


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
World Championship – Jules Rimet Cup 1966

Final Competition

TECHNICAL STUDY

FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION

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World Championship – Jules Rimet Cup 1966

Final Competition

TECHNICAL STUDY

## FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION

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## INTRODUCTION

At a meeting of the Technical Development Committee of FIFA in May 1965, it was agreed that a selected group of coaches should make a technical study of the final stages of the World Cup 1966 in England. The purpose was to collect factual data and opinion on preparation from the national coaches of the 16 teams taking part, and to observe matches of the Competition with a view to submitting a report and recommendations to FIFA.

Five coaches were invited to join the Study Group: Mr. Gavriil Katchaline of Russia; Mr. Ernesto Santos of Brazil; Mr. Ron Greenwood of England; Mr. Roger Quinche of Switzerland, and Mr. Dettmar Cramer of Germany West, who was asked to direct the work of the group. Mr. Santos later withdrew and Mr. Harold Hassall of England took his place. Mr. Cramer also had to decline because of duties with the West German team in the Competition, and Mr. Walter Winterbottom agreed to direct the study instead.

At subsequent meetings of the Technical Development Committee and the Study Group, it was agreed that:

1. One coach should be attached to each of the four initial groups, to visit team headquarters and observe matches in that zone.
2. A questionnaire dealing with selection and preparation of teams and tactics and trends of football should be completed by interview of each national team coach.
3. Reports should be made of each game stressing important technical points.
4. At the end of the Competition, the group should hold discussions with the national coaches of the Semi-Final teams, and observations in writing should be invited from the remainder. A special meeting was held in Paris of the Technical Development Committee, Study Group and the managers of the World Cup Semi-Final teams, attended also by Sir Stanley Rous and Mr. Antoine Chiarisoli of France, to consider the draft report and discuss further points.
5. Although it was agreed that psychological attitudes of players were an important factor, it was felt that, as there was insufficient time for adequate preparation, the suggested enquiry to obtain personality profiles of the players should not be undertaken.

The Report is divided into four sections:

- A. A summary of the main points of observation, opinion and recommendations.
- B. A report on the statements made by national coaches on the preparation of teams and of their opinion concerning arrangements of the Competition.
- C. Special factors arising from match play and some characteristics of team performances.
- D. Details of Players.

The views expressed in the Report are those of the Study Group and the national team coaches and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of FIFA or any of its Committees.

*Valentin Granatkin,*  
Chairman of Technical Development Committee

*Walter Winterbottom,*  
Director of Technical Study Group

October 1966

## A. SUMMARY OF MAIN FACTORS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Technique, Fitness and Team Tactics**

The Study Group and most team coaches agreed that physical condition of the players, skill technique and tactical play are the three main elements upon which the success of a team's performance in the final competition depends. Though skill technique, individually and collectively, is important, greater emphasis is now being given to physical condition and team tactics. In general terms it is considered that technique is of higher standard among South American teams, whereas fitness and variation of tactical play are more highly developed in Europe and Asia. As has frequently happened before, it is expected that the winning teams will tend to dictate future style and method, and it is thought that the success of England and Germany West in this Competition is likely to influence measures of team preparation for Mexico, with even more stress on the two factors of physical condition and tactics.

It was also considered by some members of the Study Group and some national coaches that the psychological attitudes of the players and factors affecting these attitudes were of importance. It was noted that in several matches players seemed to be uncertain and apprehensive, and to show excessive exuberance or depression according to the state of the game, which had a marked effect on their play. The Study Group and national coaches of the Semi-Final teams, after discussion of this matter, felt that without more exact scientific information it would be wrong to hazard opinion as to the way in which the varied personality traits of players could be evaluated as factors of play or moulded by training procedures.

### **Defensive Play**

Teams are adopting more defensive dispositions of play. Formations of 1-4-2-4 are giving way to 1-4-3-3, 1-1-4-2-3 and 1-1-4-3-2. According to the view of several national coaches, this emphasis on defensive strength in team play is spreading throughout world football. One prominent reason is that team coaches in modern competition cannot afford to lose a match. Similarly, in the early rounds of the World Cup Finals, it is essential to be sure in defence in order not to lose. More coaches are looking for means of overcoming this defensive trend in order to stop the game from being stultified as a spectacle.

Several proposals for alterations to the laws of the game to make for attacking play and reduce numbers of players packing into defence were

considered by the group, but rejected on the grounds that the suggested remedies would create more problems. It is the feeling of the Study Group that to bring about a solution, coaches and teams must work to develop higher standards of penetrating attacking skill.

It was noted that while most teams use a defensive barrier as a major tactic of play, only a few are beginning to evolve methods of attack which can spring from this defensive style in such forms as:

- (i) High personal skill of the few advanced attacking players.
- (ii) Rapid change from defence situations to support the attack, often using defenders in overlapping movements to become the advanced line of attacking approach.
- (iii) Players, who have been coached in earlier years to deal with packed defences, and who can readily adapt their play to defend or attack.
- (iv) Variation of individual and combined approach play with better developed skill in shooting and heading at goal.

### **Refereeing**

Differences still exist between South America and Europe in terms of players' attitudes to referee control, and of the general interpretation and practice in implementing the laws of the game. These differences were sharpened by several incidents which tended to affect the outcome of matches. Arising from interviews of national coaches before the matches started, there was some opinion that World Cup games in England would naturally tend to be played with greater fervour and vigour and with more powerful tackling and body contact. It was noticeable that in early games many serious infringements were committed and star players appeared to be marked men. The sending off of players in subsequent matches proved a disaster to the fortunes of the teams concerned, and it is likely that this acted as a deterrent to foul play in many later matches which were almost free of this kind of incident.

The Study Group feel that players are primarily responsible for match incidents, and that they must adhere to a stricter code of behaviour in not showing dissent towards referees' decisions.

Refereeing is considered to be of particular importance to the successful outcome of the matches in the Finals of the World Cup Competition. In this Competition, differences in referee practice were noted, some strange but of a trivial nature, others revealing variance in fundamental attitudes built up by years of experience. In order to attain higher standards of efficiency, uniformity of interpretation and impartiality, the following suggestions are made:



- (i) There should be wider exchange of top class referees between Europe/Asia and South America.
- (ii) A provisional panel of referees should be selected for the World Cup Competition Finals at least one year before the event to give opportunity for rehearsal of teams of referees, practice as linesmen, and conference/courses where difference in methods are analysed in a practical way.
- (iii) FIFA should be responsible for appointing referees to all international matches of outstanding importance.
- (iv) In the final selection, fewer referees should be involved, say approximately 8 teams of three with 3 reserve teams of young referees watching and gaining experience for future competitions. The reserve teams might well be selected from a "B" list of FIFA referees of younger age but with high potential.
- (v) FIFA should produce films and arrange international conference discussions of referees to help to obtain uniform interpretation of practical play situations particularly in respect of:
  - (a) Control of hard forceful play bordering on dangerous play.
  - (b) What constitutes a foul.
  - (c) Tackling which is acceptable and that which is not.
  - (d) Obstruction.
  - (e) Challenging the goalkeeper and shoulder charging.
  - (f) Application of advantage.
  - (g) When a caution is given and method of cautioning.

There was also a suggestion that to ensure neutrality and impartiality, the selection of referees should be confined to countries whose teams are not participating. At the present time this measure seems to be too drastic and would inevitably eliminate experienced referees from the countries where football is most highly developed.

### **Preliminary Competition**

From interviews with national coaches there seems to be a general feeling that the preliminary competition should now be less tied to geographical principles. It was commented that certain teams, by the geographical system, were regularly guaranteed a place in the final matches, whereas many clearly better teams were eliminated.

As the World Cup is assuming such national and international importance, it is suggested that every step should be taken to ensure that the final sixteen represent the best in the world. It has been proposed that both the winners and the host country should qualify in the same way as others. The Study Group feel that the host country should be exempted

from preliminary competition, but that winners should not have open entry to the next final competition.

There is also a suggestion that consideration should again be given to "seeding" of the teams taking part. In the first place it is suggested that some emerging countries (in the sense of football) should be allowed to take part in a "B" or "Junior" tournament, the winners of the sections of this tournament challenging in the competition proper with the "A" teams. Classification on this basis tends to be resented, but for a competition on the scale of the World Cup it may be inevitable.

Other suggestions include:

- (a) Increasing the number of countries from Sixteen to Twenty for the final competition to give opportunity for more teams from the geographical preliminary competitions to take part.
- (b) Having a central financial pool to meet some of the travelling costs involved, particularly if teams are to be grouped in such a way to ensure that weaker teams do not have easy entry to the final group.
- (c) Relying on the international competitions in each continent or region to produce team entry to the final competition.

The Study Group is conscious of the many political, geographical and financial factors which need to be considered before deciding upon a new procedure for the preliminary competition, and recommend that FIFA should set up a small study group of expert administrators to analyse the many possibilities before changes are recommended by FIFA Executive Committee.

### **Final Competition**

There is always the basic problem of reconciling the desire to produce a competition arrangement which is equally fair to participating teams, against the need to provide the public, and especially overseas visitors with World Cup interests, with the opportunities to see as much football as possible and, indeed, what is considered to be equally important, to have the best match arrangement to ensure the greatest financial returns from attendances and television.

Nevertheless, there is strong feeling from the national coaches of the competing countries in this Competition in England that some steps should be taken to make future Final Competitions more fairly balanced. For example, no team should be compelled to play twice within 48 hours and possibly with a change of headquarters, and each team should have equal periods of relaxation between games. Then, too, it is suggested that the groupings in the final sixteen should be drawn by open and not geographical lot.

There is one suggestion that the Competition should be organised as at present in leagues of four groups of four, but that only the winners of each group should go forward to the Finals to decide the first four teams, and that the second in each group should play-off to decide the next order five to eight.

From Brazil, however, comes the proposal that there should be two leagues of eight teams, which ensures that each team will at least play seven matches. The two teams of each group would then draw for the Semi-Finals. Such a system is worth considering, especially for Mexico where there is likely to be small attendances until the more vital stages of the Competition.

Yet another proposal is made that the present structure of four groups should play as leagues to produce eight teams (first and second in each group), but that these should again form two groups of four teams to play on a league principle, the winners contesting for the Championship and the second teams contesting for Third and Fourth place.

If at all possible, the present idea of drawing lots to settle a tie situation between teams should be avoided. One proposal is that the group position should be decided by the greater number of goals scored and not by goal average. Then in the case of a draw at the end of a game, the winner should be the team having scored the first goal, so that extra time would follow only where no goals had been scored.

The Study Group is of opinion that the time has now been reached when consideration of equality of opportunity should not necessarily be outweighed by matters of spectator viewing, television or finance.

These various possibilities need careful examination.

### **Substitution**

With two exceptions, the national coaches of the competing teams were convinced that substitution of players is essential in the Finals. The penalty of losing a player through injury is so heavy that four years of endeavour can balance on just such a mishap. It is also pointed out that there may be less resort to forceful and wild play if it is known that damaging a player is not of such vital consequence as it is under present regulations.

It is suggested that substitution for one player in the field and a goalkeeper should be permitted at any time during the match. There is no point in proposing that substitution should only take place when a player is injured, since both definition and proof of injury cannot be regulated.

### **Mexico – World Cup Finals 1970**

Because of the problem of acclimatisation, it is suggested that careful observation and medical tests should be taken of the players participating in the Olympic Soccer Tournament in 1968, and countries making acclimatisation tests in special high altitude training camps, should be invited to submit evidence to a special medical advisory committee of FIFA.

### **FIFA Direction and Influence**

It is important that FIFA should continue its present role of encouraging its member associations to improve the game by enlisting their help and co-ordinating their efforts in raising standards, particularly in the organisation of large-scale events such as the World Cup Competition which, because of mass communication, are rapidly becoming a spectacle for the whole world.

There is need for more international exchange of experience, method and opinion in coaching, refereeing and organisation. Bulletins, reports, coaching manuals and films should be increased in numbers and quality, and more frequent use should be made of international seminars to reach understanding on common problems.

A stage has been reached in football competition when the prize of winning a tournament is of high prestige value and when failure is unfortunately received with demoralising shame. The Study Group is convinced that the future of the game depends upon continual striving for higher standards in organisation, refereeing and play. There is need to find new techniques and encourage leadership to apply these techniques to overcome the present negative attitudes. All steps should be taken, irrespective of chauvinistic and financial pressures, to foster the true spirit and best traditions of the game of Association Football.



Opening Ceremony—Queen Elizabeth II. declaring the 1966 World Championship open. On the left H. R. H. the Duke of Edinburgh on the right Sir Stanley Rous, President of FIFA.

## **B. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON TEAM PREPARATION**

At the beginning of the Competition, members of the Study Group visited headquarters of the competing teams and interviewed national coaches with other officials. A questionnaire was completed and the following is a summary of statements concerning some important aspects of team preparation.

### **Selection and Preparation of Team before Arrival in England**

The practice of one person having full responsibility for selection of players is growing. Out of sixteen countries, eleven now adopt this procedure but, of these, Hungary and Bulgaria have an arrangement whereby the national coach's selection is passed for approval to the Association. In Switzerland the selection is done jointly by the national coach and a committee. North Korea, Mexico, Portugal and Brazil use a committee to select the players to form the squad entered for the Final Competition.

Generally speaking, players are chosen for their all-round playing ability, but some consideration is also given to qualities of character and behaviour, particularly ability to respond to group discipline and collective methods of play. Portugal bases its choice largely on players' technical skill, while Chile and North Korea look for a blend of players' of international experience with young players of exceptional promise. Germany West stress the importance in selecting reserves, of choosing players who will help to maintain a good team or camp spirit.

The task of selecting is found to be complicated in most countries by reason of having a large number of players suitable for selection but with few so outstanding as to make choice simple. However, in the time available between Competitions, it is possible to narrow down the number of acceptable players and, generally speaking, national coaches and committees seem to have a clear idea of the nucleus of their players' parties by the date of specific entry of twenty-two names.

On average, some eight players in each squad of twenty-two had also featured in the twenty-two for the previous Competition in Chile. During the twelve months preceding the Final, each country in the search for new talent, had selected on an average some eight new players to join its squad. More than half the countries reported that the team playing in the opening match was more or less the same as that representing the country in international games a year before.

Fixtures for the international programme are in most cases arranged by the Association in consultation with the national coach, but in France, Mexico, Portugal, Argentina and Italy, the Association decides the fixture programme. The average number of full international fixtures in a year is seven, Brazil and Argentina having ten matches in a season.

There is much variation in the number of club matches which are played in a season. In some countries the number lies between twenty and thirty, and though most countries have between thirty and forty games in a season, the number rises up to fifty or more in England, Italy, Russia, Spain and Uruguay.

Fourteen countries find it easy or relatively easy to secure the release of club players for international purposes. England and Uruguay seem to encounter difficulties due to extensive club programmes.

In ten countries no compensation is made to clubs for the use of players in international games. In France, Germany West, Switzerland and Argentina, there is a scale of compensation agreed between the Association and the League or clubs.

Thirteen countries arranged special tours or a series of international matches as a definite part of preparation for the Final of the World Cup, in order to gain experience of styles of play and to acclimatize players to conditions in Europe.

In almost every case special consideration was given to factors of acclimatisation and the type of physical conditions likely to be found in the Competition in England. Brazil, Portugal and Spain paid careful attention to the physical side of the game in preparing their teams and arranging matches.

Most countries like to have special training camps as well as international matches just prior to the Competition. Some arrange matches against club teams, where winning is irrelevant, so that they can try out tactics.

### **Preparation Training**

The training of teams in fifteen countries was primarily under the direction of the national coach with the help of assistant coaches and masseur and sometimes in consultation with the appointed doctor. In Mexico, a technical committee governs the training.

All the teams arrange some form of training or get-together in preparation for each international match. The length of time varies according to the importance of the particular game, and the general need and situation at the time.

In thirteen countries there is collaboration between the national coach and the clubs to assist in the preparation of selected players. In three countries special training is also arranged by clubs after players have been selected.

Physical fitness tests are a general rule in fourteen countries as part of the assessment of a player's fitness. Russia seem to have the most systematic procedure adopting regular tests five times a year.

Thirteen countries, in their programmes of fitness training, give special emphasis to speed. Bulgaria vary training as much as possible to prevent boredom. Switzerland develop fitness through skill practices and Argentina work at methods of team co-ordination in play.

Eight countries felt that there was no need to arrange special periods of acclimatisation. Brazil arrived three weeks early to allow time for players to adapt themselves, and Uruguay took special measures to allow for climate and change of food. France, Germany West and Russia played matches in countries with similar climate and outlook to England.

Bulgaria had two months of special training without international matches just prior to the Competition, but fourteen countries aimed to get their players "match" fit by playing a few "introductory" international games. England and Germany West rested players for a while after a hard season before getting them together for the final stage of preparation.

### **Preparation after Arrival in England**

It is a growing practice to seek quiet headquarters, such as a country hotel or a training camp which is not too far away from the venue of matches. Ten countries would prefer a quiet hotel, but Argentina would have liked a holiday camp or a hotel in town close to soccer facilities, and Bulgaria really would like a special headquarters suited to a football team's practical requirements but not too austere. All countries were reasonably satisfied with the headquarters they had, but Portugal would have preferred somewhere nearer the training ground. Mexico were worried about noise from the street.

Before the competition matches started, most countries (twelve) arranged two series of practical training of about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours each day, one of which was usually a practice match. The national coaches agreed that training would be lighter when once the Competition started, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours a day to keep the players in trim.

On the question of adjusting training according to opponents, only five countries adapted training to any serious extent, and one dealt with tactical side of the match only.



Twelve countries had a set time for players going to bed, but Portugal, North Korea, Argentina and France left it to individual requirements. About nine hours sleep were required on an average.

All except two countries followed a controlled diet. Smoking was forbidden, or tolerated under restricted circumstances; players were expected to cut down smoking. Alcohol was forbidden by thirteen countries, but Germany West allowed two bottles of beer per evening.

On the question of free time and entertainment twelve countries encouraged their players to follow relaxing pursuits, such as walking, table tennis, games, cinema, etc. France followed a "casual" approach letting their players lead a life as near normal as possible. Chile controlled their players the whole of the time, though naturally arranging periods of relaxation. Between matches the usual practice was to allow players to sleep and seek general relaxation, some making use of turkish baths and massage.

With two exceptions, Brazil and Hungary, all countries allowed players to watch other matches, three only by television. Russia allowed certain players to watch.

Reserves are made to train harder than selected players, especially the day after a match. It is considered to be an important factor that teams should have at least 40 minutes practice on the ground where they have to play. It is also suggested that the rule that teams cannot practice against local club sides should be relaxed; reserves badly need match practice during the Competition.

### **Attitude of Players**

Ten countries stated that no one had a special responsibility to consider psychological attitudes and temperament of players, it being left to the national coaches and their assistants. Six countries have a person, either a doctor or trained psychologist, to look into these problems.

Every country tried to induce attitudes towards competition and tension. Three countries, Argentina, Italy and Chile, gave players talks, Germany West and North Korea, worked at getting a good team spirit, and Mexico and Uruguay, emphasised correct behaviour. Brazil took every psychological factor into account. England and Spain made sure that every player had a complete understanding of collective tactics, and everything was done to keep them fully occupied in leisure time. Bulgaria would have liked films to help in relaxation. Portugal, France and Hungary took no particular measures in this field.

In considering the factors which contributed most to building a team spirit, nine countries felt that co-operation and a friendly atmosphere

were the chief ingredients. Uruguay and Mexico thought that financial rewards were also helpful. France looked at this from the individual's point of view. Russia and Spain felt that patriotism helped to weld the side together. Brazil thought that the feeling of being fit and in championship form with the will to win greatly assisted team spirit. Argentina had a special incentive in trying to prove themselves against the pessimism expressed by their countrymen of their chances.

Eleven countries gave an incentive bonus payment in one form or another. Brazil and Portugal felt that these bonuses are so usual now that they are of secondary importance. Mexico and Hungary feel that bonuses definitely get results. Four countries, Germany West, North Korea, Bulgaria and Uruguay, give no incentive bonuses.

Ten countries thought that the conditions in England would not affect their players. England felt that it would be easier to play at home. Some countries said that their players would be affected but did not specify.

Seven countries, which have a number of organised supporters as spectators, say that this has a strong influence on the teams. Germany West usually have good support but say that it does not now influence the players. Some countries from distant lands have few supporters and therefore cannot assess what effect organised spectator support would have.

Many countries feel that the knowledge that the matches are extensively covered by press, radio, film and television does have an effect on the players. They are aware of the need to do well and that more is at stake when people in their own countries are closely following their performance.

### **Medical Attention**

All countries have a doctor usually with one or two assistants, especially masseurs, in attendance. Some also have dieticians and qualified physiotherapists.

Twelve countries keep a check on food whenever possible, eating own national dishes or something similar. Russia are careful about fluid intake. France live as close as possible to normal continental life.

All but three countries, Chile, France and North Korea, use regular and systematic massage. Most teams prefer showers to baths except when players are injured.

Asked about possible improvements to medical arrangements in England, thirteen countries expressed satisfaction. Bulgaria would have liked dental checks and Uruguay and Russia thought that more refined medical apparatus should be more easily available. Switzerland feel that

use might be made of a special medical centre to carry out tests as required by the team's doctor to ascertain strain and to judge the degree of training in order to get maximum effort at the right time.

There is close co-operation between doctors and national coaches. In some countries more than in others the doctor's opinion influences the coach's decision about general preparation and individual players.

### **Match Day Arrangements**

All teams follow a set time-table according to the time of kick-off. They spend part of the day before an evening match relaxing with some very light training. Bulgaria and Portugal do not train. All teams warm up before starting the game, and Argentina reach the ground two hours early to give the players massage.

Eight teams follow a normal routine after matches whatever the result; mostly in the form of quiet relaxation, but Brazil officials make a special effort to comfort the players in defeat. Germany West always arrange for a cold meal after each match.

About half the competing teams are told of the selection the day before the match, the other half are told on the day. France try to announce the team as soon as possible, and Hungary give their selection after the previous game so that players can prepare themselves fully.

Seven countries discuss tactics on the day of the match: Hungary, Portugal, Chile, Russia, Bulgaria, Mexico and Brazil. Other countries try to complete tactical discussions before the actual match day. Germany West maintain that they discuss tactics so frequently that only a few pointers are required before a game.

Again there are different views about tactical discussion at half time. Several countries use the interval as a means of changing tactics where necessary, but a few feel that changes should not be made since it leads to confusion.

### **Opinion of National Coaches**

#### *1. What Special Team Tactics are Required in this Competition?*

Nearly all teams spoke about the need to concentrate on defence. Naturally some teams wanted both a strong defence and an attack, but in the main, teams were concerned about not taking risks, avoiding defeat, using a strong defence as a springboard for attack, and packing players in defence when opponents are attacking. These tactics would be adjusted as soon as a team got the measure of its opponent's strength. Bulgaria and Hungary saw the need for a good defence but also for brilliant individual players in the forward line. England would adapt

their play to opponents but would ensure a strong defence. France were emphasizing speed of play and Portugal planned to play offensively.

*2. Do you Arrange for Other Matches and Opponents to be Assessed?*

All countries do this, except France, but the assessment varies from having matches watched by trained observers and officials, to viewing on television and reading press reports.

*3. How Many Players Are Required for the Final Competition?*

Eleven countries were of opinion that twenty-two players were a sufficient number for each squad, but Bulgaria, Argentina and Mexico would like to see twenty-five, and France would like forty, not that they would necessarily bring this number to the tournament. The Italian Manager thought that twenty-two players in a camp headquarters were too many.

*4. Are There Any Specific Trends in Style of Play Emerging From the World Cup Series?*

Seven national coaches, Argentina, Brazil, England, France, Hungary, Switzerland and Germany West, are of opinion that defensive play will be more strongly practised. This tends to reduce the exploitation of skill, adds more strength to tackling, and the game becomes less interesting.

The style, say the coaches of Portugal and Italy, will be set by whichever team wins. Bulgaria feels that it is only in tactical formations that differences will be seen, since most countries are now alive to modern techniques. Russia thinks that the value of reserves who have to take part in later matches will be an important factor.

*5. Is the Standard of Football Improving in Your Country and In What Ways?*

Only two coaches, from Brazil and Switzerland, felt that soccer was not improving and, in the case of Brazil, this was attributed to the increase in defensive football. Hungary are still recovering from the decline after the Puskas era. In Germany West, young players are getting better coaching.

*6. What Are the Trends in Football in Your Country?*

In five countries, Brazil, England, Hungary, Mexico and Uruguay, the change is more towards defensive football, whereas in Italy, Portugal and Switzerland, there is now a revival of attacking play because it is more rewarding. With more defence there is a tendency towards more personal contact and more fouls.

Four countries, Chile, France, North Korea and Germany West, see the growth in application of skill technique, and Germany West maintain



The Jules Rimet Cup.

that physical condition cannot be improved much more. Bulgaria think more attention is now given to speed in body and mind. Argentina say that the game is becoming more professional, and North Korea say there is a greater study of tactics.

*7. Do You See Any Differences in Play or Interpretation of Law Which are Likely to Cause Problems For Referees?*

Several countries pointed to the need for greater uniformity in international understanding of:

- (a) What constitutes a foul.
- (b) Advantage.
- (c) The difference between fair tackling and that which is considered to be unfair.
- (d) Obstruction which is accepted and that which is penalised.

Argentina maintain that football is rougher at home, but some countries say that there are few differences in play. It is also thought that referees differ in their interpretation of match situation.

### C. OBSERVATIONS ON MATCH PLAY

Before the World Cup Finals began, the sixteen coaches of the teams taking part were asked what type of play they expected to see. Most of them agreed that there would be much more defensive football, and some of them felt that, as the Championships were taking place in England, where hard tackling is a characteristic part of the national style of play, there would be more emphasis on strength of physical condition and team tactics.

Both assumptions were borne out by events. Coaches and teams are realising that a high physical work rate, linked with tactical organisation, can challenge play which is primarily based on high individual technique and can overcome defensive tactics which are increasing. Northern European sides: Russia, Hungary, England and Germany West, seem fully conscious of these needs, though they apply them differently. On the other hand, South American teams, though fit, tend to be more concerned with the technical side of play and rely upon natural skill to create their football rather than the combined factors of speed and power. In individual skill technique, the South American and Latin type countries still lead. It was noticeable, however, that in this Competition there were no new developments in type of skill or its application, except perhaps that curving and swerving the ball is used more frequently and accurately. The Northern European teams are tending to submerge individual technique in favour of collective application of tactics. Hungary seem to be an exception, for they still relate skill techniques admirably to the speed requirements of the game.

It is the opinion of the Study Group that the game of football will develop as a more attractive spectacle if greater technique can be achieved by the teams now emphasizing physical condition and tactics. Equally, those teams relying on skill will have to improve in the use of tactics which demand higher all-round physical condition. The use of brilliant individual skill as revealed in several games by Eusebio, may yet prove to be one of the most effective means of unlocking packed defences, thereby encouraging attacking play because it brings the desired results.

In this Competition, no new outstanding individual talent was seen among the forwards, and only Eusebio of the established players seemed to add greater glory to his reputation.

Without doubt, defensive tendencies in football are growing and becoming more effective. This partly arises from a fear of decisive defeat

opponents from scoring, also gives a hope of snatching a narrow win. and the knowledge that a defensive style of play, whilst preventing Defensive practices are damping down the tempo of games. Apart from some notable exceptions, the matches in the North West Group between Hungary, Brazil and Portugal, the Semi-Final England versus Portugal and the Final—there were many dull matches. Formation systems of 1-4-3-3 and 1-1-4-2-3 predominated, leaving only two to three players in active forward positions, resulting often in a deliberate slowing down of mid-field play to enable other players to move up to assist in attack.

As more teams are using these tactics of massed defence, the tendency is towards:

- (i) Longer shooting from outside the penalty area (in some cases like Uruguay, this power shooting is a strong feature of play).
- (ii) Petty fouling, usually outside the penalty area, or the fringe of the defensive barrier, which though not injurious to players, arouses ire and stimulates retaliation, e. g. deliberate handling of the ball, pushing, tapping of legs to disturb the balance of a player.
- (iii) Slow organisation in developing attacks.
- (iv) More frequent interchange of position among forwards but usually with little effect.
- (v) Deliberate interpassing among defenders without making attacking progress, particularly when the team has a goal advantage.

It is also noticeable that a quick breakaway from defence to attack is less likely when players are falling back on defence than when attempts are made at interception. In this sense, the sweep (extra defensive player) enables the four defenders in front of him in the 1-1-4 system to tackle fast irrespective of the outcome. In using this method, the German defenders often won the ball quickly to restart an attack.

There are two general methods of massing a defence: by dropping back wholesale before the approach until the defenders group in or near the penalty area, and by some players moving back whilst others “shroud” the opponent in possession of the ball to seal off possible angles of passing.

Teams which tried to overcome defensive barriers made use of:

- (i) Individual players in the advanced positions (2 or 3) with highly developed personal technique of play.
- (ii) Quick change from defence to attack sometimes using rear defenders in overlapping movements.
- (iii) Quick darting interpassing at close quarters with snap shooting.





England captain Bobby Moore being handed the Jules Rimet Cup by H.M. Queen Elizabeth II of England. Next to the Queen are Sir Stanley Rous, President of FIFA and H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh.

- (iv) A constant pressure of fast movement between attack and defence to produce a work rate which is tiring to opposing players.

In some matches there were incidents showing that star players were marked men. It is natural that players of outstanding ability will be the subject of special tactical marking in order to reduce their effectiveness. This is a genuine tactical approach. What is reprehensible, however, is the attitude which seeks to subdue these star players "at all costs". Tackling which aims to go for the player as well as the ball must be condemned. Control to stop dangerous play of this kind is clearly a responsibility of national coaches, but it is also necessary that FIFA committees and selected referees should be firm in dealing with such unfair methods of play.

In view of the world wide interest in this Competition, it is suggested that FIFA should arrange for the production of technical books on the organisation of the World Cup Competition, and on the preparation and training methods of the four Semi-Final teams. It is also suggested that consideration should be given to the making of films dealing with the following technical aspects of play:

- (i) Fitness and team work.
- (ii) Individual play and its useful application.
- (iii) Variations and adaptations in tactics.
- (iv) Goal scoring movements.
- (v) Problems of refereeing.

## D. CHARACTERISTICS OF TEAM PERFORMANCES

### ENGLAND

Criticism has been levelled at the way in which the organisation of the Competition gave England, the host country, the advantage of playing on the same ground in all matches, and the benefit of the longest periods of relaxation between games. Host countries tend to have these advantages, due to the opening match ceremony and the need to plan competition matches to attract the greatest number of spectators. But, as a matter of fact, had England been second in Group 1, she would have had to play at Sheffield in the Quarter-Finals.

Experts forecast that England would do well playing on her own soil and before her own people. In previous competitions, Sweden and Chile had also featured prominently due to these favourable "home" influences.

In some quarters it was said that England were favoured by the selection of referees and also by referees being affected by the pressures of partisan English spectators. Such accusations must be dismissed striking as they do at the integrity, knowledge and experience of FIFA officials and referees, who in the line of duty must be motivated by impartiality and fair play.

In effect, England started the Competition with some uncertainty against the defensive measures of Uruguay, but relative to the overall performances of the other teams in Group 1, England won this Group decisively. England's formations varied around the themes of 1-4-3-3 and 1-4-2-4, with normally a minimum of six field players falling back in defence of goal. This did not prevent defenders from using aggressive tackling for the ball and many efforts at shooting from opponents were frustrated in this way.

The attacking movements on a broad front varied in composition of players, with Charlton playing from behind and with occasional raids by full-backs to add to the number of orthodox high crosses for heading.

Statistics show that more than 50% of the shots of England came from outside the penalty area, reflecting to some extent the defensive measures of opposing teams. Against France, however, England was caught in the offside trap on at least sixteen occasions. In these early matches, full of tension, Stiles was cautioned for unfair play, particularly instanced by the foul on Simon.

In the Quarter-Final match against Argentina, England played throughout with a 1-4-3-3 formation and Argentina also drew back on

defence. England seemed unable to make swift attack or to subject the Argentina defence to unceasing pressure. The zoning of England's defence was not effective in stopping sequences of interpassing in mid-field by the Argentine team. Some bad behaviour and fouling from both sets of players finally led to the expulsion of Rattin, though the Argentine team, uncertain of the reason, strongly protested. Following a dreadful scene, the Argentine team began to play for the safety of a draw by using more "containing" play which England found difficult to counter.

The Semi-Final match against Portugal proved to be one of the outstanding matches of the tournament and the best at Wembley, both in the spirit in which it was played and the standard of attacking football. England's 1-4-3-3 showed purpose in attack as well as defence. Passes went to the advanced forwards as quickly as possible and unselfish overlap running by players including defenders put increasing pressure on the Portuguese defence. In this game, R. Charlton's support play was outstanding, and Stiles effectively shielded the attacks of Eusebio. The physical condition demanded of this fast tactical interchange between attack and defence was typified by the play of Alan Ball, who one moment was defending and the next initiating attack or unselfishly running to provide opening for other attackers. England, on balance of play, deserved to win this game, though in the last ten minutes the Portuguese team had good chances to equalise.

The Final match against Germany West saw two teams strong in defence with Beckenbauer and R. Charlton cancelling each other's efforts. Most attacking moves were of a speculative nature with long passes. England on the whole had more of the game, but there were many defensive slips on both sides and several goals came as a result of them. The defence of England played well with Stiles having an outstanding game until extra time, when again the stamina and individual attacking ability of Ball was a notable feature. Both teams played powerfully from defence with backs giving an excellent performance. Hurst again proved himself invaluable as a marksman in heading and shooting. There was some controversy about the fifth goal which gave England a lead of 3-2, many observers claiming that the ball did not bounce from the crossbar over the goal line. Despite its dramatic excitement, the game was played in a wonderful spirit and both teams earned congratulations on their performances.



The England team, 1966 World Champion, from left to right standing: H. Shepherdson (trainer), Stiles, Hunt, Banks, J. Charlton, Cohen, Wilson, A. E. Ramsey (manager); from left to right seated: Peters, Hurst, Moore (captain, holding the World Cup), Ball, B. Charlton.

## GERMANY WEST

In the opening game against Switzerland, Germany West showed the strong features of play which took them to the Final. A defensive system of 1-1-4, using Schulz as the sweep behind four defenders, gave them opportunity for quick tackling at the ball knowing that a mistake would be covered or "swept up" by Schulz. Often Germany West were able to make a quick counter attack as a result of a timely tackle in mid-field. Then, in attack, the team had players of speed and dribbling ability who could run swiftly into forward space with precise timing of the link pass. This attack at speed was excellent and showed the nature of well-rehearsed basic tactical moves. Beckenbauer, as a half back, added dangerous attacking potential to the team, but in some matches he subdued this for a more defensive function.

In the Quarter-Final and Semi-Final matches against Uruguay and USSR, it was asserted that some West German players overdramatised «injury» from fouls. Discounting this, Germany West played with fervour and strength, showing how to tackle for the ball effectively and fairly, and to make sharp attacking moves with a variation of accurate passing.

In the Final against England, some of their attacking flair was reduced by concentrating on defence, Beckenbauer seldom showing his attacking skill. In physical condition and tactical strength, Germany West matched England and, in consequence, the game seesawed dramatically with England, in extra time, finally taking the honours.

## PORTUGAL

The team had a basic 1-4-2-4 formation, but often the attack consisted of only three players whose individual attacking styles were complementary to each other: Torres, the tall centre forward, with long stride capable of solo runs in chase of the ball, and with an exceptionally high jump for heading; Simoes, ready to interchange position and capable of amazing dribbles and snap shooting, and finally Eusebio with his fantastic skill in close ball dribble and power shooting. The defence, while playing well, were often too square and open to a fast breakthrough, yet they were quick in rectifying mistakes and played skilfully with short passes to start up a new attack.

Several goals scored by Portugal in the Group matches were the result of bad defensive lapses on the part of the opposing teams, but the three advanced forwards were always worrying their opponents. In mid-field, experienced players, like Coluna, were able to slow down the game when necessary.

The team's best achievement was in defeating Brazil when the defence, by firm tackling, denied space for the Brazilian forwards to express themselves, and the three forwards, Torres, Eusebio and Simoes, caused many problems for a new Brazilian defence.

Portugal had a shock in the Quarter-Final against North Korea, whose willingness and eagerness to fight for the ball and run into attacking space, produced a surprise three goal lead. Credit goes to the Portuguese team for not panicking and, to Eusebio for brilliant solo attacks.

Against England in the Semi-Final, Portugal played with high skill technique, varying their attacking approach. Until the end of the game, their goal scoring efforts were few and far between despite some splendid mid-field inter-passing. Eusebio was unable to shake off his shadow in Stiles, but Torres and Simoes both threw away gilt edged chances of equalising in the later stages of the game when England were leading 2-1 and were being pressed back in defence. These efforts, calling upon reserves of strength and courage, were deserving of the great ovation at the end of play.

In the game to settle third and fourth places, Russia and Portugal each played defensively with numerical superiority of five defenders against three attackers. Eusebio and Torres were well marked and, in consequence, Portugal made fewer attacks on goal than in any of their previous matches. Even so, they took control of the game in the second half especially in mid-field. Attacks were largely developed on the wings with high centres to Torres, but they did not produce many dangerous moments for Yashin, the Russian goalkeeper.

### **U.S.S.R.**

Russia had a very well trained and fit team, which overcame the North Koreans despite their speed of play. Against Italy, the Russian team used a "sweeper" for additional safety. Their defence, with Khurtsilava completely covering Mazzola, was able to stifle Italian attacks before a shot was made, and in goal Yashin capably dealt with the few chances which fell to Bulgarelli. This was a well-merited victory for Russia, achieved by good defence and the dangerous dribbling attacks of Chislenko and Khusainov.

In their last Group match against Chile, Russia, assured of a place in the Quarter-Final, had made nine team changes. They played badly and many chances fell to Chile who dominated the game even when reduced to ten fit players.

Russia played more powerfully against Hungary, whose outstanding technical play never quite expressed itself until the last twenty minutes.

Russia scored two goals through defensive lapses of Hungary. The game was marred by a number of pestering fouls without causing injury.

The important Semi-Final match against Germany West remained dull for a long time because of the strength of the defences. Playing 1-1-4, both teams were able to give close man to man marking and many of the duels between opposing players were too rough. There was too much tension in the game and after scoring the first goal, the Germans seemed content to play safety first football. When Chislenko was sent off for obvious retaliation and Russia were reduced to ten men, they then tried to mount more attacks but, in the end, Germany West looked the more competent team.

Against Portugal, Metreveli made several good dribbling attacks, but on the whole the game was confined to mid-field play with very few attacks at goal. Voronin played well against Eusebio. The promise of good attacking play in the first half was not maintained. Portugal deserved their win as a technically better team.

### **URUGUAY**

Uruguay achieved a moral victory by holding England to a goal-less draw in the opening match, using a defensive system of 1-1-4-3-2. Their style of approach from mid-field was largely by short passes to a player's feet. Their most dangerous moves came from long passes and high crosses. Forwards were excellent in their ball control and in first-time shooting, but with only two forwards playing up-field, there were few opportunities to raid England's goal. Uruguay had their worst game against Mexico, making a large number of technical mistakes and appearing to have lost the sparkle and spirit of earlier play. Against Germany West, players became upset by the referee's decisions, especially in penalising their tackles which were often late in timing. With two players sent off, there was little chance of Uruguay making a recovery. The players behaved badly towards the referee even after the end of the game.

### **HUNGARY**

Hungary used variations of 1-4-3-3 formation. The technical quality of passing and movement off the ball were as high as ever, delighting spectators in matches against Portugal and especially Brazil. Unfortunately serious defensive lapses, and failure to score when good chances were created by brilliant football, led to the team's failure. Against Brazil, Hungary played their best football with players running at speed in anticipation of cleverly timed passes. This was a game played in wonderful spirit by the two teams concerned, and set the highest standard of soccer as a spectacle for the whole of the tournament.



## **ARGENTINA**

The Argentine team were technically skilful in their play and had physical condition to maintain pressure. It was sad to see this potential marred by bad behaviour of certain players and some dangerous fouling. The first match against Spain produced some excellent football from individuals, and though several fouls occurred, they did not seriously affect the attitude of players to each other, probably because there was no language difficulty. Against Germany West, Argentina played more defensively, especially after Albrecht was sent off. The game was spoiled by continuous fouling, including deliberate kicking at an opponent. Play was better in the Quarter-Final, against England, though Argentina seemed once more to be concentrating on a safe defence. There were several fouls from both sides which increased and strained the attitudes between players. This ultimately led to the expulsion of Rattin, after which Argentina tried to prevent England from scoring, often by long inter-passing sequences.

## **KOREA D.P.R.**

Korea D.P.R. gave a remarkable performance for a team with limited experience in world football. The energetic enthusiasm of the players, the speed of their movements and their determination not to surrender, won the hearts of spectators. Though technically inferior to Chile and Italy, they kept the ball running and seemed never to tire. Having defeated Italy, they produced yet another surprising upset in gaining a 3-0 lead over Portugal in the Quarter-Final.

## **FRANCE**

Playing basically to a 1-4-2-4 system, giving way to 1-4-3-3, France had the ability to build up attacks swiftly and neatly with short range passes through the lines, i.e. from full-backs to half-back and then to forwards. Many times in matches against Mexico, Uruguay and England, they developed dangerous interpassing moves, but usually the forwards were outnumbered by the number of defenders and the final scoring effort rested more often than not on individual effort and a forced shot from a longer distance than was called for. Against Mexico it did not seem that all players were fully fit, and against England, the last match, Herbin was limping at the beginning of play. In later stages of this game, with a further injury to Simon, France despite brave efforts had not the strength to match England. In this game, shots were again made from a long distance, some eighteen out of twenty-two being from outside the penalty area.

## **MEXICO**

The Mexican team played to a 1-4-4-2 system in the first match against France, i.e. with only two players in the forward attacking positions. In attacking, therefore, there was a good deal of slow interpassing in mid-field, whilst other forwards moved up to more advanced positions of play. Only eleven shots were made, insufficient to justify victory. In the second match against England, Mexico played completely on defence, using at times a 1-9-1 formation. Though England attacked throughout the game, the defensive barrier held the scoring to two goals. The last match against Uruguay showed a new Mexico playing 1-4-2-4, building up good attacks and making many chances to score. With four forwards in attack, players interchanged positions intelligently and with effect. The defenders in this game were quick to intercept and to start up counter attacks. All three matches were vitally different from a tactical point of view.

## **SWITZERLAND**

Playing 1-4-2-4, the Swiss team looked technically as good as the West German side in their first match, but they lacked the strength and speed and gradually began to look slow in comparison, both in running to cover in defence and in interpassing exchanges. In the second game against Spain, Switzerland tried hard, but this was a negative game with defences on top and though Switzerland were better at push and run play, they could not withstand the pressure when winning 1-0. Argentina, in the last match, seemed to be content in holding Switzerland to a draw, but after scoring they could rely on a six to eight man defensive barrier to hold the Swiss team, now desperate to achieve some success. The crowd in this match gave its encouragement to Switzerland. Decisions on balance went against Argentina but they took this well. To their credit, Switzerland in all their matches never stopped trying, but it was apparent that the teams fielded had not sufficient skill or driving power to overcome any of the strong opponents.

## **SPAIN**

Looking back, the first match against Argentina was undoubtedly vital for Spain. Playing 1-4-2-4, they were as cautious as Argentina in the opening stages, but as soon as Argentina scored, Spain attacked with six to seven men to equalise. The game was then well balanced until Argentina scored a second goal. The individual play of some Spanish players



The team of Germany West lined up before the Final (from right to left): Seeler, Tilkowski, Schnellinger, Beckenbauer, Schulz, Emmerich, Weber, Haller, Held, Overath, Höttges. Next to the German captain Uwe Seeler are linesman Tofik Bakhrarov (USSR) and referee Gottfried Dienst (Switzerland).

was excellent and Suarez when near goal showed brilliant attack. The game had many fouls but players accepted them in good spirit. Spain had no difficulty in beating Switzerland in the second match, and therefore they had to win against Germany West to have any chance of progressing to the Quarter-Final. They attacked from the beginning of play and scored first, but Germany West gradually took control. Spain ran unceasingly trying in vain to open up a very strong West German defence.

### **BULGARIA**

Although Bulgaria finished last in their Group, losing all matches, they showed a surprising strength and tenacity in their play. Playing 1-1-4-2-3, they were very compact in defence but sometimes their interpassing out of defence was too deliberate and therefore readily intercepted. They did not seem to have enough variety or ability in attack to threaten Brazil. The same pattern was revealed against Portugal, when sometimes five Bulgarian defenders, with Zhechev outstanding, were held back to stop two Portuguese forwards, Torres and Eusebio. Amongst the forwards, Yakimov and Asparuhov were clever in dribbling. In the final match, Bulgaria attacked with more conviction and with some intelligently constructed football. They had several splendid chances to increase their lead at certain stages of the game, but when Hungary scored a third goal, Bulgaria became dispirited. Technically, Bulgaria were a sound team, but they lacked speed and thrust to capitalise on basic mid-field control.

### **BRAZIL**

Brazil played their customary 4-2-4 and demonstrated their great individual technical skill. In mid-field, they were able to accelerate in control of the ball across any oncoming opponent, thereby evading a tackle. Near the penalty area they revealed particular skill in bringing the ball under control with the chest and turning to evade an opponent as it dropped to the ground. Every forward seemed willing to run unselfishly to shake off close marking by opponents, and was able to play fast "one touch" football, sometimes using a clever chip overhead. Against Bulgaria, they scored two goals from curving free kicks, a speciality of Brazilian play. In the second match, playing without Pele, Brazil still showed high individual ball skill in their attempts to score, but the Hungarian defence smothered most of the final stages of attack. The speed of Hungarian attacks often outpaced the Brazil full backs. In the final match, though Pele was back in the side, there were many changes particularly in defence which seemed to start the game under emotional

stress. With two goals down, Pele was seriously injured. Brazil still tried hard but there did not seem enough improvisation in attack, and the defenders were inclined to send too many long clearances over the heads of their forwards. There was a distinct feeling that somehow this was to be an unhappy day and the players towards the end of the game seemed disheartened by the realisation that they were losing out of the World Cup.

## CHILE

In their opening match against Italy, Chile seemed nervous and played defensively. They seldom developed attacks beyond the initial stages of a short combined passing in mid-field, which was forced to move laterally by the Italian defence. Chile were unfortunate to lose Tobar through injury after 30 minutes of play. Against North Korea, playing more open 1-4-2-4, Chile might have won had they taken all their chances, some of the easiest of them being deplorably missed. The game pleased the spectators, because the North Koreans never gave up. Chile again showed good collective play against Russia but were unable to take advantage of several goal scoring opportunities. Chile were handicapped by an injury to Marcos in the first minute of this game.

## ITALY

Italy, with their disciplined defensive system, established themselves by a controlled win over Chile in the first match, but the forwards did not reveal their undoubted skill, except in a few well executed short passing movements. Against Russia, the Italians could not press home their counter attacks. Even so, two or three splendid goal chances were thrown away in the early stages of the game. As the game proceeded, the Italian forwards were held more easily by a very compact Russian defence. The final match against North Korea was a disaster. Italy started with a sure methodical game and gained two good goal chances but failed to score. It seemed only a question of time before the goals would come: Then, after 35 minutes, Bulgarelli was injured and took no further part in the game. With ten men, the morale of the team was affected, more so, when North Korea scored. In the second half, despite energetic attacks by the Italians, the North Koreans managed to stop them from scoring. The crowd supported the North Koreans because they could see that the Koreans were about to produce the biggest surprise upset of the tournament.

## E. TEAM OFFICIALS AND 22 SELECTED PLAYERS

<i>Name of Association</i>	Asociación del Fútbol Argentino
<i>Technical Director</i>	
<i>Manager / Coach</i>	Juan Carlos LORENZO
<i>Assistant</i>	Profesor Rodolfo Victor TORRECILLAS
<i>Medical Officer</i>	Dr. Felix VERNA
<i>Assistants</i>	Dr. PITTALUGA and Angel CASTRO

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Antonio ROMA	34	181	85	40	40
2	Rolando Hugo IRUSTA	28	185	82	6	3
3	Hugo Orlando GATTI	21	180	72	20	3
4	Roberto Alfredo PERFUMO	23	180	75	25	10
5	José VARACKA	34	182	78	75	35
6	Oscar Osvaldo CALICS	26	178	78	31	6
7	Silvio MARZOLINI	26	183	80	60	23
8	Roberto Oscar FERREIRO	31	175	70	40	19
9	Carmelo SIMEONE	31	170	72	60	30
10	Antonio Ubaldo RATTIN	29	189	88	90	37
11	José Omar PASTORIZA	24	178	74	15	2
12	Jorge Rafael ALBRECHT	24	176	75	15	30
13	Nelson Juan LÓPEZ	25	173	74	29	3
14	Mario Roberto CHALDU	24	172	72	6	10
15	Jorge Raul SOLARI	24	173	70	29	3
16	Alberto Mario GONZALEZ	24	170	70	50	18
17	Juan Carlos SARNARI	24	178	78	59	2
18	Alfredo Hugo ROJAS	29	185	82	40	13
19	Luis ARTIME	27	174	73	55	14
20	Ermindo Angel ONEGA	26	173	72	60	20
21	Oscar MAS	19	162	65	45	14
22	Aníbal TARABINI	24	160	69	2	2




1  
A. ROMA



2  
R. IRUSTA



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H. GATTI



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R. PERFUMO



5  
J. VARACKA



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O. CALICS



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S. MARZOLINI



8  
R. FERREIRO



9  
C. SIMEONE



10  
A. RATTIN



11  
J. PASTORIZA



12  
J. ALBRECHT



13  
M. LÓPEZ



14  
M. CHALDU



15  
J. SOLARI



16  
E. GONZALEZ



17  
J. SARNARI



18  
A. ROJAS



19  
L. ARTIME



20  
E. ONEGA



21  
O. MAS



22  
A. TARABINI

## ARGENTINA

*Name of Association* Confederação Brasileira de Desportos

*Technical Director*  
*Manager / Coach* Vicente Italo FEOLA

*Assistants* Paulo Lima AMARAL and Rudolf O. HERMANNY

*Technical Supervisor* Carlos Oliveira NASCIMENTO

*Medical Officer* Hilton Lopes GOSLING

*Assistant* Mario AMERICO

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Gylmar Santos NEVES	35	180	72	89	—
2	Djalma SANTOS	37	171	73	95	—
3	José Maria Fidelis SANTOS	22	165	64	6	—
4	Hideraldo Luiz BELLINI	36	182	83	61	—
5	Hercules Brito RUAS	26	182	81	9	—
6	Altair Gomes FIGUEIREDO	28	173	59	12	—
7	Orlando P. CARVALHO	30	177	73	46	—
8	Henrique Paulo OLIVEIRA	23	168	65	5	—
9	Rildo Costa MENEZES	24	172	65	17	—
10	Edson A. NASCIMENTO	24	171	74	61	—
11	Gerson Oliveira NUNES	25	171	69	20	—
12	Hailton Correia ARRUDA	29	187	82	10	—
13	Denilson C. MACHADO	23	181	75	6	—
14	Antonio Santos LIMA	24	173	73	17	—
15	José Ely MIRANDA	33	170	70	36	—
16	Manoel Francisco SANTOS	32	169	72	55	—
17	Jair VENTURA FILHO	21	172	71	17	—
18	Alcindo Martha FREITAS	21	170	73	2	—
19	Walter Machado SILVA	26	174	71	5	—
20	Eduardo G. ANDRADE	19	172	68	5	—
21	Ademir BARROS	24	167	68	9	—
22	Jonas Eduardo AMERICO	16	167	64	3	—





1  
G. NEVES



2  
D. SANTOS



3  
J. SANTOS



4  
H. BELLINI



5  
H. RUAS



6  
A. FIGUEIREDO



7  
O. CARVALHO



8  
H. OLIVEIRA



9  
R. MENEZES



10  
E. NASCIMENTO



11  
G. NUNES



12  
H. ARRUDA



13  
D. MACHADO




14  
A. LIMA



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J. MIRANDA



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M. SANTOS



17  
J. VENTURA FILHO



18  
A. FREITAS



19  
W. SILVA



20  
E. ANDRADE



21  
A. BARROS

## BRAZIL



22  
J. AMERICO

*Name of Association* Bulgarian Football Federation

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach* Krastio CHAKAROV

*Assistants*

Rudolf VITLACIL and Peter ARGIROV

*Medical Officer*

Dr. Konstantin ZACEV

*Assistants*

Ivan STOYCEV and Atanas BOGDANOV

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	George NAIDENOV	35	179	79	51	5
2	Alexander SHALAMANOV	25	177	70	9	1
3	Ivan VUTZOV	27	179	77	17	13
4	Boris GAGANELOV	24	177	75	14	1
5	Dimiter PENEV	21	174	73	15	—
6	Dobromir ZHECHEV	24	182	72	13	1
7	Dinko DERMENDJIEV	25	172	69	5	10
8	Stoyan KITOV	27	174	68	20	—
9	George ASPARUHOV	23	184	81	25	—
10	Peter ZHEKOV	22	178	77	4	8
11	Ivan KOLEV	36	167	66	74	—
12	Vasil METODIEV	31	170	71	17	25
13	Dimiter YAKIMOV	25	177	70	36	1
14	Nikola KOTKOV	28	177	70	21	24
15	Dimiter LARGOV	30	174	76	20	5
16	Alexander KOSTOV	28	172	71	8	10
17	Stefan ABADJIEV	32	178	69	5	10
18	Evgeni YANCHOVSKI	28	174	70	10	20
19	Vidin APOSTOLOV	25	171	74	10	3
20	Ivan DAVIDOV	23	180	79	—	—
21	Simeon SIMEONOV	20	180	74	2	1
22	Ivan DEYANOV	31	173	67	9	6



1  
G. NAIDENOV



2  
A. SHALAMANOV



3  
I. VUTZOV



4  
B. GAGANELOV



5  
D. PENEV



6  
D. ZHECHEV



7  
D. DERMENDJIEV



8  
S. KITOV



9  
G. ASPARUHOV



10  
P. ZHEKOV



11  
I. KOLEV



12  
V. METODIEV



13  
D. YAKIMOV



14  
N. KOTKOV



15  
D. LARGOV



16  
A. KOSTOV



17  
S. ABADJIEV



18  
E. YANCHOVSKI



19  
V. APOSTOLOV



20  
I. DAVIDOV



21  
S. SIMEONOV

## BULGARIA



22  
I. DEYANOV

*Name of Association*      Federación de Football de Chile

*Technical Director*  
*Manager / Coach*      Luis ALAMOS

*Assistant*                      Gustavo GRAF


*Medical Officer*              Dr. José ERCOLE

*Assistant*                      Raul ARAYA

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Pedro ARAYA	24	174	70	11	—
2	Hugo BERLY	22	173	68	4	—
3	Carlos CAMPOS	28	174	73	3	—
4	Humberto CRUZ	27	168	65	14	—
5	Humberto DONOSO	24	170	69	3	—
6	Luis A.EYZAGUIRRE	26	170	68	45	—
7	Elias FIGUEROA	26	175	70	24	—
8	Alberto FOUILLOUX	26	178	74	22	—
9	Adan GODOY	27	180	75	31	—
10	Roberto HODGE	26	174	70	4	—
11	Honorino LANDA	23	176	70	14	—
12	Ruben MARCOS	23	178	75	12	—
13	Juan OLIVARES	23	172	69	5	—
14	Ignacio PRIETO	31	175	68	30	—
15	Jaime RAMIREZ	27	176	70	15	—
16	Orlando RAMIREZ	23	175	68	2	—
17	Leonel SANCHEZ	24	174	72	29	—
18	Armando TOBAR	28	175	70	25	—
19	Francisco VALDES	23	178	69	2	—
20	Alberto A. VALENTINI	24	167	65	12	—
21	Hugo VILLANUEVA	24	176	74	17	—
22	Guillermo YAVAR	25	178	73	4	—



1  
P. ARAYA



2  
H. BERLY



3  
C. CAMPOS



4  
H. CRUZ



5  
H. DONOSO



6  
L. EYZAGUIRRE



7  
E. FIGUEROA



8  
A. FOUILLOUX



9  
A. GODOY



10  
R. HODGE



11  
H. LANDA



12  
R. MARCOS



13  
J. OLIVARES



14  
I. PRIETO



15  
J. RAMIREZ



16  
O. RAMIREZ



17  
L. SANCHEZ



18  
A. TOBAR



19  
F. VALDES



20  
A. VALENTINI



21  
H. VILLANUEVA

## CHILE



22  
G. YAVAR

*Name of Association*    The Football Association

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach*        A. E. RAMSEY

*Assistants*

H. SHEPHERDSON and L. COCKER

*Medical Officer*

Dr. A. L. BASS

*Assistant*

Dr. U. N. PHILLIPS


No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Gordon BANKS	27	180	82	24	—
2	George COHEN	26	177	78	20	—
3	Ramon WILSON	31	171	68	41	—
4	Norbert Peter STILES	23	167	66	11	—
5	John CHARLTON	29	186	81	11	—
6	Robert Frederick MOORE	24	182	81	38	—
7	Alan James BALL	20	170	64	6	—
8	James Peter GREAVES	26	172	66	47	—
9	Robert CHARLTON	28	173	73	63	—
10	Geoffrey Charles HURST	24	181	80	1	—
11	John CONNELLY	27	175	69	16	—
12	Ronald D. SPRINGETT	30	179	78	32	—
13	Peter BONETTI	24	179	69	—	—
14	James Ch. ARMFIELD	30	177	77	41	—
15	Gerald BYRNE	27	177	74	1	—
16	Martin Stanford PETERS	22	182	74	18	—
17	Ronald FLOWERS	31	180	81	48	—
18	Norman HUNTER	22	182	75	2	—
19	Terence Lionel PAINE	27	170	65	16	—
20	Ian CALLAGHAN	23	170	68	—	—
21	Roger HUNT	27	175	75	10	—
22	George E. EASTHAM	29	171	63	18	—



1  
G. BANKS



2  
G. COHEN



3  
R. WILSON



4  
N. STILES



5  
J. CHARLTON



6  
R. MOORE



7  
A. BALL



8  
J. GREAVES



9  
R. CHARLTON



10  
G. HURST



11  
J. CONNELLY



12  
R. SPRINGETT



13  
P. BONETTI



14  
J. ARMFIELD




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G. BYRNE



16  
M. PETERS



17  
R. FLOWERS



18  
N. HUNTER



19  
T. PAINE



20  
I. CALLAGHAN



21  
R. HUNT

## ENGLAND



22  
G. EASTHAM

*Name of Association* Fédération Française de Football

*Technical Director*  
*Manager / Coach* Henri GUÉRIN

*Assistants* Robert DOMERGUE and Lucien JASSERON

*Medical Officer* Dr. Jean VITTORI

*Assistant* Georges BABONNEAU

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Marcel AUBOUR	26	180	78	11	—
2	Marcel ARTELESA	28	173	70	17	—
3	Edmond BARAFFE	24	170	64	3	2
4	Joseph BONNEL	27	171	66	17	—
5	Bernard BOSQUIER	24	178	78	9	2
6	Robert BUDZYNSKI	26	176	72	4	1
7	André CHORDA	28	170	70	20	4
8	Nestor COMBIN	26	180	75	5	—
9	Didier COUECOU	22	173	72	—	1
10	Hector DE BOURGOING	32	172	72	2	—
11	Gabriel DE MICHELE	25	175	71	—	3
12	Jean DJORKAEFF	27	172	72	7	1
13	Philippe GONDET	24	173	69	5	—
14	Gérard HAUSSER	25	174	69	9	3
15	Yves HERBET	21	167	65	4	2
16	Robert HERBIN	27	179	74	17	3
17	Lucien MULLER	32	175	73	16	2
18	Jean-Claude PIUMI	26	168	64	2	2
19	Laurent ROBUSCHI	31	167	67	4	2
20	Jacques SIMON	25	172	64	5	—
21	Georges CARNUS	26	176	76	1	2
22	Johny SCHUTH	25	173	72	—	—





1  
M. AUBOUR



2  
M. ARTELESA



3  
E. BARAFFE



4  
J. BONNEL



5  
B. BOSQUIER



6  
R. BUDZYNSKI



7  
A. CHORDA



8  
N. COMBIN



9  
D. COUECOU



10  
H. DEBOURGOING



11  
G. DE MICHELE



12  
J. DJORKAEFF



13  
P. GONDET



14  
G. HAUSSER



15  
Y. HERBET



16  
R. HERBIN



17  
L. MULLER



18  
J. PIUMI



19  
L. ROBUSCHI



20  
J. SIMON



21  
G. CARNUS

FRANCE



22  
J. SCHUTH

*Name of Association*    Deutscher Fussball-Bund

*Technical Director*  
*Manager / Coach*        Helmut SCHÖN

*Assistants*                Dettmar CRAMER and Udo LATTEK

*Medical Officer*         Prof. Dr. H. SCHOBERTH

*Assistant*                 Erich DEUSER

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Hans TILKOWSKI	31	182	80	32	—
2	Horst HÖTTGES	23	174	71	13	—
3	Karl-Heinz SCHNELLINGER	27	180	79	31	—
4	Franz BECKENBAUER	21	182	76	8	—
5	Willi SCHULZ	28	181	75	31	—
6	Wolfgang WEBER	22	176	80	12	—
7	Albert BRÜLLS	29	167	73	23	—
8	Helmut HALLER	27	177	78	22	—
9	Uwe SEELER	30	170	75	48	—
10	Siegfried HELD	24	176	74	4	—
11	Lothar EMMERICH	25	178	79	1	—
12	Wolfgang OVERATH	23	176	71	16	—
13	Heinz HORNIG	29	168	65	7	—
14	Friedel LUTZ	27	180	74	11	—
15	Bernd PATZKE	23	176	75	2	—
16	Max LORENZ	27	186	80	7	—
17	Wolfgang PAUL	26	186	85	—	—
18	Klaus-Dieter SIELOFF	24	177	81	8	—
19	Werner KRÄMER	26	173	70	11	—
20	Jürgen GRABOWSKI	22	174	67	3	—
21	Günter BERNARD	27	179	76	4	—
22	Josef MAIER	22	184	75	1	—



1  
H. TILKOWSKI



2  
H. HÖTTGES



3  
K. SCHNELLINGER



4  
F. BECKENBAUER



5  
W. SCHULZ



6  
W. WEBER



7  
A. BRÜLLS



8  
H. HALLER



9  
U. SEELER



10  
S. HELD



11  
L. EMMERICH



12  
W. OVERATH



13  
H. HORNIG



14  
F. LUTZ



15  
B. PATZKE



16  
M. LORENZ



17  
W. PAUL



18  
S. SIELOFF



19  
W. KRÄMER



20  
J. GRABOWSKI



21  
G. BERNARD



22  
J. MAIER

GERMANY WEST

*Name of Association* Hungarian Football Federation

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach* Lajos BAROTI and G. HONTI

*Assistant*

Rudolf ILLOVSZKY

*Medical Officer*

Dr. Zoltan BOTÁR

*Assistant*

Lajos VINKOVICS

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Antal SZENTMIHÁLYI	27	180	79	20	—
2	Benó KÁPOSZTA	24	176	71	3	—
3	Sándor MÁTRAI	33	181	77	70	—
4	Kálmán SÓVÁRI	25	180	76	16	—
5	Kálmán MÉSZÖLY	25	180	76	37	—
6	Ferenc SIPOS	33	180	76	70	—
7	Ferenc BENE	22	172	70	17	—
8	Zoltán VARGA	21	174	71	3	—
9	Flórián ALBERT	24	180	76	51	—
10	János FARKAS	24	176	73	13	—
11	Gyula RÁKOSI	28	174	68	27	—
12	Dr. Máté FENYVESI	32	174	68	76	—
13	Imre MATHÉSZ	29	174	69	5	—
14	István NAGY	27	174	69	9	—
15	Dezsó MOLNÁR	27	174	68	1	—
16	Lajos TICHY	31	180	76	70	—
17	G. SZEPESI-SZEDUNKA	27	176	73	2	—
18	Kálmán IHÁSZ	25	174	72	9	—
19	Lajos PUSKÁS	22	176	70	2	—
20	Antal NAGY	22	176	70	3	—
21	József GELEI	28	180	81	7	—
22	István GÉCZI	21	181	81	2	—




1  
A. SZENTMIHÁLYI



2  
B. KÁPOSZTA



3  
S. MÁTRAI



4  
K. SÓVÁRI



5  
K. MÉSZÖLY



6  
F. SIPOS



7  
F. BENE



8  
Z. VARGA



9  
F. ALBERT



10  
J. FARKAS



11  
G. RÁKOSI



12  
Dr. M. FENYVESI



13  
I. MATHESZ



14  
I. NAGY



15  
D. MOLNÁR



16  
L. TICHY



17  
G. SZEPESI-  
SZEDUNKA



18  
K. IHÁSZ



19  
L. PUSKÁS



20  
A. NAGY



21  
J. GELEI

## HUNGARY



22  
I. GÉCZI

*Name of Association*      Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach*              Edmondo FABBRI

*Assistant*

Ferruccio VALCAREGGI

*Medical Officer*

Dr. Fino FINI

*Assistants*

Carlo TRESOLDI and Ulisse BORTOLOTTI

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Enrico ALBERTOSI	27	182	77	8	2
2	Roberto ANZOLIN	28	177	75	1	3
3	Paolo BARISON	31	184	81	6	3
4	Giacomo BULGARELLI	26	176	71	23	2
5	Tarcisio BURGNIH	27	179	75	10	1
6	Giacinto FACCHETTI	24	188	85	20	—
7	Romano FOGLI	28	172	69	12	1
8	Aristide GUARNERI	28	181	79	11	1
9	Francesco JANICH	29	180	80	5	8
10	Antonio JULIANO	23	173	70	1	—
11	Spartaco LANDINI	22	179	73	—	—
12	G. Franco LEONCINI	27	175	77	1	1
13	Giovanni LODETTI	24	174	69	11	2
14	Sandro MAZZOLA	24	179	64	19	—
15	Luigi MERONI	23	170	67	2	1
16	Ezio PASCUTTI	29	174	71	15	2
17	Marino PERANI	27	168	69	—	2
18	Pier Luigi PIZZABALLA	27	175	71	—	—
19	Giovanni RIVERA	23	175	68	23	1
20	Francesco RIZZO	23	171	70	2	—
21	Roberto ROSATO	23	176	73	12	1
22	Sandro SALVADORE	27	179	73	27	—



1  
E. ALBERTOSI



2  
R. ANZOLIN



3  
P. BARISON



4  
G. BULGARELLI



5  
T. BURGNICH



6  
G. FACCHETTI



7  
R. FOGLI



8  
A. GUARNERI



9  
F. JANICH



10  
A. JULIANO



11  
S. LANDINI



12  
G. LEONCINI



13  
G. LODETTI



14  
S. MAZZOLA



15  
L. MERONI



16  
E. PASCUTTI



17  
M. PERANI



18  
P. PIZZABALLA



19  
G. RIVERA



20  
G. RIZZO



21  
R. ROSATO

ITALY



22  
S. SALVADORE

*Name of Association*      Football Association of the Democratic  
People's Republic of Korea

*Technical Director*  
*Manager / Coach*            Re Hyun MYUNG

*Assistants*                    —

*Medical Officers*            Kwang SUP KIM, Seung CHUL YUN, Taik RIM RO

*Assistants*                    —

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Li CHAN MYUNG	20	173	68	15	—
2	Pak LI SUP	23	160	61	7	—
3	Shin YUNG KYOO	25	174	75	60	—
4	Kang BONG CHIL	24	171	70	26	—
5	Lim ZOONG SUN	24	171	72	52	—
6	Im SEUNG HWI	21	171	65	12	—
7	Pak DOO IK	24	170	65	44	—
8	Pak SEUNG ZIN	22	168	68	23	—
9	Li KEUN HAK	27	172	72	51	—
10	Kang RYONG WOON	25	166	58	25	—
11	Han BONG ZIN	27	166	63	49	—
12	Kim SEUNG IL	22	165	65	30	—
13	Oh YOON KYUNG	26	170	66	55	—
14	Ha JUNG WON	25	178	72	29	—
15	Yang SUNG KOOK	20	170	68	6	—
16	Li DONG WOON	22	179	73	10	—
17	Kim BONG HWAN	28	173	66	40	—
18	Ke SEUNG WOON	24	166	63	12	—
19	Kim YUNG KIL	21	168	63	10	—
20	Ryoo CHANG KIL	20	174	67	2	—
21	An SE BOK	21	168	63	11	—
22	Li CHI	22	174	66	6	—





1  
L. CHAN MYUNG



2  
P. LI SUP



3  
S. YUNG KYOO



4  
K. BONG CHIL



5  
L. ZOONG SUN



6  
I. SEUNG HWI



7  
P. DOO IK



8  
P. SEUNG ZIN



9  
L. KEUN HAK



10  
K. RYONG WOON




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H. BONG ZIN




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K. SEUNG IL



13  
O. YOON KYUNG



14  
H. JUNG WON



15  
Y. SUNG KOOK



16  
L. DONG WOON



17  
K. BONG HWAN



18  
K. SEUNG WOON



19  
K. YUNG KIL



20  
R. CHANG KIL



21  
A. SE BOK



22  
L. CHI

**KOREA D.P.R.**

*Name of Association* Federación Mexicana de Fútbol Asociación

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach* Ignacio TRELLES

*Assistants* —

*Medical Officer* Dr. Angel MATUTE

*Assistant* Victor ILIZALITURRI

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Antonio CARVAJAL	37	180	74	48	—
2	Arturo CHAIRES	27	169	67	22	—
3	Gustavo PEÑA	24	180	74	25	—
4	Jesús DEL MURO	26	180	74	30	—
5	Ignacio JAUREGUI	27	172	68	31	—
6	Isidoro DIAZ	27	169	66	27	—
7	Felipe RUVALCABA	24	180	70	20	—
8	Aaron PADILLA	23	176	66	16	—
9	Ernesto CISNEROS	25	180	72	13	—
10	Javier FRAGOSO	23	178	70	16	—
11	Francisco JARA	24	165	66	7	—
12	Ignacio CALDERÓN	22	180	74	15	—
13	José Luis GONZÁLES	23	168	66	10	—
14	Gabriel NUÑEZ	23	179	74	9	—
15	Guillermo HERNÁNDEZ	23	174	73	6	—
16	Luis REGUEIRO	23	175	70	1	—
17	Magdaleno MERCADO	22	179	74	5	—
18	Elías MUÑOZ	23	170	65	2	—
19	Salvador REYES	28	173	69	43	—
20	Enrique BORJA	20	177	64	2	—
21	Ramiro NAVARRO	22	175	70	1	—
22	Javier VARGAS	23	176	68	5	—




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A. CARVAJAL




2  
A. CHAIRES



3  
G. PEÑA



4  
J. DEL MURO



5  
I. JAUREGUI



6  
I. DIAZ



7  
F. RUVALCABA



8  
A. PADILLA



9  
E. CISNEROS



10  
J. FRAGOSO



11  
F. JARA



12  
I. CALDERÓN



13  
J. GONZÁLES



14  
G. NUÑEZ



15  
G. HERNÁNDEZ




16  
L. REGUEIRO



17  
M. MERCADO



18  
E. MUÑOZ



19  
S. REYES



20  
E. BORJA



21  
R. NAVARRO



22  
J. VARGAS

MEXICO

*Name of Association*      Federação Portuguesa de Futebol

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach*      Otto GLORIA

*Assistant*

Fernando CAIADO

*Medical Officer*

Dr. João ROCHA

*Assistants*

Manuel MARQUES and Hamilton PENA

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Américo LOPES	33	177	78	6	1
2	Joaquim CARVALHO	29	167	79	5	—
3	José PEREIRA	34	172	71	5	2
4	Vicente LUCAS	30	167	63	16	7
5	Germano FIGUEIREDO	33	176	84	23	—
6	Fernando PERES	23	166	65	3	2
7	Ernesto FIGUEIREDO	28	174	75	2	2
8	João LOURENÇO	24	177	81	—	1
9	Hilário CONÇEICÃO	27	169	67	17	1
10	Mário COLUNA	30	172	76	45	2
11	Antonio SIMÕES	22	163	63	20	—
12	José AUGUSTO	29	173	71	29	1
13	Eusébio FERREIRA	24	175	74	26	—
14	Fernando CRUZ	25	166	63	10	1
15	Manuel DUARTE	23	174	75	2	2
16	Jaime GRAÇA	24	175	63	6	2
17	João MORAIS	31	168	72	3	1
18	José TORRES	27	188	82	18	—
19	Custódio PINTO	24	176	67	10	1
20	Alexandre BAPTISTA	25	177	75	4	1
21	José CARLOS	24	173	70	19	—
22	Alberto FESTA	26	178	70	16	—



1  
A. LOPES



2  
J. CARVALHO



3  
J. PEREIRA



4  
V. LUCAS



5  
G. FIGUEIREDO



6  
F. PERES



7  
E. FIGUEIREDO



8  
J. LOURENÇO



9  
H. CONDIÇÃO



10  
M. COLUNA



11  
A. SIMÕES



12  
J. AUGUSTO



13  
E. FERREIRA



14  
F. CRUZ



15  
M. DUARTE



16  
J. GRAÇA



17  
J. MORAIS



18  
J. TORRES



19  
C. PINTO



20  
A. BAPTISTA



21  
J. CARLOS

PORTUGAL



22  
A. FESTA

*Name of Association* Real Federación Española de Fútbol

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach* José VILLALONGA

*Assistant* Sabino BARINAGA

*Medical Officer* Dr. Teodoro DELGADO

*Assistants* Carlos RODRIGO and José JIMENEZ

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	José Angel IRIBAR	23	182	80	9	—
2	Manuel SANCHIS	28	167	64	2	—
3	Eladio SILVESTRE	25	177	78	1	—
4	Luis DEL SOL	31	167	68	14	4
5	Ignacio ZOCO	26	181	80	19	1
6	Jesús GLARÍA	24	179	75	12	—
7	José Armando UFARTE	25	171	63	6	1
8	Amancio AMARO	26	166	65	9	—
9	Marcelino MARTINEZ	26	172	71	12	2
10	Luis SUAREZ	31	177	74	29	—
11	Francisco GENTO	32	168	74	36	1
12	Antonio BETANCORT	29	178	83	2	—
13	Miguel REINA	20	178	78	—	—
14	Feliciano M. RIVILLA	29	167	67	26	1
15	Severino REIJA	27	168	71	11	3
16	Fernando OLIVELLA	29	172	74	18	6
17	Francisco FERNANDEZ	22	173	75	—	1
18	José MARTINEZ	21	173	69	—	—
19	José M <sup>a</sup> FUSTÉ	25	173	72	5	1
20	Joaquín PEIRÓ	30	173	68	10	6
21	Adelardo RODRIGUEZ	26	170	71	10	4
22	Carlos LAPETRA	27	173	69	12	—



1  
J. IRIBAR



2  
M. SANCHIS



3  
E. SILVESTRE



4  
L. DEL SOL



5  
I. ZOCO



6  
J. GLARÍA



7  
J. UFARTE



8  
A. AMARO



9  
M. MARTINEZ



10  
L. SUAREZ



11  
F. GENTO



12  
A. BETANCORT



13  
M. REINA



14  
F. RIVILLA



15  
S. REIJA



16  
P. OLIVELLA



17  
F. FERNANDEZ



18  
J. MARTINEZ



19  
J. FUSTÉ



20  
J. PEIRÓ



21  
A. RODRIGUEZ



22  
C. LAPETRA

SPAIN

*Name of Association* Schweizerischer Fussballverband

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach* Dr. Alfredo FONI

*Assistant* Fritz MÜLLER

*Medical Officer* Dr. Thomas PREISS

*Assistant* Rudolf HAARI

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Charles ELSENER	32	179	82	32	3
2	Willy ALLEMANN	24	178	73	1	1
3	Kurt ARMBRUSTER	32	178	74	2	7
4	Heinz BÄNI	30	181	79	6	2
5	René BRODMANN	33	174	71	3	2
6	Richard DÜRR	28	185	83	16	—
7	Hansruedi FUHRER	29	176	73	6	1
8	Vittore GOTTARDI	25	170	70	—	1
9	André GROBÉTY	33	170	70	39	2
10	Robert HOSP	27	174	70	12	2
11	Jakob KUHN	23	175	75	17	—
12	Léo EICHMANN	30	173	69	1	—
13	Fritz KÜNZLI	20	177	73	2	1
14	Werner LEIMGRUBER	32	175	74	9	4
15	Karl ODERMATT	24	182	74	6	—
16	René-Pierre QUENTIN	23	177	72	7	—
17	J.-C. SCHINDELHOLZ	26	173	70	10	—
18	Heinz SCHNEITER	31	188	76	43	1
19	Xaver STIERLI	26	173	71	8	2
20	Ely TACCHELLA	30	174	70	25	7
21	Georges VUILLEUMIER	22	178	75	5	—
22	Mario PROSPERI	21	178	74	3	—





1  
C. ELSENER




2  
W. ALLEMANN



3  
K. ARMBRUSTER



4  
H. BÄNI



5  
R. BRODMANN



6  
R. DÜRR



7  
H. FUHRER



8  
V. GOTTARDI



9  
A. GROBÉTY



10  
R. HOSP



11  
J. KUHN



12  
L. EICHMANN



13  
J. KÜNZLI



14  
W. LEIMGRUBER



15  
K. ODERMATT



16  
R. QUENTIN



17  
J. SCHINDELHOLZ



18  
H. SCHNEITER



19  
X. STIERLI



20  
E. TACCHELLA



21  
G. VUILLEUMIER

## SWITZERLAND



22  
M. PROSPERI

*Name of Association*      Asociación Uruguaya de Football

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach*              ONDINO VIERA – RAÚL LASTRA

*Assistants*

JUAN LÓPEZ – PROF. OMAR BORRAS

*Medical Officer*

DR. ROBERTO MASLIACH

*Assistants*

CARLOS ABATE and DANTE COCITO

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Ladislao MAZURKIEVIEZ	21	178	79,5	6	—
2	Horacio TROCHE	31	173	75	18	—
3	Jorge MANICERA	27	177	70	11	—
4	Pablo FORLAN	20	179	71	3	—
5	Nestor GONCALVEZ	29	180	73	32	—
6	Omar CAETANO	26	168	68,5	8	—
7	Julio C. CORTES	25	175	67	8	—
8	Jose URRUSMENDI	20	165	70	10	—
9	Jose SACIA	30	176	79,5	28	—
10	Pedro V. ROCHA	23	181	74	12	—
11	Domingo PEREZ	29	168	67,5	16	—
12	Roberto SOSA	30	177	74	28	—
13	Nelson DIAZ	24	173	68,5	2	—
14	Emilio ALVAREZ	27	182	81,5	25	—
15	Luis UBINAS	25	178	77	9	—
16	Eliseo ALVAREZ	25	168	70	16	—
17	Hector SALVA	26	169	67	6	—
18	Milton VIERA	20	176	74	7	—
19	Hector SILVA	26	174	70	10	—
20	Luis RAMOS	26	180	72	5	—
21	Victor ESPARRAGO	21	174	71	3	—
22	Walter TAIBO	35	177	79	20	—



1  
L. MAZURKIEWIEZ



2  
H. TROCHE



3  
J. MANICERA



4  
P. FORLAN



5  
N. GONCALVEZ



6  
O. CAETANO



7  
J. CORTES



8  
J. URRUSMENDI



9  
J. SACIA



10  
P. ROCHA



11  
D. PEREZ



12  
R. SOSA



13  
N. DIAZ



14  
E. ALVAREZ



15  
L. UBINAS



16  
E. ALVAREZ



17  
H. SALVA



18  
M. VIERA



19  
H. SILVA



20  
L. RAMOS



21  
V. ESPARRAGO



22  
W. TAIBO

## URUGUAY

*Name of Association* USSR Football Federation

*Technical Director*

*Manager / Coach* Nikolay MOROZOV

*Assistants*

Yuriy ZOLOTOV and Boris NABOKOV

*Medical Officer*

Alexandr SIGAL

*Assistants*

Anatoliy MOROZOV and Oleg SOKOLOV

No.	Name of Player	Age	Height cm	Weight kg	Intern. Matches played	
					A-Matches	B-Matches
1	Lev YASHIN	37	184	82	70	—
2	Victor SEREBRJANNIKOV	26	173	71	9	—
3	Leonid OSTROVSKIY	30	176	75	4	—
4	Vladimir PONOMAREV	26	176	70	15	—
5	Valentin AFONIN	26	179	73	11	—
6	Albert SHESTERNEV	25	183	83	28	—
7	Murtaz KHURTSILAVA	23	175	81	6	—
8	Iosif SABO	26	176	70	14	—
9	Victor GETMANOV	25	174	71	7	—
10	Vasiliy DANILOV	25	174	73	15	—
11	Igor CHISLENKO	27	170	67	26	—
12	Valeriy VORONIN	27	181	77	34	—
13	Alexey KORNEEV	27	179	75	4	—
14	Georgiy SICHINAVA	23	179	75	5	—
15	Galimzjan KHUSAINOV	28	164	64	25	—
16	Slava METREVELI	30	172	68	49	—
17	Valeriy PORKUJAN	22	174	72	—	—
18	Anatoliy BANISHEVSKIY	20	173	69	15	—
19	Eduard MALOFEEV	24	176	75	10	—
20	Eduard MARKAROV	23	164	62	1	—
21	Anzor KAVAZASHVILI	25	175	78	9	—
22	Victor BANNIKOV	28	179	73	6	—



1  
L. YASHIN



2  
V. SERE-  
BRJANNIKOV



3  
L. OSTROVSKIY



4  
V. PONOMAREV



5  
V. AFONIN



6  
A. SHESTERNEV



7  
M. KHURTSILAVA



8  
I. SABO



9  
V. GETMANOV



10  
V. DANILOV



11  
I. CHISLENKO



12  
V. VORONIN



13  
A. KORNEEV



14  
G. SICHINAVA



15  
G. KHUSAINOV



16  
S. METREVELI



17  
V. PORKUJAN



18  
A. BANISHEVSKIY



19  
E. MALOFEEV



20  
E. MARKAROV



21  
A. KAVAZASHVILI

U.S.S.R.



22  
V. BANNIKOV

## F. OFFICIAL RESULTS AND CLASSIFICATION

Key      M = matches played    W = won    L = lost    D = drawn  
           F = goals for        A = goals against    P = points

### $\frac{1}{8}$ FINALS

#### Group 1

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
11.7.	Wembley	England v. Uruguay	0:0 (0:0)	I. Zsolt	D. Roumentchev T. Bakhramov
	<i>England</i>	1. Gordon Banks, 2. George Cohen, 3. Ramon Wilson, 4. Norbert Peter Stiles, 5. John Charlton, 6. Robert Frederick Moore, 7. Alan James Ball, 8. James Peter Greaves, 9. Robert Charlton, 21. Roger Hunt, 11. John Connelly			
	<i>Uruguay</i>	1. Ladislao Mazurkiewicz, 2. Horacio Troche, 3. Jorge Manicera, 15. Luis Ubina, 5. Nestor Goncalvez, 6. Omar Caetano, 7. Julio C. Cortes, 18. Milton Viera, 19. Hector Silva, 10. Pedro V. Rocha, 11. Domingo Perez			
13.7.	Wembley	France v. Mexico	1:1 (0:0)	M. Ashkenasi	Dr. K. Galba J. F. Campos
	<i>France</i>	1. Marcel Aubour, 12. Jean Djorkaeff, 11. Gabriel De Michele, 5. Bernard Bosquier, 6. Robert Budzynski, 2. Marcel Artelesa, 8. Nestor Combin, 16. Robert Herbin, 13. Philippe Gondet, 4. Joseph Bonnel, 14. Gérard Hausser			
	<i>Mexico</i>	12. Ignacio Calderón, 2. Arturo Chaires, 3. Gustavo Peña, 14. Gabriel Nuñez, 15. Guillermo Hernández, 6. Isidoro Díaz, 17. Magdaleno Mercado, 19. Salvador Reyes, 20. Enrique Borja, 10. Javier Fragoso, 8. Aarón Padilla			

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
15.7.	White City	Uruguay v. France	2:1 (2:1)	Dr. K. Galba	A. Marques L. Callaghan
	<i>Uruguay</i>	1. Ladislao Mazurkiewicz, 2. Horacio Troche, 3. Jorge Manicera, 15. Luis Ubinas, 5. Nestor Goncalvez, 6. Omar Caetano, 7. Julio C. Cortes, 18. Milton Viera, 9. José Sacia, 10. Pedro V. Rocha, 11. Domingo Perez			
	<i>France</i>	1. Marcel Aubour, 12. Jean Djorkaeff, 5. Bernard Bosquier, 4. Joseph Bonnel, 2. Marcel Artelesa, 6. Robert Budzynski, 15. Yves Herbet, 20. Jacques Simon, 13. Philippe Gondet, 10. Hector De Bourgoing, 14. Gérard Hausser			
16.7.	Wembley	Mexico v. England	0:2 (0:1)	C. Lo Bello	M. Ashkenasi Choi Duk Ryong
	<i>Mexico</i>	12. Ignacio Calderón, 2. Arturo Chaires, 3. Gustavo Peña, 14. Gabriel Nuñez, 15. Guillermo Hernández, 4. Jesús Del Muro, 5. Ignacio Jauregui, 6. Isidoro Díaz, 19. Salvador Reyes, 20. Enrique Borja, 8. Aarón Padilla			
	<i>England</i>	1. Gordon Banks, 2. George Cohen, 3. Ramon Wilson, 4. Norbert Peter Stiles, 5. John Charlton, 6. Robert Frederick Moore, 19. Terence Lionel Paine, 8. James Peter Greaves, 9. Robert Charlton, 21. Roger Hunt, 16. Martin Stanford Peters			
19.7.	Wembley	Mexico v. Uruguay	0:0 (0:0)	B. Lööw	C. Lo Bello C. Vicuña
	<i>Mexico</i>	1. Antonio Carvajal, 2. Arturo Chaires, 3. Gustavo Peña, 14. Gabriel Nuñez, 15. Guillermo Hernández, 6. Isidoro Díaz, 17. Magdaleno Mercado, 19. Salvador Reyes, 9. Ernesto Cisneros, 20. Enrique Borja, 8. Aarón Padilla			
	<i>Uruguay</i>	1. Ladislao Mazurkiewicz, 2. Horacio Troche, 3. Jorge Manicera, 15. Luis Ubinas, 5. Nestor Goncalvez, 6. Omar Caetano, 7. Julio C. Cortes, 18. Milton Viera, 9. José Sacia, 10. Pedro V. Rocha, 11. Domingo Perez			

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
20.7.	Wembley	France v. England	0:2 (0:1)	A. Yamasaki	Dr. K. Galba D. Roumentchev
<i>France</i>		1. Marcel Aubour, 12. Jean Djorkaeff, 5. Bernard Bosquier, 2. Marcel Artelesa, 6. Robert Budzynski, 4. Joseph Bonnel, 20. Jacques Simon, 15. Yves Herbet, 13. Philippe Gondet, 16. Robert Herbin, 14. Gérard Hausser			
<i>England</i>		1. Gordon Banks, 2. George Cohen, 3. Ramon Wilson, 4. Norbert Peter Stiles, 5. John Charlton, 6. Robert Charlton, 20. Ian Callaghan, 8. James Peter Greaves, 9. Robert Charlton, 21. Roger Hunt, 16. Martin Stanford Peters			

*Classification:*

	M	W	D	L	F	A	P
1. England	3	2	1	0	4	0	5
2. Uruguay	3	1	2	0	2	1	4
3. Mexico	3	0	2	1	1	3	2
4. France	3	0	1	2	2	5	1

*Qualified for 1/4 Finals:* 1. England  
2. Uruguay

**Group 2**

12.7.	Sheffield	Germany West v. Switzerland	5:0 (3:0)	H. Phillips	J. Adair B. Lööw
<i>Germany West</i>		1. Hans Tilkowski, 2. Horst Höttges, 3. Karl-Heinz Schnellinger, 6. Wolfgang Weber, 5. Willi Schulz, 4. Franz Beckenbauer, 7. Albert Brülls, 8. Helmut Haller, 9. Uwe Seeler, 12. Wolfgang Overath, 10. Siegfried Held			
<i>Switzerland</i>		1. Charles Elsener, 9. André Grobéty, 7. Hansruedi Fuhrer, 20. Ely Tacchella, 18. Heinz Schneiter, 4. Heinz Bani, 15. Karl Odermatt, 6. Richard Dürr, 13. Fritz Künzli, 10. Robert Hosp, 17. Jean-Claude Schindelholz			



Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
13.7.	Birmingham	Spain v. Argentina	1:2 (0:0)	D. Roumentchev	A. Yamasaki K. Zecević
	<i>Spain</i>	1. José Angel Iribar, 2. Manuel Sanchis, 3. Eladio Silvestre, 18. José Martinez, 17. Francisco Fernandez, 5. Ignacio Zoco, 7. José Armando Ufarte, 4. Luis Del Sol, 20. Joaquín Peiró, 10. Luis Suarez, 11. Francisco Gento			
	<i>Argentina</i>	1. Antonio Roma, 4. Roberto Alfredo Perfumo, 7. Silvio Marzolini, 8. Roberto Oscar Ferreiro, 10. Antonio Ubaldo Rattin, 12. Jorge Rafael Albrecht, 15. Jorge Raul Solari, 16. Alberto Mario Gonzalez, 19. Luis Artime, 20. Ermino Angel Onega, 21. Oscar Mas			
15.7.	Sheffield	Switzerland v. Spain	1:2 (1:0)	T. Bakhramov	I. Zsolt H. Phillips
	<i>Switzerland</i>	1. Charles Elsener, 7. Hansruedi Fuhrer, 5. René Brodmann, 14. Werner Leimgruber, 19. Xaver Stierli, 4. Heinz Bani, 11. Jakob Kuhn, 8. Vittore Gottardi, 10. Robert Hosp, 3. Kurt Armbruster, 16. René-Pierre Quentin			
	<i>Spain</i>	1. José Angel Iribar, 2. Manuel Sanchis, 15. Severino Reija, 4. Luis Del Sol, 17. Francisco Fernandez, 5. Ignacio Zoco, 8. Amancio Amaro, 18. José Martinez, 20. Joaquín Peiró, 10. Luis Suarez, 11. Francisco Gento			
16.7.	Birmingham	Argentina v. Germany West	0:0 (0:0)	K. Zecević	J. F. Campos B. Löow
	<i>Argentina</i>	1. Antonio Roma, 4. Roberto Alfredo Perfumo, 7. Silvio Marzolini, 8. Roberto Oscar Ferreiro, 10. Antonio Ubaldo Rattin, 12. Jorge Rafael Albrecht, 15. Jorge Raul Solari, 16. Alberto Mario Gonzalez, 19. Luis Artime, 20. Ermino Angel Onega, 21. Oscar Mas			
	<i>Germany West</i>	1. Hans Tilkowski, 2. Horst Höttges, 3. Karl-Heinz Schnellinger, 4. Franz Beckenbauer, 5. Willi Schulz, 6. Wolfgang Weber, 7. Albert Brülls, 8. Helmut Haller, 9. Uwe Seeler, 12. Wolfgang Overath, 10. Siegfried Held			

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
19.7.	Sheffield	Argentina v. Switzerland	2:0 (0:0)	J. F. Campos	T. Bakhramov I. Zsolt
	<i>Argentina</i>	1. Antonio Roma, 4. Roberto Alfredo Perfumo, 7. Silvio Marzolini, 8. Roberto Oscar Ferreiro, 10. Antonio Ubaldo Rattin, 6. Oscar Osvaldo Calics, 15. Jorge Raul Solari, 16. Alberto Mario Gonzalez, 19. Luis Artime, 20. Ermindo Angel Onega, 21. Oscar Mas			
	<i>Switzerland</i>	12. Léo Eichmann, 7. Hansruedi Fuhrer, 19. Xaver Stierli, 11. Jakob Kuhn, 5. René Brodmann, 4. Heinz Bani, 8. Vittore Gottardi, 3. Kurt Armbruster, 13. Fritz Künzli, 10. Robert Hosp, 16. René-Pierre Quentin			
20.7.	Birmingham	Spain v. Germany West	1:2 (1:1)	A. Marques	C. Vicuña Choi Duk Ryong
	<i>Spain</i>	1. José Angel Iribar, 2. Manuel Sanchis, 15. Severino Reija, 5. Ignacio Zoco, 17. Francisco Fernandez, 6. Jesús Glaría, 8. Amancio Amaro, 21. Adelardo Rodriguez, 9. Marcelino Martinez, 19. José M. Fusté, 22. Carlos Lapetra			
	<i>Germany West</i>	1. Hans Tilkowski, 2. Horst Höttges, 3. Karl-Heinz Schnellinger, 4. Franz Beckenbauer, 5. Willi Schulz, 6. Wolfgang Weber, 19. Werner Krämer, 9. Uwe Seeler, 10. Siegfried Held, 12. Wolfgang Overath, 11. Lothar Emmerich			

*Classification:*

	M	W	D	L	F	A	P
1. West Germany	3	2	1	0	7	1	5
2. Argentina	3	2	1	0	4	1	5
3. Spain	3	1	0	2	4	5	2
4. Switzerland	3	0	0	3	1	9	0

*Qualified for 1/4 Finals:* 1. Germany West  
2. Argentina

### Group 3

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
12.7.	Liverpool	Bulgaria v. Brazil	0:2 (0:1)	K. Tschenscher	G. McCabe J. Taylor
	<i>Bulgaria</i>	1. George Naidenov, 2. Alexander Shalamanov, 3. Ivan Vutzov, 4. Boris Gaganelov, 5. Dimiter Penev, 6. Dobromir Zhechev, 7. Dinko Dermendjiev, 8. Stoyan Kitov, 9. George Asparuhov, 13. Dimiter Yakimov, 11. Ivan Kolev			
	<i>Brazil</i>	1. Gylmar Santos Neves (Gylmar), 2. Djalma Santos (Djalma Santos), 4. Hideraldo Luiz Bellini (Bellini), 13. Denilson Custodio Machado (Denilson), 6. Altair Gomes Figueiredo (Altair), 8. Henrique Paulo Oliveira (Paulo Henrique), 16. Manoel Francisco Santos (Garrincha), 18. Alcindo Martha Freitas (Alcindo), 14. Antonio Santos Lima (Lima), 10. Edson Arantes Nascimento (Pelé), 17. Jair Ventura Filho (Jairzinho)			
13.7.	Manchester	Hungary v. Portugal	1:3 (0:1)	L. Callaghan	W. Clements K. Howley
	<i>Hungary</i>	1. Antal Szentmihályi, 2. Benó Káposzta, 4. Kálmán Sóvári, 5. Kálmán Mészöly, 3. Sándor Mátrai, 6. Ferenc Sipos, 7. Ferenc Bene, 14. István Nagy, 9. Flórián Albert, 10. János Farkas, 11. Gyula Rákosi			
	<i>Portugal</i>	2. Joaquim Carvalho, 17. João Morais, 9. Hilário Conçeição, 16. Jaime Graça, 20. Alexandre Baptista, 4. Vicente Lucas, 12. José Augusto, 13. Eusébio Ferreira, 18. José Torres, 10. Mário Coluna, 11. Antonio Simões			
15.7.	Liverpool	Brazil v. Hungary	1:3 (1:1)	K. Dagnall	K. Howley A. Yamasaki
	<i>Brazil</i>	1. Gylmar Santos Neves (Gylmar), 2. Djalma Santos (Djalma Santos), 4. Hideraldo Luiz Bellini (Bellini), 6. Altair Gomes Figueiredo (Altair), 14. Antonio Santos Lima (Lima), 8. Henrique Paulo Oliveira (Paulo Henrique), 16. Manoel Francisco Santos (Garrincha), 11. Gerson Oliveira Nunes (Gerson), 18. Alcindo Martha Freitas (Alcindo), 20. Eduardo Concalves Andrade (Tostão), 17. Jair Ventura Filho (Jairzinho)			

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
	<i>Hungary</i>	21. József Gelei, 2. Benó Káposzta, 17. Gusztáv Szepesi-Szedunka, 5. Kálmán Mészöly, 3. Sándor Mátrai, 6. Ferenc Sipos, 7. Ferenc Bene, 13. Imre Mathesz, 9. Flórián Albert, 10. János Farkas, 11. Gyula Rákosi			
16.7.	Manchester	Portugal v. Bulgaria	3:0 (2:0)	J. M. Codesal	R. Goicoechea K. Tschenscher
	<i>Portugal</i>	3. José Pereira, 22. Alberto Festa, 9. Hilário Conceição, 16. Jaime Graça, 5. Germano Figueiredo, 4. Vicente Lucas, 12. José Augusto, 13. Eusébio Ferreira, 18. José Torres, 10. Mário Coluna, 11. Antonio Simões			
	<i>Bulgaria</i>	1. George Naidenov, 2. Alexander Shalamanov, 4. Boris Gaganelov, 5. Dimiter Penev, 3. Ivan Vutzov, 6. Dobromir Zhechev, 7. Dinko Dermendjiev, 13. Dimiter Yakimov, 9. George Asparuhov, 10. Peter Zhekov, 16. Alexander Kostov			
19.7.	Liverpool	Portugal v. Brazil	3:1 (2:0)	G. McCabe	L. Callaghan K. Dagnall
	<i>Portugal</i>	3. José Pereira, 17. João Morais, 9. Hilário Conceição, 16. Jaime Craça, 20. Alexandre Baptista, 4. Vicente Lucas, 12. José Augusto, 13. Eusébio Ferreira, 18. José Torres, 10. Mário Coluna, 11. Antonio Simões			
	<i>Brazil</i>	12. Hailton Correia Arruda (Manga), 3. José Maria Fidelis Santos (Fidelis), 5. Hercules Brito Ruas (Brito), 7. Orlando Pecanha Carvalho (Orlando), 9. Rildo Costa Menezes (Rildo), 13. Denilson Custodio Machado (Denilson), 17. Jair Ventura Filho (Jairzinho), 14. Antonio Santos Lima (Lima), 19. Walter Machado Silva (Silva), 10. Edson Arantes Nascimento (Pelé), 21. Ademir Barros (Parana)			
20.7.	Manchester	Hungary v. Bulgaria	3:1 (2:1)	R. Goicoechea	J. Gardeazabal J. M. Codesal
	<i>Hungary</i>	21. József Gelei, 2. Benó Káposzta, 17. Gusztáv Szepesi-Szedunka, 5. Kálmán Mészöly, 3. Sándor Mátrai, 6. Ferenc Sipos, 7. Ferenc Bene, 13. Imre Mathesz, 9. Flórián Albert, 10. János Farkas, 11. Gyula Rákosi			

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
<i>Bulgaria</i>					
		21. Simeon Simeonov,	15. Dimiter Largov,	4. Boris Gaganelov,	5. Dimiter Penev,
		3. Ivan Vutzov,	6. Dobromir Zhechev,	13. Dimiter Yakimov,	9. George Asparuhov,
		14. Nikola Kotkov,	20. Ivan Davidov,	11. Ivan Kolev	

*Classification:*

	M	W	D	L	F	A	P
1. Portugal	3	3	0	0	9	2	6
2. Hungary	3	2	0	1	7	5	4
3. Brazil	3	1	0	2	4	6	2
4. Bulgaria	3	0	0	3	1	8	0

*Qualified for 1/4 Finals:* 1. Portugal  
2. Hungary

**Group 4**

12.7. Middlesbrough USSR v. Korea DPR 3:0 (2:0) J. Gardeazabal A. Kandil G. Dienst

*USSR* 21. Anzor Kavazashvili, 4. Vladimir Ponomarev, 3. Leonid Ostrovskiy, 6. Albert Shesternev, 7. Murtaz Khurtsilava, 8. Iosif Sabo, 14. Georgiy Sichinava, 11. Igor Chislenko, 19. Eduard Malofeev, 18. Anatoliy Bani-shevskiy, 15. Galimzjan Khusainov

*Korea DPR* 1. Li Chan Myung, 2. Pak Li Sup, 3. Shin Yung Kyoo, 5. Lim Zoong Sun, 4. Kang Bong Chil, 6. Im Seung Hwi, 11. Han Bong Zin, 8. Pak Seung Zin, 7. Pak Doo Ik, 10. Kang Ryong Woon, 12. Kim Seung Il

13.7. Sunderland Chile v. Italy 0:2 (0:1) G. Dienst R. Kreitlein J. Finney

*Chile* 13. Juan Olivares, 6. Luis Armando Eyzaguirre, 21. Hugo Villanueva, 4. Humberto Cruz, 7. Elias Figueroa, 12. Ruben Marcos, 1. Pedro Araya, 14. Ignacio Prieto, 18. Armando Tobar, 8. Alberto Fouilloux, 17. Leonel Sanchez

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
	<i>Italy</i>	1. Enrico Albertosi, 5. Tarcisio Burgnich, 6. Giacinto Facchetti, 21. Roberto Rosato, 22. Sandro Salvatore, 13. Giovanni Lodetti, 17. Mario Perani, 4. Giacomo Bulgarelli, 14. Sandro Mazzola, 19. Giovanni Rivera, 3. Paolo Barison			
<b>15.7.</b>	<b>Middlesbrough</b>	<b>Korea DPR v. Chile</b>	<b>1:1 (0:1)</b>	<b>A. Kandil</b>	<b>E. Crawford J. Finney</b>
	<i>Korea DPR</i>	1. Li Chan Myung, 2. Pak Li Sup, 3. Shin Yung Kyoo, 13. Oh Yoon Kyung, 5. Lim Zoong Sun, 6. Im Seung Hwi, 8. Pak Seung Zin, 11. Han Bong Zin, 7. Pak Doo Ik, 16. Li Dong Woon, 12. Kim Seung Il			
	<i>Chile</i>	13. Juan Olivares, 20. Alberto Aldo Valentini, 7. Elias Figueroa, 4. Humberto Cruz, 21. Hugo Villanueva, 12. Ruben Marcos, 1. Pedro Araya, 14. Ignacio Prieto, 11. Honorino Landa, 8. Alberto Fouilloux, 17. Leonel Sanchez			
<b>16.7.</b>	<b>Sunderland</b>	<b>Italy v. USSR</b>	<b>0:1 (0:0)</b>	<b>R. Kreitlein</b>	<b>A. Kandil E. Crawford</b>
	<i>Italy</i>	1. Enrico Albertosi, 5. Tarcisio Burgnich, 6. Giacinto Facchetti, 21. Roberto Rosato, 22. Sandro Salvatore, 12. G. Franco Leoncini, 15. Luigi Meroni, 13. Giovanni Lodetti, 14. Sandro Mazzola, 4. Giacomo Bulgarelli, 16. Ezio Pascutti			
	<i>USSR</i>	1. Lev Yashin, 4. Vladimir Ponomarev, 10. Vasilij Danilov, 7. Murtaz Khurtsilava, 6. Albert Shesternev, 12. Valeriy Voronin, 11. Igor Chislenko, 8. Iosif Sabo, 19. Eduard Malofeev, 18. Anatolij Banishevskiy, 15. Galimzjan Khusainov			
<b>19.7.</b>	<b>Middlesbrough</b>	<b>Italy v. Korea DPR</b>	<b>0:1 (0:1)</b>	<b>P. Schwinte</b>	<b>J. Adair J. Taylor</b>
	<i>Italy</i>	1. Enrico Albertosi, 11. Spartaco Ladini, 6. Giacinto Facchetti, 8. Aristide Guarneri, 9. Francesco Janich, 7. Romano Fogli, 17. Marino Perani, 4. Giacomo Bulgarelli, 14. Sandro Mazzola, 19. Giovanni Rivera, 3. Paolo Barison			

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
	<i>Korea DPR</i>	1. Li Chan Myung, 5. Lim Zoong Sun, 3. Shin Yung Kyoo, 14. Ha Jung Won, 13. Oh Yoon Kyung, 8. Pak Seung Zin, 6. Im Seung Hwi, 11. Han Bong Zin, 7. Pak Doo Ik, 17. Kim Bong Hwan, 15. Yang Sung Kook			

**20.7. Sunderland** Chile v. USSR 1:2 (1:1) J. Adair W. Clements  
P. Schwinte

*Chile* 13. Juan Olivares, 20. Alberto Aldo Valentini, 7. Elias Figueroa, 4. Humberto Cruz, 12. Ruben Marcos, 21. Hugo Villanueva, 1. Pedro Araya, 14. Ignacio Prieto, 11. Honorino Landa, 22. Guillermo Yavar, 17. Leonel Sanchez

*USSR* 21. Anzor Kavazashvili, 9. Victor Getmanov, 6. Albert Shesternev, 13. Alexey Korneev, 3. Leonid Ostrovskiy, 12. Valeriy Voronin, 5. Valentin Afonin, 16. Slava Metreveli, 2. Victor Serebrjannikov, 20. Eduard Markarov, 17. Valeriy Porkujan

*Classification:*

	M	W	D	L	F	A	P
1. USSR	3	3	0	0	6	1	6
2. Korea DPR	3	1	1	1	2	4	3
3. Italy	3	1	0	2	2	2	2
4. Chile	3	0	1	2	2	5	1

*Qualified for 1/4 Finals:* 1. USSR  
2. Korea DPR

**1/4 FINALS**

**23.7. Wembley** England v. 1:0 (0:0) R. Kreitlein G. Dienst  
Argentina I. Zsolt

*England* 1. Gordon Banks, 2. George Cohen, 3. Ramon Wilson, 4. Norbert Peter Stiles, 5. John Charlton, 6. Robert Frederick Moore, 7. Alan James Ball, 10. Geoffrey Charles Hurst, 9. Robert Charlton, 21. Roger Hunt, 16. Martin Stanford Peters

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
	<i>Argentina</i>	1. Antonio Roma, 4. Roberto Alfredo Perfumo, 7. Silvio Marzolini, 8. Roberto Oscar Ferreiro, 10. Antonio Ubaldo Rattin, 2. Rolando Hugo Jrusta, 15. Jorge Raul Solari, 16. Alberto Mario Gonzalez, 19. Luis Artime, 20. Ermindo Angel Onega, 21. Oscar Mas			
23.7.	Sunderland	USSR v. Hungary	2:1 (1:0)	J. Gardezabal	J. F. Campos J. M. Codesal
	<i>USSR</i>	1. Lev Yashin, 4. Vladimir Ponomarev, 6. Albert Shesternev, 10. Vasiliy Danilov, 12. Valeriy Voronin, 8. Iosif Sabo, 11. Igor Chislenko, 18. Anatoliy Banishevskiy, 19. Eduard Malofeev, 15. Galimzjan Khusainov, 17. Valeriy Porkujan			
	<i>Hungary</i>	21. József Gelei, 2. Benó Káposzta, 17. Gusztáv Szepesi-Szedunka, 5. Kálmán Mészöly, 3. Sándor Mátrai, 6. Ferenc Sipos, 7. Ferenc Bene, 14. István Nagy, 9. Flórián Albert, 10. János Farkas, 11. Gyula Rákosi			
23.7.	Liverpool	Portugal v. Korea DPR	5:3 (2:3)	M. Ashkenasi	P. Schwinte Dr. K. Galba
	<i>Portugal</i>	3. José Pereira, 17. João Morais, 9. Hilário Conçeição, 16. Jaime Graça, 20. Alexandre Baptista, 4. Vicente Lucas, 12. José Augusto, 13. Eusébio Ferreira, 18. José Torres, 10. Mário Coluna, 11. Antonio Simões			
	<i>Korea DPR</i>	1. Li Chan Myung, 5. Lim Zoong Sun, 3. Shin Yung Kyoo, 14. Ha Jung Won, 13. Oh Yoon Kyung, 8. Pak Seung Zin, 6. Im Seung Hwi, 11. Han Bong Zin, 7. Pak Doo Ik, 16. Li Dong Woon, 15. Yang Sung Kook			
23.7.	Sheffield	Germany West v. Uruguay	4:0 (1:0)	J. Finney	H. Phillips A. Kandil
	<i>Germany West</i>	1. Hans Tilkowski, 2. Horst Höttges, 3. Karl-Heinz Schnellinger, 4. Franz Beckenbauer, 5. Willi Schulz, 6. Wolfgang Weber, 8. Helmut Haller, 9. Uwe Seeler, 10. Siegfried Held, 12. Wolfgang Overath, 11. Lothar Emmerich			



Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
	<i>Uruguay</i>	1. Ladislao Mazurkiewicz, 2. Horacio Troche, 3. Jorge Manicera, 15. Luis Ubinas, 5. Nestor Goncalvez, 6. Omar Caetano, 7. Julio C. Cortes, 17. Hector Salva, 19. Hector Silva, 10. Pedro V. Rocha, 11. Domingo Perez			
<i>Qualified for 1/2 Finals:</i>					
England					
USSR					
Portugal					
Germany West					

### 1/2 FINALS

<b>25.7.</b>	<b>Liverpool</b>	<b>Germany West v. USSR</b>	<b>2:1 (1:0)</b>	<b>C. Lo Bello</b>	<b>J. Gardezabal J. M. Codesal</b>
	<i>Germany West</i>	1. Hans Tilkowski, 14. Friedel Lutz, 3. Karl-Heinz Schnellinger, 4. Franz Beckenbauer, 5. Willi Schulz, 6. Wolfgang Weber, 8. Helmut Haller, 9. Uwe Seeler, 10. Siegfried Held, 12. Wolfgang Overath, 11. Lothar Emmerich			
	<i>USSR</i>	1. Lev Yashin, 4. Vladimir Ponomarev, 6. Albert Shesternev, 10. Vasily Danilov, 12. Valeriy Voronin, 8. Iosif Sabo, 11. Igor Chislenko, 15. Galimzjan Khusainov, 19. Eduard Malofeev, 18. Anatoliy Banishevskiy, 17. Valeriy Porkujan			
<b>26.7.</b>	<b>Wembley</b>	<b>England v. Portugal</b>	<b>2:1 (1:0)</b>	<b>P. Schwinte</b>	<b>K. Zecević A. Yamasaki</b>
	<i>England</i>	1. Gordon Banks, 2. George Cohen, 3. Ramon Wilson, 4. Norbert Peter Stiles, 5. John Charlton, 6. Robert Frederick Moore, 7. Alan James Ball, 10. Geoffrey Charles Hurst, 9. Robert Charlton, 21. Roger Hunt, 16. Martin Stanford Peters			
	<i>Portugal</i>	3. José Pereira, 22. Alberto Festa, 9. Hilário Conceição, 16. Jaime Graça, 20. Alexandre Baptista, 21. José Carlos, 12. José Augusto, 13. Eusébio Ferreira, 18. José Torres, 10. Mário Coluna, 11. Antonio Simões			

## MATCH FOR THIRD AND FOURTH PLACES

Date	Venue	Match	Result	Referee	Linesmen
28.7.	Wembley	Portugal v. USSR	2:1 (1:1)	K. Dagnall	K. Howley A. Kandil
	<i>Portugal</i>	3. José Pereira, 22. Alberto Festa, 9. Hilário Conceição, 16. Jaime Graça, 20. Alexandre Baptista, 21. José Carlos, 12. José Augusto, 13. Eusébio Ferreira, 18. José Torres, 10. Mário Coluna, 11. Antonio Simões			
	<i>USSR</i>	1. Lev Yashin, 4. Vladimir Ponomarev, 13. Alexey Korneev, 7. Murtaz Khurtislava, 10. Vasily Danilov, 12. Valeriy Voronin, 14. Georgiy Sichinava, 16. Slava Metreveli, 19. Eduard Malofeev, 18. Anatoliy Banishevskiy, 2. Victor Serebrjannikov			

### FINAL

30.7.	Wembley	England v. Germany West	2:2 (1:1) 4:2 (3:2) Extra-time	G. Dienst	Dr. K. Galba T. Bakhrarov
	<i>England</i>	1. Gordon Banks, 2. George Cohen, 3. Ramon Wilson, 4. Norbert Peter Stiles, 5. John Charlton, 6. Robert Frederick Moore, 7. Alan James Ball, 10. Geoffrey Charles Hurst, 9. Robert Charlton, 21. Roger Hunt, 16. Martin Stanford Peters			
	<i>Germany West</i>	1. Hans Tilkowski, 2. Horst Höttges, 3. Karl-Heinz Schnellinger, 4. Franz Beckenbauer, 5. Willi Schulz, 6. Wolfgang Weber, 8. Helmut Haller, 9. Uwe Seeler, 10. Siegfried Held, 12. Wolfgang Overath, 11. Lothar Emmerich			

### FINAL CLASSIFICATION

1. ENGLAND
2. GERMANY WEST
3. PORTUGAL
4. USSR