Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare
Thirty years after the signing of the January
1973 Paris peace agreement ending the Vietnam War, the United States
finds itself leading a broad coalition of military forces engaged
in peacemaking, nation-building, and now counterinsurgency warfare
in Iraq. A turning point appeared in mid-October 2003 when US Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's memo on the future of Iraqi operations
surfaced. His musings about whether US forces were ready for protracted
guerrilla warfare sparked widespread debate about US planning for
Little attention has been paid to the theory
and practice of counter-insurgency warfare in mainstream strategic
studies journals. Discussions of the so-called revolution in military
affairs (RMA) and RMA-associated technologies for battlefield surveillance
and precision targeting dominated defense planning discourse in
the 1990s. Nation-building and peacekeeping discussions rarely addressed
counterinsurgency warfare, perhaps because nation-building operations
during the 1990s did not confront a determined, violent insurgency.
Meanwhile, with knowledge about counterinsurgency warfare waning
among policymakers, resurgent terrorism scholarship and counter-terrorism
policy initiatives avoided the issue of a strategic terrorist campaign
to destabilize nation-building. More recently, vague historical
references and misplaced analogies to Vietnam have muddled discussions
of the Iraqi counterinsurgency effort.
Lessons and insights from past low-intensity
wars deserve revisiting. They provide perspective as well as context
for what may be a defining period for the American war on terrorism.
What lessons from past counterinsurgencies can inform current efforts?
What theoretical and operational issues are available to aid Coalition
This exploration of why counterinsurgencies
fail avoids the American experience in Vietnam, a subject that continues
to evoke images and arguments that could possibly overshadow the
central purpose-that is, discussing the lessons of previous counterinsurgencies
and their applicability to US strategy in Iraq. Avoiding the US
experience in Vietnam also shifts attention to historical cases
that may be more applicable to Iraq than was the US war in Southeast
Revisiting Modern War
Those seeking historical insights into counterinsurgency
warfare will find Roger Trinquier's classic Modern Warfare: A French
View of Counterinsurgency disturbingly current. First published
in 1961 and one of the best-selling post-World War II books in France,
Trinquier influenced a generation of counterinsurgency scholarship.
He succeeded in describing the true face of what current observers
also label "modern war." Nearly 40 years later, for example,
Mark Bowden subtitled his bestseller Black Hawk Down, the story
of a US Special Forces operation in Somalia gone awry, A Story of
Modern War.1 Despite important differences
between Somalia and the colonial independence conflicts Trinquier
participated in, ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect
many of the nonlinear, unconventional elements of what Trinquier
labeled modern war to distinguish between armored battles between
nation-states and counterinsurgencies pitting nation-builders against
organizations using terrorist tactics.
Trinquier was introduced to counterinsurgency
warfare in Indochina before being assigned to Algeria in 1957 as
a Lieutenant Colonel with the French 10th Parachute Division. Decades
of service conditioned his views. Algeria inspired his writings
on modern war, including a penetrating testimony to the central
tenet of counterinsurgency: winning the allegiance of the indigenous
population. A systematic approach is needed. Counterinsurgencies
require "an interlocking system of actions-political, economic,
psychological, military-that aims at the [insurgents' intended]
overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement
by another regime."2
As military theory, Trinquier's "modern
war" parallels a prominent theme in post-Cold War military
thought, one documented by Israeli military historian Martin Van
Creveld's 1991 book, The Transformation of War.3
Trinquier preceded Van Creveld and other post-Cold War military
theorists in arguing that nuclear weapons would lead to a decline
in traditional armored warfare and a rise in modern warfare in its
many variants: guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, and subversion.
As do current military analysts, Trinquier approached the problem
of countering modern warfare by assessing differences between linear
clashes of armies and the tactics, goals, methods, and norms of
the insurgent or guerrilla.
Pitting a traditional combined armed force
trained and equipped to defeat similar military organizations against
insurgents "reminds one of a pile driver attempting to crush
a fly, indefatigably persisting in repeating its efforts."4
In Indochina, for example, the French "tried to drive the Vietminh
into a classic pitched battle, the only kind [they] knew how to
fight, in hope that superiority in material would allow an easy
victory."5 The only way to avoid
similar pitfalls, according to Trinquier, is to fight the "specially
adapted organization" that is common to almost all subversive,
violent movements seeking to overthrow the status quo.6
In October 2003 it appeared the United States was creating its own
special organization to combat Iraqi insurgents: Task Force 121,
a new joint strike unit reportedly composed of American Special
Forces units and Army Rangers.7
Presumably steeped in counterinsurgency warfare,
Task Force 121 and other units operating against Iraqi resistance
have learned the lessons of past modern wars. They will not simply
sweep towns. This won't defeat an organized insurgency. Instead,
the enemy's organization must be targeted to defeat the clandestine
organization attempting to impose its will on the Iraqi people.
Four elements typically encompass an insurgency: cell-networks that
maintain secrecy; terror used to foster insecurity among the population
and drive them to the movement for protection; multifaceted attempts
to cultivate support in the general population, often by undermining
the new regime; and attacks against the government. Only by identifying
and destroying the infrastructure of the subversive organization
can the fledgling government persevere. Stated another way, just
as the traditional war is not fought with the individual soldier
or platoon in mind but rather the state's capacity and will to continue
hostilities, modern war seeks to destroy the organization as a whole
and not simply its violent arm or peripheral organs.
After comparing the relative resources of the
insurgent and government forces, Trinquier concludes "that
the guerrilla's greatest advantages are his perfect knowledge of
an area (which he himself has chosen) and its potential, and the
support given him by the inhabitants."8
To turn this defeat into a victory, the counterinsurgent must recognize
that "this total dependence upon terrain and population is
also the guerrilla's weak point."9
Toward this end, he suggests three simple principles: separate the
guerrilla from the population that supports him; occupy the zones
that the guerrillas previously operated from, making them dangerous
for him and turning the people against the guerrilla movement; and
coordinate actions over a wide area and for a long enough time that
the guerrilla is denied access to the population centers that could
This requires an extremely capable intelligence
infrastructure endowed with human sources and deep cultural knowledge.
Indeed, intelligence is key. As the Commander of the US Army's 1st
Armored Division in Iraq, Major General Martin Dempsey, observed
in November 2003, "Fundamentally, here in Baghdad we do two
things: We're either fighting for intelligence or we're fighting
based on that intelligence."10
Despite unparalleled improvements in military intelligence, the
United States does not seem to have the depth and breadth required
in human intelligence (humint) and cultural intelligence arenas.
Arabic linguists are lacking. Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence
Stephen Cambone, discussing intelligence shortcomings documented
in an internal report, might have understated the problem, admitting,
"We're a little short on the humint side; there's no denying
it."11 For Trinquier, intelligence
was one of several crucial enablers for defeating an insurgent.
Others included a secure area to operate from, sources in the general
population and government, maintaining the initiative, and careful
management of propaganda.
A critical step in any counterinsurgency campaign
is the creation of a "tight organization" to counter the
enemy's organizational advantages. Created from the bottom up, based
on a full appreciation for the tactical situation, a successful
counterinsurgency organization must depart from its standard operational
approach to warfare. For example, campaign planning should include
a system to account for every citizen, coordination with the political
effort to designate a hierarchical network of groups headed by pro-government
chiefs, and a system to monitor the activities of guerrilla sympathizers.
This entails a census, the issuing of photo-identification cards,
and a countrywide intelligence system. The ultimate goal is to separate
the fish from the sea, leaving it exposed to the state's spear.
In Iraq it is clearly difficult to weed out
insurgents while protecting the Coalition's ability to win the trust
of the Iraqi people and downplay its image as an occupying force.
Whenever the commoner feels threatened or afraid, the guerrilla
has the upper hand. Protecting basic liberties must be balanced
with weeding out subversive elements and threats to stability. Some
means and methods are historically ineffective. Routine patrols,
isolated ambushes, large-scale sweeps, and even outposts tend to
be wasted activities. Of these, outposts are useful when they keep
roads and lines of communication open. But none of these activities
establishes lines of battle. In previous counterinsurgencies, success
required long occupation, something requiring a degree of political
will that the current Coalition in Iraq may not have.
Trinquier suggests an organizational structure
to wage this counter-guerrilla campaign and elaborates a "gridding"
system that divides territory into sectors in which methods are
applied to sweep them clear of subversive elements. Again, the use
of a census is important, as is the recording of vehicles, animals,
and any other assets that may be exploited by the antigovernment
forces. During these operations entire towns are to be detained
and interrogated, a process that should yield valuable intelligence
but may also alienate the population. At times, warns Trinquier,
it is vital to take the war to the enemy by going beyond one's borders.
Allowing safe havens for subversive elements may negate the successes
of previous operations.
Relearning the Theory and Practice of Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice,
penned by David Galula in 1964, provides a systematic discussion
of how to defeat the insurgent-and the pitfalls along the way.12
Bernard Fall, author of the acclaimed Street Without Joy, considered
Galula's work the best "how-to" guide to counterinsurgency
warfare. Experience in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria
as a French military officer and attache led Galula to consider
the "need for a compass," and prompted him to "define
the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles,
and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics."13
A simple theoretical construct underlies the
theory and practice of counterinsurgency warfare. It is the essence
of what today's theorists and strategists term asymmetric warfare:
although an asymmetric distribution of resources and abilities actually
favors counterinsurgent forces, they are often inappropriately wielded.
The conflict is asymmetric because there is a "disproportion
of strength between the opponents at the outset, and from the difference
in essence between their assets and liabilities."14
At the conceptual level, the insurgent is endowed with the "ideological
power of a cause on which to base his actions" and the counterinsurgent
laden with a "heavy liability-he is responsible for maintaining
order throughout the country" without undermining the ideals
on which the new government is making its pleas for support.15
nature of war
and to keep legitimacy
transition to war
to develop cause
nature of war
high political/economic burden
is cause or idea
cause or idea
Figure 1, above, shows the differences that
Galula saw between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Exploring the
practical implications of those dyadic relationships is the underlying
theme of Galula's writings, which reinforce the image of counterinsurgency
as one "where most of the rules applicable to one side do not
work for the other."16
This is a critical point for discussions of
Iraqi counterinsurgency operations. Press accounts too frequently
criticize an apparent inability of US forces to defeat insurgents
without addressing the more complex, diverging objectives of the
Coalition. Part of the Coalition's sociological mission is instantiating
important concepts into the Iraqi collective conscious, including
mercy, restraint, proportional force, and just war.
One cannot understand the theory and practice
of counterinsurgency warfare without understanding the socio-political-economic
intricacies of the "cause" which insurgents use to mobilize
support. Without a cause, the insurgency cannot persuade the population
to join or assist in the campaign. Qualities of causes include:
a large part of the population must be able to identify with the
cause; the counterinsurgent cannot be able to use the same cause
or espouse it; the essential social mobilization base remains the
same while the cause changes over time as the insurgency adapts.
With the right cause, the insurgent can mobilize recruits. Combined
with an intermixing of attacks on those aiding the new regime, a
successful cause increases insurgent power while blunting the counterinsurgency's
intelligence capabilities. Over time, as the new regime appears
powerless to prevent terrorism and restore stability, the mobilization
potential of the cause increases when propaganda arms of the insurgency
identify the new regime as the root of instability.
Arguably, the Iraqi counterinsurgency has entered
this stage. Arab media may in fact be aiding the insurgency. Reports
of staggering numbers of new Iraqi satellite television dishes suggest
that foreign media broadcasts, many of them colored with anti-American
bias, are competing with Coalition media services in the battle
to shape Iraqi perceptions.
Causes are not static. They change as the insurgency
adapts. The basic "strategic criteria" of a cause-and
the necessary ingredient of any "best cause" at any moment
in the struggle-is that it "can attract the largest number
of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents."17
Once a problem is selected, the insurgent attempts to exacerbate
the problem in order to increase the chasm between the government
and the people. Political, social, economic, racial, religious,
or even artificially created issues can be folded into a cause.
In the case of the artificial or concocted cause, the insurgent
must work to make the underlying premise appear to be fact. This
is possible through "efficient propaganda" or other means
to "turn an artificial problem into a real one."18
Mistakes made in the process of waging a counterinsurgency war often
reinforce an insurgent's propaganda. For example, accidental shootings,
deaths during interrogations, misdirected raids, and inappropriate
behavior by new police organizations fuel insurgent claims that
the new regime is corrupt or unable to protect the population.
The ability to switch causes and manipulate
them to the detriment of the government is based on a fundamental
characteristic of the war where "idealism and a sense of ethics
weigh in favor of a consistent stand [but] tactics pull toward opportunism."19
An asymmetric resource distribution leaves the insurgent few options
in his fight against the government institutions opposing him. As
the war widens and the population is forced to take sides, the insurgency
need not devote as much time and effort in cultivating the cause.
By this time, the war has engulfed the country and exposed the weaknesses
of the government as well as providing evidence as to the growing
power of the movement. The coming months in Afghanistan and Iraq
will see insurgency movements adapting their mobilization strategies
as they intensify attacks meant to reinforce the argument that new,
American-backed regimes cannot protect the population.
What can be done? How can US military planners
attack the intangible, political elements of the insurgency? Galula
offers several routes to making "a body politic resistant to
infection."20 First is continuously
reassessing the nature, scope, and degree of problems around the
country. Anticipating problems and proactively addressing them leaves
the insurgent without causes to exploit. Second, increase solidarity
for the regime. Bring additional propaganda efforts to bear, including
Arabic television broadcasts, that promote the new regime as something
worth supporting and defending. Third, counterinsurgency leadership
must maintain a high level of vigilance and support against the
movement. Many times insurgencies will take strategic pauses to
adapt, regroup, and develop new mobilization strategies. Too often
a new regime will interpret this as victory and focus resources
on regime-building. Counterinsurgencies are protracted struggles.
Fourth, as Trinquier argued, intelligence and deep knowledge of
the enemy are critical. Bringing new sources and methods to bear
throughout the effort must be a priority. Too often, commanders
consider their intelligence capabilities and tools as fixed resources
across the insurgency. Today, there are countless remote sensing,
information fusion, and surveillance capabilities available for
incorporation into the toolbox. Many are ideally suited to the urban
fight and can bolster human intelligence assets.
Intelligence tools, furthermore, must be attuned
to geographic conditions, which remain a factor in the ability of
the regime to defeat the insurgent. This is an area where US forces
should be seeking out and applying new capabilities. Geospatial
intelligence capabilities, including integration of demographic
information, play an overriding role in insurgency warfare. Insurgents
tend to use geography against the new government, including the
exploitation of active borders to receive outside support.
A confluence of military and nonmilitary operations
defeats the insurgent. This requires an organization vested with
the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military
elements. This was, presumably, the goal of a recent US National
Security Council decision to reorganize the management of Iraq operations.
For Galula, counterinsurgency efforts require unified command, a
single source of direction. This means a "tight" organization,
to borrow from Trinquier, directing "the operation from the
beginning to the end."21 The military,
moreover, cannot be allowed a free hand in the overall direction
of the war. At the operational level, "It is better to entrust
civilian tasks to civilians."22
That is, "military action is secondary to the political one,
its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom
to work safely with the population."23
Galula's discussion of command and control
problems, which must be settled prior to engaging the enemy, exposes
structural and conceptual elements of the counterinsurgency process.
Once the decision to engage the enemy has been made and an area
selected for operations, a systematic process is initiated in the
first, and each consecutive, area where the insurgent is active.
The first step involves selecting an area to win back from the enemy.
Sufficient troops are massed in the area and moved into contact
with the enemy in order to destroy or expel them. "This operation
is not an end in itself, for guerrillas, like the heads of the legendary
hydra, have the special ability to grow again if not all destroyed
at the same time. The real purpose of the operation," Galula
continues, "is to prepare the stage for the further development
of the counterinsurgent action."24
After an area has been cleared of guerrillas,
the "over-all operation is finally broken down into several
small-scale ones" and "all of the forces work on what
is left of the guerrillas after the . . . earlier sweeps."25
This is predominantly a military activity. As such, there is likely
to be some destruction of physical structures, crops, and damage
to other local assets. As a result, the insurgent is likely to initiate
a propaganda campaign using damaged assets as evidence that the
government is unconcerned with, perhaps even antagonistic to, the
local peasants or villagers. No easy solution exists for this problem.
Preventative steps are concerned mainly with limiting the destruction
and imposing constraints on the use of force. "Any damage done
should be immediately compensated without red tape."26
Counterinsurgents direct propaganda operations
at the population with a limited goal of obtaining their neutrality.
The underlying message? "Stay neutral and peace will return
soon to the area. Help the insurgent, and we will be obliged to
carry on more military operations and thus inflict more destruction."27
The construction of barracks and other housing
should be avoided and the troops forced to live like the population.
Psychologically, if the troops live in their own housing which is
distinct from that of the locals, they will develop a cognitive
distance from the population. Similarly, if the troops live in housing
that differs from the locals' housing, they will appear to be outsiders
and thus make it more difficult for the people to accept them. This
is currently a problem for Coalition forces in Iraq. As insurgents
succeeded in attacks, Coalition forces moved into more isolated,
secure billeting. Although this is prudent in the short term, in
the long run it reinforces the perception of US forces as an occupying
A decade after Trinquier's book was published
in France, Frank Kitson's Low Intensity Operations: Subversion,
Insurgency and Peacekeeping rolled of the press across the English
Channel. By then, Britain had participated-usually with unsatisfactory
performance-in more than 30 low-intensity conflicts that involved
elements of subversion.28 Kitson's
book, notes military historian General Sir Michael Carver, was "written
for the soldier of today to help him prepare for the operations
of tomorrow," an observation that still holds true in the 2000s.29
Of course, no one, including Kitson, would claim that military engagements
during counterinsurgency conflicts are really "low-intensity."
All combat is intense.
Like Trinquier and Galula, Kitson observes
that the realm of counterinsurgency involves combat with an enemy
"likely to be employing a combination of political, economic,
psychological, and military measures."30
He also identifies a viable intelligence organization as critical.
Kitson departs from Trinquier and Galula in
his discussion of the proper use of force. After warning against
abuses, he discusses "military difficulties about using too
little force and about delaying its application for too long."31
Kitson advocates fighting fire with fire, stressing "that wars
of subversion and counter-subversion are fought, in the last resort,
in the minds of the people."32
The soldier cannot become fixated with engaging the guerrilla, nor
can he become desensitized to the power of ideas to influence other
men. One only has to recognize the importance of waging war in the
mind "for the importance of a good psychological operations
organization to become apparent."33
And once this becomes apparent, then the importance of intelligence
To clarify the use of intelligence, Kitson
distinguishes between information needed in "normal" times
and "that which it will have to get after subversion has started."34
He proposes two kinds of intelligence, political and operational.
The former is collected and analyzed before, during, and after the
subversion rises and falls; the latter is unique to the fight against
the enemy organization and "will cease to be required once
the enemy is fully defeated, because it is concerned with information
about the enemy's forces and committees which will have ceased to
exist by that time."35
The move from political intelligence gathering
to operational intelligence gathering and the guiding of forces
into contact with the enemy involves more than merely expanding
the intelligence organization. As discussed above, it requires adapting
to the enemy and "developing new methods" to deal with
problems as they arise.36 In simpler
terms this means maintaining flexibility, seizing the initiative
whenever possible, and effectively coordinating the military, political,
economic, and social aspects of the conflict. The army must be involved
in the intelligence gathering and analysis aspects of the counterinsurgency
effort from the beginning, Kitson argues, "because in the later
stages of the campaign when [the army's] units are deployed, it
will rely very greatly on the information provided by the intelligence
organization for the success of its operations."37
One facet of building a successful intelligence organization is
the use of local assets, which becomes especially true when establishing
a psychological-operations organization.
How can the new regime's counterinsurgency
forces be educated? First, they must become attuned to the environment,
both the cognitive as well as the physical. Second, commanders must
learn to optimize resources for each phase in the campaign, including
the integration of civil and military activities. Third, commanders
must know how to direct and coordinate all resources under their
command. Finally, education and training must reach all levels of
Students of ongoing efforts in Iraq will benefit
from Kitson's comparison of counterinsurgencies and peacekeeping.
Fundamentally, the two share "a surprising similarity in the
outward forms of many of the techniques involved."39
Both require the combination and efficient integration of military
and nonmilitary resources, although peacekeeping arguably requires
greater attention to the political aspects of the operation. While
the use of force is typical of a campaign against insurgents, there
are advantages in avoiding the use of force in peacekeeping operations
and focusing on political means. Kitson suggests that the peacekeeper
must develop an image of being an honest broker, which enhances
the ability of the peacekeeper to negotiate and if necessary mediate
between belligerents. A unique attribute of the peacekeeper's mission
is the gathering and employment of intelligence within a different
set of ethical guidelines, a product of the "peaceful"
nature of the mission. To avoid infringing upon the privacy of the
population, Kitson suggests the exploitation of open sources and
the development of human contacts on both sides of the conflict.
Despite the need to remain neutral, however, Kitson does relate
experiences where forces intercepted communications, exposing again
the need to deploy intelligence assets with the operational force.
Trinquier, Galula, and Kitson are certainly
not the only authors providing useful insights into the nature and
conduct of counterinsurgencies. They are, however, among the best
sources of insight from a generation of soldiers with experience
fighting modern wars. A number of common lessons or themes from
the above discussion apply to the current situation in Iraq.
All three works discuss the asymmetric relationship
between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent. This is true not
only in terms of the cause, where the insurgent is likely to have
the only dynamic one, but extends to the material realm also. Optimizing
available counterinsurgency resources is crucial. Education and
reeducation of soldiers is one way of sustaining focus and adapting
efforts. During and after combat actions, the political nature of
the contest must be reinforced. Because transitioning from a combat
soldier to a political one is a delicate process, it is important
for troop rotations to be aligned with progress in legitimating
new political institutions.
Intelligence is the critical enabler. The tactical
use of information, which is the responsibility of the operational
commander, is the only way to identify the enemy. Background information
must be gathered and analyzed at all times, with operational intelligence
used to bring forces into contact with the enemy. The operational
intelligence effort must remain flexible, adapting to the situation
as it develops, and retain the wherewithal to innovate and seize
the initiative away from the enemy. Ground commanders must develop
and retain a capacity to actively gather information and avoid situations
where they are dependent on other organizations for critical operational
intelligence. This aids identification and neutralization of causes
and concerns before their exploitation for guerrilla mobilization.
Insurgency causes, their mobilization resource,
are not static. The movement will manipulate, even create, causes
as the war progresses; initial causes often decline in importance
as the struggle escalates. Counterinsurgencies must engage in reform,
adaptation, or innovation activities to counter the political appeal
of evolving causes. Counter-mobilization is a critical, strategic
process in the campaign. In Iraq, we are now seeing the shifting
of insurgent mobilization appeals from supporting the old regime
to defending against foreign occupation to appealing to local tribal
elements seeking preservation of paternal social norms. Counterinsurgency
efforts must respond accordingly.
Concurrent with the development of a viable
intelligence organization is the need to recognize the interdependence
of economic, political, psychological, and military factors. The
successful counterinsurgency campaign will have an organization
which aggregates these factors into one unified command able to
adapt and utilize resources efficiently. The efforts of elements
within the organization should not be allowed to "cut across
each other," and the commander should be aware of their actions
at all times.
Finally, the counterinsurgent must possess
the training, capability, and will to fight on cognitive terrain.
Toward this end he must develop and deploy psychological operations
units, propaganda operations, and social service units that foster
the impression that the government is addressing underlying socio-economic
problems. Additionally, the insurgent must be exposed as preventing
the government from solving these problems.
In discussing success criteria, counterinsurgents
need success as early as possible to demonstrate the will, the means,
and the ability to defeat the insurgency. Counterinsurgents, moreover,
need to avoid negotiations until they are in a position of strength.
Potential supporters will flock to the insurgent's side out of fear
of retaliation if the movement considers them disloyal. A negotiated
solution to the conflict before the new government possesses a preponderance
of power will lead to the undermining of the settlement and the
negation of gains.
The above review does not suggest such works
can resolve current problems or that concerns can be resolved merely
be dusting off and reading counterinsurgency books from the Cold
War. However, "studying the past," to borrow from John
Lewis Gaddis, "has a way of introducing humility-a first stage
toward gaining detachment-because it suggests the continuity of
the problems we confront, and the unoriginality of most of our solutions
for them. It is a good way of putting things in perspective, of
stepping back to take in a wider view."40
1. Mark Bowden, Black
Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press,
2. Roger Trinquier,
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel
Lee, with an introduction by Bernard B. Fall (New York: Praeger,
1964), p. 6.
3. Martin Van Creveld,
The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991).
4. Trinquier, p. 4.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. Ibid., p. 8.
7. Thom Shanker and
Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Says a Covert Force Hunts Hussein,"
The New York Times, 7 November 2003, p. 1.
9. Trinquier, p. 63.
10. Cited in Matt
Kelley, "U.S. Intelligence Effort Lacking in Specialists,"
San Diego Union-Tribune, 22 November 2003, p. 1.
12. David Galula,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger,
13. Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.
14. Ibid., p. 6.
15. Ibid., p. 7.
16. Ibid., p. xi.
17. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
18. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
19. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
20. Ibid., p. 26.
21. Ibid., p. 87.
22. Ibid., p. 88.
24. Ibid., p. 107.
25. Ibid., p. 108.
26. Ibid., p. 109.
28. Frank Kitson,
Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping
(London: Faber, 1971), p. xi.
31. Ibid., p. 70.
32. Ibid., p. 78.
33. Ibid., p. 72.
37. Ibid., p. 73.
38. Ibid., pp. 165-67.
39. Ibid., p. 144.
40. John Lewis Gaddis, The
United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconstructions,
Provocations (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992), p. 3.
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