Air University Review, May-June 1977

American Defense Policy, 1945-1977

A Review Essay

DEFENSE, like all political language, is a euphemism. It imparts a neutral tone to the ugly reality of conflict. Reviews of five that are concerned with the formulation of U.S. defense policies, the impact of allies on those policies, and what forces might shape future defense policies are presented in this article. Because policy decisions are always part philosophy and part exigency, it is important to understand the constellation of forces that interact in the policy formulation process.

In 1945 many hoped that the cooperation of the Allies might carry over into a peaceful international system. Spheres of influence, however, were soon established, and the division of Germany made bipolarity a fact. The International system again became a world of competing alliances and weapons. Stung by Soviet actions culminating in the 1948 Berlin blockade, the U.S. returned to conscription, and the spiral of military competition emerged. These developments, coupled with the inevitability in a pluralistic democracy of both defense policy and the defense budget being products of political competition, combined to create the postwar environment in which decisions were made. 

Although the policy debates in pre-Korean days are notable for the absence of heavy civilian involvement, the constant theme of "who gets how much money for what missions" does appear. The military services themselves were the primary actors before 1950. In 1948 a Presidential Commission on Air Power argued that although bombing might not win the next war, it could prevent losing that war. In 1949, General Omar Bradley asserted that one must first blunt the enemy attack, then mobilize and deploy the Army to win the crucial land battles. General Hoyt Vandenberg, meanwhile, believed that air power would weaken political resolve. But President Truman obviously disagreed and partially impounded funds for "excessive" air wings. The Navy criticized the B-36 and its atomic strategy with Admiral Arthur W. Radford reminding us that the atomic blitz was not an effective deterrent. The only significant civilian involvement, aside from the White House, came with George Kennan and his containment concept which furnished the intellectual rationale for policymakers.

These early policy debates naturally involved the allocation of resources. As early as May 1946, Truman had declared that the FY 1948 military programs "could have one-third of the funds remaining after the fixed [domestic] charges had been met."¹ By the spring of 1950, however, the National Security Council had noted the sharply increased Soviet capabilities and recommended immediate corresponding U.S. increases. Truman held firm against the recommendation until the outbreak of Korean fighting made the issues obsolete.

Strategy

Now a provocative book† by a British scholar, Robert E. Walters, argues that the U.S. committed two basic mistakes in its post-World War II policies: first, we allowed military strategy to determine overall policy; and, second, this "mistaken" nuclear strategy produced the wrong policies, The author holds that American policy-makers unwittingly married the heartland theory of Sir Halford J. Mackinder to nuclear deterrence. However, contrary to his statement, the author does not prove his theory "by analysis and reasoning." Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson cut back pre-Korean force levels because of the American nuclear monopoly and a desire to save money. This same concern for dollars, the failure of the NATO alliance to meet the 1953 Lisbon manpower goals, and the overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority led to the adoption of a series of defensive strategies centering about the uncertainty of nuclear release. The key determinants were clearly budgetary constraints and manpower levels. Moreover, Walters seems unable to comprehend that deterrence existed long before nuclear weapons ushered in our revolutionary epoch. Many readers will agree with the author that a balance of power is desirable and that NATO needs greater maritime strength. However, the recent Soviet growth in air power assets is ignored, More fundamentally, Walters fails to explain how control of the Atlantic affects tank battles on the Central Front. Sea control is vital but, as the Chief of Naval Operations notes, only in a NATO war lasting more than three weeks.² Finally, contrary to Mackinder’s original theory, the heartland is now accessible to nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.

†Robert E. Walters, Sea Power and the Nuclear Fallacy: A Re-evaluation of Global Strategy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975, $10.95) 215 pages.

Walters’s work is often irrelevant to its central them (still, the chapter on the blitzkrieg is excellent). Nevertheless, the world is entering a new maritime era where oceanic natural resources, strategic deterrence, and the natural rivalry between states will make the seas critically important to all. Perhaps the most interesting segment of the book is the discussion of the new capital ship, a nuclear underwater vessel. Even though the idea is old, Walter’s treatment is lively and informative. One suspects that in the near future Admiral Hyman G. Rickover will also quote Sir Julian S. Corbett, a turn-of-the-century British naval strategist, who said the major problem in naval history is "reconciling sea endurance with free movement.

Allies

If, then, Walters is wrong and our resources dictated our foreign policy and American military strategy was derived from a grand strategy, the paramount issue of the early postwar years was how to treat our defeated enemies. Both Germany and Japan were judged to be capable of resuming aggressive actions. Thus, to allow demobilization while fulfilling occupation duties demanded a political strategy incorporating significant political, economic, and elements. Policy toward Japan was clear—disarmament, demilitarization, and democratization. Policy toward Germany was, of course, more complex given the Cold War and the later realization of the need for German military manpower.

Alliance politics inevitably impose limitations on the freedom of all members. The Unites States first encountered these limitations with Germany and, more recently, has witnessed these mutual constraints in dealing with Japan. Although the Federal Republic Germany (FRG) renounced possession of nuclear arms in 1954, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's insistence on equality within the alliance made nuclear sharing a constant domestic and alliance problem between 1954 and 1966. Solutions such as the Multilateral Force (MLF) were advanced, eventually the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) granted Germany the prestige of full partnership and enhanced diplomatic flexibility.

In and obviously academic work, Catherine Kelleher richly describes the German experience of these years and relates it well to broader international events. † For example, she notes that in 1948 General Hans Speidel argued that German feelings of military inferiority would make them a weak link in the Western defensive system. Full rearmament, was clearly unacceptable to our French allies. Thus, the creation of a nuclear weapons British and advisory committee became the solution. Yet today the NPG still obscures basic policy differences between the allies. The desire of the FRG is to halt the war at the border. Their reasoning is obvious: if the nuclear threshold is passed, better that the release occur on the frontier instead of deep in German territory since more than fifty percent of the work force is within eight hours of the border by armor column. Nevertheless, the resolution of the nuclear sharing issue has freed German foreign policy—as is evident from the earlier efforts at Ostpolitik and the 1976 initiative on international terrorism at the United Nations (the first major FRG international action). Contrast this to the increasing difficulties faced by America and Japan in recent years: military bases, American-imposed fishing reductions in U.S. waters, the "two Chinas" problem, the issue of whether Japan should assume additional defense responsibilities, and now a clash over nuclear reprocessing. Clearly, the early occupation years dramatically affected the Japanese.

† Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, $15.00), 372 pages.

The three most commendable essays in a volume edited by a former Army officer, James Buck,† clarify the impact of the occupation: the absence of a viable military tradition; the continuing urbanization that further shrinks the manpower recruitment pool; and the patterns by which antimilitary opinion is formed within the culture.

† James H. Buck, editor, The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975, $15.00 hardback, $7.50 paper), 249 pages.

Despite the success of our policies promoting pacifism and discrediting the gumbatsu (military clique), the present Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), utilizing his talents and credibility as a former minister of education, is beginning to change attitudes. Now in Japan one can encounter public discussions of defense issues. Further, the September 1976 translation of the latest JDA "White Paper" hints at the Soviet maritime threat--something never before done by a government unwilling even to discuss threat perceptions. The importance of such shifts in societal attitudes has been made clear by Zbigniew Brzezinski in discussing the impact of possible American attitudinal shifts that make it "almost axiomatic that an isolationist U.S. will definitely create a nationalist and militarist Japan." The maintenance of alliance cohesion is indeed in the best interests of America, her allies, and regional stability.

Eisenhower under Attack

Eisenhower continued the Truman policy of a ceiling on defense spending and proceeded to finalize a network of regional security treaties. Events, however, forced increases in defense budgets. Defense spending rose, in constant 1954 dollars, from a 1950 figure of $16 billion to a 1954 high of $41.2 billion, before leveling off at about $38 billion annually for the remainder of Eisenhower's term.³

The Sputnik launching in 1957, however, destroyed Ike's hopes for a "long-haul" defense budget that avoided the peaks and valleys of pre-Korean days. Although the Eisenhower administration never added substantial new funds, the dissent caused by the Soviet space success made possible rapid increases in the early sixties. Individual military dissenters found civilian allies and attacked the administration policies. Superb coverage of this crucial 1957-1960 period is found in Richard Aliano's book.† His work also subjects the various "process theories" (Huntington and Janowitz on the military, Fenno on Congressional committees, Cohen on the press) to examination, and the theories stand the test well. The analysis of the shift from massive retaliation to flexible response concludes rather obviously that strategic policy formulation is a "social rather than an intellective process, involving myriad interests and opposing values and their conciliation."

†Richard A. Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975, $13.50), 309 pages.

The reality of this social process was clear when Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson called Sputnik "today's scientific Pearl Harbor," and the avalanche of criticism began. Even a "cold warrior" New York Times editorialized in support of a crash program to "assure our superiority in missiles." The only commonality among the critics was a desire for change.⁴ "Innovators" such as Maxwell Taylor, Hyman Rickover, and James M. Gavin, influenced "popularizers" such as the Alsop brothers, John Finney, and Hanson Baldwin. Both categories of people found their ideas and arguments articulate by "capitalizers" such as Senators Johnson, Symington, and later Kennedy, for political advantage. However, those senators, each seeking the Presidency, were guilty of the same error often committed by legislators today—an emphasis on defense budgetary issues to the exclusion of the relationship between defense and foreign policy. Indeed, the weakest chapter in Aliano's book concerns precisely those civilian theorists who raised such troublesome points: Brodie, Kahn, Kaufman, Kissinger, Osgood, Wolhstetter. The chapter merely strings together their quotes devoid of any analysis. Are men of ideas blind to the transfer problems of academic models to policy prescriptions? How do scholars deal with conflicts of loyalty—truth or partisan political advantage? Why did the renaissance of the fifties, the power of these "action-intellectuals" in the sixties, lead to the doubting of their contribution in the seventies?

A New Era

Pax Americana ended in 1973. Now we are groping for an uncertain future. Because diplomacy must attempt to influence events before core security interest become predominant, the essays assembled by Professor Richard Rosecrance deserve careful reading.† The premise of this volume is that the era of American hegemony is over but the United States now enjoys a greater maneuverability in foreign policy as contrasted to those earlier years. The basic lesson, according to Rosecrance, is simply "If American forces are engaged in any conflict …the encounter must be short and decisive. Such analysis followed Korea and was forgotten in Vietnam except by General Giap. Yet, Rosecrance's formula needs an addition—can America successfully make war without going on a moral crusade? Our renewed emphasis on short war strategies in Europe and Korea would indicate that many are concerned that the answer is negative. Ever here, however, there exist bedeviling questions: What is in the national interest? What is the role of tactical nuclear weapons in escalation options? Thus, our immediate future should be devoted to re-establishing a basic consensus on these points, for in a democratic society strategy must rest on what is possible.

The single area where the American public has more aware is the increasingly important economic dimension. Robert Gilpin, in a lucid piece included in America as an Ordinary Country illustrates how political economy should be written. He links economic and political change and then formulates a pattern of how such changes may affect political decisions and governmental policies toward multinational corporations (MNCs). The Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, C. Fred Bergsten, supplements that analysis with a selection emphasizing the U.S. need to redress likely future imbalances by MNCs—at U.S. expense—toward their hosts in developing countries.

Geographically, an essay by François Duchene presents a role for the European Community as a regional resource in crisis management situations. Cyprus, however, proves that the community needs improvement to reach such a position. Brigadier Hunt then develops a mediocre essay on the Far East that fails to weigh the Taiwan issue adequately, given the security treaty which makes a "Japanese solution" of trade feasible but diplomatic recognition more difficult. Hunt ignores his Commonwealth neighbors, Australia and New Zealand, while doing a slightly better job on the regional impact of possible American withdrawals from South Korea, recognizing that the mode of disengagement is all important.

The gem of the Rosecrance volume is the display of argumentative reasoning by Coral Bell. She contends that the benefits of détente outweigh its costs. "Détente is a stratagem for the management of adversary power which aims at securing the essential power interest of America and maintaining its essential diplomatic competitiveness at less than exorbitant costs." This relationship between "enemy brothers," to use Raymond Aron's phrase, is, she believes, a safety net which insulates the superpowers from regional disasters such as the 1973 Middle Eastern War. Bell argues that détente is worth the slight risk of Soviet economic gain, especially given the greater leverage gained by the U.S. from playing on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Of course, the critical unstated assumption is that the Western powers are not lulled into a false sense of security. Recent Soviet pronouncements make clear that detente is but a continuation of earlier peaceful coexistence tactics. One also wonders if an expert on the Soviet system would contend that these economic gains will serve to focus the leadership more on the satisfaction of material desires or simply allow them to expand military capabilities? It is a pity that the editor did not seek such a contribution.

†Richard Rosecrance, editor, America as an Ordinary Country: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976, $9.75), 276 pages.

OUR FUTURE, however, will assuredly see increased linkages between international events and domestic political struggles. The theater of international politics has one pervasive factor, its own interdependence: rapid population growth in developing countries; a widening gap in the economic standing between rich and poor nations; dwindling supplies of energy and agriculture; and, perhaps most significantly, the lengthy periods required for scientific advances that may help alleviative such problems. Thus, shifting international coalitions, greater intrusion of domestic politics into foreign policies, a declining (but still necessary) utility of military force, multiple channels for influencing world events, and the intertwined nature of these problems, all combine to force a new agenda on statesmen.

The critical issue of nuclear nonproliferation illustrates these new trends. American policy is creating disagreement with traditional allies over nuclear supply issues. This situation is then further complicated by the desire of other states to acquire these weapons for security and prestige reasons, despite the limited utility of such weapons. Non-proliferation, thus, cuts across a mix of economic, political, and military issues. Deterrence, for example, may be impossible in the year 2000 if a state cannot identify who launched a nuclear attack because of proliferation of such weapons. In such a world no reprisal makes sense unless on is willing to unleash the spasm of total nuclear conflict. How, then, are leaders to formulate defense policies?

Future policy implementation will demand both cross-national actions and new international institutions. Yet there is no way to ignore the truth, "Threat systems are basis of politics as exchange systems are basis of economics."⁵ Policy-makers those governed by them cannot afford illusions.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia, University Press, 1961), p.42.

2. Admiral James L. Holloway III, Hearings: Department of Defense Appropriation Fiscal Year 1976, part 3,1975, p. 197. Note especially the favorable assumptions that convoys were formed prior to the outbreak of war and that they encounter no hostile forces.

3. Indeed, from 1950 until 1969 the administrations always received either the amount requested for defense or, not uncommonly, ever more dollars.

4. Conventional wisdom often fails to consider a later press in 1954 in which John Foster Dulles stated that massive retaliation was a "capacity," not a policy. Hence, the doctrine quickly became one of selective retaliation. Further, few note the beginnings of both the Polaris and Minuteman programs in the Eisenhower administration.

5. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan; 1973), p. 31.

Captain Roy Werner, U.S. Army Reserve (B. Phil., Oxford University, England) is a Legislative Assistant to Senator John Glenn. His government service includes stints with the Federal Energy Administration (International Affairs), the White House Conference on Youth, and the Office, Secretary of the Army. He is an honor graduate of the Army Air Defense School. Previous articles have appeared in America, The Atlantic Community Quarterly, The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Military Review, and the AFROTC Education Journal.

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