



SENIOR FELLOWS REPORT

TERRORISM: WHAT'S COMING THE MUTATING THREAT

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MIPT Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism

Countering Terrorism with Knowledge



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Terrorism: What's Coming The Mutating Threat

**Introduction by Brian Michael Jenkins
Edited by James O Ellis III**

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Table of Contents

<i>Introduction</i> Brian Michael Jenkins	3
<i>The Future of Terrorism</i>	18
<i>The Organization of Terrorism</i> Martha Crenshaw	19
<i>Terrorism & Energy Security: Targeting Oil & Other Energy Sources and Infrastructures</i> Alex P. Schmid	28
<i>Observations on the Future of Terrorism</i> Leonard Weinberg	37
<i>The Future of Counterterrorism</i>	47
<i>Cooperation is not Sufficient: A New International Regime is Needed to Counter Global Jihadi Terrorism</i> Boaz Ganor	48
<i>Lessons from the Counterinsurgency Era</i> Gustavo Gorriti	54
<i>Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward</i> Rohan Gunaratna	63
About the Contributors	74
Endnotes	76

Introduction

Brian Michael Jenkins

Suppose that at the beginning of the 1970s, when I first began to write about terrorism, I had been summoned to Washington by the then newly created Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to brief its members on the future trajectory of this new mode of conflict. And suppose that, blessed with remarkable prescience or cursed with Cassandra's ability to make predictions no one would heed, I had forecast that in the years to follow, terrorists would seize thousands of hostages across the world, in airplanes, embassies, parliaments, schools, and theaters; that terrorists with truck bombs would blow up embassies, financial centers, office and apartment buildings, hotels, and restaurants; that terrorists would sabotage commercial airliners and plot to bring down 11 passenger jets at one time; that in coordinated bombings they would kill hundreds and wound thousands of commuters on trains in Paris, Moscow, Madrid, London, and Mumbai; that terrorists would unleash nerve gas on passengers in Tokyo's subways; that they would raise suicide bombings to a strategic level; that they would hijack and crash airliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, killing thousands; that in response to these events, combating terrorism would eventually become a "global war on terror," provoking two invasions, both of which turned into long wars. How remarkable that would have sounded in 1972. How remarkably ordinary it sounds today!

This introduction is about how terrorism has changed over the years and how it hasn't. It suggests that some developments seen as jihadist innovations are, in fact, neither new nor unique. It discerns some disturbing long-term trends, but it also points out some of the limitations inherent in terrorism.

A New Mode of Conflict

Our inquiry begins almost 30 years before September 11, 2001. In 1974, it seemed appropriate to write about international terrorism as "a new mode of conflict." Even then, terrorism was not new, of course—terrorist tactics had been used for centuries—but from hideouts in Montevideo and Rio de Janeiro to guerrilla training camps in Lebanon to dormitories in Milan and Berlin, disparate groups with differing agendas were experimenting with new forms of political violence.

Terrorists do not periodically descend upon the planet as extraterrestrials. Terrorism has its own natural history, shaped by circumstances and events. New generations draw from and build upon the ideologies and tactics of previous generations. Contemporary international terrorism as we define it today emerged in the late 1960s from a confluence of political circumstances and technological developments. Its practitioners shared no common cause beyond frustration borne of failure.

Israel's stunning victory in the Six Day War of 1967 made it clear that Arab military power was not going to be the solution to the grievances of the Palestinians who then found themselves under direct Israeli military occupation. If the Palestinian cause was to be kept alive, the Palestinians were going to have to do it themselves, although they were egged on and aided by Israel's Arab foes. Traditional guerrilla warfare in the

occupied territories wasn't going to work either. Instead, the Palestinians turned to the model provided by the Algerian resistance which, after years of bloody warfare that involved terrorism and terror on both sides, drove the French from the colony. Spectacular acts of terrorism in Israel or in other countries where they could be carried out more easily would not defeat Israeli armored columns, but they would fuel the flame of Palestinian nationalism and remind the world that there would be no peace until the Palestinian issue was resolved.

In Latin America, the numerous rural guerrilla movements that attempted to replicate the success of the Cuban Revolution had, by the late 1960s, been defeated or confined to remote jungles and mountains. A new approach was needed. Urban guerrilla warfare seemed to offer at least the possibility of advertising the existence of the movements, distracting government forces while rural guerrilla armies could be established, creating embarrassing crises, perhaps provoking oppression that would galvanize further resistance. Urban guerrilla warfare lent itself to terrorist tactics—hit-and-run spectacles, bank robberies, kidnappings, bombings intended to frighten foes and inspire followers. The guerrillas revived the operational doctrines of anarchist revolutionaries who terrorized Italy and Spain at the beginning of the 20th century and who, in turn, had inherited them from 19th century anarchists.

Meanwhile, in the modern cities of North America, Europe, and Asia—especially Japan—a revolutionary generation, inspired by Third World liberation movements, resurgent left-wing theories, and, for some, opposition to the Vietnam War, spawned a number of tiny armies determined to pursue their various causes, using the terrorist tactics of their heroes in Latin America and the Middle East. They pored over the writings of Algerian and South American resistance fighters and guerrillas. Sharing Marxist affinities, some responded to offers of training with the Palestinians. The assassination, the bomb, “propaganda of the deed” came full circle and returned to Europe, along with innovations in political coercion—political kidnappings, airline hijackings, barricade/hostage seizures.

Technological developments played a key role. Modern jet air travel gave terrorists a source of convenient targets—flying containers of hostages—as well as worldwide mobility. Developments in mass communications—radio, television, communications satellites—gave terrorists almost instantaneous access to a global audience. The proliferation of small arms and explosives provided a ready arsenal. In addition, modern society offered new vulnerabilities.

The volume of terrorist incidents increased in the 1970s as terrorist groups seemed to proliferate. In fact, however, the urban guerrilla groups in Latin America had been brutally suppressed by the mid-1970s. The rural guerrillas proved tougher to subdue. Their counterparts in Europe were gradually ground down in the 1980s. By the end of the decade, only the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatists of the ETA, which drew upon deeper ethnic roots, fought on, but they too were gradually contained, although the ETA has not been entirely pacified.

Toward the “New Terrorism”

A more ominous change was taking place at the same time. Terrorism was becoming bloodier. More terrorist incidents resulted in fatalities rather than purely symbolic violence, more incidents resulted in multiple fatalities, and in more incidents, it was clear that the terrorists were determined to kill as many people as possible. In part, the escalation reflected the continuing need to command attention, which, in a crowded terrorist field, required more spectacular violence. In part, it reflected the brutalization of the terrorists themselves. The self-imposed constraints that had discouraged terrorists from wanton bloodshed were eroding. But the escalation also reflected the replacement of terrorists who had political agendas with terrorists who were inspired by religious ideology and were therefore beyond considerations of morality and earthly politics.

This change was also apparent in terrorist tactics. Increased security and international cooperation among governments (largely fostered by self-interest) had gradually reduced the number of terrorist hijackings. Better security, hard-line government policies, and a greater willingness to use force in barricade situations reduced the number of hostage seizures and kidnappings, except those for cash ransoms. But terrorist motivations played a role too. Direct coercion was being replaced by threatening to kill hostages if demands were not met.

Religious motivation propelled another innovation in terrorist tactics: suicide attacks. Religious and secular conflicts provide numerous historical precedents for suicide attacks (which differ from desperate operations with little prospect for safe return or fighting to the death when surrounded). The 1972 armed assault by Japanese terrorists on passengers in Israel’s Lod Airport, which awakened people to the international character of contemporary terrorism, was a suicide attack. But it was Lebanon’s Shi’ites, then Tamils fighting in Sri Lanka, Palestinian groups, and later the jihadists and Iraq’s insurgents who made suicide attacks standard operating procedure.

By the 1990s, analysts of the phenomenon were writing about the “new terrorism” carried out by religiously motivated, bloody-minded fanatics determined to kill in quantity, willing to murder indiscriminately, ready to die themselves. The emergence of this new terrorism coincided with growing concern about the proliferation and inadequate security of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Whereas terrorists holding a city hostage with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons had been the nightmare scenario of the 1970s, terrorists armed with nuclear weapons destroying a city without warning became the nightmare scenario of the 1990s.

The analysis always seemed to be ahead of the terrorists in this area, but the idea of mass destruction clearly captivated terrorists as well. Violence without constraint, multiple devastating attacks, falling buildings, casualties in the hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, these became the goals of the new cohort of terrorists. It is against this backdrop that al Qaeda appeared on the scene.

The Emergence of the Jihadist Enterprise

Like the emergence of the first generation of contemporary terrorists in the late 1960s, the emergence of al Qaeda's global jihadist enterprise in the last two decades of the 20th century reflected a unique confluence of circumstances, events, and personalities. Al Qaeda's backward-looking fundamentalist "ideology"—more a set of beliefs than a coherent doctrine or political program—is but one response to the Arab world's discontents and the ongoing ferment in Islam. A collection of conservative and revolutionary scholars provided its intellectual foundation, while the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran provided a concrete example of fundamentalist faith transformed into political power—the Islamic equivalent of the Cuban Revolution, an event that would inspire replication. The rise of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam and jihadist ideology coincided with an increase in Muslim emigration to Europe. The economic opportunity in Europe came with prejudice, discrimination, isolation, and alienation, and Muslims responded with a renewal of faith, but also with radicalization.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the spark, not only provoking fierce Afghan resistance—a powerful historical tradition—but also bringing to Afghanistan financial support and volunteers from throughout the Islamic world, transforming the contest into a truly global jihad. And among those foreign volunteers and the global support structure, the relationships and linkages that would later support al Qaeda's operations were formed.

With significant financial and military support from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States (support that was ignored in the jihadist myth of victory), the resistance ultimately triumphed. Soviet withdrawal was followed by Soviet collapse, a seductive victory that encouraged enormous confidence among individuals like Osama bin Laden, whose charisma, communications skills, personal wealth, important connections, and talent for organization played a critical role in the creation of the jihadist enterprise. Seeking new venues to demonstrate the power of their beliefs and their prowess as warriors, the jihadists perceived the persecution of Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine, and the Philippines and the continuing conflicts in Afghanistan and elsewhere as providing both justification and opportunities for armed jihad.

The withdrawal of American forces from Somalia after the humiliating loss of 17 lives and two helicopters in 1993, like the earlier American withdrawal from Lebanon after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, further persuaded the jihadists that the United States, their principal foe, could be chased out of the Middle East by mighty terrorist blows.

With more than a modest amount of hubris, Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States in 1996, then formed an alliance of groups, mostly assertions of organizations, to wage this war in 1998. The plans for the opening salvo were ambitious, almost breathtaking in their audacity. Two American embassies were to be simultaneously destroyed, an American hotel was to be blown up simultaneously with a devastating bomb at an American airport and the sinking of an American warship, and the crescendo of violence was to culminate in the simultaneous destruction of the World

Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the White House—the decapitation of America’s financial, military, and political leadership, killing tens of thousands in the process. All of these plans were on the drawing board and in various stages of preparation at one time.

As things turned out, the embassies were successfully attacked, producing hundreds of casualties but disappointing results; the plot to blow up the hotel and airport was thwarted by authorities; and the first attempt to sink an American warship failed. The subsequent attempt to destroy America’s financial, military, and political leadership was more successful: On September 11, 2001, three out of four hijacked airliners reached their intended targets, although the attacks took fewer lives than they easily might have.

This extraordinary series of operations made al Qaeda the avatar of the new terrorism analysts had written about. Was this the wave of the future? Did it presage a fundamental shift in power between states and non-state actors? What would be the jihadists’ legacy?

The Legacy of Jihad

The jihadist enterprise merits study not only as a current and continuing challenge, but also for its contribution to the phenomenon of terrorism. Not everything al Qaeda did was entirely new. Its fighting doctrine, drawn from religion and tribal warrior traditions, gave it strength, allowing it to tap deep reservoirs of faith, to distill (and distort) passages from the Koran and episodes from the life of the Prophet to support its own ideology of violence, to recruit from religious schools, to draw on the statements of supportive religious figures, and to employ a language of belief that is shared by millions of people. This was not the impenetrable prose of the Italian Red Brigades (*brigatisti*), whose strategic directives could be understood by only a small population of far-left cognoscenti, or the bizarre, virtually incomprehensible screeds of the Symbionese Liberation Army. Jihadist ideology is not synonymous with Islam, but it is hard to separate the two, and this enables the jihadists to attract naïve acolytes, confuse opponents, and constrain counterterrorist efforts, which might be interpreted as assaults upon the religion itself.

The jihadists differ from their terrorist predecessors in their goals. They do not seek autonomy, independence, revolution, control of the reins of government, or political reform. Although al Qaeda uses its resources and connections to insinuate itself into local contests that usually have concrete grievances and agendas, the jihadists have much broader aims, achievable only through perpetual war. The jihadist enterprise aims at incitement. Jihadism is more than a military doctrine: It is about conversion and personal salvation.

The idea of terrorism as chrysalis—that embracing violent jihad will transform the person—is not new. The anarchists of the 19th century thought that violence itself would create a new man. Franz Fanon saw violence as a means of psychological liberation from racist colonial oppression. Carlos Marighela, the theorist who played a crucial role in the formation of Brazil’s urban guerrillas, wrote as much about the character of the urban combatant as he did about tactics and techniques.

Concerned with conversion, al Qaeda has communicated publicly more than any previous group. No previous clandestine leaders have ever issued so many video and audio tapes, backed up by a vast array of statements from local leaders and spokesmen, strategic documents, recruiting material, field manuals, memoirs, and recorded testaments by suicide attackers.

While, in part, this extensive outreach reflects the rich oral traditions of Arab culture, the jihadists also exploit the latest communications technology. This is not new; earlier groups used press releases, tape cassettes, and underground press conferences with hooded spokesmen to proselytize on behalf of their cause. But the jihadists have done it better, and this is perhaps their most important achievement. The rise of al Qaeda coincided with the spread of the Internet, and the jihadists were quick to exploit the opportunities it offered for direct, unmediated communications with constituents. The Internet enabled the jihadists to create a virtual terrorist community without an intervening and vulnerable hierarchy.

Al Qaeda's efforts to wage a global campaign reflect its view that the Muslim community transcends national frontiers. Jihadists view nation-states themselves as the creation of Western infidel law, a means to artificially divide Islam. The international effort that drove Soviet forces from Afghanistan strengthened the idea that, united in jihad, believers could defeat a superpower.

The idea of a community that transcends national frontiers was not new to the jihadists. Nineteenth-century anarchists envisioned an international community, and they managed to carry out isolated attacks across the world. Communists held a similar view in their attempts to reorder the world along class lines, uniting all workers. The liberation movements and guerrilla armies of the 1960s were encouraged to think of themselves as part of a global movement that would liberate the world from all forms of imperialism. Representatives from Latin America, Asia, and Africa met in 1966 at the Tri-Continental Congress in Havana to pursue this idea. The congress turned out to be more like a film festival than a revolutionary conference, and it created no central command, but the notion of global struggle was constantly invoked. In the 1970s, Germany's Red Army Faction, the Japanese Red Army, and other groups thought of themselves as components of a new worldwide revolution. They exchanged fraternal greetings, created tenuous alliances, and occasionally cooperated with one another, but they never created a genuine global movement.

Shared beliefs and new communications technologies have enabled the jihadists to go much further than the others. The jihadist enterprise is truly global. Since 9/11, it has planned, instigated, assisted, or inspired attacks in Asia, Africa, and Europe; several planned attacks have been foiled in North America and Australia, but it remains to be seen whether such counterterrorism successes can be sustained.

The jihadists can be credited with fashioning a vast, loose, flat network that has reduced the need for a vulnerable hierarchy. This organizational model contrasts sharply

with the traditional military organization of earlier, tiny terrorist armies. The jihadist enterprise seems to have patterned itself along modern business lines. This underscores the observation that al Qaeda was never a military organization; it is much more a missionary enterprise that employs violence to sell its ideology.

Like earlier revolutionary movements, the jihadists work through local fronts. In exchange for resources and assistance, al Qaeda imbeds itself, instilling its own brand of jihad, recruiting local volunteers for its own operations, claiming credit for terrorist triumphs.

The jihadists' determination to wage total war in which there are no innocent bystanders is not new, but it is an attribute of contemporary terrorism, although moral and political considerations have often limited the violence. Previous terrorist groups understood the power that would accrue from the possession of WMDs, although their acquisition remained in the realm of fantasy. Nor were the jihadists the first to experiment with chemical or biological weapons. What distinguishes the jihadists from their terrorist predecessors is their undisguised and more organized quest for WMDs, and despite occasional quivers of concern about not alienating their less bloody-minded constituents, the jihadists' leaders view collateral casualties or even the deliberate targeting of fellow Muslims they deem to be apostates or heretics as being entirely acceptable. Lack of capability, not lack of will, is the principal barrier to escalation.

In sum, the innovations that distinguish the jihadists from their predecessors are their foundation in religion; their pursuit of distant religious/political goals; their emphasis on radicalization; the volume, accessibility, and effectiveness of their communications; their flat organizational structure; and their open pursuit of slaughter. Their exploitation of new communications technologies, their notions of violence as a means of personal transformation, their efforts to wage a global campaign, and their denial of innocents have precedents.

Terrorism's Inherent Weaknesses

Despite its spectacular beginning, the jihadist enterprise has begun to show some of the strains and weaknesses inherent in all terrorist campaigns. Historically, terrorists have tended to think more about tactics than strategy, more about the necessity of violence than about what it will accomplish. Jihadist strategy, too, remains notional. The jihadists offer vague visions, not objectives. Continuing terrorist operations advertise their ideology and attract recruits, but they provide no demonstration of how these will lead to goals beyond publicity and personal salvation, which must be accepted on faith. The absence of a plan reduces the jihadist campaign to global marauding.

To make life untenable for its foes—a basic tenet of jihadist fighting doctrine—the jihadists' global terrorist campaign would have to ascend to higher levels of violence, perhaps to the level currently seen in Iraq, or it would have to include attacks on strategic targets that would produce significant strategic effects. The jihadists themselves realize this, and they often talk about economic warfare—sabotaging the enemy's economy, in particular, by exploiting Western dependence on oil. Several unsuccessful attempts have

been made to attack oil facilities, but these are hard targets. Effective sabotage requires massive destruction or a sustained campaign, which the jihadists have not yet been able to wage outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. The jihadist version of economic warfare in the West consists of blowing up banks. Such attacks can, when successful, cause casualties and damage, and they do impose long-term costs for security and insurance, but they do not bring down a nation's financial system or destroy its economy.

The jihadists have yet to make the transition from terrorist campaign to sustained guerrilla war or insurgency or a mass political movement. While public-opinion polls among Muslims suggest growing anger and antipathy toward the West, the fact is that without foreign invasions to provoke local resistance, the jihadists, on their own, have not been able to inspire any uprisings.

Although the jihadists have maintained an impressive pace of terrorist operations, with more than 30 large-scale terrorist attacks worldwide since 9/11, continued pressure and cumulative losses have degraded their operational capabilities. Numerous terrorist plots have been uncovered and thwarted, and fewer successful major terrorist attacks took place in 2006 than in any of the preceding three years. (This excludes Afghanistan and Iraq, where the violence has escalated.) Each terrorist spectacular has provoked a fierce crackdown in response. Jihadist networks have been disrupted, though not eliminated, in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Morocco, Turkey, and Indonesia.

The readiness of the jihadists to slaughter hundreds of fellow Muslims in order to kill handfuls of infidels has provoked a backlash in Muslim countries, including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. The most brutal fanatics appear to be dictating the course of action, with the top leadership willing or obliged to go along. It is a phenomenon we have seen in past terrorist campaigns. The jihadists' current strategy of turning their violence inward, deliberately targeting Shi'a Muslims in Iraq as a means of inflaming sectarian violence in order to make the country ungovernable, has mobilized Shi'as against the jihadists and has caused dismay among many Sunnis. Instead of uniting the Muslim community, the jihadists now threaten to divide it in a bloody civil war.

So-called moderate Muslims are reluctant to openly challenge dangerous jihadist fanatics, although there have been some impressive public demonstrations against their bloody attacks. More likely is a passive rejection of jihadist ideology, which can coexist with palpable hostility toward the United States and its allies.

Because of its lack of formal organization, the jihadist network has proved difficult to smash, but it is by no means clear that mere exhortation from the center and on-line instruction will sustain the terrorist campaigns. Moreover, absent central direction, planning, technical assistance, and provision of resources, local self-radicalizing volunteers are unlikely to have the capacity to launch attacks approaching the scale of the 9/11 attacks. True, Mohamed Atta and his comrades who carried out those attacks operated largely on their own, but they were selected for that specific mission, provided with a plan and direction, financed and assisted in their travel, provided with

replacements, and reinforced with the additional manpower to carry out the hijackings. It is doubtful that they could have achieved the same results entirely on their own.

While a loose command structure is compatible with al Qaeda's circumstances and the culture of its traditions and milieu—the absence of a strict religious hierarchy in Islam, traditional tribal societies that do not tolerate formalized direction—leaderless resistance in the form of a vast movement of individual and small-group actors operating in common cause, unconnected except in their beliefs, remains an unattractive organizational model for the jihadist enterprise. It reduces al Qaeda's leadership to mere exhortation and reduces any possibility of coordination. It risks disunity and atomization. It could reduce the jihadist terrorist campaign to the occasional acts of individuals. Thus far, the popular response in the Muslim community does not support the idea of a self-sustaining global intifada. To accomplish that, al Qaeda would need to reestablish some level of command and control. This would require safe havens, formalized training, and more organization, which, in turn, create more vulnerabilities. Unlike Lebanon's Hezbollah, which can field a guerrilla army, fill the streets of Beirut with marching militiamen and demonstrators, and sit in parliament, the jihadist enterprise is potentially vast but shallow, fervent in its beliefs but physically scattered. Speeches from al Qaeda's leaders command worldwide attention, but they do not command worldwide operations.

Terrorism has ascended to the strategic level in its scale of potential destruction, overall impact on society and economy, diversion of resources to security, and cause for war. Yet, paradoxically, terrorism remains a strategic failure in that no terrorist group has ever achieved its own stated goals. Terrorists have publicized their causes, galvanized their constituents, and provoked alarm, but they have not been able to translate these achievements into political gain. There is still no convincing strategy of terrorism. The jihadists come closest to a strategy in employing terrorism to radicalize and incite, but the purpose of this is the perpetuation of war, leaving ultimate victory to divine will.

All groups relying on terrorism face the same dilemma. Terrorism is essentially negative power. Terrorists can kill, destroy, disrupt, frighten, prolong conflict, deny peace, provoke repression, and create misery. But these are seldom ends in themselves. Terrorists do these things to acquire positive power—to publicize their existence, galvanize support, attract recruits, gain concessions, impose their views. To gain strength, terrorists must either escalate their violence or mobilize more people and become a mass movement—a difficult transition. Generally ill-suited for the tedious task of mobilization, yet frustrated at the lack of visible response, the default decision is to escalate the violence. If not a bigger base, then bigger bombs.

The jihadists may differ somewhat. They have successfully used terrorist violence to radicalize a population, but fervency is hard to measure, and while the violence may inspire many to embrace jihadist ideology, very few of those who do so take the plunge into armed struggle. And the few who actively join the jihad lack the capacity to sustain a campaign of terrorism that will truly threaten Western interests. Escalation is imperative, but that, in turn, risks alienating more of the Muslim world.

This discussion of the weaknesses inherent in all campaigns of terrorism, including that led by al Qaeda, does not mean to imply that al Qaeda is about to collapse, or that it is in decline. The organization is adaptable, resilient, and opportunistic; its losses have hardly dented its determination. The discussion in early 2007 speaks of al Qaeda's resurgence—the reassertion of its authority over the jihadist campaign, its reestablishment of training camps on Pakistan's frontier, its growing role in managing Afghanistan's insurgency, its continued prominence in the Iraq conflict, its exploitation of Islamic resistance in Somalia, and the spread of its ideology across Africa. Despite its difficulties, al Qaeda's jihad remains a formidable threat.

Tomorrow's Terrorism

As the opening paragraph of this introduction indicates, it is all but impossible to make predictions about the future course of terrorism, except to say that there inevitably will be surprises. Nonetheless, some near-term trends are discernible.

The current armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, with their attendant threats to surrounding countries, will likely continue for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether foreign forces remain or are withdrawn. History is instructive: Previous insurgencies and guerrilla wars are measured in decades.

It also seems safe to say that the jihadist enterprise, guided by al Qaeda's ideology and leadership, despite its failures, will remain the dominant threat for the foreseeable future. Even the tiny terrorist armies that sprang up in Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s took a quarter-century to subdue. The jihadist enterprise has yet to run its course. It may retreat and advance, depending on events; it will adapt and morph into new shapes; Osama bin Laden may or may not survive, but his personal role is less critical now. However, the enterprise will doubtless persist.

The process of radicalization will certainly continue. Some of those who embrace al Qaeda's brand of jihad will be recruited to violence. Many others will influence how Muslim societies behave internally and interact with others. We pay attention to the bombs, but jihadist propaganda may ultimately have a greater long-term effect.

Regardless of the fate of the jihadist enterprise, terrorism, as a set of tactics, as a component of armed conflict, as a means of persuasion, will persist. Whatever their moral shortcomings or strategic limitations, terrorist tactics have undeniable utility.

We can also safely say that terrorists will become more proficient in their craft of violence and in their communications. This is a long-term trend, one that is obvious if we compare today's terrorism with the crude operations of terrorists 40 years ago. The current insurgency in Iraq is creating fungible skills that will eventually disperse throughout the world, through its veterans and via the jihadists' online distance-learning enterprise.

Historically, except in ongoing-conflict zones, terrorists have seldom successfully attacked the critical infrastructure we worry so much about—bridges, tunnels, ports, power plants, waterworks, refineries, etc. These tend to be large, inherently robust facilities and complex networks that are difficult to destroy. Attacking them requires multipart operations, simultaneous attacks that are difficult to engineer. Effective long-term disruption requires a continuing campaign, which may explain why terrorists prefer to attack symbolic targets or concentrations of people that will guarantee high body counts.

Will the experience gained in Iraq, where infrastructure is a regular target of insurgents, lead to more-sophisticated attacks on infrastructure elsewhere? The difficulties encountered elsewhere will be greater, the operational environment will be less permissive—attack teams will have to be assembled, weapons and advanced explosives will be harder to come by, observation will not be as easy. At the same time, hands-on experience counts. The Palestinian campaign against oil shipments from the Middle East to Europe in the early 1970s was amateurish and ineffectual, more symbolism than sabotage. However, the most successful attack in the campaign, the destruction of the Trieste terminal of the Trans-Alpine pipeline, was led by an Algerian who learned his craft during the Algerian War.

Future terrorists may attempt to emulate the achievements of the jihadist enterprise—its flat organization, its spectacular suicide attacks, its sophisticated communications and effective use of the Internet—but the enterprise will not be replicated. New conditions, new causes, new technologies will dictate new courses of action. Terrorism has a history. It is not a human laboratory experiment.

The constraints that limited terrorist violence in the past have clearly eroded. This does not mean that all terrorists are devoted to carnage—those with political agendas still must calibrate their violence to their cause. Nonetheless, al Qaeda's continuing quest for 9/11-scale events, evident in various terrorist plots uncovered since 9/11, sustain fears that terrorists will eventually acquire and use true weapons of mass destruction. Thus far, our worst fears have not been realized: The "what ifs" remain "what ifs." There is no inexorable long march to Armageddon, but it cannot be ruled out.

If a truly catastrophic incident of terrorism, with deaths in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands, were to occur, the reactions would be unpredictable. Widespread revulsion could encourage worldwide cooperation in preventing repetition, but it could just as easily set off a sequence of retaliatory and preemptive strikes that escalate the violence. Madmen may dream of apocalyptic destruction, but as Thomas Schelling reminded me during a discussion of nuclear terrorism, the assembly and delivery of a complex and technologically sophisticated weapon will require the sustained cooperation of intelligent men who will have months to ponder what terrible forces they are about to unleash. The risks of betrayal will be high, while the consequences of exposure for anyone involved in preparing or assisting in the preparation of such an attack are likely to be devastating. In addition to devising preventive measures and making threats of

preemption, we are obliged to explore how strategies of deterrence might be applied even to terrorists.

The Challenge of Our Century

Warfare is changing. Technology and the development of terrorist tactics are putting increasingly destructive power in the hands of smaller and smaller groups whose grievances will not always be satisfied. The United States fields the most powerful military force on the planet, but military power is a coercive tool, effective only in specific circumstances, counterproductive in others. We are engaged in a “global war on terror,” but conventional military strategies don’t work, and traditional counterinsurgency doctrines may not work in circumstances where adversaries care little about winning popular support but are determined to perpetuate misery. Mayhem, we are learning, is easier to maintain than to suppress.

Our jihadist foes, like most terrorists, seek to incite. While we have degraded their operational capabilities, we have done poorly in efforts to blunt their message, reduce their appeal, impede their recruiting, turn them around.

New counterterrorist doctrines are needed that orchestrate intelligence, law enforcement, military force, and psychological operations. International cooperation has increased despite strains caused by political differences, and that cooperation has proved effective in thwarting terrorist plots and apprehending terrorist operatives. We need strategies that address radicalization and terrorist recruiting—the front end—and a better way of dealing with those who are detained—the back end. We do not have such strategies now.

Our terrorist foes are not omnipotent. We confront handfuls of them, not hordes. The historical record of terrorism is uninspiring. Nowhere have terrorists succeeded. They have not, by themselves, been able to seize or hold power. They have not brought down any national economies. They struggle to sustain their campaigns. They quarrel internally. They ultimately alienate their own base. Unwilling to yield rather than being dynamic, they invariably face growing irrelevance as the world moves on. Many of the issues touched upon here are explored in the following chapters.

An Extraordinary Company

It is a privilege for me to be a member of this extraordinary company of distinguished scholars. The authors of the following chapters are senior analysts whose inquiries preceded the events of 9/11; several have been studying terrorism for decades. Collectively, they represent two centuries’ worth of analysis. They reflect different experiences and perspectives: European, Latin American, Middle Eastern, Asian, American. They have a sense of context and history. They read behind the alarming headlines and revelations of new terrorist plots, look back in time to spot long-term trends, peer forward to discern how terrorism might evolve in the future, distill lessons learned, offer new strategies.

Martha Crenshaw, whose seminal 1978 book, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962*, set the standard for scholarship in the study of terrorism, explores terrorist organization. She begins with an examination of al Qaeda’s structure and decision-making and how these have evolved under intense pressure since 9/11. She notes that al Qaeda’s organization is “not entirely new or unique to jihadist movements” and shows how it compares to 19th century anarchist groups and violent right-wing extremists in the United States. At the same time, she notes that the contrasting, more hierarchical organization supposedly left behind by the new terrorists can, in fact, be found in contemporary groups. “There is no single uniform model,” she concludes, and this is the basis for criticizing the U.S. government’s oversimplification of the current threat. I would heartily agree.

In this volume, Alex Schmid focuses on the specific threat of “economic jihad,” al Qaeda’s strategy to attack the West through its dependence on oil. The jihadists, Schmid points out, have placed this ambition within Islamic legal tradition. Attacks on the oil industry can increase the price of oil, increase security costs, divert Western resources, discourage investment, and provoke capital flight. In pursuit of this strategy, al Qaeda has attempted to attack key facilities and shipping, while carrying on a terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia aimed at frightening away foreign oil workers. Tight security prevented these attacks from seriously threatening oil supplies, although the attacks did cause apprehension on commodities markets and temporarily raised oil prices. One solution, Schmid argues, is to increase stockpiles as a buffer against terrorist-created disruption and unnecessary alarm. A long-term solution lies in energy diversification.

Leonard Weinberg takes a long view in his chapter, which offers a sweeping panorama of terrorism from the 19th century to informed speculation about terrorism’s future. Without attempting to predict what cause may drive tomorrow’s terrorists, he concludes that al Qaeda may, like previous terrorist organizations, eventually self-destruct in an orgy of violence that alienates its constituency, but that terrorism as a tactic “offers too many benefits for relatively weak groups with extreme agendas” to disappear. Indeed, “the evidence points towards a heightened willingness by terrorists to inflict mass casualties.”

In his chapter, Boaz Ganor argues that the global network created by al Qaeda “poses a much more significant threat” than its more localized terrorist predecessors did. This has enabled it to project its power at great distance. And when faced with increased international pressure, it has been able to alter its operating pattern from centrally directed, exported attacks and operations by proxies and affiliated groups to inciting individuals and groups around the world to carry out local attacks under al Qaeda’s banner. Ganor argues that to meet this new challenge, the nations of the world must move beyond “cooperating in their counterterrorism efforts to launching a coordinated, international campaign against terrorism.” This new international regime would not only continue efforts to thwart terrorist plots, but would formulate strategies for the “prevention of incitement and indoctrination into radical Islam.”

Ganor says that a prerequisite to the creation of such an international regime is “agreement on a single objective definition of the term ‘terrorism.’” This is something both Alex Schmid and Leonard Weinberg have written extensively about elsewhere.

Gustavo Gorriti similarly takes a long view to offer a stinging critique of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. While many military planners faced with today’s frustrating conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, to say nothing of the challenges of the broader “global war on terrorism” might look nostalgically upon the apparent counterinsurgency successes in Latin America, Gorriti argues that the “counterinsurgency era offers many objective lessons of sound approaches discarded, of enlightened doctrine disdained in favor of subordinating the end to the means, and the nation’s policy objectives to the policy objectives of the many competing agencies and non-governmental actors of influence that had a role in their implementation.” He does not see improvement.

Rohan Gunaratna, who has thoroughly analyzed the jihadist movement, especially in its Asian manifestations, also criticizes current counterterrorist strategy, which he correctly describes as “overwhelmingly invested in operational counterterrorism – catching, killing, and disrupting terrorist operations.” This approach was understandable immediately after 9/11, when authorities were justifiably worried about the possibility of more such attacks in the pipeline, but more than five years later, it is inadequate to meet the continued terrorist threat. A “multipronged” strategy is required, one that not only pounds on the jihadists’ operational capabilities, but also addresses the environment that drives continued radicalization and recruitment. But this is no “eliminate all poverty, oppression, and unhappiness and we’ll all get along” approach. Instead, Gunaratna outlines a concrete, pragmatic, multifaceted strategy.

Together in a room, these authors would doubtless argue among themselves—it would be an extremely well-informed debate. What is noteworthy here, however, is the remarkable degree of consensus, despite the differences in perspectives.

These essays were all written as we are engaged in a worldwide struggle against a jihadist terrorist enterprise inspired largely by al Qaeda’s ideology and its tactical successes. There are other conflicts involving the use of terrorist tactics, to be sure, but the authors here agree that Islam’s violent jihadists currently represent the most serious threat to Western security and that they will continue to do so for decades—a struggle that will transcend the present generation.

There is consensus that while al Qaeda does represent a new and more serious threat, much about al Qaeda is neither new nor unique. That is the positive aspect of the long view reflected here. It suggests that this wave of terrorism, like others before it, eventually will pass, although it has years to run. It will be a long war, but ultimately, we should prevail.

Indeed, we have achieved a measure of success in reducing the operational capabilities of al Qaeda central, although even that may be only temporary. Authorities have thwarted many terrorist plots. But, the authors agree, we have utterly failed to

successfully address the issue of continued radicalization and recruitment. In this dimension of the struggle, we are not winning.

The current counterterrorist approach is exclusively operational and therefore inadequate. The authors agree that we need a strategy that is multidimensional, that more effectively engages the international community, and that does a better job of preserving basic values, even while changing the doctrines and rules that govern our response. This challenges the official U.S. view that we have a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy and that it is working.

Finally, despite healthy caution about making predictions, there is consensus that whether it is in al Qaeda's jihad or in future, still-undefined struggles, the employment of terrorist tactics will almost certainly persist as a means of political expression, as a mode of armed conflict. Today's jihadists have inherited terrorism's methods from previous struggles. They have added some innovations of their own and demonstrated new possibilities. Their repertoire will be inherited by tomorrow's terrorists. And all the authors of this volume agree, there will be terrorists tomorrow.

The Future of Terrorism

The Organization of Terrorism

Martha Crenshaw

This chapter addresses three questions: How is the terrorism of today organized? How does it differ from the terrorism of the past? What are the policy implications? Contemporary terrorism is diverse as well as diffuse, involving different patterns of organization rather than a single model. It is also not entirely new, as the precedents of nineteenth century anarchists and twentieth century far right extremists demonstrate. The emerging organizational framework of jihadist terrorism evolved from the dissolution of Al Qaeda in the aftermath of the American government's response to the 9/11 attacks. The jihadist threat poses a serious yet poorly understood challenge for democratic governments. The loose and shifting structure of terrorism makes it extremely difficult to prevent attacks.

The Structure of Terrorism

The April 2006, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), portions of which were declassified and made public in September, did not come as a surprise to those who follow the trajectory of contemporary terrorism.¹ Its findings were corroborated by a September 2006, U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence unclassified report on the threat from Al Qaeda.² The threat now is a diffuse and diverse group of "micro" cells implanted both in diasporas in countries where Muslims are in the minority (Spain and Britain, for example) and in majority Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Although small, these groups are capable of coordinating deadly and multiple attacks, including suicide bombings. They typically select "soft" civilian targets such as public transportation and tourist hotels or restaurants.

The National Intelligence Estimate depicts a global jihadist movement, including the remains of Al Qaeda as well as local affiliates and imitators, that is spreading and expanding around the world. The "movement" is decentralized and diffuse. As a whole, it lacks a coherent global strategy or vision of the future. Self-radicalization at the individual level and self-generated cells at the organizational level are becoming more common. Rather than membership in a top-down structure, jihadists share determination and inspiration. They are embittered by the same grievances, including fear of Western domination of the Muslim world, hatred for corrupt and authoritarian regimes in majority Muslim countries, and opposition to U.S. policies such as support for Israel and the occupation of Iraq. Since 2003, the war in Iraq has become a powerful motivator and training ground. Their extreme beliefs are not widely accepted in the Muslim world, which may contribute to a sense of isolation and self-righteousness. They conceive of their role as a vanguard.

The methods of organization as well as ideological direction of these groups depend to a large extent on electronic media, including television, the Internet, and cell phones. Communication via the Internet has become essential. Organizations and small cells are thus able to access both technical information and inspirational tracts, share information among themselves, and publicize their activities to the outside world, sometimes via graphic videos of atrocities such as beheadings. Osama bin Laden and

Ayman al-Zawahiri can issue timely challenges and ripostes to the United States and its allies. Those who wish to know how to construct a bomb, conduct surveillance, or conceal their activities can easily learn. Militants can be socialized into terrorism through participating in chat rooms and watching videos. They need not have had prior experience in violence.

Although the fact of reliance on electronic media gives the impression of completely anonymous interactions, small groups also depend on face-to-face contact. Most of those responsible for terrorist acts since 9/11 have been linked in associative networks that were established prior to or along with involvement in the jihadist cause. In most instances, the process of radicalization was collective as much as individual.

Such a pattern of prior association also characterized the key 9/11 conspirators. Expatriates met in diasporas in the West and formed friendships based on shared dissatisfaction, frustration, and mutual indoctrination into radical Islamist thought. The 9/11 pilots met in Germany and apparently formed a conspiratorial group with a desire to act before making direct contact with the Al Qaeda organization in Afghanistan, which then provided training, resources, and instructions. The attacks were imaginative, complex, and sophisticated, leading to the devastating results that will forever mark the advent of the twenty-first century. Their planning also demonstrated an important feature of the old Al Qaeda organization: volunteers could propose projects, which were then vetted and approved by the central leadership. Thus Al Qaeda was compared to a franchise, venture capital, or grant-making organization. It approved some applications and rejected others. The decision-making process was a two-way street. Some ideas came from the top of the organizational pyramid, but others came from the bottom.

In post 9/11 cases, as the power of the central Al Qaeda organization has receded under intense pressure, small local groups linked by kinship and friendship have taken the lead in planning and have proved capable of acting either without Al Qaeda's sponsorship or with minimal direction or assistance. The association between such groups and "Al Qaeda" is indirect if it exists at all. However, the organizational patterns of the contemporary globalized jihad are not uniform. Two examples of terrorism in Western democracies illustrate these disparities.

The four young men (aged 18, 19, 22, and 30, respectively) responsible for the July 7, 2005, bombings in London, were British citizens. Without prior experience or specific knowledge, they were able to organize four almost simultaneous bombings using home-made organic peroxide devices carried in backpacks.³ The construction of these devices did not require much expertise, the materials and equipment needed to build them were readily available, and the plotters financed themselves at the modest cost of around \$14,000, most of it supplied by the older ringleader, Mohammed Siddeque Khan. The bombs were built in the living room of an ordinary apartment in the city of Leeds. They were detonated manually in suicide attacks. The bombers were in contact with other Islamic extremists in the United Kingdom but not in a sustained way. Two of them, Khan and Shazad Tanweer, had also visited Pakistan in 2003, 2004, and 2005 and may have met with some Al Qaeda figures and received operational training. Khan may also

have traveled to Afghanistan prior to 9/11. However, the extent to which the bombers got advice or guidance from Al Qaeda remains unclear. In September, 2005, Al Jazeera broadcast a video made by Khan in which he praised bin Laden and Zawahiri, and a little later Zawahiri was seen in a video claiming credit for the attacks. Nevertheless, British intelligence agencies discounted Al Qaeda's claim.

None of the four had been identified as potential terrorist threats before the July bombings. They were largely invisible to the security services. After the attacks British authorities discovered that in 2004 Khan and Tanweer had met with individuals who were under investigation, but they moved in the periphery of extremist movements (as Timothy McVeigh did). The bombings showed that it may not be possible to identify significant actors in advance; nothing appeared to distinguish the bombers from other extremists who did not move from talk to action. The radicalization process was apparently very quick, with rapid progression from talking to operations. The process was one of "self-radicalization" that did not benefit from the leadership or clerical authority of a radical Imam. The bombers did not meet at a mosque (certainly none was educated in a madrassa) but at Khan's gym or at outdoor sporting events (camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing, and other outward bound-type activities, according to the government's report). The attacks also showed that there was no definitive profile of a British Islamist terrorist. They were apparently as likely to come from well-assimilated as deprived backgrounds. None of the four had appeared overtly political.

The March 2004 attacks in Madrid, consisting of ten bombs in four different commuter trains (three others failed to explode), reveal another distinctive organizational pattern.⁴ These carefully planned attacks were not suicide bombings – the bombs left in bags and backpacks were detonated by cell phones – although seven of the perpetrators later blew themselves up when the police closed in on them. Apparently their intention was to launch a campaign of terrorism (for example, a bomb was found on railroad tracks near Toledo). The bombers prepared a video, released after their deaths, that claimed that the bombs were a warning from Al Qaeda, and bin Laden later took credit, but the connection is still uncertain. The explosives were supplied by people involved in ordinary crime and apparently purchased with drugs and money. The bombs were constructed in a house outside of Madrid, one of the locations where the members of the group along with their families often gathered to socialize and play sports.

The members of the group included Jamal Zougan, a Moroccan who had lived in Spain for twenty years. He was certainly an Al Qaeda sympathizer, probably with links to a wider organization. In 2003, Europol had warned of an "Islamic World Front" under Al Qaeda's leadership, and in late 2001 the Spanish authorities had apprehended key Islamist figures.

The other members of the group who killed themselves after being surrounded were: Allekema Lamari (aged 29, an illegal immigrant from Algeria who had spent time in prison because of membership in a terrorist organization, the Armed Islamic Group); Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Fakhret (a Tunisian, aged 26, in Spain to pursue a Ph.D. in economics but working as a real estate agent, a regular at a Madrid mosque, married to

the sister of one of the organizers of the 2003 Casablanca attacks, and a friend of leading Al Qaeda figures in Europe); Jamal Ahmidan (aged 34, Moroccan, an illegal immigrant involved in petty crime who spent time in prison, becoming after his release a mosque regular); Asrih Rifaat Anwar (Moroccan, aged 24, illegal immigrant, with a prior arrest for possession of hashish); Abdennabi Kounjaa (Moroccan, aged 29, legal immigrant, with a prior arrest for car theft and smuggling, a teacher of children at a local mosque); Rachid Oulad Akcha (Moroccan, aged 33, who arrived legally as a student but served time in prison for drug trafficking, where he was held in the same prison as Allekema Lamari); and his brother Mohammed Oulad Akcha (aged 29, employed in menial jobs). Their sister, Naima, contributed over \$17,000 to her brothers' activities. Several members of the group had previously been noticed by the security forces in connection with Islamist networks in Spain. Some of the members of the extended group who did not kill themselves apparently fled to Iraq to become suicide bombers.

Compared to the British group, this cell was larger, much more experienced, more closely connected to Al Qaeda or at least to European Islamist organizations linked to Al Qaeda, radicalized over a longer period of time, extensively involved in criminal activities, and less assimilated. None of the members was a Spanish citizen; most were Moroccan. They were linked together through several different connections, primarily family and prison experience. Some members of the group frequented a mosque in the Tetuan quarter of Madrid, but religious institutions were apparently not the critical factor – in fact, the conspirators rejected some mosques as insufficiently radical. They met in mundane locations – restaurants, hairdressers' establishments, phone booths, and private apartments. The network of associations was particularly dense and large. Participation in a jihadist network seemed to be an integral part of their social lives, whereas the families and friends of the London bombers were kept in the dark. Only two were illegal immigrants at the time of the bombings, although others might have first arrived in Spain illegally. Their ideological indoctrination preceded involvement in violence. They had no specialized expertise beyond criminal activity and association with apparent Al Qaeda affiliates.

Other post 9/11 attacks in Morocco, Tunisia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and elsewhere reveal more organizational diversity. Some groups, for example, do resemble social networks with highly developed interconnections and nodal points. Some are more closely associated with the central Al Qaeda organizations than others. Some are tiny autonomous cells. In each case, however, the important point is that the groups are essentially local although inspired or emboldened by a global cause. They do not need particular skills or resources in order to cause massive loss of life. They do not need large numbers, deep pockets, public approval, or logistical support from Al Qaeda. They do not need a charismatic imam or clerical authority to legitimize their activities. Such conspiratorial undergrounds appear in Western liberal democracies as well as authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Asia.

In some ways contemporary jihadist groups resemble the organizers of the precursor to 9/11, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Perhaps the jihadist movement is beginning and ending in the same type of decentralized action structure.

Historical Precedents

Is this diffused terrorism a fundamentally new form of terrorist organization? Two historical comparisons indicate that it is not entirely new or unique to jihadist movements. One precedent is the anarchist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The other is violent far right extremism in the United States. Anarchist terrorism had several traits in common with the terrorism of today. It was decentralized and diffuse, inspired by idea and example rather than directed from the top. It was transnational. Politics and crime were linked.

The anarchist movement got its start in 1881, when Peter Kropotkin called for “propaganda of the deed,” even though he did not mean terrorism and later criticized its use. As originally proposed in 1877 by the Italian Federation of anarchists, it meant dramatic insurrectionary attempts such as seizing public buildings or other symbols of authority. Bloodshed was not necessary. In 1881 an international anarchist congress in London officially recognized the principle that revolution should be spread by illegal acts, to arouse the masses and show them that legality should be disregarded. Again, propaganda of the deed was to involve demonstrative disrespect for authority, not necessarily violence. These acts would inspire the people to rise of their own accord, spontaneously, without organization.

Terrorists were a small minority of the anarchist movement, but they caused enormous fear and disruption. Terrorist attacks occurred in Germany, Russia, France, Italy, Spain, and the United States. There were also cells in Switzerland. Anarchists assassinated eight heads of state, including a President of the United States. Much of this violence was purely inspirational. The essence of anarchism, after all, is antipathy to all forms of organization. Anarchists also identified themselves with and included criminals, since they believed that any defiance of authority for whatever reason was a revolutionary act. Anarchist terrorism was characteristically conducted by individuals acting in the absence of specific orders by higher central authority. In fact, the hallmarks of anarchist philosophy, spontaneity and liberty, solidarity without authoritarianism, *required* decentralized action. The deeds of individual anarchist terrorists were inspired by a single doctrine and a common purpose. They derived coherence and unity from examples of appropriate action, not directives from leaders.

Although the idea behind terrorism, propaganda of the deed, was introduced in 1881, terrorism did not become significant in Western Europe until the 1890s. Perhaps the explanation for this ten year hiatus between idea and implementation is the catalyst of the assassination of the Tsar of Russia in 1881. In the period 1892-94 an epidemic of terrorism swept through Europe. As well as assassinations of government leaders and monarchs, anarchist terrorism also involved indiscriminate attacks on both lower-level officials and the bourgeois class, whom anarchists considered the real but disguised enemy. Anarchists bombed crowds, cafes, music halls, stock exchanges, restaurants, and even the French Chambre des Deputés. They became famous for the slogan (actually coined by a sympathetic journalist) that no bourgeois is innocent.

Anarchist terrorism spread to the United States primarily through German immigrants. There it found fertile ground in the American labor movement, although terrorism was more talked about than practiced.

The nationality of the assassin often had little bearing on the identity of his victim. President Carnot of France was killed by an Italian anarchist. King Umberto of Italy fell in 1900 to an anarchist of Italian origin but from New Jersey.

A second non-jihadist precedent is the far right extremist movement in the United States that spun off Timothy McVeigh.⁵ Leaders of this movement invented the concept of “leaderless resistance” and were early to advocate communication via the Internet. The purpose of creating a decentralized structure was quite deliberate: to prevent infiltration by the state. Autonomous units operating independently could presumably escape surveillance. The white supremacist Louis Beam published essays on the concept in 1983 and 1992, and the practice has been widely emulated. It was adopted by a variety of ideological persuasions: white supremacists, anti-abortion and environmental activists (e.g., Earth Liberation Front), and animal rights groups in Britain and the U.S. Louis Beam called for a cell structure without central command or direction, leaving it to individuals to acquire the necessary skills and information, assuming that militants share the same beliefs and will react similarly to events. Cooperation is assured through mutual understandings, not direct contact. Orders are unnecessary. Members act when they think the time is ripe or when they take the cue from others who have preceded them.

Thus the idea of a sharp dichotomy between an “old” highly centralized terrorism and a “new” diffuse terrorism is misleading. Some of the older left underground groups, for example, were not as tightly structured as some people now believe. The Red Army Faction in Germany was far from monolithic. It included a number of different groups over the years, all calling themselves the RAF. The name was the main unifying factor.

Furthermore, outside of the jihadist milieu, many of the groups active today are centralized and hierarchical: the LTTE, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah are examples. The model has not disappeared from the scene. As one analyst concluded, in reality both “old” and “new” types of terrorism are characterized by a mix of hierarchical and network-like features.⁶ Control is not achieved via command (hierarchies) or negotiation (networks). Such hybrid organizations lack centralized operational control, their cells have considerable autonomy, they can react quickly and flexibly to changes in the environment, and their boundaries are open and fluid. New cells are constantly created and dissolved. Members have different levels of involvement or identification with the organization. Although cells are isolated from each other, they can be activated by appeals from a leadership when there is a specific need. Organizational coordination and control are secured through the identification of individuals with the movement and its goals. Religious beliefs can help cement this identification; so too can socialization, such as participation in training camps or sports, which produces consensus, cohesion, and trust. Members will act on signals from leaders

with whom they do not interact and do not know personally. Television or Internet communications are sufficient.

As a report from the West Point Center for Combating Terrorism notes, the external threat for jihadist groups is not competition from rivals but discovery by government authorities. Unlike most other types of political organization, they operate in an environment that is not simply uncertain but hostile.⁷ Operating in very small independent cells helps maintain security and reduces the problem of delegation of responsibilities from leaders to subordinates. Leaders do not expect complete control over their followers.

How to Respond

The West Point report concludes that “Al-Qa`ida’s continued transformation into a broad-based social movement...will pose overwhelming challenges to U.S. and other governments’ counterterrorism efforts and therefore must be stopped at all costs.” Unfortunately it is probably too late to stop the transformation. How can the U.S. confront this challenge? British authorities were blindsided by the July 2005 bombings. The Security and Intelligence Committee Report concluded that there were simply too many people to watch, under the constraints of limited resources and the absence of any indication as to who among the targets of surveillance might be moving from talk to action.

Governments cannot assume that methods that work against one type of organization will work against another. Thus some of the established methods for dealing with terrorism, which may have been effective against Al Qaeda or other large and complex organizations, are not likely to work against the dispersed version of the threat. Such measures may be important to preventing the re-emergence of a centralized Al Qaeda, but they are not the answer to micro-cells.

For example, a favored method of combating terrorism is restricting terrorist financing or, in general, access to material resources. However, attacks such as in London and Madrid cost very little. The ingredients of the bombs were simple. Using suicide tactics eliminated the need for sophisticated timing devices. Attacking local targets removed the need for transporting operatives across borders, so border controls would not have helped. The attacks did not occur in failed states or lawless zones; in democracies it was difficult to deny them space in which to organize. There was no state support, so deterring Iran or other states suspected of assisting terrorists would not have solved the problem.

Governments must thus think beyond conventional measures. What is required is a combination of local police and intelligence work and international cooperation. Local knowledge is essential. Democratic governments need to increase the resources available not just for surveillance of individuals who frequent extremist circles but for understanding motivations and processes of radicalization. Rather than exaggerating the threat – treating such attacks as the forefront of a coordinated world jihadist campaign – perhaps governments should treat terrorism as the unfortunate and misguided actions of

frustrated and unhappy individuals, not heroic warriors bent on world domination and capable of undermining the national security of the world's strongest powers.

Government security services must also recognize that they cannot eliminate the threat entirely. There will always be gaps in knowledge, as the British investigative report concluded. Intelligence is fragmentary and difficult to interpret. The volume of information can be overwhelming, yet still give an incomplete picture. There are always questions of resource allocation among competing priorities. There can never be complete coverage of every subject of investigation. Attacks can be planned without detection. Although governments around the world routinely intercept and disrupt terrorist planning, they cannot be 100% successful all the time. They can recognize the threat but still not be able to do anything about it because of its scale.

The British government report also emphasized the need to keep re-evaluating judgments and reassessing threats. British intelligence and security services had not expected two things: that British nationals would employ suicide attacks, and that radicalization could occur so quickly. Governments must thus guard against relying on rigid preconceptions about the nature of the threat. Assumptions can be wrong. They must be constantly tested against reality.

With these recommendations in mind, official U.S. counterterrorist strategy does not provide much useful policy guidance.⁸ Although the 2006 strategy statements acknowledge the phenomenon of “homegrown” or self-generated terrorism, they basically define the threat in monolithic terms as a movement that wishes to establish totalitarian rule over a world empire. Jihadist terrorism is compared to two of the greatest security threats of the twentieth century, the rise of Nazism and fascism in interwar Europe and the Communist empire of the Cold War. Thus, as an answer to the problem, the U.S. asserts that advancing democracy will end the scourge of terrorism and, in fact, defeat all violent extremism. The experiences of Britain and Spain notwithstanding, the strategy presumes that democracy will provide a counter to the causes of terrorism, which are identified as political alienation, grievances that can be blamed on others, subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation, and an ideology that justifies murder. Terrorism in democracies is explained simply in terms of “some ethnic or religious groups... unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom.” The U.S. strongly denies that American policies could contribute to terrorism. There is only a hint of recognition that the expansion of a diffuse jihadist movement has occurred since 2003 and that the war in Iraq is incompatible with creating a global environment that is inhospitable to terrorism. The 2006 strategy statement admits only that “The ongoing fight in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.” On the other hand, the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate (at least as far as is publicly known) cited the war as a motivation for diffuse jihadism but also noted that decisive defeat of the Al Qaeda organization in Iraq would likely be a set back for the global movement. In the short run, it is undeniable that the use of military force by the West against Muslims, no matter what their political allegiance or sectarian bent, fuels extremism. Nor is there official recognition that some of the means used to combat Al Qaeda, particularly the treatment of prisoners, have contributed to both its transformation into a decentralized transnational movement and its

ideological revitalization after 2001. Thus, although prevention is one of the key goals of American strategy, it is not clear that the means are adequate.

Conclusion

The organization of terrorism is complex and sometimes contradictory. There is no single uniform model, no one type of “terrorist organization,” whether past or future. Instead groups are adaptive and flexible. Continued organizational development and thus more surprises can be expected in the future. Different structures of terrorism require different policies. Oversimplification of the threat cannot lead to an effective response.

Terrorism and Energy Security: Targeting Oil and Other Energy Sources and Infrastructures

Alex P. Schmid

“...oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huger importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil ‘event’sends shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power.”
- Paul Roberts⁹

“Targeting oil interests is lawful economic jihad. Economic jihad in this era is the best method to hurt the infidels.”
- Sheik Abd-ALAziz bin Rashid al Anzi.¹⁰

A recent study by experts from Goldman Sachs, the investment bank, identified as the #1 threat to the global economy “raw material shortages and the related high price of oil.” The #2 threat identified by this study was “international terrorism.”¹¹

What is more logical, in terms of terrorist strategy, than targeting the energy sector in general, and oil in particular? Globalization and efficiency optimization have helped to create a highly interdependent global economic system based on supplies arriving “just in time” so as to keep inventory costs low. The United Kingdom, for instance, has “only eleven days of power supply at any one time,” according to Liam Fox, the Shadow Secretary for Defence.¹²

What is more fully realized only now is that disrupting the global energy market can be a very rewarding strategy for those who wish to damage those whose power depends on their positions in the energy sector.

Is this the strategy of Al Qaeda and its affiliates? So far attacks on energy infrastructures seem to have been low on the agenda of the jihadists. An analysis of 54 jihadi attacks in 19 countries between 1998 and May 2006 indicates that attacks on the oil industry came only on the fifth rank, behind places of gathering, government, military/police and foreign nationals/tourists.¹³ However, these statistics are incomplete and they do not indicate an emerging trend. In February 2005, an Al Qaeda-related web site with the title “Map of Future al-Qaeda Operations” announced that attacks on Middle East oil facilities should be a priority.¹⁴

Before we focus on recent developments, let us define “energy security.” This is relatively uncontroversial when compared to defining terrorism.¹⁵ Obviously, “energy” refers mainly to sources of energy like oil (diesel, gasoline, jet fuel, oil products), gas (liquefied natural gas and others) and electricity (produced by wind, water, coal, nuclear power, or oil and gas). “Energy security” then refers to the continued, reliable availability of such energy sources in sufficient quantities at reasonably stable and acceptable costs to importing countries and consumers. By implication, it also means the security of those

infrastructures that lie between the point the energy is extracted and the consumer – pumps, pipelines, refineries, ships, trucks, storage tanks, gas stations, etc.

Before 9/11 most of us lived, often without being aware of it, in a world largely based on trust. Our critical infrastructures were, if at all, only weakly protected against sabotage or terrorism. Most of us were blissfully ignorant about the size of our vulnerability and about the ubiquity of rewarding targets for those who do not wish us well. The following Table 1 lists some of the energy infrastructure objects and facilities that require protection if we want to enjoy continued energy security in one country - the United States - alone.

Table 1: Critical Energy Infrastructures in the United States

- 104 commercial nuclear power plants
- 2,800 power plants
- 300,000 oil and natural gas producing sites
- 1,400 gas product terminals
- 160,000 miles of crude oil transport
- 2 million miles of pipelines
- 80,000 dams
- 170,000 water systems

Source: Adapted from James “Chip” Ellis. “America’s Critical Infrastructures: Open Source Information Lays It Out.” Unpublished Note, 2006, p. 1.

Not all of these are “soft targets.” Nuclear power plants are generally well guarded though even these are by no means impregnable.¹⁶ Transportation (pipelines, ground transport, sea lanes and chokepoints, rail) are less well protected and the same applies to much of the physical infrastructure (ports, electric grid, refineries). This is even more true for the largely unpoliced seas of the world on which 50,000 large ships – 4,000 of them oil tankers which carry 60 percent of the world’s oil – move day and night.¹⁷

The number of vulnerable non-military targets is very high and to protect them all would require efforts which no society which is not engaged in full-scale war would be willing to shoulder. In this situation, it might make more sense to erect an outside perimeter rather than harden each critical infrastructure object individually. Yet again the task is formidable. In the case of the United States, the size of the problem is reflected in these figures: to prevent sabotage from abroad, 20,000 miles of United States borders have to be controlled, including 2,000 miles of land border with Mexico and 4,000 miles with Canada. A team of saboteurs could enter the country through any of 5,000 public airports, 361 seaports and hide among the 500 million persons crossing the United States borders every year.¹⁸

The problem of vulnerability is not confined to the consumer side. If we look at the supply side we find that, in the case of oil, about half the world’s oil production comes from 116 giant fields which each produce more than 100,000 barrels a day of oil. The other half of the world’s oil comes from more than 4,000 smaller oilfields.¹⁹ Between the source of energy and consumer markets lie long transportation trajectories

which are even more vulnerable to disruption. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has 10,000 miles of pipelines on its soil, Iraq 4,000 miles.²⁰ Iraq lost in more than 250 attacks against pipelines more than \$10 billion in oil revenues from sabotage and was almost brought down to its knees before the attacks of the insurgents could be brought under some control.²¹

However, physical infrastructure security and transportation security are but the two most concrete elements of the broader complex of energy security. The strategic elements of energy security also involve the long-term supply security of oil and other energy carriers and the concomitant financial market security. ‘Energy security’ therefore also refers to a complex set of inter-related political and market-related issues that impact on the day-to-day global economic and political operating environments.²² Given the psychology of investors and traders on the markets, their fears and anticipations are triggered by often minute changes in the normal trading environment. Speculation and panic buying or selling can act as multipliers when key products like oil are suddenly in short supply. The way world oil demand – which currently stands at some 85,000,000 barrels per day – develops; there might be a structural shortage of oil even before the year 2010.

A simulation game termed *Oil Shock Wave*, conducted with former US National Security Advisors on June 23, 2005, revealed that:

“Given today’s precarious balance between oil supply and demand, taking even a small amount of oil off the market could cause prices to rise dramatically. In *Oil Shock Wave* a roughly 4 percent global shortfall in daily supply results in a 177 percent increase of oil from \$58 to \$161 per barrel.”

Robert M. Gates, former Director of the CIA and *Oil Shock Wave* National Security Advisor concluded:

“The real lesson here [is that] it only requires a relatively small amount of oil to be taken out of the system to have huge economic and security implications.”²³

The global network linking energy supply and demand to each other is a very complex one. However, a number of basic facts (Table 2) help us to better understand its vulnerability and volatility.

Table 2: Basic Energy Facts

- Peak year of new oil discoveries was 1960; it has been downhill ever since.
- Global economy depends on cheap oil for about 40 percent of its energy needs.
- The USA, with less than 5% of the world’s population, uses almost 25% of the world’s total energy; US lifestyle is twice as energy-intensive as that in Europe and Japan, and about ten times the global average.
- From the G-8 states, Russia has 27% of the world gas reserves and 6% of proven oil reserves; the remaining G-7 have only 4% of gas reserves and 9% of the oil.
- World oil demand, now at [more than] 80 million barrels a day, will jump to 140 million by 2035; natural gas will climb by over 120 percent; coal by nearly 60 percent.
- Electricity demand could, by 2020, be 70 percent higher than today.

- Current energy economy (oil wells, pipelines, tankers, refineries, power plants, transmission lines) is worth an estimated ten trillion dollars.
- Saudi Arabia possesses some 265 billion barrels of oil in its subsoil - a quarter or more of the world's proven crude reserves.²⁴

Sources: Paul Roberts. *The End of Oil. The Decline of the Petroleum Economy and the Rise of the New Energy Order*. London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2005, pp. 7 – 15; *The Sunday Times* (London), 9 July 2006, p. 26.

By 2006, world demand for oil had already risen to some 85 million barrels a day. The price in mid-September 2006 was close to \$64 a barrel – more than three times as much as before 9/11. It has been argued that this high price is partly due to a “fear tax” or “terrorist premium” which has been put at between \$10 and \$15 per barrel.²⁵ In other words, without the threat of terrorism, the oil price would be between \$49 and \$54 per barrel rather than almost \$64. Assuming that this “terrorist premium” caused by the anticipation of a terrorist attack and its impact on future oil prices is \$12 per barrel, and taking the current worldwide oil consumption of 85 million barrels a day into account, the “terrorist premium” is \$1.02 billion per day or, on an annual basis, \$372 billion. The extra tax caused by the threat of terrorism is therefore substantial.²⁶ To be sure, it is not the terrorists who get that extra money but oil producing states like Saudi Arabia. However, some of that money might, through charities and the *zakat*, find its way to terrorists and if it were only one tenth of one percent this would still be \$372 million.

Yet this “terrorist premium” which we pay already now – substantial as it is – is minute compared to what would happen if the terrorists would manage to reduce oil flow by just four percent as indicated in the *Oil Shock Wave* simulation game mentioned earlier. That could, as in the realistic *Oil Shock Wave* simulation game, send oil prices to \$161 per barrel – increasing the “terrorist premium” by more than eightfold – from \$12 to \$103. Such a sharp rise would send shockwaves through the world economy.

Al Qaeda's Strategy

Some authors hold that it is Al Qaeda's strategy is to “bleed America to bankruptcy.”²⁷ Al Qaeda has threatened to attack critical Western infrastructures, the “hinges” of the world economy, as bin Laden calls them.²⁸ These obviously include oil. One step to come closer to this goal is to drive up oil prices to what bin Laden termed a “fair price at the present time” - “a minimum of \$100 a barrel.”²⁹ Between 2000 and 2005 the oil prices tripled and in July 2006 peaked at more than \$78.³⁰ The “minimum of \$100 a barrel” which bin Laden had in mind some years ago no longer sounds fantastic. The question is: can the world absorb a price rise of such an extent without plunging into an economic recession which would, in turn, trigger political instability in emerging economies. The recent price rises have been due to multiple factors:

- 1) natural ones like the destruction wrought in the Gulf of Mexico by hurricanes Rita and Katrina;
- 2) market-demand-driven factors like China's strong economic growth;³¹
- 3) manmade ones like the war in Iraq and the sabotage of the oil industry there; or
- 4) other insurgent attacks against energy infrastructures, such as the kidnapping of Western oil workers in the Nigerian delta.

On June 15, 2004, a book was published on the Internet, purportedly authored by the Saudi cleric Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser al-Rashid. Its title was “The Religious Rule on Targeting Oil Interests.” It was an attempt to construct some basis in the Islamic legal tradition for attacks on the oil industry.³² Yet it also outlined six expected economic effects:

Table 3: Al Qaeda’s Estimate of Expected Effects of Attacks on Oil Industry

- The rise of the price for oil
- The costly efforts needed to enhance energy security
- The diversion of Western resources to meet the higher price of oil
- The costs of research on alternative energy sources
- The destabilization resulting from the flight of local and foreign capital
- The damaging effect on the economic reputation of the United States.³³

Source: Cit. Michael Scheuer. Al Qaeda and the Oil Target. In: Michael Scheuer et al. Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy. Washington, D. C., The Jamestown Foundation, May 2006, p.7 (website: <http://www.jamestown.org>).

Al-Rashid’s analysis was probably inspired by Osama bin Laden himself who had called the oil the strongest weapon against America.³⁴ On 16 December 2004, in an audio message, Osama bin Laden had explicitly called for attacks in the Gulf region and the Caspian Sea, on the entire sectors of the oil industry, including civilians working within this industry. Bin Laden urged the mujahedeen “to strike supply routes and oil lines, to plant... mines [at oil targets] that leave behind no wounded, and to assassinate company owners in Riyadh, Kuwait, Jordan and other places.”³⁵ Al Qaeda’s deputy commander, the Egyptian Ayman al Zawahiri, had also urged militants to strike oil targets in Muslim countries. Those responsible for the Abqaiq attack of February 2006 directly referred to his call for action.³⁶

Whatever one may think of Al Qaeda, there is much clear strategic thinking behind its recent attacks. If we look at some of the aborted and the more or less successful attacks of Al Qaeda in the energy sector, a clear pattern emerges:

Table 4: Al Qaeda Attacks on Energy Infrastructures

- Attacks on Western shipping, both military (USS Cole, 2000) and commercial, as in the failed attack on the USS *The Sullivans* in 2000 in Aden, and the partly successful attack on the Very Large Crude Container *Limburg* off the Yemenese coast in October 2002;
- The planned attacks in the Strait of Gibraltar (June 2002) on British and US ships and the prevented attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz in 2003;
- The attacks on Western and local oil firms and workers in Riyadh in May 2003 (35 killed, hundreds wounded); in November 2003 in Riyadh (17 killed, 122 wounded); in May 2004 in the port city of Yanbu, Saudi Arabia (6 killed, 19 wounded) and in the oil industry housing compounds in al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia (killing 24 civilians another 25 wounded); and
- The intercepted February 2006 attack on the Abqaiq refining facility in Saudi Arabia.³⁷

Source: St. Andrews CSTPV database.

The Abqaiq (also known as Baiq) attack of February 24, 2006 is especially noteworthy. Abqaiq lies in the kingdom's eastern province which is inhabited mainly by Shi'ites. The attack involved at least two explosive-loaded vehicles posing as Aramco company vehicles. Their drivers attempted to penetrate the perimeters of the largest oil processing complex in the world. They were stopped after the first of three perimeters in a shootout, about 1 mile from the main entrance of Abqaiq.³⁸ While unsuccessful, the attempted penetration led to an immediate increase of the world's oil price by \$2 per barrel – enlarging the existing “terrorist premium.” The nervousness of the market was understandable: Abqaiq is the central node of the Arabian oil industry – more than 6 million barrels of Saudi oil a day (about two thirds of the crude exported by Saudi Arabia from the Gulf) is processed and pumped through Abqaiq.³⁹

This attack on the world's largest oil refinery, although prevented by the Saudi security forces, was not the first one prevented. Already in the summer of 2002 a group of plotters was arrested who aimed to attack Ras Tanura, the world's largest offshore oil loading facility. According to Interior Minister Prince Nayef, Saudi authorities have prevented about 90 percent of planned attacks.⁴⁰ Abqaiq is well protected by fences, cameras, motion detectors, helicopters and patrols but remains vulnerable to an insider job. While great progress has been made to secure maritime and terrestrial targets in Saudi Arabia's energy sector, such successes in target hardening might make Al Qaeda more inclined to turn to the proven tactic of using hijacked or rented civilian airliners filled with kerosene as the equivalent of cruise missiles to hit oil refineries and loading facilities like Abqaiq or Ras Tanura.⁴¹ Even if Al Qaeda is too weak for such an attack, it is likely to be strong enough to engage in needlepoint attacks on the 10,000 miles of pipelines criss-crossing Saudi Arabia.

Al Qaeda is not the only organization threatening Western oil supplies. Nigeria is the world's eighth largest energy supplier and militants managed, in the spring of 2006, to shut down between a sixth and a fourth of the country's oil exports. In the delta of Nigeria there are about 120 local armed groups who fight for a bigger share of the oil revenues in their region. One of the most militant is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which claims to represent the ethnic Ijaw people. MEND has teamed up with the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta, and the so-called Martyrs Brigade to form an anti-foreign oil alliance. MEND's goal is to expel foreign oil companies and Nigerians not indigenous to the Delta region from the land of the Ijaw. MEND's tactics include kidnappings for ransom and hostage-taking. Their bombings have targeted nodal points in oil pipelines and facilities to create maximum disruption and economic loss. MEND demanded that the government of Nigeria collect a payment of \$1.5 billion from Shell for damage done to the local environment (much of the damage is, in fact, the result of illegal tapping of pipelines by local people). The Nigerian government subsequently levied a \$1.5 billion fine against Shell, taking over the demands of the local militants. Shell has contested the payment of this huge sum until appeals are heard. In the meantime MEND declared, in February 2006 “total war” on foreign oil and stepped up its campaign of violence. By Spring 2006, Nigerian oil output was, largely due to acts of sabotage and

terrorism, reduced by 25 percent.⁴² Al Qaeda tried to capitalize from these attacks, implying the attacks by “the lions of Nigeria” were tied to Al Qaeda. It also reminded them that “Allah is with you.”⁴³

In the past, Al Qaeda has developed a signature by engaging in multiple simultaneous attacks. If this pattern continues and is applied to the world’s energy infrastructure, these are the most likely high-volume targets:

Table 5: World Energy Chokepoints

- 1) Abqaiq Oil Processing Complex, first attacked unsuccessfully by Al Qaeda on February 24, 2006: processes 6.8 million barrels of Saudi’s total 10.5-11 million barrels of oil a day and pumps it to ship loading facilities.
- 2) The Strait of Malacca which links the Indian with the Pacific Ocean: 20% of world trade moves through this narrow seaway. Sinking a few of the 130 ships that pass through this strait every day through deliberate collisions, sea-mines, or torpedoes can create hundreds of billions of dollars in costs from disruption and delay.
- 3) The 4,000 kilometer long Druzhba Pipeline which leads from southern Russia through the Caucasus to the Ukraine and into Germany and Western Europe. It moves 1.2 million barrels of oil per day and its disruption could damage economies of receiving countries.
- 4) The 1.5 km wide (at its narrowest point) Strait of Hormuz: its closing by naval mines, torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, or collisions of sea-jacked tankers could deprive the world of 15-17 million barrels of oil a day - some 20% of global daily consumption.
- 5) The Suez Canal: sinking one or more ships in the narrow Suez Canal would send 1.23 million barrels of oil around Africa to reach their destination. Its closure would severely damage Egypt’s economy for which the canal is a principal income provider. In 1984, Hezbollah placed mines in the Suez Canal, which damaged 19 ships.

Source: <http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/hterror/articles/20060515.aspx>; cit. *Strategic Warning Issues Review (SWIR)*; *MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base. Incident profile. “Hezbollah attacked Maritime Target, July 9, 1984”*; at www.tkb.org, October 10, 2006.

While these are the most obvious chokepoints, there are others – e.g. the Bosphorus where 5,000 oil tankers pass each year through a passage less than a mile wide or the Bab el Mandab in the Red Sea through which 3.3 million barrels of oil pass every day and which has already been the site of a prevented terrorist attack.⁴⁴ Al Qaeda has also encouraged attacks within the United States by small teams of local Muslims or by teams brought in from across the Mexican or Canadian borders. Suggestions have also been made to attack the Trans-Alaska pipeline as well as oil facilities in Texas, Louisiana, California and Oklahoma.⁴⁵ Simultaneous attacks on two or more chokepoints in the world’s energy infrastructure could arguably reduce capacity by 4 million barrels per day for weeks and months, thereby turning the dire predictions of the *Oil Shock Wave* simulation game into reality.⁴⁶

To defend the energy infrastructures against terrorism and sabotage is a costly business. In 2005, the countries of the world spent \$1.12 trillion on national security.⁴⁷ The expenditures on countering terrorism were, also for 2005, estimated to amount to \$191 billion.⁴⁸ These are substantial sums of money. The country that spends most –

almost half (48%) on defense is the United States of America. Its former Cold War rival, Russia, is also a potential target.

It might be that the Chechen rebels will focus on Russia's vulnerability and dependence on proceeds from oil and gas exports. In 2002, Russia became the world's largest oil producer, surpassing with 7.28 million barrels a day, Saudi Arabia, which produced 7.19 million barrels.⁴⁹ Half of the federal revenues of Russia, one third of its industrial output and a quarter of the country's GDP are dependent on its energy resources.⁵⁰ A successful attack on the Moscow Oil Refinery (MOR) could bring Moscow to a near standstill. Russia is even more vulnerable to such disruption than many Western countries as it not only needs the oil for transportation and for its industries; oil and gas revenues keep much of the Russian economy going. In a sense, the former Cold War adversaries, sit in the same boat, facing similar challenges from non-secular terrorists.

While Russia and the United States both have an energy security problem, they are not the only ones. China, which doubled its oil demand in a decade and now is the world's second largest consumer of oil is also vulnerable, as is Japan which depends very much on Middle Eastern oil.⁵¹

How to enhance energy security? The most effective short-term solution is to increase global strategic stockpiles in consumer countries to at least 3 billion barrels – with the US (which has a strategic petroleum stockpile of 700 million barrels), Japan and the European Union taking the lead, followed by other major consumers like China and India.⁵² However, there is no alternative to a determined effort at diversification, away from oil (and gas) to other sources of energy.⁵³ Unfortunately, the world energy market is largely in the hands of oil and gas interests whose desire to diversify is not great. They too profit also from tight supplies which keep prices high. Therefore it will be up to governments of major consumer countries to press for capacity increases to mitigate the consequences of supply shocks. As one energy specialist, John P. Dowd, put it:

“If there were 6 million barrels per day of idle capacity, no single terrorist act would be sufficient to cause a shortage. The risk premium would be low. However, with only 2.2 million barrels per day of spare capacity, and arguably less – which is about enough to meet 1 year of demand growth – the oil markets are at the mercy of political stability in Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq, as well as potential terrorist acts.”⁵⁴

When terrorism emerged in the late 19th century, it began to make use of the rotary press as a force magnifier. Terrorism was, in many ways, a tactic of “1 percent bang and 99 percent publicity,” as one observer put it. Later, in the twentieth century, with the arrival of satellite TV and the Internet, this multiplication effect became even more pronounced.

The idea of “small deed – large consequence” also underlies attacks on the energy system. Without oil, transportation and many other economic activities come to a halt. Without gas, many power stations can no longer produce electricity. In this sense, there

is the same logic underlying terrorist targeting of energy infrastructures as existed – and continues to exist – for playing to the laws governing coverage in the mass media. To make matters worse, there is, however, an additional third layer of effects which makes attacks on critical energy infrastructures even more attractive: the way the financial system reacts (and arguably overreacts) to such attacks – as can be seen from the “terrorist premium” discussed earlier – can send even bigger shockwaves through the global economic system.

A comprehensive strategy against energy terrorism therefore will not only have to address the issue of disruption of energy flows; it will also have to come to grips with the way our communication systems and financial systems react to terrorist challenges.

Observations on the Future of Terrorism

Leonard Weinberg

This commentary begins with a warning to its readers: efforts to anticipate the future of terrorism should be approached with modesty and greeted with skepticism. Here are four reasons to approach terrorism forecasting with caution: an excess of partisanship, earlier errors in anticipating new terrorist activity, the unplanned nature of some terrorist campaigns, and the danger of sociological determinism.

First, the highly partisan nature of the enterprise. In September, 2006 parts of a National Intelligence Estimate on Global Terrorism were leaked to the press. In response, the current Administration declassified other sections of the report to provide a more balanced picture and to contain the political damage the unauthorized leak had apparently inflicted.⁵⁵ The principal source of the public controversy was the Estimate's assertion that American involvement in Iraq was creating a new generation of jihadists prepared to carry out terrorist attacks against American interests in other parts of the world. Critics asserted that a continued American military presence in Iraq was self-defeating and cited the following sentence: "The Iraq conflict has become the cause celebre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement." What these critics failed to cite and what the Administration then declassified was the succeeding sentence: "Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be inspired to carry on the fight." The two sentences provided ammunition for both sides in the partisan debate over the Iraq war: for the critics, staying in Iraq confirms the jihadists' narrative about the American role in the House of Islam and consequently leads to more terrorism; for the Administration's defenders, leaving Iraq without winning the conflict, as the critics demand, simply encourages jihadists to escalate their terrorist campaign elsewhere.

We may observe an even more bitter partisan debate, waged retrospectively, over the failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks.⁵⁶ Former President Clinton and various spokespersons for his administration have maintained their successors either ignored or downplayed clear warnings that al-Qaida intended to launch a major attack on American soil in the immediate future. At the hearings of the 9/11 Commission and in subsequent exchanges with their predecessors, which continue to the present, national security decision-makers in the Bush administration report they received no such warnings and claim their counterparts in the Clinton administration had offered no clear plan with which to assess a future terrorist threat.

The point is that in the United States, as in Great Britain and a handful of other democracies, forecasting terrorist activity has itself become a highly partisan, highly politicized enterprise. This is the case because voters, either physically or psychologically, are usually the principal targets of terrorist attacks. As a result, governments and oppositions have an incentive to shade their forecasts, placing

themselves in the most favorable light before the voters go to the polls and render judgment.

Similarly, the politics of bureaucracy and budgetary process affect our ability to predict future terrorism. In the United States following 9/11, government agencies were created, restructured and/or expanded to deal with the terrorist threat. The same may be said of Washington-area 'think-tanks' and academic disciplines within universities. The effort to wage 'war' on terrorism has created bureaucratic and monetary incentives. In this environment, forecasts predicting a precipitous decline in terrorism, for example, are unlikely to be greeted with enthusiasm by stakeholders in the new bureaucratic and budgetary institutions/practices.

A second reason to be skeptical about efforts to anticipate the future of terrorism is that earlier forecasts have often simply been wrong. Prior to the year 2000, FBI analysts issued a strategic assessment (Project Megiddo) about the coming of the new millennium and its likely effects: "Extremists from various ideological perspectives attach significance to the year 2000, and there are some signs of preparations for violence... Law enforcement officials should be particularly aware that the new millennium may increase the odds that extremists may engage in proactive violence specifically targeting law enforcement officers. Religiously motivated extremists may initiate violent conflicts with law enforcement officials in an attempt to facilitate the onset of Armageddon...."⁵⁷ Despite fears that violent millenarians in the United States would try to provoke a final struggle between good and evil, little if any terrorist activity occurred.

The literature on terrorism abounds with doomsday scenarios according to which diabolical terrorist organizations headed by fanatics acquire or manufacture weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which they then employ to inflict thousands or millions of casualties.⁵⁸ Many serious analysts believe that the use of WMD by terrorists to murder large numbers of people is a foregone conclusion. They only ask where and when? Such estimates may turn out to be well-founded. But to date biological and chemical weapons have been used on only a limited basis to kill small numbers of individuals, as in the 1995 attack by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway system and the anthrax-laced letters sent to a handful of Americans in the fall of 2001.⁵⁹ Radiological weapons have not been used at all. The perpetrators of the most devastating terrorist attacks in the United States (the Murrah Federal Building and the World Trade Center) used substances and devices readily available at any hardware store.

The historical record provides us with a third reason to be skeptical about terrorism forecasts. In general, analysts can identify major sources of political discontent in societies. In some instances these discontents, latent or manifest, have given rise to terrorist activity, but in other cases they have not. The role of chance cannot be ignored. It seems especially hard to forecast the outbreak of terrorist campaigns when even those responsible for launching them had not planned to act until they reacted to events unfolding immediately before their eyes. It is unclear, for instance, that the People's Will's terrorist campaign to topple the Russian autocracy, beginning in 1878, would have

occurred had not Fedor Trepov, Police Commissioner of St. Petersburg, abused and humiliated political prisoners in his custody. Trepov's abusive conduct provoked Vera Zasulich, a young revolutionary, into an assassination attempt. Her subsequent trial and the favorable publicity she received helped spark the terrorist campaign that culminated in the assassination of Czar Alexander II (1881).⁶⁰ We might make a similar observation about the revolutionary terrorist campaign of the Red Brigades and other left-wing groups in Italy during the 1970s. As in czarist Russia almost a century earlier, there were widespread protests against the prevailing economic and political system in the late 1960s. But it is doubtful that these wildcat work stoppages and student marches would have given rise to the 'years of lead' had not elements in the Italian security services colluded with a band of neo-Fascists (acting in disguise as *agents provocateur*) to stage the December 1969 bombing of the Milanese branch of the National Agricultural Bank.⁶¹ The press reported that this bombing was likely staged to make it appear as if revolutionary 'anarchists' were responsible in order to provoke a general backlash against the Left and thereby prepare the Italian public for a military coup d'état. This provocation, in turn, led many figures on the Left to conclude the country was in danger of reverting to Fascism. In turn, groups on the far Left, including the Red Brigades, defined themselves as engaged in a 'new resistance' and took up the gun in order save Italy from this danger – as they conceived it.

We should also take into account the related problem of sociological or political determinism. The same or apparently closely similar social and political conditions that give rise to terrorist activity in one country or one region may not give rise to terrorism in other countries or regions. On the other hand, countries or regions where very different social and political conditions prevail may be the sites of substantially similar types of terrorist activity.⁶² The mass media and the Internet seem to play a role in sparking terrorism in locales where we might not expect it to occur.

Do these various limitations on our ability to forecast the future direction of terrorist activity mean that the enterprise itself is the epistemological equivalent of astrology? Do observers make statements about the future so vague and ambiguous that they may be made to fit virtually any outcome? The answer is no. Anticipating the future of terrorism is not the equivalent of palm-reading. There is now a substantial body of evidence about the origins and development of terrorist activity, past and present, that permits us to anticipate future directions.

To begin, let us consider David Rapoport's historical analyses. Rapoport examines the historical record and identifies four waves of modern terrorism.⁶³ He asserts that each of the waves had its own distinctive theme or *leitmotif*. Groups carrying out terrorist attacks during one 'wave' had political objectives that distinguished them from groups belonging to other waves or historical epochs. Also, each wave of terrorism has been distinguished, Rapoport reasons, by a prototypical form of violence. Although the bomb and the gun have been, far and away, the preferred terrorist weapons over the years, they have been used differently against different targets during each wave.⁶⁴

(1) **The Anarchist Wave.** For Rapoport, modern terrorism began in the 1880s in Russia and initially involved attempts by anarchists to bring down the czarist autocracy by a campaign of assassination directed against high-ranking and highly visible public officials. Within a decade or so this ‘propaganda by deed’ had spread to Western Europe, the Balkans and Asia (India). As the wave proceeded, and prominent exponents of capitalism and imperialism were shot down, nationalist grievances (as in Ireland and Serbia) mixed with a desire for social revolution. According to Rapoport’s reading of the historical record, the first wave lasted about a generation (approximately 30 to 40 years) before subsiding.

(2) **The Anti-Colonial Wave.** The second wave of modern terrorism began in the 1920s, during the years following the Treaty of Versailles. The era, the historical period during which modern terrorism was most successful according to Rapoport, was dominated by the armed struggles of various nationalist movements to compel British, French and other European colonialists to grant national independence to their territories in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In most of these conflicts insurgents employed guerrilla warfare tactics rather than terrorism. In some (e.g. Palestine, Cyprus, Algeria), however, terrorism became the dominant tactic. Terrain may have played a role in this choice. Terrorism is a largely urban phenomenon and the areas involved were relatively urban. What Palestine, Cyprus and Algeria had in common though was that different populations asserted competing claims to national sovereignty: Arabs and Jews, Greeks and Turks, Arabs (and Berbers) and Europeans. As a consequence, the fighting was often inter-communal (where the violence was frequently indiscriminate) as well as anti-colonial. Those who used terrorism in the cause of ‘national liberation’ expanded their list of targets. Instead of restricting themselves (largely) to political leaders and other prominent figures, second-wave terrorists found it advantageous to attack police and officials of the colonial administration, along with members of their families. Furthermore, those waging this ‘war of the flea’ could oftentimes rely on the financial support of Diaspora communities or sympathetic governments (e.g. Egyptian support for the Algerian FLN). The practitioners of second wave terrorism were not only more ruthless but also more successful than their predecessors.

(3) **New Left Terrorism.** American involvement in the Vietnam War was the most significant cause of a surge in terrorist activity from the late 1960s through the early 1980s. Other proximate causes included the collapse of revolutionary guerrilla movements in Latin America and the defeat of Arab armies by the Israelis in the June, 1967 Six Day War. These developments combined to create a succession of ‘urban guerrilla’ organizations in Latin America, armed bands in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and elsewhere that employed terrorism in the major cities to incite social revolution. The defeat of the Arab armies led to a major transformation in the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) itself, and the tactics various groups under its umbrella used to bring about Israel’s defeat. Tactics came to include the ‘skyjacking’ of commercial airliners or the detonation of explosives on board so that the planes could be blown apart in mid-air. During this period many young radicals in Western Europe saw in the Viet Cong’s struggle against the American military presence, the PLO’s fight against Israel (especially given its support by the United States) and Latin America’s urban guerrillas as heroic

participants in a worldwide fight against capitalism and imperialism. As a result, 'new left' groups in Germany, Italy, and a few other West European countries, groups such as the Red Army Fraction and Red Brigades, launched terrorist campaigns against local bourgeoisie and the institutions of the prevailing capitalist order. In this respect, the wave of New Left terrorism replicated an intention of the preceding Anarchist Wave. There were significant differences, however. If the prototypical terrorist attack of the anarchists was the assassination of a powerful individual, New Left terrorism was typified by plane skyjacking. And if first wave terrorists adhered to a kind of etiquette in selecting individual targets, terrorists of the New Left wave were more willing to attack members of the general public on an indiscriminate basis (e.g. Israeli civilians).

(4) **The Religious Wave.** Two major events in the Muslim world precipitated the fourth wave of modern terrorism, the wave we are currently experiencing. The Iranian Revolution of 1979-80 resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and establishment of a Shi'ite theocracy in Tehran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the subsequent jihad waged by 'holy warriors' recruited from all parts of the House of Islam, destabilized existing conditions and fostered Islamist terrorism. Unlike the previous waves, this 'new terrorism' has obviously been characterized by a strong religious component. Here we should bear in mind that some adherents of other religions, e.g. Sikh, Hindu, Christian, Jewish, have also employed terrorism in the years immediately preceding the 21st century. But we would have to be myopic not to see the current wave of religiously inspired terrorism as dominated by Islamists and Islamist ideas.

The 'new terrorism' has displayed other distinctive characteristics as well. Suicide bombings have become the emblematic form of terrorist attack. The modern suicide bombing, "an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator," is a tactic first used in Lebanon in 1982-83, then adopted by a long list of terrorist organizations in other parts of the world. Mass murder is the other key attribute of Religious Wave terrorism. The religiously-driven terrorists of the current era are distinguished from their more secular predecessors in their desire to kill large numbers of people on an indiscriminate basis; the 9/11 attacks and later operations carried out by Al Qaeda-linked groups in Bali, Casablanca, Madrid, London and other locales exemplify the point.

What lessons does Rapoport's historical survey of modern terrorism offer us about future developments? Two answers seem clear. First, the waves are not endless. They crest and subside after about a generation. We may interpret this to mean that the current wave of religious terrorism, now dominated by Islamist groups, will likely not last forever. Terrorism, though, is a tactic or repertoire of tactics likely to be used in the future by other groups with other causes. We should anticipate the beginning of a fifth wave in the not too distant future. Second, Rapoport's analysis of the problem of terrorism, like the analyses of such important writers as Walter Laqueur and Bruce Hoffman, notes terrorism's growing lethality.⁶⁵ Unlike the anarchists, today's terrorists (see above) hope to kill as many people as possible. Terrorists of the next wave seem unlikely to revert to the ethics of the Victorian era and restrict themselves to assassinating presidents, prime ministers and business leaders.

Another strategy available to forecasters of future terrorism is the identification of broad social trends, trends that currently affect large numbers of people. Forecasters using this methodology project the impact of such trends on future terrorist activity and its presumed causes. The Norwegian social scientist Brynjar Lia offers a useful guide to the future based upon this approach.⁶⁶ To begin, Lia identifies certain key social, economic and political trends and clusters them under the following categories: globalization (including the globalization of the marketplace), changes in international relations and politics, population trends, and technological developments. He then speculates about their impact on terrorism. Lia's overall conclusion is unrelentingly pessimistic: "I have found no compelling evidence... that invalidate the basic theme of this book, namely that there are important structural factors in today's world creating more propitious conditions for terrorism."⁶⁷ Further, Lia continues, there is a high probability that in the near term at least, terrorists will seek to inflict mass casualties on their victims. What structural factors does he believe will promote the continuation of terrorist activity for the foreseeable future?

Lia postulates that the growing trend towards globalization (or interconnectedness) will continue to disrupt long-held religious, economic and political practices. These disruptions, in turn, are likely to heighten anti-Western and anti-American attitudes. These hostile attitudes, coupled with a reduction in distance (thanks to improved transportation and communications technology) provide potential transnational terrorists with both motive and means to stage attacks far from the original site of their grievances. In regard to the economic effects of globalization, Lia notes growing socio-economic inequalities within countries and, especially, between countries. He believes these inequalities will continue to motivate terrorist campaigns against the beneficiaries of the inequalities. The growth of the global marketplace also means, he believes, continued dependence upon Middle East oil. One consequence of oil dependence is that the authoritarian regimes currently ruling oil rich countries will continue to use their wealth to avoid making significant social and political reforms. In the absence of such reforms, Lia thinks, the frustrations that lead to terrorism will continue to fester and multiply.

The structure of the international system in the immediate future also makes it more likely that terrorist violence will persist or even escalate. Among other things, Lia believes an increase in the number of 'failed' states as well as a proliferation of the number of countries undergoing or attempting transitions to democratic rule provide attractive environments for terrorist organizations. Failed states and states wracked by internal conflicts invite outside intervention by the United States, NATO, the United Nations and other interested parties. These interventions themselves often become the basis for terrorist campaigns aimed at coercing an end to the foreign involvement.

The international system is also characterized by the increasing importance of transnational corporations and other influential non-state actors, including international criminal organizations. For Lia, these developments significantly affect the future of terrorism. Transnational corporations are attractive targets for terrorist bands motivated by opposition to capitalist enterprises in general and fears about their economic impact on

local economies and cultures in particular. The expansion of transnational crime syndicates makes it more likely that terrorists will enter into business relationships with crime syndicates as a major means of obtaining new resources. The United Nations and other international organizations are attempting to make it more difficult for states to support terrorist organizations. To the extent this source of funding dries up, terrorists need to acquire money through criminal activity, e.g. narcotics.

Lia considers the impact of two demographic factors on future terrorism. First, the appearance of a 'youth bulge' in the population constitutes a significant risk factor. Young males are responsible for the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks. Other considerations aside, the more young males there are in a national population, the greater the risk of violence in general and terrorism in particular. Second, Lia considers the impact of immigration. The growing population of Muslims from the Middle East and North Africa in the countries of Western Europe is linked to terrorism in two ways. Alienated young Muslims in France, Great Britain and other countries constitute a pool from which Islamist terrorists, e.g. Al Qaeda in Iraq, draw recruits or attract volunteers. On the other side of the equation, the existence of large, isolated Muslim communities in Europe stimulates xenophobic feelings among indigenous populations. The resulting backlash, Lia thinks, carries with it a strong potential for right-wing terrorist campaigns.

Technology also plays a role. Lia is hardly the first observer to call attention to the increasingly significant role played by information technology in the expansion of terrorist activity around the world. Among other things, "The Internet can be used to recruit and mobilize supporters to play a more active role in terrorist activities or causes. In addition to seeking converts by using the full panoply of Web site technologies to enhance the presentation of their message, terrorist organizations capture information about the users who browse their Web sites. Users who seem most interested in the organization's cause or who seem well-suited to carrying out the organization's work are then contacted."⁶⁸ Lia expects that this technology will not only improve but will also lend itself to even more sophisticated uses by terrorists.

Lia's projection of broad social and political trends onto the future of terrorism is very different from Rapoport's historical analysis. Rapoport's examination of the historical record argues in favor of a curvilinear pattern. Waves of terrorism rise, crest and subside. Lia's work, by contrast, projects a straight line sloping upward into the foreseeable future. Further, Rapoport claims each wave has a dominant cause or theme: anarchist revolution, national independence, etc. If we apply this line of reasoning to the future we would expect new waves of terrorism to be dominated by singular causes, e.g., opposition to environmental degradation or anti-globalization. Lia, on the other hand, does not foresee a single motif as dominating future terrorist activity. He expects religion, Islamist in particular, to play a prominent role. But he also anticipates a revival of revolutionary left terrorism and would not be totally surprised if a far right reaction to immigration, and threats to national sovereignty, provoked xenophobic terrorist campaigns.

Nevertheless, despite their differences, Rapoport and Lia approach the future of terrorist violence from similarly broad perspectives – one historical, the other sociological. A third and more narrowly focused way of anticipating the future direction of terrorism is also worth considering. This approach requires that we pay attention to the behavior of terrorist organizations themselves – the behavior of those responsible for violence.

Analysts such as Audrey Cronin and Martha Crenshaw in particular are struck by the fact that terrorist organizations are relatively short lived. For instance, virtually all the groups that staged terrorist attacks in Western Europe and Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s have passed from the scene. The same may be said of their predecessors in earlier decades. By investigating how defunct terrorist groups ended their careers, we may learn something about how groups currently waging terrorist campaigns are likely to end, Al Qaeda in particular.

How do terrorist organizations end?⁶⁹ Cronin offers eight not mutually exclusive alternatives. 1) Some organizations experience rapid decline when they are ‘decapitated’ – when their leaders are killed or captured by the authorities. Peru’s Shining Path, for example, never recovered after Abimael Guzman, its charismatic leader, was captured by the authorities. 2) Some terrorist groups end as the result of defeat or repression at the hands of the forces of order. The Symbionese Liberation Army and the Silent Brotherhood, both active in the United States, were defeated by law enforcement authorities after most members were killed or captured. 3) Other groups undergo transitions to straightforward criminality where their political goals are displaced by pecuniary ones. This appears to be the case with Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, an ostensibly Islamist band for whom kidnapping wealthy tourists for ransom has become a principal *raison d’être*. Other groups pass from the scene when 4) they are unable to recruit new generations of members and, correlatively, 5) when they lose popular support. Terrorist groups may lose popular support when they carry out attacks so heinous they repel their own nominal constituents, e.g. Uruguay’s Tupamaros in the early 1970s or the Real Irish Republican Army more recently. Causes that attract one generation of young people to engage in terrorism resemble, and may amount to, political fads. Ideas and experiences that attracted one age cohort, ‘the generation of ‘68’, to terrorism may not have much meaning for succeeding generations. 6) Terrorist organizations may retain many of their political goals but undergo a transformation in the means they employ to reach them. In Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain what were essentially terrorist groups not all that long ago (the Irish Republican Army and Basque Homeland and Liberty) are recreating themselves as peaceful political parties, intent on using the ballot box rather than the gun to pursue their political objectives. 7) In a few cases terrorist groups have abandoned violence because they have achieved their objectives. During the 1950s, the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria waged a successful campaign of terrorist violence to persuade the French to grant the colony national independence. The FLN then became Algeria’s ruling party. 8) Finally, in some instances organizations either abandon terrorism completely or relegate it to a subsidiary tactic when they grow strong enough to launch a full-scale insurgency. Presently, the Communist Party of Nepal, whose original challenge to the government in

Kathmandu involved political kidnappings and assassination, has been sufficiently successful to launch a guerrilla war involving the capture and holding of territory. More than a generation earlier the Viet Cong in what was then South Vietnam followed a similar path.

If these are the ways terrorist organizations in the past have ended, what about Al Qaeda? How will its career conclude? Many have claimed Al Qaeda is so unique that the trajectories of previous terrorist organizations are hardly relevant.⁷⁰ Its “fluid organization, methods of recruitment, funding, and means of communication distinguish it as an advancement in twenty-first century terrorist groups.”⁷¹ But as Cronin maintains, this is not necessarily true. In terms of its international links and fluidity of organization, Al Qaeda bears some resemblance to the 19th century anarchist movement. Its highly effective ability to communicate compares with the early PLO. And Al Qaeda’s desire to inflict mass casualties resembles the goals Sikh separatists during the 1980’s, among other blood-thirsty groups. If all this is true, it is hardly unreasonable to see Al Qaeda’s future in the past experiences of other organizations.

Cronin examines a number of possibilities and dismisses most of them. Decapitation will not work. Al Qaeda will persist even if Osama bin Laden is killed or captured. The organization has already succeeded in recruiting new generations of supporters. The chances are low that Al Qaeda will transform itself into a peaceful political organization. Cronin believes it improbable that Al Qaeda will achieve its most ambitious goal of re-establishing the Caliphate after conquering a large territory in the Middle East and beyond.⁷²

On the other hand, there is a realistic possibility that Al Qaeda will elevate its terrorist activities into a full-scale insurgency in the manner of the Viet Cong. Something along these lines appears to be underway in Iraq and perhaps in Afghanistan and to some extent in Somalia as well. What, if anything, can be done about this development?

Unlike Rapoport and Lia’s analyses, Cronin’s is clearly prescriptive. She places emphasis on severing Al Qaeda’s links to its mass constituency, particularly its recent adherents. This may be accomplished, she believes, by interrupting the organization’s funding and disrupting its capacity to communicate with the public. Both are obviously complex tasks requiring substantial international cooperation. Al Qaeda, though, may unintentionally weaken its own links to its constituents by killing large numbers of fellow Muslims, Sunni as well as Shi’ites, and by the gruesome beheading of ‘infidels’ displayed on the Web.⁷³ If these practices persist, Al Qaeda’s holy warriors may find themselves increasingly isolated. Al Qaeda would not be the first terrorist organization to self-destruct.

Is it possible to generalize about the future of terrorism based upon the three perspectives outlined above? Despite their clear differences, the answer, perhaps surprisingly, is yes. First, organizations that employ terrorism initially as their principal tactic or go through a terrorist phase are often short-lived. They either expand their repertoire to include other types of violence, (e.g. guerrilla warfare, conventional

warfare), abandon terrorism for peaceful political activity or simply dissolve as the result of external pressures or internal fractures. Second, to say that terrorist groups are ephemeral is not to say that terrorism as a tactic is in imminent danger of disappearing in the foreseeable future. Use of terrorism, for a time, offers too many benefits for relatively weak groups with extreme agendas. Third, when we review both the historical record and social dispersion (from group to group and place to place) of terrorist activity, the evidence points towards a heightened willingness by terrorists to inflict mass casualties. Certainly the means available to achieve high casualties (and access to such means) are likely to improve over the next decades.

Rather than conclude our discussion by speculating about which particular set of social and political grievances are likely to excite a new wave of terrorism, we think it is useful to build upon Lia's work and consider the future forms terrorist violence appears likely to take.

The military analyst Max Manwaring calculated that at the beginning of the twenty-first century about half the countries in the world were experiencing violent insurgencies of one kind or another.⁷⁴ Numbers certainly fluctuate from year to year but are nevertheless likely to remain high. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Somalia and elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, insurgents employ guerrilla-style hit and run attacks on government police and military forces or initiate similar attacks on the paramilitary organizations of their ethnic rivals. Increasingly though insurgents have shown a willingness to combine guerrilla tactics with terrorist attacks on civilian populations, as in the current struggle over Iraq. Furthermore, the prevalence of insurgencies creates pressures in the global community for outside intervention to bring about negotiated settlements. The United Nations and various regional organizations, along with the advanced democracies, are often asked to participate.

These involvements, however benign their motivation, frequently antagonize one side or the other(s) in the insurgencies. Insurgents may react by attacking the peace-promoting outsiders, as in the attacks on Indian forces in Sri Lanka by Tamil Tigers in the late 1980s or Al Qaeda in Iraq's 2004 assault in Baghdad on the United Nations headquarters. The insurgents rarely have the ability to harm the outsiders by staging direct attacks and seizing control of the outsiders' territory. What they can and will do is inflict harm on the outsiders by staging terrorist attacks on the outsiders' civilian populations. Given the usually limited interest the outsider has in the outcome of the insurgency and the reluctance of publics in the democracies to suffer death and destruction for seemingly obscure causes, terrorism will often prove a powerful means for inducing outsiders to withdraw.

In the immediate future then, terrorism will likely exhibit the two forms we have just described. Terrorist violence will combine with other unconventional tactics in internal wars in parts of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It will also be used to strike at outsiders who seek to resolve an armed conflict one side or another finds intolerable.

The Future of Counterterrorism

**Cooperation is not Sufficient:
A New International Regime is Needed
to Counter Global Jihadi Terrorism
Boaz Ganor**

Terrorism is a dynamic phenomenon which changes to suit the circumstances, the time and place, its perpetrators' goals, the characteristics of their organizations, their ideologies and other factors. Many terror organizations were involved in local, regional or domestic conflicts in various states in the past, and some still are today. However, the most substantive threat to the safety of the world today is not from them, but from terror organizations with international aspirations and goals that extend beyond a specific local arena to the international arena. When such organizations join forces (whether this is the result of a gradual, natural process or the initiative of an external political entity) with other groups operating in a different geographic area, be it nearby or far away, a terror network is created that poses a much more significant threat to world peace than the individual organizations did.

Al Qaeda was established by Osama bin Laden and his associates in 1988, as the Soviets were withdrawing from Afghanistan. Their goal was to pool their resources and exploit the experience the Mujahedin had accumulated in their fight against Soviet power in order to advance the struggle to spread radical Islam and to establish a worldwide caliphate that would replace the existing states and would operate in accordance with the Sharia (Islamic law).⁷⁵ From the beginning, Al Qaeda positioned itself as a player in the international arena and not as a local terrorist organization with limited national or territorial goals in a specific area. Bin Laden also established an umbrella organization – “The Islamic World Front for the Struggle against the Jews and the Crusaders” (February 1998), that brought together various jihadi groups that operated in different areas. These groups shared a key characteristic with Al Qaeda: belief in a divine command to establish an Islamic state throughout the world, “return Islam to its former glory,” and protect Islamic culture from the danger of infiltration by modern, Western culture.⁷⁶

From the beginning, the Al Qaeda leaders decided to express their global agenda by initiating and executing major terror attacks at various sites around the globe. The organization's attacks included: the terror attack on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998); the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen (October 2000); the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S.; the attack at the Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, Kenya (2002); suicide attacks at Jewish and Western sites in Morocco (May 2003); suicide attacks at synagogues and British sites in Istanbul (November 2003); a series of attacks at three Madrid train stations (March 2004); the attack at the synagogue in Jerba, Tunisia (April 2004); the series of attacks on public transportation in London (July 2005); and the series of attacks at tourist sites in Bali, Indonesia (October 2005).

In many of these cases, the attacks were the product of a relatively orderly decision-making and preparation process carried out by Al Qaeda: the leaders of the organization decided to initiate the attack; the attack was funded by the organization; the planning of the attack, the intelligence gathering and the operational preparations all were

executed by its activists; and in many cases the attack itself was executed by Al Qaeda activists who had been sent to the target country specifically to do so. The clearest examples of this type of attack are the September 11 attacks, in which the entire attack was prepared by Al Qaeda and “exported” to the U.S. This operational process was changed after the American response in Afghanistan caused serious harm to Al Qaeda: it lost its autonomous territory in Afghanistan, along with its training bases, facilities, and offices. It also lost half of its activists, who were either killed or arrested by the American-led coalition fighting in Afghanistan. However, simultaneously the organization’s popularity rose throughout the Muslim world, especially after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Plus it seems that many of Al Qaeda’s activists found shelter by the Pakistani-Afghan border and in Iran.

Due to the fact that it had lost its grasp on Afghanistan in 2001, Al Qaeda began to carry out terror attacks around the world with the assistance of proxy organizations. Al Qaeda used its ideological and operational connections with organizations that took part in its Islamic World Front and other radical Islamic organizations to facilitate terror attacks in the affiliate organizations’ home countries or nearby countries. These attacks were carried out in Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, among other places, with financial, intelligence or operational assistance from Al Qaeda.⁷⁷ In addition, radical Islamic volunteers from around the globe, organized by affiliates of Al Qaeda, acted against both American forces and local targets in Iraq.

The increasingly global scope of these attacks, especially suicide attacks that caused mass casualties and panic in the local and international population, forced the international system to improve its preparations to fight this growing threat to world peace. Many states, led by the U.S., began to establish frameworks for cooperation, which have resulted in the prevention of more than a few terror attacks.⁷⁸ This bilateral and multilateral cooperation has included: increasing intelligence ties between the security agencies of different countries; sharing experience; joint training; and international treaties. The intelligence cooperation has been the most important component of this.

The September 11 attacks and those that followed it in various countries demonstrated the global scope of the threat and the need for an international response. In many cases, an attack was formulated in one country and the perpetrators were recruited from other countries, trained in another country, and executed the attack in yet another country. Without close international intelligence cooperation, it would not be possible to discover and foil such international terror plots. International understanding of this led to the increased intelligence cooperation after the September 11 attacks. As a result, terror cells were uncovered and attacks foiled in many states around the world:

- A number of attempts by Al Qaeda cells to attack trading ships in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz were foiled (November 2002-February 2003).⁷⁹

- The foiling of what is believed to be a “major terrorist attack” in Spain. Due to thorough cooperation between several services of European countries including Britain’s MI6 the attack was thwarted (January 2003).⁸⁰
- The arrest of an Al Qaeda cell which had planned a large-scale attack in Amman that targeted the U.S. Embassy, the prime minister’s office, and Jordanian intelligence offices (April 2004).⁸¹
- The prevention of a massive attack on malls and the underground in Manila, Philippines (March 2004).⁸²
- The arrest of seven men in Sydney and nine in Melbourne, which had planned to execute a major terror attack in Australia (November 2005).⁸³
- The arrest of 17 people in Canada, which had been inspired by Al Qaeda and were “planning to commit a series of terrorist attacks against solely Canadian targets in southern Ontario” (June 2006).⁸⁴
- The foiling of a massive attack in the U.K. in which terrorists planned to use liquid explosives to blow up 10 planes carrying passengers from the U.K. to the U.S. (August 2006).⁸⁵

There has been especially close cooperation between some Western states, led by the U.S., and Arab and Muslim states in which the jihadi organizations operate. This has made cooperation difficult between Al Qaeda and its proxies and has forced those organizations to change their operating patterns. Then the operative emphasis was placed on radical Islamic incitement which was meant to inspire, influence and indoctrinate radical Islamic individuals and groups around the world in order to lead them to execute terror attacks independently in the areas in which they reside. These individuals and groups were exposed to messages designed to incite via the Internet (websites identified with Al Qaeda and other radical Islamic websites and forums, blogs and chat rooms dominated by Islamic radical extremists), Arab-language media, audio tapes, radical literature, and sometimes through direct contact with religious clerics, lecturers and teachers or relatives and friends. The indoctrinated activists used the same channels to acquire the information needed to plan, prepare and execute terror attacks – and sometimes even decided to actually carry out attacks. In these “personal initiative” terror attacks (like the attack in LAX airport in July 2002), individuals who were influenced by the incitement went on a personal campaign of vengeance that was not a direct initiative of or under the control of a specific terrorist organization. In other cases, cells and groups of acquaintances carried out attacks together as part of what they identified as a global Islamic effort or as a protest against their country’s policies. In many cases, the perpetrators were Muslims who had immigrated to Western states or their Western-born children. In many cases, they lived in closed communities and rarely integrated into the surrounding Western community. At odds with their states’ values and narratives, frustrated by their parents’ low status as immigrants and lack of achievements, searching for meaning and goals for their lives, they found the desired solution and a way to express themselves in radical Islam. Joining the *Umma* (the great Islamic nation) and aspiring to establish an alternative global caliphate that operates according to the Sharia (Islamic law) has given meaning to their lives and fulfilled their need to be part of an idealistic group. In many cases, the Internet provided the platform to make this change in the lives of young Muslims around the world, and even young people of other religions

who chose to convert to Islam. The cyberworld enables them to establish virtual communities and receive positive reinforcement and support as they change the values and ideology by which they live.⁸⁶

In practice, two synergetic processes occurred simultaneously – Al Qaeda and the global jihadi organizations switched their emphasis from direct attacks or attacks by proxies and affiliated organizations to indirect attacks launched by brainwashed Muslim activists around the globe. At the same time, alienated first- and second-generation emigrants from Muslim countries found the answers they were searching for in the propaganda distributed by those radical Muslim groups and organizations.

The variety of threats posed by global jihadi sources makes it even more obvious that there is not a state on the face of the Earth that is immune to this type of terrorism. The jihadi activists do not respect neutrality, liberal values or free societies. The fact that the global jihadi organizations are liable to execute a terror attack in any state via one of three channels – a direct attack by its activists, an attack by activists of affiliated organizations, or an attack by local radical Islamic immigrants inspired by Islamic radicalism – makes it more difficult and complicated to foil those terror attacks. To succeed, a different type of international approach is required. The nations of the world, regardless of religion, race, strength, geographic location, or resources, must switch from cooperating in their counterterrorism efforts to launching a coordinated, international campaign against terrorism. The battle to fight the phenomenon of global jihad could be modeled on a regime such as NATO, but in a wider and different form. Such a regime would include joint international units, joint training, and shared intelligence frameworks dedicated to combating terrorism. Along with the operative battle against Al Qaeda and other jihadi organizations, such a regime would work to halt the flow of funds to terror organizations, to strengthen antiterrorism defense mechanisms, to formulate strategies for the prevention of incitement and indoctrination into radical Islam, and to lessen the motivation of audiences that identify with and support such organizations.

Many believe that impeding the flow of funds to terror organizations will reduce their ability to execute attacks. However, it is important to note that the cost of implementing most terror attacks is small and often marginal (in many cases it is not more than a few thousand dollars), while significant financial resources are needed to carry out educational, welfare and religious activities designed to sway public opinion and win hearts and minds. Therefore, cutting off funds actually only has an indirect effect on the operational capability to execute terror attacks in that the organizations will have more difficulty in recruiting activists and volunteers to carry out all of the preparations needed for the attacks. Motivation also can be reduced by the dissemination of moderate messages and pragmatic religious teachings to the masses of potential supporters of Al Qaeda and the global jihadi network. In addition to halting the purchase of hearts for radical Islam throughout the Muslim world and the Western world, such activities lessen friction between Islam and other cultures – frictions that are exploited by global jihadi sources.

The international counterterrorism regime must improve the security activities of different national components. This includes improving the ability to assess dangers and making preparations to minimize the damage caused by attacks, including unconventional terror attacks, that is chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. At the same time, such a regime must intensify the efforts and international coordination to develop new technological means that will aid the fight against terror. This includes, first and foremost, technology to locate and neutralize explosive materials from a distance and non-lethal weapons that make it possible to neutralize a hostile source from a distance without causing death or severe injury, which is important in cases of mistaken identity (false positive).

That said, no international regime has a chance of significantly lessening the phenomenon of global jihadi terror unless it truly convinces the Islamic and Arab states to join the battle against terrorism. They have to acknowledge that this phenomenon is primarily an internal Islamic problem that has implications for the entire world. Indeed, it threatens the Muslim world, Muslim states, and all enlightened Muslims who fear having their religion hijacked by extremists. U.S. President George Bush was right in emphasizing the need for an international regime to act against states that support terror – which he labeled the “axis of evil.” There is an equally urgent need to establish an alliance of hope and truth consisting of Muslim states that understand the need to fight terror and the radicalization of Islam and are willing to dedicate themselves to this goal with the understanding that it is an integral part of the international counterterrorism regime. The alliance of hope and truth will arise and operate effectively only when its members understand that they are not taking an altruistic step and acting as a pawn of the U.S. or the West, but are acting due to their own need to survive as Muslim states and nations by preventing Islam from being hijacked by extremists and leading them, along with the entire world, to ruin. It seems that more and more Arab and Muslim states have become aware of this in recent years and understand the vital need to switch from paying lip service to committing to the joint international battle against the phenomenon that endangers the peace of the entire world.

In conclusion, as the scope of international terror plots and attacks increases, additional states join the family of terror victims, and the danger to world peace rises at the dawn of the age of post-modern terror, the importance of international cooperation has increased immeasurably. The changes that have occurred in recent years in the world of terror – as it switched from small, hierarchical frameworks to mass movements and networks that extend around the entire world and are united by their religious beliefs or extremist ideology – obligate all of the enlightened states to formulate an effective international regime to fight the global jihad. However, neither this regime nor effective international cooperation can occur without international agreement on a single objective definition of the term “terrorism” and the creation of a normative platform agreed upon by all the parties to the regime. Creating such a platform requires the reexamination of international norms, laws and treaties, including the laws of warfare, and the evaluation of their suitability for addressing the scope and characteristics of the current and future threat. The enlightened states must formulate a guidebook that both defines the laws and

rules of behavior that they must observe in countering terror and serves as a base and a common denominator in the fight against international terrorism.

The nations of the world are beginning to recognize this, as can be seen in the discussions and decisions of the U.N. Security Council (see Security Council Resolution 1566, enacted on October 10, 2004, which condemns all types of terror irrespective of the perpetrators' motives or identity). The understanding of the need, and the international efforts, to come to an agreement on the definition of terror is a significant change from the worldview that was dominant for many years among decision makers, many academics, legal advisors, and security experts. They believed that it was not possible or necessary to define terror since "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" and that the subjectivity of the phenomenon would prevent international consensus on an objective definition. This worldview has begun to make its exit from the world stage. It is being replaced by the understanding that terror is a violent method of operation that is never legitimate in that it aims to harm civilians. This lack of legitimacy holds true even when the political, ideological or religious goals that the organization wishes to achieve via terror are justified or even holy. Consensus on the illegitimacy of intentionally harming civilians makes it possible for states with different, and even conflicting, ethnic, religious, economic, historic, geographic and national interests to reach an agreement on the definition of terrorism. The dilemma of agreeing upon a definition is not the only normative dilemma with which the world is struggling today, as it faces the threat of global jihadi terror. Another key normative dilemma that faces states coping with terror and which urgently awaits a solution is whether it is fair to apply the accepted rules of war and the Geneva Conference to a situation in which a state is fighting an asymmetric war against a terror organization or a sub-state entity, particularly if that entity does not observe the rules of war, does not differentiate itself from the civilian population, uses civilians as a living shield, and targets civilians of the enemy state in its attacks.

The enlightened states of the world must provide an answer to these and other moral quandaries in order to create a normative platform that will enable the establishment and implementation of an effective international regime to counter the growing threat of global jihadi terror.

Lessons from the Counterinsurgency Era **Gustavo Gorriti**

No Democracy has ever been defeated by a guerrilla or terrorist insurgency. Many Democracies, on the other hand, were overthrown by those entrusted with protecting them: the counter-insurgents.

While “‘small wars’ are as old as human conflict,”⁸⁷ modern insurrectionary doctrines hark back to late 18th and early 19th centuries. Conversely, modern counterinsurgency doctrines were articulated by the end of the 19th century. Although they might seem dialectical complements, born, as it were, in the opposite sides of the same kind of conflict, their roots are different. Modern insurgencies were mostly European affairs throughout the 19th Century, while counterinsurgency strategies were hatched up in colonial wars. In terms of their intellectual foundations and praxis, insurgency doctrines had a domestic bent and a European inspiration; counterinsurgencies had the colonial, transnational bent of small wars fought in the periphery of growing or receding empires.

This has meant that, as a rule, transnational-led insurgencies have often fared poorly (Che Guevara’s Bolivia insurgency being a ready example), unless they had strong local support while domestic counterinsurgencies have all too often suffered from their colonial intellectual inheritance.

Yet, during the time that came to be called the “Counterinsurgency Era,” President John F. Kennedy mentored a high level effort to fashion counter-revolutionary warfare into the main strategy of defense of the free world against Communist aggression.⁸⁸ When still a Senator, in 1956, Kennedy said regarding Vietnam that “...What we must offer [the Vietnamese people] is a revolution – a political, economic and social revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer – far more peaceful, far more democratic, and far more locally controlled.”⁸⁹

The Kennedy-era counterinsurgency doctrine rested upon two main assumptions: First, that the Communist world had found a risk-free way to advance its aims through the Cold War exploiting “the strains of the modernization process ...using the proven techniques of guerrilla warfare.” Second, that the United States had the duty “to confront and defeat this challenge.” The way to fulfill that duty was through “a general approach involving all arms of the U.S. government overseas (...) this effort required a shift in emphasis and direction affecting the entire foreign apparatus, both military and civilian.” The military strategy had to be geared towards the objective of “combating guerrilla groups with a set of techniques tailored to the specific challenges of that style of warfare.”⁹⁰

If there was a man who represented that early U.S. counterinsurgency thinking, he would be Edward Lansdale. He had advised Philippines President Ramón Magsaysay in his successful counterinsurgency effort against the Hukbalahap communist rebels. Lansdale described himself as a man who had served in Asia as a public servant “not to

an empire but to a democracy.” When trying to explain the nature of counterinsurgency to an audience of Air Force officers at their academy, Lansdale told them that when fighting insurgency, the dominant battlefield terrain features were not “a hill, city, river, valley or forest. The paramount object was a country’s people... ‘When the people are won, along with them go the terrain, the wealth of the land, the whole existence of the nation.’ If a rebel contending party obtains the loyalty of the populace and the governmental army secures for itself an overwhelming superiority in tanks, planes, artillery and numbers of soldiers, the government will still ultimately fall.”⁹¹ Journalist Mary McGrory described Lansdale’s counterinsurgency in a letter to him: “I saw McGeorge Bundy the other night ... and told him that of all the Vietnamese policies I had heard expounded, yours was the only one that made sense to me. I told him that while I had never recovered from the initial shock of learning from you that counter-insurgency is [only] another word for brotherly love, I was all for it.”⁹²

There were other officials in the U.S. government at the time who strongly advocated counterinsurgency as the main strategy for fighting the small wars of the Cold War. Some, like Roger Hilsman, for instance, were influential to a certain degree. But no one represented in a better way the early concept and practice of an enlightened American counterinsurgency as Lansdale – and thereby its flaws and practical shortcomings.

While in the Philippines he had virtually had a free hand and the unstinting support of a like-minded and talented President, in Vietnam the story was quite different. Lansdale was essentially juggernauted by his own government, determined to adapt that war to its means rather than its means to the war. Massive deployment, hardware, logistical prowess, firepower – the trademarks of the U.S. military machine – did not adapt to reality but tried to make reality adapt to them. In due time, body-count and carpet bombing became forms of ‘counterinsurgency,’ while the semantic contortions of the military brass and their civilian bosses to explain a war gone berserk went all the way from spin to delusion.

Yet, counterinsurgency operations were still carried out in parallel with the dominant conventional approach in Vietnam. They were quite heterogeneous and often unrelated, as their doctrinal underpinning was lost in the early stages of the war, before it could even coalesce. In all too many cases, counterinsurgency operations meant just the special small-unit tactics, the mechanics of anti-guerrilla fieldcraft or antiterrorism urban actions.

Lansdale had been – like most people in that field – a practitioner of transnational counterinsurgency. But he had made it clear that there was a difference. He was a servant “not to an empire but to a democracy.” That distinction was lost to his successors. Devoid of that spirit, counterinsurgency could be dangerous for the rebels but deadly for democracy as well.

The most influential counterinsurgency doctrine of the 20th Century the French *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine was structurally inimical to democracy. Yet, many

assailed democracies would eventually commit suicide by entrusting their defense to their own military trained in that doctrine.

The intellectual forebears of the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine, Marshalls Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey developed their counterinsurgency approach in France's colonial wars in North Africa and Indochina in late 19th and early 20th century. It was a rational, methodical system of gradual territorial control whose aim was to spread across a whole nation like an "oil slick" (*tache d'huile*). It had to be a tightly integrated effort of steady administrative conquest wherein military and territorial authority had to rest in the same hands: those of the military.

The French colonial army had been the refuge of the irredentist, anti-republican French right. As conquerors, suppressors of rebellions and administrators, they believed that the colonial army would nurture the leaders and values to "regenerate" French society from the vices of liberal democracy.⁹³

The *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine grew out of the dogmatic framework of France's military right. It combined "faith in the messianic power of the Army and willingness to use the Army for a coup d'état."⁹⁴

When the French centurions learned Maoist and Vietnamese insurgency doctrines through the harsh lessons of defeat (Ho Chi Minh, the veteran Comintern cadre reportedly was in charge of the chapter on peasant revolt in the Comintern's official revolutionary doctrine), "French generals and colonels were particularly attracted by Mao's thoughts on total war and its political function and they became almost as enthusiastic as the young Chinese Communists waving the Little Red Book at the time of the cultural revolution."⁹⁵

The ideological structure of the French right led the doctrine's development, which became official orthodoxy in 1956. General Nemo expressed it clearly. Referring to guerrilla warfare, he said: "There is no true war, but religious war."⁹⁶

So, the would-be knights of Charlemagne embarked on this new crusade of the Christian West against a system, atheist Communism, they regarded as "secular religion ...dedicated to Evil,"⁹⁷ but for which they had – because of its all-encompassing, totalitarian qualities – a perverse fascination.

Some of their doctrinal prescriptions hold interesting parallels with the current "War on Terror" language. "First, renewed faith in the counter-Crusade against Communism (an Evil) was essential; Christian revival would necessarily be at the heart of this faith... The West, its religious faith long in decline... its range of governmental – and military – action severely limited by its liberal democratic structure, had as yet found no effective response... in effect, fighting fire with fire was the only answer."⁹⁸

In this confrontation of totalitarian ideologies, after the niceties of liberal democracies were disdainfully laid aside, psychological warfare would be the weapon against indoctrination and torture the key to reveal the enemy's secrets.

While it is true that some practitioners of the *guerre révolutionnaire* opposed torture on moral grounds, its basic ideological tenets supported it and so it was widely and methodically practiced.

One of the most chillingly coherent justifications for the use of torture was written by Colonel Roger Trinquier. For him, torture was not just a necessary tool in counterinsurgency war, but also a consequence of rational analysis.

“The terrorist” Trinquier wrote, “should not be considered an ordinary criminal. Actually, he fights within the framework of his organization, without personal interest, for a cause he considers noble and for a respectable ideal, the same as the soldiers in the armies confronting him... The terrorist has become a soldier, like the aviator or the infantryman. (...) But he must be made to realize that, when he is captured, he cannot be treated as an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield. (...) Therefore, he is not asked about himself or about attacks ... but rather for precise information about his organization. (...) No lawyer is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his secrets from him. Then, as a soldier, he must face the suffering, and perhaps the death, he has heretofore managed to avoid. The terrorist must accept this as a condition inherent in his trade and in the methods of warfare that, with full knowledge, his superiors and he himself have chosen.”⁹⁹

The French centurions almost won the war in Algeria and almost overthrew French democracy.

But their intellectual influence was widespread. In Latin America, where French military missions had reorganized several national armies in the first part of the 20th century, it was direct and literal. The military in the region mostly held their mentors' view that they were an axiologically superior organization, being the guardians of the 'essence' of the fatherland and had the right to intervene when the despised, weak civilians had a worse performance than what would be normally expected.

During the nearly 30 years of internal wars in Latin America, roughly ranging from the victory of the Cuban Revolution to the peace accords in El Salvador and Guatemala, the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrine was the dominant counterinsurgency strategy. It was brutally effective in some cases and brutally ineffective in others. But it never failed in overthrowing democratic rule, except when faced (as was the case with Venezuela's Rómulo Betancourt) by exceptionally strong (or, later on, by American supported) civilian leadership that insisted in maintaining control of the counterinsurgency effort.

But especially during the 1970s, when the center of gravity of guerrilla insurgencies in Latin America shifted to the Southern Cone, abandoning the Che Guevara-*foco* strategy in favor of sophisticated but shallow urban guerrilla actions, the first casualty of counterinsurgency was democracy itself. Throughout Latin America, with the only exceptions of Venezuela, Costa Rica and, to a degree, Mexico, the continent was blanketed by bloody military counterinsurgency dictatorships.

They cooperated closely among themselves even at times of border tension (as was the case, for instance, between Argentina and Chile at the time of the Beagle Channel dispute. While their armed forces were warily facing each other across the border, their intelligence services were busily cooperating in snatchings and assassinations of suspected rebels or even peaceful opponents). The Condor framework was a true Counterinsurgency International that routinely carried out cross-border torture, disappearance, kidnapping and assassination operations. True to their doctrinal genealogy, they enlisted the mercenary help of European neo-nazis and neo-fascists (as was the case of the Argentina-supported Luis García Meza dictatorship in Bolivia), but also counted with a large degree of U.S. security cooperation. During the early stages of the Contra war, for instance, the first trainers of the Contras were Argentinean officers, discreetly sponsored by the U.S. government.

Long gone and forgotten by that time was Lansdale's approach to counterinsurgency. Having lost whatever respectability it had in the past as a worthy subject for academic discussion, counterinsurgency was mostly confined to those less ambitious officers within the military willing to renounce prospects of career success. Working on counterinsurgency almost guaranteed that the officer's career wouldn't go very far.

As events would demonstrate, neglecting the debate on the different dimensions, the perils and promise of both transnational and domestic counterinsurgency proved to be highly detrimental to post-Cold War democracies, when forgotten experiences were not in hand to help find the way to confront new threats.

While the *guerre révolutionnaire* doctrinaires regarded Democracy as a weakness, there were other experiences and doctrines that had proved that it could well be a decisive advantage.

The British approach to counterinsurgency did not evolve into "a theory, elaborately compiled and rigidly adhered to in the manner of, say, the French *guerre révolutionnaire*, but a series of responses which, when adapted to specific conditions, proved successful in maintaining at least a measure of political stability, even under the pressure of strident nationalism or communist revolutionary warfare."¹⁰⁰

A crucial point, stressed by Pimlot, is that "if the threat is political, then the long-term solution has also to be political: the role of the Security Forces should be to create an atmosphere in which guerrilla attacks do not disrupt the process of legitimate political rule." He points out that of the "five principles" laid out by pre-eminent British counter-

insurgent Robert Thompson, “four are essentially political in character and clearly dominate events.”¹⁰¹

Robert Thompson’s successful counterinsurgency experience in Malaysia and his unsuccessful advice in Vietnam (mostly because he was speaking to deaf ears) led him to formulate a set of basic principles with which to confront and eventually defeat a communist insurgency. His second principle is crucially important.

“The government must function in accordance with law.”

“There is a very strong temptation” wrote Thompson, “in dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the process of law are too cumbersome... and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot then expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for the advantage of being the government.”¹⁰²

Thompson made it clear that laws and statutes can be modified and simplified according to the emergency, but, “the golden rule should be that each new law must be effective and must be fairly applied (...) Action in accordance with the law was a vital factor during the Huk insurgency in the Philippines, where Magsaysay made a reality of the constitution and in Malaya, where the civil courts functioned normally throughout the Emergency.”¹⁰³

The application of the same principle, however counterintuitive it might seem at a certain stage, was decisive in one of the few cases of a successful national (or domestic) democratic counterinsurgency in the 1960s.

Venezuela’s Rómulo Betancourt bore the brunt of the first, the *foquista*, wave of Cuban-inspired guerrilla insurgencies.¹⁰⁴ A committed democrat, Betancourt’s lot was to confront simultaneously a Castro-led guerrilla insurgency and the unbridled hostility of Dominican dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, who ordered several assassination attempts against the Venezuelan President. Betancourt barely survived a car bomb attack (probably the first terrorist action of that kind) engineered by Trujillo.

Yet, even during the darkest hours of Venezuela’s internal war and the low-intensity international conflict he faced, Betancourt kept a firm political control of the war. He made it clear that, being the government’s objective to establish law and order, unlawful actions would not be tolerated. This even confused some of the experts of the day, two of which wrote:

“It is felt that legal restrictions imposed by the government on the activities of the internal security forces have made it very difficult for those forces to mount an effective counter-insurgency effort. This difficulty illustrates one of the principal

problems encountered by the counterinsurgency planner, that is, just when should the laws (the rules of the game) be changed to give the security forces a better operating posture.”¹⁰⁵

Some years before Betancourt, Philippine’s Ramón Magsaysay had to take a firmer approach in that regard, as soon as he took over the counterinsurgency effort.

“First, I cleaned up the Philippine Army. (...) I said I would have any soldier shot who killed a civilian for sheltering Huks. We had to shoot a few, too. Then, I told the Army to win the confidence of the people away from the Huks. When we heard that a poor farmer was sheltering Huks, we took him a bag of rice and told him we wanted to help him. We offered rewards for information, and we paid the rewards – we got the confidence of the citizens. I set up a system of free telegrams for people who had a complaint about the Army or information about Huks. All were addressed to me, personally. (...) When they had a legitimate complaint about the Army, some officer got fired. When they had information about Huks, they were rewarded.”¹⁰⁶

Among a set of measures that seemed at best paradoxical to many Americans in the Red-scared 50’s (and as they would seem to as many Americans in the Al Qaeda-scared era), Magsaysay also organized a comprehensive resettlement program for surrendered Huks; he fed “thousands of Huk families” and sent their children to school. “That brings them home,” he said, and it mostly did.

Generous amnesties, after the government gained the upper hand were also offered in Venezuela. Betancourt’s successor, Raúl Leoni, offered a first amnesty in 1964, and continued with others in the following years, freeing hundreds of those prisoners who were willing to renounce violence. Leoni’s successor, Rafael Caldera, legalized the Communist Party, extended a still wider amnesty in 1968, and called remaining guerrillas to abandon armed struggle and participate in democratic competition. Venezuela’s guerrilla insurgency was almost over by then. Some of the guerrilla leaders from the past, who were amnestied at the time, like Teodoro Petkoff, are still prominently active in Venezuela’s public life.

These ‘soft’ policies worked to a large extent because there were paralleled by aggressive military, police and intelligence actions. All of them, though, under firm control of the political, that is, the legitimate leadership of the country, acting with a clear vision of the political objectives of the counterinsurgency campaign, and subordinating methods and actions to the overarching strategic aims.

Enlightened, properly led democratic or protodemocratic counterinsurgencies have not been numerous, but their success rate has been high.

Some brutal counterinsurgencies were also successful in the sense of wiping out the insurgents even if democracy and human rights were totaled in the process.

Without taking into account the collateral damage of destroying democracy: were brutal counterinsurgencies more effective in the sheer business of eliminating armed rebellion?

In John A. Armstrong's *Soviet Partisans in World War II*¹⁰⁷ there are striking observations of the varying effects of ruthless counterinsurgency on different insurgencies. "Nazi doctrine glorified the use of violence and looked with distrust upon anyone who exhibited inclinations towards showing mercy. For the German antiguerrillas, ruthlessness became not only a practical norm, but a rule... As Franz Borkenau has pointed out... Communist partisans in Europe during World War II had an incalculable advantage over the non-communist resistance movement, for the former, having a vested interest in social disruption, were prepared to face drastic reprisals, while the latter were constantly restrained in their tactics both by moral considerations and by the desire to avoid extreme civilian losses."¹⁰⁸

So, while the Nazi's savage reprisals sapped the will to fight of, say, Mikhailovich's Chetnik guerrillas in the former Yugoslavia during WWII, they didn't deter at all Tito's communist partisans who would eventually defeat both the Germans and the Chetniks.

Totalitarian movements thrive on total war and their capability to resist attrition and destruction tends to be much higher than those groups that are not motivated by an all-encompassing, absolute set of beliefs.

What applied yesterday to communist insurgencies applies today to theocratic insurgencies too.

The U.S.'s counterinsurgency era offers many objective lessons of sound approaches discarded, of enlightened doctrine disdained in favor of subordinating the end to the means, and the nation's policy objectives to the policy objectives of the many competing agencies and non-governmental actors of influence that had a role in their implementation.

The end result was a lethal mishmash of strategic blindness and military overkill in which the war's objectives were lost and, as Lansdale had warned, despite an overwhelming military superiority, the war was also lost, because, to repeat his words: "If a rebel contending party obtains the loyalty of the populace and the governmental army secures for itself an overwhelming superiority in tanks, planes, artillery and numbers of soldiers, the government will still ultimately fall." It is clear that the "loyalty of the populace" was often obtained by the Viet Cong through widespread coercion, along with indoctrination, but that is a battle they won. There were other reasons and other factors too, but the failure to put the war in the service of Democracy rather than allowing Democracy to be sacrificed to the war was the main weakness of the U.S.'s approach in Vietnam and to other insurgencies too. To use a concept that Jeanne Kirkpatrick made current in her day, totalitarian movements tend to be stronger than authoritarian regimes, but they never manage to overthrow democracies.

When Douglas Blaufarb summed up his examination of the experiences of the U.S.'s Counterinsurgency Era, his cautionary words of advice to the future were anything but optimistic.

“In other words” he wrote, “it is imaginable, although far from likely in the near term, that some future White House may become interested in scrutinizing the counterinsurgency experience which we have been at some pains to recount and analyze in these pages, for lessons on both the pitfalls and the positive courses of action suggested by the successes and failures of the period. For several reasons it is much to be hoped that such does not turn out to be the case, and most especially for the reason that the lessons or our experience are clearly negative. Effective counterinsurgency, avoiding the brutalities of unadorned suppression, and seeking to deal with the genuine issues in a sophisticated manner which does no damage to our moral and democratic principles, is a complex and difficult maneuver for which the United States has shown no talent.”¹⁰⁹

These words, sadly, ring only truer today.

Strategic Counterterrorism: The Way Forward Rohan Gunaratna

To manage the threat posed by contemporary terrorist and extremist groups, governments must go beyond the Cold War paradigm of antiterrorism and operational counterterrorism. With the globalization of security, it is essential for the state to engage, interlock and weaken the terrorist and extremist groups on all their organizational, operational, and ideological facets. Developing a multi-pronged and a multi-jurisdictional response demands a multi-agency and a multi-national response. It involves a significant understanding of terrorism and extremism by the political elite and bureaucracy as well as the broader community. Most importantly, there must be a willingness on the part of government to allocate resources and provide sound and timely leadership to engage the very community producing the terrorists and the extremists.

Since 9/11, governments have overwhelmingly invested in operational counterterrorism – catching, killing and disrupting terrorist operations. The contribution of operational counterterrorism to the overall reduction in threat has been modest. As opposed to operational counterterrorism, governments should invest in strategic counterterrorism, initiatives aimed at changing the environment.

The seven strands of strategic counterterrorism are: 1) ideological response; 2) educational response; 3) financial response; 4) media response; 5) legislative response; 6) informatics response; and 7) developmental response. The fight against terrorism primarily involves targeting terrorist conceptual and operational infrastructures. In addition to fighting against operational cells planning and preparing attacks, government must launch a well-designed, focused campaign to reduce extremism (terrorist intentions and motivations). The starting point of such a strategic counterterrorism initiative is the ideological response.

Ideological Response

The cornerstone of ideological response is community engagement. A Community Engagement Program seeks to build bridges between the Muslim and non Muslim communities as well as between governments (both Muslim and non Muslim majority) and the Muslim community. As terrorism is a by-product of extremism, governments must encourage clerics to preach moderation and toleration. As the radical clerics preach hatred, it is necessary to drown out their voices by building platforms for the moderate clerics. While the radical clerics will divide the world into Muslims and non Muslims, the moderate clerics should seek to unite the different communities. For instance, the interfaith initiatives spearheaded worldwide have helped to alleviate the deep misunderstanding and suspicion between the different communities. For instance, the St Philips Centre for Study and Engagement in Multi Faith Society, the Diocese of Leicester and ecumenical partners, and the Leicestershire Federation of Muslim Organisations (FMO) organized a “Clery v Imams – 20/20 Cricket match with a difference” at the Leicestershire Country Cricket Ground on Monday September 11, 2006. The flyer announcing the event said: “See Bishop Tim Stevens vs your local Imam

at the crease, Umpires from the Hindu and Jewish communities, chance to mark the 5th anniversary of 9/11 in a positive way, and meet some of the top county players building good community relations through sport. Come and support them and bring all the family!” As the different communities live in different areas of Leicester, the sporting event brought them together. While Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Hindu adults sat together and watched the match, their children played, and tremendous good will was built reducing the misunderstanding and the potential for conflict. In an environment of intense propaganda, human contact will reduce suspicion and prevent demonization of each other.

The building of cultural and societal bridges should not be limited to communities. There must be bridges built between the government and the Muslim communities. Terrorist and extremist ideologues are stating that God’s law – Sharia – is superior to “man made law” – democracy. Charismatic ideologues such as Abu Qatada al Filastini, Abu Hamza al Masri and Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohamed are calling on the Muslims living in the West to defy the rule of law. As they are bent on exploiting the differences and spreading hatred, there must be greater investment both by the government and non-governmental groups to promote unity and commonality. As such, wherever Muslims live, it is necessary to create Muslim Contact Units (MCU) within Police Departments. Such best practices are essential to shield the Muslim community from deepening its terrorist and extremist infiltration. Without actively developing initiatives and projects to engage the Muslim community, increasingly susceptible to radicalization, the intelligence and operational response will not be sufficient to reduce the future threat. The specialist MCU staffed by officers trained in Islam, language and culture, should maintain contact with (a) the Muslim elite – community leaders, elders, educators, (b) the Muslim community institutions – mosques, madaris, and non-governmental associations, (c) the Muslim commercial entities – shops, eateries, gas stations, and other points of community contact. The MCU should use the interface of regular exchange with the Muslim community to develop community contacts and sources. The MCU should identify moderate Muslims and empower them to counter the radicalized Muslims. By working with moderates the MCU should seek to build a norm and an ethic against extremism and terrorism within the Muslim community. While the first strategy is the easiest to quickly institute, the second is difficult, and the third is the toughest. The main mission of the MCU is to establish a presence within the Muslim community. Initially it should serve to counter the current misunderstanding between Muslim misperceptions and eventually, to win over the Muslim elite and generate community goodwill. Such a mission would not only make it more difficult for terrorists and extremists to penetrate the Muslim community, but can drastically reduce the probability of terrorist and extremist recruitment, fundraising, procurement, and other support and operational functions. To the Muslims, MCU officers must portray their mission as protecting the Muslim community from Muslim terrorists and extremists, as well as the growing right wing.

As the terrorists and the extremists rely on the Muslim public for support and sustenance, it is necessary for governments and the private sector to work with Muslims. The support of the Muslim community is critical to detect terrorist and extremist

penetration. To prevent marginalization of Muslims, it is critical to engage, co-opt and retain them in the political mainstream. As the terrorists seek to change their thinking, it is now necessary to develop a counterweight to the violent ideology. Without winning the ideological battleground, the fight against terrorism will be lost. The international neglect of the ideological fight against the Global Jihad Movement has led to an increase in the threat.

Educational Response

In every society, there is a small band of extremists that are driven to use violence to achieve their political aims and objectives. Terrorist ideologues will inculcate and indoctrinate those most susceptible to their ideas. As opposed to the mainstream society, those living on the margins are vulnerable to virulent propaganda. Through sufficient intelligence coverage and analysis, governments must identify both the extremists and the moderates and ensure that the moderates prevail over the extremists. Failure to contain extremism will create a sufficient pool of recruits for the continuity of a terrorist campaign.

As terrorists and extremists seek to target children and youth, governments and the private sector must invest appropriately in protecting the vulnerable. After studying the age range of radicalization and recruitment, the authorities must develop programs and projects to inoculate those most susceptible to extremism. Even after 9/11, due to the failure to develop legislation against radical preachers, a small number of clerics are using educational institutions to disseminate virulent propaganda. Under the guise of preaching Islam, these radical clerics are exposing the children and youth of our generation to hate non-Muslims and moderate Muslims.

Contrary to public perception, both secular and religious (madaris) institutions have been exploited. Some segments of the media have unreasonably portrayed the entire madaris system as jihad factories. Nonetheless, only a very small percentage – below 1% of the schools – have been successfully penetrated by the radical clerics. For instance, of 14,500 Muslim schools, terrorist and extremist groups have penetrated only about 200 schools. As our response has been inadequate and inappropriate, the percentage is growing and may reach 2-5%. We must think of madaris not as jihad factories but as institutions to sow the seeds of peace. Each madarash is an invaluable platform to disseminate the message of peace, the true meaning of Islam.

Muslim governments themselves have lacked the understanding and the political will to take decisive steps to insulate and protect the madaris system from the preachers of hate. Even 1% of penetration is enough to produce sufficient terrorists and supporters to sustain a protracted terrorist campaign. It is necessary to create a revulsion against the preaching of hatred and violence. It is necessary to develop a framework for the regulation of the schools by the schools, the oversight of the syllabus by the Muslim councils, and the enforcement of laws against clerics that preach violence. As much as self-regulation and oversight are paramount, law enforcement action is necessary. For instance, the July 7, 2005 bomber Jermaine Lindsay was radicalised by Abdullah el-Faisal three years before the attack. The preacher of hatred arrested in Operation

Quadrant was found guilty of three counts of Soliciting to Murder & three counts of Using Threatening Words & Behaviour with Intent to Stir up Racial Hatred. On March 7, 2003, el-Faisal, who claimed that “The way forward is by the bullet” was sentenced to nine years in prison. Although the long sentence at that time surprised many, the length of the sentence was in fact inadequate. Just one of the children the Sheikh radicalized, Lindsay killed 26 and injured 180 in the London Underground. The preachers of hatred are the center of gravity of extremism. They must receive harsher sentences and more importantly their confiscated assets must be reinvested in community engagement and public education initiatives.

Financial Response

Terrorists and their supporters collect, store, move, and disburse funds. They exploit the very same banking and financial institutions used by the general public. With the increase in the threat, both education and regulation of the financial sector have become necessary. Although the financial community is aware of money laundering, their knowledge of counterterrorist finance is exceptionally weak. Today’s terrorists and their supporters raise funds through donors, fundraisers, charities, businesses and crime. Without an understanding of both the terrorist fundraising sources and methods, government intelligence, law enforcement, and the financial community cannot combat the financing of terrorism. Furthermore, both the government and the financial community must constantly shadow the evolution of the terrorist financial infrastructure. For instance, with law enforcement targeting individual donors, fundraisers and crime, terrorists are developing clean money routes. Terrorists’ preference is to use legitimate businesses and charities. Such sources are harder to track. They require greater investment to target and prosecute. To prevent the financing of terrorism, there is no option for government but to develop a public-private partnership. Both the financial intelligence and financial investigative units should work closely with the financial community.

Financial intelligence leads to financial investigation. Financial investigation into terrorist suspects and suspected entities has led to significant arrests and freezing of terrorist assets. More than freezing terrorist assets, financial investigations lead upstream to the donors and downstream to the operational cells. Counterterrorism financial investigation has proved to be a powerful tool especially after the London bombings. As a result, a financial investigator is assigned to any counterterrorism investigation from day one. For instance, twenty minutes to midnight on July 7, 2005, a British bank revealed the identity of the four bombers to New Scotland Yard’s National Counter Terrorism Financial Investigation Unit (NTFIU). The British banks were kept open after office hours on that dark day because the British Police, particularly NTFIU, had developed an excellent relationship with the financial sector. Long before the 7/7 attacks, NTFIU’s Karen Yearley, Neil Bennet and others had reached out and developed links with a few trusted key individuals in the financial institutions. With the increasing willingness to share information between the public and private sectors, a number of terrorist attacks in the planning and preparation phases have been disrupted. Furthermore, AUSTRAC and NTFIU conducted a number of training courses for bankers to raise their level of knowledge and understanding of how the terrorists abuse their

banks and financial institutions. The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Nanyang Technological University collaborated with AUSTAC and NTFIU in conducting the training. Academic counterterrorism centers and repositories of knowledge can play a central role in formal and informal education and training.

In most countries, there is no counterterrorism finance legislation or structures. Without appropriate legislation, training development, and a structure, it is not possible to target terrorist finance. Without investing in developing a dedicated unit, there is limited capability within the security and intelligence community as well as the law enforcement authorities to conduct financial investigations. As it requires a huge investment to train a typical police officer to understand how the financial world operates, the best practice is for governments to recruit bankers, accountants and those who understand the financial world to serve in their specialist financial intelligence and enforcement units. However, they need to be trained and constantly updated on the threat. In the future, it is necessary to exchange personnel between the private and public sectors to ensure greater collaboration between the financial institutions and the authorities. Without such integration, valuable data will be lost denying the opportunity to detect and disrupt terrorist operations.

Media Response

The mass media shapes public opinion. The media sets the norms, ethics, and standards for human behavior and conduct. Just as the media has been a vital instrument to fight poverty, disease and illiteracy, the media should be considered to battle against the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of a great religion. Traditionally, many have argued that the media must remain independent. However, most thoughtful media moguls are aware of their societal responsibility and are willing to work with the government and the private sector to do “good.” As media is a natural and effective conveyer of ideas, the counterterrorism community must build a partnership with media organizations.

To appeal to their supporters and sympathizers for resources and recruits, terrorist and extremist ideologues use passages from religious scriptures out of context. To galvanize them, contemporary jihadist ideologues selectively retrieve passages from the Koran and the Hadith to spread the message of hatred. As such, Islam is the most misinterpreted religion in the world. Both Muslims and non-Muslims alike have misunderstood the basic tenants of Islam. Islam’s emphasis on peace and harmony has been deliberately misplaced. The media is the most important vehicle to correct that misunderstanding and misinterpretation. As such, it is critical for both the governments and the clerics to develop a media strategy and a communications plan to work with the complete range of media organizations to challenge the Jihadist view. Regular briefing of schools, training of local governments, and sharing of information through a robust grass roots campaign are essential. As much as the Jihadists present a perverted form of Islam, the West misunderstands Islam. As much as countering the Jihadist view, the mass media can play a frontline role in educating the non-Muslims. In Western

countries, the perception that Muslims are violent because of Islam is gaining currency. As such, Islam is rapidly earning a bad name outside the Muslim world.

For the counterterrorism community, it is necessary not only to work with the well established mainstream media organizations (CNN, Fox, CBS, ABC, BBC) but also with the local or popular TV, radio, and print media. Terrorism and extremism often emerge from the politicized and radicalized migrant and diaspora communities as well as from the global south. The lingua franca of these communities and under privileged nations in the global south is not English. Furthermore, a vast majority of the population in the global south, have no access to the mainstream Western media. As such, it is necessary for the counterterrorism community to engage a TV station spreading conspiracy theories that 9-11 was by Mossad or the CIA, a radio station in a village that preaches both Islam and violent jihad, a tabloid that promotes violence against the non Muslims and the West, and a non English language website that advocates attacks against Christians, Hindus and Jews.

The media is also a useful instrument to formally educate the masses on concepts as well as terminology. Contrary to public perception, Islamism is not a religious but a political ideology. The contemporary extremists and terrorists refer to themselves as Islamists. They are right. Islamist means the political interpretation of Islam. It is the use of religion by politicians masquerading as men of religion. On terminology, many in the West refer to the current wave of terrorism as “Islamic terrorism.” As Islam means peace, “Islamic terrorism” means “May peace be upon the terrorists.” Islamist terrorism is the correct term.

Within the media, there is a significant misunderstanding as to who is a freedom fighter and who is a terrorist. While terrorists kill civilians, freedom fighters do not. Terrorists deliberately and intentionally seek to target those who have no direct involvement in the conflict. By killing innocent men, women and children, no respectable people, nation or country can secure freedom. In legitimate conflicts, guerrillas target armed forces not bystanders. As the terrorists seek to exploit the media to reach out to their existing and potential supporters and sympathizers, it is imperative for governments and the wider counterterrorism community not to neglect the mass media. In creating a counterterrorist environment, educating and training select media personnel as well as working with media organizations is critical. To expose the horror, it is necessary to begin working with the media long before the terrorist event. That way, every terrorist incident can be used to expose the brutality of killing bystanders, those who had no involvement either with the perpetrator or the target. By highlighting the suffering of the victims of terror, the impact of the terrorist message can be reduced.

Counterterrorism leaders must invest quality time building relationships with media organizations, media moguls, and media personnel. We live in an age where the terrorists have fully realized the importance of the media battle. Traditionally, the counterterrorism community has shied away from the media. Government institutions must develop a coherent media strategy and communications plan. Media relationship management is an art and a science. Government personnel must be trained on the

benefits of working with the media. More importantly, they must be trained to effectively communicate “in sound bytes” to the public through the media. Most government agencies try to reach out to the media after an attack, long after the media savvy terrorist cell has developed a communications strategy.

Informatics Response

The terrorists and their supporters are using the media – especially the new media technologies – extensively. The use of the Internet by the terrorists and their existing and potential supporters is growing rapidly. As such the terrorists are increasingly able to recruit and raise funds through the Internet. In the early 21st century, the Internet is the principal means of terrorist propaganda, communication, and information collection. For the counterterrorism community, the Internet is also the least expensive and the most efficient way to understand the terrorist mindset and both its ideological and operational activities. More than using computers to mount an Information Infrastructure Attack (IIA), the terrorists are using the Internet for recruitment and fundraising as well as for managing their network. Contrary to the public perception of cyberterrorism, the real and immediate concern should be the terrorists’ use of the Internet to advance their agenda, not to destroy the Internet.

Terrorists began using the Internet in the mid 1990s, but the use of the Internet has grown very significantly after the loss of Afghanistan. The Internet has become the medium through which the dispersed Jihadists link up, find new friends, and network across continents. The Internet is the most important venue for terrorists to post training manuals and ideological texts. As such, the counterterrorism technical community has no option but to develop a robust understanding of the Internet and develop the tools to surveil and track individuals on the Internet. Most terrorists are not forensically aware, so they leave behind footprints for tracking both them and their network. In addition to Federal agencies, both State and local law enforcement should expand their cyber capabilities to monitor the Internet. Terrorists and extremists are increasingly relying on the Internet for propaganda, recruitment, indoctrination, fundraising, procurement and communication to plan, prepare and execute operations. The existing capabilities within NSA and other national communications agencies are impressive, but they are not sufficient to meet the current and emerging threat. For comprehensive as well as in-depth coverage of the Internet, expansion should include assignment of Urdu, Kurdish, Farsi, Somali, Arabic and other language specialists. As opposed to the technical specialists decoding encrypted communications, the language specialist will be able to read double talk and even communicate with an extremist or a terrorist. The skills and abilities to intercept extremist web presence must develop at the same rate of expansion of the terrorist and criminal use of the Internet. This should include high-tech crime, websites, communication, etc.

Commercial encryption protecting Internet-based communication services like Skype or MSN Secure (GAIN) makes it increasingly difficult for governments to monitor Internet chats or Skype conversations. Like encryption programs such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) that encrypt e-mails, hard drives and USB thumb drives, encryption services will be available for mobile phones in due course. With the increased

availability of commercial encryption in the public domain and the sale of in-built encryption, law enforcement agencies should develop their technical capabilities to monitor as well as legislatively gain access to encryption codes from companies marketing encryption for public communication.

Today's terrorist is dependent on the Internet. Most homegrown terrorists and extremists have been politicized, radicalized and mobilized through the Internet. As such, counterterrorism practitioners should use the Internet to counter the current wave of radicalization that manifests in extremism and terrorism. There are a few thousand Jihadi websites spreading the radical message. The Jihadist websites motivated Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, an Egyptian, who was not a member of any terrorist group, to kill El Al personnel at the LAX airport on America's Independence Day in 2002. Unfortunately, there are only a handful of websites countering the radical websites. This is the forgotten dimension of counterterrorism. Today, there is a grave need to educate the moderate clerics on the use of the Internet. There should be projects supported by the West but launched in the Muslim World to build websites for clerics that can drown out the voice of the extremists. The theory that the West should not be involved in countering the radical message of the Jihadists is false and dangerous. Without Western involvement even the Muslim elite will fail to understand, develop the resources, and take appropriate action in this direction. It is critical for Western nations that have the resources, the reach, the staying power, and the discipline to link up with appropriate partners in the south to build such unique capabilities. Such counterterrorism projects can be discreet.

It is necessary to identify, monitor, track, and arrest individuals that operate the terrorist and extremist websites. As they provide the platforms for disseminating hatred, they pose an enduring threat. Although there are a few thousand websites, there are only a small number of such individuals. Of the jihad websites, only a dozen websites are directly linked to Al Qaeda and its most active associated groups. The key decision makers that conceptualize, formulate and direct the global jihad strategy are only a handful of individuals. Targeting these few leaders that have the understanding of the environment and the critical knowledge to set up, maintain, and upgrade the terrorist and extremist web is imperative for the success of the counterterrorist mission.

Legislative Response

Terrorism is a special crime. Terrorism cannot be dealt with effectively using ordinary laws. It requires special counterterrorism legislation that requires designates organizations and individuals as terrorists. Terrorists operate through front, cover and sympathizer groups. These groups take the face of human rights, humanitarian, charity, social, cultural, religious, educational, commercial, and other community organizations. When these terrorist affiliates are detected, terrorists seek either to establish new groups or to operationally or ideologically infiltrate existing groups. As such, there should be a secondary list. To delegitimize such groups, it requires constant review and proscription of front, cover and sympathizer groups. The list should also be reviewed to ensure that groups that abandon terrorism as a means are de-proscribed.

Like the provision to blacklist groups and individuals, legislation must be sufficiently robust to target terrorist support and operational activity. Support activities are criminalizing propaganda, recruitment fundraising, procurement, transport, safe houses, training, communications, and multiple identities. Operational activities are initial and final surveillance and reconnaissance, rehearsal and execution. Except terrorist attack, most of the activities that enable the attack are not legislatively criminalized. The pre-operational activity is as important as the operational activity. Due to a lack of counterterrorism legislation, courts have set many terrorists and their supporters free. Even in countries with special counterterrorism legislation, judges have failed to understand the importance of surveillance, reconnaissance and rehearsal for the success of a terrorist attack. If the judges, lawyers, jury and witnesses are intimidated or infiltrated by the terrorists and their supporters, it is necessary to develop special courts. To ensure justice, it is necessary to develop appropriate counterterrorism legislation, train judges, and create special courts for trying terrorism cases.

In the Philippines, possession of arms, ammunition and explosives is an offense for which one can post bail. Some of the Valentine's Day bombers of Manila had been arrested previously with firearms and explosives. However, they were released on bail due to the absence of terrorism legislation. They traveled to Mindanao, the south of the Philippines, received training and returned to Manila to mount terrorist attacks. Although not a Jihadist group, judges in Sri Lanka released or gave lenient sentences to members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) for mounting surveillance and reconnaissance on targets. They failed to comprehend that success of any terrorist attack depends on thorough surveillance and reconnaissance of future intended targets. Most of these problems affect developing countries. However, there are a few western countries that are also suffering due to a lack of comprehensive and robust legislation. For instance, in the United States, Samy al Hussein managed a series of websites for the awakening Sheikhs – the mentors of Osama bin Laden. Under the First Amendment, the District Court in Boise, Idaho, acquitted him of the terrorism charges. It has been a difficult process to educate government officials, particularly lawmakers, about the need for counterterrorism legislation. For instance, Australia's Department of Justice officials firmly believed that there was no necessity to have specialized counterterrorism legislation to combat terrorism. As such, one week after the Bali bombing in October 2002, the Jemaah Islamiya Australia leader left Australia and relocated to Indonesia. After the Bali attack, there was sufficient support in the Australian parliament to pass robust terrorism legislation.

Politicians are cautious of advancing national and strategic interests at the cost of compromising self-interests. Most politicians are driven by public support – they want to be re-elected. As such, politicians are sensitive particularly to the collective opinion of migrant and diaspora communities. Terrorist and extremist groups have penetrated community groups of migrant and diaspora communities. They offer politicians x number of votes for opposing counterterrorism legislation and amendments. Under constituency pressure, Paul Martin, the Prime Minister of Canada opposed the proscription of a terrorist group. Under diaspora and migrant pressure, Paul Martin even attended a terrorist fundraising dinner. Likewise, some politicians are susceptible to

pressure by human rights and civil liberties groups. It took five years for the Philippine Congress to pass the counterterrorism bill. It was watered down to a point that the bill is of limited use. Failure to educate politicians led civil libertarians and human rights activists to render the bill impotent. Constant formal and informal education of the executive, the criminal justice, and the prisons systems is critical to manage the threat of terrorism and extremism.

Developmental Response

If we divide the world into two, about 20% of the world's population lives in the global north of North America, Europe and Australasia. As a percentage, the Caucasian population is shrinking. About 80% of the world population lives in the global south of Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America. However, the world's rich mostly live in the global north. The bulk of the world's population has access only to a small proportion of the world's wealth. This vast disparity makes small segments of the population in the global south resent the global north. It also makes those living in the global south vulnerable to terrorist ideologies. Although terrorist and extremist groups are recruiting both from the north and the south, the vast majority of the terrorists and their supporters are from conflict zones in the south.

The contemporary wave of terrorism is largely a phenomenon associated with the global south and the migrant and diaspora communities living in the West. Today's conflict zones are the largest producers of terrorists. Over 95% of the terrorist groups originate from conflict zones in the global south but they form both support and operational networks in the global north. To reduce the vulnerability of the population in the south to extremism, it is necessary to invest in developmental projects in the conflict zones. The conflict zones from Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Mindanao, Algeria, Afghanistan, and Iraq produce the greatest human rights violations, internally displace persons, form refugees, and eventually produce terrorists. Until the conflict ends, the conflict zone produces human suffering, virulent ideologies, and radicalization both within and outside the conflict zone. To reduce the threat of terrorism, investment in conflict negotiation aimed at bringing together the different parties to the conflict is paramount.

Due to the associated risk, most governments and the international community scale down or abandon economic and development assistance to violence-affected conflict areas. Due to the loss of jobs and revenue, the youth living in these strategic areas become unemployed or underemployed. As such, the youth in particular become vulnerable to supporting terrorism and extremism. To prevent mass terrorist and extremist radicalization, it is necessary to retain the momentum of development and economic activity by strengthening investment. It is necessary to create a special International development fund to invest in violence-affected areas. Such a fund, managed by the United Nations and other regional bodies, can focus on providing education, jobs, housing, and health services.

In parallel, the international community should create an academy at the UN for training personnel to manage violent religio-political and ethno-political conflicts. The

training should involve, in addition to skills in political negotiation, language and cultural skills. The knowledge of the individuals and groups developed through counterterrorism intelligence can be useful in political negotiation. One of the most enduring pathways out of terrorism is conflict mediation by developing structured peace processes.

The international community should develop their capacities and capabilities to intervene. The humanitarian as well as capacity building interventions can produce unanticipated results. There are rare strategic opportunities where Western nations can intervene to improve the Muslim image of the West. US intervention in Aceh after the Tsunami and in Pakistan after the earthquake dramatically reversed the negative opinion of the US. Such strategic moments must be seized.

Conclusion

Five years after 9/11, the threat persists. The deadly attacks worldwide from Madrid on March 11, 2004 to London on July 7 and 21, 2005 make the development of a full-spectrum response critical. Failure by government – the lead actor – to enlist the collaboration of a wide range of secondary actors has led to the continuity of the terrorist threat, and even its escalation. Such a transformation in response from a mono-pronged approach to a multi-pronged approach involves a range of actors across multiple jurisdictions.



In developing a full-spectrum response, the government must be able and willing to develop state responses beyond the traditional police and intelligence approaches. It must consider applying a range of tools from other bodies and enforcement authorities. They include: the immigration, customs, and other enforcement authorities; the coast guard (or the marine police); the military; the port, airport and other transportation authorities; the private security industry; the finance and banking sector; the media; the telecommunications sector; community and other influential leaders; and religious and educational institutions.

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Endnotes

- ¹ The declassified sections are reproduced in *The New York Times*, September 27, 2006.
- ² “Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat,” Report 109-615. 109th Congress, 2nd Session. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.) Available at <http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/ExtremistThreat.pdf>.
- ³ See the May 2006 “Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005” of the Security and Intelligence Committee to Parliament. Also Brendan O’Neill, “Understanding Britain’s 7/7 attacks,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 5, 2006.
- ⁴ Rogelio Alonso and Fernando Reinares, “Maghreb immigrants becoming suicide terrorists: a case study on religious radicalization processes in Spain,” in Ami Pedahzur, (ed.), *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism*. (London: Routledge, 2006).
- ⁵ The text of one of the essays can be found at <http://www.mathaba.net/rcm/ercm/leaderless.html>.
- ⁶ Renate Mayntz, “Organizational Forms of Terrorism: Hierarchy, Network, or a Type sui generis,” Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung (MPIFG) Discussion Paper 04/4. 2004. My discussion adapts her argument somewhat.
- ⁷ “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2006.
- ⁸ See the September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, the February 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, the March 2006 *National Security Strategy*, and the September 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, all available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.
- ⁹ Paul Roberts. *The End of Oil*. (London: Bloomsbury, 2005) p 93.
- ¹⁰ Sheik Abd-Al-Aziz bin Rashid al Anzi. “The Religious Rule of Targeting Oil Interests.” <http://www.tajdeed.org.uk/forums>, February 26, 2006; cit. Michael Scheuer, Stepan Ulph & John C.K. Daly. *Saudi Arab Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy*. (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, May 2006) p 10.
- ¹¹ Cit. Erich Follath. *The Global Battle for Natural Resources: The New Cold War*. Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan. (Hamburg: Der Spiegel, 2006) at <http://mail.google.com/mail/?view=att&disp=vah&attid=0.1&th=10d58b50a929b469>, consulted on August 29, 2006, p 1.
- ¹² Dr. Liam Fox. “Energy Security and Military Structures.” Speech at the Chatham House, May 22, 2006. Text provided by the speaker, p 2.
- ¹³ IntelCenter. “Jihadi Tactics & Targeting Statistic.” (Alexandria, Virginia: IntelCenter, May 18, 2006) (Executive Summary).
- ¹⁴ Cit. SITE Publications, <http://siteinstitute.org/bin/articles.cgi?ID=publications19805&Category=publications&Subcategory=0>, October 10, 2006; Edward R. Royce, Chairman of Subcommittee on International Terrorism of the US House of Representatives Committee. In: US Congress, House. “Terrorist Threats to Energy Security.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 1.
- ¹⁵ Here the academic consensus definition is used: “Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby, in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (impaired) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a *target of terror*, a *target of demands*, or a *target of attention*, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.” - Alex P. Schmid, et al. *Political Terrorism*. (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publ. Company, 1988) p 28.
- ¹⁶ For a critical view, see Testimony of Paul Leventhal on behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute on the Recommendations of the NRC Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force, presented to the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, D.C., May 5, 1999, p 3. Consulted at <http://www.nci.org/t5599.htm>.

¹⁷ Gal Luft and Anne Korin. "Terrorism Goes to Sea." *Foreign Affairs*, Nov./Dec. 2004; reprinted in: US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 18.

¹⁸ Figures from James "Chip" Ellis. "America's Critical Infrastructures: Open Source Information Lays It Out." Unpublished Note, 2006, p 1. – Others put the number of border crossing at 300 million per year. – Ron Suskind. *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11*. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006) p 287.

¹⁹ Mike Bahorich. Expanded and updated remarks prepared for a panel discussion at the Society of Exploration Geophysicists annual meeting, Nov. 6-11, 2005, Houston; at <http://mail.google.com/mail?view=att&disp=vahatid=0.1&th=10d58b50d58b0a929b469>, August, 29, 1996, p 1.

²⁰ Gal Luft; cit. US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 35.

²¹ US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 2; private communication.

²² Peter McKiernan, former secretary of The Big Horn Mountain Foundation and current Head of the School of Management of the University of St. Andrews.

²³ For a summary of the *Oil Shock Wave* simulation game, see: http://www.secureenergy.org/reports/oil_shock_report_master.pdf, consulted on October 3, 2006.

²⁴ Bhushan Bahree and Jeffrey Ball. "Oil producers see plenty of supply to meet needs." *The Wall Street Journal*, September 14, 2006, p 2. The Saudi estimates of the world's supplies are rosy: according to them the world has already produced one trillion barrels of oil so far but has 4.5 trillion barrels more of crude – enough for 140 years of supply. *(*ibid*). Others differ from these optimistic estimates. See: Paul Roberts. *The End of Oil*. (London: Bloomsbury, 2005) who holds that "Estimates of proven reserves...are routinely exaggerated for economic and political gain" (op. cit., p 48). Roberts writes: "...according to pessimists...our estimates for the world's total remaining oil – proven and undiscovered – drops to a trillion barrels....and puts the peak at around 2010" (op. cit., p 52).

²⁵ Statement of Gal Luft, Co-Director, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security; cit. US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p.16.

²⁶ Given the fact that so many factors affect the oil price at any given time, it is difficult to prove empirically that there is such a "terrorist premium" and what its exact size is. However, the nervousness of the energy market in the wake of a relevant disruptive event – like the attack on Abqaiq - indicates that it exists.

²⁷ Literally, Osama bin Laden said: "We bled Russia for 10 years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw from Afghanistan in defeat. We are continuing in the same policy to make America bleed profusely to the point of bankruptcy." - Cit. in Statement of Gal Luft, Director, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security; cit. US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 16; see also: Michael Scheuer. "Al Qaeda and the Oil Target." In: Michael Scheuer, et al. *Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy*. (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, May 2006) p 7 (website: <http://www.jamestown.org>).

²⁸ Cit. Daniel Yergin "Ensuring Energy Security." *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 March/April 2006; cit. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessay85206/daniel-yergin/ensuring-energy-security.html> ; consulted September 10, 2006. – An Al Qaeda spokesman labeled oil supplies "the provision line and the feeding artery of the life of the crusader nations." - Cit. Gal Luft and Anne Korin. *Foreign Affairs*,

November/December 2004; cit. US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 19.

²⁹ Cit. Michael Scheuer, op. cit., p 7.

³⁰ Bhushan Bahree and Jeffrey Ball. "Oil producers see plenty of supply to meet needs." *The Wall Street Journal*, September 14, 2006, p 1. In today's dollars, the highest oil price was recorded in April 1980 when it reached today's equivalent of \$99.21 a barrel.

³¹ In 1993 China imported only 6 percent of its oil, in early 2006 it was 60 percent. Today China accounts for 12 percent of the world's energy consumption, half as much as the United States (24%). - Dr. Liam Fox. "Energy Security and Military Structures." Speech at the Chatham House, May 22, 2006. Text provided by the speaker, p 3.

³² Cit. Shawn Woodford. "Al Qaeda and Saudi Arabia: A Chronology." In M. Scheuer et al, op. cit., p 44.

³³ Cit. M. Scheuer, op. cit., p 14.

³⁴ Cit. "Kuwait boosts oil security after Saudi Qaeda attack." *Reuters*, February 27, 2006.

³⁵ Osama bin Laden, December 14, 2004; cit. Michael Scheuer, Stephen Ulph & John C.K. Daly. *Saudi Arabian Oil Facilities: The Achilles Heel of the Western Economy*. (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, May 2006) p 10.

³⁶ Cit. idem.

³⁷ Shawn Woodford, op. cit., pp 35-47.

³⁸ "Saudi Arabia: Failed attack on oil refinery proves solid Saudi oil security." *Reuters* (Dubai), February 24, 2006.

³⁹ John C.K. Daly. "The Global Implications of Large-Scale Attacks on Saudi Oil Facilities." In: M. Scheuer et al., op. cit., p 27. From Abqaiq, pipelines flow westwards to the Red Sea port of Yanbu which can carry 5 million barrels a day. Eastward to the Persian Gulf, the pipeline brings some 6 million barrels a day to Ras Tanura, the huge offshore oil loading facility.

⁴⁰ Shawn Woodford, op. cit., p 47.

⁴¹ This has been pointed out first by Robert Baer; cit. J.C.K. Daly, op. cit., p 30. - Gal Luft, Co-Director, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security said in a testimony to a US Congress committee: "A single terrorist cell hijacking an airplane in Kuwait or Dubai and crashing it into Abqaiq or Ras Tanura, could turn the complex into an inferno. This could take up to 50% of Saudi oil off the market for at least six months and with it most of the world's spare capacity. Such an attack could be more economically damaging than a dirty bomb set off in New York City." -Col. Luft, in: US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 25.

⁴² MIPT Knowledge Base. Group Profile. "Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta," at <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4692>, August 19, 2006, pp 1-2.

⁴³ M. Scheuer, et al., p 11.

⁴⁴ US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 20.

⁴⁵ "Targets for Economic Jihad," SITE Institute, December 2005; cit. M. Scheuer, et al, op cit., p 12.

⁴⁶ Donald R. Hamilton. "Is there a Terrorism 'Tax' on Oil?" *MIPT July 2006 Newsletter*.

⁴⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as quoted by *Reuters*, June 12, 2006.

⁴⁸ Figure according to the Washington-based Homeland Security Research Corporation. 44% of that sum is spent by one country - the United States of America - alone. HSRC estimates that world expenditures on fighting terrorism will increase to 350 billion dollars by 2010 (with 36% being spent by the USA) and exceed 517 billion dollars by 2015 (with 35 % spent by the USA), according to Dan Inbar, president of HSRC. - *Press Trust*, May 26, 2005, at <http://www.presstrust.com/article 435829.html>.

⁴⁹ Saudi Arabia is currently investing heavily in both gas and oil and aims to boost its daily oil production to 12.5 million barrels by 2009. *Saudi Arabia*, September 30, 2006, p 10.

⁵⁰ Liam Fox. "Energy Security and Military Structures." Speech at the Chatham House, May 22, 2006. Text provided by the speaker, p 7.

⁵¹ Op. cit.

⁵² Mr. Luft, in testimony before the US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. "Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 34.

⁵³ Daniel Yergin., op. cit (*Foreign Affairs*), pp 75-77.

⁵⁴ Statement by Mr. John P. Dowd, Senior Research Analyst, Sanford C. Bernstein & Company, Inc., in: US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) pp 11-12. – On the other hand, the resilience of the developed energy consumer states should not be underestimated. In the words of Gal Luft, in his testimony to Congress: No doubt that oil terrorism could drive oil prices to over \$100 a barrel, but the impact of such disruptions is likely to be short-lived. If we look at the statistics, the average duration of supply disruption of the past 55 years were 6 months, with loss of no more than 2.5 percent of the market. Most pipelines and pumping stations can be repaired within a few days or weeks. A blockage of a chokepoint by a burning tanker is not likely to last more than a couple of weeks. Once the disruption ends, prices are likely to be gradually restored. It is important to remember that a loss of 4 to 5 percent of the market can be offset by the 700-million barrel Strategic Petroleum Reserve." - Mr. Luft, in: US Congress, House. "Terrorist Threats to Energy Security." Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations. 109th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 2005. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005) p 22.

⁵⁵ "Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate on Global Terrorism" *The New York Times* (September 26, 2006) pp 1-4.

⁵⁶ The debate was originally ignited by Richard Clarke, *Against All Enemies* (New York: The Free Press, 2004) ad passim.

⁵⁷ "Project Megiddo," Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, p 32.

⁵⁸ For a discussion of this literature see, Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp 49-78.

⁵⁹ For a discussion of some of the cases see, Jonathan Tucker (ed.), *Toxic Terror* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000) ad passim.

⁶⁰ James Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men* (New York: Basic Books, 1980) pp 406-407.

⁶¹ Franco Ferraresi, *Threats to Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996) pp 90-115.

⁶² For a discussion see, Louise Richardson (ed.), *The Roots of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2006) pp 1-13.

⁶³ For a recent version of his views see David Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism" in Audrey Cronin and James Ludes (eds.), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004) pp 46-73

⁶⁴ "What is a wave? It is a cycle of activity in a given time period – a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups characteristics and mutual relationships." (p. 47)

⁶⁵ See, for example, Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Continuum, 2003) especially, pp 161-231.

⁶⁶ Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2005) ad passim.

⁶⁷ Lia, p 187.

⁶⁸ Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006) p 118.

⁶⁹ See, Audrey Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends," *International Security* 31:1 (Summer 2006) pp 7-48.

⁷⁰ See, for example, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003).

⁷¹ Cronin, p 39.

⁷² For the Al Qaeda perspective on this see, Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery: the most critical stage through which the Umma will pass*, translated by William McCants (Funding for this translation was provided by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University).

- ⁷³ A letter from an Al Qaeda leader in Pakistan to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which was captured in Iraq by American military forces following the June 7, 2006 air strike on al-Zarqawi's "safe house" expresses these concerns in strong terms. "Letter Exposes New Leader in Al-Qa'ida High Command" Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy (September 25, 2006).
- ⁷⁴ Max Manwaring, *Internal Wars: Rethinking Problem and Response* (Strategic Studies Institute, 2001) p vii.
- ⁷⁵ Yoram Schweitzer and Shaul Shay, *An Expected Surprise*. Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, August 2002, p 67.
- ⁷⁶ The front's members included the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Bangladeshi Islamic Jihad and the Afghan Al Ansar group, among others. For a list of the members, see *An Expected Surprise*, p 68.
- ⁷⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) pp 54-58.
- ⁷⁸ For example, the cooperation between American and British authorities and agencies led to the prevention of a mass aerial attack in which terrorists had planned to blow up 10 planes carrying passengers from the U.K. to the U.S. See "Bush Praises Effort to Thwart Terror Plot," *Fox News*, August 10, 2006, www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,207710,00.html and Rose Cowan, "Police foiled major terror attacks in UK, Met claims," *The Guardian*, December 12, 2003, www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,1105237,00.html.
- ⁷⁹ "White House lists 10 foiled Attacks," *CNN International*, February 15, 2006. see: <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/US/02/09/whitehouse.plots/index.html>.
- ⁸⁰ "'Major al-Qaeda attack foiled'," *BBC News*, January 26, 2003. see: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2690629.stm>
- ⁸¹ "Jordan says major al Qaeda plot disrupted," *CNN International*, April 26, 2004. see: <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/26/jordan.terror/>
- ⁸² "Manila foils 'Madrid-style' attack," *CNN International*, May 6, 2004. see: <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/03/30/philippines.terror/index.html>
- ⁸³ "Australian arrests foiled 'catastrophic' attack: police," *CBC News*, November 8, 2005. see: <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2005/11/08/australia-plot051108.html>
- ⁸⁴ "Toronto terror plot foiled – Canada," *CNN International*, June 3, 2006. see: <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/06/03/canada.terror/>
- ⁸⁵ "'Airlines terror plot' disrupted," *BBC News*, August 10, 2006. see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778575.stm
- ⁸⁶ Roy Olivier, *Globalized Islam: The Search for the New Ummah*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) pp 145, 263-273, and 283. See also Roy, Olivier, "EuroIslam: The Jihad within?" *The National Interest*, Spring 2003: [Online edition]: http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2003_Spring/ai_99377576
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- ⁸⁹ Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: the Guerrillas in History*. (Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1975) p 1076.
- ⁹⁰ Blaufarb, op. cit. pp 66-67.
- ⁹¹ Cecil. B. Currey, *Edward Lansdale, the Unquiet American*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988) pp 268-269.
- ⁹² Currey, op. cit. p 261.
- ⁹³ Ian F. W. Becket and John Pimlott (eds.), *Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency*. (London-Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985) p 4.
- ⁹⁴ Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) p 108.
- ⁹⁵ Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: a Historical and Critical Study*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977) p 374.
- ⁹⁶ Laqueur. *Ibid*.

- ⁹⁷ John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, *Revolutionary War*, in *Makers of Modern Strategy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p 853.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p 854.
- ⁹⁹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, a French View of Counterinsurgency*. (New York, 1964) pp 20-22.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ian F. W. Becket and John Pimlott (eds.). *Op. cit.* p 19.
- ¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* p 20.
- ¹⁰² Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966) p 52.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.* p 53.
- ¹⁰⁴ Thirty years of internal wars in Latin America, can be roughly classified in the following way: a) a first wave of mostly rural guerrillas, inspired by the *foco* theory, as described by Che Guevara and prescribed by Regis Debray. This stage lasted until about 1967; b) a second wave of mostly urban insurgencies, mainly in the Southern cone (Tupamaros, Montoneros, ERP). It was essentially over by the mid 1970s; c) A third wave, mostly of Central American insurgencies, sounder and more experienced in political and military strategies, was the only one that achieved relative success. Colombia's FARC guerrilla insurgency, probably the oldest insurgency in the world, is, of course, a class of its own.
- ¹⁰⁵ Adrian H. Jones and Andrew R. Molnar, *Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases*. (Washington, D.C.: SSRI, 1966).
- ¹⁰⁶ "You don't Kill Communists with Guns Alone," *U.S. News & World Report*. 1953.
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- ¹⁰⁸ *Op. cit.* pp 5-7.
- ¹⁰⁹ Blaufarb. *op. cit.* p 298.

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