Defining Minorities and Identities

Religious Categorization and State-Making Strategies in Greece and Turkey

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The Puzzle

Why do states choose to reinforce certain social categories over others in the state-building process? How do the imperatives of state-building lead elites to emphasize some aspects of identity and down-play others? This paper seeks to better answer these questions through an investigation of the consolidation of state power in Greece and Turkey in the 1920s. Through a number of historical examples I show that state-makers privileged religious categories over potential alternatives, such as race, blood-ties or language. I argue that state-makers followed this path because they realized that linking the state to religion would serve both symbolic and practical functions in a way that other identity categories could not.

For one, the symbolic resources inherent in religious categories provided state-makers with a source of legitimacy. The legacy of the Ottoman administrative structure known as the *millet* system had created a hegemonic cultural framework in which religion was already conceived of as a legitimate means of social organization and moral authority by most individuals. The state itself, by contrast, did not enjoy such widespread legitimacy. State-makers were not only cognizant of the strength of the general public's religious ties; they also understood that they lacked this same type of credibility. Over time, state-makers grew privy to the fact that religion could serve as a "powerful psychological and symbolic force helping to cement the unity of the new nations which the states had created."[1] Given that most people were already members of religious organizations, joining concepts of religious loyalty to the idea of state loyalty was an opportune way to guarantee adherence to the national idea and curb internal dissent.

Yet the appeal of religious categorization extended beyond symbolism and legitimacy.

[1] Paschalis M. Kitromelidis, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of Southeastern Europe* (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1994), 185.

Employing religious categorization also supplied state-makers with institutional and administrative resources that ultimately enabled state power to triumph. Leveraging faith-based organizations for the nationalist cause was administratively convenient, for state bureaucracies were weak and inefficient whereas faith-based organizations were highly organized and had a tangible presence in most local communities. By linking the state-building mission to religion, the state was able usurp religious institutions of schooling and social organization and impose its will through these pre-established networks. Furthermore, in merging religious categories with the idea of loyalty to the state, Greek and Turkish elites also succeed in solving the dilemma of church-state relations in the state's favor. The ultimate irony of state-building in Greece in Turkey was that the symbolic function of religion was being preserved and extolled at the same time that the actual power of religious institutions was being severely curtailed. Greek and Turkish state builders turned to religion not because they wished for religious authority to hold a privileged place in the nation-state nor because of any deep religious conviction of their own. The rapid turn towards secularism and the marginalization of religion in both countries (although to a greater extent in Turkey) proves otherwise. Rather, state-builders sought to divest religious authorities of real political power while at the same time co-opting and maintaining religious identity markers and administrative structures by linking them to the state in such a way as to facilitate and legitimize the expansion of state control.

Situating the Puzzle in its Historical and Theoretical Context

Looking back to the 1920's, it is clear that the situation facing state-makers in Greece and Turkey was one of upheaval and devastation. In the early months of 1922 the lands encircling the Aegean Sea lay in ruins. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13, World War I and finally the Greco-Turkish War and the Turkish War of Independence had completely destroyed what little remained of Ottoman imperial control. Years of fighting had steeped policy makers in an environment of suspicion and

hostility. This antagonism was directed both at internal minorities and at land-hungry neighboring powers, creating a spiraling situation in which leaders had become increasingly obsessed with questions of border security and internal dissent.[2] As the Greeks, Turks and major European powers confronted one another across the negotiating table at Lausanne in November of 1922, the chief issue at stake was how to create well-fortified states encapsulating loyal and governable populations. With all parties involved eager to settle the region's conflicts once and for all, considerable leeway existed for the new national leaders to forge states in a way that they saw fit.

The wars had caused substantial ethnic un-mixing and, as a result of migrations, expulsions, and killings, the territories making up the new Greek and Turkish states were much more linguistically, religiously and ethnically homogeneous than they had been just twenty years earlier. Nonetheless, both states still included substantial minority enclaves as well as large swaths of territory that were ethnically, linguistically and religious mixed. Tables I and II provide information on the minorities living in Greece and Turkey respectively when negotiations opened in 1922.[3] As the tables

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2 Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Development," *World Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 4. (Jul., 1971), pp. 665-683.

3 There is no single source that consistently and reliably lists the minority groups living in the region at the time. The information in Tables I and II has thus been culled from a variety of primary and secondary sources. Furthermore, I have not included the number of members in any given group because such data is not available for the time in question. Although it may be possible to piece together rough estimates through further archival research in Turkey and Greece, this information is presently not available to the author. Sources used in building the table are: Miranda Vickers, "The Cham Issue: Albanian National & Property Claims in Greece", Conflict Studies Research Center, ISBN 1-903584-76-0, (April 2002); Dimitris Michalopoulos, "The Moslems of Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey", *Balkan Studies* Vol. 27 No. 2 (1986), 303-13; Ioannes Archimadritis, *Τσάμηδες. Οδύνη και δάκρυα της Θεσπρωτίας* (Chams: Suffering and Tears in Thesprotias) (Athens: Georgiades, 196?); John Bintliff, "The Ethnoarchaeology of a "Passive" Ethnicity: The Arvanites of Central Greece" in K.S. Brown and Yannis Hamilakis, eds., *The Usable Past: Greek Metahistories* (Ladham, Md: Lexington Books, 2003); Maria Michail- Dede, *Οι Έλληνες Αρβανίτες.* (The Greek Arvanites) (Athens: Dodonis, 1997); Titos P. Giochalas, *Άνδρως Αρβανίτες και Αρβανίκα* (*Andros Arvanites and Arvanika)* (Athens: Patakis, 2000); Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2006); Steven Bowman, "Jews" in Richard Clogg ed., *Ethnic Minorities in Greece,* (London: Hurst&Company, 2002), 64-80. Giannis Mankriotis, Πομακοι η Ροδοπαιοι: *Οι Έλληνες Μουσουλμάνοι* (*Pomaks or Rodopi: The Greek Muslims*) (Athens : Ekdoseis Risos, 1990); Anastasia Karakasidou, "Cultural illegitimacy in Greece: the Slavo-Macedonian 'non-minority'" in Clogg., 122-164; Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922-1930* (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 2006), 199; T.J. Winnifrith, "Vlachs", in Clogg, 112-21; I.K. Hassiotis, "Armenians" in *Ethnic Minorities in Greece,* Ed. Richard Clogg, 94-112; Ayhan Kayah "Political Participation Strategies of the Circassian Diaspora in Turkey", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 2004), pp.221–239; M. Bjedug & E. Taymaz, "'Sürgün' halk Çerkesler", Birikim 71-72 (March-April 1995), 118-24; Nicos Marantzidis, "Ethnic Identity, Memory and Political Behavior: The Case of Turkish Speaking Pontian Greeks," *South European Society and Politics,* 5:3 (Winter 2000) 56-7.

demonstrate, both territories were really still complex ethnic, linguistic and religious mosaics. In addition to Greek speaking Greek Orthodox Christians, the enlarged Greek state also included Cham Albanians, Arvanites, Gagauz Turks, Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, Doenmeh, Muslim Cretans, Pomaks, Roma, Slavs, Muslim Turks, Valaades, and Vlachs. The new Turkish state, in addition to housing Turkish speaking Sunni Muslims, included Alevis, Arab Christians, Jacobites and Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, Karamanlides, Greek Orthodox Christians, Kurds, Jews, Laz, Pontics and Roma. The fact that ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages were cross cutting as opposed to reinforcing further complicated the task of state-building. For example, the Valaades spoke Greek but were Muslim. Should they remain in Greece by virtue of linguistic similarity or be sent to Turkey to join their religious brethren? What of communities like the Pontics and Karamanlides, who largely spoke Turkish but were Greek Orthodox Christians? Were they to keep their homes in Turkey, where they had lived for centuries, or should they be uprooted based on religious difference? Such were the questions confronting Greek and Turkish state-builders as they endeavored to secure their borders and strategically reorganize the internal composition of their states. Establishing the boundaries for legitimate membership in the state—and, by the same token, defining enemies and minorities—was perhaps the most pressing issue for political leaders during this period. As Anthony Marx has pointed out, "selective exclusion was not tangential to nation-state building, as liberals argue, but was instead central to how social order was maintained."[4]

[4] Anthony Marx, *Race and Nation* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1998), 3.

Table I: Minority Groups in Greece

Group	**Language**	**Religion**	**Exchanged**
Albanian (Cham)	Predominantly Albanian, some Turkish	Muslim (Bektashi)	unclear (in the end most appear to have been exempted but there are Turkish reports of numerous Albanians coming with the exchange)
Arvanites	Arvanika, some Greek speakers	Greek Orthodox	no
Gaga(v)uz Turks	Gagauz (Turkic Language) often written in Greek script	Greek Orthodox	no (but some individuals appear to have been admitted to Turkey)
Jewish (Sephardic)	Ladino, Greek, Italian	Judaism	no
Jewish (Ashkenazi)	Yiddish, Greek, Judeo-Greek	Judaism	no
Jewish (Doenmeh/*Dönme*)	Ladino and Greek	Explicitly converted to Sunni Islam in the 17th century but often secretly retained Judaic practices	yes
Muslim Cretans	Kritika (a dialect of Greek)	Muslim	yes
Pomaks	Pomak a South Slav language often considered a dialect of Bulgarian	Muslim	no
Roma	Romany	Muslims and very few Orthodox Christians	no
Slavs	Various Slavic dialects closely related to Bulgarian, Greek	Schismatics (supporters of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church) and Patriarchists or Grecomanoi (Supporters of the Greek Orthodox Church)	Voluntary exchange in 1919 but many still left behind as shown by stats. Also, internal displacement, sent to the island to depopulate and help state control
Turks of Macedonia	Turkish and Greek	Sunni Muslim	Yes
Turks of Western Thrace	Turkish and Greek	Sunni Muslim	No
Valaades	Greek	Muslims	Yes
Vlachs (Romanizontes)	Koutsovlach sometimes divided between (Aromanian and Megleno-Romanian)	Greek Orthodox and very small number of Muslims	No

Table II: Minority Groups in Turkey

Group	Language	Religion	Exchanged
Alevis	Kurdish and Turkish	Bektashi, Shi'ite and Sunni	no
Arab Christians, Jacobites and Other Eastern Christians	Arabic, Assyrian, Chaldean, Turoyo	Various Eastern Christian Churches	no (but the Turks tried to exchange the Arab Orthodox population of Mersin)
Armenians	Armenian/Turkish	Christian	yes, some (most had been killed or deported by 1922)
Circassians (called Cherkes in Turkish. The name is in fact a blanket term for various related North Caucasian peoples, primarily Abkhazians, Adighe and Ubigh ; although occasionally Chechen and Ingush are also included.	various dialects of both Circassian and Abkhaz-Abaza	Sunni Muslims	no, (but there are some reports that some 9,000 were transferred to Greece in 1922 as a result of collaboration with the Greek army)
Greeks Karamanlides	Turkish and Greek	Greek Orthodox	yes
Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos	Greek	Greek Orthodox	no
Kurds	Kurdish or Zaza	Muslim	no
Jews	Ladino and Turkish	Jewish	no
Laz (*Lazlar)*	Laz, a language closely related to Georgian and Mingrelian	Sunni Muslims	no
Ponitcs	Turkish	Greek Orthodox	yes
Roma		Nomadic Muslims	no

After months of wrangling over the contents of a peace agreement, Greek and Turkish parties concurred that the minority question would be best resolved by implementing a "population exchange" between the two countries.[5] Formally, the treaty mandated that "there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory."[6] This exchange came to involve the identification and forcible uprooting and relocation of 189,916 individuals living in Greek territory and 355,635 individuals living in the new Turkish state. The agreement further stipulated that an additional 750,000-950,000 people who had left on their own accord to avoid the violence would not be allowed to return to their homes.[7] Although the population exchange did not succeed in completely removing all religious minorities from Greece and Turkey, the results were astounding. According to journalist Bruce Clark, the exchange stood as

> proof that it was possible, both practically and morally, to undertake huge exercises in ethnic engineering, and proclaim them a success. Massive population exchanges, agreed by governments over the heads of the ordinary people, became a conceivable and often attractive option for world leaders.[8]

Furthermore, as I will through a series of detailed historical cases presented below, the type of religious categorization used to conduct the population exchange went on to shape the way that the state treated all remaining individuals who were loyal to a religious organization other than the one privileged by the state.

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[5] Renee Hirschon, "The Unmixing of Peoples in the Aegean Region" in *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey,* Ed. Renee Hirschon (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 3-6; Recently, several good and detailed historical accounts of the diplomatic negotiations have been produced. For the role of the Allies and the League of Nations at Lausanne see Michael William Anthony Dark, "Population Exchange and Peace Making" (PhD Dissertation: Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2005); for the Greek and Turkish Perspective see Onur Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922-1934* (New York: Routledge, 2006), chapters 2-3.

[6] Text of the "Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations Signed at Lausanne, January 30th, 1923" in Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Greece* (Paris: Mouton &Co, 1964), Appendix I.

[7] Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: MacMillan, 1932) pp. 437-442.

[8] Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

In having considered the historical realities within which Greek and Turkish elites were working I have better contextualized the central puzzle that this paper seeks to explain. Yet before jumping too far ahead to the question of why states chose to reinforce some identity categories instead of others, the theoretical perspective from which I am working needs to be brought into sharper focus. Namely it is essential to briefly turn to the issue of what it is that states do. Borrowing from the classic, Weberian conception, I view the state as a compulsory association claiming control over society within a given territory.[9] As Alfred Stepan has illuminated, the state employs administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that seek to structure the nature of the relationship between civil society and public authority as well as relationships within civil society.[10] Towards this end the state encourages the cultivation of a popular, national identity, since allegiance to the nation strengthens the state's monopoly on power and increases its legitimacy.[11] Yet as James Scott reminds us, officials of the modern state are often "at least one step—and often several steps—removed from the society they are charged with governing." And, as a result, state elites "assess the life of their society by a series of typifications that are always some distance from the full reality these abstractions are meant to capture."[12] Hence the state's need to impose simplifying categories for the purpose of engendering solidarity and loyalty.

Clearly, what emerges from this discussion is that we should expect states and the people who rule over them to try to extend the reach of state control and perfect its implementation. The Greek and Turkish states were no exception to this general rule. But just because state-makers exhibit the will to exert and expand their power does not tell us *which* social categories they will chose to reinforce in their endeavor to perfect control. For this reason it is crucial to explore the issue of how and why

[9] See Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds. *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 11.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Marx, 4.
[12] James C. Scott. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 76.

certain categories of social identity are defined, imposed, reinforced and linked to the state. These decisions will greatly impact the immediate viability of a state-building project as well as the historical trajectory and internal dynamics of the state in question.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First I address alternative theories to see what they would predict with respect to the question under consideration. These alternative explanations can be divided roughly into two categories: those that predict different values on the dependent variable (the identity category that will be reinforced by the state) and those that predict the same value on the dependent variable (religion) but for the wrong reasons. I then use historical argumentation[13] to show that religious categories were indeed consciously employed, both as part of the population exchange and beyond. It is through these historical examples that I build an empirical structure around the theoretical scaffolding erected above with respect to state-makers objectives and goals. Finally, after demonstrating that religion was the preferred method of categorization by the state, I turn to the question of why, elaborating on the symbolic and practical functions served by religious categories.

Alternative Explanations

This section considers alternative explanations in two parts. Part one addresses theories of nationalism, which make incorrect predictions regarding the question of which identity category state -makers will reinforce in our cases. Part two considers a particularly persuasive genre of explanation based on previous patterns of violence. I argue that although such a line of reasoning leads to the

[13] In terms of methodology, this study is informed by historical studies and by political theories of the state. Primary sources include the memoirs and accounts of policy makers as well as official and non-official observers of the population exchange, statistics collected by the exchange commission and state censuses, records of correspondence between the Central Greek government and regional officials, and the transcripts of 550 open-ended interviews with Greek refugees compiled and transcribed by Greek social scientists and archivists at the Center for Asia Minor Studies (*To Kentro ton Mikorasiatikon Spoudon*) in Athens. Secondary sources of note include anthropological studies of the resettled refugee communities as well as several recently published, high-quality diplomatic histories of the exchange which have been crossed-checked for bias. Secondary sources which have been particularly useful include: Anastasia Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia*, 1870- 1990 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Renee Hirschon, H*eirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); Yildirim, *Diplomacy and Displacemen*t; and Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922-1930* (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 2006).

correct prediction on our dependent variable of interest, it does so for the wrong reasons.

1) ***Theories of Nationalism: Language and Modernization****?*

Given that nationalism is thought to be ideological glue that holds states together in the modern era (hence the term nation-state), theories of nationalism mark the logical starting point for trying to understand which categories state-builders will emphasize in their quest to consolidate power and influence.[14] The dominant theoretical framework for understanding nationalism is best depicted in the work of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner and places great emphasis on the role of language and modernization. Anderson argues that nation-states are "imagined communities." Imagined not because such communities are a fabrication or essentially false; rather, they are imagined in the sense that even though any given individual will never meet the vast majority of his/her co-nationals, somehow "in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."[15] Anderson contends that the imagination of national communities emerged as a result of the advent of "print-capitalism." National imaginings endure because the idea of the nation evokes a sense of immortality, lending purpose to individuals' everyday life in a modern, secular era. Anderson's story thus begins with the erosion of the pre-modern cultural systems based on religion. Religion's decline also roughly coincided with the advent of capitalism, massive advances in the technology of communication and the spread of "vernaculars" as tools of centralized administration. This "half-fortuitous, but explosive" interaction "assembled" and "gave a new fixity to language", making the nation state possible.[16]

Yet Anderson recognizes that emergence of nationalism is not always the spontaneous result of structural forces. In fact, he argues that later periods (like the one under investigation in Greece and

[14] This view is widely agreed upon in the literature. For instance Anthony Smith states that "The legitimating principle of politics and state-making is nationalism"(pg. 129); Ernest Gellner also argues that nationalism is essentially the imposition of "a high culture on society . . . codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication"(pg. 57).

[15] Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Revised edition), (London: Verso, 1991), 11.

[16] Ibid., 145 and 11.

Turkey) are characterized by what he calls "official nationalisms". Official nationalisms are essentially pirated blue-prints that power-seeking elites "adapted from the model of the largely spontaneous popular nationalisms that preceded them."[17] If, as Anderson claims, state-makers in later periods were indeed working from "visible models provided by their. . . predecessors"[18] to establish power, one can derive a clear prediction with respect to the central question of this paper. Because Anderson argues these "previous models" were based on the unifying power of print-capitalism and a common language, his theory leads one to expect that state-makers employing official nationalism will forge state boundaries on linguistic lines and base decisions regarding enemies and minorities on linguistic grounds.

Insights derived from Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism lead to a similar conclusion, albeit for slightly different reasons. For Gellner, nations (and nationalism) arise because they facilitate the growth-oriented goals of modern industrialized societies. Successful economic growth in an industrial age demands "both a mobile division of labor, and sustained frequent and precise communication between strangers involving a sharing of explicit meaning, transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required."[19] Put simply, the modern imperatives of capitalism are best met by turning individuals into interchangeable workers and integrating them into a rational, bureaucratic organizational structure. Towards this end, nation-states require official languages and high levels of literacy forged through a centrally administered and standardized education system .[20] Gellner briefly acknowledges that nation-building will be particularly contentious in areas where populations possess

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[17] Ibid., 110.

[18] Ibid., 67.

[19] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983), 34.

[20] Ibid., This emphasis on the preeminent role of language in identity formation has also had a pronounced impact on the study of ethnicity more generally. For example, in a recent quantitative study Fearon uses linguistic similarity (as measure in terms of distance between classified language groups) as a proxy for cultural similarity, see J. Fearon, "Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity by Country," *Journal of Economic Growth*, Vol.8 No. 2 (2003), pp. 195-222. For Donald Horrowitz's take on the role of language see *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1985), 219-24.

"ambiguous historical or linguo-genetic allegiances" [21] (like Greece and Turkey). Nonetheless, his general theoretical set-up implies that, if confronted with a choice, states-builders will opt to define membership in the state in linguistic terms. This is because linguistic homogeneity best fulfills the "communicatory" perquisites of economic growth, which Gellner considers to be so central to states' goals and function.

Both Gellner and Anderson's theories thus lead to an incorrect prediction when applied to the question of which categories Greek and Turkish state-makers chose to reinforce. In the 1910's and 1920's the inhabitants of Greece and Turkey were largely illiterate peasant farmers. In Turkey, the "vast majority of the Anatolians lived in some 40,000 small, isolated villages, resting upon an economic base of subsistence grain farming and animal husbandry." Over 85 percent of people could neither read nor write.[22] Literacy rates aside, there is simply no way that a print-based language disseminated through newspapers was cultivating a common national identity in the early 1920s. Atatük's language and education reforms did not began until the late 1920's and, even then, the newspapers that began circulating in the true (reformed) Turkish language were like "Chinese puzzles" to most citizens. Selma Ekrem, who lived through Atatük's language reforms, recounts that even as late as 1928 "They [the state] adopted a policy of writing several articles a day using the old Turkish words long in disuse in order to teach them to the public. A glossary was attached to each article giving the Arabic and Iranian equivalent of these outlandish words."[23] In Greece, although literacy was slightly more widespread and maritime activities supplemented agricultural pursuits, the situation was comparable. As Danforth argues, in the first decades of the twentieth century "most inhabitants of Macedonia were illiterate peasants with no clearly developed sense of national identity at all."[24]

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[21] Gellner, 100.

[22] Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 36.

[23] Selma Ekrem, *Turkey Old and New* (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1947), 64.

[24] Loring M. Danforth, *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 59.

Dwelling on the importance of language thus obfuscates the actual mechanisms employed in a critical stage of the state consolidation process. As the political theorist David Miller recognizes, "someone who later appeals to common language as a feature marking off one particular national community from its neighbors will be obliged to draw a veil over the actual process whereby the language gained its current status."[25] This is not to say that the Greek and Turkish states did not subsequently embark upon a systematic program of language reform and formal, state-sponsored education. They did. But the development of a common language was an issue of secondary importance for state builders. Before wholeheartedly attempting to enforce a common language, both states sought to organize their populations in such a way as to guarantee that an official language and a program of obligatory schooling would achieve the desired effect. It was towards this end that state-makers leveraged already existing religious sentiments. Basic questions of territorial control and citizen loyalty superseded the demands of industrial modernization and capitalist development. It was religion—not language—that state makers selected as the best grounds for fostering a stable foundation of citizen solidarity and loyalty. Only once this baseline of control was securely established did state-makers embark on full-fledged programs of standardized education and linguistic assimilation.

2) *Previous Patterns of Violence*

In addition to theories of nations and nationalism, it is also necessary to address another type alternative explanation. This is the contention that previous patterns of violence—not the conscious choices of state-makers—determined the category upon which the Greek and Turkish nation-states would be built. Such a line of reasoning goes as follows. *A vast amount of fighting and bloodshed took place in the region prior to states' formal attempts to define minorities and initiate a population exchange. Was it not simply the case that war-time allegiances were based on religion, making it the logical and natural criterion by which to separate warring parties through a population exchange and*

[25] David Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 33.

to construct new states? There certainly does exist some evidence to suggest that violence, especially that perpetrated during the Greco-Turkish war, served to harden religious differences. For example, such logic emerges from an interview with Dimitriou Misailidi, a member of a Karamanli community that was forced out of Turkey and sent to Greece. Although Misailidi himself recalls having a fairly positive relationship with his Muslim neighbors, he puts the point thus: "How do you expect a Turk to [go on] loving you when the Greek army stepped into Turkey and killed the child of that Turk on his very own soil."[26] Conceding that a history of violence is important, there are three reasons why previous patterns of violence are misleading if used as the chief variable for predicting state makers' decision to use religious criterion to define minorities and enemies after the fighting had ended.

1) For one, the idea of exchanging populations based on religion was not a spontaneous response to the Asia Minor atrocities of the 1920s. The idea of an exchange had first originated in 1913 and had been circulating in Greek and Turkish political and military circles for some time. Furthermore, a minority exchange agreement similar to that which was eventually enacted in 1923 had actually already been reached by the Ottomans and the Greeks in 1913. Under the terms of this earlier agreement, the Muslims in Macedonia and Greek Epirus would be exchanged for the Orthodox Greeks in the *Vilayet* (Province) of Aydın.[27] Soon after the 1913 agreement was concluded the maelstrom of WWI engulfed the region, rendering its execution impossible. Yet the interesting point to be made is that the idea of removing the population of Aydın was not the result of uncontrollable violence between the Greek and Turkish communities living together in the province. In 1913, the citizens of Aydın "were not persons uprooted by the tumult of war and ruined by military campaigns. They were peacefully living people, prosperous and satisfied, feeling secure and having no desire to abandon their

[26] Interview with Dimitriou Misailidi, transcribed in P.D. Apostolopoulos, Ed., *Η Έξοδος Β* (The Exodus B Testimonies from Parcheesi of Central and Northern Asia Minor) The Center for Asia Minor Studies (Athens, 1980), 213. It should be noted that Misailidi and all other interviewees employ the terms "Greek" and "Turk" because the interviews were actually conducted nearly 25 years after the exchange occurred.

[27] Ladas, 27-49; Yıldırım, 40.

homes."[28] Here, state-builders' desire and actual attempts to remove religious minorities preceded the outbreak of violence.

2) Secondly, a reading of interviews with Orthodox Greek Karamanlides living together with Muslims in the Cappadocian region of central Anatolia also suggests that previous patterns of violence alone did not determine state-builders' decision to remove minorities on a religious basis. The Karamanlides had maintained peaceful relations with their Muslim neighbors and had been largely unaffected by the type of inter-communal violence brought on by national armies in the Aegean and Black Sea coastal communities; yet they were removed from Turkey nonetheless during the exchange. The interviews demonstrate that, despite being devout religious practitioners, local village identity often trumped religious differences for both the Karamanlides and the Muslims. Although religion was central to everyday life, hostility across religious groups was not the norm. In fact, the native Muslim Turks and the Christian Karamanlides of Cappadocia were, in many instances, actually united in their disdain for the incoming Muslim refugees from Greece.

Evlabias Moumtzoglou, who was forced out of the village of Chalbadere (close to what is now Aksaray in Central Anatolia) in the spring of 1924, depicted the native Turks that he lived with as his protectors:

> Three months before we left the Turkish refugees from Greece came [to Chalbadere]. They were from Kozani and they knew Greek. They glorified their homeland; but they were terrible people. They beat us up and asked for food. They would have killed us all. The native Turks were the ones that saved us.[29]

Another Cappadocian native, Evanthias Govisoglou, contrasts the good will of his native Muslim neighbors with the grabbing-hand of the incoming Muslim refugees. Govisoglou wanted to make sure that what he left behind went to a native Muslim Turk whom he trusted, in this case the village leader (*Mouhtari*).

[28] Pentzopoulos, 57.
[29] Interview with Evlampias Moumtzoglou transcribed in P.D. Apostolopoulos, Ed., 30.

> The (refugee) Turk who wanted my house came with a mattress and was waiting to get inside. I just pushed him out of the way, I couldn't speak. He went and sat on the sidewalk. The native Turks were crying: "We ate olives and bread together for six hundred years; this thing that's happening, it's difficult for us too" they said. We all told ourselves not to cry . . . I closed all the doors to the house and just after I locked them I took the key and I gave it to the head of the village (*mouhtari*). He could give the key to whomever he wanted[30]

G. Xaziliadi, who was forced to leave the village of Soulotzova, which was home to approximately 100 Turkophone Christian Orthodox families, also recalled his Turkish Muslim neighbors with fondness. His testimony shows that both Orthodox Christians and Muslims resented the way that the exchange tore-apart the fabric of local life.

> We were the last ones to leave and when were leaving the Turks saw us off, crying until the very edge of town. We lived well together with most of the Turks until the very end. They didn't want to let us leave. They didn't even want to hear about the Turks who would be coming from Greece. There, on the edge of town, where we separated, they cried and said: 'my Greek friends, they took silk from our hands and are giving us goat hair.'[31]

The lesson to be drawn from the experience of the Karamanlides is that the identity category around which the population exchange was based was not merely a mechanism intended to separate warring religious factions. Rather, emerging nationalist politicians on both sides recognized the strength that could be garnered by replacing Muslim citizens with Christian Orthodox ones and visa versa. The Greeks saw little harm in taking-in more Greek Orthodox Christians and the Turks remained fearful that the Karamanlides' loyalty to the Greek Orthodox Patriarch would eventually undercut efforts to consolidate state control in this underdeveloped rural region.[32] Religion was thus the determining factor that led to the Karamanlides deportation—not because the Karamanlides had engaged in

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30 Interview with Evanthias Govisoglou, ibid., 119.

31 Interview with G. Xaziliadi, ibid., 244.

32 In the period leading up the population Turkish authorities largely considered the Karamanlides to be loyal citizens. They were even initially sympathetic to the idea of creating a Turkish-Orthodox Church in Cappadocia which would divert the Karamanlides allegiance away from the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul and towards an organization more sympathetic to the ambitions of the Turkish state. Yet when these efforts failed, Turkish statesmen came to consider Karamanlides as, if not dangerous, then a pesky minority enclave. See Alexis Alexandris, "Η Απόπειρα Δημιουργίας Τουκορθοδής Έκκλησιας στην Καππαδόκια, 1921-23" (The Attempt to Create a Turkish-Orthodox Church in Cappadocia" *Deltio Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon,* Vol. 4 (1983), 159-99.

religious conflict with their Muslim neighbors but because Greek statesmen recognized the advantages of diluting other minority strongholds within Greece by importing devout Greek Orthodox individuals. Similarly Turkish statesmen recognized the advantages of removing Christian communities from the heart of the new nation.

3) Third, and finally, the fact that leaders in Greece and Turkey were still debating the definition of a "minority" in the period leading up to the population exchange reinforces the point that a religious definition was not preordained by patterns of violence. In Greece, the nationalist ideas circulating at the elite level were based on irredentism, which had been enshrined in the concept of the *Megali-Idea* (Great Idea). At heart, the *Megali Idea* was "the aspiration to encompass within Greece the territorial expanse of Byzantium and to regain the intellectual supremacy of Ancient Greece."[33] Despite the over-arching goal of territorial expansion, Greek statesmen spoke loftily of attempting to harness the ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity of diverse populations by adopting a flexible notion of Greekness based on Isocrate's dictum: "We consider Greeks all those who partake in our culture."[34] The early nationalist ideals entertained by Greek thinkers were thus similar to those later described by the Benedict Anderson as an imagined community forged through a common language.[35] As the historian A.A. Pallis observed at the time:

> [After 1913] the national ideal is not anymore a purely Hellenic Greece but the establishment of a large Hellenic state in which many foreign elements would coexist with the Hellenic one, keeping naturally their particular national consciousness under the sovereignty of the Hellenic element and using as their connecting link the Greek language—the official language of the state.[36]

Eleftherios Venizelos, who was the Greek representative at Lausanne and became Prime Minster soon

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33 Adamantis Pollis Koslin, "The Megali Idea—A Study of Greek Nationalism" (PhD. Dissertation: Faculty of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, 1958), ii.

34 Quoted in Thanos Veremis, "1922: Political Continuations and Realignments in the Greek State", in *Crossing the Aegean, 59.*

35 For an excellent look at the content of the early "nationalist" ideas of Greek statesmen see Kitromelidis,150-186.

36 A. A. Pallis, "The Exchange of Populations from a legal and Historical Viewpoint and its Significance for the International Position of Greece" speech delivered at the Panteios School of Political Sciences in Athens, April 20, 1933, pg. 18 quoted in Pentzopoulos, 28.

thereafter, had been a vociferous proponent of the *Megali Idea.* Yet the "inclusive" and "pluralistic" ideals of the *Megali Idea* eventually came into conflict with the strategic imperatives that he believed were necessary to establish and maintain control over the population. On the eve of the exchange, this theoretical desire to assimilate diverse elements of society through a common language and Hellenic culture could not be completely reconciled with the practical concerns of border control and citizen loyalty. Venizelos realized the potentially divisive nature of the minority question and the importance of solving it in a manner that would be beneficial for Greece's long-term security. Prior to the opening of talks at Lausanne he expressed its urgency thus:

> Without exaggeration, the future of Greece depends on whether we get the right or wrong solution to this question. If we fail to arrive at the right solution there will be disasters which one trembles even to think of, whereas a successful solution will contribute within in a few years to our recovering from the unbearable burdens which the defeat in the war that has bequeathed us, and to our securing, after the collapse of the Greater Greece, the consolidation of the Great Greece, of which the frontiers will never be secure if Western Thrace and Macedonia are not ethnologically as well as politically Greek territories...[37]

What Venizelos needed was a definition of citizen and minority that would save the state from internal divisions and external exploitations.

Likewise, in Turkey the question of what it actually meant to be a Turk was still unresolved. Although Muslims had held a privileged position under Ottoman rule, the role of religion in the new Turkish state was yet to be determined and leaders had not agreed upon definitions of minority and Turk. As in Greece, the most pronounced dilemma faced by Turkish nation builders was that the confines of territorial nationalism as suggested by state land holdings and "ethnic" nationality by virtue of the Turkish language did not overlap in the slightest. In the words of Soner Cagaptay, "political membership in the state and ethnic membership in the nation were not the same."[38] Rıza Nur, who was

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[37] Quoted in Michael Llewellyn Smith, Venizelos' Diplomacy, 1910-23: From Balkan Alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement," in Paschalis M. Kitromilides, *Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 171-2.

[38] Cagaptay, 14.

among the envoys sent by the new Turkish national government to Lausanne, recalls the dilemma in his memoirs as follows:

> Franks [Europeans] assume that there are three types of minorities in our country: minorities by race, minorities by language and minorities by religion. This is a great danger for us. When they are against us, these men think so deeply and well! By the term 'race' they will put Circassians, Abhazes, Bosnians and Kurds in the same category as Greeks and Armenians. By the term 'language' they will turn those Muslims who speak other languages into minorities. By the term 'religion' they will make two million *Kızılbaş*,* who are pure Turks, into minorities.[39]

As Nur's exclamation demonstrates, not only would the way in which minority was defined have lasting implications in terms of the consolidation of internal state security, the "correct" decision was not obvious.

Nur credits himself with ultimately imposing a Turkish definition of the minority that was based on faith rather than race or language. Although some historians dispute Nur's claim to have coined this definition, at the Lausanne conference he and other negotiators did consistently insist on defining minorities broadly in terms of non-Muslims (*gayri-Müslım*). Using this broad definition would ensure that the other hostile European powers could not justify a further division of Turkish territory based on the claim that Kurdish and Alevis were ethnically, linguistically or even religiously (being Shi'ite or Bektaşi) different. It would also guarantee that surviving Armenians would be permanently relegated to outsider status. Still, there were also less favorable consequences of defining minorities in the broad terms of Greek Orthodox Christian vs. Muslim. For instance, in Turkey it opened the floodgates to Albanians, Roma and other Muslim groups [40] and in Greece it did not solve the question of what to do with the massive Slavic, Orthodox Christian populations in Macedonia.

Tying these points together, in this section I have demonstrated that previous patterns of

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[39] Quoted in the original Turkish and translated to English in Yıldırım, *footnote 34,* pg. 250.
* Kızılbaş, which literally means "red-head" in Turkish is thought to derive from the Ottoman name given to a wide variety of Shi'ite militant factions. Today the term is used to describe members of the Alevi-Bektashi community who are Shi'ite Muslims but ethnically are Turks, Kurds or Zazas.

[40] Yildirim, 110.

violence were not perfectly correlated with religious differences and that they therefore cannot fully explain why state-builders opted to define minorities in terms of religion. Rather, at the highest level of politics, there existed an internal debate over the content of national identities and the criteria by which they would be defined from this point on. The nature of this internal struggle within Greece and Turkey is thus well captured by Przeworski's 1977 insight that "cultural struggle is a struggle about culture, not a struggle between cultures."[41] Rigidly adhering to any singular definition of "minority" would entail substantial complications (removing populations that had been consistently loyal, e.g. the Karamanlides) and absorbing some undesirable ones (Albanians, Roma). Yet this contingency did not deter Turkish or Greek state-builders from selecting a singular category. As I will show below, the proclamations and actions of state-makers both demonstrate that they were willing to forsake the instrumental flexibility that a more nuanced system of determining minorities and enemies would have afforded because they realized that: 1) enforcing a single and dominant cultural divide would lower the costs of mass compliance to the national idea; and that 2) such a strategy would eventually work to undermine the strength of traditional religious authorities.

Imposing the Religious State

In this section I show that words and deeds of Greek and Turkish elites support my contention that state-makers consciously and consistently pursued a policy of reinforcing religious categories. To begin with, the historical record supports the argument that nation-builders gradually came to understand the importance of merging religion and the state. For example, in a parliamentary debate that took place in May of 1920, Emir Pasha, the representative from Sivas, warned against the too rapid propagation of a racially or ethnically based Turkish identity:

> There is a Caliphate founded in the name of Islam . . . I request that we not act only in the name of the Turks [*Türklük namına istimal etmiyelim*] because we did not gather here only in the name of the Turks. If you please, it is more appropriate to say Muslims

[41] Quoted in Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups* (Cambridge, MA: Havard University Press, 2004), 59

> or even Ottomans not Turks. In our homeland there are Circassians, Chechens, Kurds, Laz and other Islamic peoples. Let us not speak in a divisive manner that will leave [these groups] on the outside.[42]

Another prominent Turkish nationalist, Rauf Orbay, put an even more explicit emphasis on the role that religion would play when he declared in 1922:

> It is hard for us to control the general situation. This [state authority] can only be secured by an authority that everyone is accustomed to regard as unapproachably high. Such is the office of the Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and try to set up an entity of a different character in its place would lead to failure and disaster. It is quite inadmissible.[43]

In merging their state-building and modernizing agenda with religious symbols, Kemalist leaders claimed to be learning from the "past mistakes" of the *Tanzimat* reformers who had come before them. Ziya Gökalp, the most influential and original thinker behind the emergence of Turkish nationalism, argued that, in trying to completely separate Islam from the modern state, the *Tanzimat* had "reduced it [the state] to an inorganic condition" and made it untenable. "People can neither entirely drop the religion they hold sacred", wrote Gökalp, "nor can they dispense with the necessities of contemporary civilization. Reason demands, not that one be sacrificed at the expense of the other but that an attempt be made to reconcile the two."[44] In short, the Kemalists realized that nominal Islam (as a system of culture and socialization as opposed to purely faith) could be a powerful mechanism by which to solidify the new Turkish national identity.

Greek state makers envisioned the link between the church and the nation in a similar fashion.

[Insert missing quotes Greek Elite (Venizelos)]

One observer writing in *Foreign Affairs* at the time of the exchange argued that the Greek decision to

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[42] Quoted in Howard Eissenstat. "Metaphors of Race and Discourse of Nation: Racial Theory and State Nationalism in the First Decades of the Turkish Republic," in Paul Spickard, *Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 2005), 246.

[43] Quoted in Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), 15.

[44] Ziya Gökalp.*Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays,* Niyazi Berkes Tr. (London: George Allan and Unwin, 1959)., 202

define minorities by religion was an almost natural extension of the historic relationship between religion and politics in Greece:

> The choice of a "religious" test as the sole basis for determining nationality seems a singular one; yet . . . in the Near East other tests may be suggested— doubtless were — only to be rejected. . . A test of blood or descent would be useless, for the racial origin of large parts of the population is not traceable . . . A language test would have been still less satisfactory. . . When you make a treaty of exchange it is necessary to have an objective criterion in order to prevent property owners from forswearing themselves for the sake of keeping a foothold with their property. Among the Greeks, Church has been immemorially interwoven with State and all "Hellenes," even if agnostic, have their children baptized in the Orthodox Church and claim membership in it.[45]

State-makers were not just paying lip service to religious symbols. Their actions also stand as a testament to the fact that they realized that a union with religion could bolster state power on a number of fronts. I employ three separate historical examples to demonstrate that state-makers actively implemented policies based religious identity categories. The first example recounts how Greek administrators tried to use religious categories as a justification for deporting Muslim Albanians from the contested region of Epirus. The second case demonstrates how Greek politicians imposed religiously based categories in their resettlement policies in order to create an overwhelming Greek Orthodox presence in areas that remained religiously mixed. The third example illustrates the durability of religious categorization by showing how Turkish statesmen employed religious categories in the economic sphere up into the 1940s in order to create a Muslim middle class that was sympathetic to, and representative of, the state.

1) The Cham Albanians: From Friend to Muslim Foe

The Greek state's decision to impose a religious definition of minorities and enemies is well demonstrated by the evolution in Greek elites' attitudes towards the Cham population of Northern Epirus. The overwhelming majority of Cham Albanians were Muslims who belonged to various Sufi orders (primarily Bektashi) and settled around the numerous *tekkes* (mystic houses of worship) situated

[45] Charles P. Howland, "Greece and Her Refugees", *Foreign Affairs* Vol 4. No. 4 (July 1926), pp. 618.

in the region. In 1923 official Greek documents reported the number of Chams to be 20,319, most of whom were living in Thesprotia, an area close to the Albanian border in the northwest corner of Greek Epirus.[46] Referring to the Cham Albanians a "very tough nut to crack", A.A. Pallis described them as follows:

> By religion Muslims, by decent Greek Epirotes who were converted to Islam in the 17th century, they are linguistically Albanian, and by political sympathy Turkish, as is shown by the desire of many of the them to emigrate to Turkey and by the fact that during the numerous Albanian insurrections against Turkey they have invariably sided with the Turks.[47]

Yet despite Pallis' description, other sources claim that the Chams were in fact divided amongst themselves as to where their loyalties lay. A special envoy of the Council of the League of Nations visited the region and found that a large portion of the Muslim population did not want to be included in the Greco-Turkish population exchange and that most people had no idea of their origin or preferences beyond their local religious affiliations.[48]

The ambiguity of the Chams' self-identification aside, the Greek state originally had viewed the Chams as a group that could be assimilated to a dominant Hellenic culture. Immediately following the end of the First World War, Venizelos spoke of the Albanian speakers of Northern Epirus with lofty praise. He claimed that all the residences of Epirus had been Greek long before the Kingdom of Greece was founded. "One may be tempted," remarked Venizelos,

> to raise the objection that a substantial portion of this Greek population uses Albanian as its mother tongue, and is, consequently, in all probability, of Albanian origin; but the democratic conception of the Allied and Associate Powers cannot admit of any other standard than that of national conciousness . . . It may be useful to add that the present vice-president of the Greek Ministerial Council, Mr. Repoulis; . . . the commander-in-chief of the Greek naval forces and Minster of Marine, Admiral Koundouriotis; and the majority of the crews of the Greek navy speak Albanian as their mother tongue.[49]

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[46] Dimitris Michalopoulos, "The Moslems of Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey," *Balkan Studies,* Vol. 27, No. 2 (1986), pg. 304.

[47] A. Alexander Pallis, "The Exchange of Populations in the Balkans," *The Nineteenth Century and After.* Vol. 47 no. 576 (1925): 1-8.

[48] Michalopoulos, 308.

[49] Herbert Adams Gibbons, *Venizelos.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 345-6.

Yet as the demands of state consolidation and security became more immediate and pressing, the Greek elites' attitude towards the Muslim Chams began to sour. A review of the official reports that circulated between local administrators in the region and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens clearly demonstrates that by 1923 the Greek government had come to view the Chams as enemies who should ideally be removed (and if they could not be removed, then at least their influence should be mitigated). This is best evidenced in a memorandum sent from a local Greek administrator in the Dirrahio district in northern Epirus to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 31 May 1923. This document reveals that the Greeks had approached the Albanian government with the idea of trading the Muslim Cham populations in Greece with a community of Greek Orthodox people living on the Albanian side of the border. To the dismay of Greek officials, Albanians refused to consider such a scheme.[50] The fact that such a diplomatic overtures were being made indicates that Greek statesmen were beginning harden their thinking on the minority issue, and were doing so in religious terms

This assertion is further bolstered by the fact that such scheming was not limited to diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania. The Greeks also made a considerable effort to include the Chams in the Greco-Turkish population exchange of 1923 simply by virtue of the fact that they were Muslim. After extensive debate, the Chams were officially omitted. Certainly the Greeks would have been happy to see them go; but Italian and Albanian delegates at the Lausanne Conference made a strong case that the Chams primarily self-identified as Albanian nationals (a dubious claim) and thus could not rightfully be sent to Turkey. Nonetheless, local Greek authorities in charge of resettlement did not always honor the Cham's official exemption from the population exchange and this group increasingly became the target of state sponsored repression and unofficial deportations. Reports

[50] Memorandum from I. Kokotakis in Dirrihio to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 1923. Istorikon Archeion Yporgeiou Exoterikon (Greek Foreign Ministry Archives) (From now on referred to as A.Y.E), 1924, A/5, άρ. 5382 reprinted in Ελληνίσμος της Βόρειου Ήπειρου και Ελληνοαλβανικές Σχέσεις (The Greeks of Northern Epiros and Greek-Albanian Relations) Vol. 3 (The Onasis Foundation: Athens, 1997), 91.

compiled by League of Nations representatives charged that local Greek authorities were intentionally making life unbearable for the Cham Muslims in order to force them out of Greece.[51] Furthermore, Turkish historians have found evidence that somehow a number of Albanian speaking Muslims were actually forcibly subjected to the Greco-Turkish population transfer and wound up in Turkey. For example, in his memoirs, Turkish statesman Rıza Nur claims that a number of Albanians from Janina were transferred and began populating the Erenköy and Kartal districts of Istanbul.[52] In light of such reports and evidence, international authorities continued to insist that the Greeks distinguish between "exchangeable" Turkish Muslims and non-exchangeable Albanian Muslims. But Greek authorities were often simply unwilling to acknowledge that such a distinction existed. Documents reveal that local Greek authorities warned the central state that the Muslim Chams were really "Turks" in disguise and that they were seeking to gain a political foothold in the region with help of Albanian authorities.[53]

In mid June of 1925, as a result of international pressure as well as a basic failure to be able to actually distinguish between "true" Cham Albanian Muslims and Turkish Muslims, local Greek administrators temporarily settled on a policy of not deporting anyone unless they outright declared Turkish loyalties.[54] Nonetheless, this hardly settled the issue and Greek officials remained uncomfortable with the Albanian Muslim minority in its midst. As correspondence records between Greek administrators in Epirus and central authorities in Athens demonstrate, as the 1920's wore on, the Cham question was a constant source of irritation for Greek authorities seeking to impose standardized, Greek language schooling in the region, for the Chams were not associated with the Orthodox Churches through which most educational initiatives were being organized.[55] Low level tensions

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[51] Also see Memorandum from I. Kokotakis, Greek Embassy in Tirana to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 June 1928, A.Y.E. 1928, A/21/I, άρ. 7208, ibid., 372. Also see Michalopoulos, 311.
[52] Yildirim, 112.
[53] Memorandum from General Commander of Epiros Petihakis to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 April, 1925, A.Y.E. 1927-9, A/4/α, άρ. 5854, ibid., 210.
[54] Unsigned Memorandum, 14 June 1925, A.Y.E., 1925, Γ/68, X, άρ. 7691, ibid., 224.
[55] Memorandum from Colonel Y. Fessopoulos to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A.Y.E., 1926, B/33, άρ. 6668

simmered well into the 1930's. These tensions finally came to a head with the outbreak of WWII and the Italian invasion of Greece. The Italians are said to have manipulated the Cham issue to stir-up resistance to Greek rule and, indeed, many Chams appear to have collaborated with the Italian occupiers. Once the Greek army succeeded in pushing the Italian forces from its territory, it resolved to remove the Muslim Chams' influence once and for all. Over 100 *tekkes* were burned to the ground and Cham communities were systematically cleansed from the region. The Greek state expropriated Cham properties and encouraged nomadic Vlachs to settle in these houses and lands.[56]

The turnabout in Greek attitudes towards the Cham Albanians reveals that state-builders began to define minorities and enemies in religious terms. The Chams, who had once been considered potential members of a pan-Hellenic nation, became enemies whose influence had to be eliminated or, at very least, substantially curtailed. The Cham's situation was not unique. As we will see below, other religious minority groups living in Greece and Turkey also suffered at the hands of the state by virtue of their religious affiliations.

2) Religion and Resettlement: Diluting Slavic Exarchate Influence in Macedonia

Much like the shift in attitudes towards the Muslim Chams, Greek resettlement policies also reveal that the state was consciously employing religious categorization to maximize its own power and influence. These resettlement policies had a momentous impact on the religious make-up of Macedonia, an area that was one of the most religiously, ethnically and linguistically mixed in all of Greece. The overwhelming majority of Muslims residing in Macedonia had been subjected to forced deportation as part of the Greco-Turkish population exchange. Yet a sizable number of Slavic-speaking peoples remained. These Slavic communities had been living in the area for centuries and even constituted a majority in some provinces. Although a "voluntary" migration scheme with Bulgaria in 1919 had led some Slavs to migrate across the border, there was still a substantial Slavic

[56] Miranda Vickers, "The Cham Issue: Albanian National and Property Claims in Greece" *Conflict Studies Research Centre* ISBN 1-903584-76-0 (April 2002), pp. 7-8.

influence in the region in 1923.[57]

With respect to the state's categorization of the Slav's loyalties, religion was again the guiding mantra. Yet in this case it was internal divisions within the Christian Orthodox world that preoccupied Greek state-makers. The Greek position was that the true “nationalist sentiments” of any given Slavophone was best determined by his ecclesiastical allegiance. Although all Slavs were Christian Orthodox, in official documents the Greek state often divided Slavs into two distinct categories. The first was the *Voulgarizondes* (also referred to as Grecomani), who supported the religious rule of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and thus attended “Greek” churches and schools. The second group was the *Skhismatikoi* (Schismatics), who followed the Bulgarian Exarchate (the Bulgarian National Church which had split from the Patriarchate in 1872) and frequented Bulgarian churches and schools.[58] Despite speaking a Slavic dialect as their first language, the *Voulgarizondes* were considered assimilatable and thus potential “Greeks”. The Greek authorities remained incredibly suspicious, however, of the *Skhismatikoi.* As a result of these suspicions, Greek elites implemented resettlement policies that explicitly aimed to dilute Slavic (and especially the *Schismatikoi*) influence in the borderlands. The ultimate goals of these resettlement policies were to create a buffer-zone of religious loyalists that could be leveraged to protect the Greek nation from pernicious would-be infiltrators as well as to dilute concentrated pockets of potential resistance to the state.[59]

Resettlement statistics, as well as the statements of Greek policy makers and observers made immediately following the population exchange, strongly support the argument that the nationalist Greek government was engaged in a concerted effort to have Greek Orthodox Christians constitute the

57 Historians who have done work in the relevant Macedonian archives estimate that only 1.5% of the entire Slavo-phone population had left the western section of Macedonian by 1922. In Central and Eastern Macedonia estimates are more difficult to come by because documents have been destroyed but it is suspected the Slav populations had decreased substantially by 1923. See Kontogiorgi, 203-4

58 Anastasia Karakasidou “Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece: The Slavo-Macedonian 'Non-minority'” in Richard Clogg, ed. *Minorities in Greece,* (London: Hurst&Company, 2002), 124; Kotogiorgi, 234.

59 The theme of infiltrators had become especially important over the course of the Balkan wars, as Greek and Bulgarian politicians accused one another of using religious propaganda to sway the loyalties of peasant communities.

majority in all of Macedonia's provinces. First, although 54% of the total refugee population that arrived in Greece was classified as urban and only 46% was classified as rural, resettlement funding schemes heavily favored the rural migrants. According to Charles Eddy, a highly disproportionate 86% percent of funds were allocated to rural resettlement, with the remaining 13% going to urban groups.[60] Furthermore, the vast majority of these rural settlements were set-up in Macedonia. Although some of the settlements were constituted from the homes and lands that exchangeable Muslims had evacuated, in many cases new settlements were attached to existing villages or simply started from scratch.[61] A map detailing the refugee settlements published by the League of Nations in 1926 shows that these settlements were heavily concentrated in the stretch of land that separated Greece from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey, the region populated by *Voulgarizonde* and *Skhismatikoi* Slavs.

[Insert map I]

Beyond these patterns of funding and resettlement, statements by policy makers and observers support the assertion that a primary aim of the refugee resettlement programs was the ethno-religious homogenization of the nation state. In his memoirs, Colonel Stilianos Gonatas, who served as Greek Prime Minster between 1922-4, recalls that "We settled the rural refugees particularly near the borders of the state in order to consolidate the frontier populations so that they could defend themselves against irregular aggressions."[62] Divisional Greek army commanders also reported that "they looked upon the introduction of colonies of refugees to those parts [Macedonia] as one of the best means of countering Bulgarian action, in that, once these refugees got possession of land, they took their own measures to prevent outside interference."[63] Outside observers also acknowledged that the goal of religious homogenization underpinned resettlement decisions. Charles P. Howland, writing in *Foreign Affairs* at the time of the resettlement, remarked that the population of Macedonia "has been raised from 513,000

[60] Charles B. Eddy. *Greece and the Greek Refugees* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1931), missing pg. #
[61] Extract of a Report filed by Colonel Blair in December of 1924, quoted in Kotogiorgi, 100.
[62] Stilianos Gonatas, *Apomenemonevmata* (Memoirs) (Athens, 1958), 265; also quoted in Petzopoulos, 136.
[63] Kotogiorgi,

to 1,277,000" and that "more than 1,500 villages have been built, each containing from 100 to 500 families" in order to "eliminate civil or guerrilla war among villages and comitadji, and to reduce appreciably the chances of war between Greece and her neighbors who so often have had or created an excuse for intervening on behalf of non-Greeks in the table-lands and valley-pockets of Macedonia".[64]

In large part the movement of Greek Orthodox Christian refugees into the region achieved the desired effect of forcing Slavs to either adhere to the Greek national cause or abandon their homes and join religious sympathizers in Bulgaria. As the population statistics in Table III show, by 1926 the Slavs (in this table referred to as Bulgarians) and Muslims had been greatly outnumbered in all Macedonian provinces as a result of the refugee resettlements.

[Insert Table III: See Appendix I]

Like in the case of the Cham Albanians, the historical record of refugee resettlement illuminates the fact that Greek elites enacted policies to undermine the influence of religious minorities—Muslim and Christian alike. By invoking a concept of the national identity in which religious loyalty equated loyalty to the state, state builders produced a climate within which the achievement of security and order came to be equated with religious homogenization. Greek state-builders thus carried out their nationalist mission by reifying religious symbols and rhetoric through forcible policies of resettlement based on religious categories. The Turks, too, followed a similar strategy. It is toward state-sponsored discrimination toward non-Muslim in Turkey that I now turn.

3) *Religious Classification and Economic Discrimination in Turkey*

Forcible policies based on religious categories were not limited to deportation and resettlement. The use of religious categories crept into other aspects of administration in the new states and colored the everyday experiences of individuals well into the 1930's and 1940's. This fact is well exemplified by the economic policies of religious discrimination employed by the Turkish state. The taproot of

[64] Howland, 622.

these policies can be traced back to the thinking of the Young Turk intellectuals. These scholars had carefully followed Russia's capitalist transformation and warned that the prospects of survival for a society composed only of peasants and officials would be dim. To be strong, they argued, the new Turkish state needed a commercial, bourgeoisie class made up of the dominant national group—Turkish Muslims. One such intellectual, Yusuf Akçura, expressed this point of view as follows:

> [The] foundation of the modern state is the bourgeois class. Contemporary prosperous states came into existence on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, of the businessmen and bankers. The national awakening in Turkey is the beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie. And if the natural growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage or interruption, we can say that the sound establishment of the Turkish state has been guaranteed. [65]

Yet Akçura failed to appreciate the fact that the "natural growth" of the Turkish bourgeoisie remained highly unlikely, for non-Muslim minorities had already corned the dominant industries of the countries commercial capital, Istanbul.

Statistics compiled on the eve of the exchange clearly demonstrate that the Greek Orthodox Christians had held a major stake in local businesses and were incredibly active in both Turkish and foreign-owned companies. In 1921, 66% of Istanbul's restaurants and 94% of its beer halls were Greek owned. Furthermore, 528 of the 654 registered wholesale ventures belonged to Greeks.[66] Likewise, a basic tally of Greek employees in the major companies registered in Istanbul (shown in Table IV) demonstrates the Greeks played a dominant role in banking, shipping and insurance.

[Insert Table IV: See Appendix II]

In addition to the Greeks, the Jews and a small group of Armenians were also influential players in the Istanbul business scene.

Yet, through a series of policies that were indicative of the Turkish states' decision to reinforce religious categories, the Turkish government quickly dismantled the religious minorities' economic

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65 Ahmad, 44,

66 Clarence Richard Johnson, *Constantinople to-day (The Pathfinder Survery of Constantinople: A Study in Oriental Social Life)* (The Macmillan Company: New York, 1922), pp. 263.

networks and influence. Removing non-Muslims from prominent commercial positions would provide citizens with a constant reminder that the new Turkish state was, above all, one for Muslims and by Muslims. Two of the most infamous laws imposed by the Turkish government were law #2007 and the capital tax (*varlık vergisi).* Law #2007, which the Turkish Parliament passed in 1932, effectively barred non-Muslims from some thirty trades and professions, including itinerant merchanting, tailoring, insurance and real-estate.[67] As a follow-up to law #2007, in 1936 the Greek Orthodox Christian minority was also prohibited from acquiring new property.[68]

The capital tax, which was formally instituted in 1942, dealt a death blow to religious minority involvement in economic life. The tax mandated a levy on property owners, business men, and certain categories of workers who were required to pay based on their earnings. Special local commissions made the actual tax assessments and were afforded much discretion in their audits. In the case of Istanbul, it was the city's *defterdar* (director of finance) Faik Ökte who administered the criteria for tax assessments. Ökte's memoir reveals that the primary factor determining any given taxpayers' assessment was his religion. Ökte's offices placed taxpayers on one of two lists: the "M" list for Muslim or the "G" list for *Gayrimüslim* (Non-Muslim). Citizens on the "G" list were typically taxed ten times more than those on the "M" list.[69] In addition to the "G" list, later on a "D" list was also instituted for *Dönme* Jews, who were to pay twice as much as Muslims.[70] Defaulters, of which there were thousands, were sent to forced labor camps in Aşkale, a region in northern Turkey known as the Turkish Siberia. In a matter of years, these Turkish policies succeed in removing almost all traces of Christian (and to a lesser extent Jewish) influence from economic life.

At this point a summary is in order. The path of history is a winding one, and I lest I lose my reader in an endless stream of official policies and proclamations, it is worth reminding them of why

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[67] Speros Vryonis Jr. *The Mechanisms of Catastrophe* (New York: Greekworks, 2005), 33.
[68] Prodromou, 15.
[69] Faik Ökte, *The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax,* tr. Geoffry Cox (London: Wolfeboro, 1987), 77-82.
[70] Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey* (New York: Fredrick and Praeger, 1955), 119.

such a detailed investigation was necessary in the first place. What I have show through these historical discussions is that religion was consistently and concertedly used as category by state-makers to determine which individuals would be considered loyal members of the state and which would be forever deemed enemies and minorities. By virtue of the sheer scope of any state endeavor to categorize an entire population on a singular identity dimension the process by which categorization occurs is not seamless. Yet given the expected complications, it is remarkable that the Greek and Turkish authorities pursued the aim of imposing a religiously homogeneous state with such consistency and severity. Religious discrimination and categorization colored a wide range of state policies and were implemented through a chain of command that led from top national authorities down to lowly local administrators. Only one question thus remains to be answered: How can one explain the zeal, thoroughness and viciousness with which state-building elites took up the project of religious homogenization?

Why Religion?: The Cultural Hegemony of Religious Classifications under the *Millet* System

The key to understanding state-makers' decision to employ religious categories can be found in the historical legacy of the *millet* system. To put it simply, Ottoman administrative structures created a society in which religious ties were strong and religious authority was seen as legitimate. I have shown that state-makers gradually came to understand the need to merge their state-building agenda with religious symbols. In this section I illuminate just how everyday practices and administrative organization under Ottoman *millet* system came to create a hegemonic cultural framework[71] in which the masses viewed religion as a legitimate means of political organization and moral authority. But before looking more closely at how the *millet* system structured patterns of everyday life for Ottoman

[71] I borrow the concept of a hegemonic cultural framework from David Laitin, who himself borrowed it from Antonio Gramsci. It is defined as "the political forging—whether through coercion or elite bargaining—and institutionalization of a patter of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense." See David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 11.

subjects, a very brief historical note is in order.

During the fourteenth and fifteen centuries, the Ottoman Empire expanded its territorial holdings into Eastern Europe, the Middle and Northern Africa, bringing large numbers of Christian subjects under its rule. The *millet* system gradually emerged as an answer to the question of how to administer these diverse territories. Essentially a federation of theocracies, the system functioned by providing a degree of religious and cultural autonomy to each *millet* while simultaneous incorporating them into the wider Ottoman administrative and economic structures. Above all, the *millet* system emphasized the universality of the religious faith around which it was organized and, in doing so, it superseded but did not undo other ethnic and linguistic differences. From the mid fifteenth century until the empire's collapse, three *millets*—the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian[72] and the Jewish—enjoyed official sanction from Ottoman authorities.[73]

Within each *millet* religion provided a "universal belief system" as well as a "hierarchy of authority culminating in the chief prelate (the patriarch) of each *millet*."[74] The foundation of the *millet* system was the village (or in a town, the neighborhood (*mahalle*)) community, and at the heart of each community was the religious congregation. Leadership over these communities was most usually handled by a small group that included the priest, several other religious representatives and a prominent layman (often a *mouhtar,* or village elder). The priest exercised spiritual leadership but also acted as the intermediately between the village or neighborhood and the upper ecclesiastical authorities, who in turn oversaw control of larger towns and served as a connection to the higher-up Ottoman religious and political authorities. These upper ecclesiastical authorities operating at the town level

[72] Although the terms Greek Orthodox and Armenian seem to imply a privilege for the ethnic groups that we think of today as Greek and Armenian, this was not the case. As Kemal Karpat has show, until mid eighteenth century, "the patriarch's emphasized the universality of the faith and not their respective ethnic origin or language since they could maintain their position in their *socially* and *ethnically* diverse millets only by upholding the universal elements of faith." Kemal H. Karpat, "*Millets and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Naiton and State in the Post-Ottoman Era"* in Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, Ed. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, Vol. 1 The Central Lands* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 142.

[73] Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights,* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 156.

[74] Karpat, 142.

enjoyed immense power and influence, for in acting as a liaison between the *millet* and Ottoman administrators they were responsible for the distribution of state-lands, tax collection and general order and security.[75] Such characteristics were not limited to only non-Muslim communities. Life for Muslims looked very similar and produced equally strong religious sentiments. One contemporary observer noted that an ordinary resident of any Anatolian village, when asked the question of who or what she was, would invariably respond with "I'm a Muslim."[76]

Furthermore, institutions of education, while still not widespread, were also organized by individual community leaders around the church or mosque, further inculcating a religious consciousness.[77] In 1897 the various non-Muslim *millets* controlled 5,982 elementary schools with 8,025 teachers and over 300,000 students. The vast majority of these schools (4,390) were run by the Greek Orthodox Church, and the remainder were run through Armenian or Jewish religious organizations.[78] As for the Muslims of the Empire, if they received any education at all it too was likely to be a religious one. Although there were periodic experiments with secular preparatory schools for the military and civil-service, the vast majority of educational institutions were *mekteps* (religious primary schools) and *medresses* (religious secondary schools). These schools were under the guiding hand of the Supreme Religious Court (*Fetvahane-i Celile*) and staffed by religious teachers.[79] As Andreas Kazamis writes "education in Islamic Ottoman society was not the responsibility of the state. It was the function of the religious institutions and was essentially designed to induct the masses of the people into the Ottoman Islamic culture. With other agencies, such as the mosque, it performed a socializing function."[80] It is in this way that the Ottoman administrative structures, organized widely

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[75] Ibid., 142-3.
[76] Robinson, 63.
[77] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 317.
[78] Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977),
[79] Ibid., 74.
[80] Andreas Kazamis, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 31.

around religion and reliant on local clergy for leadership and education, engendered a sense of both religious universality and local parochialism amongst its subjects.

State-builders understood that breaking deeply instilled patterns of local parochialism would demand that they make an appeal to religious universality. The question at stake was basically one of how state-builders could turn individual loyalties toward the state given that religious institutions had structured patterns of everyday life for so long. Because the state was not yet recognized by the masses as having any real independent legitimacy of its own, state-builders opted to meet the old religious system on its own terms in hopes of successfully usurping its following. Demanding outright that people exchange religious ties for state ties was out of the question, for it would have undoubtedly been met with widespread resistance. Fusing religious imagery, symbolism and structures with the state, on the other hand, offered a viable alternative.

Furthermore, because the states lacked "capacity" in the sense that their administrative and bureaucratic penetration was weak, piggy-backing on religious institutions had advantages other than symbolic clout and legitimacy. By usurping the channels and networks of religious authority, the state not only succeeded in spreading its own influence, it also squashed the power of its chief competitor: religious authority itself. As our discussion below will elucidate, if the state had merely wanted to borrow religious symbols to achieve a mass following, church-state relations would have likely been cooperative, collaborative and mutually reinforcing. Put simply, the church and the state would have likely struck a bargain through which they would support one another. But the state was not interested in striking bargains with respect to its own power. That the state sought to achieve total power over religious authority is evidenced by the fact that church-state relations grew contentious to the point of outright hostility. Ultimately the state employed religious methods of categorization because appropriating religious constructs and schema striped religious authorities of their *raison d'etre*. By linking the state cause to religion, state-makers deprived religious authorities of their unique

justification to rule, facilitating the states' capture of religious institutions.

Solving the Question of Church State Relations (in the State's favor)

Just how did the use of religious categories abet the state's aim of establishing itself as the only legitimate source of power and authority? In Greece, understanding just how the state succeeded in muting religious authorities is best depicted by exploring the fate of the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul and the Ecumenical Patriarch. The Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul had been exempted from the Greco-Turkish population exchange of 1923 in large part because Greek negotiators were adamant and uncompromising in their conviction that this group remain in Turkey. Greek negotiators had refused to bend on this point entirely because the continued presence of the Orthodox Greeks was bound-up with status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate (also referred to as the Greek Church of Constantinople), based in the Phanar district of Istanbul.[81] Although throughout the late 19th and early 20th century the various nationalist Orthodox churches of the Balkans succeeded in gaining autocephalous status, the Ecumenical Patriarch held the symbolic position of the highest ranking bishop of the Eastern Orthodox communion. Greeks leaders argued that removal of the Patriarch would cause a general crisis of confidence in the Orthodox world and would open the door for permanent Russian domination over the Eastern Orthodox Church.[82] Furthermore, for the Greeks, the legacy of the Patriarch's seat in Constantinople extended back to the city's "glorious past" as the capital of the Byzantine Empire, giving it a formidable symbolic place in the narrative of Greek national identity. In short, the Patriarch was one of the most formidable religious symbols in state-builders' repertoire.

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[81] Elizabeth Prodromou provides a good, succinct description of the role of the Ecumenical Patriarch: "The institution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has been located in Istanbul (formerly, Constantinople) since the early fourth century and is the ecclesiastical center of the world's approximately 300 million Orthodox Christians. Dating back to the time of the Christian Pentarchy, the title "Ecumenical"implies primacy of honor amongst the many patriarchates that currently constitute the Orthodox Church in global terms. The Ecumenical Patriarchate is responsible for the spiritual and administrative direction of the Greek Orthodox in Turkey and elsewhere." in "Turkey Between Secularism and Fundamentalism: The 'Muslimhood Model' and the Greek Orthodox Minority" *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs* (Spring 2005), pp. 13.

[82] See Harry J. Psomiades' The Eastern Question: The Last Phase (Institute for Balkan Studies: Thessaloniki, 1968) and "Soviet Russia and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Autumn, 1957), pp. 371-81.

Turkish nationalists, who were working to abolish the power of their own Muslim Caliphate (see below), were loath to allow the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate to continue to exert any political or religious authority in the newly created Turkish state. Furthermore, the Turkish state had good reason to question the political loyalties of Meletios IV, who had served as Patriarch since 1921. Meletios had been thoroughly implicated in anti-Turkish activities during the Greek occupation. As a result, the Turks made a considerable diplomatic efforts to see that the Greek Patriarch's headquarters be moved to the Holly Synod on Mount Athos in Halkidiki, a region squarely within Greek territory. Yet Turkish demands fell on deaf ears and international pressure eventually succeeded in convincing the Turks to agree to a compromise: the Greek state would force Meletios IV to abdicate his position and the Turks would allow a new Patriarch, who would be stripped of all political and administrative authority, to exercise his spiritual prerogatives over the Greek Orthodox community.[83]

I contend that this compromise was indicative of the Greek nationalists' general attitude towards religion. They aimed to strip religious authorities of real political power while at the same time appropriating leveraging and maintaining religious identity markers by linking them to the state in such a way as to legitimize the expansion of state control. That this was the underlying objective of the Greek state is evidenced by two facts. The first is that the Greeks did not press the Turks to secure the precise conditions under which the Patriarchal institution was to maintain its existence. The Greeks did not demand any written commitment from the Turks on the issue and effectively took the Turkish promise to allow the Patriarch to continue his religious duties at face value.[84] The fact that the Greeks were so adamant that the Patriarch remain in Turkey but then did so little to formally safeguard the institution demonstrates their preference for symbolic as opposed to real religious authority. The

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[83] See the *Treaty of Lausanne,* especially articles 37-45. Although the treaty does call for the equal treatment of religious minorities it is vague on the actual authority that the Patriarchate should enjoy and on the issue of succession. Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974* (Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), 87.

[84] Ibid., 93.

second relevant fact is that Meletios IV himself, together with other religious authorities, fiercely resisted the Greek decision to maintain a politically castrated Patriarchate in Constantinople. Ironically, Meletios actually sided with the Turks in wanting the church headquarters moved to Mt. Athos or somewhere else within Greece! He realized that the symbolic location of Constantinople was just that—symbolic—and that the best chances for exercising real power would be from within the Greek state itself.[85]

Despite Meletios recalcitrance, he ultimately lost his battle with Greek national authorities and was deposed. Divested of all formal authority, the Patriarchs who came after Meletios were essentially powerless and could not even offer effective protection to the small Orthodox community of Istanbul. As a result, the Orthodox population of Istanbul has declined from 110,000 in 1923 to a mere 2,000 today.[86] The sad fate of the Orthodox Christians in Istanbul was the price that had to be paid to maintain the religious symbolism of the Patriarch while simultaneously preventing him from meddling in the political affairs of the new Greek state. By using religious categories to define who would be considered a member of the new state, Greek nation-builders had gained purchase on the source of religious leaders' legitimacy and authority. Once religious symbols were successfully fused with the nations, subjecting religious institutions entirely to state control was no longer unfathomable. With the state claiming to be speaking in name of the religion, only religious authorities themselves realized that the true voice of religion was intentionally being silenced.

A similar duality marked the actions of Turkish state-makers with respect to religion. Turkish nationalist were also solidifying the symbolic link between religion and the state through policies based on religious categories. Yet Turkish elites eventually took an even more aggressive stance towards actual religious institutions than did the Greeks. Between 1920-22 Mustafa Kemal and other nationalists had made a concerted effort to gain the public support of orthodox Sunni religious

[85] Ibid., 149.
[86] Prodromou, 14.

dignitaries in Anatolia as well as leaders of the Alevi (Shi'ite) community and the Bektaşi orders.[87] Furthermore, in some provinces religious leaders had played an instrumental role in the nationalist movement through the organization of Associations for the Defence of Rights (*Müdaafayi Hukuk Cemiyetleri*), which supported the Kemalist cause.[88] As such, despite the Kemalist's later "commitment to secularism and territorial-voluntaristic-linguistic forms of citizenship, to a large extent, Kemalist nationalism was still moulded by Islam."[89] In fact, Kemalists rode to power by forging alliances with religious leaders and organizations.

Yet as the Kemalist government began accruing power, Kemal himself instigated what can only be described as a turn towards militant secularism. This policy began quickly on the heels of Lausanne when, in August 1923, the Kemalist assembly approved a resolution to make Ankara the capital of the new state while retaining Istanbul as the seat of the Caliphate.[90] In doing so, he managed to temporarily preserve the symbolic authority of Islamic leaders while isolating them from the inner workings of the new national politics. This death blow to the political influence of the religious establishment is expressed best in the words of Atatürk himself. When the Caliph wrote to Ankara in the fall of 1923 requesting increased say in government decisions, Kemal issued a stringent response:

> Let the Caliph and the whole world know that the Caliph and the Caliphate which have been preserved have no real meaning and no real existence. We cannot expose the Turkish Republic to any sort of danger to its independence by its continued existence. The position of the Caliphate in the end has for us no more importance than a history memory.[91]

In the crucial period between August 1923 and the spring of 1924, the Caliphate remained in place as token of the Kemalists' link to Islam. Yet its actual influence diminished daily. Finally, in March of 1924, in a demonstration of national authority Kemal completely abolished the Caliphate. Later, in

87 Erik Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History,* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 152.
88 Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özelem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change,* (London: Routledge, 2004), 13.
89 Cagaptay, 15; also see Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The CUP in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 134-62.
90 Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford: One World, 2003), 87.
91 Shaw, 369

1926, he repealed Islamic Holly law (Shariat) and abolished pious foundations (*vakıfs*). Abolishing Shariat put legal authority in the hands of the secular elite and shutting-down the *vakıfs* robbed religious authorities of their main source of funding and allowed the state to appropriate valuable properties. These moves were not just about eradicating religious influence: rather, they were also about bringing religious institutions and leaders under state control. This is demonstrated, more than anything else, by the Kemalists' establishment of two religious directorates: the *Diyanet Işleri Müdürlüğü* (The Directorate for Religious Affairs) and the *Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü* (The Directorate-General for Pious Foundations). These two institutions effectively turned religious actors into civil servants monitored by the state and moved all education from the religious to the secular sphere.[92] With an iron grip on power, in 1928 Kemal laid down the capstone of his secularization program: he deleted the phrase "the religion of the Turkish state is Islam" from the constitution.[93]

The support of religious organizations had played and instrumental role in Kemal's rise to power. He had allied with religious leaders, utilized religious symbols and he even continued to employ religious categories to consolidate state power under his own control. With control over the masses nearly achieved, however, he felt that he needed to control the only organizations that could possibly threaten his authority, the institutions of religion themselves. Ironically, by employing religious categories with a total disregard for the particularities of local life and fortifying a almost completely religiously homogeneous state, Kemal genuflected in the direction of religious authority only to deal it death blow from behind.

Concluding Remarks

To close the circle, lets summarize the logic and argument of the paper from start to finish. Through policies of deportation, resettlement and economic discrimination, the Greek and Turkish states used religious categories to define enemies and minorities and effectively consolidate their own

[92] Zurcher, 187.
[93] Douglas A. Howard, *The History of Turkey* (London: Greenwood Press, 2001), 97.

power. Yet considering that linguistic and ethnic cleavages also existed—why did state maker opt to employ religious categories towards this end. Theories of nationalism fail to account for state makers' adherence to a religiously based conception of national identity, instead leading us to believe that questions of language will be paramount. Likewise, explanations based on previous patterns of violence are unsatisfying because they fail to consistently predict who will be targeted deemed a minority by the state and who will not. Instead, I have argued that state makers adopted religious modes of categorization because simultaneously fulfilled both symbolic and practical functions. The Ottoman *Millet* system had institutionalized an everyday social and political existence that ran along religious lines and had turned religion into the dominant symbolic framework of society. Although ethnic and linguistic differences existed, they fell under religion's shadow. State makers could not and did not ignore this reality when deciding how to establish the composition of the new state and the nature of popular national identity. To have done so would have been to jeopardize the success of the national project these politicians held so dear. Yet state-makers use of religious categories was also extremely instrumental. In fact, I have shown that, in both Greece and Turkey, state-makers used this union with religion to actually curtail the authority of religious institutions and secure the preeminence of the secular state. The history of Greek and Turkish state-building thus exhibits a peculiar wrinkle: the symbolic function of religion was being preserved and extolled through state imposition of religious identity categories at the same time that the actual power of religious institutions was being severely undermined.

Table III: % Population by District in Macedonia: 1912 vs. 1926

Population in 1912		Population in 1926	
Elassona			
Greeks	88%	Greeks	100%
Muslims	12%	Muslims	
Bulgarians		Bulgarians	
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Grevena			
Greeks	78%	Greeks	96%
Muslims	18%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	4%	Bulgarians	4%
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Caterini			
Greeks	80%	Greeks	100%
Muslims	18%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	2%	Bulgarians	
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Cozani			
Greeks	60%	Greeks	100%
Muslims	40%	Muslims	
Bulgarians		Bulgarians	
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Annasselitsa			
Greeks	75%	Greeks	100%
Muslims	25%	Muslims	
Bulgarians		Bulgarians	
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Cailaria			
Greeks	20%	Greeks	93%
Muslims	76%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	4%	Bulgarians	4%
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	3%
Verria			
Greeks	70%	Greeks	93%
Muslims	20%	Muslims	
Bulgarians		Bulgarians	
Miscellaneous	10%	Miscellaneous	7%

Florina			
Greeks	32%	Greeks	61%
Muslims	32%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	35%	Bulgarians	37%
Miscellaneous	1%	Miscellaneous	2%
Edessa			
Greeks	40%	Greeks	86%
Muslims	48%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	12%	Bulgarians	14%
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Enotia			
Greeks	54%	Greeks	64%
Muslims		Muslims	
Bulgarians	46%	Bulgarians	26%
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	5%
Castoria			
Greeks	56%	Greeks	78%
Muslims	24%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	19%	Bulgarians	22%
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Yenitsa			
Greeks	56%	Greeks	96%
Muslims	39%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	5%	Bulgarians	4%
Miscellaneous		Miscellaneous	
Ghoumendza			
Greeks	36%	Greeks	79%
Muslims	42%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	17%	Bulgarians	19%
Miscellaneous	5%	Miscellaneous	2%
Salonique			
Greeks	29%	Greeks	80%
Muslims	26%	Muslims	
Bulgarians		Bulgarians	
Miscellaneous	45%	Miscellaneous	20%
Kilkis			
Greeks		Greeks	97%
Muslims	66%	Muslims	
Bulgarians	29%	Bulgarians	
Miscellaneous	3%	Miscellaneous	3%

Langada	
Greeks 36% Muslims 60% Bulgarians 4% Miscellaneous	Greeks 100% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous
Chalcidique	
Greeks 86% Muslims 14% Bulgarians Miscellaneous	Greeks 97% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous 3%
Siderocastro	
Greeks 19% Muslims 40% Bulgarians 37% Miscellaneous 4%	Greeks 84% Muslims Bulgarians 15% Miscellaneous
Serres	
Greeks 47% Muslims 40% Bulgarians 9% Miscellaneous 4%	Greeks 94% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous
Zichni	
Greeks 74% Muslims 17% Bulgarians 7% Miscellaneous 2%	Greeks 95% Muslims Bulgarians 5% Miscellaneous
Pravi	
Greeks 40% Muslims 60% Bulgarians Miscellaneous	Greeks 100% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous
Drama	
Greeks 15% Muslims 79% Bulgarians 5% Miscellaneous 1%	Greeks 97% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous 3%
Cavalla	
Greeks 29% Muslims 69% Bulgarians Miscellaneous 2%	Greeks 100% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous

Nestos	
Greeks 98% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous	Greeks 100% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous
Thassos	
Greeks 100% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous	Greeks 100% Muslims Bulgarians Miscellaneous

Table IV: Greek Employment in Foreign and Turkish Companies in Istanbul 1923[94]

Company	Percent of Greek Employees
Registered Foreign Concessionary Companies	
Commercial Bank of Near East	90%
Orosdi Bank	60%
Deutsche Orientbank	50%
Credit Lyonnais	50%
Compagnie d'Assurances Generales	99%
Banco di Roma	50%
Banca Commerciale Italiana	50%
Banque hollandaise pour la Mediterranee	50%
Banque Fancaise de Pays d'Orient	50%
Ionian Bank	50%
The Adriatic Petroleum	50%
Assicurazioni Generale	50%
Union of Paris	20%
Helvetia (insurance)	20%
Bank and Manson Insurance Co.	25%
Halcyon Line	25%
Khedivial Mail Steam Ship	25%
Messageries Maritimes	25%
Paquet	25%
Gelchrist Walker and Co.	25%
Lloyd Triestino	25%
Walter Seager Co.	20%
Registered Turkish Companies	
Societe Cooperative des Marchands de fromage de Constantinople	100%
Minoterie d' Orient	60%
Minoteries Unies	60%
Compagine d' Assurances Generales de Constantinople	60%

[94] Statistics were originally presented in a letter from the Turkish government to the League of Nations on 6 March 1925 (Reprinted in Alexandris, 109).

Banque de Salonique	50%
Industrie Chimique et Olifere	40%
Balia-Karaidin	40%
Banque Nationale de Turquie	25%
Societe de Glace de Constantinople	25%
Fabriques Unies de Ciment Arslan et Eski-Hissar	25%
Fabriques Unies de Conserves Hermes et confiance Cartal	25%
Mines de' Heraclee	20%
Society Nationale d' Assurance Turque	20%
Cine-Magic	20%
Docks et Chantiers de Stenia	20%

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