Chemi Shalev on Politics in Israel

On Thursday, June 5th, IPF National Scholar Steven L. Spiegel moderated a conference call with Chemi Shalev, a leading Israeli political analyst and diplomatic correspondent, currently serving as deputy editor and political analyst for Israel Hayom. The following is a summary of his remarks:

The diplomatic situation in Israel today is completely subservient to political conditions and to the charges of corruption against Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

While there has been reported progress in the negotiations with the Palestinians on the issue of borders, on the other two major issues of the negotiations-Jerusalem and refugees-little movement has apparently occurred. Barring any dramatic breakthroughs, it is difficult to imagine how an agreement will be reached by year's end.

There is even worse news on the issue of a cease-fire with Hamas. Although Defense Minister Ehud Barak appears to be interested in the proposals conveyed by Egypt, he does not enjoy the support of either the cabinet or Olmert. While Hamas is interested in a cease-fire, it refuses to accept Israel's conditions to refrain from using the interim to build up its strategic capabilities and to include the release of Gilad Shalit in the deal. As long as Hamas rejects those conditions, Israel rejects the cease-fire.

Instead, Hamas is trying to heat up the arena in order to force Israel to accept the cease-fire it wants. That unfortunately resulted in the mortar attack that killed Amnon Rosenberg, a resident of a kibbutz near the Gaza frontier.

The opposite of what Hamas wanted is happening. There is now a groundswell of support for a large-scale military operation in Gaza. Not necessarily an all-out invasion, but something much bigger than has been pursued until now. Even though the army has been opposed to such an operation, we could soon reach the point where the cabinet will issue the orders for an attack on Gaza.

The only piece of relatively good news is on the Syrian front. The indirect contacts that have been going on in Turkey between Israel and Syria may not result in a serious change under the current U.S. administration, but it is a sign that neither country wants to tangle with the other.

Syria is currently playing both sides of the fence. It is arming Hezbollah while conducting diplomatic negotiations with Israel.

However, considering the common assumption in the region that there will be a military confrontation with Iran within three years, it is significant that Syria apparently does not want to get involved in such a confrontation. The "good news" on Syria, therefore, is sort of a backhanded positive.  It's the only piece of good news, however, that we really have.

The conventional wisdom is that we're not going anywhere with Iran diplomatically, and that a military attack is therefore inevitable. Whether that's in the cards before U.S. elections, we don't know. Some in Israel's intelligence community may see some possibility of an attack on Iran before January. Generally, however, the intelligence community does not think a U.S. attack on Iran is on the table, mainly because of the opposition of the U.S. military.

Israeli intelligence estimates that by the end of 2009 the Iranians will be capable of putting together a bomb. The Syrians are also assuming that by around 2010 there will be an outbreak of hostilities between either Israel and Iran or the United States and Iran or both.

Whether carried out by Israel or by the United States, an attack on Iran would likely be supported in Israel, even if it was carried out while Olmert was prime minister. Another military operation or a diplomatic breakthrough on his watch might be viewed with suspicion. While the timing and motive might be suspect to some, Iran is viewed as such an existential threat that an attack on Iran might be the one issue that would transcend Olmert's political situation. The same cannot be said about any political breakthrough, including an agreement with Syria or a declaration of principles with the Palestinians.

The current consensus is that the end of Olmert's term as prime minister is only a matter of time. It could be a few weeks or a few months. Meanwhile, a majority within the Knesset has been declaring that they support a bill to dissolve the Knesset and, therefore, bring on a new election. However, there is a game of chicken going on, with parties like Labor and Shas saying, "Yes, yes. We will vote for an election," but possibly also hiding ulterior motives. It is not certain that elections are very close.

A more interesting question is whether there will be a Kadima primary. If there is a primary, and assuming that Olmert will not be re-elected (he may not even run), then his successor will be waiting in line. As long as he doesn't have a successor, he's got a bigger hold on his own party.

The two main contenders in a possible Kadima primary seem to be the current Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and the Minister of Transportation Shaul Mofaz. Livni is very popular with the public. She is far less popular within her own party. More importantly perhaps, Olmert does not like Livni and does not want her to be the leader of the party. Therefore, a lot of his maneuverings are not only aimed at saving his own skin, but also at outflanking Livni and doing as much as he can to support Mofaz.

Mofaz has said that if he headed the party, he would try to constitute a government that would be led by him, Binyamin Netanyahu, and Ehud Barak. Without a doubt, that triumvirate would be further to the right than the current triumvirate of Olmert, Livni, and Barak. Of course, it is unclear whether Kadima would have the votes in the Knesset to build the governing coalition.

If elections are held in the near future, particularly if they are based on security issues, Netanyahu is likely to be the frontrunner. But there is an unknown element now because corruption is so high on the public agenda.  It is therefore possible that Livni, who is considered to be the "cleanest" of all the current politicians, or an unknown, centrist "knight in shining armor" promising to come in and save us all from corruption, could be the wild card that would change everything.

And then there are the American elections, which Israelis have been paying great attention to. While Obama's speech to AIPAC may not have turned every Israeli into an Obama supporter, it certainly helped to offset earlier concerns. His speech was described as very Zionist and pro-Israel. It was the main headline in all the newspapers. There was almost nothing negative written about him for the first time ever. Even columnists who had been critical of him were suddenly giving him a chance.

While Obama's speech received media attention, Israelis are not very good at thinking about next January. They're more worried about tomorrow morning.  For now, Israelis are completely focused on Olmert's corruption charges, and on whether or not he is going to last the week or the month.  Therefore, in understanding Israeli policy over the next several months, the interplay between the diplomatic and the political scenes must be constantly viewed in perspective. Any diplomatic efforts or developments must be seen in the light of internal Israeli political maneuvering.