buses and high load factors
- Integrated fare using smartcard “Multivía”
- Reduces frequencies
- Requires transfers
- Increases, or at most retain, travel times

Three groups of concessions + Metro + Infraestructura?


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Trunk routes




Business model



No government subsidies
No major infrastructure improvements
Use of modern technology (GPS, SmartCards)


Implementation

- Concession awarded in 2006, partial implementation and then...
- in February 2007 the system is implemented in a “one-day big bang”
- Severe teething problems
 - SmartCard does not work well
 - Information system is poor and incomplete
 - Chaos, frustration, incidents
 - Metro is very overloaded
 - Severe political backlash: President loses 20 percentage points in approval rate



User benefits?

Fewer buses but more cars



Critical problems

- **Service coverage and comfort:** despite the new buses, these are overloaded, offer fewer seats, sometimes passengers cannot board them and this increases delay: fragility of the new system
- **Walking and Travel times:** these have increased although a few people with trips along a trunk route now have somewhat faster services
- **Transfers:** more transfers than before thus increasing travel time and uncertainty
- **“One-Day Big Bang”**, a very risky strategy that nobody has got right yet
- **SmartCard:** initially a significant problem; seems to work OK now

Lessons from TranSantiago

A personal perspective

Lessons

- Transantiago was not a good idea poorly implemented. It is a poor idea badly implemented.
- High performance bus systems
- Implementation
- Political processes
- Technological progress and consultancy markets

1. BRT design

- High performance is not the same as trunk-feeder services
- Trunk-feeder structure will only improve services if the infrastructure and operation design permit significant saving on the trunk section to compensate for transfers
- Add low costs via tailoring service closely to “known” demand and this creates a major problem
- If major protected bus infrastructure is not possible it is better to think about open rather than closed systems
- There are many ways to design high performance bus systems; Latin America provides most of the expertise required.

The route and service design model

- Based on the strategic network model, ESTRAUS, without enough detail for route design and model user requirements
- A clever and advanced optimisation mechanism
- Where operating costs overwhelm user costs
- Ignores practical issues, believes in the “modelled demand”
- Moreover, the model was poorly used to design the concessions.
- More detailed models, supported by surveys and street-smart experience should be used; leave optimisation routines for academic papers
- **Public Transport systems are much more vulnerable to errors and overloads than road traffic; they require redundancy (should not be designed by those who never use them regularly)**

2. Implementation

- NEVER TRY TO IMPLEMENT A RADICAL NEW ROUTE SYSTEM IN ONE DAY
- There is a lot to be learnt from pilot studies and gradual change
- Users need time to adapt to new systems, but they need to go to work every day
- Implementation must be thought from the user point of view, not the convenience of a clever concession system
- The resources required for good implementation are easily underestimated at a significant political cost

3. Political processes

- There is a significant political risk in introducing a major new Public Transport scheme. Presidente Bachelet has paid a significant price for this.
- It is unwise to label as “enemy” whoever expresses a dissenting view.
- Clever advisors are not enough; experience is necessary; if they are not available locally, import them from elsewhere.
- The importance and dangers of an attractive narrative
 - The use and abuse of “spin”
 - Consultants can be tempted to use a similar narrative without due analysis and experience
 - But this is not enough to solve transport problems

4. Technological progress and consulting skills

- The international reputation of Chilean Transport academics was very high; this led to a consulting style that valued analytical brilliancy over experience and pilot studies.
- Consulting based on “Technical Studies” and arms-length advice is insufficient to deal with real problems.
- A “solution oriented consultancy” is needed, capable of critical and creative thinking; developing this type of consulting in a young country takes time and an open market.
- **There is no free lunch**, clever technology is no substitute for sound investment in BRT infrastructure.

Conclusions

- I hope that TranSantiago will eventually get better, but at a very significant monetary, social, political and policy cost .
- These costs were avoidable; TranSantiago was an unnecessary self-inflicted injury.
- Be careful what you ask in a market survey; it may just confirm your prejudices.
- A trunk-feeder service may only improve services if there is sufficient investment in the trunk infrastructure and good operational design.
- Avoid models without experience.
- Public Transport require more redundancy than traffic systems.
- Transparency is valuable; ignore constructive criticism at your peril.

Many thanks

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