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Policy Watershed: Turkey's Cyprus Policy
and the Interventions of 1974

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At 5:45 a.m. on July 20 1974, the government of Turkey began to land troops on Cyprus. At the break of dawn, landing craft carrying Turkish soldiers began to reach the island's shore, and at 6:07 a.m. nineteen C-13 transport planes began to drop paratroops into the main Turkish enclave between Kyrenia (Girne) and Nicosia. At 6:30 a.m. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit went on Turkish National Radio to announce the decision his government had made.

The Turkish Armed Forces have started landing in Cyprus from the air and sea. Let this operation be auspicious to our nation and to all Cypriots. We believe that by acting in this manner we shall be rendering a great service to all mankind and to peace. I hope that our forces meet no resistance and that a bloody clash is avoided. We in fact are going to carry peace and not war to the island, and not only to the Turks but also to the Greeks. We have had to make this decision after we had exhausted all diplomatic and political methods. Meanwhile, I wish to express my gratitude to friends and allies, particularly the United States and Britain, which have displayed well-meaning efforts to have the dispute settled through diplomatic methods.¹

The Turkish forces met only scattered resistance by disorganized Greek-Cypriot forces, and soon established an area of control over the fifty-mile Nicosia-Kyrenia corridor. In response to Turkey's offensive, the Greek government of General Demetrios Ioanides announced that Greece would begin preparing a general mobilization of its armed forces.²

The Turkish intervention into Cyprus was made in response to the coup d'état that had been committed four days earlier against the Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios. The coup had been committed by Greek Cypriot elements favoring *enosis*, the integration of Cyprus into Greece³, and was the culmination of a power struggle that had long been taking place on Cyprus between 'moderates' such as Makarios and extremist followers of Cypriot militia leader George Grivas.⁴ As a guarantor power of the 1960

¹ Radio Ankara, July 20, 1974 in Couloumbis, Theodore A., (1983), *The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*; p. 93.

² Couloumbis (1983), p. 93.

³ Shaw, Stanford and Shaw, Ezel Kural (1977), *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II*, pp. 430-431. Also see Pope, Nicole and Pope, Hugh (1997), *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After*, p. 119.

⁴ See Patrick, Richard A., (1976), *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971* for a detailed discussion of the rivalries within the Greek Cypriot political leadership in the 1960's. pp. 144-156.

Zürich-London Accords, Turkey had sworn to maintain both the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. With Cyprus' independence threatened, Turkey was entitled to act to restore the status quo. The Turkish invasion was therefore seen as having been launched in support of preserving the Cyprus status quo—its territorial integrity and independence.

On July 22, a cease-fire was signed between Turkey and the new Cyprus regime, and on July 23 the military junta governing Greece collapsed. The fall of the junta, which was seen to have been supportive of both *enosis* and the new Cyprus government of Nicos Sampson⁵, then led to the fall of the ten-day old Sampson regime itself. With Cyprus President Makarios negotiating with the Turkish and British governments at the United Nations in New York, temporary presidential responsibilities were assumed by Cyprus House of Representatives Speaker Glevkos Clerides, as was stipulated in the Cyprus Constitution.⁶ Five-party negotiations including representatives from Turkey, Greece, Britain and the two Cypriot communities then started in Geneva.

With the fall of the Sampson government and its sponsors in Athens, it seemed as if the return to power of President Markarios, who had governed Cyprus since the island became independent in 1960, would herald a withdrawal of Turkish forces and a return to the pre-coup status quo. The negotiations for a Turkish withdrawal, however, proved to be more complicated than anticipated. With its soldiers on the ground in Cyprus, Turkey began to harden its line, insisting upon the creation of a new administrative framework for the island. The Turkish proposals were for a governmental structure consisting of either a loose bizonal federation or an even looser multicantonal federation.⁷ The latter of these two proposals was known as the “Güneş Plan”, after Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş. Upon receipt of the Güneş Plan in Geneva, Greek Foreign Minister George Mavros and Acting Cypriot President Glavkos Clerides asked for 36 hours in order to consult with their governments. In response, Foreign Minister Güneş noted that further delays would create security problems for the exposed Turkish troops in Cyprus and demanded an immediate yes-or-no answer to his proposal. The five-party negotiations then broke down.⁸

The next morning, August 14, the reorganized and heavily reinforced⁹ Turkish troops on Cyprus recommenced the military operation that had been suspended on July 22. Before long, 37% of the island was under Turkish control, creating 180,000 Greek refugees fleeing to southern points in the island.¹⁰ Subsequently, Turkish Cypriots living in the south left their homes to seek refuge in the north. Today, less than 1% of the population of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is Greek Cypriot, while just over 1% of the Greek-administered area of Cyprus is Turkish Cypriot.¹¹

In Athens, the new government of Constantine Karamanlis—who had come to power following the collapse of the military administration—found itself in an

⁵ “New Cypriote President Defends Coup”, *New York Times*, January 18, 1974, p. 10. Also see Stearns, Monteagle (1992), *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus*, p. 109 and Couloumbis (1983), pp. 85-86.

⁶ Couloumbis (1983), p. 95.

⁷ Couloumbis (1983), p. 96.

⁸ Couloumbis (1983), p. 97.

⁹ Couloumbis (1983), p. 97

¹⁰ Couloumbis (1983), p. 97.

¹¹ CIA Factbook, 1999.

excruciating dilemma. As a guarantor state of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Greece also had a right to intervene militarily to preserve the territorial integrity of Cyprus, now threatened by Turkey. Karamanlis' initial predilection was thus to declare war on Turkey and battle Turkish troops in Cyprus and anywhere else the two sides might meet.¹² Military advisors to the new Greek President, however, informed Karamanlis that the Greek Army was unprepared for a general war against Turkey. This would be particularly the case if the focus of the war's activity would be in relatively distant Cyprus, as Greece had hundreds of poorly defended islands located within one hundred miles of the Turkish coast.¹³ Thus Karamanlis acquiesced to the advice of his military staff. Instead of declaring war against Turkey, Karamanlis withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO in protest against what he saw as a lack of support from Britain and the United States in restraining Turkey.¹⁴

There were thus not one but two military operations carried out by Turkey on Cyprus. The first one, launched on July 20, had seemed to be both consistent with and a natural extension of fourteen years of Turkish policy in support of the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. However, with the successful landing of troops on Cyprus in July, Turkish objectives appear to have changed dramatically. Suddenly, Turkey was no longer arguing in defense of the status quo, but rather was seeking to overthrow it. Turkey's objective now became the replacement of the governmental structure that had been in place since 1960 with a framework based upon the concept of *taksim*, the division of the island's Greek and Turkish communities.

The events of 1974 generate several questions. What led Turkey to abandon its policy of supporting the 1960 treaties? Having already scored a major military and diplomatic success and seemingly well on its way to restoring the *status quo ante* in Cyprus, why did Turkey make the diplomatically and economically costly¹⁵ move of expanding its occupation force to control 37% of the island? What prompted Turkey to withdraw its support for the Cypriot governmental structure of 1960 and propose instead a bizonal or multicantonal structure? More importantly, what changes had taken place internationally and within Turkey that led Ankara to the conclusion that it could afford to pursue a more aggressive policy in Cyprus?

Turkey's decision to abandon its support for the 1960 Accords in favor of a new constitutional arrangement resulted from a combination of two sets of circumstances: circumstances resulting from trends that had been developing for more than a decade, and events that took place immediately after the Cyprus coup and Turkey's initial invasion. Given the multidimensional quality of the formulation of Turkish Cyprus policy in 1974, this case study is divided into three broad sections. First there will be a brief discussion of Cyprus' pre-independence history, including an account, in summary form, of the domestic and international political factors at play with regard to the creation of an independent Cyprus. Secondly, I will analyze the international scene as it involved Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the years 1960-1974. Much of this discussion will focus upon Turkey's relations with the United States during this period, as it was this relationship which was primarily responsible for Turkey's policy of restraint in its Cyprus

¹² Stearns (1992), p. 87, Couloumbis (1983), p. 97.

¹³ Couloumbis (1983), p. 97.

¹⁴ Which Greece rejoined in 1983.

¹⁵ See Pope and Pope (1997), pp. 127-129.

policy in the years leading up to 1974. Thirdly, I will provide a detailed breakdown of the events of July and August 1974 as they unfolded. My conclusion will be based upon an understanding that Turkey's change of policy after its initial invasion resulted from several trends that had been developing for more than a decade, combined with events that had occurred in the immediate aftermath of the coup and July invasion. Together, these factors led Turkey to embark upon what was seen to be an abrupt change of policy in 1974. In retrospect, however, Turkey's policy 'switch' ought to have taken fewer people by surprise.

THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE HISTORY OF CYPRUS

1571-1955

In 1571 the Ottoman Empire defeated the Venetian rulers of Cyprus and established its first garrison there. Ottoman soldiers were given *timars*, fiefs of land, and were encouraged to settle on the island permanently. Following substantial population growth in the seventeenth century, Turks grew to represent approximately twenty percent of the island's inhabitants, with Greeks making up most of the rest of the population.¹⁶ By 1970 there were approximately 130,000 Turkish Cypriots and 440,000 Greek Cypriots on the island.¹⁷

In 1878 the British government was granted the right to administer Cyprus 'in the name of the Sultan' in return for British diplomatic support following the Ottoman Empire's disastrous 1877-78 war with Russia. Britain then annexed the island outright as a colony when the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in 1914. In 1915, Britain offered Cyprus to Greece as an inducement for its entry into World War I, an offer the Greek government declined. Pro-*enosis* agitation, however, had been present on the island since the arrival of British administration in 1878. This agitation intensified during the period between the two world wars. In 1931 the Government House of Cyprus, which housed the British administrators of the island, was burned to the ground by a Greek Cypriot mob. This event was interpreted by the British to have been instigated by pro-*enosis* elements. British suppression of the *enosis* movement followed soon afterward.¹⁸

During the Second World War the Greek alliance with Britain led to support among the Greek Cypriot community for the British war effort. In response to this improvement in Cypriot-British relations during the war, the British administrators proposed at the war's conclusion the establishment of a more democratic and representative government in Cyprus. This initiative, however, was opposed by both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. The Greek Cypriot leadership opposed the proposed reforms because they believed that their acceptance of a limited representative government would be understood by the British as an abandonment of their *enosis* objectives. Turkish Cypriot leaders opposed the democratization initiative as a move that would subjugate the Turkish Cypriot minority to the Greek Cypriot majority.¹⁹

¹⁶ The combined numbers of Armenians and Jews totaled approximately five percent of the islands population until the 1960's. Today, the population of these two groups is approximately one percent.

¹⁷ Patrick, Richard A, (1976), p. 9.

¹⁸ For a detailed account of Cyprus' pre-independence history, see Patrick (1976), pp. 3-25.

¹⁹ Patrick (1976), p. 6.

Pro-*enosis* agitation among both Greek mainlanders and the Greek Cypriots continued throughout the postwar pre-independence era (1945-1960). In 1948, King Paul of Greece declared that Greece desired the union of Cyprus and Greece and in 1951 a petition sponsored by the Cypriot Orthodox Church was presented to the Greek government and claimed that 97 percent of all Greek Cypriots supported *enosis*.

By the 1950's, however, the shaping of much of the world into the bipolar superpower system had created a situation in which Britain, Greece and Turkey now found themselves members of an increasingly vital and cohesive system of Western military alliance. In 1952 both Turkey and Greece were admitted into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In 1955 Turkey and Britain became members of the Baghdad Pact. Thus to Britain, maintaining good relations with both Turkey and Greece became increasingly important. It was similarly important for both Britain and the United States, the leader of the NATO alliance, that Greece and Turkey perpetuate the spirit of *rapprochement* that had existed between them since the 1930's. For Turkish and Greek leaders as well, the maintenance of mutually satisfactory relations was highly desirable, despite the bitter legacy of the two countries' more recent enmity. Greece was just emerging from a period of violent civil war, and looked to its postwar/post-civil war era with hopes for peace, stability and development. Turkey, on the other hand, was feeling even more than Greece threatened by an increasingly belligerent Soviet Union²⁰, and hoped to achieve security through its newly concluded alliances. With the era of British colonial administration winding down in Cyprus, it was clear to all of the countries involved that Turkish-Greek cooperation was of profound importance to the stability of the two countries themselves. It was, furthermore, of equally great importance to the cohesion of the regional alliances that were being created by the United States as part of its policy of 'containment' against the expansion of Soviet influence.²¹

The dismantling of British colonial governments from India to Palestine to Cyprus, however, gave rise to nationalist tensions over the political shape of the newly independent countries. In the case of Cyprus, these tensions spilled over into Turkish-Greek relations. This, in turn, became a concern of the United States due to the roles both Greece and Turkey played in the overall Cold War power struggle.

Towards Independence: 1955-60

On April 1, 1955 EOKA—a pro-*enosis* terrorist group whose Greek initials stood for the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters—set off its first bombs against British installations. EOKA was headed by Lieutenant Colonel (later General) George Grivas, a Cypriot-born officer of the Greek army with a history of right-wing extremism. Operating from secret bases in the Troodos Mountains in the central region of the island, EOKA launched a low-level guerilla campaign against British rule. British military and colonial authorities were the primary targets of EOKA terrorists, although several Greek Cypriot 'collaborators' were killed as well. Some Turkish Cypriots, who tended to support either the continuation of British rule or the partition of the island into two (*taksim*), were also killed, but were not a primary target of EOKA. This has been interpreted as having likely

²⁰Shaw and Shaw (1977), pp. 399-400.

²¹ For a description of the Eisenhower administration's pressure on Britain to follow a policy which would alienate neither Greece nor Turkey, see Stearns (1992), pp. 25-26.

stemmed from a desire of EOKA to not unnecessarily transform inter-communal tensions into inter-communal warfare, thereby complicating a British withdrawal from the island.²²

In 1958, however, inter-communal enmity did erupt into rioting, kidnappings, reprisal killings and the evacuation of minorities from several villages. This led to an announcement by the British that unless Greece, Turkey and the Cypriot communities came together to negotiate a new constitutional framework for Cyprus, British troops would be withdrawn into their bases. From this point forward, Britain's objectives were to negotiate an independence framework for Cyprus which would not exacerbate Turkish-Greek tensions and which would continue to safeguard Britain's strategic interests.²³

In February of 1959, Greece and Turkey undertook bilateral talks in Zürich over the shape the constitution of an independent Cyprus should take. The outline of these talks was then taken to London to present to the British government. It was only at this point that representatives of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities were invited to take part in the negotiations. The two Cypriot delegations were presented with the agreements, which became known as the Zürich-London agreements, as a *fait accompli*. In these agreements, both *enosis* and *taksim* were prohibited, and Turkey, Greece and Britain were all named as guarantor states to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. Greece, Turkey and Britain had clearly worked in a spirit of diplomatic compromise, understanding the rationale for one another's political and security concerns. However, the exclusion of the Cypriots themselves from the decision-making process created an agreement which the Cypriots, particularly the Greek Cypriots, obviously did not feel themselves a party to. This would be demonstrated repeatedly in the decade to follow.

Turkey and Cyprus: Turkey's interests

As any glance at the map of Cyprus will suggest, Turkey's primary interest in Cyprus stems from the nearly 150 miles of Cypriot coastline located just seventy miles to the south of Turkey's 'soft underbelly' in the East Mediterranean. 250 miles to the west of Cyprus lies Rhodes, the easternmost of nearly 2,400 Greek islands--more than 100 of which are populated--located in the Aegean Sea between Turkey and Greece. Covering an area of approximately 80,000 square miles, the Greek Islands form a stranglehold over most Turkish outlets to the sea. Guarding the entrance to the Dardenelle Straits leading to the Sea of Marmara and Istanbul is Limnos. Located just ten miles off the Turkish coast and blocking the entrance to the sea from the major port of Izmir (Turkey's third-largest city after Istanbul and Ankara) are the islands of Lesbos and Khios. Indeed, there is no Aegean Turkish city which would not be vulnerable to Greek blockade in the event that war broke out between the two countries. Thus, out of nearly 1,500 miles of coastline, just 250 miles—that between Rhodes and Cyprus--would have relatively free access to the Mediterranean were war to break out between Greece and Turkey and with Cyprus in unfriendly hands. With the northern coastline of Cyprus in the friendly hands of the

²² Stearns (1992), p. 26.

²³ Which would be safeguarded by the establishment of two large British military bases on Cyprus when the island became independent.

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus²⁴, however, the Turkish ports of Mersin and Iskenderun have relatively free access to the sea and the amount of secure coastline Turkey would have in a war against Greece is doubled.

Furthermore, Turkey is practically surrounded by potential enemies. This was even more the case in 1974 than it is today. To the west is Greece. To the north was Zhivkov's Bulgaria and over the Black Sea were Ceaucescu's Romania and the Soviet Union. To the east lay countries whose relations with Turkey have ranged from cordial to openly hostile as the decades have passed: Iran, Iraq and Syria. Were Cyprus to have become a satellite of Greece or even part of Greece itself, the Turkey of the 1960's and 1970's would have been completely surrounded by potentially hostile neighbors.

In addition to protecting the interests of Turkey itself, Turkey has an obvious interest in safeguarding the welfare of the Cypriot Turkish population. Although in the republic of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk revanchist sentiment and Ottoman nostalgia have never run high, Turkish citizens certainly do not like seeing their fellow Turks outside of Turkey treated badly. Thus in March of 1964, after a series of attacks by Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriot community, there were demonstrations in Turkey demanding the invasion and partition of Cyprus.²⁵ Similarly, the immense public acclaim bestowed upon Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit after the initial leg of the 1974 invasion was quite possibly a significant factor in the Turkish decision to proceed with the second leg of the invasion three weeks later.

Thirdly, the Turkish approach to Cyprus also has to be seen within the context of broader Turkish-Greek relations. Given the many aspects of Turkish-Greek conflict--including the status of various uninhabited islands in the Aegean, Greek and Turkish minorities in the two countries, disputes over the distribution of mineral rights in the Aegean, and the Cyprus issue itself²⁶--any retreat on one particular issue would conceivably be seen by the other party as a sign of weakness. Thus, within the context of the 'cold war' being fought generally between Greece and Turkey, an abandonment of the Cyprus cause could prompt a 'domino effect' and encourage aggressive behavior by the other side on one of the other 'fronts' of the general Turkish-Greek dispute.

Limiting Turkey's freedom to maneuver on the Cyprus question, however, was Turkey's presence in the NATO alliance. Although membership in the alliance had done much to relieve Turkey's security concerns on its eastern border with the Soviet Union, Turkey's evolution from non-aligned Kemalist republic in the 1920's-1940's to NATO member in the 1950's was accompanied by increasing dependency upon American weapons, spare parts and expertise.²⁷ With both Greece and Turkey integrated into an alliance directed against the Soviet Union, the trade-off for both of these countries was increased security in exchange for decreased independence. More precisely, increased contact with the United States had increased the amount that could be lost by behaving in too independent a manner. This was Turkey's experience after the 1974 invasion, when the United States instituted a weapons embargo against Turkey.

²⁴ Recognized internationally only by Turkey.

²⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, March 15, 1964. P. 1.

²⁶ Not to mention Greek support for the PKK in later years.

²⁷ Ahmad (1977), p.407.

Turkish Policy towards Cyprus: The 1950's

Turkey's Cyprus policy in the 1950's was remarkably mild. In response to the activities of EOKA in the 1950's Turkey's Prime Minister Adnan Menderes could not have been more tempered. Initially, Menderes refused to comment, stating only that his government was following the developments on Cyprus and that Turkey wished to maintain good relations with its ally Greece.²⁸ Shortly thereafter, the celebrations marking Izmir's 'Liberation Day' and the end of Greek occupation in 1922 were cancelled by the Menderes government. In reference to this, Menderes declared 'I am of the opinion that to allow the sacred meaning of September 9 (Liberation Day) to be exploited...would trouble our national conscience'. A few days later, it was announced that 'Turkey will not take the slightest action which may cause even a small crisis in the Tripartite Alliance'.²⁹

By 1959, Turkey's Cyprus policy had settled on support for Cyprus' independence and territorial integrity, which was formalized by the Zürich-London agreements with Greece and Britain of that same year. A staunch supporter of the United States and its Cold War policies, compromise on the Cyprus question for the sake of NATO harmony came naturally to Menderes.³⁰ Thus, an agreement between Britain, Greece and Turkey was then hammered out in Zürich and London in August-September of 1960.

THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

Establishment

According to the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus could not accept union with, or be partitioned by, another state. Thus, both *enosis* and *taksim* were expressly forbidden. In the event of a breach of the provisions of this treaty, the treaty's co-guarantors were to take collective action to return conditions to the status quo. In the event that collective action was not possible, each of the co-guarantors were given the right to undertake unilateral action.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance, which was also signed during the Zürich-London negotiating process, Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus agreed to co-operate for their common defense. A Tripartite Military Headquarters consisting of representatives of the three countries was to be established in Cyprus and commanded on a one-year rotational basis by a representative of each of the three countries. Furthermore, a committee consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus would constitute the supreme political body of this alliance. Contingents of 950 Greek soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers were to be stationed in Cyprus under the command of the Tripartite Headquarters.³¹

²⁸ Zafer, August 22, 1954. Taken from Ahmad, Feroz (1977), *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, p. 403.

²⁹ Ahmad (1977), p. 403. The alliance referred to was the Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia.

³⁰ See Ahmad (1977), pp. 401-405.

³¹ Patrick (1976), p. 30.

Cyprus was thus incorporated into the pro-Western ring of alliances that the United States had been encouraging its allies around the world to form in order to contain Soviet influence. With Greece and Turkey connected to the British and American defense structures through NATO and the Balkan Pact, and with Turkey furthermore connected to Britain and also to three other³² ‘northern tier’ Middle Eastern states through the Baghdad Pact, the Treaty of Alliance filled in a vital gap in the interlocking defense structure that the United States had established across Eurasia, from Iceland to Pakistan. Simultaneously, the Treaty of Alliance gave both Greece and Turkey the reassurance of having a small contingent of soldiers on the ground in Cyprus at all times. It was also hoped, no doubt, that the Tripartite administration would foster closer Turkish-Greek relations through enhanced levels of interaction and cooperation.

The Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance were included among the ‘basic articles’ of Cyprus’ new constitution. As ‘basic articles’, they could neither be amended nor repealed. Non-‘basic’ articles of the constitution could be amended only by a majority vote comprised of two-thirds of the members of each of the two communities in the house. Thus, ‘one-third of the house membership plus one’ of either of the two communities could block amendments to even non-‘basic’ elements of the constitution.

The President of the Republic was to be a Greek Cypriot, elected by the Greek Cypriot community. The Vice President of the Republic was to be Turkish Cypriot elected by the Turkish Cypriot community. The Cabinet consisted of a Council of Ministers, including seven Greek Cypriots chosen by the President and three Turkish Cypriots chosen by the Vice President. At least one of the major portfolios of Defense, Foreign Affairs or Finance had to be held by a Turkish Cypriot. Council decisions could be approved after an absolute majority vote, but could be vetoed by either the President or the Vice President.

Despite the bi-communal emphasis of the new country’s constitutional, security and political framework, elements within both the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot community viewed the present situation as only the ‘second-best’ alternative to either *enosis* or *taksim*.³³

As a minority comprising just one-fifth of the island’s population, the Turkish Cypriot community tended to operate from a position of weakness vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots. Therefore, rather than undertake large-scale agitation in favor of *taksim*, the Turkish Cypriot political strategy was to insist on a strict adherence to the provisions of the 1960 constitution and especially to the treaties which made up the ‘basic articles’. If, however, the constitutional framework proved to be unworkable, the Turkish strategy was to match Greek Cypriot demands for *enosis* with a demand for double-*enosis*, namely *taksim*.³⁴

1963-1964

Cypriot independence however, far from leading to an end to inter-communal bloodshed, witnessed a dramatic increase in violence between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The most violent period between Cyprus’ independence and Turkey’s

³² Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.

³³ Patrick (1976), pp. 36-37.

³⁴ Patrick (1976), pp. 36-37.

1974 invasion came between December 21, 1963 until August 10, 1964. During this time 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots were reported killed in inter-communal violence.³⁵ In December of 1963 street-fighting broke out in Nicosia and Lanarca, with 87 Turkish Cypriots and 30 Greek Cypriots known to have been killed in a period of ten days. On January 12 1964, a mass grave was exhumed in the village of Ayios in the presence of foreign reporters, British Army officers and Red Cross personnel. The grave contained the bodies of 21 Turkish Cypriots believed to have been killed in the village in the third week of December. The observers verified that a number of the victims appeared to have been tortured, and to have been shot after their hands and feet were tied.³⁶

In response to this violence, Turkey threatened in December to invade Cyprus. This led to the imposition by the Makarios government of a cease-fire.³⁷ On December 26, an exchange of hostages took place, with the Makarios government handing over 545 Turkish Cypriots in exchange for 26 Greek Cypriots that were being held by the Turkish Cypriots. On December 30, British troops began patrolling Nicosia.

One of the causes of the December fighting had been President Makarios' November 30 announcement that he wished to change the 1960 constitution. In response to this, the Turkish Foreign Ministry made what could be considered its first warning to the Greek Cypriots, marking a new stage in Turkish-Cypriot relations. The Turkish Foreign Ministry statement protested against what it called the 'completely irresponsible statements of the Greek Cypriot leaders against the constitutional regime in Cyprus'.

It is legally insupportable and impossible to argue that such an attempt is an internal affair, for the Cyprus Constitution was established in accordance with an international agreement, and the provisions of this Constitution were guaranteed by the Treaty of Guarantees to which Turkey is a party...A government that can abandon some 100,000 dear members of our race to the arbitrary administration of foreigners will never come to power in Turkey'.³⁸

During the period 1963-1974 Turkey's principle vehicle of choice for solving its problems in Cyprus was NATO. Turkish policy hinged upon a belief that NATO's dominant power, the United States, would assist Turkey in bringing Athens and Nicosia around to the Turkish viewpoint. Convinced that the Turkish position was the just one, Ankara hoped the United States would convince Athens and Nicosia to unequivocally abandon *enosis*.³⁹ Indeed, for much of Turkish public opinion, the Cyprus question was simply one of law and order. On December 26, 1963 the lead editorial for the Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet* demonstrates the extent to which Turks saw their position as legally unassailable.

³⁵ Patrick (1976), p. 46.

³⁶ Patrick (1976), p. 50.

³⁷ Patrick (1976), p. 49.

³⁸ Ahmad (1977), p. 405.

³⁹ Ahmad (1977), p. 405.

Turkey is respectful of international agreements. Turkey is respectful of the law. This is one of the principle characteristics of Atatürk's republic...Cyprus must understand and we must make Cyprus understand that we will not abandon our legal rights.⁴⁰

Makarios, however, refused to accept a 'NATO Solution', and instead took his case to the United Nations, where a resolution was passed to send an international peacekeeping force to the island. When Turkey attempted to have the Makarios government condemned for its actions, it found itself diplomatically isolated.⁴¹

On January 1, 1964 President Makarios announced that he was unilaterally abrogating the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee.⁴² After consultations with British Commonwealth and Foreign Minister Duncan Sandys, however, Markarios rescinded his declaration and instead announced that he intended to terminate the Treaties by 'appropriate means'.⁴³ Shortly thereafter a conference was scheduled to convene on January 15 in London at which Turkey, Greece and representatives from the two Cypriot communities would meet in an attempt to settle their disputes.

At the conference, the Greek Cypriots insisted on abrogating the treaties, demanding in their place a unitary Cypriot government which would be free to amend its own constitution. Turkish Cypriot rights would be written into the constitution, but the Greek Cypriots rejected the legitimacy of the threat of external intervention being used to guarantee those rights. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, insisted upon the full implementation of the Constitution of 1960.⁴⁴ With Greece and Turkey supporting the positions of their respective communities on the island, the conference ended in deadlock on January 31.

Meanwhile, hardly a day passed in Nicosia and Larnaca without an exchange of shots being fired across cease-fire lines. In other parts of the country, fighting proceeded apace. In February, 31 Turkish Cypriots and 10 Greek Cypriots were reported killed in inter-communal fighting. In March, 26 Turkish Cypriots and 12 Greek Cypriots were killed.⁴⁵

On March 13, 1964 Turkey informed Makarios that it would intervene unilaterally unless there was an immediate cessation of all actions against the Turkish Cypriot community, an immediate cease-fire, a 'green-line' zone agreement in Nicosia, the lifting of the siege from Turkish districts, the restoration of telephone and postal service to Turkish areas, and the return of Turkish hostages.⁴⁶ This note was rejected by President Makarios, prompting mass demonstrations in Turkey in favor of invasion and partition. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü convened an extraordinary session of the Turkish Parliament and on March 16 İnönü's government was given the authority to send troops to Cyprus by a vote of 489 to 0 with four abstentions.⁴⁷

⁴⁰ *Cumhuriyet* Editorial, December 26, 1963, p.2.

⁴¹ Ahmad (1977), pp. 404-405.

⁴² *Cumhuriyet*, January 12, 1964, p.1.

⁴³ Patrick (1976), p. 52.

⁴⁴ Patrick (1976), p. 52.

⁴⁵ Patrick (1976), p. 69.

⁴⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, March 14, 1964.

⁴⁷ Ahmad (1977), p. 406.

Lack of support on the Cyprus question from the United States in the United Nations, however, had led to a great disillusionment with America in Turkey. On April 16 President Gürsel took NATO to task for not supporting ‘our national and just cause’ and concluded that ‘Turkish-Greek Friendship is dead’.⁴⁸ In the Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet*, Prime Minister İnönü was quoted as saying “I believed in the leadership of America, which is the responsible party in the alliance; now I am paying a penalty”⁴⁹

As the crisis developed, a turning-point in Turkish-U.S. relations occurred with the arrival of a letter sent by U.S. President Lyndon Johnson to Prime Minister İnönü on June 5, 1964. In the letter, Johnson wrote:

...a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention.

İnönü was also reminded that:

Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States’ consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished...I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.⁵⁰

Johnson’s letter, in the words of Mehmet Gönlüböl, Professor of International Relations at Ankara University:

...became the most important factor since World War II to affect the relations between the two countries unfavorably. This document was...received with great surprise and created strong repercussions, not only in leftist circles, but in public opinion as a whole.⁵¹

Although the letter was not made public for eighteen months, reports of its contents were leaked to the Turkish press almost immediately upon its receipt.⁵² The letter strongly influenced a liberal intelligentsia which had been adopting an increasingly

⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, March 14, 1964.

⁴⁹ *Cumhuriyet* (1977), p. 1.

⁵⁰ Landau, Jacob M. (1979), *Johnson’s 1964 Letter to İnönü and Greek Lobbying*, pp. 19-22.

⁵¹ Landau (1979), p. 6.

⁵² Ahmad (1977), p. 407.

anti-American stance since the early 1960's.⁵³ By now, however, the calls for a re-appraisal of Turkish foreign policy began coming from inside the government as well.⁵⁴

Turkey: 1964-74

From 1964 onwards, Turkey was to formulate a policy which, while never questioning the basic pro-Western and pro-NATO stance of Turkey's diplomatic orientation, began taking steps towards adopting more independent positions.⁵⁵ As the Turkish government never went out of its way to offend the United States needlessly, and as Turkish and American foreign policy interests tended to converge on most major foreign policy issues, Turkey's fundamental approach to policy formulation did not change greatly. However, there was a discernable increase in the independence of Turkish policy on several questions of both major and minor importance. Three examples of these include: 1) Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union, 2) The decision to reintroduce poppy production, and 3) Cyprus.

Turkey and the Soviet Union

On the very day Prime Minister İnönü received his letter from Johnson, he appealed in a radio broadcast for warmer relations with the Soviet Union. In doing so, he appeared to place just one condition upon an improvement in relations with Moscow:

But, there is something we ask of them: they must acknowledge our need for security in causes we are pursuing.⁵⁶

On October 30, 1964 Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin visited Moscow amid rumors that Moscow might finance the Keban dam in eastern Anatolia, leading to an 'Aswan on the Euphrates'.⁵⁷ In May of 1965 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko traveled to Ankara and two months later Prime Minister Ürgüplü of Turkey traveled to Moscow. Premier Alexei Kosygin then visited Ankara in 1966. In September of 1967, Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel visited Moscow, establishing what was seen as a new working relationship with the Russians. In Moscow, Demirel declared:

I think we have entered a new era in our dealings with the Russians. As is known, there had been great strain between our countries over the years, and in the period after World War II we had no relations at all. Now that gap has been

⁵³ Shaw, Stanford and Shaw, Ezel Kural (1977), *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II*, pp. 430-433.

⁵⁴ See, for example, the proposals written up by Hamit Batu, Director-General of the fourth department of the Foreign Ministry, in which it is argued that Turkey should diversify its foreign policy by enhancing relations with European, African and Asian countries, rather than rely exclusively upon its American connection. See Ahmad (1977), pp. 406-407.

⁵⁵ See Ahmad (1977), pp. 401-421; Shaw and Shaw (1977), pp. 431-433.

⁵⁶ Ahmad (1977), p. 408.

⁵⁷ *The Economist*, October 24, 1964., from Ahmad (1977), 410.

bridged; I am not suggesting that all doubts are gone, but I think the hostility is gone.⁵⁸

Poppies

The issue of Turkish poppy production, while of relatively minor importance to Turkish-American relations generally, is also indicative of a conscious effort on the part of Turkish politicians to display their primary commitment to Turkish interests, rather than to the interests of Turkey's American benefactor. In July of 1971, the military-installed (following the military intervention into politics on March 12, 1971) government of Nihat Erim agreed to end the cultivation of poppies, used to manufacture opium, in Turkey. In exchange for this, the United States agreed to provide \$35 million, of which \$15 million was used to compensate Turkish poppy growers and \$20 million was given to the Turkish government for other agricultural investments.⁵⁹

This agreement has been aptly described as the sort of deal that only a government unconcerned about electoral politics could have made.⁶⁰ The decision to eradicate poppy cultivation was extremely unpopular throughout the country, and practically all political parties running in the 1973 elections promised to overturn it if they were elected.⁶¹

One of the first acts of the government of Bülent Ecevit elected in 1973 was thus to repeal the ban on growing poppies and to distribute poppy seeds to licensed farmers. Although the issue of Turkey's poppy production was hardly the sort of disagreement that could cause a rupture in relations between allies, the Turkish perception that the United States had bullied Ankara into banning poppy production contributed considerably to anti-American sentiment in Turkey in the early 1970's.⁶² Ecevit's repeal of the ban therefore assumed greater significance than it otherwise would have as it was seen in Turkey as a rebuke of American bullying and an assertion of Turkish independence and the protection of Turkish interests.⁶³

Cyprus: 1967

Between August of 1964 and November of 1967, it is estimated that 109 Turkish Cypriots and 60 Greek Cypriots died in inter-communal fighting. On November 15 1967, the Cypriot National Guard, which was led principally by Greek officers from the mainland under the command of General Grivas, attacked Turkish Cypriot positions. In Turkey, there were again demonstrations in favor of invasion and partition⁶⁴. On November 16 and 17 the Turkish Parliament and Senate met in a special joint session and authorized the government to use the Turkish Armed Forces if circumstances required it.

⁵⁸ *Milliyet*, October 14, 1967, from Ahmad (1977), p. 410. .

⁵⁹ Ahmad (1977), p. 418.

⁶⁰ Ahmad (1977), p. 417.

⁶¹ Ahmad (1977), p. 418-419.

⁶² Spain, James (1975) "The United States, Turkey and the Poppy", in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 29, number 3, 1975.

⁶³ Ahmad (1977), p. 419; Shaw and Shaw (1977), pp. 432-433.

⁶⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, November 16, 1967, pp. 1-3.

The Armed Forces had, in fact, already been mobilized and the Air Force was conducting reconnaissance missions over Cyprus. Cemal Tural, who was Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, later wrote:

In the 1967 crisis the cabinet took the decision to intervene in Cyprus. But in the four hours that followed I do not know what happened; the cabinet decided to postpone the action. There was not a thing left for us to say. I obtained the decision to postpone the action in writing...⁶⁵

In response to the Turkish sabre-rattling, General Grivas was recalled to Athens and Greek troops stationed in Cyprus were withdrawn. Although diplomatically the actions of Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel had been a success, politically they had been a failure. Demirel was criticized by all opposition parties for having missed a chance to intervene in Cyprus and settle the problem once and for all.⁶⁶ At the same time, anti-American sentiment became much more widespread in Turkey, particularly in the years 1968-71. During this period, Sixth Fleet visits to Turkey were reduced, and even temporarily stopped due to anti-American demonstrations and the kidnapping of US military personnel.⁶⁷

With just several inter-communal homicides taking place per year, the period 1967-74 was one of relative tranquility on Cyprus, the result of increasing U.N. peacekeeping on the island. Tensions within the Greek Cypriot community, however, began to intensify. Specifically, these resulted from splits which had developed between Makarios and the more fiercely pro-*enosis* party of General Grivas' supporters, who were enraged at Makarios for his expulsion of the Cypriot leader as a concession to Turkey in 1967. On January 27, 1974 Grivas died of a heart attack. Although Grivas well-known an outspoken pro-*enosis* renegade, he has also been described as having had a controlling influence over his militiamen. With his passing from the scene, pro-*enosis* provocations intensified on the island.

Meanwhile, Turkey was headed toward developing a considerably more independent foreign policy. With the return of elections 1973, Bülent Ecevit's Republican People's Party was able to form a coalition with the Islamic-oriented National Salvation Party of Necmettin Erbakan to create a government. With the rise to power of Mr. Ecevit—a Social Democrat with a strong admiration for the social and diplomatic orientation of the Scandinavian countries⁶⁸--the traditionally non-aligned approach to foreign policy of Ecevit's Republican People's Party had met modern-day leftist anti-Americanism.⁶⁹ The result was a strong desire on the part of the new government to continue the process of diversifying its foreign policy. Ecevit's coalition partner Erbakan, himself more interested in fostering ties with the Muslim world, was also content to see a diversification in Turkey's foreign policy away from NATO and the United States. Thus, in the year of the Cyprus crisis, Turkey had in place a government which was arguably

⁶⁵ Ahmad (1977), p. 415.

⁶⁶ Ahmad (1977), p. 415. Also *Cumhuriyet*, November 27, 28, 30, December 2, 3, 4 1967.

⁶⁷ Pope and Pope (1997), p. 105; Shaw and Shaw (1977), p. 431.

⁶⁸ Pope and Pope (1997), p. 98.

⁶⁹ Ahmad (1977), pp. 421-422; For more on the Republican People's Party, see Shaw and Shaw (1977), pp. 373-400.

the most skeptical of American intentions of any the country had had in the history of the Republic.

1974

On July 15, Archbishop Makarios was overthrown when supporters of Nicos Sampson, a longtime Grivas militiaman, attacked Makarios' offices with artillery shells. Fleeing the capital, Makarios crossed the mountains of southeastern Cyprus and found refuge at a British naval base. Nicos Sampson then declared himself president.

The next day, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit sent a diplomatic note to London seeking arrangements for joint action in Cyprus in accordance with Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Flying to London on July 17, Ecevit met with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Prior to departing Ankara, Ecevit was quoted in the *New York Times* as saying: 'We cannot accept any fait accompli. And we cannot give up our rights. We will do everything to defend the rights of the Turkish Cypriot Community'.⁷⁰

Ecevit then met with U.S. Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco. To Sisco, Ecevit related the following demands to be passed on to the Greek government.

1. Removal of Nicos Sampson from power.
2. Safe return of Makarios to Nicosia.
3. A timetable for the withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus with meaningful provisions for inspection and enforcement of this condition.
4. Replacement of Greek officers in Cyprus by neutral personnel under U.N. auspices.
5. Guarantees of the Turkish Cypriot community, with a land corridor under Turkish Cypriot military control to link the Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia with the coast.⁷¹

Turkey's demands, though hardly acceptable to Athens, are indicative of Ankara's continuing commitment to the return of the legal status quo on Cyprus according to the 1960 Zürich-London Accords. The fact that Turkey initially proposed a joint action with London, rather than undertaking a unilateral action without prior warning, is also indicative of a desire on Turkey's part to continue working within the 1960 framework.

Within two weeks after Turkey's initial intervention, however, Ankara's demands had escalated considerably. By August 10, Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş had renounced the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, and was demanding a new federal structure for the island.

What led to this about-face? The answers are rooted in both Turkey's experiences during the 1960-1974 period and in the manner in which events unfolded during the month that passed between Sampson's ouster of Makarios and Turkey's second military intervention into Cyprus. The breakdown of these events indicates three simultaneous streams of activity: 1) A general preparation in Turkey for military intervention. 2)

⁷⁰ *The New York Times*, July 17, 1974, p. 12.

⁷¹ Couloumbis (1983), p. 92.

Efforts by Turkey to either convince Britain to join them in an intervention or at least ‘go through the motions’ of engaging in diplomatic activity prior to the intervention. 3) American reluctance to denounce the coup and the appearance in Washington of wishing to establish contacts with the Sampson regime.

Countdown to Intervention: Part I

July 17

Turkish Parliament convenes in an extraordinary session to determine course of action to be taken on Cyprus. Awaits Prime Minister Ecevit’s return from London following consultations with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Meanwhile, the United States begins talks with the new Cypriot government. A U.S. State Department official tells *The New York Times* that Secretary of State Kissinger has long seen Makarios as ‘the Castro of the Mediterranean’ and is advocating recognition of Sampson.⁷² The headline of *The New York Times* for July 18 reads: “U.S. Begins Talks with New chiefs of Cyprus Regime: Administration said to lean toward leader of coup rather than Makarios”.

July 18

Turkey extends its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea into an area over which Greece claims sovereignty. According to the official Gazette published by the Turkish government, Turkey now claims an additional 3,900 square miles of territorial waters toward the Greek coast. At the same time, Turkey begins a military build-up on its south coast. An estimated 50,000 troops are thought to be assembling with landing craft near Turkey’s southeastern port city of Mersin.⁷³

July 19

U.S. Undersecretary of State Sisco, who has by now received a negative response to the Turkish demands from Greek President Ionnides, flies to Ankara in a last-ditch attempt to forestall the Turkish invasion. When Sisco asks Ecevit to postpone the decision to invade, Ecevit responds by saying that he will not repeat the mistakes made by Turkish governments in 1964 and 1967.

The United States and Turkey both have made mistakes—the United States by preventing Turkish military action and Turkey by accepting. We should not make the same mistakes again.⁷⁴

July 20-21

Public response in Turkey to Ecevit’s announcement of the invasion is overwhelmingly supportive. Overnight, Ecevit is transformed into a national hero.⁷⁵ The

⁷² *The New York Times*, July 18, 1974, p. 17.

⁷³ *The New York Times*, July 19, 1974, p. 10.

⁷⁴ Couloumbis (1983), p. 92.

⁷⁵ Ahmad (1977), p. 420.

lead editorial for the Kemalist⁷⁶ daily *Cumhuriyet*-- pronounces 'We're in the Right'.⁷⁷ After ten years of unsuccessful attempts to protect Turkish Cypriots through diplomatic channels, Turkey has taken matters into its own hands. 'There was no other choice', opines *Cumhuriyet*.⁷⁸

Intervention Redux: Part II

After two days of fighting, during which time the Turkish army secured a corridor between the northern city of Kyrenia (Girne) and Nicosia, the island's capital, a cease-fire was agreed upon. Two days later, on the twenty-third of July, both the Greek junta ruling in Athens and the putschist regime of Nicos Sampson had fallen. In Athens, Constantine Caramanlis, the former conservative Prime Minister that had governed from 1955 to 1963, returned from self-imposed exile in Paris. In Cyprus, President of the House of Representatives Glavkos Clerides assumed presidential responsibilities following Sampson's resignation. Clerides' assumption of the post of acting president was in line with the Constitution of Cyprus, which called for the President of the House of Representatives to fill the position of president should the position be vacated.

Thus, it appeared that Turkey had achieved the return to the *status quo ante* that it claimed to have been seeking through the first invasion. The Sampson regime had resigned, constitutional order had returned, and Makarios, still in New York, announced that he was planning to return to office 'in a few weeks'.⁷⁹ On July 25, a multinational peacekeeping force consisting of British, Swedish, Canadian, Danish, Austrian and Finnish troops began to arrive on Cyprus. On July 26, the peacekeeping force took command over the island's main airport in Nicosia.

As events began to turn increasingly in Turkey's favor, however, Turkish policy regarding Cyprus became increasingly assertive. This assertiveness manifested itself not only through Turkey's negotiating tactics with Greece in Geneva—whither representatives from the two countries had traveled for talks following the July 22 signing of a cease-fire—but also through Turkish military tactics on the ground in Cyprus.

A break-down of Turkish diplomatic and military activities in the month-long interlude between Turkey's military operations reveals a systematic pattern of aggression and military preparation on the part of Ankara.

July 28

Turkey is reported by *The New York Times* to be taking a "strong line" in negotiations with Greece over Cyprus. Meanwhile, Turkish journalists report that three Turkish ships have been witnessed unloading approximately 1,000 men in Kyrenia on July 25--three days after the cease-fire had gone into effect. Cyprus complains to the

⁷⁶ As a newspaper identifying itself as 'Kemalist', *Cumhuriyet*—the second-largest newspaper in Turkey in the 1970's and the nation's oldest newspaper and 'paper of record'—would hardly be considered nationalist in the revanchist sense of the word. Typically, the newspaper is skeptical of Turkish attempts at projecting its influence beyond its borders.

⁷⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1974, p. 1.

⁷⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1964, p. 3.

⁷⁹ *The New York Times*, July 24, 1974, p. 15.

United Nations that Turkey is ‘daily and massively importing into the island more and more weapons of destruction’.⁸⁰

July 29

The New York Times reports⁸¹ that ‘Turkish helicopters, merchant ships and naval landing craft landed more troops and armor on Cyprus today for the ninth day’ consecutively, one week after the conclusion of the cease-fire.

Meanwhile, Turkish and Greek negotiators are reported to have reached an impasse, with disagreements arising over the issues of Turkish troop withdrawal and a revision of the Cyprus Constitution. Turkey now reportedly desires changes in the Constitutional structure of Cyprus.⁸² Meanwhile, Turkey is reported to be widening its hold over the northern coast of Cyprus. Turkish forces are reported to have expanded their area of control six miles to the east from Kyrenia, ordering United Nations peacekeeping troops to leave the area.⁸³

In Ankara, the Turkish Cabinet issues a statement that ‘Turkey will not accept arguments about withdrawal, reinforcement and supply of the Turkish troops on Cyprus’.⁸⁴

July 30

It is announced that Turkey, Greece and Britain have signed a new accord imposing (again) a cease-fire on Cyprus and giving Turkey the right to maintain its forces on the island until an ‘acceptable’ settlement is reached.⁸⁵ Turkey, meanwhile, is reported to be ‘moving, every day, to establish a quasi-independent self-sufficient area in Cyprus’.⁸⁶ Negotiations continue over the question of power-sharing, with Turkey demanding greater security guarantees for Turkish Cypriots.

Although Turkey has not yet made public its specific demands regarding ‘power-sharing’ and ‘security guarantees for Cypriot Turks’, the fact that these items are now up for negotiation is indicative of the extent to which Turkish objectives now extend beyond a return to the status quo of the 1960 accords.

July 31

One day after signing a cease-fire accord with Greece, Turkish troops are reported to have shelled and seized two towns in northern Cyprus. The towns of Karavas and Lapithos, to the west of the corridor occupied by the Turkish army since July 20, are seized after Turkish troops shell the Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen guarding them. This account is confirmed by United Nations peacekeeper witnesses to the shelling.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union, which has maintained consistent diplomatic support of Turkey since the Sampson coup and which even proposed joint action with Turkey prior to Turkey’s initial invasion, vetoes a measure at the UN Security Council

⁸⁰ *The New York Times*, July 28, 1974, p. 4.

⁸¹ *The New York Times*, July 29, 1974, p. 5.

⁸² *The New York Times*, July 30, 1974, p. 3.

⁸³ *The New York Times*, July 30, 1974, p. 3.

⁸⁴ *The New York Times*, July 30, 1974, p. 3.

⁸⁵ *The New York Times*, July 31, 1974, p. 1.

⁸⁶ *The New York Times*, July 31, 1974, p. 2.

that would have given the peacekeepers on Cyprus broader powers to enforce the ceasefire.⁸⁷

August 1

Turkish troops are reported to have occupied two more towns, Siskipos and Aylos Ermolaos, directly to the west of the Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor. The capture of these towns followed a long exchange of artillery and machine-gun fire, after which the Greek Cypriot National Guard defending the villages retreated.⁸⁸

August 4

Turkish armed forces are reported to be trying to occupy ‘all the high ground on both slopes of the mountains that dominate the road from Myrthou to Lapithos’⁸⁹. The village of Agridhaki is reported to have been shelled with mortar and tank fire, after which the Turkish army is said to have advanced on the southern side of the mountains. Five large Turkish cargo vessels are also reported to have been seen landing to the west of Kyrenia.

Following talks in Ankara with Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş calls for the creation of a federation on Cyprus.⁹⁰

August 5

Turkish troops are reported to have arrested the able-bodied male residents in the ‘last Greek Cypriot havens in the Turkish-occupied area of northern Cyprus’. Women and children living in the area are reported to have been expelled.

August 8

Turkish forces are reported to have advanced, after a heavy artillery bombardment, into the village of Vasila, to the west of Karavas on the northern Cyprus coast.⁹¹

In Washington, Richard Nixon resigns as President. Vice-President Gerald R. Ford is sworn in as President.

August 10

Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş declares that ‘there will be no point in continuing’ the negotiations with Greece if Athens continues to insist on retaining the 1960 Cyprus Constitution as the basis for the sharing of political power on the island. Turkish negotiators say they will press for new political boundaries on Cyprus, and the replacement of the Republic of Cyprus with two federated but autonomous Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot states.⁹² Turkish and Greek roles vis-à-vis the status quo have now been completely reversed, with Ankara openly advocating the overthrow of the 1960 accords and Greece defending them.

⁸⁷ *The New York Times*, August 1, 1974, p. 1.

⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, August 2, 1974, p. 2.

⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, August 4, 1974, p. 1.

⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, August 4, 1974, p. 1, 3.

⁹¹ *The New York Times*, August 8, 1974, p. 3.

⁹² *The New York Times*, August 11, 1974, p. 6.

August 12

The Güneş Plan is revealed, proposing that Cyprus be divided into a number of separate cantons. Negotiations between Greece and Turkey are brought to a standstill when Turkey demands an immediate yes-or-no answer to its proposals. Turkey is reported to now have approximately 40,000 soldiers on Cyprus.⁹³

August 13

Ankara begins its second military operation in Cyprus.

CONCLUSION

Turkey's Cyprus policy in 1974 underwent profound change, stemming both from factors that had been developing for over a decade and from events that had arisen in the aftermath of the coup and Turkey's initial intervention on July 20. Although both the intervention of July 20 and the intervention of August 14 were launched in the name of defending the long-suffering Turkish Cypriot community, the immediate motivations behind the two interventions arose from concerns and ambitions that could hardly be described as identical. On July 20, Turkey had been responding in a defensive manner to events that had taken place on Cyprus that could have led to Greek annexation of the island. On August 14, however, Ankara was clearly on the offensive, taking advantage of favorable circumstances. These circumstances, following the July 20 intervention, included the following points:

1. An advantageous military position in Cyprus, coupled with an overwhelming military advantage generally over Greece.
2. Diplomatic support from the international community, including particularly strong support from Britain. International condemnation of Greece for what was viewed to be its role in engineering the coup in Cyprus.
3. Increased international support for increased protections for Turkish Cypriots based upon Constitutional change.
4. Overwhelming popular support in Turkey for Ankara's initial intervention.
5. Political turmoil among the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leadership, with the fall of both the Sampson regime and the junta ruling Greece.
6. The resignation of Richard Nixon in favor of a new, untested American President.

Several factors had thus come together to induce Turkey to abandon its previous policy of supporting the Constitutional status quo in Cyprus. For several years and particularly since Johnson's 1964 letter had been made public, Turkish leaders and opinion makers had blamed the United States for inhibiting Turkey from acting to protect the lives of Turkish Cypriots. Against a backdrop of increasing anti-American sentiment

⁹³ *The New York Times*, August 13, 1974, p. 3.

among the Turkish intelligentsia and a concomitant effort by the Turkish Foreign Ministry to diversify its foreign policy, the Sampson coup was overturned by a Turkish government ready and willing to comport itself in a more independent manner than its predecessors. American initiatives toward establishing relations with the Sampson regime prior to Turkey's intervention, moreover, must have confirmed feelings in Ankara that the only surefire method of safeguarding Turkish interests in Cyprus was to maintain Turkey's military presence on the island once the initial landing had been completed. Under the conditions of so many present advantages combined with more developed changes generally in Turkey's overall foreign policy outlook, a military foothold in Cyprus had become too vital for Ankara to surrender.