Document created: 4 September 03
Air University Review,
September-October 1975
Lieutenant Colonel
Thomas C. Blake, Jr.
Inherently, aircraft are easier to destroy on the ground than in flight, yet ground survivability has not always been a major cause for concern.
During World War I, neither side had the munitions or aerial delivery capability to pose a serious threat to the other’s air bases. Furthermore, the concepts and doctrine for employing those fledgling air forces had not developed an effective means for attacking any kind of ground target.
In World War II, the Axis powers did not sustain a concentrated effort long enough to inflict crucial damage to home bases of the Allies’ aircraft. Initially this was due largely to fallacies in Axis strategy. Later in the war, when the Axis power might have sought to correct their mistake, the Allies had gained air superiority. This air superiority allowed the to operate from their “sanctuary” bases with relatively little concern for d survivability.
After World War II and into the 1950s, there still was little perceived threat to the ground survivability of U.S. theater air forces. In Korea and later in Vietnam, US Air Forces never suffered a heavy attack by enemy air. In Europe, Soviet Pact aircraft had limited range and payload and were largely air-defense oriented, Soviet strategic air was intended for a different kind of target.
Development of the first family of relatively unsophisticated medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) marked the beginning of today’s ground survivability dilemma. Later, when the Soviets acquired immediate-ranger ballistic missile (IRBM), they were able for the first time to threaten North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air bases throughout West Europe and the United Kingdom. It was not only the direct MRBM/IRBM threat that caused concern but also the influence that this had on the employment of Soviet aircraft. As the Soviet operational missile forces grew in quantity and quality and were able to assume more of the strategic targets, the manned bombers they replaced became more available for tactical targets. The Soviets began shifting from an almost totally defense-oriented tactical air system toward one that possessed a respectable offensive capability.
In 1961 the Soviets, having long been aware of NATO’s capability to attack
their air bases, began to build hardened aircraft shelters. To understand
better the overall implications of all these developments, in 1964 the
Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to establish a working group to
study and analyze the subject of “Theater Air Base Vulnerability.” This “TAB
VEE Working Group,” as it became known, published an initial report in 1965.
Major findings concerning passive defense measures included the statement that
tactical aircraft and other mission-essential resources should be dispersed
(either widely separated on the same facility or formed into small groups and
located at operating sites other than main bases), concealed, and sheltered.1
While the U.S. was negotiating with other NATO nations to determine how much should be spent to carry out the recommendations of the TAB VEE Working Group and who should pay the cost, events occurred in the Middle East that dramatically illustrated the need for action. Early on 5 June 1967 at the outset of the Six Day War, the Israeli Air Force caught the bulk of the Egyptian Air Force vulnerable on the ground at a number of air bases and virtually demolished it. This demonstration of the need to protect aircraft on the ground spurred the Soviets to intensify their program for sheltering aircraft and hardening facilities. NATO countries continued for several years to lag in taking these steps, although more recently significant progress has been made in this direction (but less than the U.S. recommends).
trends for the future
A number of developments and trends indicate a new context for tactical air forces (TACAIR) ground survivability in the future. This new concept may affect the relative emphasis placed on the findings and alternatives (dispersal, concealment, sheltering) of the TAB VEE study.
An existing trend that promises to continue is NATO’S increasing dependence on its tactical air power. NATO depends heavily upon tactical air power to help offset the significant disparity in the amount of its military resources that are organized and in-place readily available for combat vis-à-vis the Pact countries.2 Moreover, if it appeared that NATO TACAIR could be held down or significantly disrupted, much of its weight in deterrence would be removed. Therefore, tactics which either hold down aircraft or destroy TACAIR resources (including sheltered air-craft) would tend to be more effective against NATO than against the Pact nations, whose powerful land army likely could accomplish its objectives in a neutralized air environment.
For several reasons it appears likely that the Pact forces could attack air bases more productively than could NATO: (1) There are fewer NATO air bases to be attacked and destroyed or held down, and the Pact force has an increasing numerical superiority in tactical assets. (2) Compared to NATO, more of the Pact’s air forces can operate from sod surfaces without depending on prepared runways, making NATO’S forces more vulnerable to runway denial tactics. (3) As aggressors, the Pact forces can strike at a time most opportune to them and possibly achieve a favorable element of surprise. (4) Geography favors the Pact commanders in that they can position and disperse their strategic reserve of general-purpose air forces over a vast heartland area.3 Also, the Soviets’ task would be simplified if their advancing armies were able to engulf NATO airfields.
In particular, the advent of precision guided munitions (PGM) adds new dimensions to the problem of defending airfields. In the Six Day War of 1967, the Israelis employed “concrete dibbers,” new-type lightweight bombs with special shaped-charge conventional warheads, to crater Arab runways and make them unusable. 4 (Since then, Martin Marietta Aerospace Corporation has developed an improved lightweight penetrator that will pierce a foot thickness of steel-reinforced concrete and cause runway damage much more difficult to repair than simple cratering.) Similar weapons delivered with precise guidance techniques could be used to penetrate existing shelters and destroy the aircraft inside. This problem will grow as the standoff delivery capability of precision guided munitions improves. Because of their high speed and small size, PGM launched from standoff ranges will probably be more difficult to detect and intercept than penetrating aircraft. The U.S. is directing much technological effort toward increasing the accuracy of PGM as well as the standoff range from which they can be employed. It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets also will pursue this objective.
In addition to PGM threats from manned aircraft, technological advances in drone or remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) could lead to the development of an air base attack system. Conceivably, drone/RPV could counter in tense point defenses by employing standoff PGM or by penetrating and taking losses that might be unacceptable for manned aircraft.
Standoff weapons such as air-to-surface (cruise), surface-to-surface, short-
or intermediate-range ballistic missiles might be used in lieu of manned
aircraft or RPV for air base attack. Various types of rockets, artillery, and
mortars also would be effective, particularly against unsheltered aircraft or
unhardened air base facilities. 5
Although this article is concerned primarily with the threat to air bases from conventional weapons, it must be noted that a tactical nuclear threat also has existed for some time and continues to be considered credible. The Soviets might risk employing tactical nuclear warheads in a limited, “surgical” application, particularly against counterforce targets such as runways, if they felt that (1) this was the best way to achieve their objectives and that (2) NATO might match this escalatory step but would go no further toward general nuclear war.6
Together these factors serve to make the’ future TACAIR ground survivability problem in NATO increasingly more severe than when it first was addressed ten years ago in the TAB VEE study.
future problems of air base survivability
Fundamentally, an air base has become a vulnerable array of separate but interdependent targets. The capabilities of modern offensive air power threaten all three interdependent elements of an air base: (1)the aircraft; (2) the runway; and (3) the mission-essential resources, such as the logistical support and services infrastructure composed of personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies. These elements are separate but mutually dependent—like the links of a chain. First, the aircraft must be survivable while on the ground. Second, the aircraft must be able to get airborne to perform their mission during or after attack. To do this, TACAIR must be able to use its runways or become independent of them. Third, the logistics infrastructure must survive to sustain future air operations. TACAIR will be only as strong as the weakest of the three links.
In the future, each one of these elements or links will become more difficult to protect so long as air bases continue to be relatively confined and in close proximity to conspicuous runways. The presence of a runway alerts the enemy that aircraft can be expected to base in that vicinity and serves as a readily identifiable focal point for his reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence gathering, and subsequent targeting efforts. A determined and resourceful enemy could pinpoint the locations of individual shelters and support facilities around such a landmark. New sensors, platforms, and methods for detecting and attacking targets at night and in adverse weather will continue to evolve.
It should be expected that, as aircraft and the logistical infrastructure continue to be more effectively concealed and hardened, runways will become much more attractive targets. As this happens, surely new munitions will evolve that can cause damage very difficult to repair. Furthermore, as the Israelis showed in 1967, repairs can be prevented or greatly hampered by the use of antipersonnel munitions equipped with devices that allow randomly timed, delayed detonation. This ordnance is small and can be dispensed at intervals to blanket an airstrip.
Of course, assuming that repair resources were still intact and the work was
not effectively hampered by continual enemy harassment tactics (or residual
nuclear radioactivity), airfield out-of-commission time from runway damage can
be fairly short. Even so, a runway out of commission for only a limited period,
if at a crucial time, could be catastrophic in a short war—as shown by the
repeatedly successful Israeli tactics against the Arabs. Studies show that
disrupting an opponent’s sortie rate, even without destroying aircraft (which
could be destroyed at leisure if the runway were unusable), can greatly
influence the outcome of an air operation. This is because such actions
effectively alter the power balance of the opposing air assets.7
alternatives for ground survivability
It is beyond the scope of this article to address the active defense measures that might be taken to enhance TACAIR ground survivability. Any active system for defending air bases against all air threats must integrate capabilities to cope with surface-to-surface, cruise, or ballistic missiles, as well as with manned aircraft and drone/RPV, perhaps employing standoff PGM. Of the many active means for defending against a powerful, aggressive air attack, each has limitations, and it is not apparent that any one or combination is completely reliable or feasible. Some enemy weapons will get through. Insofar as U.S. TACAIR is vulnerable on the ground and can be crippled by a relatively small air attack employing advanced weaponry, additional survivability measures must be taken beyond active air defense.
There are many ways that passive means can be used to enhance the survivability of parked aircraft and their ancillary facilities as the capability of the weapons used against them increases.
One course of action would be to continue sheltering aircraft and further hardening the logistics infrastructure. (Runways are already hard, and it would be difficult to increase their hardness significantly.) This alternative will provide only short-term respites until succeeding advances in weapons technology can again make aircraft shelters vulnerable and overcome the hardening of base facilities. Eventually, a point will be reached where it becomes too costly to pursue further this single alternative.
Another passive measure is to introduce concealment and mobility on an air base. Aircraft can be concealed or moved to different areas on the base. Facilities and storage areas can be camouflaged. (Again, runways would not be amenable to this alternative.) However, studies indicate that it may be a worthwhile tactic to attack occupied airfields, even if bombs have to be dropped by use of random area techniques. Should shelters be concealed or proliferated, it probably still would be worthwhile to attack them because the attacker knows the shelters are concentrated in a relatively small area and many or all can be found (if necessary) and destroyed with shelter-bursting munitions.
Proliferation of major air bases could increase the effectiveness of active area defenses and could complicate the Pact’s targeting problems by allowing aircraft to be employed from a larger number of operating sites located throughout the defended area. This would make it more difficult and costly for enemy air to penetrate and effectively conduct air base attacks. Also, if more bases are available than are needed at any one time, vacant ones would serve as decoys to confuse and dilute the enemy’s offensive efforts. A major obstacle to proliferating air bases in West Europe lies in the difficulty of acquiring adequate real estate to meet the requirements. Even if most of the base facilities were put underground (to enable use of the surface in other ways), the land requirements for runways and taxiways would be prohibitive in many areas. Also, to man and maintain a large number of bases suitable for the present force would be more costly than current basing concepts. Where construction of new runways and facilities is necessary, it would be still more expensive.
By acquisition of more aircraft capable of short takeoff and landing (STOL), the runway construction and maintenance portion of the cost for airfield proliferation could be reduced somewhat. If these STOL aircraft could operate from sod strips, runway costs would be still less, and more potential sites would be available for basing TACAIR. The Soviets employ this technique extensively. But, while the amount of land required for STOL runways is less than that required for conventional operations, acquisition of real estate in West Europe for new STOL airfields would remain a major problem. Furthermore, although a sod strip is less conspicuous than a runway, so long as aircraft must be parked in that vicinity and a logistics infrastructure clustered nearby, the base would provide a lucrative, relatively vulnerable target.
Many of the real estate costs and political obstacles to proliferating main bases could be circumvented through the acquisition of “zero launch and recovery” TACAIR forces. One way to do this would be by modifying the present force. However, zero launch techniques, such as catapults and auxiliary propulsion units, were tested on conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft in the early 1950s and rejected as not feasible. Even had the tests been successful, such a system would not have been fully beneficial because there was no provision for zero recovery. A comprehensive technological assessment and cost analysis would be needed to determine the feasibility of “adding on” a zero launch and recovery capability to present and oncoming CTOL aircraft. On the surface it appears complex and costly to modify manned aircraft for this purpose.
Another way—one that may have more merit—is to acquire vertical or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, which have an integral zero takeoff and recovery capability. The Air Force has considered V/STOL for many years but for several reasons has never opted to acquire such an operational capability. Historically, a major drawback to V/STOL systems has been that they were expensive to develop, fly, and maintain. This is still true, but now there are ways in which the impact of the cost barriers to V/STOL exploitation could be mitigated. Another factor that reduced V/STOL utility and desirability was the severe constraint on its fuel and payload capacity imposed by the gross weight limitations for vertical operations. The advent of precision guided munitions helps alleviate the small payload factor because PGM are relatively small and light, and not as many are required to equal the lethality of comparable unguided bombs against a wide range of targets. As the standoff capability of PGM increases, there will be opportunity for even more range/ endurance/payload trade-off.
However, a capability to land and take off vertically would not be a panacea in itself. Even if no runways existed to serve as landmarks and targets, main bases would continue to be lucrative, relatively vulnerable targets as long as their complement of aircraft and other mission-essential resources were clustered in a rather confined area.
A survey of the potential for hardening, concealment, mobility, and proliferation reveals that, under current basing concepts, no single passive defense alternative appears particularly promising. Nor do any of the alternatives seem promising in combination, for neither hardening, concealment, nor mobility appears to have great utility so long as aircraft and facilities must be located at only a few main bases and in the near vicinity of a runway. Thus, proliferation of major bases, even without runways, does not provide a to tally acceptable solution.
A more innovative and comprehensive approach to the problem of TACAIR ground survivability appears to be necessary. If TACAIR could operate independent of centralized major bases and runways and if aircraft and logistics infrastructure could be dispersed much more than is now possible, those passive measures already outlined could become mutually reinforcing. Dispersal of TACAIR resources into numerous small, inconspicuous targets can strengthen all links of the chain more than any other passive technique. Mobility, concealment, proliferation, and hardening would all become more effective when combined with dispersal techniques. At the same time, dispersal tends to increase the overall effectiveness of the active defense system against attack by manned aircraft. Furthermore, it is equally good for both conventional and nuclear survivability
A big question to be answered is how to provide major maintenance and repair and other logistical support to numerous widely dispersed operating sites. A lack of innovative logistics concepts has been the undoing of several previous proposals for V/STOL systems and TACAIR dispersal. New basing concepts are needed to suggest both feasible and substantial improvements, and it would seem that such concepts should focus on the pivotal liabilities imposed on dispersability by dependence on runways. As these liabilities are lessened or eliminated, new ground survivability avenues can open up. New concepts, therefore, should be oriented toward wider dispersal after becoming independent of runways. The complete independence from runways provided by V/STOL systems offers the ultimate potential for airfield dispersal and—when combined with other active and passive defense measures—for survival.
Even without V/STOL, the application of innovative basing and logistics
concepts should allow a gradual shift in emphasis from hardening toward
dispersal to enhance TACAIR survivability. This also could make TACAIR more
mobile and responsive and further add to its flexibility. 8
USAF future directions
In general, it appears that the Air Force would be well advised to commence new directions for TACAIR ground survivability in a combat theater. The following Air Force actions and future directions appear appropriate for the short term (next five years), mid term (subsequent five years), and long term (10-15 years after the mid 1980s).
Short-Term Directions:
· Begin spreading out the logistics infrastructure on existing bases, employing optimum hardening and concealment.
· Continue the aircraft sheltering and concealment program, with emphasis on greater individual separation where possible.
· Place greater emphasis on emergency operating capability to cope with runway damage or destruction of portions of the logistics infrastructure.
· Initiate more intensive advanced research and development for TACAIR V/STOL capabilities.
· Begin developing advanced basing and logistics concepts and capabilities for highly dispersed operations.
Mid-Term Directions:
· Begin de-emphasis of further shelter construction at main operating bases.
· Where feasible, implement permanent or emergency dispersal plans to operate TACAIR from more air bases, emphasizing overall mobility and relocation capability as well as survivability.
· Employ airfields with unprepared runways or STOL-only runways where this will add to dispersal without excess operational or resource cost.
· Continue developing concepts, procedures, and hardware for dispersal, concealment, hardening, and mobility of TACAIR operating locations and logistics. Emphasize V/STOL developments.
Long-Term Directions:
· Continue efforts to achieve greater dispersal, concealment, hardening, and overall mobility of TACAIR resources in-theater.
· Where feasible, implement V/STOL operations employing a highly dispersed and flexible structure of operating locations without runways.
Of course, passive measures should be combined with active counterair techniques such as air base attack and air-to-air and surface-to-air intercept. Future passive measures should ensure that the air base’s essential elements all have roughly equal survivability, without any weak links.
Air War College
Notes
1. Over the years, this program has been referred to as the Theater Air Base Vulnerability Program (TAB VEE), SACEUR’s Airfield Physical Protection Program. NATO Airfield Survivability Measures (ASM), and the Aircraft Shelter Program, Current Air Staff actions dealing with this program use the standardized title “Improved Airfield Survivability Measures.” Although hardened aircraft shelters for tactical fighters represent a large portion of the Air Force program, many other active and passive airfield survivability measures are included, such as dispersal, hardened operational facilities, point air defense, airfield security, and reduced vulnerability of strategic airlift. (Source: Input from DCS/Plans & Operations to the Daily Staff Digest, Headquarters USAF, No. 58, Monday, 25 March 1974, p. 2.)
2. Report of Secretary or Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY l975 –1979 Defense Program, 4 March 1974, pp. 87, 88.
3.”The Military Balance 1974/75, “A Publication of The International Institute for Strategic Studies,” London, Air Force Magazine, December 1974, pp. 41-104. Also see FY 1975 Annual Defense Report, p. l43.
4. Robert R. Rodwell, “Three Hours—and Six Days,” Air Force Magazine, October 1967, p. 58.
5. Air base defense against sabotage or enemy ground forces, as shown by experiences in Vietnam, continues to be important. This problem is separate from that of defending against attack by air weapons and, although beyond the scope of this article, must be considered in the total context of the ground survivability problem. Some or the alternatives discussed herein for enhancing survivability against air attack also may offer a measure of protection against the ground threat.
6. John M. Collins, Defense Trends in tie United States 1952-1973, Congressional Research Service Study 74-103SS, Library of Congress, May 14, 1974. pp. 24, 25.
7. William B. Ammon, Jr., Study Director, Barbarossa II, Orlando Division, Martin Marietta Aerospace Corporation, Orlando, Florida.
8. To provide these TACAIR characteristics, it would appear that in the combat theater tactical combat aircraft must be stationed reasonably proximate in distance and time to the areas in whirls they will operate. For this reason, the ground survivability alternative or stationing all TACAIR combat resources far to the rear of the expected areas of operations (e.g., in the United Kingdom or possibly even in the CONUS for NATO operations) was not discussed. It is true that this alternative might permit the U.S. to exploit its superiority in aircraft range, in-flight refueling techniques, and standoff technology so as to attain great range and mobility from bases outside the combat zone. However, such a concept would have major disadvantages. For example, assuming that Pact aircraft or missiles posses, or could possess equivalent ranges in- theater, any TACAIR stationed in the U.K. would continue to suffer the same survivability problems described under trends for the future, Basing procedures would tend to be more centralized and rigid, thereby reducing basing mobility and flexibility and making it more difficult for TACAIR to deploy to and provide a continual presence in distant overseas areas. Except when aircraft actually are patrolling over a given area, TACAIRs responsiveness would be severely curtailed. The concept may warrant further study, but essentially it is alien to this article’s basic subject—ground survivability of TACAIR stationed in-theater.
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Blake, Jr. (M.B.A., George Washington University) is assigned to the Directorate, Development Plans, Hq AFSC. A tactical aircraft pilot with some 1000 combat hours, he has had overseas assignments in Japan and Europe and two voluntary tours in Southeast Asia. Other assignments have been at Hq TAC and at Hq USAF. Colonel Blake is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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