Chinese rule in Tibet: establishment, administration and maintenance
Chapter 6
6.1 Introduction
The Chinese government argues that Tibet became an integral part of China in the 13th century and has remained Chinese territory ever since. The Tibetan Government claims that Tibet was independent before the Chinese invasion in 1950.1 Whatever the various arguments presented, it is generally accepted among scholars that Tibet existed and acted as an independent state from 1913 to the Chinese invasion in 1949/1950.2 On the eve of the Chinese invasion, Tibet fulfilled all generally recognised criteria of statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other States.3 Prior to the invasion, the Tibetan government established diplomatic relations with a number of countries and steadfastly refused to respond to repeated Chinese overtures to 'approve', 'accept' or 'join' the Chinese Republic, which had been established in 1911.4 Chinese military intervention constituted an act of aggression against a state which at that point in time was neither part of the People's Republic of China, nor acted as such.
In this second part of the independent study, the nature of China's rule over Tibet will be examined in light of the criteria of colonialism identified in Part I.
6.2 Establishment of Chinese Authority
Military Conquest
Shortly after the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, after decades of turmoil and civil war in China, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) started its march towards Lhasa. Some heavy fighting took place between the Tibetan and the Chinese armies, in which the former were outnumber by the latter by many tens of thousands. In the first two weeks of fighting, which took place in and around Chamdo, some 4,000 Tibetans officers and soldiers were killed and the rest were forced to surrender.5 By 1953 the Chinese authorities had consolidated their rule in most parts of Tibet. The Dalai Lama tried to find a modus vivendi with the Chinese authorities, given the impossibility of effective resistance in the face of the powerful Chinese PLA. Despite these efforts Tibetan protest against Chinese rule gradually mounted and culminated in a mass uprising against Chinese rule in 1959. In Lhasa the uprising was crushed, and according to Chinese figures at least 87,000 Tibetans were eliminated .6 In the course of the following year, the Chinese authorities crushed many Tibetan resistance movements and eventually established control over most parts of Tibet. Tibetans continued to wage a guerrilla war against the occupation forces and initially received some support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. However, major revolts occurred in 1968 (the Nyemo rebellion which spread to 20 of the Tibet Autonomous Region's (TAR) 70 counties) and the early 1970s, none of which had any CIA involvement, in addition to hundreds of small revolts and protests which continue to this day.
Treaty
After the defeat of the Tibetan army, the Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed by representatives of the Chinese and Tibetan governments in Beijing in May 1951. The Chinese government threatened the Tibetan representatives that failure to sign the agreement would result in the resumption of the military invasion of Tibet.7 The Tibetan representatives preferred to sign the agreement rather than witness the further destruction of Tibet. The Seventeen Point Agreement states inter alia that 'the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland - the People's Republic of China'.8 Moreover it states that 'the Local Government of Tibet shall actively assist the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences '.
The Tibetan government , which had not given the Tibetan delegates full powers to sign any kind of treaty, rejected the Agreement as soon as it was broadcast by Radio Peking on 27 May 1951. Attempts by the Dalai Lama, who was 16 years old at the time, to re negotiate the treaty failed. Shortly after his escape to India in 1959, he stated publicly:
While I and my government did not voluntarily accept the Agreement, we were obliged to acquiesce in it and decided to abide by the terms and conditions in order to save my people and country from the danger of total destruction.
On another occasion, the Dalai Lama stated that:
The consent of the [Tibetan] Government was secured under duress and at the point of the bayonet. My representatives were forced to sign the agreement under the threat of further military operations against Tibet by the invading armies of China leading to utter ravage and ruin of the country.9
From a legal perspective, the Seventeen Point Agreement was void ab initio. According to Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on treaties, which is declaratory of international customary law, a treaty is without any legal effect if 'the expression of a State's consent to be bound by a treaty which has been procured by the coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him'. Article 52 adds: 'A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat of use of force in violation with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.'
The Seventeen Point Agreement continues to play an important role in Beijing's efforts to legitimise Chinese rule over Tibet, even though most of the treaty's substantive provisions have been violated by Chinese governments. The most relevant provisions in this respect are Articles 4 and 11 of the treaty. Article 4 reads: 'The Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. Neither will the Central Authorities alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual'. Article 11 reads: 'In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities. The Local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they must be settled through consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.'
Interestingly, the TAR is the only autonomous region within the People's Republic of China which was established on the basis of a treaty (i.e. the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951). This suggests that the Chinese authorities regard the TAR as different from the other four autonomous regions.10
Settlement
Before the Chinese invasion in the early 1950s, there were virtually no Chinese in Tibet, except in some border regions between Tibet and China. (These areas were later incorporated in the Chinese provinces Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan, and in Qinghai.) Chinese colonists settled here as farmers, traders and shopkeepers in the decades preceding the military conquest and gradually gained control over large tracts of land that once belonged to Tibetan nomads.11
Up until 1934 there were no Chinese officials in Tibet. Earlier there had been Manchu, who had been expelled by the Tibetan government after the Manchu empire had collapsed in 1911. In 1934 China opened a diplomatic mission in Lhasa, the status of which was equal to the British mission in Lhasa, but lower than the Bhutanese and Nepalese missions.
Soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army were the first large group of Chinese frontier pioneers in Central Tibet. After they had established military control in the early 1950s, Beijing's comprehensive political rule in Central Tibet was mainly effected by Chinese government officials and Chinese Communist Party cadres. Many Chinese from all over China were moved to eastern Tibet in order to carry out the 'economic reconstruction work' outlined in the first 5-year plan. Some of these Chinese laborers settled down permanently. Not until Deng Xiao Ping's introduction of economic liberalisation policies in the early 1980s did a large number of Chinese merchants and entrepreneurs arrive in Central Tibet as well12
6.3 Administration:
6.3.1 Political Aspects
As stated before, the government of the People's Republic of China has consistently claimed that Tibet constitutes an inalienable part of its territory, and that those who claim that Tibet was or should be an independent state are 'splittists' supported by foreign anti-China forces13 and the 'Dalai clique' As detailed in Part 1, some European powers, notably France, the Netherlands and Portugal, similarly maintained that some of their colonies constituted integral parts of their metropolitan states. This did not prevent the international community from recognising these territories as colonies and treat them as such.
In the debates in the United Nations General Assembly, most states outside the communist block condemned China's rule in Tibet, and many referred to it as colonial rule. Interestingly, Tibet14 was recognised as having a separate status within the PRC. Officially it enjoys a status which is equal to the other 4 Autonomous Regions within the PRC.15 However, the government of the PRC unilaterally restricted the application of the Agreement to the area which it called the Tibet Autonomous Region. Leaving aside the illegality of this restriction of the treaty which was legally void ab initio, the TAR is the only Autonomous Region within the PRC which is based on a treaty.
Although most substantive provisions of this treaty have never been implemented, Chinese policies in Tibet are to a certain extent adjusted to local, Tibetan circumstances. Moreover, serious efforts have been undertaken to create a semblance of Tibetan local autonomy.
Political Representation
In theory, Chinese law provides for Tibetan political representation by establishing a system of local autonomy. In practice these legal provisions are circumvented in ways which deny real autonomy.
Since 1949, China has maintained control in Tibet through Tibetan and Chinese Party and government officials. The erosion of the role of Tibetans started before the TAR was established. In the 1950s, the Dalai Lama was given important but nominal titles in the structures set up by the Chinese authorities, including the Chairmanship of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet.16 Following the 1959 rebellion, Tibetan involvement in the government was drastically limited and remained nominal. During the 1970s, China continued to transfer many Chinese cadres to Tibet, upon whom they relied heavily to govern Tibet. When Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Communist Party, visited Tibet in 1980, he ordered this trend to be reversed, so that greater levels of governance and authority be put back into the hands of Tibetans.17 In a famous speech the Panchen Lama said:
When Comrade Hu Yaobang visited Tibet in 1980, he decided to repatriate all the useless Chinese personnel from Tibet. We consider this a wise decision. What is the point of having useless personnel....Tibet has suffered greatly because of the policy of sending a large number of useless people. The Chinese population in Tibet started with a few thousand and today is has multiplied manifold.18
Hu Yao Bang's personal efforts did not materialise, and there was no immediate policy shift, but the 1980s did see a period of relaxation which included the limited empowerment of Tibetans in government positions. By July 1994, even this very limited trend was officially halted. At the Third Work Forum on Tibet, the Central Committee of the Communist Party announced that we should take effective steps to maintain the current ranks of Han cadres and transfer Han and other minority cadres from the hinterland to Tibet. 19 Today, the remaining upper level Tibetan cadres are concentrated in the United Work Front Department, a branch of the Communist Party, which only has the authority to give advice to the government and the Party.
The preamble of the Seventeen Point Agreement refers to the Tibetan people as the 'Tibetan nationality' and states that:
All nationalities within the People's Republic of China shall enjoy national equality and the freedom to develop their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits and religious beliefs. 20
Its substantive provisions guarantee that Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government, [emphasis added]21 that the Central Authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet [nor] the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. 22
It guarantees freedom of religious belief 23 and prohibits any form of compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities with regard to the introduction of reforms.24
A historical parallel can be drawn to the treaty-based French protectorate regimes in Tunisia and Morocco. In these two French protectorates, indirect rule by local representative bodies gradually moved towards direct rule by the French authorities. Similarly, the Chinese authorities have violated the very Agreement which, according to them, constitutes the legal basis for Chinese rule in Tibet.
The autonomy provisions in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982) and the Law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Autonomy of Nationalities (1984) are much more limited and qualified than those in the Seventeen Point Agreement. According to the Law on Regional Autonomy, the autonomous organs have to operate under 'the uniform direction of the Central Government'25 and remain 'subject to the approval by the Central Government26 and the National People's Congress'.27
In assessing the current political representation of Tibetans within the political system of the PRC, three important points should be made. In the first place, the number of Tibetan representatives in the central government and central CCP organs is small.28
As Hungmao Tien notes: 'While Peking can claim participation by all nationalities in the political process on the basis of percentage figures, their numbers have tended to be concentrated in less important organizations at the lower levels. 29 As the Chinese government and Party structures operate on a centralist basis, in which the lower level is subordinate to the higher level,30 political representation on the local level involves little decision making power. TAR officials are subordinate to the central government, while Tibetan officials in the Autonomous Counties and Prefectures are subordinate to their provincial governments.31
Secondly, it is important to note that in reality it is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which makes policy and monopolises power, while the 'state implements policy and provides symbolic expressions of popular participation.'32 As such, the CCP constitutes a semi-independent power block with a strong and pervasive influence on both the government and the army. CCP members dominate key government posts and have more real and effective power than non-Party government officials, even those with higher ranks. One of the Four Cardinal Principles on which Chinese politics is based is: Leadership by the Communist Party. Significantly, China's autonomy laws remain silent on the role of 'minorities' in the CCP. Whereas the 1984 Law on Regional Autonomy requires that Tibetans hold positions of authority in the TAR33, no such requirement exists with regard to positions in the CCP. The highest, though still nominal, government position in the TAR is indeed occupied by a Tibetan34, while the TAR Party Secretary post has never been occupied by a Tibetan. The official autonomy which Tibetans enjoy on a governmental level is subject to the ultimate, de facto control of the CCP.
Thirdly, the most important precondition for becoming a CCP member is political loyalty. Article 6 of the Party Constitution states:
A probationary Party Member must take an oath in front of the Party flag. The oath reads: 'It is my will to join the Communist Party of China, uphold the Party's programme, observe the provisions of the Party Constitution, fulfil a Party member's duties, carry out the Part' decisions, strictly observe the Party discipline, guard Party secrets, be loyal work hard, fight for communism throughout my life, be ready at all times to sacrifice my all for the Party and the people and never betray the Party. [emphasis added]
In addition, Party Cadres have to 'fight against the hostile forces disrupting socialism and combat all erroneous tendencies inside and outside the Party.'35
Tibetan officials, and Party cadres a fortiori, are either genuinely loyal to the Chinese regime or try to reform the system from within. The leeway for such reform is extremely limited: cadres who are suspected of 'inconsistent thinking'36, i.e. disloyalty, are sidelined or purged.37
It can be concluded that the political representation of the Tibetan people, on the local as well as on the central level, is structurally inadequate both in law and in fact, and is nominal at best.
Imposed Borders
Tibetans were relatively unconcerned about the legal status of their country, until the Chinese started to lay territorial claims to Tibet. Religion, more than a nation state structure, was the organizing principle of Tibetan society. Like many of the pre-colonial territories, Tibet did not perceive itself in terms of a nation state until the early part of this century. In spite of the fact that Tibet defined itself primarily in religious terms until the beginning of this century, Tibet did function as a nation state, and fulfilled all the criteria for statehood, including a defined territory over which the Tibetan government exercised its jurisdiction.38
After the annexation of Tibet, Beijing divided Tibet into the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and a number of Tibetan Autonomous Counties and Prefectures which were incorporated into Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai Provinces. Some of these borders between the TAR and the other Tibetan regions had been imposed as early as 1950, but most of them were officially imposed by the Chinese government on 9 September 1965. By this time much of the original government structures of the pre-1949 Tibetan state had already been dissolved. The division of Tibet into the TAR and the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures is a Chinese construction and does not reflect the Tibetan perception of Tibet as 'cholka sum' (three regions): Utsang, Kham and Amdo. Moreover, the borders between the TAR and the other Tibetan regions do not always correspond to ethnic, historical and cultural boundaries.
Not only did the Chinese authorities change the external borders of Tibet, but they also renamed or rearranged a number of internal administrative units inside Tibet. The military administration of the area is based on yet another structure. The eastern part of the TAR belongs to the Chengdu Military Region and the western part belongs to the Lanzhou Military Region. The fact that Tibet does not operate as one unified administrative and military unit appears to be at odds with the concept of 'autonomy' and Tibetan self-identification.
6.3.2 Economic Aspects
Imposed Development
Ever since China annexed Tibet, Beijing has imposed development projects on Tibet without consulting the local Tibetan population. This practice was particularly obvious during the early decades of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, when Beijing imposed a system of collectivised farming on the Tibetan people, whose criticism of this system was crudely suppressed. During the 1970s and '80s the Chinese authorities unilaterally imposed large-scale wheat production in parts of Tibet. These projects failed completely, as wheat does not grow well in high altitude areas. (Tibetans traditionally did not eat wheat. Barley is the staple food of the Tibetans as Tibet's high altitude is particularly suitable for growing this crop.)
After the abolition of collectivised farming and the introduction of Deng Xiao Ping's policy of Reform and Opening Up in the late '80s, Beijing stepped up its efforts to explore the economic potential of Tibet and the possibilities to exploit this potential to the maximum extent. The shift from ideologically motivated to profit oriented development projects was not accompanied by increased participation of Tibetans in the planning
and implementation of these projects.
A clear example of an imposed development project is the Hydro-electric power station in Lake Yamdroktso. Tibetans were adamantly opposed to the construction of this station for a number of religious and environmental reasons. Tibetans regard the lake as a sacred place, which would be desecrated by the construction of the power station. The project has serious environmental implications, as the water level will drop considerably each year. The late Panchen Lama managed to suspend the project, but after his death the construction work was resumed and the station is now functioning.
Another example of an imposed development project is the Panam Rural Integrated Development Project. This project aims to boost the grain production of the Panam area in central Tibet. In 1995, the European Union, relying on Chinese sources claiming that the project is to benefit local Tibetans and has the support of NGOs working in the field, was about to provide substantial funds for the project. When subsequent independent research revealed that neither local Tibetans nor NGOs were consulted, the EU (temporarily) suspended its funding proposals. To date the decision is still pending. The same research revealed that Panam has no need for increased grain production, as Panam is already one of Tibet's main 'bread baskets'. This suggests that, contrary to Chinese claims, the extra grain will be transported elsewhere, rather than benefit the local Tibetans. Moreover, local Tibetans have expressed concerns that the project may attract Chinese workers and/or farmers to the region. The Yamdroktso and the Panam Integrated Rural Development Project do not constitute exceptions: rather, they typify the development policy which is imposed by Beijing and which does not take Tibetan views and concerns into account.
In many areas in Tibet, economic development involves the use of forced labor: Tibetans are recruited on a regular basis to perform 'community services', such as constructing roads, government offices or irrigation canals. Generally, failure to show up results in fines or the imposition of extra work quotas. Most of these community services constitute compulsory labor as defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO): 'all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily' and clearly do not meet the criteria set by the ILO for 'normal civic duties', in which case 'the members of the said community or their direct representatives shall have the right to be consulted in regard of the need for such services'.39
The economic development priorities set by the Third National Forum of Work on Tibet (1994) include irrigation, mining and infrastructure construction projects. Apart from a handful of individuals selected by Beijing, Tibetans have been systematically denied participation in determining these objectives. The fact that Tibetans lack effective political means to set their own economic development priorities as well as have a say in the practical realisation of the priorities set by Beijing, is directly related to their structural lack of political representation.
Progress or Exploitation
Chinese sources invariably praise development projects in Tibet as selfless attempts by Beijing to modernise poor and 'backward' Tibet. This rhetoric is inspired by socialist ideology, which depicts the socialist paradise as a classless, prosperous, materialist society. Closely related to this theory, is the idea that Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule will disappear once Tibetans are wealthy. Both views reflect the importance of economic progress as legitimization and consolidation of the regime. Before going into the underlying reasons for the Chinese government's emphasis on economic progress in Tibet, it is necessary to examine whether Tibetans have indeed benefited from Chinese development projects and economic liberalisation policies.
During the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, when millions of Chinese and Tibetans starved to death, socialist rhetoric on economic progress was blatantly at odds with reality both in China and Tibet. Following the introduction of Deng Xiao Ping's economic liberalisation policies, the Chinese authorities have sought to step up the exploitation of the economic potential of Tibet. All over China, the problem of the growing gap between the poor hinterland and the rich coastal areas is perceived by the Chinese government as a potentially serious source of instability. Tibet is not only a poor hinterland but also a politically sensitive area. Therefore, Beijing has attempted to enhance economic growth in Tibet by encouraging mainland Chinese and foreigners to invest in Tibet and improving the infrastructure in order to facilitate the transportation of natural and human resources. As a result, the overall standard of living has risen sharply, but the new wealth generated by 'market socialism' tends to be distributed among members of the new urban business elite, which is predominantly Chinese.
In some mines heavy labor is performed exclusively by Tibetans, whereas other mining companies employ a considerable number of Chinese workers. Some mining enterprises in Kham and Amdo are reported to make use of forced or semi-forced labor. In some cases, Tibetan workers are summoned to construct roads connecting these mines to major roads to China. They have to work for a certain number of weeks per year for a negligible salary. Those who do not turn up have to pay a fine or have to work extra shifts. In some areas a 'gold tax' is imposed: locals have to mine a fixed quota of gold a year and sell it at a nominal price to the authorities.40 If they fail to meet the set quota, they have to pay a fine. In some parts of Tibet, prisoners are forced to work in mines.41
The official reason why some mining companies employ Chinese rather than Tibetans is that in some areas there simply are not enough Tibetans who could do the work. In addition, there are reports that in certain types of mines42, Tibetans are not allowed to work as the resources which are being mined there are very valuable.
Mined resources are transported to mainland China. This is clearly the case in the areas around Lake Kokonor where large scale salt mining takes place. Many truckloads of salt are transported to China on a daily basis. Little research has been done on uranium mining in Tibet as relevant data are not available, but a number of Tibetan refugees have reported that there are uranium mines in Tibet in which all workers are Chinese and where the uranium is transported to China as soon as it has been mined.
Logging takes place on a large scale in many parts of Tibet, notably in the east, and is devastating for the environment. Almost all of this wood is transferred to China. Very little is used for construction work in Tibet.
Stretching the concept of natural resources to include lucrative tourism, it should be noted that the kind of tourism which Beijing promotes in Tibet involves expensive Chinese operated tours and services, tailored to wealthy tourists.43 Whereas Chinese tourist agencies employ a considerable number of Tibetan drivers, guides and hotel personnel, the main profit goes to these Chinese agencies. This pattern of discouraging and restricting individual tourists has no parallel in China.
Civilising Mission
Rhetoric on China's 'historical mission'44 to liberate the Tibetan people from 'dark, medieval feudalism' and 'superstition' and to 'civilise' them can be found in almost any randomly picked Chinese book on Tibetan history. Tibetan rulers are described as merciless cruel exploiters, while the current Chinese authorities are portrayed as the embodiment of civilised, rational and modern rule:
Chinese literature on Tibet tends to present Chinese culture as dominant and modern, while it presents Tibetan culture as peripheral, eccentric and medieval. In Chinese propaganda material, Tibetan Buddhism has often been referred to as 'feudal superstition' and ridiculed as the 'blind faith' of a backward people. China's legal newspaper Fazhi Ribao recently reported that in Tibet: 'Feudal and superstitious activities are rampant.... Shamanist witches dance into frenzies, geomancers search for auspicious locations.'46 (The perception of religion as a manifestation of 'backwardness' is closely related to Marxist evolutionism, which views history in terms of stages of development towards the 'Socialist Paradise', which is 'prosperous, rational, scientific and atheist.' According to this socialist view, Buddhist devotion is simply a stage in the development of a society:
Religion is a historical phenomena which occurs at certain stages of human society. (...) The conditions for the natural extinction of religion are: the great improvement of social productivity and the abundance of social property, the establishment of high level socialist democracy and great improvement in education, culture, science and technology.'47
Beijing derives part of its official legitimacy for its rule over Tibet from its professed 'advanced stage of civilisation.' Its official rhetoric closely resembles the language on the 'sacred trust' principle used in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations:
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility (....) [emphasis added]
The PRC claims to 'assist' Tibet, politically, economically and culturally to overcome its 'backwardness'. Chinese literature tends to present China's policies in Tibet as self-sacrificing efforts to help a poor and backward area and protect it from 'western imperialism'.
Chinese rhetoric on education invariably refers to Chinese education as the path towards modernity and socio-economic progress:
'The results [of Chinese education policies] helped free the [Tibetan] people from ignorant and backward conditions created by serfdom, and enabled them to walk along the glorious path of modern civilisation.48
The economic counterpart of Beijing's civilising mission is its emphasis on the necessity to recruit technical experts from China in order to advance Tibet materially and build up its socialist market economy.
The Chinese government maintains that the overwhelming majority of Tibetans are grateful to their Chinese 'liberators' who freed them from oppression and lifted them into the 20th century. The Chinese government's technique of discrediting political resistance as a reactionary attempt to re-establish feudal society and as an imperialist threat to Tibetan society, enables Beijing to portray itself as the 'protector' of Tibetan interests against the harmful influences of a mere handful of pro-independence activists.
Asymmetrical Cultural Exchange
Particularly in urban areas of Tibet, Chinese cultural influence is both visible and pervasive. Most young urban Tibetans are able to speak fluent Chinese and tend to adopt various aspects of Chinese culture. In certain parts of the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and Counties in, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan, Tibetan is no longer the language of communication among Tibetans. Very few Chinese settlers speak Tibetan, even those who were born in Tibet. Most of them continue to live according to the traditions and life-style they brought along from mainland China. They continue to identify with mainland China as their region of origin.
The Sinocization of the Tibetan people and culture is promoted by two types of assimilation: 'informal' assimilation resulting from the mere exposure to Chinese influence and institutionalised 'formal' assimilation resulting from explicit attempts by the Chinese authorities to assimilate the Tibetan people. The distinction between these two types is not always clear, as one could argue that 'informal' assimilation results from a deliberate absence of policies aimed at preserving the distinct Tibetan cultural identity.
As far as 'informal' assimilation is concerned, in most urban parts of Tibet, a considerable degree of assimilation has taken place. Generally speaking, the Chinese influence in the Autonomous Prefectures, most of which fell under Chinese control several years before the Autonomous Region, tends to be stronger than in most parts of the TAR. One of the reasons for this is that the Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan and even Qinghai have become relatively small Tibetan regions in predominantly Chinese provinces, dominated by Chinese. Beijing's economic policy of Reform and Opening Up, its subsequent efforts to attract and facilitate Chinese investment in Tibet and to encourage Chinese migration to Tibet are likely to promote further assimilation. The education system in Tibet tends to reflect Chinese cultural, political and social values. Chinese students at Tibetan schools do not learn Tibetan and are often placed in separate classes, while Tibetan students learn Chinese either as their first or their second language.
Beijing's educational policies in Tibet have gone through a series of changes. After the Cultural Revolution, during which manifestations of Tibetan cultural traditions were virtually outlawed, Tibetan language education underwent a revival. This revival was mainly a result of Chinese concessions to the late Panchen Lama, who continuously promoted the Tibetan language as the language of education and administration. In July 1988, Tibetan was declared the official language of the TAR. The Regulations on the Study, Use and Development of the Tibetan Language , which were passed by the local People's Congress in March 1989, stated that most lectures in tertiary institutions should gradually be in Tibetan and that Tibetans must speak in Tibetan at important meetings, that official documents and signs should be written in Tibetan and Chinese, and that proficiency in Tibetan should be one of the qualifications for government employment.49 This latter criterion is interesting, as its implementation would have amounted to the exclusion of Chinese from government posts in Tibet, as the number of Chinese who are fluent in Tibetan is negligible. Since the late Panchen Lama's death in 1989, the political mood has changed considerably.
Therefore, more and more Tibetan parents encourage their children to concentrate on Chinese from an early age. The top 1,600 children aged 12 or 13 are selected each year to attend secondary schools in mainland China.50 Many parents do whatever they can to have their children selected, believing that assimilation is the only key to a successful career.51 At university level, a similar trend towards abolishing Tibetan language education is taking place. The original objectives of the University of Tibet in Lhasa, which was founded in 1985, was to provide training for both Tibetan and Chinese cadres who would advance Tibet's economic development. In the early years of the existence of the University of Tibet, which offered a number of classes in Tibetan language and art52, Tibetan cultural aspirations played an important role. By now only one of the university's 17 courses is taught in Tibetan. The previous head of the University, who maintained that 'the ultimate goal [of the University] is the establishment of the centre of Tibetan culture in China', was recently replaced by a Chinese official who does not even speak Tibetan.
The fact that both at schools and within the administration, the Tibetan language promotion campaign of the mid-eighties has been substituted by policies affirming Chinese as the language of administration and communication, has raised concern among Tibetans.
Without educated people in all fields, expressing themselves in their own language, Tibetans are in danger of being assimilated. We have reached a crucial point, one leading Tibetan intellectual told the South China Morning Post in 1992. All hope in our future, all protection of our heritage depends on this. 53
Restrictions on individual rights in colonial situations cannot be seen in isolation, but are part of a system of collective control and maintenance of colonial rule in the face of opposition. Cause and effect are closely intertwined and form a vicious circle: most restrictions are attempts to stifle protest movements and often spark off more resistance. In the case of Tibet, restrictions imposed on the rights and freedoms of individual Tibetans are inspired by Beijing's attempts to stifle and root out Tibetan nationalism. But these very restrictions often fuel the resistance to Chinese rule and the independence movement. In order to maximise its control over Tibet, Beijing cautiously combines severe restrictions on civil and political rights with selective concessions in other areas. The following sections will give an overview of the various methods employed to achieve this aim.
The Chinese Constitution and Criminal Procedure laws provide for a wide range of civil and political rights, including the right to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, the right not to be tortured or ill-treated as well as the freedom of religious belief.54 The wording of these provisions, however, tends to be vague and subject to serious restrictions, especially when the security of the state is deemed to be at stake. Both in China and Tibet, civil and political rights are systematically curtailed and violated. In mainland China, Beijing's human rights policies and practices often respond to challenges to the monopoly of power by the Communist Party. In Tibet, Chinese human rights policies respond to a different type of challenge: Tibetan protest seldom targets specific aspects of the Party or of Chinese rule, but generally rejects this rule altogether. Tibetan independence demonstrations are seen by the Chinese authorities as an attack on the Chinese state itself. The Chinese authorities at times regard Tibetan resistance as a more grave threat and affront to the system than Chinese dissent, which by its very nature is at least not anti-Chinese.
Beijing's religious policies in Tibet show parallels to the attempts by some of the European colonial powers to convert their colonial subjects in order to consolidate their power. (See Part 1) Conversion amounts to substituting a certain belief system by another one. Similarly, Beijing's attempts to replace the Buddhist belief system by an atheist, socialist frame of reference constitutes a form of conversion. Realising that Buddhism is the organizing principle of Tibetan society and a vehicle of Tibetan nationalism, Beijing has systematically attempted to substitute Tibetan Buddhism by a state-controlled surrogate version of Buddhism referred to in Chinese propaganda as 'normal', i.e. patriotic, religious practice.
Beijing's policies on religion have gone through a series of changes. During the '60s and '70s, Buddhist practice was outlawed. Most Tibetan temples and monasteries were destroyed in the 1950s and early 1960s while the remaining ones were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Since the early 1980s, a number of monasteries and temples, including Sera, Ganden, Drepung and Tashi Lhungpo, began rebuilding, and greater religious freedom and tolerance was permitted. Pictures of the present (14th) Dalai Lama re-appeared in monasteries and private houses and for several years it was possible for Tibetans to worship the Dalai Lama as their religious leader as long as they did not openly support the political struggle which he represents. During the mid- and late 1980s, thousands of monasteries, temples and religious sites were being rebuilt by local villagers, with or without permission by the relevant government agencies which have tried to carefully manage and oversee the post Cultural Revolution religious opening.55
Analogous to its treatment of Tibetan party members and high government officials, the Chinese authorities treated the Tibetan religious 'upper strata'56 with great circumspection, hoping they could co-opt these leaders and use them as intermediaries between Beijing's policy makers and the Tibetan people.57 In his speech at the 1990 Work Conference of religion, CCP Secretary and PRC President Jiang Zemin stated:
Jiang's 1990 speech reflected Beijing's attempt to maintain stability and control by allowing a limited amount of freedom of religion:
We must make it clear that Communist Party members are atheists, and that this does not in any way contravene the policy of religious freedom. We ought to step up education. However, we cannot interfere willy-nilly, if the masses believe in religion. If we do, it would be very easy to harm the party's relationship with the masses of believers, and harm stability and unity.59
Since the Third National Forum of Work on Tibet in July 1994, Beijing's policy on religion has undergone yet another clear shift.60 Whereas the aim of maintaining 'unity and stability' has remained the same, political strategies now include active, hands-on management of monasteries by government or Party authorities, intense re-education of monks and nuns, and campaigns to root out support for the Dalai Lama. During the Third National Forum it was decided that the policy of allowing a limited degree of religious support for the Dalai Lama would be abandoned. Whereas earlier campaigns had targeted the 'Dalai clique', rather than the Tibetan leader himself, the Third Forum signified a shift towards direct personal attacks on the 'Dalai' himself:
Although sometimes the Dalai speaks softly and says nice things to deceive the masses, he has never ceased his splittist activities. Even up to today he has never changed his standpoint of trying to gain Tibet's independence. We must always have a clear view of Dalai and reveal his double-faced true colour as much as possible. The focal point in our region's fight to oppose splittism is to oppose the Dalai clique. As the saying goes, to kill off a serpent, we must first cut off its head. If we don't do that, we cannot succeed in the struggle against splittism.61
The Chinese government justifies its current attack on the Dalai Lama by discrediting him as a religious leader and portraying him as a threat to Buddhism itself. The fact that the inherently atheist Chinese government has appointed itself the role of the very 'protector of Buddhism' manifests a significant technique of political control: instead of prohibiting
Religion has a wide-spread influence in Tibet. Our Party's external policy is freedom of religious belief, and protects the normal religious order. The State has invested substantially on the reconstruction of temples and supports the normal religious activities, while at the same time administrating temples in accordance with the law to prevent any manipulation to engage in any activities that are harmful to the interests of the public and the government. At present, the majority of monks and nuns in the region are law-abiding and patriotic religious devotees, but there are still some thoroughly convinced followers of the counterrevolutionary Dalai clique.63 [emphasis added]
The anti Dalai Lama campaign and the Chinese government's orchestration of the search for and enthronement of the 11th Panchen Lama are closely related developments which share an important common element: the Chinese government claims that it is protecting the religious interests of the Tibetans. In December 1995, China's official daily newspaper Xinhua News Agency noted:
If [the Dalai Lama's] words are followed, Tibetan Buddhism will be led on a path of going against the interests of the people.65
At the same time, Beijing denies the Tibetan people any say in determining the actual contents of these religious interests. This policy is not an end in itself but a method of gaining and maintaining control over the central belief system of the Tibetan people. Until now Chinese policies on religious practice appear to have had little effect on the Tibetan people, who continue to practice religion on their own terms. The pressure on monasteries and nunneries to adopt 'normal' religion has been strong. Those resisting this pressure are frequently expelled from the institution, or if the resistance is too openly articulated, they face arrest and risk long prison sentences. In spite of these harsh punishments, resistance has been continuous and widespread.
The Chinese government attempts to combine the nominal maintenance of Tibetan 'autonomous' government bodies with a strong central state structure. Tibet's formal autonomous status within the PRC has confronted Beijing with a serious dilemma: on the one hand, Beijing is not prepared to grant Tibet real autonomy as it fears it will lose its grip on the politically sensitive region. However, the complete denial of autonomy would be an embarrassment to the Chinese leadership, as it would obviously and visibly violate Chinese legal provisions on Tibetan autonomy. Moreover, it could be a source of further social and political instability among Tibetans and fuel pro-independence sentiments.
For many years, the Chinese authorities have attempted to create a group of 'loyal' Tibetan cadres and government officials who could bridge the gap between the Central government and the Tibetan people and provide a 'Tibetan face' on Beijing's policies. This is similar to methods employed by a number of European colonial powers. The Chinese government hoped that these 'hand-picked'66 Tibetans would give up their pro-independence aspirations for positions of relative power and wealth. For a long time high ranking Tibetan government officials and party members were invariably portrayed as 'patriotic' and dissidents among them were seldom publicly punished. A former TAR government official and CCP member, who escaped to India in 1993, recounted the following experience:
In 1983 the authorities started to suspect that I was taking part in pro-independence activities. [...] I was interrogated for 13 days without being beaten. [...] They told me: 'If you tell the truth we will reward you with money and you will be promoted.' I saw that they had brought torture equipment, but they didn't use it. They were very polite and said: 'Even Party members make mistakes. As long as you confess and repent, you don't need to worry.' After 5 days they got angry and shouted: 'We have tried to reform you because we think you are a promising man. You could have a bright future. You could have a top position in the TAR government.' They did not hurt me. It would have been a disgrace to the party to torture me. Finally I was released. I was quietly removed from the party and sent on 'early retirement.67
Recently the Chinese authorities have started to replace many high-ranking Tibetans by Chinese68 as their strategy of instituting indirect rule appears to have failed. This shift manifested itself clearly in the decisions taken at the Third National Forum of Work on Tibet in July 1994, during which Beijing launched a campaign which aimed at 'purifying the cadre contingent'. By now, those cadres who 'did not have a firm standpoint' have been side-lined or dismissed.
Internal CCP documents suggest that economic development in Tibet is not only motivated by Beijing's wish to diminish the gap between its newly industrialised rich provinces and the poor hinterland, but also by it's attempt to break Tibetan resistance and eliminate support for 'splittism'. Beijing is attempting to accomplish with wealth what force failed to do: undermine the independence movement and integrate long-rebellious Tibet, according to the Wall Street Journal which recently ran a front page story on the this theme69. In a speech at the 6th TAR Regional CCP Congress, Chen Kuiyuan, the Secretary of the TAR branch of the CCP, stated:
Our Central Party stands firmly by the guidelines given by comrade Deng Xiao Ping, to pay attention to 'grasping with two hands'. Both hands must be tough; while successfully handling the economy, the Party must also settle some big political waves. ... Thus we are not only able to competently raise the speed of economic growth but also fight effectively against the hostile power in the political dimension.70
The fundamental interests of the Tibetan people are increasing development and maintaining stability. As communists are representatives of [the] Tibetan people's fundamental interests, the starting point and the end-result of all our work is to make the Tibetan people prosperous and help them thrive as soon as possible, so that they will live and work in peace and contentment. (...) While people continue not to clearly see their own fundamental interests, blind religious belief is unavoidable. (...) Communists should intensify the work of educating and guiding the people, so that they will become prosperous as soon a possible. People in richer areas usually do not take a great interest in religions, whereas the poorer people are, the stronger their enthusiasm for religions. Party and government leaders at all levels should pay attention and importance to this point.71
More than anything else, economic development provides the Chinese leadership with legitimization of Chinese rule over Tibet. Significantly, during the recent 1996 re-education campaigns, the monks at Sera Monastery were taken on visits to the Military Hospital in Lhasa, the restoration work at the Potala Palace, and the Traditional Tibetan Hospital, in order to illustrate the benefits of Chinese rule. The monks were later taken on a tour of modernisation projects in Lhasa.
Economic development being one of Beijing's main legitimization devices for it rule in Tibet, demonstrations against price-rises, increased medical and tuition fees and taxes are in certain respects more threatening to the Chinese leadership than outright pro-independence demonstrations: they constitute a direct challenge to the Central Government's claim that Chinese rule has brought prosperity and development to Tibet.
A large contingent of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops is stationed in Tibet. The total number of PLA soldiers stationed in the TAR is difficult to establish with certainty, and estimates range from 40,000 to 200,000.72 The overwhelming majority of PLA soldiers are Chinese from all over China. The official rationale for this heavy and permanent army presence is the defence of the international borders with India, Nepal, and Pakistan. But the heavy army presence also appears to reflect Beijing's concern with the potential for social and political unrest in Tibet. On sensitive dates, such as the anniversaries of major Tibetan demonstrations or uprisings as well as on Chinese national holidays, army presence tends to be particularly heavy.
The PLA functions mainly as a deterrent, the visible manifestation of China's authority in Tibet. As such, it performs important symbolic tasks, such as marching through the capital Lhasa on the anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China. During the last few years, the presence of the PLA has become more inconspicuous, reflecting Beijing's shift in policy towards using more refined measures of control through the police and an inconspicuous network of informers.
The PLA in Tibet is no longer directly in charge of suppressing Tibetan resistance. Ordinary policemen, the majority of whom are Tibetans, are responsible for identifying and dealing with individual cases of political opposition to Chinese rule. The People's Armed Police, which consists mainly of Chinese, is responsible for quelling mass demonstrations and using force where necessary.
The 1990s have seen a regression with respect to the use of the Tibetan language at schools and universities as well as in the administration as compared to the 1980s.
One reason given for the decreased use of Tibetan as the language of education and administration is simply practical one. It is much easier and cheaper for the authorities to use existing Chinese school material than to have to produce Tibetan materials. The same goes for official documents: it is time consuming and expensive to translate documents. The Chinese authorities increasingly appear to be unwilling to invest time and money into providing Tibetan language education materials and official documents.
But, the decline in the use of Tibetan appears to be politically motivated. The Tibetan language is seen by some leaders as the proper target of both the current campaign against the pro-independence movement and the nation wide campaign to eradicate traditional beliefs. In October 1995 Communist Party leaders in the Tibet Autonomous Region are said to have circulated a document arguing that separatism was partly caused by schools teaching too much religion and using the Tibetan language.73
Beijing's rhetoric on education in Tibet has always reflected a concern with losing political control over the interaction process between teachers and their pupils. Teachers suspected of arousing pro-independence sentiments among their students have been systematically removed from their posts or detained and sentenced74. After the relatively liberal period from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, education in Tibet has once again become more politicised. Current Chinese rhetoric on education bears some resemblance to the extreme language of the Cultural Revolution:
The success of our education does not lie in the number of diplomas issued to graduates from universities, colleges, poly-technical schools and middle schools. It lies, in the final analysis, in whether our graduating students are opposed to or turn their hearts to the Dalai clique and in whether they are loyal to or do not care about our great motherland and the great socialist cause. This is the most salient and the most important criterion for assessing right and wrong, and the contributions and mistakes of our educational work in Tibet. To successfully solve the problem, we must improve political and ideological work at schools and have political and ideological work run through all the teaching, study and work at schools.75
The early influx of Chinese settlers during the process of establishing Chinese control over Tibet, should be distinguished from Beijing's more recent policy of population transfer. Beijing's current policy of population transfer in Tibet is a means of conquering a territory which has consistently opposed Chinese rule, by demographic rather than military means.
Beijing's methods of population transfer to Tibet have varied from forced resettlement, to active encouragement of Chinese citizens to settle in Tibet, to a passive laissez-faire policy towards spontaneous Chinese migration to Tibet. The following section will give an overview of these methods:
Forced Resettlement
All over the People's Republic of China forced resettlement of large groups of people to sparsely populated regions has taken place, notably during the 'rustication' (Chinese: Xiafang) programme during the 1950s. Tibet being one of the most sparsely populated areas under Chinese control, Tibet saw a large influx of Chinese during the early years of the PRC. New Chinese towns were created in Tibet, such as Bayi in the TAR and Golmud and Xining in Qinghai. 76 Many Chinese were transferred to the Xining area to build agricultural communes and most of them settled down permanently. Moreover, millions of Chinese prisoners were transferred to prison labor camps in North East Tibet, referred to as Qinghai.Many of these prisoners were forced to settle in this area after their release or simply had nowhere else to go.
Forced resettlement of the type described in the preceding paragraph, is largely a phenomenon of the past. However, another type of forced resettlement still exists. Chinese Communist Party cadre and government officials who are transferred to Tibet often have no other option than to move to this high and remote area. Refusal to go and work in Tibet may result in disciplinary measures, such as demotion or dismissal.
Active Encouragement
Chinese migration to Tibet has been actively encouraged by the Chinese leadership, in order to accelerate the economic development and to consolidate Chinese control over Tibet. In August, 1994 Chen Kuiyuan, the Secretary of the TAR branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) said that to accelerate Tibet's development, (...) we (...) open our job market to all fellow countrymen.' Furthermore, he said:
All localities should have an open mind, and welcome the opening of various restaurants and stores by people from the hinterland. They should not be afraid that people from the hinterland are taking their money or jobs away. 77
Beijing's strategic attempts to employ 'loyal' Tibetans as government officials, both in the TAR and the remaining Tibetan areas, has failed and their positions are being filled with Chinese cadres. In February 1994, Xinhua , the official Chinese News Agency, reported that 1000 'outstanding leading officials and technicians' would be sent to the TAR 'to help boost the local economy and promote social progress'.(Decisions of this kind have repeatedly been announced and carried out since the early 1980s.)
Other examples of active encouragement of Chinese to settle permanently in Tibet include the policy to encourage PLA soldiers to settle in Tibet after their military service is over and engage in civil professions.78
Since Lhasa was given the status of a 'Special Economic Zone' within the PRC, Beijing has stepped up its earlier policies of offering financial incentives to Chinese entrepreneurs who set up businesses in Tibet. In 1992, the TAR Government issued a document entitled 'Certain Regulations on Encouraging Businessmen from Home [i.e. mainland China] and Abroad to invest in Tibet.' These regulations included the following incentives:
For productive enterprises set up by businessmen from outside of the region, the incomes from their production and operation are exempted from local income tax. (...) Investment projects in tourism worth over US $5 million that last more than ten years are exempted from income taxes during their first three profit making years, and are required to pay only half of their income taxes in their fourth profit-making years. Businessmen who invest in Tibet may hire technicians and management personnel from outside the region and these personnel may apply for multiple entry-exit permits.79
In addition to financial incentives, Chinese living in Tibet are sometimes exempted from the strict one child policies in force in mainland China.80 Moreover, many Chinese recruited for specific development projects receive considerable hardship allowances in addition to housing and free education for their children. These policies and practices are referred to in numerous regulations and publications but nowhere are they more succinctly stated than in Poverty of Plenty, originally commissioned as an official
The personnel thus brought in from developed regions cannot be expected to live on the local fare of tsampa (roasted barely flour) and raw meat. They need good housing, hospitals, cinemas and schools for their children. Hence, in order to make use of the initial equipment [from developed areas], new personnel and machinery have to be continuously brought in, which in turn require the successive construction of buildings and other facilities.81
Laissez Faire Policy
As a result of relaxation on the restrictions on movement, lack of economic opportunities at home and improved roads into Tibet82, many more Hui Muslims and Chinese have migrated to Tibet, setting up petty business and semi-skilled service industries, such as bicycle repair, hairdressing, restaurants and hotels.
After the institution of Deng Xiao Ping's policy of Reform and Opening Up, a number of administrative measures controlling individual freedom of movement have been revoked in order to facilitate the emergence of a free market economy.83 As a result of this relaxation, it became much easier for Chinese people to migrate to Tibet and start private businesses. Moreover, many existing roads into and within Tibet were improved and new roads were built. The road construction projects have attracted many (mostly unskilled) Chinese laborers from neighboring, overpopulated Sichuan Province and has facilitated the influx of Chinese migrants.
The overwhelming majority of those currently arriving in Tibet are part of the so-called 'floating population'. The introduction of mechanised farming in mainland China produced a large surplus rural labor force. Since the partial lifting of the restrictions on the freedom of movement, these surplus rural laborers have drifted to cities in search of work. In mainland China the Central Government has issued national guidelines in order to regulate and reduce this 'wild' migration to urban areas because of its potentially destabilizing impact. In Beijing rural migrants had to start paying large sums of money as 'city accommodation fees' in order to be allowed to stay in the city. In Tibet, which is classified as a 'rural' area, migration has not been restricted. The majority of the 'floating population' migrating to Tibet consists of small entrepreneurs, traders and unskilled workers.
At present, there are few Chinese farmers in the TAR,(as opposed to Eastern Turkestan , where many Chinese farmers have settled), but this may change as a result of current agricultural developments. These types of projects initially attract a large number of Chinese workers and may in future attract Chinese farmers in search of arable land.
After 'liberating' Tibet, the PLA has played an important role in the colonisation of Tibet. Not only does the army regularly take part in infrastructure building activities, agriculture84 and industrial production, but it has also attracted many entrepreneurs who set up entertainment businesses catering to the army. Prostitution, which is officially illegal in the People's Republic of China, is rampant near army bases in Tibet, including in many cities such as Lhasa. A significant number of those running and working in the entertainment industry in Tibet are Chinese migrants from Sichuan.85
Forced resettlement, active encouragement and a passive laissez-faire policy are the three methods employed by Beijing to carry out what it has significantly called 'the final solution for Tibet'.86 If implemented fully, this 'final solution' will complete the colonisation process which started in the early 1950s and render the sinocization of Tibet irreversible. In Chinese controlled Mongolia (so called Inner Mongolia ), this policy has already been successfully implemented: at present the ethnic Mongolian population constitutes less than 2% of the population of the area and has largely lost its distinct cultural identity. Another parallel could be drawn to the so-called 'white colonies' of European powers, in which the colonisation process at some stage passed the point of no return and the original inhabitants have been reduced to negligible minorities.
There is no doubt that Tibetans, even those who accept the Chinese claims, experience Chinese rule over Tibet as 'alien'. In 1988 a by now well-known group of monks from Drepung Monastery issued a manifesto entitled The Precious Democratic Constitution of Tibet The manifesto, which describes the group's hopes for a future society based on a constitution guaranteeing democracy and human rights, states:
If Tibetans continue to struggle with a courageous determination based on the force of established truth, we will not always have to remain under the foreign Chinese invaders.' [emphasis added]87
The distinctness of the Tibetan culture and history was consistently recognised internationally. Thus, the UN General Assembly passed resolutions in 1959, 1961 and 1965 which expressly referred to the distinct culture and religion of the Tibetan people.88 More recently, in 1991, the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities also adopted a resolution on the situation in Tibet in which it referred to the 'distinct cultural, religious and national identity of the Tibetan people'89
The fact that Tibetans perceive Chinese rule as 'alien', is based on a number of objective and subjective factors. The most important objective factor is that Tibetans are culturally and ethnically distinct from the Chinese. The Chinese and Tibetan languages are entirely different. At present Tibetans use a number of Chinese loan words, but the Tibetan language itself has nothing in common with Chinese. The Tibetan language is part of the Tibeto-Burmese language group, while the Tibetan script is based on Sanskrit. Tibetan Buddhism, which is one of the most essential elements of the Tibetan cultural identity and constitutes the central value system of the Tibetan people, is radically at odds with the atheism preached by the current Chinese leadership. Tibetan culture and its visible manifestations, such as architecture and clothing are distinctly different from their Chinese counterparts. Moreover, the physical features of the Tibetans are different
Even more important than the aforementioned objective factors is the subjective perception of alien-ness. Neither the Tibetans nor the Chinese consider themselves as belonging to the same race or people. Interestingly, Dr Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Chinese Republic, referred to Tibetans as belonging to the 'alien races'.90 Most Chinese today would still agree with this observation. The overwhelming majority of Chinese living in Tibet retain their Chinese identity and their sense of being culturally and ethnically different from Tibetans. The amount of inter-marriage is marginal, even among Chinese who have lived in Tibet for a number of decades. In most Tibetan cities and towns, Chinese and Tibetan inhabitants live in separate quarters. The fact that Tibet is administered as a separate territory within the People's Republic of China reflects that Beijing regards it as distinct from its Chinese provinces. Tibet is the only 'autonomous' region within the current People's Republic of China with which Beijing concluded a treaty.
Tibetan resentment against alien policies imposed by the Chinese manifests itself in various ways. Pro-independence protest is the most obvious manifestation of this resentment, but by no means the only one. Many cases of economically motivated protest are fuelled by the same resentment and are increasingly interpreted by Beijing as a political threat. Mao Zedong's distinction between so-called 'antagonistic offences
against the people' and 'non-antagonistic contradictions' within the people,91 appears to have become blurred. Traditionally, repressive policies were merely applied to the first category, whereas the latter 'offences' were to be resolved by discussion and education. Over the past few years however, a number of essentially 'non-antagonistic contradictions', such as protest against tax increases or price rises, have been referred to in Chinese sources as 'hot topics' susceptible to 'manipulation' by political dissidents:
Exploiting 'hot topics' in society, [the 'Dalai clique and 'international hostile forces'] incite the masses, sow dissension among various nationalities and create incidents in an attempt to undermine political stability and unity and to interfere with reform, opening up to the outside world and economic construction.92
This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that a considerable number of non-political, socio-economic demonstrations in Tibet manifest strong pro-independence undercurrents. This is related to the fact that Tibetans perceive Chinese policies as 'alien'. Social and economic dissatisfaction tends to be fuelled by general resentment against alien Chinese rule.
Since the Chinese invasion, Chinese control over Tibet has steadily intensified. Until now Chinese influence has tended to be strong in low altitude, easily accessible, mostly urban areas, while it is absent in high altitude and remote places. Most European colonies showed this same pattern. For example, Many parts of what later became Indonesia never came directly under Dutch control, which was concentrated on the island Java. Similarly, many parts of India were never effectively controlled by Britain.
At present, parts of Tibet resemble settlement colonies and parts of it resemble non-settlement, or 'exploitation' colonies. In most parts of Amdo and Kham, Chinese settlers outnumber Tibetans. In these areas, colonisation appears to be irreversible. The Tibet Autonomous Region shows characteristics of the 'hybrid' type of colony discussed in Part I. It bears some resemblance to Algeria during French colonial rule: a large and influential settler community in a colonised society which has retained a strong sense of distinct cultural and ethnic identity. Unlike the colonisation process in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, the colonisation of Algeria was not irreversible. Like the French in Algeria, the Chinese maintain that Tibet constitutes an integral part of its territory.
Where Tibet differs from the settlement colonies described in Chapter 1 is that the Chinese settlers in Tibet do not cease to identify with Beijing as their capital and metropolitan China as their state.
The colonisation process in Tibet has not yet been concluded and continues to penetrate into areas of the Tibetan plateau which so far have remained more or less unaffected by Chinese rule. This increased accessibility of these areas resulting from the construction of a number of airports and major roads may well accelerate this development. 'Floating' Chinese migrants are now able to enter Tibet relatively easily. If this migration process continues at the current rate, the colonisation process will become irreversible all over Tibet and Tibet's distinct cultural and ethnic identity will be permanently replaced by the identity imported by the Chinese settlers.
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untapped, for technical as well as religious reasons. Since the Chinese take-over, Beijing has undertaken to locate Tibet's natural resources, exploit them and transfer them to China for further processing and marketing.
In many respects, Beijing's mining policies in Tibet are reminiscent of the ways in which European powers used to exploit the natural resources in their colonies in the name of (local) economic development.
6.3.3 Cultural Aspects
As is well-known, Tibetan feudal serfdom was a reactionary, dark social system characterised by cruelty and brutality.... Following the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the people's government introduced a series of measures to help the Tibetan people in political, economic and cultural spheres and to improve the living standards.... Today the Tibetan people, freed of centuries-old feudal exploitation and oppression as well as of imperialist penetration, are working with renewed vigor for the building of a socialist new Tibet and contributing to the nation-wide effort to modernise China.'45
Chinese rhetoric on education in Tibet reflects a return to the primacy of politics over education standards. Most of the measures promoting the Tibetan language have now been reversed. Except for some 40 special schools in Qinghai province, Tibetan is only taught for a few hours a week at secondary schools in Tibet, while all other subjects are taught in Chinese. Four Tibetan-medium secondary school classes, initiated by the late Panchen Lama in 1989 in three secondary schools in central Tibet, have now been dissolved, although they were extremely popular and successful. As most Tibetan children attend Tibetan medium primary schools, they score well below national averages at Chinese medium secondary schools and the drop-out rate among Tibetan students is high. Proficiency in the Tibetan language has little practical use except for those who wish to become teachers of Tibetan.
6.4 Maintenance of authority
6.4.1 Curtailment of Civil/Political Rights
6.4.2 Religious Policies
Senior figures in the religious sector have a certain influence among the masses of believers, so it is of great importance to do our work with them properly.58
religion altogether, Beijing tries to 'appropriate' Tibetan Buddhism by divesting it of its essence and replacing it with so-called 'normal' religion. This 'normal' religion is state-controlled, and 'patriotic.'62 'Normal' religious activities exclude worshipping the Dalai Lama and involves 'love for the great motherland':
Beijing's reaction to the events leading up to and following the identification of the 10th Panchen Lama is another clear example of this technique of appropriation and subsequent control. The 10th Panchen Lama was the most important religious leader in Tibet after the Dalai Lama's flight to India in 1959. After the death of the 10th Panchen Lama in 1989, the Chinese government declared that Beijing would be in charge of finding the 11th Panchen Lama, and appointed a committee to search for the new incarnation. However, when the Dalai Lama announced in May 1995 that, according to religious practice, he had recognised the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama from the candidates presented to him by the search committee, the Chinese government declared the Dalai Lama's pronouncement 'null and void' and prohibited Tibetans from worshipping the 6-year-old boy identified by the Dalai Lama as the 11th Panchen Lama64 In November, the Chinese government announced that it had recognised another 6-year-old boy as the 11th Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama recognised by the Dalai Lama was kept in detention and Chadrel Rinpoche, the Lama who headed the search committee, was arrested. The authorities went to great lengths to have an enthronement ceremony which, to all outward appearances, looked like a traditional ceremony but which was perceived by Tibetans as ridiculing Buddhism and Buddhist rituals.
6.4.3 Political Aspects
6.4.4 Maintenance of Authority by Economic Means
Economic development policies in Tibet are both economically and politically motivated. Its political purpose is to strengthen Chinese rule in a politically sensitive region. The Chinese leadership appears to believe that the Tibetan demand for religious freedom and political independence will diminish as a result of an increased standard of living. According to Chen Kuiyuan:
6.4.5 Military Presence
6.4.6 Education/Language Policies
6.4.7 Population Transfer
report, and subsequently translated into English in book form:
6.5 Perceptions
from those of the Chinese.
6.6 Outcome of the colonization process
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Last updated: 3-Oct-97