Air University Review, January-February 1969

Aircraft Development
Its Role in Flexible Military Response

Major General Harry E. Goldsworthy

 

In the approaching era of atomic plenty, with resulting mutual deterrence, the Communists will probably be inclined to expand their tactics of subversion and limited aggression. The National Military Program therefore must provide for the defeat of such aggression if deterrent measures fail.

General Maxwell D. Taylor,
The Uncertain Trumpet

 

Revolutionary warfare cannot be left to happy improvisation any more than can nuclear warfare.

Bernard Fall, Street With-
out Joy: Indochina at War, 1946-1954

Changing international relations and limited wars have forced the United States to rely once again upon relatively large numbers of manned aircraft and related munitions. The current need to place men and supplies in the Southeast Asia theater and nonnuclear munitions on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong targets has pointedly emphasized the soundness of earlier decisions to update the former United States doctrine of reliance on massive nuclear retaliation. Within the context of “atomic plenty” and conflicting East-West ideologies, the cold war came to be fought largely in the realm of military technology. Both Russia and the United States continually increased the lethality of their nuclear weapons, built and deployed their fleets of manned carriers, and developed and improved their missile delivery systems. The ever enlarging nuclear arsenal has created a stand-off between Russia and the United States, with neither power willing to subject itself to atomic devastation and with both exercising restraint.

The occasional eruption of localized hot war and changes in tactical and strategic doctrine from massive nuclear retaliation to a combination of conventional and reserve nuclear forces must be viewed in this context of restraint exercised under the threat of mutual destruction. Beneath the level of ideological hostility, the super-powers have made the necessary effort to control conflict. Whenever war did follow a breakdown of diplomacy and when Third World nations enlisted support from either East or West war was not on the massive scale envisioned by strategists at the end of World War II.

The United States began to recognize the changing nature of conflict, with its new military requirements, during the late 1950s. The Lebanon crisis, for example, enabled us to reexamine airlift capabilities. Our nation’s ability to deploy combat-ready troops and supporting equipment to that Near East trouble spot prevented what might have become a more serious confrontation. In the early 1960s the unfolding Vietnam struggle showed that, even in a nuclear era, war could take many forms and could be fought for specific and localized objectives. Nevertheless, U.S. ability to cope with limited war—from both the doctrinal and actual military points of view—was questionable. Such lessons had to be learned, but they were learned quickly.

Now heavily committed in Vietnam, the United States is not fighting to destroy North Vietnam, to provoke war with China, or to fulfill any colonial ambitions. Rather, it is attempting to stabilize South Vietnam and allow that country to determine its own course of development free from coercion by the Communist North. No one can say with certainty what will ultimately persuade North Vietnamese leaders to relinquish their aims, but the United States has made every effort to apply only that force necessary to attain its limited military and political objectives. It has attempted to keep the door open to negotiate ark end of combat. The goal is not one of pointless and indiscriminate destruction.

Consequently, the war in Vietnam, although on a large scale, has been carried on far below the possible nuclear level. The weaponry which the United States has employed is nevertheless modern and complex, generally possessing a flexible munitions capability. As the war has progressed, military leaders have revised strategy and tactics accordingly, to meet new threats or to gain the initiative, Still, much that has happened in Vietnam is strikingly reminiscent of previous air and ground warfare, and the process of relearning has frequently accompanied the vital process of military innovation.

The fact that combat in Vietnam requires both relearning and innovation raises a number of questions. What does the Air Force need to fight a deadly but limited conflict? How do requirements emerge? What is the role of aircraft in the current military posture? What is the Air Force doing to prepare for current and future crises? What do these needs signify for the Aeronautical Systems Division and other military organizations charged with the day-to-day development and production of weapons?

Since the United States does not know where trouble might erupt next or the precise form a future conflict might assume, it must be prepared to contend with a broad range of threats, including that of nuclear war. The U.S. military response to any potential or actual conflict must be immediate, flexible, and believable. Although one cannot predict with certainty the nature of or the participants in a future conflict preparations can nevertheless be based upon solid analytical work, such as that performed by the Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. A struggle such as that in Vietnam cannot be resolved with Polaris-equipped submarines or intercontinental missiles. If those were the only possible weapons, Vietnam would have been written off some time ago. In other words, nuclear missiles would have exceeded the requirements and compounded the problems, which most people would like to see resolved in a rational and humane manner.

The United States, then, seeks to accomplish its objectives so as to avoid a wider war. The primary goal of our military forces is the deterrence of war at all levels. To attain that goal, the U.S. must possess a capability that is credible to any potential enemy and forces him to doubt that he can reach his goals through the use of military power. To control crises calls for a demonstration of resolution, the ability to execute highly specialized tasks, and the courage to function effectively during periods of extreme tension. Crisis management further demands that this nation and its forces avoid actions which might lead an enemy to misunderstand our intentions.

To function in such a world situation, the United States Air Force must be extremely versatile; it must possess not only enough aircraft and munitions for simultaneous deployment to various parts of the world but also the kinds of aircraft suitable for diverse missions and the ordnance appropriate for striking a wide range of targets. The Air Force must have multiple options to fight all levels of warfare, the ability to survive an enemy first strike and then retaliate, a first-strike and second-strike capability with ability to retarget, and the ability to strike all kinds of targets under diverse combat, weather, and terrain conditions. Weapons must be tailored for specific tasks and must be of differing magnitude for incremental applications. In addition, intelligence gathering and command and control techniques must be kept at the highest level of accuracy and reliability.

To prepare and maintain such a force, Air Force leaders must realize that requirements do not remain static, that today’s weapon may not be optimum tomorrow. At the same time, today’s weapon must have growth potential. The Aeronautical Systems Division has the task of meeting the aircraft and munitions needs for both today and tomorrow. While Vietnam covers most of the front pages of newspapers and in fact constitutes a substantial portion of the ASD workload, it remains only one of the division’s many concerns. While many of our activities are geared to meeting daily requirements from operational units, others are concerned with the requirements that may arise ten years in the future. In the words of General James Ferguson, Commander of the Air Force Systems Command, “the mission of research and development has been futuristic. It still is. But the future is any point ahead of us in time. It can be ten seconds, ten minutes, or ten years away. "The Aeronautical Systems Division’s work, then, is not that of happy improvisation.” Its products are the result of imagination, meticulous planning, and much hard work.

Aircraft and missile systems designed for current or future military uses must employ the latest and best technology available in this country. For many years, the general goal in producing new weapons was to fly faster, farther, and higher.

The rapid pace of technological innovation obviously creates an enviable framework for system designers. New technology, essential as it is to weapons design, is not sufficient by itself. Any advances must be integrated into a weapon system, and the system must have every promise of becoming operationally useful within reasonable cost limits. If application of latest technology means the introduction of complexity, there may well be lower reliability, higher maintenance costs, and waste of valuable time. This may also cause a few critical items to dictate the timing of the development schedule, a dangerous situation that can lead decision-makers to question the usefulness or even the feasibility of the entire system.

An important aspect of the Aeronautical Systems Division’s mission centers upon the origins of new weapons or air vehicles. Three significant factors lead to new systems. The first is that the nature of the threat changes. This may be determined by intelligence activities and analytical work such as that carried on by our Foreign Technology Division. Second, advanced technology may permit a break-through in our weapons design and thus allow our engineers to develop new and more effective weapons. Third, decision-makers at the national level may deliberately alter the nation’s political and military policy in the light of their estimates of a changing international climate. Rather than proceed with a catalog of the division’s many systems and projects, it will be useful here to review the origins of one of our major programs, the C-5A transport, and place it in the context already discussed.

When the idea of massive deterrence dominated military and political thinking, the general feeling was that no need existed for a large, long-range transport such as the C-5A. As it became clearer to policy-makers that the major powers were functioning under conditions of a nuclear stand-off, a conscious change in national policy emerged. Consideration had to be given not only to the question of what the military organizations required but also to what the country wanted and would support in terms of its military forces.

The United States obviously has undertaken worldwide commitments. These imply the ability to deploy forces quickly to many parts of the world, often in large numbers, as has been the case in Vietnam. At the same time the United States has never wished to become a garrison state; that is, it has usually preferred to maintain a relatively small, highly professional military force which can be augmented in the event of a crisis. Two apparently contradictory intentions are involved here, since a small military organization cannot ordinarily commit itself to simultaneous action in many parts of the world. Unless the U.S. retreats to an isolationist position—unlikely if not impossible—the military forces will have to respond to a situation of world commitment with relatively small forces.

The answer to the dilemma is found in an ability to deploy forces--men and materiel—rapidly to any part of the world. That demands large, fast transports. How fast, how large, and how advanced the transports must be also become major questions. There exists the possibility of using forward bases as staging areas. However, these, too, present difficulties. Our own alliance system has undergone some rapid and dramatic changes. Several years ago few people considered the possibility of losing France as our NATO ally; when France altered its diplomatic position, the U.S. had to vacate its forward areas there. This is but one example of the impact of changing international conditions on the peacetime deployment of military forces.

To some extent our military equipment dictated the need for a worldwide system of bases, but if the equipment dictates the need, the hand of the State Department is tied. Our objective must be to allow our makers of foreign policy as flexible a position as possible. If new, advanced equipment can eliminate much of the need for stationing men and materiel abroad, if the Air Force can suddenly shift troops to any trouble area, the country can freely advance or pull back at any time with no diminution of power. Arguments such as this have affected development of the C-5A.

Prior to the late 1950s, when strategists such as General Maxwell Taylor and Henry Kissinger began to attack the policy of massive retaliation, few people recognized a need for significantly expanding our airlift capability. Consequently, proposals for transports that would have allowed a more flexible policy were not approved. The XC-132, an aircraft that would have had a 5000-mile range at a gross weight of 500,000 pounds, was canceled in the 1957-58 time period. Military planners had advanced the idea of the XC-132 as a replacement for the C-124 and C-133 aircraft. Although the XC-132 was canceled, the issue of long-range, high-payload transports was not closed, and with the changing look at policy it was decided to undertake the development of an intertheater transport. Concurrently there was a new stress on tactical systems.

In the Air Force decision to push ahead with a larger, faster transport, there was general recognition of the nation’s world commitment. While there had been much discussion of the problem prior to 1959-60, the hard fact was that our forces lacked speedy response time, a fact borne out in the Lebanon crisis. Early discussion centered upon the possible modification of commercial jet transports to provide the requisite speed, range, and space for troops and military cargoes. There was also some discussion of purchasing a modified version of the CL-44, a large Canadian aircraft.

From these discussions and proposals came the turbofan C-141, also a major Aeronautical Systems Division project, which has become the basic workhorse of the Vietnam conflict. Nevertheless, this still did not settle the issue of a large intertheater transport. With no firm policy guidance in existence at the time, Aeronautical Systems Division planners looked ahead to what they thought would be a basic military need of the near future, a large, long-range transport that could carry the great majority of the items contained in the Army tables of equipment. They encouraged contractors to carry on their own research and development, stressing size, speed, and payload. Although much of the work was performed in an informal manner, contractors eventually submitted designs to the Military Airlift Command. When MAC agreed to the proposals, the specific operational requirement followed, which led to additional studies withommand. When MAC agreed to the proposals, the specific operational requirement followed, which led to additional studies within and funded by the Aeronautical Systems Division.

The changing political or military climate in itself does not explain the advent of a new aircraft, and it is of utmost importance to emphasize the role of technological innovation and the willingness to accept calculated risks. This is particularly true in the case of the C-5A. General Electric had worked extensively on engines with low specific fuel consumption; Pratt & Whitney had conducted many studies of engines employing higher temperature materials. From the information derived from this corporation research, ASD isolated two distinct possibilities in its approach to the intertheater transport.

One possibility was to design a large airplane utilizing six TF33 engines. The TF33, an adaptation of the older J57, employed technology that was essentially 15 years old. The other route was for the Air Force to underwrite the development of new engines, utilizing both ASD’S and the contractors’ research, to obtain vastly better specific fuel consumption. With a new power plant, the C-5A would have four rather than six engines. The question was whether to stick with the old and somewhat less desirable turbofans or lean on advanced engine technology and introduce a calculated risk for the sake of a superior airplane.

At that time AFSC’s propulsion laboratory had also performed extensive research on low specific fuel consumption engines. On the basis of in-house research, ASD planners were able to present their case for a new engine to the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, without however, deciding precisely which new engine to procure.

The decision was to employ a new model that incorporated principles from advanced technology. It would bleed off compressor air to cool the turbine blades. It would operate with thermodynamic temperatures in the neighborhood of 2300 degrees and metal temperatures of 1500 to 1600 degrees, attaining a bypass ratio of 6 to 8 compared to current bypass ratios of approximately 2.5. By achieving the high bypass ratio and the high inlet temperatures necessary for low specific fuel consumption, C-5A designers were able to achieve the cost-effectiveness level that would make the C-5A a feasible intertheater transport. By turning to the advanced engine technology, the Air Force took a calculated risk, albeit one based solidly upon excellent research by ASD’S propulsion engineers. Their efforts in advanced technology paid off directly in the establishment of the C-5A program.

The C-5 depended directly upon the exploration of advanced technology. Innovation and planning went hand in hand. At the same time, possible built-in complications were rejected or set aside for future use in still newer aircraft. For example, the C-5A does not use laminar-flow control. Again, engineers felt there was insufficient knowledge in the field of composite structures. Nevertheless, these new materials or techniques will someday play major roles in aircraft design.

Already planners at ASD are thinking beyond the C-5A, to ways of extending the range and capacity of transports so as to free them from the “island hopping” characteristic of past operations. Every stop means longer time, change of crews, new clearance for flights, and greater maintenance. For the future, designers envision an aircraft of one to one and a half million pounds’ gross weight-larger than the C-5A, now the world’s largest aircraft.

Every system that ultimately becomes a part of the weapons inventory undergoes an evolutionary process, beginning with the formulation of a concept with schedules established for every step. From the concept stage it progresses through research and development, contract definition, and contract awarding; finally it is purchased in quantity and proceeds into operational use. That is the formal course of the system. It should be clear that there is far more involved than the highly formalized procedure often put on paper, that innovation, threat and political decisions may interject themselves at any point.

When the system is no more than a concept, designers are working towards objectives in operational performance. Their commitment to and belief in the system are usually strong, and during the course of development most people concerned with the system acquire a progressively greater faith in it. During later development, when designers must pinpoint materials and components, they rely heavily upon advanced technology. If designers and system integrators have done their job well, if they employ new technology wisely as in the C-5A, the system will emerge successfully into the early operational stage.

When new system concepts are developed through studies and analyses, including system effectiveness studies, the proposed weapon need not always contain the most complex technological advances. Designers must examine the technology of a system in the light of what is actually required to counter a threat. The need, then, is for precision in sizing up the threat and in orienting the system to meet it. Neither too much nor too little will suffice.

The planners’ first objective is to conceive the simplest possible design, using the most advanced technology possible, to accomplish a mission. Cost and effectiveness of the system must be related, with particular emphasis on reliability and maintainability. In new designs the Aeronautical Systems Division examines potential systems from the standpoint of meeting military needs with weapons that will fully satisfy the immediate or long-range operational demands.

The Aeronautical Systems Division has under way many projects that will supersede or improve existing Air Force weapons. In fiscal year 1968 the division’s budget was approximately $5 billion. In the previous fiscal year, ASD had 62 different systems under way, 33 of which involved nearly $4 billion in that year alone. A vast amount of the money was invested in programs such as the extremely sophisticated F-111, the C-141, C-5A, F-4, and F-5. Millions were spent on munitions and munitions research, from iron bombs of World War II vintage to a new plastic model of the BLU-26 aluminum antipersonnel fragments per bomb, a version which produces more fragments per bomb at about one-half the cost of its predecessor.

Some of the proposed aircraft which the division may buy in the near future will be subsonic and designed for specialized employment, such as the A-X close support fighter. Another aircraft, the F-X tactical fighter, is planned to be a highly sophisticated, fast, maneuverable fighter incorporating the latest avionics, rapid fire-control system, and new engines. When the F-X joins the operational inventory, it is expected to be able to counter the greatest predicted performance threat an enemy can impose in the time period beyond 1975. Its development naturally demands the best technology available.

Although best known as the developer and procurer of aircraft for the Air Force, ASD is certainly not restricted to this role. The division has recently investigated concepts such as that of the tactical air-to-air short-range missile, a more effective air-to-air combat weapon. In early 1968, ASD was involved in studies of air-to-surface missiles for attacking ground targets in close support and interdiction missions, much needed for use in limited-war situations.

Other studies currently being made are of tactical electronic warfare systems. Electronic systems of the type envisioned are extremely complex. Many comprehensive studies are required to identify the appropriate concept and integrate the various components. Although the primary mission of the tactical electronic warfare system will be to support aircraft attacking ground targets, it will also have the capability to defend itself from air-to-air attack. In any situation where ground targets have to be struck, the Air Force must assume that the ground defense will be formidable. The tactical electronic warfare system will aid attacking aircraft by jamming radars and analyzing enemy signals to determine the depth of the penetration environment. Such weapon systems, coupled with those already in existence, are necessary adjuncts of the force structure which the Air Force requires to meet the demands of limited war in the future.

Also for limited-war use, the division is designing support aircraft such as the light intratheater transport (LIT), incorporating STOL or V/STOL capability. Such an aircraft may be needed for moving troops and supplies into or from a combat area.

The V/STOL concepts represent a very important aspect of ASD’S advanced planning. There is an old military maxim that those who hold the highest ground have the advantage. Fighting forces have always attempted to gain a vertical envelopment capability7 whether by putting men on a hill or in the air. In World War II this was done with limited success by using parachute and glider troops. There were many failures when troops scattered over wide areas found it difficult if not impossible to regroup in or near the drop zone. In Vietnam the Army has attained a relatively short-range vertical envelopment capability through the use of helicopters. In 1960 the division attempted to achieve a V/STOL capability by designing the tilt-wing X-18, but it was so unstable it could not be flown. More recently the division produced the XC-142, a stable tilt-wing aircraft, which has demonstrated conclusively the feasibility of the concept.

An Army is always tied to the logistics tail. During World War II soldiers in England hand-loaded five-gallon cans of gasoline into the bomb bays of B-17s to supply General Patton’s rapid tank advance through the crumbling German line. Nevertheless, Patton could not obtain the necessary fuel. To supply and move troops rapidly, the Air Force needs aircraft with extensive cargo space and adequate range, as well as the capability to move quickly into, out of, and around a combat area with out prepared landing pads or strips. To achieve workable V/STOL aircraft, which would be much more effective than helicopters, the Air Force must continually exploit the technological innovations emerging from the Aeronautical Systems Division.

Aeronautical Systems Division plays a significant role in maintaining and strengthening the U.S. strategic posture. In spite of the current attention to limited war, the strategic role remains one of the most significant aspects of the division’s work. One of the division’s foremost goals is to develop a manned strategic aircraft to replace the B-52 fleet. The specific project is Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA). Like the B-52, AMSA could be used for a controlled response in both general- and limited-war situations.

When the Strategic Air Command studied new aircraft concepts in the early 1960s, it became convinced of the need for a much greater low-level penetration capability. From the requirements came various AMSA concepts that would have provided for low-level supersonic flight. AMSA would take advantage of advanced technology, such as variable sweep, to achieve greater ranges and improved take-off and landing capabilities; it would certainly employ the latest technology in avionics and propulsion.

In order to establish an acceptable system concept for AMSA, planners must draw heavily upon improvements in structures and materials technology for the airframe, and they must use the most advanced propulsion system. There must be completely integrated avionics systems to enable the aircraft to penetrate enemy defenses. Whatever form AMSA ultimately takes, it will be an extremely complicated system taxing the ingenuity of designers. When it once enters a contract definition stage, it is expected to require another five or six years for development.

For use with AMSA, the B-52, or the FB-ll1, the division is developing stand-off missiles such as the AGM-69A. AMSA must also have various penetration aids, and planners are currently considering attack missiles and decoys. At some point these missiles will be developed and coupled with AMSA or other aircraft in our inventory.

Aerial refueling remains a requirement, and this may well be true even when AMSA becomes operational. Equally vital but less glamorous is the advanced-capability tanker under consideration for the future, a very significant planning project at ASD. At present and in the near future, aircraft range extension for both limited war and strategic purposes will continue to be achieved with aerial refueling. The KC-185 tanker has been in use for many years, and while it has been improved, the Air Force still needs greater range and the ability to transfer larger amounts of would have much longer life spans than weapons designed solely for limited war, and the bomber in particular will achieve extreme flexibility in its weapon-carrying and delivery capability. AMSA, coupled with the FB-111, the new tanker, and various short- and long-range aerodynamic missiles, would help to provide the United States with a great retaliatory and deterrent force.

It would be possible to mention many of our new systems, the quantities in which they are projected or purchased, and the advanced technology they have employed. Most readers familiar with the Air Force are aware, however, that the F-111, for example, is new, has already seen combat and utilizes the most sophisticated avionics available. Similarly, they are aware that the old C-47 and more recently the C-130 have been introduced—with added complex electronic gear and rapid-fire guns—as combat weapons in Vietnam. It would also be possible to catalog the helicopters, fighters, and munitions now in use or projected. The object however, has not been to catalog but rather to show that a changing climate of opinion and changing military actualities have for nearly a decade placed aircraft in a new light and that aerodynamic vehicles dominate much of the thinking of planners. It is highly unlikely that in an age of nuclear weapons the airplane will relinquish either its role as a combat weapon or that of transporting military forces to various parts of the globe.

Aeronautical Systems Division, AFSC


Contributor

Major General Harry E. Goldsworthy (B.S., Washington State College) is Commander, Aeronautical Systems Division, AFSC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Commissioned in 1940, he commanded the 10th Bombardment Squadron in Puerto Rico and Trinidad; the 377th Bombardment Squadron and 329th AAF Base Unit at Columbia AAB, South Carolina; and the 42d Bombardment Group (M), Pacific Theater. Postwar assignments have been as Tactical Inspector and Commander, 7th Bombardment Group and Wing, Carswell AFB, Texas; member, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Hq USAF; DCS/O, Hq Air Proving Ground Command, Eglin AFB, Florida; Inspector General and C/S, Seventeenth Air Force, Morocco; Vice Commander, 4061st Air Refueling Wing, SAC, and Commander, Det. 18, Ballistic Missiles Center, Los Angeles, duty at Site Activation Task Force, Malmstrom AFB, Montana; and at Hq USAF as Director of Production and Programming, DCS/Systems and Logistics, from 1963 until his present assignment in 1967.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor