

Consociational Democracy and Postconflict Peace. Will Power-Sharing Institutions Increase the Probability of Lasting Peace after Civil War?

Helga Malmin Binningsbø*

Department of Sociology and Political Science,
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

&

Centre for the Study of Civil War,
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

Abstract

Compared to the vast literature on the relationship between political regime and the probability of civil war, relatively little research has addressed the relationship between political regime and rebuilding *after* civil war. Also, different political institutions have received little attention. My proposition is that postconflict societies need a certain type of political institutions to avoid resuming violence. The consociational, power-sharing democracy consists of four main institutions: a grand coalition, a mutual veto, proportional representation and segmental autonomy. I argue that these institutions are particularly suited to address the challenges of postconflict societies. This paper offers a quantitative approach to the relationship between power-sharing institutions in postconflict societies and lasting peace. Based on various sources I code the presence or absence of grand coalition, proportional representation and territorial autonomy in 118 postconflict societies between 1985 and 2002. The paper analyzes the relationship between these institutions and the probability of lasting peace. The main finding is that a proportional representation system and territorial autonomy is positively associated with lasting peace in postconflict societies. In particular, decentralizing decision making through territorial autonomy is a highly useful peacebuilding strategy, and should be recommended as a solution for countries struggling to rebuild after civil war.

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* Email: binnings@stud.ntnu.no

In consociational democracies,
politics is treated not as a game,
but as serious business.
(Lijphart 1969:216).

Introduction

Once in a while the news report about terminations of civil wars. Combatants have ended the violence and parties meet to shake hands and plan for a better future. But all too often we later hear that the parties do not cooperate and violence has resumed. Why does this happen? And more important: how can it be avoided? My paper will try to answer the second question.

This paper rests on the theory of a democratic civil peace. The probability of war is lower in democracies and autocracies than in semi-democracies (Hegre et al. 2001). For obvious reasons, democracy is preferable to autocracy. Therefore the best strategy to achieve lasting peace in a postconflict society would be to establish a democracy. Nonetheless, not all types of democracy are equally suitable. My suggestion is that the type of democracy which is most likely to have a positive effect on lasting peace is consociational, power-sharing, democracy. This proposition leads to my main hypothesis: *The probability of lasting peace is greater in a postconflict society with power-sharing institutions than in such a society without power-sharing institutions.*¹

A consociational democracy is a type of democracy which emphasizes the importance of power-sharing among different segments in society. This democracy is characterized by four main political institutions: a grand coalition, a mutual veto, a proportional representation and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1969, 1977, 1985). Instead of a power division between government and opposition, most, if not all, groups in a consociational democracy will take part in the decision making.

In the following pages the paper aims at explaining why the consociational democracy is the most suitable form of democracy when it comes to establish lasting peace in postconflict societies. First, I elaborate the concept of consociational democracy. I seek to explain why democracy is the best solution for war-shattered states, but also why not all kinds of democracy

¹ Dahl argues that an *institution* has been settled for a long time, whereas *arrangements* are more provisional and *practices* somewhere in-between (1998:83f). My paper does not differentiate between long-lasting institutions and newly established arrangements in a postconflict society. "Arrangements" might be more precise. However, I follow the terminology of other researchers who have dealt with the problem of rebuilding postconflict societies, who use the term "institution" (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).

are equally suitable. Next, the paper introduces the dataset used in the analysis, the operationalizations and codings of the different variables, before I present the empirical analyses. Finally I present some conclusions and policy implications and give recommendations for further research.

One of my main findings is that a proportional representation system in the legislature following a civil war increases the probability of lasting peace, such a system seem to secure groups in society the participation in the decision making process as they feel needed. Even stronger is the finding that decentralization of power through some sort of autonomy reduces tension and contributes positively to the likelihood of lasting peace. However, grand coalitions seem to be more doubtful, as their influence on lasting peace is seldom significant. In some instances the correlation actually is negative. Nonetheless, power-sharing democracy appears to be a wise peace-building strategy for a postconflict society; the more power-sharing institutions which are included the higher is the probability of lasting peace.

Consociationalism: Theory and Hypotheses

Before I present the details of the consociational institutions and why these are especially suitable for postconflict societies, I will give a brief explanation of the peculiar challenges after civil war, and how the postconflict society resembles Lijphart's plural society. A short introduction to the relationship between democracy per se and peace is also necessary to fully understand the positive influence of consociational power-sharing institutions in postconflict societies.

The Challenge after Civil War

Following a civil war the combatants have to live together within the same political unit. However, a long-lasting war exacerbates hatred and mutual suspicion, which makes peaceful cooperation difficult. The characteristics of postconflict societies are in many ways similar to the plural society, which provided the starting point for the theory of consociational democracy. It can be useful to look more closely at the plural society and its resemblance to the postconflict society to understand the challenges such societies must cope with.

The Postconflict Society

Lijphart's description of a plural society is useful in order to understand the characteristics of a postconflict society. A society having experienced civil war is likely to retain strong contradictions between the parties. Even though the civil war itself has not been ethnic or over

identity issues, a society plagued by violence between contesting groups will be facing the same type of challenges as a plural society. By plural society Lijphart refers to a society characterized by sharp religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial and/or ethnic segmental cleavages. In such a society the members will direct their loyalty on all or most aspects to one particular group or segment (Lijphart 1977:3f). By contrast, in societies with crosscutting cleavages and overlapping memberships, individual cross-pressures lead citizens to moderate attitudes and a cooperative political culture (Lijphart 1969:208). In a plural society there will be no such cross-pressure, attitudes will be fragmented and there will be little room for compromise.

Paris (1997) points out that the competitive aspect of democracy, and how this stimulates political conflict, can have negative consequences. According to Lijphart it is exactly this competitive political process that should be avoided in plural societies. This because "Political contests in severely fragmented societies are indeed not likely to be "good games"." (Lijphart 1969:215). He further argues that "... the anxieties and hostilities attending the political process may be countered by removing its competitive features as much as possible" (ibid. 216). Hence, the political system which has the highest probability of establishing lasting peace in a postconflict society is consociational democracy.

The Security Dilemma in Postconflict Societies

Previous research on the relationship between power-sharing and civil strife has focused on the reasons why lasting peace is so difficult. This obstacle has mainly been explained with the challenges and the security dilemma the belligerents face in the postconflict period (Hartzell 1999, Hoddie and Hartzell 2001, Snyder and Jervis 1999, Walter 1997, 1999, 2002). A security dilemma is defined by Snyder as "a situation in which each party's efforts to increase its own security reduce the security of others" (Snyder and Jervis 1999:15). This explains why circles of violence are so common and disarmament so difficult.

A complete seizure of illegal weapons is essential to reinstall security and cooperation in a country plagued by civil war. Cooperation will be extremely difficult if the cooperation partner has an army hidden behind its back, an army previously gathered to eliminate its opponent. If a country is to survive as an entity it can not have more than one army, the state need to have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Hartzell 1999:5). Even though the majority of weapons are handed over, a small implacable group which resists disarmament can cause a peace process to halt.

The great task is therefore to design a layout of the future which “convinces the combatants to shed their partisan armies and surrender conquered territory even though such steps will increase their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty’s other terms” (Walter 1999:129). The best layout of the future involves a restructuring of the central state authority, and addressing the security concerns of the contending parties (Hartzell 1999:4). Both Hartzell and Walter believe that these security concerns are best ensured within a power-sharing arrangement where antagonists are guaranteed positions within the postconflict state.

Democracy and Peace

Very few doubt the connection between dyadic democracy and international peace. While the relationship between democracy and intrastate peace is not as simple as for interstate peace, there is still substantial evidence that a democratic state has a low probability of experiencing domestic violence (Hegre et al. 2001). The relationship between political regime and domestic war is parabolic; both very autocratic and very democratic regimes have low probabilities of civil war, while intermediate, semi-democratic regimes have a higher probability of internal war. However, for various other reasons autocracy is not a widely recommended political regime type. While an autocratic regime might control domestic violence, it will be negatively correlated with e.g. human rights, freedom of expression, political participation and other liberties highly valued in contemporary politics.²

With regards to a political regime recommendation for a post-conflict society, democracy is unrivaled. Both because democracy is the political system that best guarantees its inhabitants highly valued rights, but also because it will reduce the likelihood of domestic violence. I assume that a political system that has a low probability of outbreak of civil war, also has a low probability of renewed civil war.

The emphasis on political institutions in postconflict societies has also been expressed within the international community, in particular through the United Nations. During the 1990s we saw a great effort to democratize countries which had experienced civil strife, as the United Nations transitional authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) following the peace agreement signed in 1991 (United Nations 2003). And the different United Nations missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the cease-fire and the implementation of the Dayton agreement of 1995.

² See for example Rummel (1995) on the correlation between political regime and democide.

Democracy, rule by the people, is today the “dominant political philosophy of the multilateral community” (Barnes 2001:86). Democracy has some benefits related to participation and human rights that are not found in any alternative political system (Dahl 1998:45ff). However, the failure of the democratization process seen in some war-torn countries throughout the world challenges this dominating belief. The planning of democracy and multiparty elections in Rwanda, agreed upon in the Arusha Declaration of 1993, led to one of the worst genocides in recent history (Paris 1997:71). Although democracy is a suitable political system in postconflict societies, maybe not all kinds of democracy are equally suitable. A liberal and competitive “winner-takes-all” democracy might not fit well into the political environment in war-shattered countries. In 1969 Arend Lijphart introduced the concept of *consociational democracy* as a kind of political system that would better fit fragmented societies (1969, 1977). This democracy focuses on power-sharing arrangements that enable all segments in the country to have their voices heard and opinions respected.³

Lijphart saw the democratic success of plural countries like Lebanon (1943-75) and Malaysia (1955-69) as a result of the countries’ consociational features (Lijphart 1977). He also strongly recommended consociationalism as a solution for post-apartheid South Africa (Lijphart 1985). Others have argued in favor of power-sharing as well; McGarry (2002) finds consociationalism to be the best answer to Northern Ireland’s challenges, and Schneckener (2002) looks at Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of power-sharing. In numerous publications Hartzell (1999, Hartzell et al. 2001, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) and Walter (1997, 2002) have concluded that for a peace agreement to be implemented, it must include power-sharing.

Consensus Democracy

One of the most common typologies of democracy is Lijphart’s division of political systems into two polar types: the majoritarian and the consensus democracy.⁴ These are separated on the executive-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart 1999). However, in the writings of Lijphart the majoritarian system also has another polar opposite, namely the

3 The term “consociational” equals the term “power -sharing”. However, while “consociational” was a clear enough concept in academic discussions, Lijphart found it “.. too esoteric and polysyllabic” when discussing with policy-makers (2000:427). In my paper I will mostly use the term consociational, but for variation the synonym power-sharing will also be used.

4 See Bogaards (2000:397) on the difference between theoretical (ideal and polar) and empirical types.

consociational democracy, which does not equal the consensus system (Lijphart 1969, 1977, Bogaards 2000).

Lijphart (1999) and Hoddie and Hartzell (2001) observe that majoritarian democracy, with its winner-takes-all electoral system, is viewed by many as a superior kind of democracy. It was also viewed as the best choice for most of the former British colonies after independence (Lijphart 1999:10). Critics of a majoritarian system argue that such a winner-takes-all system will not foster stability in fragmented postconflict societies. This both because in war-torn countries the people will seldom trust the government and because majoritarian democracy do not meet the security concerns of the parties (Dahl 1998:194, Hoddie and Hartzell 2001:3-4). According to Paris (1997), the post-Cold War effort to install market democracy in war-shattered states has been guided by the paradigm of ‘pacification through political and economic liberalization’ (1997:56). He argues that this effort has failed and illustrates it with examples from Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia.⁵

According to Lijphart, a society characterized by sharp cleavages and with few overlapping memberships needs a radically different political system than societies with crosscutting cleavages and overlapping loyalty. A postconflict society with high levels of distrust and suspicion between the parties, and extensive security challenges, can reach a stable peace if its political institutions are shaped as in the consociational democracy.

This type of democracy has four characteristics, the first and most important of them being a grand coalition with representatives from all the significant groups in the society. The other three characteristics are mutual veto, proportional representation and some kind of segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977:25).⁶

Grand Coalition

In the grand coalition leaders of all significant segments rule together, searching compromise and consensus. The importance of a grand coalition government reflects the thoughts of Rousseau that important and serious questions should be solved with near-unanimity (Lijphart 1977:28). In a deeply divided society, or a postconflict society, almost all questions discussed in government will be of importance for the segments and the stakes will usually be high. Parties to a civil war

5 Stedman (2002) claims that Paris’ definition of peacebuilding success is too strict. He further argues that El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique should be regarded as successes, not failures (ibid. 19).

6 It has not been possible to find data on mutual veto, this characteristic is therefore excluded from both the theory and the analyses.

will be especially concerned with executive power. In a newly established democracy there will most likely be few constraints on the executive, and instead of being overruled by their rival in a competitive government the factions will prefer guaranteed positions in a power-sharing government (Walter 2002:30).

The idea of a grand coalition is that policy choices shall not only have majority support, based on a minimum winning coalition, but rather the support from an overwhelming majority. A strong opposition, which is the common feature of majoritarian democracy, is avoided. Because of the lack of trust between the segments after civil war, it is better to be in government together with your counterpart, than to trust him to govern in favour of your interests while you are in opposition (Lijphart 1977:31).⁷

I assume that if a post-civil war country has a grand coalition, the probability of renewed warfare is less than if the postconflict country does not have such an institution. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows:

Hypothesis 1: The probability of lasting peace is greater in a postconflict society with a grand coalition than in such a society without a grand coalition.

Proportional Representation

Consociational democracy is based on a proportional distribution of influence (Lijphart 1977:40). The most common use of the proportionality principle is as an instrument to distribute seats in the legislature. But it is also a means to allocate civil service and judicial appointments, financial resources and assure an adequate representation within the army and state-owned companies (Lijphart 1977:38f, Schneckener 2002:205). Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) and Walter (2002) both express the necessity of an equal or proportional representation in a new national army following a civil war, where the rebel combatants are included in the regular forces.⁸

Reynolds (1999) asserts that the electoral system in a divided society should reach the ensuing normative goals: representativeness, accessibility, providing incentives for conciliatory

⁷ The grand coalition does not have to be a cabinet in a parliamentary system, which was the solution in Cambodia following the 1998 election, where the coalition cabinet consisted of CPP and FUNCINPEC, receiving 41 and 32 per cent respectively of the votes (Roberts 2001). It can have different shapes as well, such as the three-member rotating presidency in Bosnia after the peace agreement in 1995 (Schneckener 2002). Power-sharing can also take the form as it did in Sierra Leone in 1999, where one party got the presidency, while the other party was assigned the majority of the cabinet positions (Walter 2002:30).

⁸ Such proportional representation was included in the peace agreement in Mozambique in 1992 where the parties decided to create a new national army consisting of 15000 soldiers from both RENAMO and FRELIMO (Walter 1999:148).

behavior, accountability, encouraging cross-cutting parties and stability of government (1999:92). Following his analysis of political systems in Southern Africa, Reynolds postulates that with respect to these criteria a proportional representation system is clearly better than other systems. In line with the arguments in favour of the grand coalition, civil war antagonists will prefer a proportionality-based allocation of parliamentary seats, assuring that each party is represented.

I expect that a proportional influence allocation system will be the most suitable when concerned with stability in war-torn countries, and my second hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: The probability of lasting peace is greater in a postconflict society with proportional representation than in such a society without proportional representation.

Segmental Autonomy

In plural societies it can be wise to leave as many decisions as possible concerning the different segments to themselves (Lijphart 1977). Issues of the minorities exclusive concern include, among others, questions about religion, language and education. Such a segmental autonomy can be based on either a personal self-identification or a territorial principle, depending on the demographic distribution of the people. Where the regional cleavages correspond to the segmental cleavages this might take the form of federalism. Based on a personality principle, the Croatian constitution of 1990 guarantees the equality of nationalities and there is widespread cultural autonomy.⁹

Demands for greater self-administration or secession are often expressed in civil wars over identity issues (Toft 2001, 2003). The government will seldom grant independence to secessionists, but often the only solution to a protracted civil war is increased autonomy and maybe some sort of federalism. Eritrea's long lasting war of independence ended in 1993, when Eritrea was granted sovereignty. Following this secession, Ethiopia's new constitution of 1994 established a federal government where the regions were allowed not only autonomy, but also the right to secede.¹⁰

In an analysis of 26 negotiated settlements between 1945 and 1999 Rothchild and Hartzell (1999) found that the granting of territorial autonomy had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of settlement stability. Although various kinds of autonomy, as federalism, confederalism, regional autonomy and cantonization, have been promoted as conflict resolution

⁹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 2003: <http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=119668> (Downloaded June 22, 2003).

¹⁰ *Keesings Record of World Events*, Ethiopia, December 1994.

approaches (Rothchild and Hartzell 1999:260), Mozaffar and Scarritt (1999) argue that the success of territorial autonomy depends on some favorable conditions. These conditions are not present in Africa, and they further argue that the case of Ethiopia is not a success story, rather, Ethiopia's ethnic federalism might exacerbate conflict.

It seems to be necessary to have some kind of autonomy when a postconflict society is to be rebuilt, in particular if the war has been over identity issues. My third hypothesis regarding the consociational elements in a war-torn country expresses this:

Hypothesis 3: The probability of lasting peace is greater in a postconflict society with segmental autonomy than in such a society without segmental autonomy.

I assume that the more power-sharing which take place in a post-civil war country the higher is the likelihood of lasting peace. This relationship was also found by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003). Therefore I include a hypothesis expressing this:

Hypothesis 4: The more power-sharing institutions in a postconflict society, the higher is the probability of lasting peace.

Favorable Conditions for Consociational Democracy

Whereas consociational democracy has four defining features: grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional representation and segmental autonomy, there is also quite a few conditions which are favorable concerning the stability and efficiency of this democracy. Students of consociationalism do not seem to agree on what kind of conditions that are most favorable, Bogaards (1998) points out that even Lijphart is not consistent when it comes to favorable factors. Bogaards' starting point is four of Lijphart's works: 1968, 1969, 1977 and 1985. In these four works Lijphart presents as many as fourteen different favorable conditions, but only four of them are present in all the overviews. Those four are variations of: *distinct lines of cleavage*, *balance of power*, *external threats* and *small size* (Bogaards 1998:478, Table 1.).

According to Bogaards the three first factors are more likely to occur in small countries than in large ones (1998:479). Even though these favorable conditions are related to the success and efficiency of an already established consociational democracy, I express the hypothesis in a more general form, and consider only size of a country:

Hypothesis 5: The smaller a postconflict society, the greater is the probability of lasting peace.

Criticism of Consociational Democracy

In 1977 Lijphart mentioned some of the main criticisms of consociational democracy. These were basically on two dimensions: consociational democracy is not democratic enough, and consociational democracy is not enough to achieve efficient and stable government (1977:47).

Consociational democracy is viewed as a weak democracy because it does not have a strong opposition, but Lijphart argues that if opposition is supposed to be a part of the definition of democracy a regular government transition is required. This might not be the case in plural societies and the result can be that one minority will be permanently excluded from government.

In 1977 Lijphart also mentioned that consociational democracy did not provide efficient and politically stable government. Decision-making is slow in a grand coalition, and mutual veto might cause immobilism. Further, to follow a proportionality principle might lead to positions distributed according to membership and not individual competence. Finally, segmental autonomy is an expensive kind of political system. Twenty years later van den Berghe still finds consociational democracy “a clumsy, inflexible, conservative model that benefits mostly the ruling elites.” (2002:437). Lijphart agreed that in a short-term perspective an adversarial system might be better at economic development and stability. However, in the long run such a system most likely will break down, while a consociational democracy will reach stability and effective policy decisions (Lijphart 1977:51f).

Horowitz (1985, 1991) has been critical of Lijphart’s democratic solution for plural societies. He argues that the heterogeneous countries in Europe are not easily comparable with the deeply divided African and Asian countries. It is difficult to adapt the western consociational democracy in these countries, because the hostility toward members of other groups are much more intense than in the European countries (1985:572). Horowitz is also particularly critical to the grand coalition. Although he agrees that “Coalition *should* be the centerpiece of accommodative arrangements.” (Horowitz 1991:175), he emphasizes that “... not any coalition will do, only a coalition likely to produce compromise rather than perpetuate conflict” (Ibid.). The grand coalition in Lijphart’s consociationalism neglects intragroup differences, and such coalitions will also generate more intragroup difference and competition. Horowitz further argues that the proportional representation system does not create compromise or moderate attitudes, it rather strengthens differences.

Consociationalism as a peacebuilding strategy for postconflict societies has been questioned by different scholars. For Spears (2002), power sharing in a post-civil war environment is to make a “deal with the devil” (2002:127). It is not about cooperation with a political opponent, but with an enemy. Therefore, it is most likely to fail and, ironically, works best where least needed (ibid. 132).¹¹ According to Kaufmann (1996) it is not possible to end an ethnic civil war unless “... the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves” (1996:137).

Lijphart has worked with the concept of consociational democracy for more than three decades, and he admits that his writings might seem contradictory and cause confusion among readers. In an article in 2000 he emphasizes that where there is a difference, it is his latest formulation that is valid (Lijphart 2000:425). In spite of flaws and criticism, consociational theory is still valid, and, in different approaches, has been widely used as a reasonable path when concerned with peacebuilding.


Summing Up and Hypotheses

My argument is that in order to achieve stability and lasting peace in a postconflict society, it would be wise to have political institutions in accordance with the idea of a consociational democracy. If valid, this would provide a viable policy for peacebuilding, and also add a *war termination* dimension to democratic civil peace theory hitherto supported only by evidence regarding *war onset* and *war incidence*.

The hypotheses regarding power-sharing institutions and postconflict peace presented earlier lead to the following visual model:

¹¹ Kaufmann (1996) has also criticized the power-sharing system for not being able to handle grave contradictions. It might perhaps prevent potential ethnic conflict and dampen mild conflicts, but falls short on bringing peace in situations with intense violence.

Figure 1 Explanatory Model



A fifth hypothesis is also presented, to grasp Lijphart’s favorable conditions for consociational democracy:

Hypothesis 5: The smaller a postconflict society, the greater is the probability of peace.

Research Design and Data

This study takes the form of a large-N quantitative analysis. The unit of analysis is the individual observation of internal conflict between 1985 and 1998, and the dependent variable is lasting peace.¹² The same conflict (with the same parties and over the same issues) can have more than one observation, which leaves the dataset with a total of 166 observations of conflict. The basis of the dataset is the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset 1946–2002 Version 2.0 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Eriksson et al. 2003). In the Armed Conflict Dataset an armed conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Strand et al. 2003:3).

In the Armed Conflict Dataset the ID is the conflict’s individual identification-number whereas the subID indicates some sort of change in the conflict. Thus the conflict ID remains the same, but different sub-conflicts have different subIDs. The Dataset further divides the conflicts according to their intensity as minor, intermediate and war (Strand et al. 2003:4).

¹² The conflicts being analyzed are those that ended between 1985 and 1998, however, the time period under investigation is 1985–2002, since the five year period defining the dependent variable ends in 2002 for the civil wars that ended in 1998.

In my dataset I have not allowed for the differences in either intensity or subID, so the conflicts are separated just with their ID-number. This means that an observation of conflict is considered as *one continuing conflict* as long as the ID stays the same, no matter changes in subID or intensity level. The unit of analysis is therefore a conflict with one particular ID, lasting from the first year of observation to the last year of continuous observation of this same conflict.¹³

Operationalization of Variables

The dependent variable reflects whether there was lasting peace after the civil war ended or whether the conflict reverted to warfare (reflects the outcome of conflict). A conflict was coded as having ended if it was followed by *one* or more years with no violence (less than 25 battle-related deaths). A conflict was further coded as having achieved *lasting peace* if there was no observation of violence the following *five* years after the last year of observation. A conflict was coded as having *reverted to war* if there was an observation of violence within five years after the last year of observation, provided that there was at least one year without observation of violence.¹⁴ Conflicts that had observations of violence in 2002 or ended later than 1998 are not included in the analyses.¹⁵ The dependent variable is a dummy variable coded as: **1 = lasting peace** and **0 = reverted to war**.

Independent Variables: Power-Sharing Institutions

I seek to test four hypotheses about the correlation between consociational characteristics and lasting peace in post-civil war societies. The four defining elements of the consociational democracy are a grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional representation and segmental autonomy.¹⁶ The independent variables should reflect these elements, if they have been present

13 My theory concerns civil wars, while the Armed Conflict Dataset includes both low-scale fighting as well as intense wars. I use the concepts “civil war” and “conflict” randomly, even though some of the observations can not be defined as *war*.

14 Seven civil wars end with independence for the rebels, these civil wars can obviously not resume as *civil wars*. However, if a civil war erupted as an internationalized internal or interstate war, it is coded as *reverted to war*. Only one of these reverted to war, Yugoslavia - Croatia. It is questionable whether this actually is a resumed war - over the same issues - or a new war with new issues, but some of the same combatants.

15 2002 is the last year of observations in the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflicts Dataset Version 2.0 (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Eriksson et al. 2003). Mikael Eriksson has provided me with information about the (potential) hostility level in 2003 for the 7 civil wars that ended in 1998, these are therefore among the civil wars analyzed.

16 Due to difficulties in finding reliable information on mutual veto, this characteristic is excluded from the analyses.

some time during the five years following the end of conflict.¹⁷ The codings are basically based on four independent online sources: *CIA World Factbook*, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, *Keesings Record of World Events* and the Electionworld homepage. Where additional information has been needed this has been sought from a variety of different sources.¹⁸

A **grand coalition** should gather the leaders of all significant segments to govern together (Lijphart 1977:25). The grand coalition, or power-sharing executive, may take different forms:

such as that of a grand coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems, a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in presidential systems, and broadly inclusive councils or committees with important advisory and coordinating functions (Lijphart 1985:7).

Few countries have installed a pure consociational democracy or a pure grand coalition with all segments represented. Usually, some segments or parties are excluded. If a civil war in the dataset has been followed by a grand coalition, one of the following situations must have been present some time during the first five years after the civil war ended: (1) an agreement guaranteeing two or more segments/parties in the Executive, (2) a majority coalition cabinet,¹⁹ or (3) a temporarily transitional coalition government. The grand coalition variable is a dichotomous variable, with the value 1 if there is a grand coalition and 0 if not. A nominal categorical variable consisting of the above categories is also constructed.²⁰

The **proportionality** principle in consociational democracy is supposed to decide the influence allocation in society. The proportionality variable is a dichotomous variable with the value 1 if there is proportional representation and the value 0 if not. A postconflict society is coded as having had some sort of proportional representation in the five year period after the end of war if: (1) at least 50 per cent of the seats in parliament are allocated on a proportional basis, or (2) the distribution of seats in parliament is fixed on either an equal quota or a quota in

17 To get the value 1 (institution present) in my dataset it is not necessary that the institution was established after a civil war ended, as a peace-building strategy. The consociational features can well have been present in the country for a long time.

18 The list of conflicts, codings and related sources are available from the author on request.

19 Lijphart has argued against a majoritarian system in which a minority is excluded from government, in particular in a plural society where the minority will be a permanent minority (in absence of significant demographic changes). However, he also recognizes that a grand coalition in a consociational democracy is seldom *all*-inclusive, it is more often *most*-inclusive (1977:31, 1985:6f). A clear definition of how many parties that have to be included in government for a coalition to be a grand coalition is hard to find, therefore I have made a cut-off point at: at least two parties, none larger than 50% (of the total votes), and the parties have to represent at least 2/3 of the seats in parliament.

20 The categories are: 1 = no grand coalition, 2 = an agreement, 3 = a majority coalition cabinet and 4 = a transitional coalition cabinet.

proportion to the size of the group. To control for differences between these various coding criteria regarding the influence on the dependent variable I have made a categorical variable.²¹

To avoid that the government in a postconflict society takes decisions which contradicts the interests of the different groups it is wise to leave as many decisions as possible to the groups themselves. The **segmental autonomy** variable is a dichotomous variable with the value 1 if there is segmental autonomy and the value 0 if not. The ensuing situations in post-civil war environments have all resulted in the coding of having had autonomy:²² (1) if the country in which the conflict takes place have one or more autonomous regions, (2) if the state is defined as a federal state, or (3) if the region fighting for independence actually achieved this independence.²³

In line with Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) I have made a variable which adds up the three independent variables, reflecting the assumption that the more power-sharing, the better. It is simply made by adding the values of the three independent variables, and has the value 0 if there are no consociational features at all, the value 1 if there is one, the value 2 if there are two, and the value 3 if all of the three consociational features are present. It might be that a special combination of power-sharing institutions are more positively related to lasting peace than other combinations. I have therefore made a categorical variable with one category for each possible combination of consociational features.

One of Lijphart's favorable conditions regarding the success of a consociational democracy is a small **size**. My country size variable is obtained from the *CIA World Factbook* (2003), and is the total area in square kilometers of each country in 2003. This includes both land and water area. The variable is transformed using the natural logarithm because I expect size to have a diminishing effect on lasting peace.

21 The categories are: 1 = no proportional representation, 2 = between 50% and 99% of the seats in legislature allocated by proportional representation, 3 = 100% of the seats in legislature allocated by proportional representation and 4 = seats in legislature allocated on a fixed quota. The variable will be used as an ordinal (scale) variable in the analyses.

22 The coding of this variable is based on data provided to me by Anita Schjøset. However, since her data do not single out states with autonomous regions, or states where a region gained independence, I have added these situations to the variable.

23 To see if different kinds of autonomy influence the probability of lasting peace, I have also made a categorical variable which is coded as follows: 1 = state with no autonomy, 2 = state with one or more autonomous regions, 3 = a federal state and 4 = the rebels achieved independence. This variable is used as an ordinal (scale) variable in the analyses.

Control Variables

In addition to the independent variables some control variables are needed. These will reflect conditions other researchers have expected to influence the probability of lasting peace in postconflict societies.

The literature on *incompatibility* of civil war focus on two different types of incompatibility. Whether a conflict is over territory or over government, and whether the conflict is an ethnic or a non-ethnic conflict. The probability of conflict is greater in multi-ethnic countries than in homogenous countries (Ellingsen 2000, Lake and Rothchild 1996, Reynal-Querol 2002), domestic conflicts over identity issues are also assumed to be harder to solve than conflicts over non-identity issues (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Kaufmann 1996, Licklider 1995). Being in control over territory is for many groups essential and territorial conflicts might be harder to solve than governmental conflicts.

Even though ethnic conflicts often coincide with territorial goals, this might not always be the case, and the incompatibility variable in the Armed Conflict Dataset do not reflect the division between ethnic and non-ethnic wars. However, Buhaug and Gates (2002) have made a list over identity civil wars based on the PRIO/ Uppsala Armed Conflict dataset, which I use.²⁴ This incompatibility variable, *identity conflict*, is a dichotomous variable with the value 1 if the conflict is over identity issues and the value 0 if it is a non-identity conflict. I also include the variable in the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset which distinguishes between civil wars over government and over territory. This variable, *Territorial Conflict*, is coded with the value 1 for territorial conflicts and the value 0 for governmental conflicts.

The *costs of war* have often been viewed as influential when it comes to the probability of achieving lasting peace in a post-civil war country. It is assumed that the higher the costs, the higher the likelihood of lasting peace. The costs can be expressed in numerous ways, but usually it is expressed as the duration of conflict, or the intensity of the conflict.²⁵ The *duration* variable express the number of months a conflict lasted. The variable is log-transformed.

24 Fearon and Laitin (2003) also reports ethnic wars, however, their sample is different from the PRIO/Uppsala dataset.

25 The PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset reports the begin year (Begin) and the end year (End) of domestic conflicts, it also reports the start date, as detailed as possible. However, enddates are not published yet, but Håvard Strand at PRIO has given me a preliminary dataset where end dates are included, this has been used to calculate the duration in months.

The intensity level of a civil war might influence the probability of lasting peace. The intensity variable in my dataset is taken from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, it is not expressed in numbers of battle-related deaths, but it is instead coded in three categories as minor, intermediate and war.²⁶ The *intensity* variable, has the value 1 when the cumulative deaths exceeded 1000, and 0 where it did not.

The *type of conflict* might influence the likelihood of peace as well. This variable is also obtained from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset. Initially it had four values; extra-state, interstate, internal and internationalized internal. Since my concern is intrastate wars, the first two categories are non-existent in my dataset. The remaining two are dummy-coded into: 1 = internationalized internal conflict and 0 = internal conflict. International actors might assure a quick end to a violent conflict, however, actors intervening on behalf of one, or both/all, parties to a civil war might also decrease the probability of lasting peace (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000, Regan 2002).

Political regime experience may have an effect on the probability of lasting peace, previous democratic regime experience will most likely have a positive influence on lasting peace. The measure of political regime most often used within peace research is taken from the Polity Project's Dataset (Marshall 2003). The control variable used in my dataset is the Polity2 variable, a democracy-autocracy scale where a country's autocracy score is subtracted from its democracy score, it ranges from -10, perfectly autocratic, to +10, fully democratic.²⁷ Following Ellingsen (2000) I have made three categories of this variable; autocratic (-10 to -6), intermediate/semidemocratic (-5 to 5) and democratic regime experience (6 to 10). The theory assumes that the political regime experience prior to conflict outbreak can influence the probability of lasting peace, the polity score used in the analysis is therefore reported for the year prior to the first year of observation of violence.²⁸

26 Strand et al. further describe the variable: "This variable is not ordinal. The intermediate category is not necessarily more intense than the minor category, but it adds an element of history that is not coded in the categories 'minor' or 'war'. Some users may find it preferable to recode this variable as a dichotomy (minor conflict/war) and use the historical information (cumulative deaths exceeds 1000: yes/no) as a separate variable." (2003:9)

27 The Polity2 variable uses standardized authority codes. The original polity variable reports the values "interruption" (-66), "interregnum" (-77) and "transition" (-88). These values reflect in various ways unclear situations, and they are hard to interpret. In the Polity2 variable these values have been converted in the following manner (Marshall 2002): -66: system missing, -77: neutral polity score of 0, and -88: protracted across the span of the transition.

28 For three countries (five civil wars); Angola (1975), Burma (1948) and Georgia (1991), the polity value for the year prior to outbreak was missing, the polity value for the outbreak year is therefore reported for these wars.

Most civil wars occur in less developed countries (Collier et al. 2003). It is also assumed that countries which are less developed economically have more trouble when trying to rebuild after war (Doyle and Sambanis 2000:785). I use two measures of GDP, growth and per capita, to reflect level of development. The *GDP growth* variable is gathered from the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank 2003). *GDP per capita* is the variable RGDPPCH from The Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1), with missing observations filled in with estimates from Gleditsch (2002) version 3.0.

For both the GDP growth and GDP per capita variables I have computed the average level for the first five years after the end of the conflict. Quite a few post-civil war countries experience extreme economic growth when violence has ceased. For example Liberia had a GDP per capita growth in 1996 of 100.8 %. To balance this impression of high growth rates I have computed a mean score. I have also logged the GDP per capita variable.²⁹

Statistical Method: Logit Regression Analysis

In order to test the expectations and hypotheses presented earlier I will use logit (logistic) regression analysis. The dependent variable (outcome of conflict = peace) is a dichotomous variable and it will therefore not be appropriate to use ordinary least squares regression (Hamilton 1992).

The logit regression model is expressed as: $\ln \left(\frac{P}{1-P} \right) = \alpha + \beta X_{it} + e_{it}$, where α is the intercept, βX is the set of explanatory variables with corresponding coefficients, and e is the error term for country i at time t . The logit is a linear function of the X variables, and the probability is a nonlinear S-shaped function of the X variables. By using the following equation to reverse the logit one yields predicted probabilities that $P(Y = 1)$: $P = 1/(1+e^{-L})$. The statistical programme SPSS, Version 12.0, was used to run the analyses.

²⁹ In six of the civil wars in the dataset the conflicts ended when the rebel groups achieved independence. These are Ethiopia (Eritrea), Indonesia (East Timor), South Africa (Namibia), Soviet Union (Armenia), Soviet Union (Azerbaijan), Yugoslavia (Slovenia) and Yugoslavia (Croatia). Since my concern is the political institutions in *postconflict* societies this provides a challenge. Which country's institutions are relevant regarding lasting peace in these cases? To give proper values on the different independent and control variables I have been inspired by the democratic peace theory. Therefore I demand the same independent variable (political institution) to be present in both "colonial" and "independent" country if the case is to be given the value 1 (institution present). When it comes to the continuous variables the coding gets a bit more complicated. For size, area of country and population, I have simply added the values of both countries. For the economic variables I have weighted and added the values for each country. The weighting is based on population data.

Empirical Analysis

In the following I test my hypotheses over different multivariate regression models. I first test whether the presence of power-sharing institutions in general in postconflict societies are associated with higher probabilities of lasting peace (Table 1). Thereafter I study the institutions in more detail, whether the different categories of grand coalition, proportional representation and segmental autonomy affect the probability of lasting peace differently (Table 2). Finally I run a regression model with the composite measure, to test whether the more consociational features, the higher is the likelihood of lasting peace (Table 3).

The first multivariate regression shown in Table 1 is one with all independent variables as dichotomous variables.

Table 1 Logit Analysis of Lasting Peace by Grand Coalition, Proportional Representation and Autonomy as Dichotomies, 1985-1998.

Variables	Model 1			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Grand Coalition	-.076	.616	.901	.926
Proportional Representation	.579	.570	.310	1.785
Autonomy	1.103	.537	.040	3.013
Area of Country (ln)	-.263	.162	.104	.769
Identity Conflict	.082	.679	.903	1.086
Territorial Conflict	-.382	.637	.549	.683
Duration of Conflict (ln)	-.347	.177	.050	.707
Cumulative Deaths Exceeded 1000	1.171	.653	.073	3.226
Internationalized Internal Conflict	-1.296	.962	.178	.274
Political Regime Experience: Intermediate Regime	-.205	.588	.727	.814
Political Regime Experience: Democracy	.082	.663	.901	1.086
GDP Growth	.000	.044	.995	1.000
GDP per Capita (ln)	.154	.313	.623	1.167
Constant	2.917	3.020	.334	18.485
-2 Log likelihood	126.75			
Cox & Snell R2	.176			
Nagelkerke R2	.238			
N	110			

Neither grand coalition nor proportional representation are significant, but autonomy is significant at a 0.05 level.³⁰ It is quite clear that granting regions in conflict-ridden societies some sort of autonomy will ease tensions and reduce the likelihood that conflicts revert to violence. This result is in line with Kaufmann (1996), who argues strongly in favor of partition as a solution to (ethnic) civil wars. However, Kaufmann (1996) claims that to reach peace opposing groups have to be demographically separated. My autonomy variable does not say anything about whether *groups* are separated, and the analysis show that *territorial* autonomy, no matter what groups live in the regions, is positively related to lasting peace.

Area of country is not significant, but the significance level is not far from the 0.10 threshold (it is 0.104). This supports the hypothesis that the smaller a country the more likely it is to achieve lasting peace. Neither of the incompatibility variables are significant.

Both variables expressing costs of war are significant. Interestingly, they show opposite influences. Duration of conflict has a negative influence on lasting peace, while high-intensity conflicts are more likely to achieve lasting peace than low-intensity conflicts. In research by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) the relationship between duration of conflict and peace-building success is only modestly supported. Hoddie and Hartzell (2001) do not get significant results for their duration variable and its influence on lasting peace. Duration is often correlated with intensity, which might explain why it is different in my analyses compared to other research. The effect of international actors intervening on behalf of one, or both, of the parties to the civil war is not significant.

Political regime experience is not significant, neither are the two measures of development.

Size of Country and Consociational Features

A small country is one of Lijphart's favorable conditions. In small countries the political leaders see each other often and know each other personally, because of this they will most likely choose cooperative styles of decision making. According to Lijphart a small country is also easier to govern than a larger one (1977:68). The negative relationship between area of country and lasting peace supports this. Even though a small country is beneficial regarding the success of a


³⁰ In all models I present full p-values. Because of the low number of cases included in my sample the levels of significance are quite high. Interesting relationships might be neglected with strict adherence to arbitrarily set significance levels, e.g. 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. In the following models statistical significance refers to p-values below 0.10.

consociational democracy, I assume that a large post-civil war country will also benefit from having one or more consociational features. And such institutions will reduce the risk of renewed civil war in large countries as well.

The relationships between the size of a country and the various consociational institutions, and lasting peace, can be visualized through effect plots. Grand coalition has previously shown a non-significant influence and the visual difference between having and not having a grand coalition is not shown here.


Even though the proportional representation variable is not significant in Model 1, the effect plot in Figure 2 shows that postconflict societies with some kind of proportionality have higher probabilities of lasting peace than countries without. The difference between having and not having such an allocation system in the legislature seems to increase the larger the country is. This indicates that proportionality is even more important in large countries rebuilding after civil war than small countries.

Figure 2 Predicted Probability of Lasting Peace by Area of Country (ln) and Proportional Representation



Again autonomy, the only significant independent variable in Model 1, shows clearly in Figure 3 how it has a positive impact on the probability of lasting peace. The predicted probabilities of lasting peace for the largest postconflict societies are about 25 percentage points higher for the ones with autonomy than the large ones without.

Figure 3 Predicted Probability of Lasting Peace by Area of Country (ln) and Segmental Autonomy



From the effect plots it can be concluded that especially large postconflict countries should be aware of the benefits of the two consociational features proportional representation and autonomy. The difference between having and not having these institutions, regarding lasting postconflict peace, gets bigger as the size of the country increases. Small countries have quite high probabilities of lasting peace, whether the consociational features are present or not.

Multivariate Analysis: Independent Variables as Categories

To understand more about the relationships between the different consociational features and lasting peace I run multivariate regressions with the categorical independent variables instead of the dichotomous variables. The categorical grand coalition variable is nominal, the four categories are not related to each other in any hierarchic way. But both the categorical proportional representation and autonomy variables are ordinal: each category expresses a higher level (on a thought scale) than the previous category. Table 2 shows a regression where grand coalition is included as a nominal variable with three categories, while proportional representation and autonomy are included as ordinal (scale) variables.

Table 2 Logit Analysis of Lasting Peace by Grand Coalition, Proportional Representation and Autonomy as Categories, 1985-1998

Variables	Model 2			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Grand Coalition: an Agreement	-3.204	1.444	.026	.041
Grand Coalition: a Majority Cabinet	.184	.837	.826	1.202
Grand Coalition: a Transitional Majority Cabinet	.398	1.235	.747	1.489
Degree of Proportional Representation	.916	.433	.034	2.499
Degree of Autonomy	.827	.326	.011	2.286
Area of Country (ln)	-.448	.199	.024	.639
Identity Conflict	.726	.744	.329	2.066
Territorial Conflict	-.631	.665	.343	.532
Duration of Conflict (ln)	-.398	.186	.032	.672
Cumulative Deaths Exceeded 1000	1.510	.681	.027	4.525
Internationalized Internal Conflict	-1.550	1.001	.122	.212
Political Regime Experience: Intermediate Regime	-.214	.664	.747	.807
Political Regime Experience: Democracy	.148	.715	.836	1.160
GDP Growth	-.015	.048	.748	.985
GDP per Capita (ln)	.046	.336	.890	1.048
Constant	3.935	3.241	.225	51.181
-2 Log likelihood	116.933			
Cox & Snell R2	.246			
Nagelkerke R2	.333			
N	110			

Expressing the independent variables as categories instead of dichotomies yields interesting results. Having a power-sharing agreement instead of no grand coalition at all actually decreases significantly the probability of lasting peace. This questions the recommendation of grand coalition found in various publications of Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1985). The main feature of consociational democracy is the power-sharing grand coalition, but my analysis show that such an institution has a negative impact on postconflict stability. However, among the civil wars with power-sharing agreements that revert to violence are the ones of Angola, Burundi and Rwanda, some of the most devastating and complicated civil wars of recent history. The fact that these wars resume contributes to the skepticism expressed by Spears (2000, 2002) about making deals with devils.

The positive coefficient for proportional representation turns significant at the 0.05 level when the variable is analyzed as an ordinal (scale) categorical variable, compared to as a dichotomy. The more seats in the legislature allocated on a proportional basis, the higher is the likelihood of lasting peace. The analysis suggests that proportionality functions best as a peace building strategy when it is carried out thoroughly. Efforts to provide all groups influence through a non-total proportional system might not secure the parties to a civil war the representation they feel needed. Such systems might also exclude relatively large groups. A 100% proportional representation or a fixed representation seem better regarding lasting peace in postconflict societies.

Degree of autonomy is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. Previous results from the regressions with autonomy as a dichotomy (Table 1) is supported. The more decentralized decision-making, the higher is the likelihood of lasting peace.

Area of country is negatively related to lasting peace and turns significant at the 0.05 level. In Model 2 both duration of conflict and cumulative deaths exceeded 1000 are significant at the 0.05 level. The longer a civil war has lasted the lower is the probability of lasting peace, while high intensity conflicts seem to be more likely to achieve lasting peace than low intensity conflicts. Internationalized internal conflict has a negative, but not significant, impact on lasting peace. The political regime experience variables are not significant either, as well as GDP growth and GDP per capita.

Multivariate Analysis: Composite Consociational Features

Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) found that the more power-sharing institutions in postconflict countries, the higher was the likelihood of lasting peace. A brief look at the frequencies in my sample seems to support this. Of the 29 postconflict societies with no consociational features at all 14 reverted to war (48%), while this proportion was lower for the postconflict societies with one, two or three consociational features (38%, 40% and 0%, respectively). This indicates that the more consociational features in a post-civil war country, the higher is the probability of lasting peace. Table 3 shows a multivariate regression analysis with the composite consociational features variable as independent variable.

Table 3 Logit Analysis of Lasting Peace by Consociational Features, 1985-1998

Variables	Model 3			
	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
Consociational Features	.472	.299	.115	1.603
Area of Country (ln)	-.228	.155	.140	.796
Identity Conflict	.126	.647	.845	1.135
Territorial Conflict	-.348	.618	.574	.706
Duration of Conflict (ln)	-.353	.175	.044	.703
Cumulative Deaths Exceeded 1000	1.209	.644	.061	3.349
Internationalized Internal Conflict	-1.425	.933	.127	.240
Political Regime Experience: Intermediate Regime	.056	.550	.920	1.057
Political Regime Experience: Democracy	.361	.625	.563	1.435
GDP Growth	.002	.043	.968	1.002
GDP per Capita (ln)	.265	.274	.332	1.304
Constant	1.605	2.810	.568	4.977
-2 Log likelihood	128.916			
Cox & Snell R2	.160			
Nagelkerke R2	.216			
N	110			

The composite consociational features variable is positive, but not significant in Table 3, the significance level is, however, not that far from the 0.1 threshold (it is 0.115). The more power-sharing institutions that are present in a postconflict society, the higher is the probability of lasting peace. This supports both my hypothesis and the various publications of Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1985). In a more recent publication Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) find a similar relationship regarding the number of power-sharing institutions in 38 negotiated civil war settlements. The control variables significant in previous models are also significant in the model with composite consociational features as independent variable. The longer the civil war has lasted, the lower is the likelihood of lasting peace, and high-intensity civil wars are more likely to achieve lasting peace than low-intensity civil wars. However, the negative impact of area of country is not significant in this model.

Probably, the effect of the composite consociational features variable is dismantled by the negative impact of grand coalition.

Crosstabulations

In Table 4 I present a crosstabulation with all possible combinations of the three consociational features and whether these reverted to war or achieved lasting peace.

Table 4 Crosstabulation Consociational Combinations and Outcome of Conflict, Frequencies

	Outcome of Conflict		Total
	Reverted to War	Lasting Peace	
No Consociational Features	15	15	29
Coalition, none of the other	2	1	3
Proportional Representation, none of the other	6	10	16
Autonomy, none of the other	11	20	31
Coalition and Proportional Representation	7	6	13
Coalition and Autonomy	3	4	7
Proportional Representation and Autonomy	3	9	12
All Consociational Features	0	5	5
Total	46	70	116

The number of cases in each cell is not sufficiently large to [permit me to] draw indisputable conclusions. Nevertheless, the results in previous analyses regarding the negative impact grand coalitions have on lasting peace are supported. Grand coalition is not a useful institution to have if one's aim is lasting peace. Of the 12 postconflict societies with the combination proportional representation and autonomy, only 3 reverted to war. But of the 13 postconflict societies with the combination proportional representation and grand coalition as many as 7 reverted to war. The combination autonomy and grand coalition also has a high risk of resuming violence.

None of the five postconflict societies with all three consociational features did go through a new war during the five years following the civil war. Even though this do not confirm my main hypothesis that *the probability of lasting peace is greater in a postconflict society with power-sharing institutions than in such a society without power-sharing institutions*, it clearly supports it. The result also supports the various works of Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1985), where he argues that power-sharing will give stability and reduce tensions in deeply divided societies. However, Lijphart's most important institution is the grand coalition, which my analysis has shown is the least favorable of the three. A grand coalition is positively related to lasting peace only if the two other features, proportional representation and autonomy, are present.

Summary of Findings

A grand coalition has the opposite effect of what I hypothesized. Having a grand coalition *decreases* the probability of lasting peace, and *Hypothesis 1* is not supported. The influence of a proportional representation system on the probability of lasting peace is positive. Having all seats in parliament allocated proportionately is positively and significantly related to lasting peace. Even though the dichotomous variable is not significant the results still suggest that allocating the seats in parliament by proportional representation will most likely decrease the risk of renewed warfare. I consider *Hypothesis 2* related to proportional representation as confirmed.

To decentralize authority is a wise approach to take for countries ridden by violent conflict. I regard my *Hypothesis 3* related to autonomy confirmed. The positive correlation between autonomy and lasting peace found in my analyses supports the consociational democracy theory formulated by Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1985). His argument that decentralizing decision-making power in deeply divided societies is a fine instrument to ease tensions holds for countries having experienced internal armed conflict as well. Of the three defining elements of the consociational democracy tested here, autonomy is the institutional arrangement which relates closest to lasting peace, even though the positive correlation between proportional representation and lasting peace is also quite solid.

Although the composite consociational features variable is not significant, the direction of the influence is quite clear. The more power-sharing institutions a postconflict society has, the higher is the probability of lasting peace. I consider *Hypothesis 4* related to the composite consociational features as partly supported. The favorable factor size is also supported in my analysis. In line with Lijphart's expectations (1977) the smaller a postconflict society the higher is the probability of lasting peace.

Conclusion

Within peace studies most focus has been directed towards factors that influence the risk of (internal) violent conflict. Less focus has been on how to *end* violent conflict. Recently, however, peace agreements and the role of the international community has received increasing interest (Hartzell et al. 2001, Stedman et al. 2002, Walter 1997, 2002). This research tends to conclude that power-sharing is a feasible solution for postconflict societies, and peace negotiations with such arrangements are less likely to break down and see renewed civil war.

Inspired by the consociational democracy formulated by Lijphart for plural societies (1969, 1977, 1985), and the findings from research on successful implementation of peace agreements (Hartzell 1999, Hartzell et al. 2001, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Walter 2002), I postulated that power-sharing democracy is the best approach to achieve lasting peace in *all* postconflict societies, regardless of how the conflicts end.

My findings show that there is a positive relationship between consociationalism and lasting peace in postconflict societies. In particular a proportional representation system and autonomy, both individually and in combination, increase the probability of lasting peace. Contrary to what I hypothesized the presence of a grand coalition has a negative influence on lasting peace, especially when the grand coalition is the result of a power-sharing agreement.

In a postconflict society, with grave contradictions and hostility, it is important that all groups and parties are represented in the decision-making. My analyses suggest that this representation is best ensured through a proportional electoral system. The principle guiding how votes are transformed to seats in parliament should therefore receive attention from policy makers, and a proportional representation system will be the most appropriate in a post-conflict society. Through proportionality each group and party are ensured to be represented in the legislature and to have some decision-making power. Most probably this will reduce the groups' fear of being marginalized, and disputes can be solved through non-violent means.

My most robust finding is the positive relation between decentralized decision-making power, autonomy, and lasting peace. Previous research has also argued that being in control of a territory considered as homeland is important for many (ethnic) groups (Toft 2001, 2003), and the granting of territorial autonomy has been found to be a viable solution to avoid conflict (ibid.) or breakdown of peace agreements (Rothchild and Hartzell 1999). These findings are supported by my analyses.³¹

I have demonstrated that institutions matter and postconflict societies should look to the institutions of the consociational democracy in order to achieve postconflict peace. In particular governments should consider decentralizing power and granting of territorial autonomy as a possible and sound strategy to terminate violence.

³¹ Yilmaz (2004) finds that decentralization clearly reduces the hazard rate of post-civil war regimes.

Future Research

As far as I know, no other research has explored quantitatively the relationship between consociational democracy, in fact any *type* of democracy, and lasting peace in postconflict societies. Whereas researchers associated with the World Bank have emphasized economic factors and their influence on lasting peace, the Bank has given less attention to various political institutions (Bigombe et al. 2000, Collier et al. 2001, 2003, Doyle and Sambanis 2000). The positive impact of power-sharing institutions on lasting peace has been discussed by Hartzell and her associates (most recently Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), Stedman et al. (2002) and Walter (2002), but their focus has been on civil wars ending in peace agreements rather than on all civil wars. My study contributes with data and findings regarding postconflict institutions for *all* civil wars.

To get a better understanding of the relationship between political institutions and civil war termination different approaches should be taken. Theoretically, a closer investigation of what kind of democratic institutions that lead to a democratic civil peace theory is needed. Empirically, better and more detailed data are required. Data on a state level, regarding electoral systems, governments and autonomy arrangements, as well as on a group level, regarding both (ethnic) groups in a country and what groups are parties to war. Analytically, better knowledge on the relationship between type of democracy, political institutions, and lasting peace can be achieved with using a variety of statistical methods.

Nonetheless, what is most important within peace research is the policy implications it leads to. People in war-torn countries do not necessarily demand more research, but ask for action. My paper provides even more support to the already emphasized positive relationship between power-sharing and lasting peace, now it is left to policy makers to take the consequences of these results.

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