Buy Online (TBA) | Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans 1992-1995 Co-authored with John Llambias Abstract: Chances for Peace: The Canadians in the Balkans, 1992-1995 is the first glimpse into the human side of the long Canadian military involvement in the Balkans. Focusing on the days of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Chances for Peace provides the reader with a cross-section of the Canadian experience, both in Croatia and Bosnia, in an accessible oral history format supplemented with a primer on Balkan operations, Canadian Army organization, vehicles, and equipment used during the 1992-1995 period. My mate John Llambias and I came up with the idea for C4P back in 1994: we knew a lot of soldiers that were coming back from Croatia and Bosnia with horrifying stories that the mainstream media was ignoring. While Christiane Amampour sat in Sarajevo, a Canadian infantry battalion fought it out with the Croatian Army is a little known valley that became known as the “Medak Pocket.” Other Canadians worked with the British SAS in Gorazde. The book became a tapestry of experiences all over the region and from it you could get a sense of what these nasty conflicts were like from the ground up. We interviewed as many people as we could and put this book together in 1995: eight publishers rejected the manuscript: one major Canadian publisher sent a letter questioning whether Canadians really wanted to read such horrifying accounts. Another wrote that Canadians really didn’t care about what a bunch of soldiers thought about the Balkans. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation told us to go away, that there was no value in what we were doing. We begged to differ. After six years of hard work, we finally got C4P published. Now the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is supporting one of its journalists who is running around interviewing Medak Pocket personnel and preparing her book…. We were fortunate to get General Jean Cot (French Army) and Lt Gen Michel Maisonneuve (Canadian Army) to write a foreword and a preface respectively. Foreword Text: If Sean Maloney asked me to write the introduction to this book, he had unquestionably a good reason! Here is my explanation: during my time as UN Force Commander, from July 1st 1993 to March 15th 1994, I had a special affection for “my Canadians.” Let me clarify. Out of some forty national contingents I was commanding, only one tenth of them had the necessary operational capabilities, and they were not subject to unacceptable government-imposed work restrictions. The Canadian contingent was one of them, which explains the high demands I put on it. Before adding to the accounts given in this book, based on my personal experience, I shall briefly talk about three UNPROFOR Canadians from my direct circle in Zagreb. Only three, regrettably, because I can’t name them all. Major-General MacInnis was second in command. I think I can say that we complemented each other exceptionally well. Retrospectively, I shouldnot have left him to deal with the Zagreb mission’s civilian mangaement, when I assumed I had better things to do in the field. When I left he gave me, on behalf of the Canadian contingent, a kayak oar bearing the words “In memory of all the rapids we went down together, without a rudder!” Thank you General! Colonel Maisonneuve was Chief of Staff Operations. I asked much of him, our personal relationship allowing me to frequently bypass the regular hierarchy. In November 1992, during the operation in Medak, I made him my personal representative in the field, as recounted in this book. In particular I remember vivedly his surprise when I gave him back, without correction, the general guideline he had prepared according to my instructions for my subordinates shortly after I assumed command. We had to move fast. Why quibble about the wording of my intentions when he had grasped its spirit so well? Major Marcotte was my Communications Officer. I had heard about his skills in his army through his aide de camp. He accompanied Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff when the latter paid me a visit in Zagreb. I asked him to join me immediately, and that’s what happened! I wished to give a voice to UNPROFOR, rather than the usual gobbeldygook of the UN. I wished to tell the truth and to oppose dishonesty. No matter the parties concerned. I wished to defend love against hatred. I was aware of the iportance of words in wars where vicious language is often more dangerous than weaponry. We failed totally, because of the constant obstruction by the UN Chief of Civil Affairs who jealously protected his alleged prerogatives in the communications area. I absolve Major Marcotte, who suffered from this hindrance, butthrew himself with all of his might into an impossible mission! I mention these three associates, less to promote individuals than to bring to light the extraordinary quality of the Canadian officers with whom I had the great pleasure of working. To this end, I would like to elaborate upon three actions led by Canadian battalions that I witnessed first-hand. I encountered for the first time an operating Canadian battalion in Croatian Krajina, in the far south of the UN zone. It was at the end of July 1993. I was getting ready to occupy some of the region’s strategic areas, including the Peruca Dam, assuming the political negotiations between Serbs and Croatians that had been broken off in Geneva on July 16 1993, would resume. Unfortunatley, it did not happen. For this high-risk mission, I needed some reserves, which I did not have. I therefore asked Sector West to make available for me half of its Canadian battalion/ The 550 kilometer ride along dangerous and rutted roads started on the morning of July 20th with 150 armoured vehicles and relevent command and support vehicles. Thirt-six hours later, with neither an incident or an accident, the detachment was ready to carry out on the Molovaki Heights the mission I assigned to it. In this book, the Mission Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Calvin, relates that I kissed him when I visited his headquarters in the countryside. It is likely true that I wanted to express my satisfaction without lengthy words! During my command, I knew two Canadian battalions in Visoko, one from the Royal 22nd Regiment until November 1993, and one from the 12th Regiment Blinde du Canada, with their reinforcement. Their mission, along the fighting line between the Serbs and the Bosnians, was difficult. They executed it remarkably well as I observed during my visits. My visit on December 23 and 24 1993 to the Srebrenica enclave is no doubt my most enduring memory. The enclave, the first UN-declared “safe haven,” was held at the time by less than 200 men from the Visoko battalion, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel David Moore. For a long time we expected a Dutch battalion to take the rotation from there, but we kept on waiting for its arrival. Considering the perimiter of the enclave (about 40 kilometers) which was staked out by thirteen observation posts with some ten men in each, the presence and humanitarian assistance mission of the Canadian detachment was particularly difficult. As for the beseiged Bosnian population, the repenishment of the “Blue Helmets” depended on the good will of the Serbs. I would like to pay tribute to these men who, in spite of their physical and mental exhaustion, held out until the last day, while knowing too well that they could not defend the enclave against an organized offensive by the Serbs, for lack of proper means. I will finally mention the so-called “Medak Pocket Operation,” in Croatia in September 1993. The decision was mine alone, and I personally got involved in it. In this book, Lieutanant-Colonel Calvin gives a detailed account of the operation, which he led. It was the most important force operation the UN conducted in the former Yugoslavia. To carry out the attack, I reinforced the Calvin battalion with two French armoured infantry companies, and an angineering platoon. One of them was under the command of my son, who had come at full speed from the Bihad Pocket in Bosnia. I went to Calvin’s command post on the first day of the action and again later during the operation. I am proud of theeffecive partnership and brotherhood in arms the Canadians and the French established at that time. I am also proud of what we achieved. While we could not prevent the slaughter of the Serbs by the Croatians, including elderly people and children, we drove back to its start line a well-equipped Croatian battalion of some thousand men. Together, the Canadians and the French succeeded in breaking the Croatian lines, and with their weapons locked and loaded and ready, firing when necessary. They circled and disarmed an eighteen-soldier commando from the Croatian Special Forces who had penetrated by night into their location. They did everything I epxected fromthem and showed what real soldiers can do, even when the indefensible political mistake was made of forcing them to wear blue helmets and paint their vehicles white, in a theatre of operatons where it was no longer realistic to pretend to maintain peace, but where indeed it was crucial to curtail war. -General Jean Cot General Jean Cot was UNPROFOR commander in July 1993. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali recalled General Cot to France in March 1994. He resigned in June. He was named Grand Officer de la legion d’Honneur with five citations, was awared the Commander’s Cross of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Legion of Merit (United States). Preface Text: I would like to know what the average Canadian knows or remembers about Canada’s involvement in the Balkans since the 1990s. Probably uppermost in their minds are "incidents" such as the misbehaviour of some soldiers at the Bakovici hospital, or media reports of minor disciplinary transgressions by soldiers under enormous pressure. Some Canadians may actually think the Canadian military involvement in the United Nations (UN) Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from 1992 to 1995 was a failure. This book will likely change this perception. Incredible events are described in vivid detail by the authors; events that typify the operational capability and resourcefulness of Canadian soldiers’ involvement in Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Peacekeeping in the early 1990s brought to the fore the failure of old precepts about peace support operations. The old model was the interposition of forces between two belligerents who agreed to the deployment of the UN within a usually well-defined situation. Suddenly Canadian soldiers were thrust into chaos of the first order in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans, with numerous belligerents hacking each other to pieces, rehashing centuries-old enmities, and forming non-traditional alliances for mutual advantage only to have them break up and fight amongst themselves. On top of this near-incomprehensible situation, UN forces were provided difficult mandates (if any) and constrictive rules of engagement which limited action. The forces were then were left to their own devices with little direction from strategic headquarters in New York. We had to come up with solutions that worked in the environments our people worked in day after day and it was a difficult task. These operations were attempts to discover new ways of dealing with an old type of conflict in a increasingly lethal environment against the insane backdrop of the post-Cold War order. But what of the specific context within which the events of this book took place? As a former Chief of Operations in the Zagreb headquarters of UNPROFOR from March 1993 to March 1994, I had a privileged vantage point to observe, feel and sometimes direct and participate personally in the work of my compatriots. The pride I felt and the bursts of elation I could barely contain while witnessing Canadian soldiers’ dedication and performance were enormous. Canadians were never above any task in the former Yugoslav Republics. Some of the more well-known operations are described in this book by the actors themselves. But do many people know, for example, that Canadians troops were the ones who initially set up the first-ever UN preventative deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)? That Canadians stopped a larger conflict from erupting in the Krajinas and attempted to stop ethnic cleansing by using force in 1993? That Canadians showed the way to peace for the Bosnian Government forces and their Bosnian Croat antagonists in the face of incredible odds and Serb provocation? That for a time they deterred Bosnian Serb attacks against Srebrenica and evacuated significant numbers of non-combatants from Gorazde? Canadian soldiers performed the hardest tasks in Croatia, Bosnia and later in Kosovo. A former UNPROFOR Force Commander of mine, French General Jean Cot used to ask Canadians "Why are you here?" He greatly admired the ‘can-do’ attitude of Canadian soldiers and loved to visit Jim Calvin’s battalion to talk to Privates and Corporals, especially when he needed to "recharge his batteries" after dealing with the frustrations of command in the Balkans.by Major-General J.O.Michel Maisonneuve, OMM, MSC, CD This book was made possible by the hard work of Sean Maloney who has developed an impressive expertise in telling the story of Canadian soldiers in the Balkans from the more obscure such as Canadian involvement in the European Community Monitoring Mission to the main battle-group operations described in this book and, when he completes them, work on the IFOR, SFOR and KFOR operations. His co-author, John Llambias, is to be equally commended for his dedication to this project. More than 10,000 Canadian soldiers served in UNPROFOR. For them, UNPROFOR was not a failure. It came down to containing the violence, saving lives, providing hope, and showing people of other countries that there exists something other than strife and conflict : a state called ‘peace.’ This book begins to tell these soldiers’ stories of frustration, but also their stories of gallantry under impossible conditions. They truly have followed in the footsteps of their wartime predecessors; they now live with the memories of these operations, and their story must be told. - Major-General J.O.Michel Maisonneuve, OMM, MSC, CD Major-General J.O.M. Maisonneuve was Chief Operations Officer of UNPROFOR from March 1993 to March 1994 and drafted the withdrawal agreement signed by the Croatian and Serb forces for the Medak pocket. |