Document created: 3 June 04
Air University Review, January-February
1971
On 25 April 1945, the Eighth Air Force flew its last bombing mission of
World War II. That day 550 aircraft released the last of about 700,000 tons of
bombs dropped by the Eighth, and the six missing B–17s were the last of almost
6000 heavy bombers lost by that unit in the air war over Europe. In all, the
Eighth lost over 9000 aircraft, along with about 44,500 men originally reported
missing in action or killed, in over 523,000 effective sorties.1
When the Eighth entered combat in the summer of 1942, it did so with equipment and a doctrine markedly different from those of either its British allies or its German foes. The Eighth’s principal weapon was the heavy day bomber, the famous Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress, later joined by the Consolidated B-24 Liberator. Both were equipped with what seemed at the time to be a lavish number of .50-caliber machine guns and the ultrasecret and accurate Norden bombsight. This equipment was built and developed to implement the American concept of strategic bombing, which grew out of ideas that emerged from World War I and from such spokesmen and theorists as Britain’s Hugh Trenchard, Italy’s Giulio Douhet, and America’s Billy Mitchell. These ideas were honed and improved by the instructors of the Air Corps Tactical School, stimulated at least in part by the technological advances of the early thirties. The strategic bombing concept that emerged was based on five assumptions, all of which would be challenged in combat:
—a war could be won by destroying key elements in a nation’s economy,
—these key elements could be identified,
—bombers could economically attack the targets,
—the targets could be hit, and
—the bombs could destroy the targets.
The American strategic bombing theory stated that long-range, high-altitude, heavily armed, fast daylight bombers flying unescorted in formation could economically penetrate, accurately bomb, and thus destroy key elements of a nation’s economy, causing that nation to collapse.
Established in Britain in early 1942, the Eighth Air Force flew its first heavy bomber mission on 17 August 1942. Despite British assistance, operations through that fall and winter were small, as men and equipment were diverted to TORCH (the invasion of North Africa) and the Pacific Theater. Moreover, the early bombing operations were cautious, experimental, and often directed against what were, from the aspect of the American strategic bombing theory, diversionary targets. In the summer and fall of 1943, American bombing doctrine was tested and found wanting when unescorted bombers suffered prohibitive losses on deep penetrations in daylight. By the end of 1943, the Eighth introduced into combat airborne radar, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and long-range fighter escort (made possible by fuel carried in external drop tanks) and employed what was probably the best all-round piston-powered fighter of the war, the North American P-51 Mustang. These weapons and increased strength prepared the Eighth for the decisive air battle that followed in 1944. Epitomized by Big Week in February and the battles over Berlin in March, the Eighth’s fighter escort essentially drove the Luftwaffe (the German Air Force) from the sky. By April 1944 the Eighth had won air superiority. During that spring and summer the direct and indirect support of ground forces in operations such as OVERLORD (the Normandy invasion) and CROSSBOW (the campaign against German long-range secret weapons) diverted the Eighth from its strategic bombing offensive.
By fall, with large numbers of both bombers and escort fighters, trained crews, and new techniques, the Eighth had gained tactical as well as numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe. During the war the Germans improved flak and fighters and introduced new aerial tactics and equipment, of which intruders, jets, and air-to-air rockets were the most notable. It was, however, a case of too little, too late. When the Allied bombers hit full stride in mid-1944—in the ten months after 1 July 1944 American and British bombers dropped 72 percent of all their tonnage on Germany2—their attacks, especially on oil and transportation, effectively throttled the German economy and war machine. The Eighth’s last strategic bombing mission on 25 April 1945 was soon followed by V-E Day, 8 May 1945.
The Eighth did not fight the air war over western Europe alone but alongside British Bomber Command, American strategic bombers based in Italy, and Allied tactical air forces. The most authoritative report on the results of the air war against Germany states:
Allied air power was decisive in the war in western Europe. Hindsight inevitably suggests that it might have been employed differently or better in some respects. Nevertheless, it was decisive. In the air, its victory was complete; at sea, its contribution, combined with naval power, brought an end to the enemy’s greatest naval threat—the U-boat; on land, it helped turn the tide overwhelmingly in favor of Allied ground forces. Its power and superiority made possible the success of the invasion. It brought the economy which sustained the enemy’s armed forces to virtual collapse, although the full effects of this collapse had not reached the enemy’s front lines when they were overrun by Allied forces.3
The Eighth’s primary accomplishment was the defeat of Germany’s air force. At the same time it weakened both her industry and her war effort.
The Luftwaffe was designed as a direct army support force, and it was ill prepared—In numbers, training, and equipment—to battle in three theaters: Russia, the Mediterranean, and Western Europe. In the latter, the GAF had to meet three different threats: heavy night bombers, heavy day bombers, and fighters. The tardy mobilization of the German war economy and poor leadership hampered the Luftwaffe’s efforts, but the crushing blows were delivered by the Eighth’s bombers and fighters. The heavy bombers claimed destruction of over 6250 German fighters in the air, in addition to the thousands of aircraft destroyed on airfields and in factories.4 In the words of the USSBS report: “The attacks on German airplane production in the year 1943 and February 1944 contributed significantly to the winning of air superiority in the critical air battles of the early months of 1944.”5 The GAF also was adversely affected by bomber attacks on transportation and oil and by certain defensive measures, such as the dispersion of industry, that these attacks prompted. Finally, the day bombers acted as a lure which enticed the German pilots into the guns of the Eighth’s fighter escort.
The Eighth’s fighters claimed the destruction of over 5200 German fighters in the air and over 4200 on the ground.6 The American fighters eventually had superior numbers, superior average pilot quality, superior tactics, superior aircraft (with the possible exception of German jets and rockets) for fighter-to-fighter combat, superior modifications, superior equipment, and a higher order of operational and command leadership. With these, the Eighth won and retained air superiority and maintained the initiative in offensive operations.
The bombing of Germany’s industry, especially oil and transportation,
seriously weakened her war effort. Industry and the mobility of ground forces
were hampered, as was German flying, both operational and training. “An overall
shortage of aviation gasoline,” USSBS reports, “resulted in the curtailment of
flying training as early as 1942 and this decision was reflected in a
deterioration of quality of personnel, which was the principal cause of the
defeat of the German Air Force.”7
Indirect effects of strategic bombing included dispersion of industry, which disrupted production and put further strains on German transportation. Although the Germans skillfully repaired, substituted, and improvised to keep up production, the quality of equipment declined. The result: parts that failed, artillery tubes that burst, shells that failed to explode, and aircraft that crashed. The bombing also siphoned off cannon from support of ground forces to use as flak. In a like manner, considerable manpower was tied down to man flak units (1.5 million men in Germany and the occupied countries on D-Day8) and to repair damage.
Although overall Allied planning for World War II called for strategic bombing of Germany, the airmen were not given free rein. Their primary objectives were to support the cross-channel invasion by defeating the Luftwaffe and to weaken German industry fatally. In accomplishing these missions, the Eighth never gave the bombing theory’s main assumption, that war could be won by destroying key elements of industry, a true test. The Eighth was forced to deviate from and modify the strategic bombing theory in three other major respects as well:
First, unescorted bomber attacks proved to be too expensive. Flexible gunnery on board the aircraft was inadequate, partly because the bombing theory underestimated the power of modern interceptor aircraft and because gun turrets and flexible gunnery training were neglected. Furthermore, the effect of radar was not considered as it was unknown when the bombing theory was formulated. In defense of the American airmen, it should be noted that some of them recognized and advocated the desirability of escort, but it was commonly believed to be technically impossible to build an aircraft with fighter performance and bomber range. The technological superiority of the bomber over the fighter in the early 1930s and a shortage of funds fostered this notion. Despite numerous studies recommending escort, attempts to produce large, multiseat escort aircraft failed (for example, the Bell XFM-1 and the converted Fortress escort, the YB-40). Only drop tanks that extended fighter range made long-range escort possible.9 Second, because of German defenses and weather, daylight precision bombing with the Norden bombsight could be employed in dropping only one-half of the total tonnage. Third, “pickle barrel” bombing accuracy was seldom achieved. Besides the Luftwaffe, the Eighth’s other problem areas included effects of weather, deficiencies of intelligence, and crew inexperience.
The Eighth overcame these obstacles and accomplished its missions by means of a remarkable tactical development. Aircraft were modified to increase effectiveness, especially firepower and range. Certainly one of the outstanding innovations of World War II was the fighter range-extension program that produced the long-range fighter escort, with combined fighter performance and heavy-bomber range. By employing new ideas, new devices, and new techniques, the Eighth acquired adequate equipment, tactics, and organization.
The Eighth’s most brilliant attribute, however, was excellent leadership, at both the command and operational levels. It proved itself, not only over the hostile skies of Europe but also in making decisions that served the entire Air Force. Thus, the Eighth carried out its assigned task by making the necessary tactical evolution. The Eighth took what it was given, modified and used it to defeat a skilled, courageous, and potent air force, and helped defeat Germany.
For the twenty-five years since the Eighth Air Force fired its last shot and
dropped its last bomb in the war, no individual work recorded its history. At
least, this was true until the recent publication of Roger A. Freeman’s The
Mighty Eighth.* Of course, the official Army Air Forces in World War II
includes the Eighth, but there its story is swallowed up in the mammoth seven
volumes covering the entire war.10
* Roger A. Freeman, The Mighty Eighth: A History of the U.S. 8th Army Air Force—Units, Men and Machines (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970, $14.95), 311 pp.
The Mighty Eighth is a big book. Printed on slick paper in large format, it is generously illustrated with photographs and 14 pages of color plates. Its 236 pages of detailed text—small type on large-size paper—means a lot of prose per page, and the six appendices add 57 more pages. The author knows his subject well and has dug deep and mined much gold, putting quantities of information into print for the first time. He writes in a journalistic manner, relating an exciting story, usually in an exciting way, with detailed anecdotes that convey the action and irony, the blood and valor, the essence and reality of the Eighth’s air war. For all that, The Mighty Eighth is not easy reading; rather it is a lengthy book, broad in scope and minute in its detail.
But a book covering such a complex subject is seldom without flaws. The greatest failing of this book is its lack of bibliographical references. Footnotes serve a number of useful functions, indicating what sources the author has used and allowing the reader to weigh and judge the author’s evidence and in turn his interpretations. Footnotes also enable an interested reader to investigate further any particular point or subject. While it is obvious that “a very large number of documents and publications were researched in compiling this book,” it is not acceptable for the author to excuse the lack of footnotes by simply stating: “space limitations, however, prevent the inclusion of bibliographical notes.”11 This lack considerably limits the usefulness of the book, not only to the student and scholar but to the layman as well. History requires documentation, for without it a study is incomplete.
The author’s errors of commission are few, though his narrative style often bogs down under excessive detail, especially in long direct quotes. This detail contains much gore, which to some may enhance the realism but to others will be in poor taste and uncalled for. Few will quibble with the author’s handling of numbers, which, as he points out, are often conflicting even in the official sources. A few minor errors of fact mar the book, but considering the sources and the scope of the subject their small number is remarkable. I mention them only to show how minor they are.
The B-17 did not stem from the Project “A” specifications noted by the author (the Boeing XB-15 did) but instead stemmed from a 1933 design competition.12 On the ferrying of aircraft to Britain, the author’s figures and dates differ from those of the official sources.13 Admitted German losses are indicated for several missions, but apparently the author has not consulted the English translations of Luftwaffe losses.14 In this regard he apparently relied on Adolf Galland in a number of places, for example, in using 25 as the number of German aircraft lost in the 17 August 1943 Schweinfurt- Regensburg mission.15 For that day, Field Marshal Erhard Milch stated: “Our losses are between 60 and 70 aircraft, 27 of them to losses.”16 Grossbatterien (large batteries) were German flak emplacements of three normal batteries of up to 12 guns each, while Doppelbatterien were double batteries; not as the author describes 88mm guns “sited in groups of 12, 16, 18, or 24 (known as Grossbatteries).”17
Several omissions must be noted.
—The Introduction, sketching the formation of the American bombing theory and the prewar development of equipment, is weak, covering but two pages.
—Neither Giulio Douhet, the leading bombardment theorist, nor the Air Corps Tactical School is mentioned.
—The effect of grand strategic plans and decisions is dealt with briefly, which shortchanges the very important and pertinent subject of targeting, one of the major criticisms leveled against American strategic bombing. The author does not go deeply into the criticisms raised against the Eighth’s activities, as in the raid on Dresden or other alleged instances of bombing and strafing civilians.18
On the positive side, the book’s emphasis is on mission narratives and anecdotes that mention numerous personnel and individual aircraft names. Units are particularly well covered, and veterans of the Eighth will find a wealth of material on their units. In this regard, the appendices on group histories and group aircraft camouflage and markings are especially useful. These entries are noteworthy not only because they are the only published collection of such information but also because they are well done, superb in detail and completeness. The 14 pages of color plates include both the standard marking and the bizarre schemes of the B-24 assembly aircraft. Covered in other appendices are Medal of Honor winners and fighter aces.
The book is profusely illustrated with photographs, some never before published. Although a few may be meaningless, redundant, or too small, the illustrations alone are almost worth the price of the book. Mr. Freeman is to be complimented for covering not only the better known and more dramatic combat activities of the bombers and fighters but also their nonbombing missions and such diverse activities as reconnaissance, partisan supply, and leaflet operations.
The Mighty Eighth, the only published history of the Eighth Air
Force, is well done and worth consulting, scanning, or reading. It is a solid
account of a truly great military outfit which developed, in Freeman’s closing
words, “such admirable characteristics as a remarkable esprit de corps, dogged
bravery and supreme determination to succeed. It was, indeed, these attributes
which have so rightly conferred upon the Eighth the honour of becoming one of
the most famous military organizations in history.”20
Radford, Virginia
Notes
1. Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater: 17 August 1942–8 May 1945, pp. 16, 29, 37. Hereafter cited as 8AF Statistical Summary. Eighth Air Force Mission Folder, 25 April 1945. Losses include aircraft missing and scrapped (Category “E”).
2. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Statistical Appendix to Over-all Report (European War), (Washington, 1947), pp. 11, 13; USSBS, Over-all Report (European War), (Washington, 1945), p. 71.
3. USSBS, Over-all Report, p. 107.
4. 8AF Statistical-Summary, p. 52.
5. USSBS, Over-all Report, p. 25.
6. 8AF Statistical Summary, p. 52.
7. USSBS, Over-all Report, p. 25.
8. Hermann Goering, interrogation, 24 September 1945, p. 8.
9. Bernard L. Boylan, “The Development of the American Long-Range Escort Fighter,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1955, pp. 15–51. Also published as USAF Historical Study No. 136, USAF Historical Archives, Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
10. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., 7 volumes (University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958).
11. Freeman, p. 295.
12. Ibid., p. 1; Craven and Cate, I, 65–66.
13. Freeman, p. 7; Craven and Cate, I, 644.
14. Air Ministry translation VII/133-36, 138–39, 142 under the titles “Luftwaffe Losses on the Western Front,” and “Luftwaffe Losses in the Area of Luftflotte Reich” for the period January through September 1944.
15. Freeman, p. 29; Adolf Galland, The First and the Last (New York: Holt, 1954), p. 179.
16. Speech by Field-Marshal Milch at the Conference on the Problems of Aircraft Production, 25 August 1943, Appendix 29 in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air War Against Germany, 1939-1945, Vol. IV: Annexes, Appendices, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, edited by Sir James Butler (London, 1961), p. 306.
17. Freeman, p. 176; Interrogation Report on General der Flakartillerie Walter von Axhelm, 20–31 May 1945, 5 June 1945, pp. 5, 7.
18. See, for example, David Irving’s passionate but insidiously inaccurate account, The Destruction of Dresden (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1963).
19. Freeman, p. 235.
20. Ibid., p. 236.
Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell (USAFA; Ph.D., Duke University) is Associate Professor of History at Radford College, Virginia. He served five years in the Air Force, including 3½ years as a weather reconnaissance pilot in Japan. Dr. Werrell worked for two years as an Air Force contract historian, writing a history of the Eighth Air Force, and as a historian for Operations Research, Inc., Carlisle, Pennsylvania, before going to Radford in 1970.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor