Air University Review, November-December 1967
The time for agreement within the Department of Defense about the meaning of the word “logistics” is long past due. It is axiomatic that if our military efforts are to succeed at all, they will succeed because of, not in spite of, logistics. Yet logistics is all too often ignored, misunderstood, abused, or barely alluded to in military planning. Under these conditions, disaster in some form is imminent for the planned military operation. Thus, not only must we reach agreement within the Department of Defense about the meaning of logistics but we also have to reach an agreement concerning the application of logistics to our Defense organization.
But good logistics and bad logistics, perhaps more of the latter, will coexist in military operations until the aforementioned agreements are reached. In fact we really cannot know the difference between good and bad logistics until the agreements are achieved. Accordingly, this article has a dual purpose: to achieve an understanding of what “logistics” really means and to establish an insight regarding the reason for the current confusion about logistics. Professional military men need this understanding if they are to recognize the mistakes of the past and their causes. Comparison of present actions with the past will then establish the existence of similar errors, which might then be resolved. Finally, an analysis of current Defense organization can reveal possible errors in the logistics structure, thus clearing away much of the confusion. With this knowledge and understanding, the military profession will be able to satisfy the need for good logistics in military operations.
logistics defined
What is meant by the. word “logistics”? A few centuries ago it was everything military other than fighting. A highly regarded military historian, Mark M. Boatner III, relates that in sixteenth century France an officer known as le Major Général des Logis was charged with just about all the duties now performed by the entire general staff of modern armies. Furthermore, as recently as 1870 Der General Quartier Meister was the second officer to Von Moltke on the Prussian General Staff.1 Thus, until at least a century ago logistics was consolidated under one officer and included all military efforts except actual combat. As recently as World War I the U.S. Army was organized into forces. Significantly, the Army service force was responsible for full support of air and ground combat forces. Over time, the name had been changed, but the function remained essentially the same.
Bringing the definition of logistics up to date has been an appropriate task for the academicians within this nation’s armed services. That responsibility has not been shirked. In determining what is and what is not logistics, logisticians owe a debt of gratitude to the U.S. Navy for its efforts toward analysis and definition of logistics as it applies to military operations. Foremost in the Navy effort stands Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, who dedicated his career to a study of logistics and who inspired many other Naval officers to similar study and research. One of these officers is Captain R. B. Hunt, who published Definitions of Logistics in 1956 under the sponsorship of the George Washington University Logistics Research Project. His definitions include:
Logistics is the process of planning for and providing goods and services…
Military logistics is the process of planning for and providing goods and services for the support of the military forces.
Subsequent research on the subject by Admiral Eceles himself contributed some refinement to these definitions. In particular, a theme of his book Logistics in the National Defense (1959) is that logistics is a bridge between our national economy and the actual combat operations of our forces in the field. The Admiral’s efforts resulted in this definition:
Logistics is the provision of the physical means by which power is exercised by organized forces. In military terms it is the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons. [Italics mine.] Its objective is maximum sustained combat effectiveness.2
Thus, logistics is the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons. Once this definition had been established, only one more academic effort remained; to explain how logistics is accomplished. The how of logistics was hinted at by Captain Hunt’s use of the word “process” and by Admiral Eceles’ characterization of logistics as a bridge.
With this background information and more obtained through additional research, two students of the Graduate Logistics Course in the Air Force Institute of Technology School of Systems and Logistics analyzed and described the logistics process in their master’s thesis. Their conclusion was that the process consists of three major areas of activity:
Military logistics is the process at the strategic level of determining the force structure; at the support level of translating the broad statement of requirements into usable military assets; and at the operational level of distributing and applying the assets as well as providing the broad range of services and facilities necessary for the movement and sustained support of the combat force.3
In this view, logistics encompasses a broad spectrum of military effort and consists of a myriad of detailed activities that are so interrelated as to create a process directed toward the support of military operations. This conceptual description firmly indicates the span of logistics.
Successful military operations are directly dependent upon successful logistics. Logistics has a direct interface with operations at both ends of the military spectrum. Strategy cannot be devised without logistics planning for its support. And the reverse of this relationship is also true. While at our highest government-military levels operations and logistics staffs must work together, at the business end of the military spectrum, the firing line, the other interface occurs. In a tactical environment the supply of “beans and bullets” to the fighting man becomes critically important to success in combat.
Admiral Eccles’ concept of the logistics bridge is considered confirmed. The bridge can be visualized as having one end planted firmly in the nation’s economic base (support logistics); the other in actual combat organizations (operational logistics); and the structure itself as a representation of national policy (strategic logistics). This concept is taught in the Graduate Logistics Course, AFIT School of Systems and Logistics. The definition of logistics which has been established―the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons―is accepted and taught by the school’s faculty; so too is the conceptual definition of the logistics process.
the real problem
The challenging task of defining logistics has been successfully completed by military academicians. The real problem, then, is not that we do not know what logistics is. We do know. The real problem is that we have not used the knowledge properly in practical applications within the Department of Defense. What needs to be accomplished is a sometimes harsh, but necessary, analysis of logistics as applied to our military organizations and operations. Analysis is one way of determining whether or not the mistakes of the past are being repeated. It is also a way of finding and applying what was obviously good logistics in the past to our current and future organization and operations.
Some examples from recent military history are readily available for
analysis. For instance, after World War II, the German General Friedrich von
Paulus is said to have remarked that two hundred additional tons of supplies
daily could have turned his defeat at
Of course, our history is not all so bleak. On another front, and later in
the same war, logistics was a shining success. Okinawa was the locale, some six
thousand miles from the economic, industrial, and military base of the
Thorough analyses of logistics in past military operations have yet to be completed. This task can be done, now that we understand the meaning of logistics. But until it is done, success in tile practical application of our theoretical knowledge will be frustrated. And frustration can cause confusion. Because these analyses have not been made, we find it difficult to identify what, in practice, is and what is not logistics.
logistics organization
This difficulty is reflected in a somewhat confused organizational structure for logistics in the Department of Defense. A brief but critical look at the structure hopefully will create an insight as to how our misunderstanding of logistics has created confusion in our organization for logistics. It should also show why the organization itself confuses the minds of military men regarding what logistics is, thus compounding an already difficult situation.
Let us start at the top of the Department of Defense and work down through tile organization. The current U.S. Government Organization Manual is a most appropriate reference for this task.4 It contains charts of the major organizations in the department. We first notice in the Office of the Secretary of Defense an Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics. His title implies that installations are not a part of logistics. But installations are normally a part of support for forces and weapons. Confusing? Yes, but still an improvement over past structure. In the mid-fifties there was an Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics and another Assistant Secretary for Properties and Installations. The implication then was that supply, property, and installations were not part of logistics. So the organization under the present Secretary is improved, though not perfect, from a logistics point of view. Next we notice the separate existence of a Director of Defense Research and Engineering, who is responsible for the research, development, test, and evaluation of new weapon systems. One would logically assume that since this effort is involved in the creation of military weapons, it is logistics. Yet the organization structure plainly says it is not. Are the reasons for confusion about logistics becoming apparent?
Let us turn next to the Department of the Air Force chart. The structure of the Air Staff reveals some very interesting interpretations of logistics. Starting with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Systems and Logistics, we find by implication that systems are not part of logistics. In the Air Force a system is known as consisting of a weapon and the related personnel, equipment, and facilities required for operating it. Furthermore, implied by the word “Systems” in the title is the process of conceiving, defining, acquiring, and delivering to operational units the weapon and its associated facilities and material. That process appears to be the creation of combat forces and weapons, yet Air Staff structure implies it is not part of logistics. This impression is confirmed when the next-lower level of Air Force organization is viewed: at the major air command level we find an Air Force Systems Command and an Air Force Logistics Command―the first to create forces and the second to support them.
Are there other functions which might rationally be assumed to be part of logistics but which the Air Force has separated for independent operation? Let us look again at the Air Staff structure. There is a Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. Again, this function seems to be part of the process of creating forces, yet it is not under logistics. Its existence, however, does align Air Staff structure more closely to that of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Then we discover the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources who is “responsible for developing Air Force programs pertaining to the attainment of operating and supporting forces.” That stilted phraseology sounds suspiciously like our definition of logistics. Is it any wonder that there is confusion; that a misunderstanding of logistics exists; that logistics efforts in the Air Force face difficulty, perhaps partial failure, in accomplishing the mission?
Our sister services are in some respects better organized for logistics. A recent reorganization of the U.S. Army created the Army Materiel Command, responsible for procuring and distributing combat weapons and materiel.
But even that word “material” adds to the confusion. Both the Air Force and the Army continue to use it. Such titles as Deputy for Materiel and Materiel Management make one wonder where materiel fits in logistics. An attempt to answer that question is beyond the scope of this article. Perhaps the services would be better off if use of the word “materiel” were discontinued. For most applications, “logistics” should be used instead of “materiel.”
Interestingly enough, the U.S. Navy does not use the word, having chosen to use instead the anglicized version “material” and thus adding to the confusion. However, by establishing the Office of the Chief of Naval Material the Navy has achieved what is possibly the best military organization for logistics to be found in the Department of Defense. Only three military functions are to he found outside the jurisdiction of that office: operations, personnel, and medicine. All other functions―procurement, supply, distribution, facilities, finance, etc.―are under the Chief of Naval Material. Naturally there are similar functions organic to the operating fleets, but the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons are the responsibility of the Office of the Chief of Naval Material.
Why, then, is the office not designated as “Naval Logistics”? Perhaps the reason is that the personnel and medicine functions are not included in the office. One can reasonably assume that both functions are properly part of the creation and sustained support of combat forces. Nevertheless, none of the armed services place personnel or medicine under logistics.
the task ahead
The purpose of this article is not arbitrarily to decide what is and what is not logistics in Defense organization. Its first purpose is to achieve an understanding of the meaning of logistics. Therefore, it has been shown that within a military organization there appear to be only two functions. The first is to create and sustain combat forces and weapons. The second is to conduct combat operations.
The other purpose of this article, it will be recalled, is to establish an insight regarding the confusion surrounding logistics. It has been established that the confusion does not result from a lack of knowledge of what logistics is. Apparently the confusion results from what might be termed a misapplication of theory to practical military organization. It seems that our knowledge of logistics has been ignored in the structuring of the Department of Defense. Therein lies the problem. If we are ever to avert future disasters in military operations, if we are ever to assure success through efficient and effective logistics, then we must analyze and refine our structure.
We simply must decide which military functions are operational and which are logistical. It can be done because we know what logistics is. A thorough analysis of logistics in past military operations will either confirm or disprove our decisions regarding an organization for logistics. It appears that some decisions will be nothing more than amending titles and office designations. Other decisions may require consolidation of staff functions or perhaps a complete reorganization. These decisions must be made. All that remains is to get on with the job. Until the job is done, confusion and potential disaster will continue to surround logistics.
School of Systems and Logistics,
AFIT
Notes
1. Mark M. Boatner III, Military Customs and Traditions (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 16-17.
2. Henry C. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1959), p. 22.
3. Richard C. Williams and Robert L. Breeding, “A Conceptual Description of Military Logistics (unpublished master’s thesis, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1965).
4. All organizational references were taken from the U.S. Government
Organization Manual 1966-67, published by the Office of the Federal Register,
National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration,
Major Graham W. Rider (USMA); M. S., Air Force Institute of
Technology) is a doctoral student,
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the
author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of
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