

FRANCHISE CONFLICT: THE TIDE OF ANTIPOPE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE EASTERN SCHISM

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I. INTRODUCTION

This is a paper about the economics of religion.² The model of the franchise organization is applied to the early Christian and Roman Catholic churches. The importance of this research is that it shows how the application of a simple economic model, franchise theory in this case, can give new perspectives to historical events.

We argue that using franchise theory as an overarching model of the growth and development of Christianity gives a much clearer understanding of a number of issues that have long concerned economists, historians, and social scientists. Franchise theory is able to incorporate the received wisdom of historians concerning the spread of Christianity throughout Western Europe. It rationalizes the existence of state religions and the demonstrable monopoly power of the medieval Roman Catholic Church. Finally, it explains the historical record of conflicts within Christianity and the Roman Church including the Eastern Schism, the Great Papal Schism, and the Protestant Reformation.

This paper argues that the Roman Catholic Church grew out of a partnership between secular leaders and the Roman See in the aftermath of the Fall of the Roman Empire. The Roman Church was the franchisor of a brand-named religious good. The secular rulers were franchisees that controlled the production of the good. The secular rulers found it in their interests to monopolize the supply of religion while they acted as agents for a franchisor of a brand-named product. That they did both of these things is understandable in a historical context. It also set the stage for predictable contractual conflicts between the franchisees and the franchisor. The lifecycle of the franchise contract maps out much of the history of the Roman Church.

In the early stage of the Roman Church, secular rulers controlled production of religion by appointing bishops within their political territories in a process called *lay investiture*. Secular rulers captured rents from these appointments and controlled the flow of revenue from the supply of religion. Predictably, as the value of the franchises increased, the papacy attempted to and, in part, succeeded in renegeing on the original contracts and restructuring them so that more rents flowed to Rome.

This paper examines the events surrounding the schism between the Eastern and Western Christian churches that occurred in 1054, and explains these events in terms of opportunistic behavior on the part of the papacy. Obviously, the Eastern Schism represented a break by Rome with the Eastern part of the Christian Church, but we argue

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² See Iannaccone (1998) for a review of the literature on the economics of religion.

that the impetus for this split was a desire by the Roman See to rearrange the franchise agreements with its franchisees.

While the empirical focus of this paper is the Eastern Schism, we think that a franchise interpretation of the church organizes all three of the great schisms: the Eastern Schism, the Great Papal Schism, and the Protestant Reformation. Social scientists traditionally have treated these as three independent events. Our approach explains all three events in terms of incentive misalignments, the balancing of which is the challenge of the franchise organization.

The paper is organized in the following way. The next section outlines our model and relates it to the literature. In the third section, we develop the model in its historical context. Following that we present some quantitative measures in support of our model as it applies to the Eastern Schism and its aftermath. Finally, we summary the paper and present some concluding comments about its application to the later history of the Roman Church.

II. PRIOR RESEARCH & OUTLINE OF THE MODEL

Our franchise model of the Roman Catholic Church develops the link between church and state. Most of the prior literature has applied franchise theory more narrowly to contractual arrangements within the church itself.³ No one else has modeled the secular rulers as the franchisees, which is the fundamental part of our analysis.

Prior research has also been disjoint on the issues of state religion and the monopolistic supply of religion.⁴ We think that our broader view of the franchise organization of the Roman Catholic Church gives a clearer understanding of these issues as well.

The franchise model applied to the organization of the Christian Church from its incipency offers an explanation for state religion as well as the monopoly market structure of the Roman Church. The incentive misalignments that are inherent in the life cycle of the franchise contract then explain several important events in church history. Our empirical focus is the Eastern Schism.

State Religion and Monopoly

Although the Roman Catholic Church appears to have exercised substantial market power especially late in the Middle Ages, the simple monopoly model offers only a weak

³ We are not the first researchers to apply the franchise model to the Roman Catholic Church. Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (1989), Davidson (1995), and Schmidtchen and Mayer (1997) have used similar analysis. Ekelund, Hebert, & Tollison look at the franchise-like organization within the church. Interestingly, both Davidson and Schmidtchen & Mayer develop the notion of opportunistic behavior and incentive misalignments which are at the heart of our approach. Even so, they do not apply the opportunism idea broadly as arising from an incentive misalignment between Rome as the franchisor and secular leaders as the franchisees. Smith (1776) is more keen to this conflict, though he does not anticipate franchise theory. Finally, Allen (1995) argues that church organization responds to the potential for opportunistic behavior between the clergy and the congregation.

⁴ See Barro and McCleary (2003) for an analysis of state religion over the last century. Also, they discuss the many alternative theoretical frameworks that have been used to model state supported religion.

explanation for the actions and structure of the Roman Church. We argue that the medieval Roman Catholic Church as well as Christianity from the time of Constantine through the Middle Ages was not monopolistic any more so than Coca-Cola but rather was linked to monopoly power due to its association with political authorities.⁵

Our view contrasts sharply with that of Ekelund, Hebert, & Tollison (2002) who view the monopoly power of the Roman Church as independent of the association of church and state. They argue that the monopoly power of the medieval Roman Catholic Church is shown by the price discrimination widely practiced in the church. They argue that its monopoly power was its own demise. The Protestant Reformation occurred because the high prices charged by Rome drew competitive rivals into the market. Their arguments have merit and empirical support on several margins. Nonetheless, they fail to account for the fact that the Protestant schismatic sects in nearly every instance aligned themselves with secular authorities to monopolize their own markets.⁶ Our model explains a bigger swath of history and is not in conflict with their empirical results. We remark on this further in the last section.

We argue that the hegemony of the Roman Catholic Church began with the fall of the Western Empire. Following the fall of Rome, political entities aligned themselves with the Roman Catholic Church in exchange for a license to promote the Christian brand name. The Roman Church was the franchisor; the secular leaders were the franchisees. The secular leaders were able through the coercive power of government to enforce a monopoly in the supply of this franchised religious product. We argue that the religious and secular authorities operated as financial partners, sharing the rents associated with the supply of religion.

That the supply of religion involved the collection of rents is not in dispute.⁷ However, it is important to recognize the component parts of these rents. We argue that some of the rents were brand-name quasi-rents and some were monopoly rents. The brand-name quasi-rents reflected the value that the Christian religion offered to the secular leaders. The monopoly rents came from the partnership between the Roman Church and the secular leaders.

Roman Catholicism was a brand-named product in the Middle Ages as it is today. Even in the modern competitive market for religion, the Roman Catholic Church is able to collect more net revenue than less well established Christian sects. Some portion of the rents that flowed to the papacy in the Middle Ages must be attributed to brand name. It was the brand name of the Roman Church that made it attractive to secular leaders who chose to partner with it rather than promoting some other religious product.

⁵ We draw an analogy here to the partnership between Bell Telephone and the U.S. federal government in 1916 to create a monopoly telephone company. In another example, Coca-Cola gained a monopoly in the soft drink industry in Brazil in the early 1940s by government interdiction.

⁶ Where this did not occur, civil war ensued.

⁷ Rent collection by the papacy has been investigated in great detail and commented on widely. Lunt (1939, 1962, 1965, Vol I & II, 1968) has much data. Smith argues that dissipation of the rents on consumption rather than charity caused the collapse of the church. Tuchman (1978, 1985) echoes this theme as do many of the historians describing the Renaissance papacy.

At the same time, some of the rents associated with the supply of religion by the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages hailed from the church's exclusive partnership with secular authorities. By definition, an exclusive arrangement would have restricted the supply of competing religions and increased the flow of rents to the church. Even so, the rents associated with this closure of the market were fundamentally political rents that the political leaders could have exploited with or without the Roman Catholic Church. The pure monopoly rents were purely political.

No doubt, the political leaders of the time chose to partner with the Roman Catholic Church because this maximized the value of their political monopoly. Presumably western leaders, such as Charlemagne, aligned themselves with the Christian Church in Rome in an effort to strengthen their political power.⁸ Having done so, it is equally likely that the maximized value of the political rents were shared in some fashion with Rome.⁹

Even so, we emphasize the two elements of this choice by the secular leaders. First, they chose to monopolize the supply of religion, and second, they chose to supply Christian religion. These are separate choices and yet derive from the same cause.

Obviously, there are rents and royalties associated with supplying a religious product and this alone could stand as an explanation for why secular leaders chose to monopolize the supply. However, the choice of Christianity over other religious products suggests a more complex model is warranted. We expand on the arguments of David Hume.¹⁰ Hume believed that secular leaders supported state religions because state religion is an efficient way to control fanaticism.¹¹ We argue more generally that secular authorities in the west adopted Christianity as the state religion after the fall of Rome because it was an efficient institution, not only for collecting revenue, but also for creating social order.

After the fall, stability of property rights was a central issue. The decline in wealth and income in the West during the early Middle Ages has been analyzed at some length. Interestingly, the decline cannot be attributed to a decay of knowledge or loss of technology. Doehaerd (1979) points out that the most advanced agricultural and engineering practices of the Roman Empire continued throughout the Middle Ages to be practiced at various places in Europe. The most compelling explanation of the decline in

⁸ Charlemagne, c. 800, is notable because his association with the Roman See perfectly captures the franchise arrangement that we think best characterizes the organization of the Roman Church. However, the same argument can be applied to the Byzantine Emperor Constantine (c. 300) at the very infancy of Christianity. Also, it is interesting to note that state religion did not end with the Protestant Reformation even in the protestant areas.

⁹ An analogy to modern business seems appropriate. When Burger King gives Coca Cola an exclusive franchise to soft drink sales within its stores, rents in the sale of Coca Cola are created. Obviously, Coke enjoys rents in the sale of its product even in venues where the sale of other soft drinks is not prohibited as a result of its brand name. However, within Burger Kings, extra rents are generated. Presumably, Coke and Burger King share these extra rents.

¹⁰ Hume debated Adam Smith on the nature of state religion. Their discourse is recounted in the *Wealth of Nations*, (Cannan, ed., 1965) pp. 742-743.

¹¹ Smith argued that monopolized supply was inefficient in the way that all monopolies are. See Smith (1776) and Anderson (1988).

wealth is the lawlessness of the barbaric invasion.¹² Certainly, as the secular rulers of Western Europe were trying to stabilize the property right systems, the adoption of a brand-named religious product that had subscribers throughout the region was an obvious choice.¹³ Adopting Christianity as the monopolized, state religion may have maximized rents, but more importantly it minimized property rights disputes.

Incentive Misalignments Within the Roman Church

We argue that the Roman Catholic Church grew out of a partnership with fragmented secular leaders in the Western Empire. The Roman Church acted as a franchisor of a brand named product. The political leaders in the West acted as franchisees managing the supply of the product in their exclusive territories. Within this framework we look for organizational problems that predictably arise from incentive misalignments within the franchise organization.

The franchise organization has received a lot of attention in the economics literature. In particular, the potential for incentive misalignments within a franchise structure was recognized and discussed by the earliest contributors to franchise theory: Rubin (1978) and Klein, Crawford, & Alchian [KCA] (1978). Both Rubin and KCA discuss the problem of opportunism by the franchisor especially in regard to termination without cause. Termination of the franchise contract by the franchisor is a basic mechanism for controlling opportunism by the franchisee. However, termination without cause is an act of opportunism by the franchisor. The latter allows the franchisor to resell the franchise outlet and expropriate the franchise fee of the terminated franchisee.

The potential for opportunism is always present in a franchise setting, though it is muted by considerations of long term implicit contracting. Unjustified termination severs an implicit contracting bond and makes dealings with other agents more costly. Even so, when the costs of these broken contracts are relatively low or when their value is high, we can anticipate that the franchisor will act opportunistically.

As Rubin points out, when the franchise organization is young, the franchisor is forced to sell the franchise rights at a discount. The franchisor has no history of fair dealing. Potential franchisees equate this with a high threat of opportunism on the part of the franchisor and will not pay the full, unprejudiced expected value of the rights. Furthermore, the franchisor is willing to sell at a discount when the franchise is young because of the value gained in expanding the brand name. Once a link has been established between the franchisor and a franchisee the franchise has entered its growth phase.

¹² We do not attempt to close this debate. Many claim that the decline in income in the early Middle Ages was a result of the interruption of trade on the Mediterranean. This argument is not in conflict with the one that we present.

¹³ It might be argued that the reason why government chose to supply religion throughout the middle ages is the public good aspect of the religious product. Sometimes public goods are supplied by government rather than private agents because there is no effective exclusion mechanism that mitigates the free-rider problem. However, the problem in using the public-good-public-supply argument in the case of early Christianity and the Roman Church is that ultimately, Christianity is privately supplied. The challenge is explaining the shift.

There is another element of incentive misalignment that is important to our story. As the franchise expands the potential for opportunistic behavior on the part of the franchisor diminishes, but is rising for the franchisee. Opportunism on the part of franchisees is usually associated with cost cutting and quality shortfalls. However, it may also be associated with deviations in product definition. Franchisees have an incentive to reshape the brand named product, at least marginally, to suit the tastes of their individual clients and earn greater rents.

On the other hand, the franchisor wants its franchisees to more rigidly adhere to the brand name specifications. When multiple links have been established and the brand name has spread widely, there is little lost in renegeing on franchise agreements. This is the point at which the potential for opportunistic behavior by the franchisor is at its peak. In the limit, as KCA point out, the franchisor can terminate *all* of the original contracts and replace them with vertically integrated outlets or resell them at terms more favorable to the franchisor.¹⁴ Moreover, there is much to be gained at this point because the value of the franchise rights, which were sold at discount, has been proven to be substantially higher.

The probability of opportunistic behavior on the part of the franchisor tracks the development of the franchise. We can explain this in terms of a franchisor life cycle. During the infant stage of a franchise, the probability of opportunism is high because of the unproven character of a new franchisor, and earlier franchises are sold at a discount. As the franchise expands and franchisees gain value, the potential for opportunism diminishes. However, once the franchisees attain a certain level of maturity the probability of opportunism by the franchisor increases.¹⁵ The franchisor is essentially looking to recoup the discount that it had initially offered to its franchisees.

In this sense, economic growth tugs at the franchise contract from both ends. Growth raises the value of the franchise outlets. This motivates the franchisor to renege on the terms of the franchise agreement. The franchisor is incited to raise its demands for royalty payments, to engage in unwarranted termination of franchisees, and to violate the rights of exclusive territories. On the other hand, economic growth increases the diversity of demand for the religious product. This raises the likelihood that the franchisees will fail to adhere to the product standards of the franchisor and potentially split off.

These problems inherent in the franchise contract apply directly to the history of the Roman Catholic Church. In the two centuries leading up to the Eastern Schism, Western

¹⁴ Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (KCA, 1978) say: "Generally, a franchisor will lose by terminating a franchisee without cause since that will produce poor incentives on the remaining franchisees to maintain quality and will make it more difficult for the franchisor to sell franchises in the future. But, what prevents the franchisor from an unanticipated simultaneous termination of all franchisees, especially after growth of a chain is 'complete'? (306, footnote 22)."

¹⁵ Whether the franchisor will be successful in his/her opportunism will depend on whether the franchisor and its franchisees separately agree on their definition of maturity. If the franchisor and franchisees are on par, theoretically it would be possible for the franchisees to set up defenses to thwart such behavior, either in the manner of new contracts, or in the form of a new organizational structure.

Europe had experienced substantial economic growth.¹⁶ Furthermore, the Roman franchise system was “mature” in the KCA sense. The Roman Church had spread throughout Western Europe and the time was ripe for opportunism by Rome.

III. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In its early days, Christianity expanded throughout both the eastern and western portions of the Roman Empire along the lines of separate patriarchal sees (the “ancient pentarchy”) with a councilor, or cooperative, association on religious dogma.^{17,18} The cooperative structure can be regarded as a loose franchise structure wherein members shared in a brand name (that of Christianity) but possessed autonomous control of the economic organization within their respective patriarchal sees. At that time, the patriarchal see in Rome was merely an equal among the five cooperative members. Each member was claimant to the residual profits within its territory.

Much of the growth in the Roman Catholic Church transpired in the wake of the Roman Empire. With the dissolution of the Roman Empire came a disintegration of the existing property rights structure.¹⁹ The protection of intellectual capital by the church and especially monasteries after the collapse of the Empire essentially established the church as a leading property rights institution in the West well into the Middle Ages.

In 800, after repelling Roman and other threats to the pope, Leo III crowned Charlemagne Holy Roman Emperor. The anointing of Charlemagne formalized the relation between church and state. Charlemagne’s success in quelling barbarism and looting reunited much of the western realm of the former Roman Empire and cleared the way for solid economic growth in the Empire and the church. The acceptance of the crown from the pope evidenced the value of the church to the state and vice versa.

The anointing of Charlemagne formalized what might be called a double franchise system. Under this system, the church franchised the Christian brand name to secular rulers like Charlemagne. In turn, the secular rulers appointed bishops who then managed the affairs of the supply of the franchised religious product. In this way the secular rulers acting as franchisees operated also as franchisors of the bishoprics.

This practice is known as lay investiture. According to the custom of lay investiture, nobles such as kings and emperors or even nobles of lesser status could rightfully grant ecclesiastic positions. Lay investiture was customary in the East where the emperor acted

¹⁶ As evidenced by increases in cultivated land mass and reclamation of farms. See Bloch (1966) and also Doehaerd (1978).

¹⁷ Probably the first edict addressing the tolerance of Christianity in the Roman Empire was issued in 309 by the emperor Caius Galerius Valerius Maximianus. In 313, Constantine I and his fellow emperor, Licinius confirmed Galerius’ edict with the Edict of Milan, which stated that Christianity would be tolerated throughout the empire.

¹⁸ The “ancient pentarchy” included Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Rome.

¹⁹ In 395 Arcadius and Honorius inherit from their father, Roman emperor Theodosius the western and eastern portions of the Roman Empire, respectively. The subsequent decline and fall of the Roman Empire is attributed to the period 395-476. The deposition by the Goths of the Emperor Romulus Augustus in 476 generally is considered to mark the conclusion of the Roman Empire.

as the “protector of the universal church” and “the manager of its administrative affairs” (a relationship between the church and state sometimes called “caesaropapism”).²⁰ In the West, the right and legitimacy of lay investiture flowed from the papacy to the secular rulers.

Temporal leaders profited from the assignment of benefices as well as rents associated with the bishoprics. In return for the right of lay investiture and the rents flowing from it, kings and nobles offered protection for, as well as compensation to, the church. In this early period of the franchise relation, compensation from political leaders commonly took the form of real estate. For instance, in 756 the Frankish king Pepin seized Lombard territory in Italy over which the pope claimed ownership, so that he might “ ‘return’ it to the Roman see.”²¹

The *Filioque*, Investiture, and the Eastern Schism

Centuries of invasions had introduced into the western territories a residual population of Goths (an amalgamation of Scandinavian bands). The recast customer base created an incentive among the Roman franchisees to differentiate the religious product from the Eastern-based cooperative.

The principal example of this product differentiation is found in the case of the *filioque*. In 1014 Pope Benedict VIII formally added the *filioque* clause to the Nicæan Creed.²² The Nicæan Creed is the Christian statement of faith and was produced by the First Ecumenical Council of Nicæa in 325. The *filioque* is a clause that involves the relationship of the Holy Trinity and implies a double procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. By adding the *filioque*, the Roman Church acted outside the auspices of an ecumenical council of the Christian patriarchies. As the Roman See was a member of the larger cooperative of the patriarchies, we argue that Rome’s move was an act of opportunism.²³

As early as 447 at the Second Synod of Toledo, the Visigoths (responsible for sacking Rome in 410) had “affirmed” the *filioque* clause although it was not inserted into the creed.²⁴ After the Third Synod of Toledo in 589, the *filioque* began to be used in Latin liturgy.²⁵ One possible explanation for the acceptance of the clause could have been for

²⁰ Source: *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1985, vol. 2, pp. 718-719 (on “caesaropapism”).

²¹ Tierney, p. 17. Pepin did this after Pope Zacharius sanctioned Pepin’s coup on the Frankish king Childeric in 752.

²² Pope Benedict VIII has been accused of “avarice,” or an immoderate desire for wealth, according to the New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia (<http://www.newadvent.org>).

²³ Proper procedure would have dictated that an ecumenical council, including representatives from the greater church, decide on the change, which they would have undoubtedly not have approved. The approval of the *filioque* evoked reproach from the other patriarchs who regarded the move as “uncanonical.” Source: http://www.maxpages.com/democracy/Spirituality_and_Holy_Trinity.

²⁴ Source: <http://www.prestoncitybible.org/CD/holyspirit.htm>. In addition, Toledo served as the capital city of Visigoth Spain.

²⁵ Coincidentally, the Visigoths also renounced Arianism in favor of the Catholic faith at the Third Synod. Source: http://www.maxpages.com/democracy/Spirituality_and_Holy_Trinity. Arianism (founded by Arius in the 4th century), was “one of the most widespread and divisive heresies in the history of Christianity.”

the church to appease its then most valued clients. Although the Goths moved into Spain following Rome's defeat in 410, the threat that they posed as neighbors provided an incentive for Rome to ally itself with the group. Use of the *filioque* subsequently spread from Spain through the Frankish territory.

While the papacy was not quick to approve of it, neither did the papacy take steps to quash the *filioque*. Pope Leo III (795–816) is alleged to have recommended against adopting it in worship, although he approved of the clause in a theological sense.²⁶

A major consideration involved the church's partnership with one of its chief franchisees, the Frankish king Charlemagne. Charlemagne was the church's foremost defender at the time, and also happened to be a staunch supporter of the *filioque*. Since he had begun his public career as a Frankish king he was accustomed to the belief in the *filioque*. Following his crowning as Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne took the opportunity to denounce the Eastern Church as heretic for failing to adopt the clause.²⁷ Charlemagne's zeal on the matter, combined with his value to the pope, contributed significantly to the promotion of the *filioque* in the Western Church.

Rome's tolerance and ultimate approval of the *filioque* figures as a sort of opportunistic behavior against the rest of the Christian cooperative and is predictable in a franchising context. Rome differentiated its product from the established brand name of the greater Christian Church to suit Western consumers. In a franchising framework, Rome was opportunistically destroying value and reducing rents to the other patriarchies. Rome's approval of the *filioque* diminished the value of the brand name of Christianity even though it no doubt increased rents to the papacy. Both the pope and the patriarchs of the other sees excommunicated each other and believers were forced to take sides. It is possible that Rome chose to break with its eastern partners merely because there was more value in refining its own product to suit the tastes of its customers than sticking to a uniform Christian product, but it is also possible that Rome saw the break with the East as a necessary step in rewriting contracts in the West.²⁸

The Arians philosophy essentially held that Jesus was a "supernatural creature." Followers of Arianism, spread the religion across Western Europe as well as into Africa.

²⁶ Source: <<http://www.newadvent.org>> (on "*filioque*") and <<http://www.ccel.org/s/schaff/encyc/encyc06/hlm/ii.xii.htm>> (Christian Classics Ethereal Library). In addition, the 6th edition, Columbia Encyclopedia 2001 (on "Leo III") claims that Leo III "recommended its (the *filioque*'s) omission in the name of East-West unity. Pope Hadrian I (Leo III's predecessor) also is recognized as having been critical of the addition. See <<http://www.ocf.org/OrthodoxPage/reading/filioque.html>>.

²⁷ Source: Orchid Land Publications, <http://orlapubs.com/AR/R140.html>.

²⁸ The growth of the Islam movement had the effect of diminishing the value of Christianity in the East. While Islam had moved rapidly through North Africa and into western Europe through Spain, this movement had been stemmed. By 1000, the point of attack for the Islamic movement was the eastern part of the Christian church. On this basis alone, Rome's opportunism in differentiating its product from the East could have been a profitable strategy.

Papal vs. Lay Investiture

Franchise theory suggests that the expansion of the Roman franchise throughout the West and the economic growth experience during this period raised the value of the Roman Catholic brand name and therefore rents to Rome's franchisees. Most of the rents were collected through the bishoprics. Under the original system of lay investiture rents flowed first from bishoprics to secular rulers. Thus, it was difficult for the papacy to extract further rents.

Around the time of the Eastern Schism, the Roman Catholic Church began to assert a new method of control over its franchise system. In 1059, Pope Nicholas II declared that only the pope had the right to invest bishops. Traditionally, a king or emperor had the authority to invest an individual with the bishop's ring, staff, and respective lands (i.e., the benefices). The 1059 church legislation of Pope Nicholas II established an official precedent for papal investiture, which subjugated the royal right to invest bishops and popes to canonical elections. Nicholas' decree stated that those who would accept an ecclesiastic appointment or other ecclesiastic benefits issued from secular leaders, rather than from the church, were to be excommunicated (Tierney 43-44).

Although the investiture issue has roots preceding the Eastern Schism, it appears to have become more palpable shortly after the split. It is arguable that the Roman Church allowed the *filioque* dispute to mushroom into the Eastern Schism because it made opportunistic actions against its franchisees more defensible. Clearly, neither the eastern emperor nor the other patriarchs of the Christian Church would have ceded to Rome the right to appoint bishops in their territories, and if Rome and the Eastern Church continued to sell the same unified product, then western secular rulers could have appealed to eastern patriarchs to legitimize their lay investitures.

Papal investiture allowed the Roman Catholic Church to assume direct control over bishoprics. Thus the Roman Catholic Church attempted to cut secular leaders off from the revenue stream and redirected the rents associated with bishoprics to Rome. The church tried to remove the middleman, but doing so by breaking its contract with its secular partners. The franchisees did not give up the rents associated with lay investiture without dispute. Indeed, the Holy Roman Emperors of Germany resisted strongly and ultimately maintained a substantial share of the royalties.

IV. EVIDENCE OF PAPAL OPPORTUNISM

In this section we quantify the evidence of papal opportunism. The evidence that we present comes from the frequency, longevity, and allegiance of antipopes. We treat the existence of antipopes as evidence of the incentive misalignments in the organizational structure of the church, a proposition that is hard to disagree with. However, our model goes further. We expect that the frequency and length of the pontificates of antipopes varied with the degree of opportunistic behavior exhibited by the papacy.

Historically, antipopes have been challengers to the control of the Roman Church. Obviously, the term antipope is an invention of the Roman Church, which wishes to claim a clear title to Christianity. Nonetheless, antipopes often claimed the throne of St. Peter and sat in Rome while the "true" pope was exiled to another city or simply roamed

the countryside. Regardless of the revisionist history of the Roman Church, the fact remains that at times antipopes were in control of the purse strings of the enterprise. The existence of antipopes and the constituency of their support versus the constituency supporting the “true” pope offer quantifiable evidence that can be used to test our application of franchise theory to the history of the Roman Catholic Church.

Frequency of Antipope Pontificates

The first antipope was Hippolytus in 217.²⁹ From the time of Hippolytus to the Eastern Schism there were seventeen antipopes over some 800 years. From the Eastern Schism to the Great Papal Schism (1054-1378), there were fifteen. However, of these all but one were concentrated in the period immediately following the Eastern Schism. This was the height of the investiture controversy, when the papacy first began renegeing on its franchise contracts.

Figures 1 & 2 show the time line of popes and antipopes. Table 1 gives the number of years of antipope pontificates over this period. As indicated in Table 1, the pontificates of the antipopes accounted for 63.5 percent within the period from 1054-1180,³⁰ compared to 13 percent of the time from 217-476 (from the pontificate of the first antipope through the fall of the Roman Empire) and 3.6 percent from 476-1054 (fall of Rome through the Eastern Schism). Figure 2 shows the concentration of antipopes in the period immediately following the Eastern Schism.

Table 1: Pontificates of Antipopes Through 1180

<u>Period (A.D.)</u>	<u>Total # Years</u>	<u>Antipope Pontificates</u>	<u>% Antipope Pontificates</u>
217-476	260	34 years	13.0%
476-1054	578	21 years	3.6%
1054-1180	126	80 years	63.5%

The evidence on the frequency of antipopes offers general support for the argument that there was more organizational discord within the Roman Catholic Church during the period following the Eastern Schism than before. The evidence that the lowest incidence of antipopes occurred during the growth phase of the Roman Church is also consistent with the franchise theory predictions. Franchises that survive to maturity do not act opportunistically in their growth stages. Further support for the theory can be found by linking the pontificates of popes and antipopes to their supporters and constituencies.

The Tide of Antipopes in the Wake of Papal Investiture

Table A-I gives a full listing of the popes and antipopes from the Eastern Schism through the papal schism. We identify the following categories for each pope (competing or otherwise): his tenure, nationality, place of birth,³¹ geography, respective supporters, and the presiding emperor.

²⁹ Hippolytus died a martyr along with Pope Pontian in exile on Sardinia. He was sainted as a consequence. The official line is that he was reconciled to the church during his exile with Pontian.

³⁰ We highlight the period through 1180 because from 1180-1378 there is only one antipope.

³¹ If place of birth is unavailable we use the location of the pope’s last known official post (for instance, as bishop) before his appointment to the papacy.

There are sixty-five popes in total. The Roman Catholic Church today recognizes fifty of them as following the true papal succession, while the remaining fifteen are recognized in hindsight as antipopes. Regarding nationality, the first two popes (in chronological order) are German. They are followed, in no particular order, by forty-six Italians, fifteen Frenchmen, one English pope, and one Portuguese.

The category labeled “geography” characterizes the extent of a pope’s stay in Rome during the course of his pontificate. This is important because many of those popes that the Roman Catholic Church recognizes as having been antipopes, actually held court in Rome, while the “true” pope was forced to reside outside of Rome.

As noted above, in the period from 1054 through 1180 there were fourteen antipopes. Table A-I shows their supporters. We can link all of the antipopes of this period to the clash between the Holy Roman Emperor and the pope with factions of Italy supporting one or the other. Starting in 1080, antipopes supported by the emperor held pontificates nearly continuously until 1111. At the end of the pontificate of antipope Gregory in 1121, Pope Calixtus and the emperor reached an agreement on investiture called the Concordat of Worms (1122). According to the agreement:

Bishops in Germany were to be canonically elected, and the emperor agreed to give up the practice of investing them with the ring and staff. On the other hand, he was permitted to be present at the election and to receive homage from newly elected prelates for the feudal lands of their churches. Since the king could refuse to accept homage from a nominee who was unacceptable to him, he possessed in effect a power of veto over the election, and in practice secular rulers continued to have a very large say in the appointment of their bishops all through the Middle Ages.” (Tierney 86)

Thus, after some sixty years of dispute the papacy and the emperor entered into a profit-sharing arrangement that essentially split investiture royalties down the middle. However, the agreement was not solidified for another sixty years, because of warring and conflicts among Italian factions. The political history of this period is discussed in Appendix B.

During the 126-year period spanning 1054-1180 there were 19 “true” popes and 14 antipopes. The pontificates of antipopes covered 80 years, or 63.5 percent of the time. More importantly, popes under the influence of or thought to favor the HRE include a mix of “true” popes and antipopes. Their number totals at least 15 and covers 87 years (or 69 percent of the 126-year period). There is some ambiguity in these alliances and the number could be as large as 22 “true” popes and antipopes spanning 110 years (or 87 percent of the 126-year period).

Probably the most important issue is which claimant to the chair of Peter sat in it; that is, which competing pope resided in Rome. This is important because the person sitting in Rome had stronger control of the cash flows of the church. Evidence on this point is not complete. We only have clear evidence of papal residence for only 76 of the 126 year period. However, during 55 of these 76 years, the pope or antipope residing in Rome was under the influence of the Holy Roman Emperor.

The bottom line is that the struggle for the control of the Roman Church was a pitched battle over the century following the attempt by the papacy to rewrite the franchise

contract with secular leaders of the west. The organizational fight during this time involved a takeover attempt by the Holy Roman Emperor, who was the most prominent secular leader during this period. Overall, the emperor was able to control the papacy or unseat it more than half of the time. Ultimately, a new franchise contract was instituted that shared the rents in roughly this proportion.

V. SUMMARY & EXTENSIONS

We use the franchise model to understand the history of early Christianity. We treat the Roman Church as a franchisor of outlets assigned to secular leaders throughout Western Europe. Predictably, the franchisor was drawn into opportunistic behavior because of the incentive misalignments that are endemic to the franchise organization. Early in the life of the franchise organization, the franchisor is forced by economic exigencies to sell the outlets too cheaply. When the firm proves to be successful, the franchisor has a strong incentive to renege on the franchise agreement and terminate the franchise contracts.

This is the story of the Roman Catholic Church from the fall of the Roman Empire until the Protestant Reformation. Starting around 476, the Roman apostolic see entered into franchise agreements with the secular rulers of Western Europe. It gave these rulers the rights to sell the Christian religion. In particular, it vested the rights of local franchise distribution to the rulers in the form of lay investiture of bishops.

By the year 800, the success of the franchise was ensured. Charlemagne exerted control over much of the western territories. The Roman Church pronounced him Emperor, and then set a course toward reneging on the franchise terms that had led to his coronation.

Tensions between the Eastern Church and Rome increased over this time as well. The disputes largely revolved around dogmatic issues, but clearly the power that Rome wished to exert in the control of its franchisees was hard to reconcile in the context of the larger Christian organization. Rome sought to reclaim the right of investing bishops from the secular leaders of the West. In the East, the secular rulers exercised the right of naming the leaders of the apostolic sees who were equals of the pope in Rome.

The tensions between East and West came to a head in 1054 when the Roman pope and the bishop of Constantinople jointly excommunicated each other. The schism was to be final. Shortly thereafter the papacy laid claim to investiture rights in the Western Church.

We document the organizational struggle that unfolded in the aftermath. A battle for control of the Roman Church ensued for over a hundred years. The contest was defined by the imperial forces of the Holy Roman Emperor who resisted the expropriation of his right to sell bishoprics, and the anti-imperial party that fought for strong papal rights. Both popes and antipopes, alternating between the vying parties, ruled the church. Ultimately, a compromise agreement was enforced that split the investiture royalties between the pope and emperor.

While the evidence presented here focuses on the Eastern Schism, the predictions of the model do not stop there. As other researchers, notably Davidson (1995) and Schmidtchen and Mayer (1997), have documented, the papacy acted increasingly opportunistic

throughout the next 350 years. We argue that this opportunism, predictable in the framework of the franchise structure of the Roman Church, led to the Great Papal Schism in which there were three popes simultaneously vying for control of the organization, and ultimately to the Protestant Reformation where large chunks of franchises split off.

The Protestant Reformation was clearly a turning point in the history of the Roman Catholic Church. Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (2002) lucidly argue that it was monopoly pricing by the Roman Church that led to the break. Our argument is not in conflict with theirs, but we view the evidence slightly differently. We think that it was not so much monopoly pricing but rather the distribution of the monopoly rents that led to the break. Secular leaders had originally partnered with Roman for a share of the rents created by both the brand name of Christianity and the monopoly power of the state. From the mid 11th century on, they were increasingly cheated out of their share of the loot. Eventually, the partnership was no longer valuable to them.³²

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³² Full attention to this extension of the model requires another venue (see Terkun and Maloney 2004), but note the simplicity of the explanation as it applies to England. There is ample evidence of the enormous wealth flowing from English churches to the papacy in the period leading up to the break with Rome. The flow was monitored, bickered over, but ultimately approved by both the king and Parliament until the perceived gains from the partnership with Rome were less than the rents Rome was siphoning. The break with Rome stopped the flow of rents to Rome and redirected them to the royal treasury. The aftermath of the break also fits our story. The social order created by brand-named Christian religion was lost and England struggled through social unrest, regicide, and civil war for a century and a half.

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APPENDIX A: Table A-I. Popes and Antipopes from 1050 until the Great Papal Schism

Popes ³³	Tenure	Nationality	Place Of Birth	Geography	Supported By	Holy Roman Emperor
St. Leo IX ³⁴	1049–54	German	Egisheim, near Colmar	Rome?	Henry III	Henry III (1046), king (1039)
Victor II ³⁵	1055–57	German	Bavarian Nordgau or Swabia	Rome	Henry III	
Stephen IX ³⁶	1057–58	Italian	son of Duke of Lower Lorraine and Junca	Rome	Freely elected in Italy ³⁷	Empress Agnes, regent 1056-1068
(a) Benedict X	1058–59	Italian			Count of Tusculum ³⁸	
Nicholas II ³⁹	1058–61	Italian	Chevron (Savoy)	Rome	Agnes	
Alexander II	1061–73	Italian	Baggio	Rome	Hildebrandists (reformists), Normans of S. Italy, and Beatrice & Matilda of Tuscany	
(a) Honorius II	1061–72	Italian	Bologna			
St. Gregory VII ⁴⁰	1073–85	Italian	Tuscany ⁴¹	Rome ⁴²	Initially, Henry IV	
(a)Clement III ⁴³	1080–1100	Italian	Parma	Rome and Ravenna ⁴⁴	Henry IV	Henry IV (1084), king (1056)

³³ (a) designates antipopes.

³⁴ Leo IX was a relative of Henry III.

³⁵ Victor II was recognized as a "collateral kinsman" of HRE Henry III (newadvent.org)

³⁶ Possibly Stephen X.

³⁷ Grandson of Berengarius II, King of Italy. Not liked by Henry III

³⁸ A powerful Roman family and imperial supporters.

³⁹ Nicholas II was appointed after antipope Benedict X was elected, while Hildebrand was on a trip to Germany.

⁴⁰ Also known as Hildebrand.

⁴¹ Specifically, the town of Soana (Ravacum).

⁴² This was "the last instance in history of a papal election being ratified by an emperor" (Source: Catholic Encyclopedia, www.newadvent.org). Gregory VII was kicked out of Rome twice by Henry IV.

⁴³ Also known as Guibert of Ravenna.

⁴⁴ Clement III died in Ravenna.

Popes³³	Tenure	Nationality	Place Of Birth	Geography	Supported By	Holy Roman Emperor
Victor III	1086–87	Italian	from Lombard Dukes of Benevento	Rome and Monte Cassino ⁴⁵	Hildebrandine cardinals & bishops in Rome forced the papacy on Victor	
Urban II	1088–99	French	Champagne	Sicily, Rome ⁴⁶	Elected by cardinals supportive of Hildebrandine reformers	
Paschal II	1099–1118	Italian	Central Italy	Italy and France ⁴⁷	Elected by cardinals aligned to Hildebrand. ⁴⁸	Henry IV-Henry V (1111), king (1106)
(a) Theodoric	1100	Italian	Bishop of Albano or Santa Rufina		Clement III's followers, Tusculum family	Henry IV
(a) Albert	1102	Italian	Bishop of Santa Rufina or of Sabina		Henry IV, Tusculum family	Henry IV
(a) Sylvester IV	1105–11	Italian	Archpriest of Sant Angelo in Pescheria		Henry V and Roman aristocracy (including Tusculum family)	Henry V
Gelasius II	1118–19	Italian	Gaeta, in southern Italy			
(a) Gregory VIII	1118–21	French	probably Limoges		Henry V	
Calixtus II	1119–24	Italian	from Burgundy			
Honorius II	1124–30	Italian	Fagnano, near Imola			
(a) Celestine II	1124	Italian			Roman house of Pierleone ⁴⁹	
Innocent II	1130–43	Italian	native of Rome	fled to France	Roman house of	Lothar II (1133), king (1125)

⁴⁵ In 1086 an imperial prefect scared away the cardinals from Rome and Victor fled for a year to Monte Cassino. He very briefly returned to Rome when the Normans kicked out the antipope, but continued to retire on several occasions to Monte Cassino.

⁴⁶ Urban II did not enter Rome until nine months after his election due to a Norman civil war going on there. He was in Sicily during this time. After finally gaining entrance to Rome he was forced to leave for island of St. Bartholemew because "the whole city practically was in the hands of the antipope." St. Bartholemew was guarded by Pierleone. Urban II later had help from the Frangipani. It was six years before he sat on the papal throne again, and then only briefly. Urban II returned once more to Rome in 1098 and died there in 1099 in the house of the Pierleone family. "For three years Urban was compelled to wander in exile about southern Italy." In separate instances Urban excommunicated the German HRE and Philip of France. (Source: Catholic Encyclopedia, www.newadvent.org)

⁴⁷ Paschal II journeyed through the countryside holding synods in a manner similar to his predecessor Urban II.

⁴⁸ Paschal II seems to be the last of a line of popes that had been recommended by Hildebrand to succeed him. The cardinals elected him against his wishes during the antipapacy of Clement III.

⁴⁹ The Pierleone family traditionally was opposed to the emperors.

Popes ³³	Tenure	Nationality	Place Of Birth	Geography	Supported By	Holy Roman Emperor
(a) Anacletus II	1130–38	Italian	Pierleone family	Rome	Frangipane ⁵⁰ Roger II (first king of Sicily and of Norman descent), majority of bishops, and Romans (particularly the Pierleoni)	
(a) Victor IV	1138	Italian	Pierleone family		Partisans of Pierleone family	
Celestine II	1143–44	Italian	native of Roman Tuscany			
Lucius II	1144–45	Italian	Bologna			
Eugene III	1145–53	Italian	"neighborhood of Pisa"			
Anastasius IV	1153–54	Italian				
Adrian IV	1154–59	English	Langley, near St. Albans	Rome, Agnani ⁵¹	Frederick I and William of Sicily	Frederick I Barbarossa (1155), king (1152)
Alexander III	1159–81	Italian	from Siena	Agnani ⁵²	Cardinals aligned with the Normans of Naples	
(a) Victor IV ⁵³	1159–64	Italian	Tusculum family		Frederick, minority of cardinals, and Romans	
(a) Paschal III	1164–68	Italian			Frederick	
(a) Calixtus III	1168–78	Italian	bishop of Albano		(initially) Frederick, and Roman imperialist party	
(a) Innocent III	1179–80	Italian	Tusculum family		the brother of antipope Victor IV (1159-64), and other barons of Campagna	
Lucius III	1181–85	Italian	Lucca			
Urban III	1185–87	Italian	Milan			
Gregory VIII	1187	Italian	Benevento			
Clement III	1187–91	Italian	Roman by birth			
Celestine III	1191–98	Italian	Roman Orsini family ⁵⁴			Henry VI (1191), king (1190)

⁵⁰ The Frangipane family traditionally was in favor of the emperors.

⁵¹ Adrian IV was later kicked out of Rome by imperial loyalists (c. 1157), who disapproved of his favoring William of Sicily. He died in Agnani. (Source: Columbia Encyclopedia, www.bartleby.com)

⁵² Alexander III seemed to have spent his entire papacy outside of Rome, at Agnani. He was elected by cardinals that included themselves in "the party of independence that sought to escape the German yoke by an alliance with the Normans of Naples" (Source: Catholic Encyclopedia, www.newadvent.org).

⁵³ Maybe Victor V.

Popes³³	Tenure	Nationality	Place Of Birth	Geography	Supported By	Holy Roman Emperor
Innocent III	1198–1216	French	Agnani			Otto IV (1209), king (1208)
Honorius III	1216–27	Italian	Rome			Frederick II (1220), king (1212)
Gregory IX	1227–41	French	Agnani			
Celestine IV	1241	Italian	native of Milan			
Innocent IV	1243–54	Italian	Genoa			
Alexander IV	1254–61	Italian	house of Segni			
Urban IV	1261–64	French	Troyes			
Clement IV	1265–68	French	Saint-Gilles			
Gregory X	1271–76	Italian				
Innocent V	1276	French	Tarentaise			
Adrian V	1276	Italian	native of Genoese			
John XXI	1276–77	Portuguese	Lisbon			
Nicholas III	1277–80	Italian	Rome (Orsini family)			
Martin IV	1281–85	French	Tourraine			
Honorius IV	1285–87	Italian	Rome			
Nicholas IV	1288–92	Italian	Ascoli			
St. Celestine V	1294	Italian	Neapolitan province of Moline			
Boniface VIII	1294–1303	Italian	Agnani			
Benedict XI	1303–4	Italian	Treviso			
Clement V	1305–14	French	Villandraut, in Gascony			Henry VII (1312), king (1308)
John XXII	1316–34	French	Cahors			Louis IV (1328), king (1314)
(a) Nicholas V ⁵⁵	1328–30	Italian	Corvaro, near Rieti	Rome ⁵⁶	Louis IV	
Benedict XII	1334–42	French	Saverdun, in Toulouse			
Clement VI	1342–52	French	Correze			

⁵⁴ Celestine III was the first of the Orsini family to become pope.

⁵⁵ Also known as Rainalducci.

⁵⁶ Nicholas V sat in Rome during the pontificate of John XXII at Avignon. After a year he submitted to and was pardoned by pope John XXII.

Popes³³	Tenure	Nationality	Place Of Birth	Geography	Supported By	Holy Roman Emperor
Innocent VI	1352–62	French	Mont (Limoges)			Charles IV (1355), king (1347)
Urban V	1362–70	French	Grisac, in Languedoc			
Gregory XI	1370–78	French	Mont (Limoges)			

APPENDIX B: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE TIDE OF ANTIPOPES FOLLOWING THE EASTERN SCHISM

This section is a discussion of the facts presented in Table A-I regarding the rivaling claims to the control of the Roman Church. While the Roman Catholic Church today labels some of the claimants as “true” popes and others as “antipopes” this section illustrates the ambiguity of this taxonomy.

The movement against lay investiture started very shortly after the break with the East. The most prominent personality associated with the movement is Hildebrand (later Pope Gregory VII).

Cardinal Hildebrand started his career in the church as a reformer under Pope Leo IX (1049-1054). Early on he gained a reputation as “the youngest of the reforming cardinals” (Tierney 45). After Leo IX died in 1054 Tierney notes that “there was a radical change of attitude toward the imperial authority among the group of reformers” of which Hildebrand was a part (33).⁵⁷

Hildebrand was successful in the church and “emerged as the dominant figure in the Roman curia” by the time Pope Alexander II was elected in 1061 (Tierney 45). His endurance was marked by the fact that he “was almost the only survivor of the original [reform] group,” according to Tierney (45). In fact, Alexander II is recognized as “a candidate of the Hildebrandists.”⁵⁸

Hildebrand himself was popularly elected pope in 1073, at which point he assumed the name of Gregory VII. Recognized as one of the greatest reformers of the Roman Catholic Church Gregory VII was adamantly against lay investiture, which he saw as “the root of all the evils afflicting the church.”⁵⁹ His beliefs on this matter influenced the elections of at least three popes during this period.

HRE Henry IV was adamantly against papal investiture. As a result, Gregory VII’s relations with Henry IV were severely strained. Thus, in 1080 Clement III was duly installed in competition with Gregory VII until the latter died in 1085. The two succeeding popes (Victor III and Urban II) were elected with the support of Hildebrandine reformers. However, both reigned in the presence of antipopes (Theodoric, Albert, and Sylvester IV) supported by the HRE’s Henry IV and Henry V.

⁵⁷ Pope Leo IX and HRE Henry III had experienced cordial relations, according to Tierney (33). However, both died around the same time (Leo IX in 1054 and Henry III in 1056). Consequently, the emperor left only an infant son who could do little in the face of the radical reformers of the church (33).

⁵⁸ Source: <http://www.newadvent.org> (on “Pope Alexander II”).

⁵⁹ Source: 6th edition, Columbia Encyclopedia 2001 (on “Gregory VII”).

The Counts of Tusculum

The Tusculum family also was quite influential over the papacy in the late 10th century.⁶⁰ For instance, “from 1012 to 1044 three popes of the great Tusculan family succeeded one another: Benedict VIII, his brother John XIX, and their nephew Benedict IX.”⁶¹

During the investiture controversy the Counts of Tusculum were generally supportive of the emperor. The first of the antipopes, Benedict (1058-9), following the investiture dispute was supported by the Tusculum family. They also supported the series of antipopes (Theodoric, Albert, and Sylvester) during Henry V’s conflict with Paschal II over investiture matters. Further, in 1159 a member of the Tusculum family was elected as antipope Victor IV in opposition to Alexander III. He was considered to be a “great friend of the Germans.”⁶² Three more antipopes, Paschal III, Calixtus III, and Innocent III, followed Victor IV during the pontificate of Alexander III.⁶³

Innocent III was the last in the line of antipopes of this period, and he marks the beginning of the end of the investiture conflict between the pope and the German rulers. Pope Lucius III succeeded Alexander III in 1181. Lucius showed himself to be friendly with the Germans. In the following year Tusculum came under attack by the Romans. Lucius III responded to the attack by calling on the German Archbishop of Mainz to defeat the Romans, which he did. Ironically, the mend of the partnership between the Holy Roman Emperor and the pope ultimately led to the end of the friendship between the Dukes of Tusculum and the emperor. In 1191 Henry VI “recalled his German garrison from Tusculum,” and it was destroyed by the Romans.⁶⁴

Other Roman Rivalries

Leading Roman families at the time took sides in the controversy. Two important ones were the Pierleone and the Frangipane families. The Pierleoni were “financiers and merchants, opposed to the empire,” while the Frangipani represented “the pro-imperial nobility.”⁶⁵

After the death of Calixtus, who was responsible for the Concordat of Worms, Honorius II was elected. In opposition the Pierleone family in opposition to the emperor installed Celestine as a rival though his pontificate lasted only a short time.

Again, after the death of Honorius II in 1130, the families backed different candidates, each of whom were elected. The Frangipani supported Innocent II and the Pierleoni supported a competing pope Anacletus II (a member of the Pierleone family). Anacletus

⁶⁰ The diocese of Tusculum (the modern day city of Frascati) essentially was a northern suburb of Rome during this period. Source: <http://www.newadvent.org> (on “Frascati”).

⁶¹ Source: <http://www.newadvent.org> (on “Frascati”).

⁶² Source: <http://www.newadvent.org> (on “Victor IV, part II”).

⁶³ Innocent III was also from the Tusculum family. He was the brother of antipope Victor IV (1159-1164).

⁶⁴ Source: <http://www.newadvent.org> (on “Frascati”).

⁶⁵ Source: “The Normans, A European People”, sponsored by the European Commission (<http://www.norman-world.com/angleterre/index.htm>).

II received support not only from Rome's anti-imperialist faction, but also from Roger Guiscard (Roger of Sicily, the Norman successor and brother to Robert). As a result, "Innocent II had to flee to France."⁶⁶ During this period, the popes were supported by the emperor. However the anti-imperial forces were gaining strength, linked largely to the Normans.

The Role of the Normans

The power struggle between the Normans and German emperors was responsible for dragging out the investiture dispute. The Normans supported the pope over much of this period in terms of protecting the vulnerable territories of southern Italy from Muslim and other invaders.

Prior to the Norman immigration into southern Italy the region was allegedly under the "judicial authority of the Holy See in Rome."⁶⁷ However, the papacy held these property rights according to the forged Donation of Constantine that surfaced in the latter part of the 8th century (Tierney 18). Consequently, others laid claim to the territory, including the Byzantine and German emperors.

However, the introduction of the Normans appears to have unified the opposing claimants, at least initially. For instance, Pope Leo IX and HRE Henry III (a relative to Leo IX) partnered up "to expel the Normans... (and even made a pact with the Byzantines to do so)."⁶⁸ Forces clashed in the Battle of Civitate in 1053 but the Normans proved themselves victorious. Moreover, "the papal army was annihilated and the pope was imprisoned and kept captive for ten months in Benevento."⁶⁹

The Eastern Schism followed shortly thereafter and the investiture controversy heated up between the papacy and the German Empire. The papacy lacked allies. In addition, the Norman leader "Robert Guiscard... was eager to legitimize his position in south Italy by obtaining papal recognition of his rule over the lands he had conquered there," according to Tierney (36). In return for this recognition "he agreed to hold his lands as a fief of the Roman Church and took an oath of vassalage to the pope in which he explicitly bound himself to assist the cardinals in the conduct of future papal elections" (Tierney 36).

Furthermore, in 1059 according to the Pact of Melfi, Pope Nicholas II promised Sicily to the Normans "who were assigned to seize it [from the Muslims]."⁷⁰ After thirty years of war (1060-1090) the Normans wrestled Sicily from the Arabs and ultimately founded the Kingdom of Sicily in 1130.

Consequently, the Normans went "from being 'troublemakers'... to the armed wing of Christianity."⁷¹ Moreover, Robert Guiscard was celebrated as "the defender of the

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.


Church of Rome.”⁷² In fact, he rescued Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) at the height of the investiture controversy when HRE Henry IV invaded Rome and installed the rival Pope Clement III (1080-1100).

The Normans maintained their support for the pope until the papacy and the German emperor had reached an agreement in the Concordat of Worms. Following that were a string of popes disposed to maintain the agreement with the emperor. Nonetheless, the Normans along with the Pierleone and Tuculum families installed a number of antipopes, and were finally able to regain control of the papacy with the election of Alexander III in 1159. Even so, the end-game was not far off.

Although William II of Sicily (1166-1189) faced raids from Emperor Frederick I (Barbarossa) he was facing a greater threat from the East. Therefore, in 1184 he betrothed his aunt Constance de Hauteville (the daughter of Roger II) to Frederick’s eldest son, (the future Henry VI) “in a grand alliance against Byzantium.”⁷³

William II had named Constance as his heiress. In spite of this, after his death in 1189, “the Sicilian nobles, wishing to prevent German rule in Sicily, chose Constance’s nephew Tancred of Lecce as William’s successor.”⁷⁴ When Tancred died in 1194 Henry VI deposed Tancred’s young son and claimed the kingdom of Sicily in his wife’s name. In this way Henry VI was able to “bring back to the fold of the Empire, southern Italy, which had been desired for such a long time by his predecessors.”⁷⁵

Thus ended the tide of antipopes in the period immediately following the investiture conflict. The organizational difficulties with the Roman Church began at this point to shift west to France.



⁷² Robert Guiscard swore allegiance to the papacy in 1080. Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Source: 6th edition, Columbia Encyclopedia 2001 (on “Constance, Holy Roman Empress”).

⁷⁵ Ibid.

