Air University Review, September-October 1981

Focus on African Conflict

For several reasons, Africa south of the Sahara has never occupied a high priority in American consciousness nor among foreign and defense policymakers. This condition is historically understandable, in that independent African nation-states other than the Republic of South Africa and Liberia are a relatively recent phenomenon. The first of the recently independent black states, Ghana, came into existence in 1957. Consequently, only in the past few decades has there been any particular reason to focus on the "dark continent.’’ At the same time, until recently, Africa has largely been spared the vicissitudes of major East-West competition. Following a spate of both Soviet and Chinese attempts at involvement in the early 1960s, which produced only marginal positive results, both superpowers for a decade steered a course of minimal activity beyond maintaining a physical presence.

Events have forced a reexamination of this placid situation, and policymakers and analysts are being forced to rediscover Africa. These events have taken several forms. In the wake of the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) embargo and the consequent realization of the finity of many other strategic nonrenewable resources (largely mineral), there has been a rising awareness of Africa’s importance as the repository of significant amounts of vital mineral reserves. Conflict and instability in the Horn of Africa and in former Portuguese Africa have provided exploitable opportunities for Soviet mischief, and an increasingly aggressive Soviet posture, abetted by Cuba, is seen on the continent. The nagging intractability of black-white relations in southern Africa remains a lit powder keg with an ever shorter fuse. All of these problems comingle to create a situation of growing urgency if outcomes unfavorable to American interests are to be avoided.

All of these things have not, of course, gone unnoticed, as evidenced by a spate of recent books on various aspects of the African political situation, which individually covers a variety of concerns and judgments about the range, depth, and directions of African affairs. They include a continental overview, the southern African (and especially South African) dilemma, communist activity and penetration, and the volatile Horn.

Taken collectively, these works provide considerable insight into what Ali A. Mazrui calls "the African condition," which is also the title of his most recent work.*

*Ali A. Mazrui, The African Condition: A Political Diagnosis (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980, $17.50 cloth, $5.95 paper), 138 pages.

Mazrui’s slender, highly readable volume is derived from scripts for the 1979 Reith lectures on the British Broadcasting Corporation. He poses the African situation in terms six paradoxes.

• The first, the "paradox of habitation," arises from the apparent incongruity in the fact that Africa was, by most anthropological accounts, man’s first home; yet it remains the continent least hospitable to human sustenance.

• The "paradox of humiliation" refers to the unique oppression Africans have suffered and continue to suffer and has, according to Mazrui, three principal sources: ". . . the slave trade, European colonization of Africa, and continuing racial discrimination wherever black people live with white people." (p. 28)

Three of the paradoxes stem from Africa’s interaction with the West and its underdevelopment by Western standards.

• The "paradox of acculturation" refers to the massive assault on African peoples by Western cultural and political forms, which had the effect of overwhelming traditional values and, as the physical colonial presence receded, left Africans with conflicting sets of identities.

• The "paradox of fragmentation" is at the root of African economic underdevelopment. It has, according to Mazrui, three sources:

Africa is one of the best endowed regions of the world, but it is still the least developed of the inhabited continents . . . . This is the paradox of technical backwardness. Of course, there are rich blacks as well as rich whites. . . . This is the pathology of maldistribution. . . . The paradox here is of a rich continent which contains many poverty-stricken societies. This is the pathology of fragmented economy. (Emphasis in original; pp. 70-71)

• This fragmentation creates the fifth paradox, "retardation." As a result, "in world affairs the continent does not act as a unit; on the contrary, it is subject to the weakness of its national, ethnic, ideological and religious cleavages." (p. 102)

• The heart of the African condition is brought together in the sixth paradox, "the paradox of Africa’s location. Africa is the most centrally located of all continents, but politically it is perhaps the most marginal.’’ (p. 116) In this final exposition, Mazrui lapses into prediction and prescription with mixed results. He predicts, for instance, that "the triumvirate of African diplomatic powers before the end of the century will consist of Nigeria, Zaire, and black-ruled South Africa," (p. 128) a not implausible scenario with important geopolitical implications. In a less compelling vein, he advocates African acquisition of nuclear weapons as a principal means to assert African self-importance in the international system.

Mazrui’s prediction of black rule in the Republic of South Africa (Azania to many black nationalists), combined with his earlier observation that "there has so far been no precedent of any white settler community in Africa, effectively in control of the local situation, giving up power without violence" (p. 18) serves as a transition to the second area of African concern, southern Africa. Although there are difficult and important problems associated with the states on its borders, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the most heated controversy is focused on the last white redoubt on the continent, the Republic of South Africa. The South African question has several facets, including continuing racial discrimination symbolized by apartheid and the policy of separate development, as well as how the United States should deal with South African governments espousing racist policies.

Four recent books of varying levels of specialization have appeared that consider this complex set of questions. The most general in scope are Gwendolen Carter’s Which Way is South Africa Going?* and Robert I. Rotberg’s Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa.** Carter has collaborated with Patrick O’Meara to coedit a series of essays, Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis,*** that treats South Africa and her neighboring states, and Desaix Myers et al. have compiled a guide to the business climate and prospects in U.S. Business in South Africa: The Economic, Political, and Moral Issues.****

*Gwendolen M. Carter, Which Way is South Africa Going? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, $ 10.95), 155 pages.

**Robert I. Rotberg, Suffer the Future: Policy Choices in Southern Africa (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980, $15.00), 295 pages.

***Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O’Meara, editors, Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, $17.50 cloth, $7.95 paper), 404 pages.

****Desaix Myers III with Kenneth Propp, David Hauck, and David M. Liff, U.S. Business in South Africa: The Economic, Political, and Moral Issues (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, $17.50), 318 pages.

The heart of the South African problem is simple enough to state, if not necessary to solve. The problem is the determination of the Afrikaner-dominated white government in Pretoria to maintain control in a country where whites represent only about 16 percent of the population. The vehicle for control is the system of racially discriminatory laws and regulations that physically separate white from black from colored, collectively known as apartheid. The system has disenfranchised all but the white population and, South African rhetoric notwithstanding, is intended to perpetuate white minority rule. This position is enunciated in a long-term strategy called "separate development," as implemented by the "homelands" policy. Under this scheme, Africans are to move into physically separate areas within South Africa where they eventually would become self-governing and presumably related to overall South African governance in some form of confederation wherein the major racial groups—white, black, colored, and Asian—would share power.

The major objection to this formulation is that it is only acceptable to the whites, and especially the Afrikaners. Blacks see separate development as an instrumentality to maintain segregation and white economic and political dominance. The homelands are inhospitable places, generally either barren, barely arable hinterlands or overcrowded urban slums, and most want nothing to do with them. Rather, they prefer a united South Africa organized along something like "one man-one vote" lines (which is unacceptable to the white minority). The result, as Gwendolen Carter sees it, is a moral question:

The moral dilemma of South African whites is clear. To provide the majority. . . with the rights they prize for themselves is to threaten the edifice they have so carefully and skillfully erected. (p. 16)

Although whites have managed to maintain control and, due to a very strong paramilitary and military organization, probably will continue to do so for some time (both Rotberg, p. 160, and Carter, p. 145, agree on this point), the long-term trends are working against the whites. The principle trends are demographic and economic, and they are related.

Demographically, two things are occurring. First, the black population growth rate considerably exceeds that of whites, magnifying black numerical dominance. Second, blacks are increasingly concentrated in urban homeland ghettos, where they form the core of the industrial work force. Black labor is absolutely necessary to the health of white-controlled industry, and population trends will increase that dependence in the future. Rotberg describes the implications of this situation:

But the ticking of the demographic time bomb, and the location of that bomb—in terms of African numbers, in the cities—makes it unlikely that separate development can reduce the implications of the policy of industrial growth that made whites wealthy and transformed Africans from a rural people. (pp. 7-8)

The demographic trend thus has economic consequences. The affluence of white South Africa depends on black African labor, and inevitably some of those laborers have become more affluent. Just as inevitably, enhanced economic standing has led to demands for political rights. Myers and his associates summarize the problem:

Significant economic advances for blacks in the early 1970s went unmatched by a growth in political rights, and the contrast between the growing importance of blacks to the economy and thc stagnant rights of blacks in the society became increasingly apparent. (p. 49)

How can these problems be solved? If the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely as all trends indicate, the options are peaceful negotiation or violence, and time is running short. As Rotberg maintains, "An orderly leadership-influenced, evolutionary resolution of the issues between white and black South Africans may not be possible indefinitely. That is the inescapable message of today’s South Africa." (p. 170)

What can or should the United States do to bring about desirable change? This is a viable question because of the importance of American (and other Western) private investment in South Africa’s economy, which has the indirect effect of bolstering the apartheid system. The degree of American penetration is impressive, as Myers et al. catalogue:

More than half of Fortune’s top 100 companies in the United States have South African subsidiaries. Approximately 350 American companies have subsidiaries or affiliates in that country and an additional 6,000 firms do business there on an agency basis. American companies employ nearly 100,000 workers, approximately two-thirds of whom are black. (p. xii)

If mobilized, this penetration could form a potent force for inducing change. The means to do so remains contentious.

Two strategies by which American companies can put pressure on the South African government are generally put forward: constructive engagement and total withdrawal (disengagement). Advocates of constructive engagement argue that incremental change can occur if U.S. companies in South Africa adopt nondiscriminatory employment and compensation policies that will improve the lot of blacks and create pressure for similar action elsewhere in the economy. The so-called "Sullivan code" of conduct (named after General Motors board member the Reverend Leon Sullivan) provides the model for such action. Thomas Karis, writing in the Carter and O’Meara volume, states the withdrawal position: ". . . the United States should move as rapidly and convincingly as possible to withdraw all semblance of governmental and business support for the South African regime, thus disengaging itself from the South African embrace." (p. 315) Black South Africans and Americans disagree about the appropriate strategy to follow.

Soviet-Cuban action in Angola and Ethiopia and concern over continuing southern African instability have combined to raise questions about Soviet African intentions. Two recent books, David E. Albright’s Communism in Africa* and Morris Rothenberg’s The USSR in Africa** explore this subject. The studies vary in tone and conclusion: the essays in the Albright volume are generally reflective and interpretive, concluding that the problem is serious but not dire. Rothenberg uses Soviet public policy pronouncement as his analytical case and reaches more ominous conclusions.

*David E. Albright, editor, Communism in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980, $12.95), 236 pages.

**Morris Rothenberg, The USSR in Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power (Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980, $12.95 cloth, $8.95 paper), 280 pages.

Two questions stand out: Why are the Soviets there? and What is likely to be their future form of involvement? The first question amounts to asking if the Soviets are operating from a carefully conceived master plan or whether they are simply exploiting mischievous opportunities. The weight of analysis in the Albright volume (and made explicit by Albright himself, p. 50, and by Jiri Valenta, p. 116) is that no clear-cut design is evident and that the Soviets are mainly reacting to situations that present themselves. That conclusion, however, offers scant comfort when contemplating the future of Soviet activity. According to Rothenberg:

As in Angola and Ethiopia, endemic African problems are likely to provide virtually endless new opportunities for future Soviet-Cuban involvement on the continent. . . . The complicated cross-border ethnic mosaic which marks the African scene is replete with existing or potential irredentist movements in which one party or another might seek outside involvement. (p. 265)

If the Soviets continue to be active in Africa, an assessment of their past success is necessary as context for the future. A judgment can be made in both a general and specific manner. At the general level, the tally is mixed. Colin Legum, writing in Communism in Africa, concludes, "Judged in terms of overall Soviet strategic objectives, Africa has not afforded the USSR any conspicuous successes thus far." (p. 34) Much of the basis for this judgment is the fluid nature of African commitments and the instrumental way that Africans view major power associations. As Legum explains, "Those who characterize African governments or movements as pro-Western or pro-Soviet almost always do so out of a failure to understand why certain African leaders, governments, or movements find it useful to choose a particular ally at a particular point in time." (p. 15) As a result, he concludes that "the Soviet encounter with Africa is much more likely to continue to be marked for some time to come by shifts of ‘alliance’ rather than to provide a solid base of Soviet influence." (p. 24)

This transient and fluid situation can be shown specifically through Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa, as skillfully portrayed by Tom J. Farer in War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Gathering Storm.* Writing in a lucid and rapier-like manner, Farer explains the twisted events that have brought Ethiopia into war with Somalia and internally into bloody conflict with secessionists in Eritrea. The superpowers’ involvement with both the Somalis and Ethiopians at different times is generally described as clumsy and callous. Of American early involvement with the Ethiopian Dirgue (the ruling junta), for instance, Farer writes:

*Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Gathering Storm, second, revised edition (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979, $10.00 cloth, $5.00 paper), 171 pages, bibliography.

The fact remains. . . that the government of Ethiopia tried, with careful premeditation, to orchestrate the starvation of Eritrea’s rural population. This did not deter then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from vetoing proposals to terminate military assistance to Ethiopia. (p. 44)

The Soviets are characterized as simple opportunists in Farer’s account. In discussing their switch in support from Somalia to Ethiopia, he says,

The nub of the matter, then, is that the potential costs were not extravagant, and so one need not construe the change of partners as the sign of a master plan that magnified the value of a united Ethiopia under a secure left-wing regime intimately linked to the Soviet Union. (p. 134)

Rather, he contends it is folly to interpret Horn activities in a geopolitical way.

Strategic marginality characterizes all of the Horn. . . .The Horn is too peculiar, too poor, and its principal actors are too preoccupied with provincial conflicts and aspirations to give the place a very high rank on any rational list of geopolitical priorities. (p. 134)

It has been possible only to suggest the tip of the iceberg of concerns and problems examined in this rich and varied set of volumes. The problems of sub-Saharan Africa are indeed many and complex. As the Western world finds itself increasingly turning toward the mineral riches of the African continent, their problems will become ours. Thus it is time that we begin to acquaint ourselves with these difficult realities. The eight books discussed here are an excellent starting point.

Donald M. Snow (B.A., M.A., University of Colorado; Ph.D., Indiana University is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies at the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. He was Visiting Professor of National Security Affairs, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in 1980. Dr. Snow has published articles in professional journals, is the author of Nuclear Strategy in a Dynamic World: American Policy in the 1980s (1980), and a previous award-winning contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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