In July 2007, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or “Lula”) announced that his government would significantly boost the Navy’s funding to allow it to pursue its uranium enrichment program and complete a small prototype reactor, suitable for submarine propulsion.  (See “Brazil Embraces Nuclear Energy with Decisions to Complete Nuclear Power Plant, Expand Uranium Enrichment, Fund Navy Nuclear R&D Activities,” WMD Insights, September 2007.) At the time, Lula acknowledged that Brazil sought a nuclear submarine to prove its technological prowess and to raise its status on the international stage. In September, Lula announced an initiative to design a new national defense strategy to make Brazil a major military power, and again he expressed the hope that Brazil would build a nuclear-powered submarine. 
The ensuing debates about the readiness and roles of the various branches of the services in protecting Brazil’s vast resources, in particular the Amazon region and huge new Tupi off-shore oil deposit, have raised the possibility of a new arms race in South America and highlighted the significance of nuclear technology – whether for a submarine reactor, uranium enrichment, or nuclear weapons – to the country’s perception of its security and stature in international forums. (For a discussion of the possibility of a Brazilian arms race with Venezuela, see the text box below.) Meanwhile, the Brazilian defense minister has been pursuing a deal with France and Russia that would provide Brazil with a conventional submarine to upgrade its ailing fleet and the transfer of nuclear submarine technology. Most recently, some media outlets have reported that Brazil has held discussions with Argentina about a joint nuclear submarine project.The Brazilian government’s renewed support for the Navy demonstrates the importance that Lula’s administration places on both civilian and military uses of nuclear technology, and the military’s central role in nuclear decision making.
A New National Defense Strategy
On September 6, 2007, Lula signed an executive decree mandating the creation of a group of Cabinet ministers who would have one year to decide how to resume the technological development of the three branches of the armed forces and to devise a security and national defense strategy for the next 10-15 years.  In announcing his plan to Army, Navy, and Air Force officials, Lula asserted that the plan needed to link the development of the armed forces to the country’s economic and technological development. He cited uranium enrichment, the legacy of the Navy’s nuclear weapons program under the country’s former military regime, as an example of technology developed by the military and now used by civilian industry. He went on to express the hope that Brazil would one day build a nuclear- powered submarine.  To support Brazil’s military resurgence, the government increased the defense budget by 50 percent from approximately $3 billion in 2007 to approximately $4.6 billion in 2008. 
|An Arms Race with Venezuela?
While Lula denies that his defense strategy is related to events in Venezuela, his announcement follows Venezuela’s 2006 shopping spree for military equipment, including Russian diesel submarines.  Regional analysts and media have speculated that despite official denials, Brazil’s quest for a new national security strategy has been spurred on by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s military build-up and his bid to be taken seriously as a regional leader.  Some analysts argue, however, that although they believe that Brazil and other South American countries have increased defense spending in response to Chavez’s military purchases, they do not think that Venezuela intends to attack its neighbors or that it has the capability to do so.  A former senior advisor to President Chavez, General Alberto Mueller Rojas, confirmed this view when he told Folha de Sao Paulo that the idea that Brazil and Venezuela are in an arms race is ridiculous. According to the general, Venezuela’s increase in military spending has more to do with U.S. sanctions than any hostility to neighboring countries.  Brazilian Defense Minister Jobim has categorically denied that Brazil would start an arms race with Venezuela, and he has emphasized diplomacy instead.  Nonetheless, many of the reports on Brazil’s efforts to revise its defense strategy and revitalize its armed forces make direct or veiled references to Venezuela as a possible rival for regional leadership and a potential security threat.
SOURCES AND NOTES
 Vladimir Voronin, “Venezuela’s Weapons Acquisition from Russia Analyzed,” Novoye Vremya, July 2, 2007, OSC document CEP20070709358002. See also, Daniel Rittner, “Analyst Notes Brazil May Lose Regional Military Leadership,” Valor, March 23, 2007, OSC document LAP20070323055002. The Russian press has reported that the Venezuelan Navy would probably sign a $1.4 billion deal in April 2008 for three Russian Kilo-Class Project 636 submarines designed for anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface-ship warfare as well as general patrol missions. See,“Russia, Venezuela May Sign $1.4 bln Contract for Three Subs In April,” RIA Novosti, February 5, 2008.
 Ignacio J. Osacar, “Argentina: Brazil to Develop Defense to Become World Power,” Nueva Mayoria, September 10, 2007, OSC document LAP20070912021003; “Security Update: Lula Calls for a Major Review of Defense Strategies,” Latinnews Daily, September 26, 2007.
 Andrew Downie, “Is Latin America Heading for an Arms Race?” Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0116/p07s01-woam.html.
 “Venezuela and Brazil Not in An Arms Race: General,” Defense News/AFP, November 5, 2007 [http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3162096&C=America].
 “Brazil Denies ‘Arms Race’ with Venezuela,” Xinhua, October 31, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/01/content_6988196.htm. [View Article]
Defense Minister Nelson Jobim formally chairs the cabinet-level national defense strategy commission and the Minister for Long-Term Planning Roberto Mangabeira Unger coordinates the group’s work. In a November 9 interview with Dinheiro Vivo Agency, Jobim stated that he and Mangabeira had already spoken with representatives from the Navy, Army, and Air Force and had recommended to the president that the government create a Committee for Formulation of a National Strategic Plan for Defense to be comprised of commanders from each branch of the service, advised by their General Staffs, and the Ministers of Finance, Planning, and Science and Technology.  Jobim noted that the goals for the Committee would be to determine how the armed forces can collaborate to defend Brazil’s territory, while developing the necessary technology in Brazil and thus boosting the civilian economy and military exports.  Jobim emphasized that “in the very decree that established the group, it says that this National Defense Plan has to be connected with the Plan for Development of the Country.” In discussing how investment in the military sector could lead to the development of technology for export, Jobim echoing Lula’s September speech, pointed to the uranium enrichment program at the Navy’s Aramar Center, where according to Jobim “little is lacking for total domestic production.” 
A Nuclear “Padlock”?
One of Defense Minister Jobim’s key advisers on the national defense policy is General José Benedito de Barros Moreira. A senior four-star Army officer and former commander of the Brazilian War College, Moreira also heads the Political, Strategic, and International Relations Secretariat at the Defense Ministry. (In March 2008, Moreira will become the military adviser to the Brazilian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.)  In an October 13, 2007 interview, Moreira argued that a nuclear submarine was essential to protect Brazil’s vast natural resources — and those yet to be discovered. He asserted that Brazil, with its biofuels and off-shore oil fields, must invest in defense as it was becoming a mid-level power: “We have to choose the padlock that befits the riches in the safe.”  A month later, on November 13, during the television program, “Expressão Nacional,” Moreira reiterated his theme that Brazil needs a strong “padlock” because its natural riches make it a target, and astonished the other program participants — two congressmen and a university professor — by asserting that Brazil should develop the technology necessary for an atom bomb.  As quoted in a November 16 O Estado de Sao Paulo article, Moreira stated: “We must have in Brazil the future possibility, if the State agrees, of developing a nuclear device. We cannot be oblivious to the world’s reality.” 
Moreira acknowledged that atomic bomb technology would breach Brazil’s obligations as a non-nuclear weapon state member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); however, he asserted that a country would be entitled to ignore the treaty when a neighboring country builds an atomic bomb or “when the State feels threatened.” While Moreira admitted that he sees the world as an increasingly violent and dangerous, with troubling signs of conflict among Brazil’s neighbors, he did not advocate Brazil’s immediately building a weapon: “I am not arguing that we should develop a nuclear device. No nation can feel safe if it does not develop the technology enabling it to defend itself when necessary.”  Congressman Raul Jungmann (Popular Socialist Party, Pernambuco) indicated that while he understood the “realism” of Moreira’s statement, he condemned the possible violation of the NPT. Another program panelist, Congressman Jose Genoino (Worker’s Party, Sao Paulo) objected to Moreira’s veiled reference to Venezuela as a potential military target and noted that development of a nuclear device is distinct from the development of a nuclear-powered submarine, which Moreira also supports.
Although there did not appear to be any direct official response to Moreira’s comments, the troubling question of developing nuclear weapons began to shadow questions related to building a nuclear-powered submarine and the Navy’s uranium enrichment activities. On November 15, during the opening of an international security conference in Rio de Janeiro, Defense Minister Jobim once again argued that Brazil needed a nuclear submarine to protect the recently discovered Tupi oil field, located in the Santos Basin off the coast of Rio de Janeiro, that will increase Brazil’s reserves by more than 50 percent. He was quick to add, however, that Brazil needed to have the ability to complete the uranium enrichment cycle for production of propulsion systems, and “not for the war area, atomic bombs. Those things are nonsense.”  Similarly, in December 2007, when Eletronuclear Director Vice Admiral Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva was asked by a Jornal do Brasil reporter whether he was in favor of building an atomic bomb, he responded, “We do not have rivalry problems with other countries. That would add nothing and could even cause the political unbalancing of the region. Our uranium is only for generating [electric] energy.” 
At least one Brazilian newspaper commentator saw sinister motives in comments by a “high-ranking Army representative” who “spoke of the need for Brazil to command the entire nuclear energy cycle, which includes, more than just the submarine, nuclear explosive devices.”  This same commentator also noted that during the November Fourth Copacabana Fort International Security Conference, Defense Minister Jobim said that Brazil is reluctant to sign an International Atomic Energy Agency additional protocol, which would allow more rigorous inspections of its nuclear facilities. The author saw this as another hint that the Brazilian government might have plans for developing nuclear weapons technology. Also in November, without mentioning Moreira’s remarks, a Folha de Sao Paulo columnist predicted that the “taboo” issue of nuclear weapons would be discussed during the new defense strategy debates. He added, “The worst thing that could happen here is to have a nuclear arms race; with Chavez sharing not exactly peaceful knowledge with the Iranians and encouraging Brazil to do something more with its nuclear program — which is militarized, by the way.” 
A Nuclear Submarine: The Improbable Dream?
For several decades, Brazil has pursued the dream of a nuclear submarine primarily as a means of signifying its status in the region and in international forums.  The recent defense budget increase and defense strategy commission seem to favor the Navy’s role and to make the development or acquisition of a nuclear submarine more probable. But as Brazil’s defense minister appears about to seal a deal with France for a conventional submarine and perhaps the transfer of nuclear submarine technology, questions have been raised about the health of Brazil’s fleet and the strategic value of a nuclear submarine.
On September 23, 2007, a few weeks after Lula touted the Navy’s success in uranium enrichment technology, Correiro Braziliense reported that Commander of the Navy Admiral Moura Neto provided an assessment to a closed session of the Foreign Relations and National Defense Committee in the Brazilian Congress that revealed the decrepit state of the Navy’s equipment.  According to Neto’s report, of Brazil’s existing 21 ships, 11 are immobilized and 10 operate with restrictions; moreover, in the next three years, 17 warships will need to be retired. Of Brazil’s five submarines, two are immobilized, and another two operate with restrictions. The story is similar for the Navy’s aircraft, 27 of its 58 helicopters are immobilized and 31 operate with restrictions; of its 23 aircraft, 21 are immobilized, and the remaining two operate with restrictions. The report concluded that the current state of the Navy “represents a dangerous reduction of the capability of the national defense system” and has already compromised the security of the off-shore oil and gas platforms and the 500 ships per day that stop at Brazil’s ports and carry 95 percent of the country’s foreign trade. 
In addition to a resumption of the nuclear program at the Aramar Experimental Center, Commander Neto has requested funds for the construction of one submarine, modernization of five others, and procurement of torpedoes by the end of 2012.  These priority items have an estimated cost of R5.3 billion (approximately U.S.$2.6 billion). In 2006, the Navy received just R500 million; in September 2007, Lula’s government proposed an increase to R2.1 billion, the minimum necessary to meet the Navy’s need.  Despite the Navy’s dire financial condition, Commander Neto claims that the Navy will be able to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale for powering a submarine in 2015 and the first nuclear-powered submarine could be ready in 2020, if not earlier. His prediction is based on the federal government providing the R130 million per year for eight years to support the effort, as Lula promised in July 2007.  In late January 2008, the Navy began modernizing its existing fleet by signing a $35 million contract with Lockheed Martin’s Undersea Systems unit for new combat systems for its four Tupi-class diesel-electric submarines, the more recent Tikuna, and a shore-based trainer system. 
To drum up public support for a nuclear submarine, Admiral Neto and Defense Minister Jobim have asserted that Brazil needs a nuclear submarine to protect its off-shore oil and gas platforms, including the newly discovered Tupi “mega-deposit,” from enemy seizure and terrorist attacks.  Jobim claims that Brazil needs submarines, and preferably nuclear submarines, rather than surface ships to protect the oil platforms, as submarines are not easily detected by satellite. 
Regional analysts have pointed out, however, that Brazilian officials are just using protection of newly discovered resources as a pretext for a nuclear propulsion project that has been on-going for years. Moreover, as Diego Fleitas, director of the Buenos Aires Association for Public Policies, has pointed out, strategically a nuclear submarine is used to attack another nation or to respond to an attack; a nuclear sub is not necessary to protect an oil platform 400 kilometers off-shore.  Similarly, in a November 17 article in Folha de Sao Paulo, columnist Igor Gielow challenged Jobim’s assertion that nuclear submarines are necessary to protect oil fields against terrorist attack. Pointing to the 2000 attack in Yemen against the USS Cole, he stated that incident “demonstrated that terrorist threats on the high seas can only be stopped by lighter surface craft that are agile and well-armed.”  Gielow’s argument was echoed in a November 22 editorial in O Estado de Sao Paulo that stated, “For a country like Brazil with its extensive coastline, nuclear-powered submarines are weapons of deterrence constituting the first line of defense in conflicts between states. If the purpose is to protect the petroleum installations from terrorists, Brazil needs light and fast surface vessels.”  The editorial concluded that while the country’s military forces need to be revitalized as quickly as possible, “it must be done within the limits of the country’s defense needs and its financial possibilities, not according to the outdated doctrine of Power Brazil.”
Brazil Seeks Nuclear Sub Cooperation with France, Russia, and Possibly Argentina
Recently, Brazil’s president, defense minister,
and other military advisers have gone on record stating that a nuclear submarine is now the government’s top priority, as it is essential to protect Brazil’s long coastline and new oil wealth.  But while the justifications are new, Brazil’s nuclear submarine development effort began in 1979 and consists of three projects: the nuclear fuel cycle (codename Ciclone), the reactor (codename Remo), and the construction of the submarine (codename Costado). Until recently, the Navy officially denied the existence of the submarine project and focused instead on the civilian use of the first two projects for producing nuclear fuel for power plants and electric energy for small cities. Despite its official silence, for decades the Navy has maintained engineering mockups of the submarine and a new naval base in a building at the Navy Technology Center (CTMSP), in Sao Paulo. According to a December 2007 Estado de São Paulo article, the Navy’s proposed nuclear submarine, designed to carry up to 100 crew members, will be 96 meters long, 9.8 meters in diameter, and 17.8 meters tall. To accommodate a nuclear submarine, the Navy will need to construct: a naval base near the Sao Paulo industrial area, probably on the coast north of Sao Sebastiao, and a shipyard in Sepetiba on Rio de Janeiro’s southern coast where the submarines will be built. 
In an example of the Brazilian Navy’s connection with civilian technology, the Estado de São Paulo reported that the technology for moving the submarine propeller will use a concept borrowed from the uranium centrifuge technology developed for the Ciclone project. (The proprietary centrifuge technology, including the new electromagnetic bearing, played a prominent role in Brazil’s 2004 refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to thoroughly inspect its facility at Resende.) The 80-meter-long shaft will be magnetic, avoiding friction and thus operating noiselessly with the added benefit of reducing wear and tear of moving parts. Admiral Carlos Bezerril, director general of CTMSP estimates that the Navy has already mastered 40 percent of the technological know-how — including mastering the fuel cycle and propulsion — necessary to build a nuclear submarine. 
To complete the other 60 percent of the submarine, Brazil has been seeking a new diesel-powered submarine along with the transfer of technology from partners with experience in building nuclear submarines.  The leap from conventional submarine technology acquired from Germany to nuclear has not materialized as planned, and Brazil has turned to other potential partners. 
In September 2007, the on-line Terra Magazine reported that in June 2007 Brazil signed a secret military agreement with France that would put Brazil closer to acquiring the technology to build a nuclear submarine. According to Terra, negotiations had been initiated in May 2006 when former French President Jacques Chirac visited Brazil.  In a June 2007 interview with Defesa@Net, Laurent Mourre, Director General of Thales Brazil, suggested that French cooperation with Brazil could include design information for a nuclear submarine. When asked how Brazil would benefit from acquiring France’s Scorpène conventional submarine, Mourre laid out a plan for technology transfer: “First the technology transfer of production of the conventional submarine. Also we propose that a group of Brazilian engineers follow the construction of the new class of nuclear submarine, the SSN Barracuda. Thus Brazil will have gained years in knowledge, when it decides to go ahead with the nuclear submarine.” 
On January 27, 2008, a Brazilian delegation including Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and Navy Commander Julio Soares de Moura Neto made a 13-day visit to France and Russia to discuss the submarine plan, which, in accordance with the new national defense strategy, envisions technology transfers, investments in bilateral projects, or joint ventures that would allow Brazil to build most of the submarine itself. During his visit to France, Jobim negotiated acquisition of the design for a diesel-electric Scorpene submarine developed by French shipbuilder and systems integrator Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS) to be built in a new jointly owned plant in Brazil. Brazil agreed to purchase the submarine for $600 million to be financed over 20 years at an annual interest rate of 2.4 percent. However Brazil will only sign the final agreement if France also agrees to transfer technology to help Brazil complete its nuclear submarine.  French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Defense Minister Hervé Morin met with the Brazilian delegation, underscoring the strategic importance of the deal that reportedly might also include 50 helicopters, Rafale fighter jets, and a defense satellite.  Presidents Lula and Sarkozy met in French Guyana on February 12 and plan to meet three more times in 2008 to consolidate the alliance. 
During the February meeting, President Sarkozy expressed France’s interest in transfer of technology for an attack submarine and fighter jets, but did not mention transfer of nuclear technology. 
While the international media have given little attention to the proliferation aspects of Brazil’s quest for a nuclear submarine, a recent commentary in Paris Liberation by Jean-Marie Collin, a research fellow at the Armaments Study Center, does point out some proliferation concerns. He argues that France’s apparent willingness to transfer nuclear submarine technology, following on Russia’s lease of a nuclear attack submarine to India, opens an export market in nuclear attack submarines “despite the danger of nuclear propulsion technology being diverted toward a nuclear weapons program.” He notes that although “the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty does not ban such transfers, this breach could have repercussions on the struggle against proliferation. This would create a new caste among its members: such powers as Brazil would be on the verge of manufacturing the bomb, producing and using its principal component, enriched uranium!”  (For a discussion of Russia’s lease of a nuclear submarine to India, see “Questions Persist on Reported Russian Lease of Nuclear Sub to India,” WMD Insights, December 2007 - January 2008.)
While the Venezuelan Navy reportedly will soon sign an agreement with Russia for three Russian Kilo-Class Project 636 submarines, the Brazilian delegation did not find Russia a likely party to its plans for a diesel submarine and a transfer of nuclear submarine know-how. Defense Minister Jobim reported that his first contact with Russian state-run submarine companies was not very positive. He stated that the Russian companies, while willing to sell an entire conventional submarine, showed no interest in a partnership involving the transfer of technology.  Following his first unfruitful meeting with Russian companies, Jobim said that he was still optimistic that high-level talks with Russian government officials might change the companies’ positions. Brazil continues to pursue military and technology cooperation agreements with Russia.
On February 25, 2008, an Associated Press article reported that Brazil and Argentina have agreed to work together on joint uranium enrichment and a nuclear submarine.  According to Clarin, Jobim confirmed that Brazil and Argentina had agreed to a joint project to build a nuclear submarine; Argentina would provide a compact nuclear reactor while Brazil would provide the nuclear fuel and the rest of the submarine based on French conventional submarine technology.  However, on February 25, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense denied that the two countries planned to work together on a nuclear submarine. According to Jobim, the proposed joint venture would only build nuclear reactors “exclusively for the production of energy.” Jobim emphasized that the nuclear submarine would be built with Brazilian nuclear technology. 
Brazil’s dogged pursuit of a nuclear submarine has brought to the surface the question of whether Brazil is keeping open its nuclear weapon option. A few years ago, it would have been unthinkable for a high-level military adviser to state in a public forum that Brazil should consider developing nuclear weapons technology and breach its NPT obligations. Brazil’s quest appears to be fueled by the prestige associated with mastering nuclear technology, a desire to win a permanent seat at the UN Security Council with the five NPT nuclear weapons states, a potential arms race with Venezuela, and the hopes of attaining regional leadership. Indeed, Brazil may perceive acquisition of a nuclear submarine as a proxy for a nuclear weapon in its quest for great power status. It is questionable whether the cost of this dream will be worth the reward and whether a nuclear submarine will actually fulfill the goals of Brazil’s new national defense strategy. By forgoing other military equipment and defense opportunities to fund a nuclear submarine program, Brazil may be jeopardizing its strategic position while perpetuating concerns that its real goal is a nuclear deterrent.
Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
SOURCES AND NOTES
 The government agreed to provide 1 billion reals (approximately U.S.$534 million) over eight years for the Navy to complete its nuclear program. With 130 million reals per year, the Navy will be able to enlarge a smaller uranium conversion facility at Iperó to produce uranium hexafluoride gas and complete a small prototype reactor, suitable for submarine propulsion.
 “Brazil’s Lula Announces Plan to Turn Country Into New Military Power,” EFE, September 6, 2007, OSC document FEA20070907308795.
 “Security Update: Lula Calls for a Major Review of Defense Strategies,” Latinnews Daily, September 26, 2007; Raymond Colitt, “Lula Pede Parque Industrial Militar Como Estratégia de Defesa” [Lula Asks for Re-Activation of Military Industry as National Defense Strategy], Estado de São Paulo, September 6, 2007 [www.estadao.com.br/nacional/not_nac47687,0.htm].
 “Brazilian Defense Minister Discusses Aspects of New Defense Industry Policy,” Dinheiro Vivo Agency, November 9, 2007, OSC document LAP20071115357002.
 Ibid. See also, “Security Update: Lula Calls for a Major Review of Defense Strategies,” see source in .
 “Brazilian Defense Minister Discusses Aspects of New Defense Industry Policy,” see source in . When the reporter stated, “What they make there [at Aramar] is enough to export with no problems. It is one of the best technologies they have there.” Jobim replied, “So much so that the United States is crazy to find out what our factories are like.”
 “Discurso de Despedida do General-de-Exército José Benedito Barros Moreira na Transmissão de Cargo da SPEAI” [Army General José Benedito Barros Moreira’s Farewell Speech During SPEAI Command Change Ceremony], Brazilian Ministry of Defense, February 8, 2008 [https://www.defesa.gov.br/imprensa/index.php?page=noticias_md].
 Leonel Rocha, “Brazil: General Moreira Discusses Future Armed Forces Model,” Brasilia Correio Braziliense, October 13, 2007, OSC document LAP20071013055003. Moreira reiterated that a nuclear submarine should be the country’s highest priority in a Defesa@Net interview in February 2008. José Romildo, “Entrevista: General-de-Exército José Benedito de Barros Moreira” [Interview: Army General José Benedito de Barros Moreira], Defesa@Net, February 8, 2008 [www.defesanet.com.br/md1/barros_1.htm].
 A tape of Moreira’s appearance can be seen at “Investimentos Militares” [Military Investments], TV Câmara - Expressão Nacional, November 13, 2007 [http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/TVcamara/default.asp?selecao=MAT&velocidade=100k&Materia=56955].
 “Army General Defends Developing Nuclear Weapons in Brazil,” O Estado de São Paulo, November 16, 2007, OSC document FEA20071119416067; Expedito Filho, “General Defende Idéia de País ter Bomba Atômica” [Army General Defends Developing Nuclear Weapons in Brazil], Estado de São Paulo, November 15, 2007 [www.estadao.com.br/nacional/not_nac81062,0.htm].
 Alberto Komatsu, “Jobim Wants Nuclear Submarine to Protect Oil Reserves,” Estado de São Paulo, November 16, 2007, OSC document LAP20071116032003; Alberto Komatsu, “Jobim: Brasil Precisa Melhorar Capacidade de Proteção” [Jobim: Brazil Needs Improved Protection ], Estado de São Paulo, November 15, 2007 [www.estadao.com.br/nacional/not_nac81067,0.htm].
 Rodrigo Camarao, “Electronuclear Director Discusses Nuclear Energy, Angra 3 Cost,” Jornal do Brasil, December 9, 2007, OSC document LAP20071210357003.
 Janio de Freitas, “Commentary Warns About ‘Obscure Motives’ Behind Change in Nuclear Policy,” Folha de São Paulo, November 18, 2007, OSC document LAP20071118060001.
 Quoted in “Highlights: Brazil Political Issues 19 Nov 07,” OSC document LAP20071119032003.
 Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, “Brazil Embraces Nuclear Energy with Decisions to Complete Nuclear Power Plant, Expand Uranium Enrichment, Fund Navy Nuclear R&D Activities,” WMD Insights, September 2007, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I18/I18_LA1_BrazilFundsNavy.htm. [View Article]
 Leonel Rocha, “Brazilian Daily Says Half of Navy Fleet Inoperative; Navy Biggest Victim of Cuts,” Correio Braziliense, September 23, 2007, OSC document LAP20070924357002.
 Until July 2007 when Lula promised the Navy new funds for its uranium enrichment activities at Aramar Experimental Center, the Navy’s efforts to maintain the foundations of the dormant program resulted in a loss of $1.1 billion as of the end of December 2006.
 Rocha, “Brazilian Daily Says Half of Navy Fleet Inoperative; Navy Biggest Victim of Cuts,” see source in .
 Tania Monteiro, “Brazilian Navy Commander Says First Nuclear Submarine Could be Built by 2020,” Agnecia Estado, October 25, 2007, OSC document LAP20071025055002.
 Christopher P. Cavas, “Brazil Seeks to Modernize Sub Force,” DefenseNews.com, February 5, 2008 [http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=3348343&C=America].
 “Brazilian Defense Minister Discusses Aspects of New Defense Industry Policy,” see source in ; Alberto Komatsu, “Jobim Wants Nuclear Submarine to Protect Oil Reserves,” see source in ; Rocha, “Brazilian Daily Says Half of Navy Fleet Inoperative; Navy Biggest Victim of Cuts,” see source in .
 Roberto Godoy, “Brazilian Navy Plans Fleet of Nuclear-Powered Submarines,” Estado de São Paulo, December 15, 2007, OSC document LAP20071215061003; Roberto Godoy, “Marinha Planeja Frota Nuclear,” [Navy Plans Nuclear Fleet], Estado de São Paulo, December 15, 2007 [www.estadao.com.br/estadaodehoje/20071215/not_imp96407,0.php].
 Alberto Komatsu, “Specialists Against Nuclear Submarine Project,” O Estado de São Paulo, November 17, 2007, OSC document LAP20071117061002; “Alberto Komatsu,” Para Especialistas, Submarino Nuclear Não é Necessário” [Specialists: Nuclear Submarine Is Not Necessary], Estado de São Paulo, November 16, 2007 [www.estadao.com.br/nacional/not_nac81450,0.htm].
 Quoted in “Highlights: Brazil Political Issues 19 Nov 07,” see source in .
 “The Rearming of Brazil,” O Estado de São Paulo, November 22, 2007, OSC document LAP20071122032002; “O Rearmamento do Brasil” [The Rearming of Brazil], Estado de São Paulo, November 22, 2007 [www.estadao.com.br/estadaodehoje/20071122/not_imp83739,0.php].
 Tania Monteiro, “Lula Defende Reequipamento das Forças Armadas” [Lula Defends Reequipment Of The Armed Forces], December 11, 2007, Estado de São Paulo [www.estadao.com.br/nacional/not_nac94187,0.htm]; Lilian Christofoletti, “Construction of the First Brazilian Nuclear Submarine is a Government Priority,” Folha de São Paulo; September 25, 2007; José Romildo, “Entrevista: General-de-Exército José Benedito de Barros Moreira” [Interview: Army General José Benedito de Barros Moreira], Defesa@Net, February 8, 2008 [www.defesanet.com.br/md1/barros_1.htm].
 Godoy, “Bazilian Navy Plans Fleet of Nuclear-Powered Submarines,” see source in ; Godoy, “Marinha Planeja Frota Nuclear,” see source in .
 Claudio Camargo, “Em Busca Da Soberania” [In Search of Sovereignty], IstoÉ, January 30, 2008 [www.terra.com.br/istoe/edicoes/1995/artigo70956-1.htm].
 Rubens Valente, “Submarino Nuclear Pode Custar ao País R$ 2,74 bi Até 2020” [Nuclear Submarine in 2020 Could Cost R$ 2.74 Billion], Folha de São Paulo, February 4, 2008, posted on Defesa@Net website [www.defesanet.com.br/md1/fr-ru_11.htm].
 Reportedly, the agreement was signed on June 19, 2007 in Paris by the Brazilian and French Ministers of Defense. Cláudio Leal, “Brazil-France Agreement Aims at a Nuclear Submarine” [Acordo Brasil-França Visa ao Submarino Nuclear], Terra Magazine, September 5, 2007 [terramagazine.terra.com.br/interna/0,,OI1880923-EI6578,00.html].
 Nelson Düring, “Thales Foca o Brasil Exclusivo: Entrevista com Laurent Mourre Diretor Geral da Thales no Brasil” [Thales Focus On Brazil: Exclusive Interview With Laurent Mourre, Director General of Thales Brazil], Defesa@Net, June 6, 2007 [www.defesanet.com.br/zz/th_mourre.htm].
 Eliane Cantanhêde, “Brazil Negocia Com França Compra De Submarino De US$ 600 Millhoes” [Brazil Negotiates with France Acquisition of $ 600 Million Submarine], Folha de Sao Paulo, January 29, 2008.
 Eliane Cantanhêde, “Pacotaço” [Big Package], Folha de São Paulo, January 31, 2008 [www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/pensata/elianecantanhede/ult681u368401.shtml]; “Em Sigilo, Jobim Negocia um Satélite com a França” [Secretly, Jobim Negotiates Satellite With France], Folha de São Paulo,” February 2, 2008, Defesa@Net [www.defesanet.com.br/md1/fr-ru_7.htm].
 Eliane Cantanhêde, “Pé Francês no Brasil” [French Foot in Brazil], Folha de São Paulo, February 6, 2008, posted on Defesa@Net website [www.defesanet.com.br/md1/fr-ru_16.htm].
 “France Ready to Transfer Technology for Fighter Planes, Submarine to Brazil,” International Herald Tribune, February 12, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/12/news/CB-GEN-French-Guiana-Sarkozy-Brazil.php. [View Article]
 “French Commentary: Military Technology Transfers to Brazil Could Be Proliferating,” Paris Liberation, February 12, 2008, OSC document EUP20080213029004. For more on the issues raised by nuclear submarine proliferation, see James Clay Moltz, “Closing the NPT Loophole on Exports of Naval Propulsion Reactors,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/61/cmoltz61.pdf; [View Article] James Clay Moltz, “Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and Problems,” Nuclear Threat Initiative Issue Brief, March 2006 [http://www.nti.org/e-research/33_74.html].
 Vivian Oswald, “Brasil Enfrenta Resistência de Russos na Area de Defesa” [Brazil Faces Russian Resistance in Defense Agreements], O Globo, February 4, 2008, Defesa@Net [www.defesanet.com.br/md1/fr-ru_13.htm].
 Associated Press, “Argentina, Brazil Eye Nuclear Sub,” [http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/080225/argentina_brazil_nuclear_sub.html?.v=1].
 “Argentina y Brasil Acordaron Fabricar un Submarino Atomico” [Argentina and Brazil Agree to Build a Nuclear Submarine], Clarin, Feburary 24, 2008 [http://www.clarin.com/diario/2008/02/24/elpais/p-00601.htm].
 “Submarino nuclear do Brasil terá reator da Marinha brasileira” [Brazilian Nuclear Sub Will Have the Brazilian Reactor], Ministry of Defense, February 25, 2008, [https://www.defesa.gov.br/mostra_materia.php?ID_MATERIA=31963].