Air University Review, November-December 1967

Canadian Defence Policy

The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer

Adherence to dogma has destroyed more armies and lost more battles and lives than any other cause in war.

Major General J. F. C. Fuller

Many of the basic principles that govern Canada’s defence policy are constant because they are determined by factors, such as geography and history, which are specific. Others, such as the nature and the magnitude of the threat to peace and security and the development of weapons and weapons technology, change rapidly and drastically. Defence policy must adapt itself to such changes, while principles remain constant.

The modern military force must be a dynamic organization—dynamic in the sense that it must be constantly changing and improving. It must be able to adapt to the products of today’s advanced technology; it must have the best equipment available in sufficient quantity to meet the requirements of national policy. Most important of all, it must be manned with responsible men highly trained in the art of modern military techniques.

Underlying the major revision of Canada’s defence policy announced in 1964 is the concept that any organization, military or civilian, which does not adapt to a changing environment will surely decline. In the early 1960s it became apparent that two aspects of this problem demanded special attention. They were the management and control structure and the influence of rising costs.

One of the issues stressed in a statement before a Parliamentary Committee on Defence in 1964 was the number of senior officials with direct access to the Minister. I pointed out at that time:

With the present prerogative of the Chiefs of Staff to come directly to the Minister with their problems and submissions, there are many cases where proposals are dealt with by the Minister in isolation. This will be overcome in our proposed organization by the fact that all military proposals will come through one channel, and therefore, must in effect be coordinated before they come to the attention of the Minister.

The desirability of adopting sound management principles and a simplified chain of command was reiterated in a subsequent statement I made before the same committee.

I think it [the Canadian defence organization] will be the best military organization, the most responsive to co-ordinated action, and that because of its simplified lines of communication it will be able to develop new concepts and techniques more quickly.

This point reflects the growing complexity of defence choices, which often involve political, economic, and scientific problems as well as issues of military effectiveness.

The impact of sharply rising costs for personnel, maintenance, and operations had been observed for some time, and its consequences for Canada’s defence activities were strongly emphasized in the policy discussions of 1964. It was recognized that the total funds available for defence were not likely to change greatly, so that money available for capital equipment would inevitably decline drastically unless something was done about it.

In the White Paper on Defence, which was tabled in the Canadian House of Commons in March 1964, and previously in the Report by The Royal Commission on Government Organization, great stress was placed on the importance of reducing manpower costs associated with headquarters, training, and similar establishments, as well as operating and maintenance expenses which could be cut without impairing operational efficiency.

After considering the factors of management and control, the influence of rising costs as well as personnel considerations and the nature of modern warfare and the influence of technology, it was necessary to apply general conclusions reached to the specific military requirements of Canada. If we were to maintain useful forces to meet our national and international commitments, we had two choices: we had to increase defence spending or reorganize our forces. The decision was to reorganize.

Broadly speaking, the objectives of Canadian defence policy fall under four major headings:

(a) Collective measures for maintenance of peace and security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, including the search for balanced and controlled disarmament;

(b) Collective defence as embodied in the North Atlantic Treaty;

(c) Partnership with the United States in the defence of North America;

(d) National measures to discharge responsibility for the security and protection of Canada.

These are not in any order of priority but are merely broad headings under which priorities may be established.

To carry out these objectives, we have concentrated our efforts on our forces in being. The purpose of our forces in being is to preserve peace by making a contribution to the deterrence of war in cooperation with our allies. This principle applies throughout the whole spectrum of possible conflict. At the high end of the scale, thermonuclear war and major nonnuclear war are deterred by the existence of sufficient force to make any aggression unprofitable. Similarly, at the lower end of the scale in peacekeeping and other activities, it is the existence of and in some cases the use of forces in being which contains or tends to contain the conflict in a limited way and prevent it from escalating into something more dangerous. In most situations in the real world, then, it is flexible forces in being which may be useful to keep the peace and deter war. The chance of calling on mobilization potential, though possible, is remote.

This assessment was the guide to the setting of our priorities. Forces in being, which traditionally have been low priority, are now at the top of our list; and reserve forces, which were the backbone of our mobilization in two World Wars, have been moved down the scale proportionately.

Following careful study we concluded that the most unlikely development at this time would be an all-out thermonuclear exchange. The second least likely would be a major conventional war in Europe lasting for any extended period. At the other end of the spectrum, the most likely possibility of conflict will be a continuation of small wars, riots, insurrections, overthrow of the civil power, etc. These are likely to continue, perhaps on an increased scale.

The reasons for this assessment, which incidentally was unanimous in the Defence Department, are obvious. Under existing circumstances an all-out thermonuclear exchange, even after a surprise first strike by either side, would inflict unbelievable damage on the two great power blocs. Casualties on each side would number in the tens of millions, and there is no known way that this result could be avoided. An exchange could take place as the result of miscalculation, though the chance is remote. From a rational standpoint, there is no conceivable national purpose to be achieved by an all-out thermonuclear exchange, and consequently the probability of its happening is low—provided, of course, a credible deterrent is maintained.

Almost equally unlikely is a major conventional war in Europe, since a war on this scale would almost inevitably escalate into nuclear conflict, if for no other reason than it would soon threaten the nuclear capability of one or both sides.

At the other end of the scale, and far more likely is a continuation of small wars, insurgency, riots, overthrow of civil government, and other minor conflicts of this sort. Not only have we been warned that there will be activity in these areas, but in some cases it could be a legitimate extension of an aggressive foreign policy from the standpoint that the potential gain might justify the risk taken and, therefore, we should expect continued and, perhaps, accelerated activity at this level.

Once having decided what we believed the possible spectrum of conflict to be, we began to design a force structure flexible enough to contribute throughout the scale. This means forces equipped to contribute to the deterrent on the central front in Northwest Europe and also capable of being employed in peacekeeping activities, brush-fire wars, and related missions. The range of training and equipment required for these varied tasks is very great indeed. Requirements range from the heavy equipments needed on the central front for deterrence to that of light air-portable equipments for peacekeeping, brush-fire wars, etc. Training ranges from that required to cope with the possibility of nuclear war to lightly armed peacekeeping. To meet these varied contingencies, forces must be flexible and mobile. Key words in our force structure then are “flexibility” and “mobility.”

For our purposes we decided the best way to achieve flexibility and mobility was through a single force. It has been suggested that the idea of a single force is new and should be approached with extreme caution. Actually it is not a new idea. It is one which has been discussed and debated for at least a generation. The idea has won the support of some of the greatest military commanders this century has produced. These include General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Montgomery, and Air Chief Marshal Harris, to name a few.

Each of these on the basis of his own command experience came to the conclusion that the old lines of demarcation were no longer valid. The grey areas are increasing, and the trend to combined operations involving two or more of the traditional elements requires a unity of command and control to ensure maximum success.

The White Paper of 1964 would not have recommended integration as a first step toward a single service if we had not been certain of the improved capacity of a unified force to meet the demands of modern warfare. The pattern of warfare in which armies fought armies, navies fought navies, and air forces fought air forces is not likely to be repeated. Under the traditional three-service concept, the individual service recruited, administered, trained, equipped, and supported the combat force units within that service. Joint or combined headquarters were created, where necessary, to coordinate and direct the operations of the elements of two or more of the services. This is a device necessary in a three-service system, but it has built-in drawbacks arising out of the very fact that units and elements belong to different services. Each component depends on its parent service for support in a host of ways which require special channels of communication and complex methods of coordination throughout.

Commanders and staffs down to the lowest level of operations, and in the support echelons from the scene of operations back to the home base, must act together and in unison as the situation demands. Under conditions of modern warfare, consultation between services having different areas of responsibility and different channels of communication is time-consuming. More important, it cannot achieve the high degree of coordinated response that could be critical and would be immediately available through a single organization. The old system can result in misunderstanding and delay which, at best, a military activity can ill afford and, under some circumstances, cannot afford at all.

Fast decision-making and quick reaction are synonymous with modern warfare. The introduction of jets, missiles, rockets, computers, satellite reconnaissance vehicles, and other new military techniques demands an expeditious resolution of problems and rapid response. For intercontinental warfare, the impact of the contraction of time and distance is evident, but it is also valid in relation to military activities at the lower end of the spectrum. Even the success or failure of peace-restoring or peacekeeping operations can depend on the speed with which decisions are reached and the force and its equipment delivered to the trouble zone.

I believe it is a fair conclusion that a single organization which works and thinks together day-in and day-out, with direct lines of communication and a single line of responsibility, eliminates the self-inflicted problems associated with the three-service system of coordinating combined operations.

Concomitant with the change in our force structure are the changes in management techniques which have been introduced into the Defence Department since 1964. One of the most important problems in defence management was the reconciliation of the programs of the three services, that is, the setting of the real priorities between the programs of each.

The integration of Navy, Army, and Air Force headquarters aided materially in the solution of this problem. An Integrated Defence Program (IDP) has been established, which displays all approved defence activities and forecasts spending over the current year and the following five-year period. The program data relate the various military functions and missions to resource requirements of manpower, money, and materiel. With this information available, we can determine at once the implications, both on a particular mission and on the integrated defence program as a whole, of any new requirement.

The defence programming system includes a program change procedure which keeps the IDP current as it reflects changing national and international conditions and the adoption of advantageous technological advances. The development of this comprehensive system has been taking place for some months. To assist in its implementation, we have retained a civilian consultant group familiar with the process, to advise us.

The operation of this system insists on the solution of the two management problems raised. First, since it includes all missions and the elements of all missions, it displays each of these in a way which facilitates the consideration of priorities and demands their solution. Second, the data required for the system include capital costs, personnel and support requirements, and operating costs, and therefore the total effect of each new program change is known at the outset and available for review at any time. The information necessary for management to make decisions is readily available, and the system itself ensures that the data are presented in a manner that tends to realistic decisions.

Another important area which has been subject to reorganization is that of development. Each service had its own development funds, and in each case the administration and screening were carried out within the service concerned without consultation with the other services unless a particular field in which it was known that there might be more than a one-service interest. Since integration, the three service development programs have been amalgamated and coordinated to fit the overall defence program.

The facts are clear and incontrovertible. Either the defence budget has to be substantially increased or substantial cost reductions have to be made, else funds would simply not be available for the capital expenditures that are essential to effective military forces. These pressures will continue. The integration-through-unification process will generate important new cost reductions for some years to come. It cannot be expected that these will match the increasing costs in current dollars from year to year, but without them we would face much higher defence budgets to maintain defence forces at approximately the level we have today.

The nature of modern warfare has resulted in a compaction of time and distance to the point that decision-making and reaction time must be much swifter than ever before in history. I feel a unified force best meets this demand. Unification will broaden the opportunities available to service-motivated and expensively trained personnel when changes in roles or systems alter requirements. In this way, the nation will benefit, the forces as a whole will benefit, and—just as important—the serviceman himself will benefit.

Ottawa, Ontario

Contributor

The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer, P.C., M. P., (B.A., University of Toronto) was Canada’s Minister of National Defence until September, when he became Minister of Transport. He was graduated in aeronautical engineering from the Curtiss-Wright Technical Institute of Aeronautics at Glendale, California, in 1941. Subsequently he was employed by Fleet Aircraft Limited at Fort Erie, Ontario, starting as junior-draughtsman and working up to group leader in engineering on the Cornell aircraft elementary trainer. Mr. Hellyer obtained a pilot’s license in California and was working toward his pilot’s wings in the Royal Canadian Air Force when he transferred to the Royal Canadian Artillery. After demobilization, he went into business in Toronto and at the same time worked his way through the University of Toronto. When elected to Parliament in 1949, he became, at the age of 25, the youngest member of the House of Commons. In 1953, he was re-elected and in February 1956 was appointed Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Defence. Fourteen months later, Mr. Hellyer was sworn in the Privy Council as Associate Minister of National Defence. He was re-elected to the House of Commons as Member of Parliament for Toronto-Trinity in a December 1958 by-election. He acted as Chairman of the 1961 National Liberal Rally in Ottawa, and he served as a Parliamentary representative to NATO under both Liberal and Conservative administrations. He was president of a Toronto construction company resigned to devote full time to public life in 1962. Re-elected in the general election of April 8, 1963, Mr. Hellyer was named Minister of National Defence when the Cabinet was formed.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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