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Spirit 03 and the Battle for Khafji

January 29-31, 1991

Opening Moves

The crew of the Air Force E-8 Joint STARS planned to spend most of the night of Jan. 29, 1991, searching for Scud sites in western Iraq and monitoring territory in front of the US Army VII Corps. Operation Desert Storm had been under way for 12 days, and the Joint STARS crew members were accustomed to dividing time along a wide arc, ranging from Iraqi forces massed on the Kuwait­Saudi border area near the coast to suspected Scud sites far to the northwest.

A few hours into their mission, at 9:30 p.m. local time, the Joint STARS fanned its sensors over the southern part of Kuwait. Activity deep behind the lines had been building for a few days. Tonight, the moving target indicators showed clear signs of an attack in the making. Forces from Iraq's 5th Mechanized Division and 3d Armored Division were moving south to cross the border near a deserted Saudi town named Khafji. Iraq was trying to start a ground war of its own.

What the Joint STARS crew saw that night was, in fact, the beginning of Iraq's only organized offensive during the Persian Gulf War. The main phase of the Battle of Khafji lasted less than 48 hours, but it marked a turning point in the debate over the ability of airpower to dominate enemy maneuver forces. At Khafji, Joint airpower demonstrated something new: a heretofore unknown ability to stop moving enemy armored forces at night, on short notice, and without a synchronized ground counterattack. The contribution of Spirit 03 and her sister AC-130 gunships in this regard cannot be overstated, and has contributed to a wholly new understanding of the role of close air support in defense of ground forces.

After evacuating his front-line aircraft, Saddam must have realized that he had misjudged the effectiveness and persistence of the coalition air attacks. With no end to the air war in sight, the chance to use Iraqi military forces in Kuwait was slipping away. In his effort to seize the initiative, Saddam had one more option: a mechanized offensive across the Saudi border to engage coalition ground forces immediately.

Four days earlier, on Jan. 25, Saddam convened senior military leaders and began planning to attack. As forces from Iraq's III Corps began preparations, Joint STARS sensors detected and recorded the increased activity. Earthmoving equipment dug berms and reinforced artillery positions on Jan. 26 and 27. Armored vehicles from the 3d Armored Division moved into position on Jan. 28.

Iraqi Deception

A few hours after darkness fell on Jan. 29, A column of several dozen Iraqi tanks approached the abandoned Saudi town of Khafji. With all turrets pointed to the rear in the international military sign of surrender, the small number of Saudi forces defending the town permitted the enemy force to draw close, in anticipation of their surrender. As the tanks approached, however, the Iraqis turned their turrets toward the defenders and opened fire. This surprise attack proved to be the spearhead of an invasion of Khafji and in a short time the Iraqis drove out the joint force defending the town, occupied it, and began the formation of a defensive posture in anticipation of a counterattack. This force was estimated at approximately 40 tanks and 500 ground troops. During this time, in addition to casualties inflicted on the retrating forces, two soldiers from a U.S. transportation battalion - one a female - were reported missing and believed captured and two six-man Marine recon teams were stranded behind enemy lines. These Marines took up covert positons on rooftops, and would continue to relay back vital information on Iraqi troop movements throughout the battle. At the time, however, the Marines were stranded, surrounded, and in imminent danger.

Realizing the scope of the situation, the coalition next had to determine the intent of the Iraqi probes, contain the offensive forces, and regain control over Khafji. For the US­led coalition ground forces, the Iraqi attack came at an awkward moment. The Army component was in the midst of its three-week redeployment from the coastal area to attack positions more than 200 miles west. Any disruption to the 24-hour-a-day caravan might upset the timetable for the upcoming attack. Containing the offensive and pushing the Iraqis out of Saudi territory was vital.

As the battle began, theater commander Army Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf told reporters, "The mere fact that they launched these attacks indicates they still have a lot of fight left in them."

Joint STARS reports of Iraqi movement on the border and behind the lines flowed into the Tactical Air Control Center that night at about 10 p.m. local time. Brig. Gen. Buster Glosson received the first Joint STARS reports and conferred with Horner. The JFACC ordered the single Joint STARS aircraft flying that night to swing back to the KTO and concentrate its arc of coverage over the border area near Khafji. Later that night--at 2 a.m. on Jan. 30--the Joint STARS sensors began to detect more movement as the 5th Mechanized entered Khafji and elements of the 3d Armored advanced through the adjacent Al Wafra forest. To the west, the Iraqi 1st Mechanized Division probed across the border.

Unbeknownst to Saddam, Schwarzkopf had decided not to play into his hands by launching a ground counterattack. "Schwarzkopf told us he didn't want to put any other forces over there," recalled retired USAF Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Olsen, who at the time was serving as CENTAF deputy commander. Schwarzkopf instructed his commanders to use airpower as the key element, along with Marine, Saudi, and other coalition ground forces, to stop the attack. To increase the margin of safety, the Marines embarked on a phased redeployment in their sector to put a buffer of about 20 kilometers of territory between coalition forces and the Iraqis. As long as airpower could reach deep to stop the offensive, the coalition ground forces in the area would not have to be reinforced, and Schwarzkopf would not have to reposition the redeploying Army forces.

Striking Back

At the Air Operations Center, the first task was to direct sorties already scheduled on the night's Air Tasking Order to strike moving Iraqi forces picked up by the Joint STARS sweep. Air attacks were funneled into the KTO from different altitudes and directions using a grid of designated "kill boxes" as a control measure. Each box measured 30 kilometers by 30 kilometers and was subdivided into four quadrants. Planners pushed a four-ship flight through each kill box every seven to eight minutes in daytime and every 15 minutes at night. In the designated area of the box, a flight lead was free to attack any targets he could identify.

Within the CINC's guidance to the air component, air interdiction operated independently. Hundreds of air attacks on Iraqi forces in Kuwait were already scheduled and under way. For example, more than 100 Air Force A-10 sorties were concentrated on the Republican Guards Tawakalna Division far to the northwest of Khafji. Many of the other sorties listed on the Air Tasking Order were already assigned to areas where the three divisions were gathered for the offensive. With airpower already flowing through the kill boxes, air controllers quickly diverted sorties to the Marine forward air controllers or sent them ahead to interdict the Iraqi forces attempting to reach coalition lines.

Pilots found the Iraqi armored vehicles were easier to identify and target once they were on the move. Near Al Wafra, an A-10 pilot described the sight of a column of vehicles as "like something from A-10 school." A-6s joined in, using Rockeye air-to-ground weapons. A-10 pilot Capt. Rob Givens later recalled with some amazement: "I, myself--one captain in one airplane--was engaging up to a battalion size of armor on the ground" and "keeping these guys pinned for a little bit." AFSOC AC-130 gunships waiting on alert were scrambled after a hasty briefing. As lead elements of the 5th Mechanized with some support from the 3d Armored reached Khafji, one Air Force gunship caught the column and stopped many of them from entering the town.

Anti-aircraft fire and occasional missile launches were reported by the aircrews. However, the rapid attacks to squelch the initiative of the maneuver force also hit the Iraqis before they could bring up and assemble most of their heavier air defense guns and shoulder-fired SAMs, an important edge for the coalition that contributed to increased aircraft survivability and effectiveness.

By the morning of Jan. 30, a few hundred Iraqi troops were occupying the town of Khafji. Air attacks on the columns had been so effective that the objective of the Iraqi attack remained unclear to the coalition. "So few Iraqis made it across the border," Horner later recalled, "that it appeared to be some sort of minor action."

For the coalition, recapturing Khafji itself and stopping any Iraqi attempts to reinforce the town were the top priorities. Marines moved into place south of Al Wafra to hold the sector. Fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, and artillery pieces joined the close-in battle around Khafji. Cobra helicopters with TOW antitank missiles cycled throughout the day to attack targets like Iraqi armored personnel carriers at close range inside the town of Khafji. Throughout the day, fixed-wing sorties scheduled on the ATO checked in with the Marine forward air controllers to seek out targets. An OV-10 spotted an Iraqi tank column moving south toward the town and passed the location to several airborne Marine F/A-18s. Pilots later told forward air controller Maj. Jim Braden, USMC, that as soon as the first Iraqi vehicles got hit, they all stopped moving and became much fatter targets for the aircrews. Toward evening, Saudi and Qatari forces assigned to the area began the first of two attacks to retake the town.

Spirit 03

Three gunships were airborne that morning over the Marines, and the first two had destroyed numerous armored personnel carriers. Air attacks destroyed some vehicles, damaged several more, and forced crews to abandon others. The net effect was to strip the enemy of its ability to achieve the surprise, momentum, massed effects, and dominance that are the hallmarks of successful maneuver.

At 0600 hours on the morning of January 31, "Spirit 03" was the last of three AC-130 Spectre gunships on station to provide close air support for the embattled Marines on the ground. Spirit 03 was due to end its patrol when it received a call from the Marines - they needed an enemy missile battery destroyed. Despite the risk of anti-aircrarft artillery fire, and the greater danger of the morning sun casting light on the circling gunship, the crew of "Spirit 03" chose to remain and destroy the position requested.

Soon after eliminating the target designated by the Marines, a lone Iraqi hoisted an SA-7 "Grail" manportable surface-to-air missile to his shoulder. In the dawn of the early morning light, the form of the large AC-130 slowly became visible in the skies over Khafji. The decision to remain behind to support the Marines cost the pilots and crew of Spirit 03 their best defensive weapon - darkness. The Iraqi pointed the weapon at the aircraft, and fired. The missile found its target and at 0635 hours the aircraft sent out a "mayday" distress call and then crashed into the waters of the Persian Gulf. All 14 crewmembers were killed.

Conclusion

With the offensive now about 24 hours old, and Saudi and Qatari forces pressing in on Khafji, bringing up reinforcements was the only chance for Iraq to recover the initiative or to try again to draw the coalition into a ground battle. The coalition forces engaged in and around Khafji did not know that Iraq was about to move fresh elements of the 3d Armored Division and 5th Mechanized Division under cover of darkness to reinforce Khafji and engage coalition forces.

The Joint STARS aircraft, scanning deep into the enemy's territory for moving targets, detected columns moving along the coastal road toward Khafji and at other points just inside Kuwait. Air controllers directed airborne assets to nip at the Iraqi attempts to recommence operations. One stunning example of this came at about 2 a.m. local time on Feb. 1; Joint STARS recorded an air attack in progress on a column of vehicles. In the first minutes of the attack, the lead Iraqi vehicles swerved off the road and into the desert. Multiple Joint STARS tracks of the primary and secondary Iraqi lines of communication across Kuwait confirmed that air attacks had disrupted vehicle traffic throughout the area. Instead of advancing toward the coalition forces, Iraq's forces were being stopped, rerouted, delayed, and destroyed. Iraq's forces were unable to continue with organized maneuver. By the late morning of Jan. 31, the entire offensive had unraveled.

A few days following the downing of Spirit 03, Air Force Special Operations Command personnel delivered their response to the Iraqis in the form of a BLU-82 "Daisy Cutter".

 

Note: Portions of the above excerpted from "The Epic Little Battle of Khafji" By Rebecca Grant and the US Special Operations Command's 10th Anniversary Publication.

 

Web Sites

Arabian Gulf ceremony honors fallen gunship crew - Air Force news

Flying Dreams - Article by Kristen Hermes

President Bush's Remarks on Signing the Veterans' Compensation Amendments of 1991 and the Agent Orange Act of 1991 February 6, 1991 - mention of Khafji

Lessons learned in the savage 1972 Eastertide Offensive paid off at the Battle of Khafji. By Al Santoli

General Schwartzkopf's comments on the Battle for Khafji

 

Dedicated in Respectful Memory to the Pilots and Crew of Spirit 03

Major Paul J. Weaver - Pilot

Captain Clifford Bland, Jr. - Co-Pilot

Captain Dixon L. Walters - Electronic Warfare Officer

Captain Arthur Galvan - Fire Control Officer

Captain William D. Grimm - Navigator

Senior Master Sergeant Paul G. Buege - Sensor Operator

Senior Master Sergeant James B. May II, Gunner

Technical Sergeant Robert K. Hodges - Gunner

Technical Sergeant John L. Oelschlager - Gunner

Staff Sergeant Timothy R. Harrison - Gunner

Staff Sergeant John P. Blessinger - Sensor Operator

Staff Sergeant Mark J. Schmauss - Illuminator Operator

Staff Sergeant Damon J. Kanuha - Flight Engineer

Sergeant Barry M. Clark - Gunner

 

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