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As you probably know, the proposal that an airport should be built at Maplin was considered at the public inquiries, as one of several alternatives to the British Airports Authority's planning application, brought forward at the invitation of the Government, to develop Stansted. The decisions on all the proposals considered at the inquiries will be taken by the Secretaries of State for Transport and the Environment in the light of the Inspector's report, and the evidence before him at the inquiries. I hope you will understand that it would not therefore be appropriate for the Prime Minister or the Department to comment at this stage.

Reference

D. Conn
Room 636
1-19 Victoria St

I enclose an extract from our standard reply on alternatives to Stansted. It is not very helpful, but it cannot be at this stage. I do not know how you are going to reply to this letter but if are going to mention examples of capital expenditure, then you may want to mention that we have authorised unprecedented levels of expenditure at the regional airports since 1979, and that we do recognise the need to create further airport capacity in the south east.

ANDREW CAMPBELL
57/05
Marsham St
212 8824
6.12.84.

Miss Lightfoot

17/111

3/10
2/11
Room 612
1 Vic ST

S3/ACM

LOOSE MINUTE

D/S9(Air)/5/7/1/C

DPEE

MGO Sec 2

DOT/AS)4

DOT/MARI(Mr Douek)

MOD RESPONSE TO INSPECTOR'S QUESTIONS
CONCERNING MAPLIN

Further to my minutes of 5 and 8 October I attach a copy of the final MOD paper passed earlier this week to TSOL (Mr Michaels). Thank you very much for the helpful comments made on earlier drafts.

27 Oct 82


P RYAN

S9a(Air)

MB 7198 2786 MB

* minute written 20 October - should now read 'last' !

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE RESPONSE TO
INSPECTOR'S QUESTIONS CONCERNING MAPLIN

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE RESPONSE TO

INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

DEFENCE RELOCATION AND THE LEAD-TIME FOR MAPLIN AIRPORT

1. During his examination of Brigadier Shaddock on Day 146, the Inspector asked the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to provide a note on the advice given to the Study Group on South East Airports (SGSEA) on the matter of the timescale for Defence relocations needed for an airport at Maplin. He sought elucidation of the source of the "5 year estimate" in the SGSEA Report (BAA 4, para 5.18) and its apparent inconsistency with the information placed before these Inquiries in MOD 7. (Transcript references: Day 146 p.76 letters C-D and p.77 letters A-B.)

BACKGROUND

2. Within the SGSEA Report there are a number of references to the effect of Defence relocations on the overall lead-time for an airport at Maplin. In some cases the context of these passages dictated that they should refer to different elements of the overall Airport lead-time. The complete and internally consistent picture of what the SGSEA Report said on lead-times can best be seen in diagrammatic form. The inter-related components of the overall timescale, based on the SGSEA Report assumptions, are therefore illustrated in a bar-chart at Annex A which is annotated with an indication in "bracket" form of the timescale estimates quoted in the text.

3. It can be seen, for example, in relation to the Inspector's specific question about the "5 year estimate" for Defence relocation, taken from paragraph 5.18 of the SGSEA Report, that this refers only to the "expenditure period", ie the physical work of constructing the new Defence facilities at the relocation site(s) after all the necessary planning consents and land purchases etc had been completed. The 5 years were highlighted in the SGSEA Report because they represent a complete hiatus, between the airport planning phase and the beginning of airport construction, which is unique among the sites examined by the Study Group. This 5 year expenditure/construction period was obtained from the MOD's advice to the Study Group as described below.

MOD ADVICE TO SGSEA

4. On the assumption that suitable sites would be made available, the MOD estimated an overall Defence relocation time of not much less than 10 years. This was reported in Appendix 4 of the SGSEA Report (para 45) together with the caveat that more precise times would depend on detailed studies leading to an agreed Defence relocation plan. It was broadly estimated in the SGSEA Report that 4 years would be required for the completion of all the statutory planning procedures related to Defence relocation sites, and possibly up to one year for land acquisition and provision of site access (although this was not separately spelled out in the final report). The remaining 5 years would be required for the construction of the new facilities, the installation and testing of the equipment, the work up to a functional status at the new sites and the transfer of the work as the Proof and Experimental Establishment, and the other establishments, as Shoeburyness ran down. It is this 5 year period which is sometimes taken as the Defence relocation timescale.

5. In addition, it was assumed in paragraph 3.65 of the SGSEA Report that no major expenditure would be incurred until all statutory consents had been obtained, including those for surface access. There could therefore be a period of up to 7 years before Defence relocation works could begin (see note 1, Annex A). Finally, it should be noted that no separate allowance was made within the overall lead-time for the clearance of ordnance from the sands. The Study Group assumed it would

take place in parallel with the run-down of range work at Shoeburyness and the site preparation phase of airport construction.

CONCLUSION

6. In the SGSEA Report the lead-time estimates for an airport at Maplin reflect accurately the advice given at the time by the MOD. The estimate of the overall Defence relocation timescale, of about 10 years, is not inconsistent with the other information placed before these Inquiries.

POSITION OF SHOEBURYNESS RELOCATION AT THE TIME OF THE MAPLIN DECISION 1971

7. Referring to the statement by the Secretary of State on 26 April 1971 announcing the Maplin decision (BAA 33) which entailed the early relocation of Shoeburyness, although by then it had been decided not to proceed with the move to Pembrey, the Inspector asked MOD to confirm that it was considered possible at that time to relocate Shoeburyness elsewhere (Transcript for Day 146, page 75 letters G-H).

BACKGROUND

8. During Roskill, analysis of the various airport sites led MOD to conclude that Maplin/Foulness was the least damaging from the Defence point of view, largely on the grounds that the projected controlled airspace requirements, based on the high traffic forecasts then current, would have required the closure of P&EE Shoeburyness whichever site was chosen, and that an airport at Maplin/Foulness would not have a serious effect on other major Defence installations.

9. The Department therefore pursued the relocation of the Shoeburyness establishments. The Pembrey proposal would have been the best solution from a technical viewpoint and offered the earliest release of the Shoeburyness site for the airport. However, it was turned down by the Secretary of State for Wales following an adverse public inquiry report (MOD 3B) and this was announced on the same day (26 April 1971) as the Government's decision to proceed with Maplin.

10. However, when that announcement was made there were a number of alternative sites for the relocation of P&EE Shoeburyness which were considered possible, although it was recognised that at any site there could be difficulties related either to the environmental impact or further defence relocations. Nevertheless, relocation was considered feasible and a decision was taken prior to the Maplin announcement (BAA 33) that West Freugh in Wigtownshire, Scotland was the preferred site. /See West Freugh under entry 11 in Annex C to MOD 7.7

11. The relocation of Shoeburyness to West Freugh depended on a favourable planning consent and the relocation of the aviation trials work based there. As a formal approach had not been made to the local planning authority, West Freugh was not mentioned in the 26 April statement. However, this was made to the Wigtownshire County Council the following week and their initial reaction was not unfavourable as they thought the additional employment prospects might counter the environmental penalties.






12. The attached PQ (Annex B) shows that by June 1971 the West Freugh relocation plan had proceeded as far as experimental gun-firing at the site to allow local people the opportunity to evaluate for themselves the impact on the environment. As it became obvious that the job opportunities were not as welcome as first thought, and the impact on the environment became more contentious, pressure grew throughout the latter part of 1971 for a public inquiry into the proposals (PQ 4 August 1971, Annex C).

13. Meanwhile more detailed studies had been instigated into the relocation of the aviation trials work. A site had been selected prior to the 26 April 1971 announcement, but the detailed studies revealed that there were topographical problems which could affect the MOD's ability to carry out comprehensive testing of future generations of high performance aircraft. No other satisfactory site was found to enable West Freugh to be released without unacceptable detriment to military aviation development work and it was therefore decided to abandon this solution (PQ 17 April 1972, Annex D refers).

14. The urgent search for alternative Shoeburyness relocation sites was therefore resumed and a less efficient multi-site solution was evolved, as described in MOD 7 para 48ff.

CONCLUSION

15. At the time of the Maplin decision in April 1971, the Government had been advised that the relocation of the Shoeburyness establishment was possible and from a number of options a preferred solution, West Freugh, had been agreed, subject to the satisfactory outcome of planning consultations and Defence studies into the further relocation of the aviation trials work conducted there. West Freugh was later ruled out, primarily on Defence grounds because the further relocation proved not to be feasible.



AIRPORT

DEFENCE RELOCATIONS

DEFENCE RELOCATIONS

Notes:

1. Para 3.65 explained the assumption that no major expenditure would be incurred, and therefore no construction work begun, until the statutory processes had been completed for all aspects of the airport programme. Defence relocation has therefore to await completion of the planning phase for surface access. The extra 3 years available to defence planners could be used either to resolve the problem of finding relocation sites (B1-B2) or, if a site (or sites) had been identified, would be an interval period (between B1 and C) which could be used to undertake more detailed planning (and, perhaps land acquisition and preparatory site works if surface-access for the one inconsistency in the SGSEA favourably). It is this "floating" 3 yrs.gap which accounts for the one inconsistency in the SGSEA account of lead-times. In paragraphs 4.151 and paragraph 45 of Appendix 4 it is stated that defence relocations could not be achieved in much less than 10 years from the decision in principle to locate the airport at Maplin. In fact, whilst 10 years would be sufficient for the actual defence planning and works, there would be a 3 year delay in the planning part of the programme, resulting in an overall defence programme of 13 years from the date of a decision in principle.

2. No allowance is made for sand clearance between C and D. It was assumed to take place in parallel with the rundown of P and EE Shoeburyness and the start of airport construction.

Experimental Gun Firing (West Freugh)

15. Mr. Hannan asked the Minister of State for Defence if he will make a statement about the experimental gun firing undertaken recently in the West Freugh area of Scotland and what were the local reactions thereto.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: Demonstration firings took place on 24th and 25th June at the request of the Wigtownshire County Council. There was some unfavourable local comment.

Mr. Hannan: To use a colloquialism, the Minister can say that again. In view of the acute differences in the county council and the overwhelming opposition in the local community in respect of the noise nuisance, and also bearing in mind the negligible value of this project—a project which apparently is unwanted elsewhere in the United Kingdom—for employment purposes in Scotland, will the Minister give an assurance that he will not take a decision until a public inquiry is held?

Mr. Gilmour: In reply to the last part of the question, it will be for my right hon. Friend, in the light of the representations which have been made, to decide whether there should be a public inquiry. In the earlier part of the question, it is not true to say that local opposition is overwhelming. Wigtownshire trade unionists are in favour of the move because there will be more than 600 permanent jobs for civilians available at the range; other bodies have indicated support for the proposal, including the South-West Scotland Tourist Association, the Stranraer and District Chamber of Trade and the Stranraer Town Council; and the Wigtownshire County Council has also accepted the proposal.

Mr. Brewis: Is my hon. Friend aware that the organisations which he has mentioned are mostly out of the sound of the guns and that I have a large file of letters which I shall be sending him shortly? I only wish that I could send him all the telephone calls I have received on this matter.

Mr. Gilmour: I shall be interested to receive all the information my hon. Friend has at his disposal.

Mr. James Hamilton: Will the hon. Gentleman accept from me that, if this is the best the Government can do to solve the unemployment situation in Scotland, the people of Scotland will want no part in it? Will he now hold a public inquiry to prove conclusively what we are saying?

Mr. Gilmour: As was made clear in an earlier debate, this is not the principal measure we have for dealing with unemployment in Scotland. I do not think the hon. Member for Bothwell (Mr. James Hamilton) is immediately concerned in this area, and therefore I do not feel that he speaks for the workers in it.

Mr. John Morris: Was not the answer given by the Minister to the question about the need for a public inquiry absolutely pathetic? If there are local anxieties and fears, is it not incumbent on the Government at the earliest possible moment to announce a public inquiry? Will the hon. Gentleman recall that when there were similar difficulties in South Wales the Labour Government announced a public inquiry at the earliest possible moment?

Mr. Gilmour: I do not think the right hon. Gentleman listened to my earlier reply, when I said that it would be for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland to decide on this point.

Mr. William Hamilton: That is what worries us.

Beira Patrol

16. Mr. Evelyn King asked the Minister of State for Defence what estimate he has of the number of oil tankers which in the last three months have been prevented from delivering oil by the ships and aircraft of the Beira Patrol.

Mr. Kirk: No oil for Rhodesia has passed through Beira. All the tankers which would otherwise have been delivering such oil have obviously been deterred from doing so.

Mr. King: Would my hon. Friend accept that, misconceived as is the whole sanctions policy, there might be some conceivable logic in it if everyone were to join in? Within a week in which Zambia has announced that she is

increasing her trade with could my hon. Friend tell the Britain alone should bear this phantom patrol, which she Does he realise that this has on for six long years and is he assured the House that, not agreement is reached with this particular waste of money?

Mr. Kirk: As I have told my hon. Friend more than once, whether the patrol goes or not is a matter for me but for my hon. Friend. Secondly, as I have told the House more than once, this question laid upon us by the Security Council of the United Nations.

Mr. Fernyhough: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that every international law-breaker is delighted with the philosopher (Mr. Member for Dorset, South West, Mr. King) that if we cannot catch we should never make any catch any?

Mr. Kirk: I would only have prevented oil going through Beira, which was the oil used on the Royal Navy.

20. Mr. Boyd-Carpenter asked the Minister of State for Defence what was the total cost to the Government of maintaining the Beira patrol since April, 1966; how many oil tankers have been intercepted; how many have been diverted from Beira, and how many have continued on their way to Rhodesia; how many cases has the patrol made to use force, and in how many cases has it been successful; and what has been the effect of this on the supply of oil and petrol to Rhodesia?

Mr. Kirk: The extra cost of the Beira patrol is £2½ million. About 50 oil tankers have been stopped since April, 1966. All inquiries all have been all answered. I cannot say how many have been attempted, but I can say that my hon. Friend that the patrol has been successful in that no oil for Rhodesia has passed through Beira. This has been denied the cheap direct method of importation.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: It is a fact that petrol in Rhodesia is only unrationed but cheap in London, and in view of

which has been established by arrangement with the Scottish Council (Development and Industry).

In view of the specially serious employment situation in Scotland and the pressing need for industrial investment, my right hon. Friend has authorised an increase in the grant already provided for carrying out the plans to £70,000 in 1971-72 and to £100,000 in each of the two succeeding years.

Mr. MacArthur: Is my hon. Friend aware that this is splendid news? I congratulate him and his right hon. Friend on this welcome new initiative.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. This is a very considerable increase in the amount of money available and shows the great importance we attach to advertising outside Scotland the attractions which Scotland holds for industry and investment.

Mr. MacLennan: In order to put the matter into perspective, is the hon. Gentleman aware that the Highlands and Islands Development Board itself planned to spend £98,000 on one project of promotion this autumn but that he and his Government have stopped the Board from doing that? Is he aware that the only afflic there will be between Scotland and Europe will be that of the unemployed in search of jobs elsewhere?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am sorry that, as usual, the hon. Member is so carping when financial help is given to this very important task of advertising Scotland elsewhere. If the hon. Gentleman and some of his hon. Friend's would only be constructive in letting people abroad, outside Scotland, know how much Scotland had to offer, instead of crying it down, then indeed we could look to a much happier future for Scotland.

Police Force (Vacancies)

30. **Sir J. Gilmour** asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what is the latest figure of shortage of personnel in the Scottish Police Forces.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: On 30th June it there were 669 vacancies in the regular police force in Scotland, 209 fewer in a year before.

Sir J. Gilmour: I welcome the increase, but will my hon. Friend take steps to publicise the shortfall in such a way as to bring the police force to full strength in the shortest possible time?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: As my hon. Friend knows, we are reviewing police force establishments and hope that this will help, but my hon. Friend must appreciate that one of the greatest difficulties is in Glasgow where many of the vacancies occur. But we hope to help through a co-ordinated recruiting campaign this autumn.

West Freugh (Gunnery Range)

31. **Mr. Brewis** asked the Secretary of State for Scotland whether he will now order a public inquiry into the proposal to move the Shoeburyness Gun Range to West Freugh.

Mr. Gordon Campbell: I am awaiting a fully detailed application for the development.

Mr. Brewis: Is my right hon. Friend aware that since the experimental firing I have received 537 communications, all of which have been against this range, and that over 5,000 people have signed petitions against it? Will he order a public inquiry as soon as he possibly can?

Mr. Campbell: I, too, have received views expressed locally, both in favour of and against this suggestion. The Ministry of Defence has been holding initial consultations with the county council in an attempt to ensure that the proposed development will as far as possible accord with the planning of the area, but as this is a planning matter, or may become one, it would not be right for me to comment on the merits at this stage.

Great Western Road Expressway (Glasgow)

32. **Mr. Galbraith** asked the Secretary of State for Scotland how many representations he has received concerning the Corporation of Glasgow's intentions to widen Great Western Road.

Mr. Gordon Campbell: Since publishing my decision to confirm the Great Western Road Expressway Compulsory

Purchase Order, I have received representations.

Mr. Galbraith: Does not number of representations my hon. Friend has received—and I have 73—indicate the great concern only about the future of the Glasgow Road but about the consistency of Glasgow's trying to carry out my right hon. Friend's proposal of a public inquiry? Will he attempt? Indeed, in the decision of the Toronto Transport Commission to abandon a similar expressway will he re-examine this costing scheme which can never be successful because of the Kelvingrove Park?

Mr. Campbell: My hon. Member recall that I decided to order a recommendation of the Commission looked into the question. I am considering the revised proposals have been submitted by the Corporation still stick to the decisions made.

POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

National Giro

33. **Mr. Leslie Huckfield** asked the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications when he expects to make a statement on the future of the National Giro.

The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications (Mr. Christopher Grieve): I have nothing to add to the statement made by the hon. Member on 30th June 1970, c. 369.]

Mr. Huckfield: Is the Minister aware that he has given that statement every Question Time this year and is still reluctant to give an answer for the report? Is he further considering if Giro should close and the Common Market, or if the only Post Office in Europe should not operate a Giro? If the Giro is closed, this will be a serious loss to the country which has started a Giro and closed it.

Mr. Chataway: As the Minister knows, this operation was based on a basis which has subsequently

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the year ending 30th June, 1971; and what was the comparable figure for the United Kingdom.

Mr. Anthony Stodart: The following is information on average producer prices for main crop potatoes for the period September, 1970, to April, 1971, for E.E.C. member States and August, 1970, to July, 1971, for the United Kingdom. Information is not available for Luxembourg.

	Average producer prices, ex farm £ per ton	
Germany	...	10.50
France	...	12.50
Belgium	...	9.00
Holland	...	12.25
Italy	...	20.85
United Kingdom	...	14.50

Source for continental countries: "Kartoffelwirtschaft", Hamburg; No. 24, June 1971.

The prices are for the most popular Continental main crop variety (generally Bintje).

DEFENCE

Service Personnel (Part-time Jobs)

Mr. Harold Walker asked the Minister of State for Defence how many serving members of the Armed Forces in the United Kingdom have part-time civilian jobs.

Mr. Kirk: This information is not available, and disproportionate time and effort would I am afraid be involved collecting it.

Gunnery Range, Shoeburyness

Major-General Jack d'Avigdor-Goldsmid asked the Minister of State for Defence what further consideration has been given to relocating the Shoeburyness gunnery range at other sites.

Mr. Ian Gilmour: After a detailed examination we have concluded that we cannot move the Shoeburyness gun firing facilities to West Freugh in Scotland, as was originally hoped, because of the difficulty of relocating satisfactorily the air work now carried out there. We are now examining the possibility of locating some of the gun firing work with existing establishments at Tain and Kirkcudbright in Scotland. Studies into ways of meeting the other requirements are continuing.

There is already a gun firing range at Kirkcudbright; the work which would be transferred there is of a similar nature and would not significantly affect the level of activity. Tain is an air weapons range and will continue to be used as such, although at very much reduced intensity, if part of the Shoeburyness work is transferred there.

Housing Land

Mr. James Hill asked the Minister of State for Defence what is the acreage of land in Hampshire held by his Department that he considers would be suitable for release to the building industry for residential development; and what acreage has been disposed of in this manner.

Mr. Kirk: Ministry of Defence land is only released when it is surplus to defence requirements and no study has been made to establish either how much of the Departments land in Hampshire is suitable for residential development or how much has been sold for that purpose in the past.

EMPLOYMENT

Industrial Relations Act (Registration)

Mr. Skeet asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will list the statutory effects on a trade union or employers' association of not registering, or ceasing to be registered, under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971.

Mr. Dudley Smith: Trade unions which are not registered under the Industrial Relations Act suffer the following main disadvantages, as compared with registered unions:

- (1) they are liable to legal proceedings, if, in contemplation or furtherance of an industrial dispute, they induce or threaten to induce others to break a contract (section 96);
- (2) they have no right to apply to the National Industrial Relations Court (N.I.R.C.) for recognition as a sole bargaining agent (Sections 45 and 49);
- (3) they have no right to apply to the N.I.R.C. for a ballot to secure an agency shop agreement (Section 11);

This is a copy of a report...

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Department of Transport
Room S15/03
2 Marsham Street London SW1P 3EB
Telex 22221 Direct line 01-212 8839
Switchboard 01-212 3434

1) The Helms
2) 17/111

Miss C A Carlson
Department of Trade
CAP4A
Room 620
1 Victoria Street
LONDON
SW1H 0ET

Your reference

Our reference

Date

4 August 1982

Dear Miss Carlson

STANSTEAD AIRPORT INQUIRY

Some papers have arrived on my desk, under a compliments slip from you, which are Mr John Black's (Chief Executive of the PLA) evidence to the inquiry. The papers have been around the Department and it may be too late to comment. I have in any event just one comment. I would just say that the Port of London Authority is currently dependent on Government support to remain in business and despite any attractions Maplin may have for them I would not have thought that there could be any question of the PLA promoting any seaport development there.

Yours sincerely
G A WheelDON

G A WHEELDON
Ports B Division

Ms. Adson

1) *Miss Jackson*
2) *17/111*

PS/Sir George Moseley
Room N16/12
Marham Street

STANSTED INQUIRY: MR ELDON GRIFFITHS' EVIDENCE

1. As I told you on the 'phone yesterday, Mr Lionel Read, G.C. for the BAA, made a statement at the Inquiry yesterday saying that the Authority did not wish to ask Mr Eldon Griffiths to return, and referring to views expressed in the Seventies by the Authority about the future of Stansted in published documents e.g. "the Expansion Chamber for the South-East Airport System". The Inspector has asked that a copy of the transcript be sent to Mr Griffiths. This shows that neither the Treasury Solicitor nor Rochford District Council wish to recall the M.P.

2. It now seems unlikely that Mr Eldon Griffiths will give further evidence. However the Defenders of Essex, who oppose Maplin, have not expressed a view. Nor have the Town and Country Planning Association commented, for whom he appeared. If either propose that Mr Griffiths should return to the Inquiry, the Secretariat will let me know immediately. It could not be before Friday, 6th August. The Inquiry will be adjourned from that date to the 21st September.

3. There therefore seems no need to ask a Minister to have a word with Mr Eldon Griffiths at present, if you agree. I will let you know if he is to return to the Inquiry, in which case he should perhaps be advised of the situation about production of documents.

K B PAILING
29 July 1982

cc Miss Hammond Legal
Mr Alexander PLUP1
Mr Spearing

cc Mr D Michaels (silent)
Mr Harris DoT ✓
Mr Child " "



Matthew Parker Street
London SW1H 9NN

Telegrams Proctorex London SW1
SWITCHBOARD 01-233 3000
Telephones DIRECT LINE 01-233 7694
Telex 917564

Our reference

Your reference

21st July 1982

1) Miss Carlson
2) 17/1111

M J Ware Esq
Solicitor
Department of the Environment
2 Marsham Street
London SW1

Dear Michael,

THE STANSTED INQUIRY - MR ELDON GRIFFITHS MP

We have spoken on the telephone on two occasions about the evidence which Mr Eldon Griffiths gave to Mr Graham Eyre QC, the Inspector at Stansted, on Thursday last, the 15th July. I enclose a copy of the transcript of his evidence which, as you will see, concerns to some degree the advice he was given by the British Airports Authority when he was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at your Department during the last Conservative Government.

Mr Eldon Griffiths' constituency is Bury St Edmunds, and he explains at page 70E of the transcript that he is taking a view of the Stansted Inquiry as an East Anglian Member of Parliament. His statement, which was very short, was circulated at the request of the Town and Country Planning Association, and as the Inspector observed during the course of Mr Griffiths' evidence (page 80G), it did not give a clear indication that he would be referring to the advice which he received as a Minister in connection with the Maplin project.

The thrust of Mr Eldon Griffiths' evidence is that in 1972, the British Airports Authority (whose Chief Executive in the early 1970s is now its Chairman) believed that 'Stansted could not possibly work,

and that the evidence that was given to him as a Minister in respect of Stansted by the Authority '..... was virtually the opposite then of what you are being given by the British Airports Authority now' (page 68E).

19
27.7

At page 64C of the transcript, the witness says that there are of course files of your Department, the Department (sic) of Transport, and no doubt other Departments which he supposed in one sense are 'ministerially' his papers. Mr Eldon Griffiths believes that they are pertinent to the matters into which the Inspector is enquiring for the reasons which he gives in evidence, and at 68E, Mr Griffiths observes that he is entitled to ask - of Mr Heath - that he should have access to such papers, and that access would be granted so that they could be made available to the Inquiry. You will see what the Inspector said by way of comment. I think it is fair to note that he accepts that the documents upon which Mr Griffiths bases his evidence are confidential, and at 68F, the Inspector concludes that he is not going to ask to see such papers '..... at this stage of the Inquiry'. But he does warn the witness that it is a matter for his judgment as to whether the documents should be seen by the Inspector, and at 68G, Mr Griffiths, having said that he will inevitably refer to Ministerial decisions adds '.... but I shall not attempt to document them'.

David Michaels of this Office addressed the Inspector towards the end of Mr Eldon Griffiths' examination in chief when he referred to the likelihood that documents containing advice given confidentially to Mr Eldon Griffiths in his capacity as a Minister some ten years ago could be the subject of a claim of public interest immunity. At the end of the extract from the transcript, there are comments about Mr Griffiths' return to the Inquiry to answer questions in cross-examination.

Mr Eldon Griffiths has given a very general summary of the reasons why Maplin was preferred to Stansted last time round. I understand that the Inspector will be considering a good deal of evidence concerned with the advantages and disadvantages of the Maplin project as well as the matters which put that project into ^{the} perspective of the 1980s. Mr Eldon Griffiths said little or nothing which was new to the Inspector. Nevertheless, if he were to seek to obtain, for the purposes of this Inquiry, documents submitted to him in his Ministerial capacity, even as long as ten years ago, then it seems to me that because those documents were I assume, put before him in confidence in relation to the formulation of the then administration's policy, the Crown would be obliged to

advance a claim in the public interest that the production of the documents should not be permitted, because they will affect the proper functioning of the public service.

As you know, a well recognised class of documents which the Court is prepared to protect are those relating to the formulation of policy. The fact that they may have been prepared at the request of Government by a nationalised industry such as the BAA does not matter. I think it is most unlikely that Mr Eldon Griffiths will himself seek the production of any of the memoranda placed before him in regard to the Maplin project. His evidence in chief is now concluded, and I do not think he will seek to refresh his memory. The Inspector has made his position clear - he is most unlikely to require production of the documents, pursuant to section 250, subsection (2) of the Local Government Act 1972.

However, Lionel Read QC was unable to obtain instructions from the BAA at the end of Mr Griffiths' evidence, and it is possible that he will seek to cross-examine the witness in order to support the credibility of his own witnesses. Copies of the documents in respect of which public interest immunity might be claimed may conceivably be in the possession of the Authority, although I understand that they destroy all their documents, save Board minutes, after seven years. My present feeling is that their solicitors should be warned that a direction will be given to their clients not to produce the documents, if they exist, nor to give oral evidence of their contents. I have not yet heard whether Mr Read is proposing to cross-examine Mr Eldon Griffiths. He is holding a consultation on Friday, the 23rd July. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a proper balance, you may think that Mr Eldon Griffiths should be warned of the likelihood that, if production of the documents is sought, or an attempt is made to give oral evidence of them, then a claim in the public interest will be made, supported by a certificate signed by a Minister of the Department of the Environment.

I believe that your Permanent Secretary has already been made aware of the general consensus of official views. I have told Jim Nursaw at the Law Officers Department about the present situation, and, if necessary, he will put the matter, formally, before the Attorney General.

*James
Bailey*

J B BAILEY

Ms Adam

1) Miss Carlsson

2) 17) III

PS/Sir George Moseley

STANSTED: EVIDENCE BY MR ELDON GRIFFITHS MP

You were alerted to the evidence given by Mr Eldon Griffiths on Day 142 at the Stansted Inquiry, which referred to advice he says was given by BAA when he was in office. He claims that BAA said that "Stansted could not possibly work". [page 68D], although he indicated that the papers were not available to him.

2. Clearly there is a possibility that either the Inspector or Mr Griffiths himself may wish to bring papers before the Inquiry.

3. The Treasury Solicitor will be writing to Sir Robert Armstrong and to the Permanent Secretary seeking agreement that no papers should be produced.

4. At some early stage it will be desirable to warn Mr Griffiths, as well as BAA, that no papers will be disclosed. The feeling of officials is that the message to Mr Griffiths should come from Mr Shaw. Would the Minister and the Permanent Secretary agree with that? They may prefer to await the Treasury Solicitor's letter before deciding.

K B Pailing
K B PAILING
ERO

19 July 1982

cc
PS/Mr Shaw
Mr Alexander
Mr Harris DOT ✓
Mr Michaels T.Sol.

Ms Adam

*S
21.7.*

A I think the only further point I want to make in broad terms on the airport concerns the aeroplane, airline, air passenger nexus. Maplin would allow us in the end to have one main airport in the south-east, and the advantages of that in terms of interlining, for the single site for engine replacement and all the mechanical and engineering aspects of an airline, for the catering and suchlike, the advantages of it as a single site are very great. The drawbacks of a whole variety of sites are enormous, and again this will have been put before you but it does seem to me that Maplin gives the indefinite extensibility of the airport and the possibility of a single site development for our future aviation in south-east England, and any alternative involved a combination of different airports in different places, and I am bound to say that I do not think that is efficient or desirable.

B I conclude this first point on the airport aspects of the Maplin project by reminding you, if I may, Mr Eyre, that in all these matters I, like Mr Rippon, the Secretary of State, and the Prime Minister of the day, Mr Heath, was advised by the best available experts. There were no others that we did not have available to us. I just remind you that they were, of course, the British Airports Authority, the Civil Aviation Authority, the officials of the Department of Trade, the Department of the Environment and the airlines, and so on and so forth, and I can assure you that I very frequently cross-examined them to try to be sure that we had the best judgment that was available. I was under attack in Parliament, in public, indeed from Mr Derek Wood, so I had to keep on asking whether the advice I had was right.

C D One thing I am quite clear about is that advice can change, and I put it to you, and this really is the central point, that it is a very odd thing to me that the British Airports Authority, whose case you are fundamentally examining, should have told me as the responsible Minister in the early 1970s that Stansted could not possibly work, and they told me that again and again, but now they say it is the only thing that will work. While I do not wish to get into personalities at all, and I am in the difficulty that I cannot actually deposit with the Inquiry the ministerial papers which will prove what I have to say, I can only assure you that the evidence that was given to me as a Minister by the British Airports Authority in respect of Stansted was virtually the opposite then of what you are being given by the British Airports Authority now.

E F Of course, I understand the reason. Governments change, statutory requirements are altered when Parliament rescinds legislation, and, as we see in the television series, "Yes, Minister", the advice to some extent tends to reflect the decisions that government has taken. It does not surprise me that the British Airports Authority is now just as sincerely for Stansted as it was sincerely and expertly against Stansted, but I think it is of some importance to record that at this Inquiry because you will have to judge the credibility of the evidence that you have in front of you.

G THE INSPECTOR: Does anything surprise you in this airport saga?

MR ELDON GRIFFITHS: No, including the length of this Inquiry.

H The only other aspects of my responsibilities as a former Minister that I think I should mention to you concern the new town and the communications system. I will leave out the ports because it is not really germane. The one thing I learned about airports on the advice is that it is very important to look at the travel to work area around

ROOM 602

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
1 VICTORIA STREET
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- 1. Mr Adams
- 2. Mr Booth
- 3. Back to me pl.



Telephone Direct Line 01-215 3641
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17/111

Mr Adams

Miss Callan

It looks as if this

16 July 1982 is now a dead duck.

David Wright Esq
Private Secretary to
the Secretary to the Cabinet
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London
SW1

Dear David,

PROTECTION OF MINISTERIAL PAPERS

I am sorry to have recently troubled you twice, at short notice, about matters concerning the protection of the confidentiality of Ministerial papers. Your advice, on the first occasion, about access to papers for the Falkland Islands inquiry was extremely helpful. As we had suspected, the Prime Minister's exchanges with Mr Ted Heath MP were raised by the plaintiffs' Counsel in the Court of Appeals hearing the following day. The Treasury Counsel, Mr Simon Brown, who was acting for the Secretary of State, was able to draw upon your advice to deal with the point. There is no transcript available but the attached press report from the "Guardian" on 5 July gives a reasonably accurate account, although I am afraid it describes what Mr Brown said as a Cabinet Office statement. Lord Denning and his colleagues appeared satisfied with this response, although we are still awaiting their final judgement.

So far as yesterday's events at the Stansted public inquiry are concerned, I attach, as promised, an extract from the transcript. Mr Eldon Griffiths MP was appearing for the Town and County Planning Association who are promoting Maplin as an alternative to the Stansted proposals. Now that I have read the transcript, I think it is clear that Mr Griffiths does not retain the Ministerial papers to which he referred, although he appears to be under the misapprehension that it would only require Mr Heath's approval in order to obtain access to them.

Please regard this as an informal report at this stage. I have placed the matter in the hands of the Treasury Solicitor (whose representative at Stansted is Mr David Michaels). He will be writing more formally next week to Sir Robert Armstrong, Mr Moseley (whose Department will have the papers concerned) and



our own Permanent Secretary about what steps should be taken, if any, to prevent breaches of public interest immunity by this former Minister.

Yours ever,

Tom

T G Harris

Blind copies:

PS/Secretary	
Mr Knighton	Dep Sec
Mr Blanks	CAP
Mr Ayling	Sols

Owen backs prime ministers over Cabinet paper disclosure

Thatcher delay over Falkland war inquiry

By Ian Aitken, Political Editor

The Prime Minister has postponed for a few more days the setting up of the Falklands inquiry in the face of the continuing controversy over its standing, composition, and terms of reference.

She is to see Mr Michael Foot, the Leader of the Opposition, today and is also expected to send letters to three former Prime Ministers this morning, asking their formal permission to make Cabinet papers dating from 1965 available to the inquiry.

Her original intention to establish the inquiry last week was delayed after Mr Edward Heath and Mr James Callaghan had protested that her plans breached long-established constitutional convention on the disclosure of a former administration's Cabinet papers.

Officials continue to insist that Mrs Thatcher's interpretation of the constitutional conventions is correct and that asking permission from her three immediate predecessors is simply a matter of politeness.

The significance of her decision to seek the permission of Mr Heath, Mr Callaghan and Sir

Wilson in writing is that a confrontation would have been highly embarrassing, in the case of Mr Heath, and would also have implied that she is formally consulting them, which she insists she has no need to do.

In the whole affair has already caused the Prime Minister the maximum embarrassment. She believed that the protesters were likely to be confined to Mr Foot who would have attracted little public sympathy.

That was a misjudgment, and it is likely that the public comments of Dr David Owen, former Foreign Secretary, will have added still more weight to those of Mr Callaghan and Mr Heath.

Mr Heath's complaint is that it is a breach of convention to allow outsiders to examine the confidential Cabinet papers of a previous administration.

The Government has insisted that this is mistaken, citing the example of the Bingham inquiry set up by the last Labour Government to examine alleged breaches of Rhodesian oil sanctions. Dr Owen pointed out yesterday that the Bingham committee had not been authorised to see previous Cabinet papers, and recalled that he had to apologise to the Callaghan cabinet when it emerged that Bingham was allowed to see some papers in error.

Mr Thatcher has yet to make formal approaches to prospective members of the inquiry. It is thought that she will include two senior practising politicians, one from the Labour Party and the other from the Conservative Party.

They are expected to be Mr Merlyn Rees, former Home Secretary and Northern Ireland Secretary in the Callaghan Government, and Mr Geoffrey Rippon, the Foreign Office minister who negotiated Britain's entry into Europe under Mr Heath.



Mr Merlyn Rees — likely member of inquiry

Judge's order to inspect official papers opposed

By Richard Norton-Taylor

The row over the terms of reference of the Falklands inquiry has spilled over into a case before the Court of Appeal involving the constitutional conventions covering access to official papers.

Two former Prime Ministers, Mr Heath and Mr Callaghan, are questioning Mrs Thatcher's proposal that the inquiry should have access to the papers and documents of previous governments.

But in a statement read out to the court last week the Cabinet Office said that the Prime Minister's intention was to allow access to the papers for members of the inquiry but not for members of the Government.

According to established convention governments cannot see the papers drawn up for their predecessors. That principle is at the centre of the Crown's case in a significant dispute in the Appeal Court.

The Department of Trade is challenging a High Court order that Mr Justice Bingham must be allowed to inspect 100 working papers relating to the policy of successive trade ministers towards the British Airports Authority between 1977 and 1980.

The judge reached the provisional conclusion that the documents must form part of the evidence in a claim by 20 international airlines relating to increased landing charges at Heathrow.

Never before has a court ordered the disclosure of so many government policy documents. Mr Simon Brown, for the department, argued last week that the disclosure would

threaten the principle of Cabinet confidentiality and by implication, the principle of Crown privilege consistently used in defence of secrecy by Whitehall.

The Crown is claiming immunity for the documents by arguing that disclosure would be against the public interest. Both Sir Robert Armstrong, the Cabinet Secretary, and Sir Kenneth Clucas, former Permanent Secretary at the Department of Trade, have stated in the Crown's defence that documents drawn up by civil servants must remain confidential.

And using an argument that has a direct bearing on the Falklands inquiry, Sir Kenneth also drew the attention of the court to the convention—which protects civil servants as well as former ministers—that governments should not see Whitehall papers drawn up for their predecessors.

The Cabinet Office has therefore told the Court of Appeal in a statement read out by Mr Brown: "There is no question of Cabinet papers of a previous administration being made available to this administration. What is contemplated by the Prime Minister is privileged access by Privy Counsellors for a specific, limited purpose of the Falkland Islands inquiry."

Meanwhile, the Appeal Court on Friday reserved its judgment on the department's case. Mr Denis Henry, QC, for Pan American and Trans World Airways, said that the idea that the public service would be prejudiced by a judge inspecting the documents was "simply laughable."

3.15

Q. But, of course, the expert tells us that that will happen.

A THE INSPECTOR: The existing tail would not wag the future dog.
A. That is what I am trying to say.

B MR. WOOD: It looks, does it not, that the existing tail is likely to be the future tail in which case is it not likely to wag the future dog? A. That has not been my experience in dealing with european colleagues. I spend quite a lot of time in Brussels and I have not ever encountered the kind of attitude you are suggesting.

Q. I take it that you have not been meeting colleagues in Brussels on the question of problems of air traffic control.
A. Rather more difficult ones.

C Q. Have you been on air traffic control. I would not ask the other more difficult ones that you have been concerned with.
A. No. I am sorry to seem obstinate on this point. It is a fact that air traffic controllers have an expertise which is very specialised and in which they are supremely competent and thank God they are, because the safety we all enjoy is largely in their hands. However, when it comes to re-jigging a whole system and conceiving of a new arrangement of airports it is not always the air traffic controller who is the best person to set the scene, to actually lay down the requirements. They need to be given the requirements and they will then work out safe and reliable procedures within those limits.

D Q. Your comments will be on the transcript and I b sir, that there is need for us to have a break. If you would like I could cease interrogation now. We might then have our break.

E THE INSPECTOR: Mr. Ash mentioned to me after the mid-day adjournment that Mr. Eldon Griffiths would be arriving during the course of the early afternoon. I said that I was willing to interpose him at any stage. Mr. Eldon Griffiths has arrived and I am content to interpose him if you are content.

F MR. WOOD: It will not affect my cross-examination at all.

THE INSPECTOR: You will get Mr. Sharman back.

MR. WOOD: I am looking forward to it.

(The witness withdrew)

MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS, M.P.

THE INSPECTOR: Mr. Ash, I take it you are going to introduce Mr. Eldon Griffiths.

H MR. ASH: Yes. Mr. Eldon Griffiths is the M.P. for Bury St. Edmunds and he was Under Secretary at the Department of the Environment

at the time of the Heath administration and at the time of the appointment of the Maplin Development Corporation. I would like to ask him to say in his own words what he wishes to say to you.

A THE INSPECTOR: Our procedure is very informal.

MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS: Thank you, sir. Can I ask two small points of procedure as a newcomer to your proceedings? First, I have circulated through the auspices of the TCPA a short paper. I take it that that is available to you.

B THE INSPECTOR: Indeed.

C MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS: Secondly there is a rather more difficult matter. There are of course in the files of the Department of the Environment, the Department of Transport, and no doubt other departments, those papers which I suppose in one sense are ministerially my papers. They are very pertinent to the matters into which you are inquiring, both in the specific field of the Maplin Sands project and also because the decisions that were taken and the policies pursued in respect of Maplin required a judgment to be made on alternatives of which Stansted, of course, was an important one. Indeed Maplin involved, as you appreciate, the closure or run-down of Stansted.

D I wonder, sir, whether in fact these papers first are of interest to you and, secondly, whether you have access to them. I ask those questions because if I believe that those papers were germane (and I rather think they are) I believe that I am entitled to ask of the Prime Minister of the day, Mr. Heath, that I should have access to them and that that would be granted. I could then and there make them available to the Inquiry.

E THE INSPECTOR: They are not confidential - or rather their confidentiality can be lifted? I am not concerned with that aspect. I would like to make my position clear: I will listen to anything that responsible people think is relevant to my deliberations. I am certainly not going to ask to see the papers at this stage. I would not do that until I have heard what might be described as the Maplin Case at this stage of the Inquiry. I think I must leave it as a matter for your judgment as to whether you think I should see them and whether you should secure their release to me. If you do, I shall look at them.

F MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS: I am much obliged and I think the reality of that, Mr. Eyre, is that in my remarks, or evidence, I shall inevitably refer to ministerial decisions, but I shall not attempt to document them. Thank you very much.

G As my short summary indicates I wish to offer a few views in three capacities: first as a former Minister who had specific responsibility for the Maplin project and for all the relevant matters that were attached to that. Secondly, as an East Anglian Member of Parliament concerned, in particular,

A with agricultural land and environmental matters, and it may be of relevance in that respect that I was also for a number of years, a Minister responsible for transport and also for planning. I was concerned with a subject which first led me to come across your name, sir. Also I had responsibilities for all pollution control, including the Chairmanship of the noise council of the Government.

THE INSPECTOR: Have we met?

B MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS: I am not sure, but I am very well aware of your name.

THE INSPECTOR: I just wondered if we had. It is not at the root of the matters I am now considering, but I just wondered whether we had.

C MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS: If we have not, I am sorry. Thirdly, I want to say a few words as a frequent air traveller. I will try and do so informally and as quickly as I can.

In respect, sir, of the Maplin project, my responsibilities involved these seven or eight matters in no particular order of importance because they were all important:

- D (1) The relocation of the army, artillery, and missile range. Incidentally also the Brent Geese.
- (2) The reclamation in the first instance of up to 12,000 acres of land from the sea and related to that the preservation of fishing and navigation as far as we would be able to do so.
- (3) The construction of a new deep water harbour for the Port of London Authority, using in particular the very deep channels that would be created by taking out the spoil from the sea
- E to build the airport.
- (4) For the planning and the construction of the airport. It was my ministerial duty to the Secretary of State and Parliament to ensure that that airport should be safe, efficient, economical and, of course, it was important that it should be extensible. One of the attractions of the Maplin project to us as an airport was that it was almost
- F indefinitely extensible. We could take more land from the sea and extend it if we need to.
- (5) The consequential of that for airport policy-specifically what effect would it have on Heathrow and the broad long term intention there would have been to stop the further growth of Heathrow and as Maplin developed, to run down the passenger levels, and therefore the nuisance levels, and probably end up with a Heathrow in the far distant future which would
- G predominantly be a cargo airport, from which all passengers had been transferred to Maplin. Another consequential of that would have been, of course, the closure of Southend inevitably, of Luton (although there were some differences of opinion with the local authority on that matter) and Stansted. So the fifth point I am making of these responsibilities was the consequentials to other airports.
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(6) The area of responsibility here was, of course, the planning, land acquisition, design of the new town to be built near Rochford. Predominantly it would be for the airport workers and associated people, but also concerned with what we conceive to be the reversal of the tidal flow of commuters from the relatively depressed areas of East Essex into London. There is a large number of people going today and if there had been more employment, and opportunity, in East Essex we believed (and I believe still) that we could reverse that tidal flow of commuters. That would be a helpful step.

THE INSPECTOR: Yes. I have had some figures on that.

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MR. ELDON GRIFFITHS: Another aspect of that, of course, was the possibility for a more rapid development of London Docklands if there had been this magnet of prosperity and development at this end of London.

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Finally of course, and essentially, the provision of an adequate communications system by rapid rail and by road. I think I should just complete this package of responsibilities that fell under the Maplin Project in the Department and the other departments that we had in mind to contemplate (no more than that) the possibilities of a maritime industrial development area, adjacent to the port and the airport for light high technology industry and we also had in mind the overall benefits for the south east region - a contentious matter. Finally, we were conscious of the fact that the public investment that would be going into Maplin, the port, the roads, the airport, the MIDAS, the town, could have been a very valuable contra-cyclical investment in new infrastructure during the period that seemed likely to bring about a severe economic recession. I would like to underline that because we have gone into the difficult period and if there had been the substantial development of Maplin going forward, in the middle 1980s, it would I think have generated a good deal of economic development that we could have sustained.

Continued . . ./. . .

3.45 p.m.

A That is the broad pattern on the various leaves of the asparagus for which I had responsibility to the Secretary of State and thereafter to Parliament. The legislation had to be got through. There is a vast amount of committee material which I would not recommend you to study but I am sure is of interest, and in the event we passed the legislation - not without dissent - established the development authority, put in a chairman and then lost the election. That is the background to my responsibilities.

B I do not intend obviously to go over this whole wide range of things, but there are three bits of it that I think are of importance to this specific Inquiry as I judge from your terms of reference.

C First, the airport itself: I will, if I may, try to put it in headlines for the purpose of brevity. The first concern I had and still have is safety. The advantage of Maplin is that all or virtually all of the flights when coming in and taking off would be over the sea. In the case of Stansted they will all without exception be over the land. Therefore, in the case of Maplin in virtually all the cases heavy aircraft with large numbers of people would not be going over people's homes. In the case of Stansted they all will, and that basic fact of safety seems to me a critical one, and it is one of the few things a small island can achieve. It is very interesting to me, as probably to you, as a frequent air traveller that more and more of the world's great airports seem to be at the seaside: New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and so on. It is a great advantage to be able to shoot your aircraft over the sea instead of over people's homes. We could achieve that at Maplin; we cannot achieve it at Stansted, so my first view on the airport aspect is that Stansted fails and Maplin succeeds on safety.

E The second aspect is the environmental one. I have gone into great detail in the past, and no doubt your Inquiry will go into it in much more detail, on the question of noise footprints and all of the judgments, and I hope you will accept that I had the best available advice on this matter. Some noise, of course, would be generated over people in the case of Maplin but the contrast is sharp. In the case of Stansted all of the noise will be over people. In the case of Maplin only a very small amount of the noise will be over people, so I take the view that Maplin succeeds on noise and Stansted fails.

F Thirdly, land: I am deeply concerned, as you are, about the loss of agricultural land in our country, and I am sure that has been much testified to and will continue to be over the balance of the Inquiry. The difference is painful. Stansted takes away substantial quantities of land and some of our richest. Maplin takes away no land but it adds land to a country that is desperately short of it. If I may put it in cost benefit terms, the fact that the government of the day would automatically be able to give planning consent to the new land that was taken out of the sea, whether for the airport or the MIDAS or the port or anything else, meant that we would not only be physically obtaining land but the benefit in terms of simple development value is very great, since it is new land that is acquired and can be used for specific high value purposes. On the argument of land, therefore, it seems again to me that it is Maplin 10, Stansted nil.

A I think the only further point I want to make in broad terms on the airport concerns the aeroplane, airline, air passenger nexus. Maplin would allow us in the end to have one main airport in the south-east, and the advantages of that in terms of interlining, for the single site for engine replacement and all the mechanical and engineering aspects of an airline, for the catering and suchlike, the advantages of it as a single site are very great. The drawbacks of a whole variety of sites are enormous, and again this will have been put before you but it does seem to me that Maplin gives the indefinite extensibility of the airport and the possibility of a single site development for our future aviation in south-east England, and any alternative involved a combination of different airports in different places, and I am bound to say that I do not think that is efficient or desirable.

B I conclude this first point on the airport aspects of the Maplin project by reminding you, if I may, Mr Eyre, that in all these matters I, like Mr Rippon, the Secretary of State, and the Prime Minister of the day, Mr Heath, was advised by the best available experts. There were no others that we did not have available to us. I just remind you that they were, of course, the British Airports Authority, the Civil Aviation Authority, the officials of the Department of Trade, the Department of the Environment and the airlines, and so on and so forth, and I can assure you that I very frequently cross-examined them to try to be sure that we had the best judgment that was available. I was under attack in Parliament, in public, indeed from Mr Derek Wood, so I had to keep on asking whether the advice I had was right.

C D One thing I am quite clear about is that advice can change, and I put it to you, and this really is the central point, that it is a very odd thing to me that the British Airports Authority, whose case you are fundamentally examining, should have told me as the responsible Minister in the early 1970s that Stansted could not possibly work, and they told me that again and again, but now they say it is the only thing that will work. While I do not wish to get into personalities at all, and I am in the difficulty that I cannot actually deposit with the Inquiry the ministerial papers which will prove what I have to say, I can only assure you that the evidence that was given to me as a Minister by the British Airports Authority in respect of Stansted was virtually the opposite then of what you are being given by the British Airports Authority now.

E F Of course, I understand the reason. Governments change, statutory requirements are altered when Parliament rescinds legislation, and, as we see in the television series, "Yes, Minister", the advice to some extent tends to reflect the decisions that government has taken. It does not surprise me that the British Airports Authority is now just as sincerely for Stansted as it was sincerely and expertly against Stansted, but I think it is of some importance to record that at this Inquiry because you will have to judge the credibility of the evidence that you have in front of you.

G THE INSPECTOR: Does anything surprise you in this airport saga?

MR ELDON GRIFFITHS: No, including the length of this Inquiry.

H The only other aspects of my responsibilities as a former Minister that I think I should mention to you concern the new town and the communications system. I will leave out the ports because it is not really germane. The one thing I learned about airports on the advice is that it is very important to look at the travel to work area around

A the airport and to make sure you have got enough housing and service etc. for the staff who run the airport, for all of the airline people concerned and for the inevitable commercial and industrial development that comes in its train. One of the problems around Heathrow quite frankly is that the travel to work area around Heathrow, the catchment area for the people who work there and do their business there, is enormous, and the impact that has had on house prices, on communications, on congestion and on schooling is a very high price to pay.

B I had to give a lot of thought as to where in the country we could achieve a travel to work area that made any kind of sense at all for a new airport serving 60, 70 or 100 million passengers over the generations to come. I certainly was advised then, and I believe it now, that the travel to work area that would need to be developed around Stansted, whether it is for 15 million or, as I conceive, something that might go very much higher than that in the future, would involve a degree of housing, sewerage, concreting, schooling, commercial development and industrial development for the technical support of the airport around the general environment of Stansted which would totally transform this area. Rightly so, because C it would be wrong to contemplate an airport and not contemplate the housing and the travel to work of the people who were to be employed at it, so I came to the conclusion that a new town was inevitable if we were to have a new airport.

D Of course, the project you are contemplating at Stansted at this point is nowhere near so large, but I think a sensible view of things must be that some very substantial new housing development and schooling development would be inevitable and quite proper. In the case of Maplin we had it in mind in the first instance to go for something of the order of 80,000 and to make provision for that, and the land acquisition plans were all in place.

THE INSPECTOR: You are talking in terms of dwellings, are you?

E MR ELDON GRIFFITHS: No: people, and thereafter to go for something where the number of people could be as high as a quarter of a million. That, of course, is a longer term project, but they were real plans; they were not merely speculations. The officials concerned in the Department of the Environment and Essex County Council had made their practical plans for the land acquisition. We had even got to the point of designing quite a lot of this new town.

F Mutatis mutandis, something of the same order - not that big, perhaps, but something of the same kind - is in my judgment going to be inevitable in the case of Essex, and it would be wholly wrong to contemplate an airport unless one were also prepared to contemplate and plan for the consequential housing and travel to work problem.

G The third point arising from my ministerial responsibilities is communications. In the case of Maplin it was quite a long way; one had to expect that, but there were some regional benefits of putting in a decent transport infrastructure for South Essex anyway, and certainly with the combination of the port, the airport and the industrial area, we believe that it would have paid off in cost benefit terms.

H In the case of Stansted we have got the M11, we have got the railway - when it works - and that in principle is an existing transport infrastructure which one must take into account. However, I would just like to leave two thoughts with you. The transport infrastructure

A to Stansted does absolutely nothing for the Docklands. It is very important we get on with the Docklands. In a sense we got two for the price of one in the case of Maplin. Secondly, the communications system to Stansted does absolutely nothing for the relatively depressed area of East Essex. I think I referred to you the problem of reversing the tidal flow of people coming into not always highly paid jobs in London on the very crowded trains. In the case of Maplin we got two for the price of one. We benefited East Essex. In the case of Stansted the rail and the road does absolutely nothing for the Docklands, for East London or for East Essex.

B I think that completes what I wanted to say as a former minister, and the other two points I wish to make are wearing different hats, and they can be brief.

C As an East Anglian Member of Parliament, for my constituency the development of Stansted would be a thoroughly good thing in one sense, that is to say, we would have most of the roses and none of the thorns. My constituency is a little bit to the north of here. I would gain, if I can use the personal pronoun, because my constituents would find that they got on aeroplanes more quickly and more easily. I personally would enjoy that very much instead of flogging on to Heathrow. They would benefit by more jobs, particularly in Haverhill, which is a town that needs employment very badly in South Suffolk. The sideways effect of the airport would certainly generate more industrial and commercial activity into my part of Suffolk, and it would certainly have a great effect on the price of houses and on the housing industry, so I have to say in a narrow constituency sense that probably Stansted would do me more good than harm.

D However, I think I have to take a rather wider view as an East Anglian Member of Parliament. East Anglia, possibly like the South West or the Lake District, is a rather special part of Britain. It has been historically cut off. Its way of life is still touched in almost every respect by agriculture and countryside, and these are very special values. We have benefited enormously from overspill from London. It has injected new people and new industry into many of our towns, and East Anglia certainly now is picking up quite strongly. We have the east coast ports to link us with Europe and we have some fall out from North Sea oil and gas. None the less East Anglia remains a rather well balanced area of agriculture, commerce and a little bit of industry, and it is, in my judgment, a rather unique and splendid area of our country.

E Not very long ago, when he was Secretary of State for Economic Development, Mr George Brown said: "East Anglia is now ripe for industrialisation and urbanisation".

F THE INSPECTOR: Did he really?

G MR ELDON GRIFFITHS: He did. He said it in my constituency and he said it with some pride. After all he was Secretary of State for Economic Development. I cannot disagree more, because I think that that is the opposite of a sensible national view that our country has got to be not one mass of the same industrial urban mix; it has got to be a patchwork quilt of different areas with different characteristics, and I think it is important to try to sustain that. I think that we have got to get closer to London, and with the M11 we are getting closer to London, and

I think we have helped London, particularly with the overspill programme.

A I must say, however, that my constituents, and as I conceive it
the majority of people in East Anglia, do not wish the hot breath of
London to be upon them. I suspect that if this large airport complex
were to be developed here, the reality of it is that London reaches out
with an arm of industry and concrete and starts to generate into East
Anglia something that is not very far short of Boswash. Let me remind
you, sir, if I may. I am sure you know, but perhaps not everybody else
B does, that Boswash is that concept in the United States where Boston,
all the way down through the New England towns to New York and then on
to Washington, is gradually being turned into a single megapolis,
and something similar has happened in Southern California. I do not
want to see that. As an East Anglian Member of Parliament, though I
have to accept there would be benefits from this large Stansted airport
for this area as a whole - no one could deny that - I do not think,
C taking a historical, geographical, planning view of our country, that
it is wise to extend the hot breath of London into this particular region.

(Continued on next page)

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My last submission arises from my personal role as a frequent air traveller, which I suppose makes me not in the least unique. I only want to say one thing really on this. An air traveller above all wants the airport to be convenient and wants to be able to get from one place to another with the minimum of waiting time and expense and trouble on the floor. My worst experience in travelling round the world for a large number of years has been in those cities where there are more than one airport. One had to change about in Chicago (though no longer), in Paris for a while, and I know that while the British do not change about very much in London because we know where to go to and we are generally going home or coming from home, an increasingly large number of non-British people do find themselves having to change from one airport to another. That is exactly why we have put in helicopters and new roads to join up Gatwick and Heathrow.

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I personally think the notion of having three or three and a half, or four or four and a half or whatever it is a wholly inefficient and incompetent way to proceed. So as an air traveller as well I am not very keen on the idea of yet another substantial London airport. I believe the right thing to do is to take a big step, create the possibility at Maplin of having one airport, which must be conceived of as a total regional complex with all the other aspects that I have alluded to - it cannot be seen as an airport alone. It must also be seen as a development of a quarter of a century. It is not something to be regarded as solving an immediate problem. One of our problems, Mr. Eyre, as you well know is that the time cycle or the time scale of major projects, of infrastructure and planning, are very much longer than the time scale of governments. Again and again we have failed in our country in comparison with others because we have not been able to make a strategic decision and stick to it and see it through. This has been the besetting sin of airport policy for a very long time, and you find yourself, if I may say so, sitting in that chair very largely because of that problem. I believe that the Maplin project in its multi-dimensional character was an imaginative, exciting opportunity for our country to build in what was the sea the best airport in the world, a port that could provide facilities for up to 500,000 ton tankers, which Rotterdam cannot accommodate, for it to improve the entire economic and, I believe, infra-structural life of south-east England. I think it was a national plus. I believe that one day we may yet have to come back to it, and I hope that nothing you recommend arising from this Inquiry will make it impossible to achieve it.

Examined by MR. ASH

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Q. Could I ask, Mr. Griffiths, if you could enlarge on what you have said to shed some light to this Inquiry particularly from a political vantage point. Could you tell us why in your opinion the Maplin project was stopped? -- A. Yes, very

A simple. The calculations on which it had been promoted, namely a massive increase in projected air travel, fell apart because of the oil crisis. My advisers and the Government's advisers turned out to be wrong. The Arabs reduced the projections dramatically, and therefore the need for Maplin as perceived by the Government fell sharply away. However, I have to add to that that is no longer quite the case. One way or another, despite the original impact of the oil crisis, air travel has once again picked up, and though it has not increased the number of aircraft because they are much bigger, the numbers of people are sharply rising again. That was the first reason.

B The second reason was the constellation of anti-Maplin views. I think I can summarise them very simply. There was the regional airports people, whether in Bristol, Liverpool or Birmingham, in both parties of the House of Commons. They were not terribly keen on Maplin because if Maplin had gone ahead then you could say goodbye to whichever of their particular pet projects in the region they were promoting. So that was a factor. There was of course the financial concern. Maplin would have been a very substantial public sector investment, and we were running into economic crises - indeed the Government that succeeded my own had a very severe economic crises, and it would have been bound to have been asked whether the country could afford to go on with this. But of course the main reason was change of Government. The Government which followed my own was less anxious to support projects in the south-east and more anxious to promote them elsewhere, and the new Government took a different view and Parliament consequently rescinded the legislation.

- E Q. You said in your proof that Stansted is a shortsighted mistake. What do you think of the political conditions for a far-sighted solution to succeed, and would you give particular attention in that connection to the timescale of this Inquiry itself. -- A. I believe that as with Maplin so with many other projects, the only way you can get a thing of this sort to succeed is governmental stability. That is not to say that the same government should remain in office for a long period of time but there being a nexus between the Government and principal Opposition on some important issues of national infrastructure or of national policy which are not going to be uprooted every time there is a change at an election. I can only say that if, for example, hypothetically, Mr. Heath's Government had succeeded itself I have no doubt that a start would have been made on Maplin, indeed it would have been mandatory because the law required it to do so. We probably would have found in the light of economic circumstances that we would have had to do the usual thing Governments do, which is to slow it up, extend the time cycle, change the rate of investment. We would have had to have done all of those things, but it would have proceeded, and once it had been started and once proceeding then I think although successive governments of a

A different political complexion might have had less enthusiasm for it once started it would have been carried through. So if you ask me what is the condition for achieving a project of this kind it has to be political stability and a good economic base.

- B Q. Lastly was the Maplin Development Corporation in good heart when its life was ended, or was it daunted by its task at that point. -- A. Very far from daunted. I had the opportunity to appoint, or at least recommend formally to the Government the appointment of the chairman and members of the Development Corporation. Their tails were up, they were excited. I remember taking Frank Marshall out in a cockleshell boat to the Maplin Sands where we stuck a flag on the sandbank there and we looked at it and that was the place that we believed within ten years would see a modern runway of great pride to Britain. So far from it being demoralised, the organisation was in very good heart. And I would like to say this: it is very rare in our country that we bring multi-disciplinary functions of Government together. In my experience it was the first time that we were able to embrace in a single piece of machinery in Whitehall the Department of Defence to move the range, the Department of the Environment on planning and on local government and on housing, the Department of Trade on aviation policy, and the local government people, plus all the nationalised industries, the railways, Port of London Authority. We had them all bracketed together. The approach we were able to take was a project engineering approach, and that was the exciting thing. For once our country would be engaged in a project engineering approach to a marvellous national possibility. So that was the sort of spirit with which the Maplin Development Authority was proceeding. Where we failed was that we did not succeed in selling this concept to the nation and exciting its imagination. We should have done so.

Continued

A Q. Do you think it conceivable that in two or three years' time the country might be in a mood to face such a project again? -- A. A week is a long time in politics, let alone three years. A great deal depends, does it not, on international considerations - if Saudi Arabia collapses; if the Russians invade Poland; if Mr. Reagan makes a nonsense of his economic policies? How on earth do I know what the situation will be. But I do think that, provided we can get ourselves back to economic good sense, we can, with the assistance of North Sea, and with the new techniques that are available for land reclamation, make a fist of this one without any difficulty at all. What it requires is the political will and the imagination of our leadership to see what is possible and to do it.

B THE INSPECTOR: I think that I should say this. I have certainly learned about a number of matters which I do not think I could have anticipated from the extremely short statement that I have before me, whereas it has been our practice during the course of these Inquiries to ensure that parties are informed in some detail as to what is likely to be said by the deposited documents at an early stage; otherwise the thing would have been quite unworkable, or even more unworkable. I think I ought to say that, in case parties take certain views with regard to the material to which you have just spoken.

C D But before we canvass that a little further, can you help me with regard to this. I must suppose, must I not, that you have put to the present administration your views as expressed to me this afternoon as enthusiastically as you have this afternoon expressed them? -- A. Yes.

E Q. I certainly do not want you to breach any confidence or anything of that nature, but are you in a position to tell me whether those views were expressed prior to or subsequent to the then Secretary of State, Mr. John Nott's, statement in the House in December 1979. -- A. Not in the detail that I have touched upon them this afternoon; and, looking back, not sufficiently.

F G Q. The second matter is this. I would not like any colleague of yours or yourself to anticipate that I am attaching any particular weight to the views expressed either in the House or out of the House, because I am looking at this matter de novo here, on the material that is put before me; but of course it was of interest to me to read the various debates in both Houses. There are two points which arise. The first is this. I would have thought, Mr. Eldon Griffiths, that the views that you have just expressed to me - you will forgive me if this sounds in any way presumptuous - were fit and meet for contribution to debate in the House of which you are a Member. -- A. Yes.

H Q. I do not think that you made a contribution. Why was that? -- A. I am sure, Mr. Eyre, you are as well aware as I am that there are many who seek to catch Mr. Speaker's eye in

A a short debate, and there are many fewer who succeed. The choice of speakers for a debate is very much a matter for the Chair, and it would be very presumptuous of me to comment on his particular selection.

B Q. He would not look to a former Minister who had been responsible for-----? -- A. Yes; in many cases, he would and, if I may say so, should, and does. However, he has to take account of other debates that have taken place in the same week, to which the said persons may have also contributed. One has a limited ability to preempt the time of the House. I am very sorry, of course, that you did not have the opportunity of reading it in Hansard, because I was most anxious at the time to put it there.

C Q. You attempted to catch the Speaker's eye? -- A. Yes; indeed I did, but I was unsuccessful. But I would not thereby in any way wish to criticise Mr. Speaker. He has a difficult enough task as it is.

D Q. I have great sympathy with him. The other point is this. Of course I have read the February debate with much interest, as I have indicated; and it has to be said, unless I can be persuaded that I have mis-read it, that not one voice in the House was raised in favour of resurrection of the Maplin projection - not one voice. How do you account for that. -- A. I think the fact that the House of Commons tends to go on to the next thing. One of the reasons why I think that former Ministers are not particularly welcome when offering their views about what they were doing is that, for one thing, there are too many of them, and the House would, if it followed that practice, be regaled only by self-justificatory speeches about what was done yesterday. Secondly, in any event I think it is a proper part of our Government that new Ministers charged with new responsibilities should not, particularly in their own Party, be expected at all stages to be looking over their shoulders to those who came before them. I think that it is not a bad practice that, when you have had ministerial responsibility, you should in the House of Commons walk away from that particular area and deal with other things.

E F G Q. I was not thinking of you alone, but what astounded me, reading the debate, was that not one Member of Parliament urged upon the House that Maplin should be resurrected. -- A. Well, sir, can I give you this assurance, subject of course to the Speaker's discretion: that when, as will happen, there are further debates on airport policy - indeed, there could conceivably be one on the submission of your own report; I would think that that would be most likely - then the whole matter of Maplin will be rehearsed - I can assure you of that - and I hope that you will then have the pleasure of reading a contribution of mine.

H Q. Could it not be - I do not want anyone to speculate as to the content of this question - a bit too late? That is another massive hypothesis I am introducing into these proceedings. -- A. No, sir. Again, you are in a better position to judge

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than I am; but, given the speed of this Inquiry and my own knowledge as a former planning Minister of the need for you to wrap a wet towel around your head at some stage, stare at all this evidence and work through what you are going to say, I would be very doubtful indeed if you will feel able to put your conclusions before the Secretary of State until, optimistically, quite late next year. It may be that you will be able to do it before that, but I would have thought that that is a realistic judgment. In those circumstances, my guess is that the present Government will be reaching a point in its history where it will be unlikely to be able to take a hard specific decision on this matter before there is a General Election. While I am bound to say - you will appreciate that it is in no sense a partisan view - that I myself do not think that a change of Government is probable. I also hope that there will not be a change of Government. None the less, I am quite clear from some experience in the House of Commons that a new Government taking office, as would be the case in (let us say) the middle 1980s, will have to take the decisions on your report and that it is more likely that that Government will take the decision than this one. It is a matter of judgment, but you did, with respect, ask me a very hypothetical question, and I must be hypothetical back.

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Q. That is perfectly legitimate, and that really takes me to the next point on which I would seek your help. So far as this Administration is concerned, the possibility of revival of Maplin was dealt with quite unequivocally by the Secretary of State, as you well know, in the debate. As I read the contribution made by his Shadow counterpart, so far as Maplin is concerned there seems to be a consensus, and there was no contribution on behalf of any other political party, as I read the material, which suggests that any administration would seek to revive it. I put that to you because it has been urged upon me (and I see the force in it) that I must, notwithstanding the complexities of the matter that I am investigating, keep my feet on the ground; and it would be an absurdity if I sought to recommend something which was not likely to be implemented, so that I must have regard to the state of play as I see it.

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-- A. Of course, I entirely understand. To summarise what you are saying, Maplin could be regarded as a lost cause, and therefore why spend a great deal of time contemplating it; but I think that is a matter, with respect, of political judgment. Again, with the greatest respect, your task is not that: it is to examine all of the facts and the evidence and to arrive at a conclusion on those facts of evidence, taking account of course, as you have just suggested, of reality. If the planning reality is such that you feel that the whole thing is a totally lost cause, you will be guided by that. I understand that exactly. But it remains my view, as I have said in reply to Mr. Ash, that things can change. I would remind you that you have made the point that both the present administration and its predecessor, which knocked Maplin on the head, and the Opposition spokesman

A in the debate, all virtually closed the door on Maplin. But I might suggest this - it is an analogy and not an exact one - the previous administrations, possibly including the present one, may have closed the door on the Falkland Islands. We have just spent quite a lot of time and trouble re-possessing them.

B Politics is a very changeable art, and, in my view, if the balance of evidence as - not to be pompous - history unfolds points once more in the direction of not putting an inland airport on our best agricultural land, if the evidence points in the direction of not having large lumps of metal with people in them flying around over our towns and cities on take off and landing, if the evidence points to the cost benefit of taking back land from the sea, which can be a great addition to our national estate, then I do not rule out the possibility of this matter being resurrected. I would say that it was a marginal possibility; that would only be reality; but I cannot accept for one moment that its day has gone. It may well be that its day is to return.

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D However, can I please, if I may, recall to you that much of my evidence was directed to demonstrating my own judgment that Stansted fails and, while Maplin is an important subject, in a sense it is a side issue to this Inquiry, which I understood was originally set up to judge whether or not Stansted was the right place to have 50 million passengers. My evidence to you has said that, on the basis of the experience I had as a responsible Minister for airport policy, Stansted fails on that, it fails on noise, it fails on safety and it fails on regional planning; and that is why I think that it ought not to be proceeded with.

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Q. There are just two further points. Where shall I find a public expression of Government policy that London Heathrow was deliberately to be run down eventually to a cargo function airport and Maplin was to take transferred traffic? -- A. The short answer is in the Committee stage debates, and also in some of the papers that I alluded to at the beginning. But I hope to say that I was careful in my choice of words. I referred to this as a long-term possibility that we were taking into account; it would not be correct to say that there was a firm and settled policy to do that, but it was something that was among the possibilities that would have arisen, because almost by definition the ability to handle some 60 million people out of Maplin would have made it questionable whether Heathrow needed to be sustained at the sort of levels that it, by that time, would have been approaching.

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A Q. I follow that. I have not, and it must be my fault, in the vast documentation that is before me seen any expression of Government policy that Maplin was to effect the function of Heathrow. What I am really interested to know is: if any decision even on a preliminary basis of that kind was taken, on what material could it conceivably be taken? What investigation was made as to the financial and economic implications of that course? A. No decision was taken. There was advice available to me about the benefits in terms of land; in terms of planning and, of course, in noise and environmental terms, if Maplin were able to grow in the end of the century and Heathrow accordingly could shrink. That is the evidence that is available to me in the files. There was no decision.

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C Q. I see that the Treasury Solicitor is trying to attract my attention. I think he is concerned at the position that may be developing.

MR. MICHAELS: Sir, it is with the greatest reluctance that I do rise and interrupt the witness in what he is saying to you. Before I deal with what is presently being said, may I say a few words in relation to the offer which was made to you at the commencement of Mr. Eldon Griffith's evidence?

D THE INSPECTOR: Would you like to deal with that in a moment and just deal with this at this moment?

E MR. MICHAELS: I will do though they are tied in very closely together: that is the claim of public interest immunity and its possibility and the second relates to the question of ministerial confidence. We are dealing with a situation which is, of course, unscripted and it is one which, of course, causes me a certain degree of embarrassment (if I can put it that way) because I do not know what is going to come next. I certainly do not wish to interrupt what is necessarily to you very important evidence with technical arguments which are needless. I must say that in relation to, for example (and I know that you would rather I discuss this issue later) the offer of documents, I would need to see them. In relation to the tenor of the evidence which is now being given and which relates to the advice of civil servants to their Minister, in a former administration ----

F THE INSPECTOR: I am not asking questions about that.

MR. MICHAELS: I appreciate that, but we are touching on the subject.

G THE INSPECTOR: I asked where I might find the published expression of government policy with regard to the running down of Heathrow.

H MR. MICHAELS: I believe the short answer to that is 'no' - you do not find such a public expression. Thereafter we do touch upon questions of ministerial confidence and all I do at this stage is to rise to put up a marker that it is the cause of a certain amount of embarrassment. It may be that

A | an opportunity to discuss the issues that you would like
the answers to, with the witness before he continues would
obviate the need for any procedural difficulty.

THE INSPECTOR: I am not in the least surprised at your intervention.

MR. MICHAELS: I do so with great reluctance.

B | THE INSPECTOR: I have the answer to the question that I posed.
There is just one matter which does trouble me and I do not
think that I can leave it as it stands. Before I take the
matter further, having explained what it is, I would appreciate
any comment that Mr. Read might wish to make on it. I am
C | disturbed by what Mr. Eldon Griffiths said with regard to
the British Airports Authority and his statement that he was
informed by that Authority in the 1970s that Stansted could
not possibly work. Those were the words that he used.
I am a little troubled about that because you were at pains,
I think, not to identify the informant. So, I do not know
whether you intended, Mr. Read, to raise this matter?

MR. READ: Yes, I did.

THE INSPECTOR: Is this a convenient moment to do it?

D | MR. READ: It would be more convenient, because I must say that I
am bound to regard it as perhaps potentially important,
if you were to adjourn these inquiries for about ten minutes
to enable instructions to be obtained over the telephone.
E | Mr. Eldon Griffiths is in a position better than most Members
of the House of Commons to know that I am wholly unable to
deal with this evidence that he has chosen advisedly to give,
of the advice which he says he received in confidence as a
Minister from those advising Ministers and advisedly to draw
your attention to the different advice which you are now
receiving. I, of course, have to take instructions upon that
kind of matter. Nobody was available on the telephone a
little while ago. Indeed those who were able to give me
instructions were at that moment actually with the Minister.
F | I understand that they are now, as it were, available to speak
over the telephone. I would be unhappy if Mr. Eldon Griffiths
were to go about his business without me having an opportunity
to deal at least in some measure with this matter.

G | THE INSPECTOR: Mr. Read, may I make my position clear and you
probably anticipated it from a remark I made upon the
termination of the statement made by Mr. Eldon Griffiths.
We are in this position because he did speak to matters at
which his statement does not really hint even.
A. With respect, sir, I must disagree with you.

Q. That is my view, Mr. Eldon Griffiths. A. I am entitled to
comment on it.

H | Q. You can comment as much as you like but that is my view.
I am certainly prepared to ask Mr. Eldon Griffiths (I know
how busy he is) to come back on a later date, if necessary,

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A to clarify this matter or, indeed, if the Government, through the Treasury Solicitor or counsel, wants to make any statement. I am quite prepared to do that, although I do it most reluctantly. I think you understand my position.

A. Yes, Mr. Eyre, I do understand your position and I would want to, in every way, support and assist you.

Q. I am sure you would. A. I think, however, for the record I am entitled to draw your attention to the second paragraph on page 2 of my statement where I say in the first sentence, "The main thrust of my evidence will be that Stansted is still the short-sighted mistake" that all the statutory agencies involved "thought it was in the early 1970s." On the preceding page you will observe that I refer to those who were advising me as including all the statutory agencies (that is line 6 of page 1) and the first of those I referred to is the British Airports Authority. I must respectfully disagree with the suggestion that there is no hint in my paper that I would be contrasting the advice that British Airports Authority is offering now (which is in favour of Stansted) with that which it offered to me then (which as I say, and I repeat, is that it was a short-sighted mistake). I have given indication in advance of my intention to touch on that point.

G Continued . . . / . . .

4.35 p.m.

A THE INSPECTOR: I do not regard it as sufficient indication. That is my clear view.

MR READ: I think I would accept your suggestion, sir, and leave it at that stage for the moment.

THE INSPECTOR: I think that is right, Mr Read.

MR READ: Better than that I judge one cannot now do.

B THE INSPECTOR: I think that is right. Mr Eldon Griffiths, I will ask you to return if parties want you to return, and I am sure you will co-operate. We will try and find a date which is convenient to you. I am aware of your existence, Mr Sivell.

MR SIVELL: I am grateful to you, sir.

C THE INSPECTOR: Do you want to put questions now?

MR SIVELL: I think that if Mr Eldon Griffiths is going to return ...

THE INSPECTOR: He may not, that is the point. If you want to put questions to Mr Eldon Griffiths on matters other than those that I have been canvassing with Mr Read and Mr Michaels you should do it while he is here.

D THE WITNESS: Can I to assist Mr Sivell and yourself and anyone else say that I have to leave. I did in fact give notice before I came that I would need to leave at half past four because of breaks in the House of Commons at half past six. Traffic is heavy. But of course I regard it as a matter of honour and public duty to come again when I shall be available to answer any questions that you allow to be put to me, though I think I ought to make it plain as I did at the beginning that there are papers that I could request. It would have to be, I think, at my request.

E THE INSPECTOR: It will not be at mine. A. I would only make such a request if you felt that it was desirable. I did ask your opinion on that matter at the very outset.

F Q And I gave it, I said that it was your responsibility. A. I cannot, with respect, answer questions that may arise that pertain to matter dealt with in those papers. I must be responsible for those and no one else.

G MR SIVELL: Sir, before I give way to Mr Michaels I would say that we will be a little time with Mr Eldon Griffiths and if he does have another appointment then if he would confirm that he will come back we will be content to leave it there.

THE INSPECTOR: I hope you will not be upset by this description, Mr Eldon Griffiths, but it looks as if you will have to go into the residual week. A. Thank you. But I cannot also undertake to be here for an indefinite amount of time. I will of course come back.

H THE INSPECTOR: I do not think you will be required for an indefinite amount of time - I think I am the only person required for an indefinite period of time.

A MR MICHAELS: Sir, before the witness does leave and in relation to the papers which he has proferred, the invitation which you have not accepted that he may none the less wish to fulfil, I would ask this: because there is a risk that the Crown may wish to claim public interest immunity for what is contained therein that any such papers that may be referred to be transmitted to me at least seven days before the witness's reappearance so that I may take the necessary instructions thereon.

B THE INSPECTOR: I do not think I am going to offer any kind of direction on that, but I am anticipating that those instructing you will take a view and may wish to communicate with Mr Eldon Griffiths, and I am sure he will receive such communication. I would much rather do it that way. I am not offering directions on these very difficult matters, which may raise matters of government confidentiality and so on. I hope you see my position.

C MR MICHAELS: I am obliged to you, sir.

THE INSPECTOR: I am quite sure that Mr Eldon Griffiths will listen to the appropriate party on this point.

THE WITNESS: Certainly, sir.

(The witness withdrew)

D THE INSPECTOR: Perhaps, Mr Sharman, you would be kind enough to return. I am afraid the gap was rather longer than I had anticipated.

MR F. ANDREW SHARMAN: Recalled
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WOOD (Continued)

THE INSPECTOR: Yes, Mr Wood. Follow that, as they say!

E MR WOOD: Sir, I feel in some way like the sacrificial lamb. I have got my mind into a channel really to cross-examine Mr Eldon Griffiths, to which I was looking forward with infinite pleasure.

THE INSPECTOR: I hope it has not inconvenienced you.

F MR WOOD: It is somewhat difficult now to get one's mind back upon the Sharman channel, but I will try.

THE INSPECTOR: Not for you, Mr Wood! I hope it did not inconvenience you though. I do understand that Members of Parliament have to get back to the House. But nevertheless as far as I am concerned these Inquiries are paramount.

G MR WOOD: I obviously totally and completely accept that, sir. I only hope that you will piece out some imperfection now because it is somewhat difficult to stand on one's head, as you know, particularly if you are untrained.

THE INSPECTOR: I tolerate almost everything you do, Mr Wood.

H MR WOOD: I am deeply appreciative, sir. Just one residual point, Mr Sharman, that we were making before the break, and that is coming back to the question of air traffic controllers. I wondered whether you had taken



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Ms Anderson
The Spoke to
R. Abrahams!
 17/111

Dr P Brooker
 DORA
 CAA House
 45-59 Kingsway
 London WC2B 6TE

Your reference

Our reference

Date 8 July 1982

Dear Dr Brooker,

STANSTED INQUIRY: BIRD STRIKE AT MAPLIN

Further to our telephone conversation of yesterday, I attach an extract from the transcript of Day 46, in which Mr Abrahams is cross-examined by Councillor Wood for the Defenders of Essex. Mr Wood stresses that bird strike will be of great importance in the Maplin context, and asks for official information. As you know MAFF have submitted their Maplin ornithological survey, but the actual problem of bird strike is the responsibility of the CAA, and Mr Abrahams agrees here to refer back to the CAA bird strike unit. It is clear that Mr Wood will be expecting something from that quarter, and I am sure it would answer his request if you were able to collate recent data and draw some conclusions about the likelihood of bird strike at Maplin. He gives the references to bird strike in the Roskill report, which should assist you in seeing what comments have already been made on the subject.

Yours
Rolande Anderson

Ms R J R Anderson

CR
10/7/82
Proper, hand

8.7

A running speed, and I think I can get through in that time without delaying lunch. I am very conscious of the fact that my questions are, so to speak, tributaries to the main stream, but I think, and hope, they are important nevertheless.

Cross-examined by Mr. WOOD

- B Q. There are just two aspects that I would like to take up with you, Mr. Abrahams, if I may. One is almost a refinement of DoT.41, but arising out of the comments made on Day 13, by Mr. Poole - page 7 is the particular reference that I have in mind. It deals with the question of gravity models. I say it is a refinement of DoT.41, because there a gravity model would deal with the allocation of traffic within an area of a smaller nature than the broad one that you have been taking into account in DoT.41. Do I need to refresh your memory - I am sure I do not - about gravity models and the various work that was done on them during the time of the Roskill Commission? (No response). The question I would like to ask you is this: when Mr. Poole said, in answer to a question that I put to him - "This is a matter which has been, I believe, researched by the Civil Aviation Authority principally. They have continued, since the Roskill Commission's work, to work on gravity models and traffic allocation by that basis. I have not been concerned with such work, although I have observed what they have been doing" - are his observations exact, how far have those studies gone and are they likely to be available to help the Inspector before a local Maplin Inquiry, say, in April of this coming year, unless I am being unduly optimistic?
- D A. The statement, I believe, is exact, but the last research work we did on such gravity models, or perhaps more correctly termed if I may say, traffic allocation models, was for the Airport Strategy of Great Britain documents. We have not done any work since then. It is normally, on that sort of scale, time-consuming and costly, and we do not do it just for fun, as it were, although the visage of the models as done at the Roskill Commission are forever in front of my eyes.
- E Q. I am sure you would not be doing it for fun, Mr. Abrahams, but would you accept that it is a study that would be essential to do at the stage when and if the Inspector would have to make a recommendation between various sites within, say, the London area and the South-east? A. It depends what the Inspector wanted to get from these studies. There is a lot of work that has been done, certainly in the Airport Strategy of Great Britain and in the Maplin Review. Perhaps you are, I suspect looking towards Foulness.
- F Q. Perish the thought! A. But one would hope that perhaps the work that had been done in the past would give sufficient lead and indication as to how the work would go in the future if were done, and perhaps would not make the embarkment of another major study necessary.
- G Q. Do I take it from that comment of yours, Mr. Abrahams, that it would be your opinion that the work done on the gravity model for the Roskill Commission would give as reliable an indication to the rival attractions of rival sites as was
- H

A
B
likely to be obtained without an exhaustive and very expensive study? A. It is a matter of degree. I think I would refer to the Maplin Review, perhaps, as the last example that would be useful. I would say that the results of a model, if we did them now, would not be sufficiently different from then - of course, the assumptions would be different, and forecasts would be different, and so on - as to come up with significantly different results, certainly in the way that they were indicating, from those done at the time of the Maplin Review.

C
D
Q. Thank you. I will not pursue that particular point further. It may be, of course, at a later stage we shall have to. The other point that I wanted to take up with you very briefly, and I do this as you are the leading representative of the Civil Aviation Authority here, is to ask you does the Authority, and is it likely to do so, take unto itself the responsibility for detailed investigation of, say, bird strike hazards at airport sites? A. I am not sure on this, but I think I can give some help. I do not think it is any intention of the Civil Aviation Authority to do any bird strike studies, and when a query was made to them recently I did see a copy of a letter referring the enquirer to a bird strike unit, which I had never actually heard of before, but that is as far as I can go at the moment. I think if you want a more definitive answer on that, I will have to refer back to the Authority.

E
F
Q. That is something that we can take up later, because I am sure it will be no surprise to you that the hazards of bird strike is something on which we shall be producing detailed evidence at the Maplin stage, and it would be most helpful and useful, I am sure, if there would be some official detail, some official records, available at the time of that inquiry? A. I would consider it to be certainly a contributory factor which should be taken into account, but without the study actually going ahead, I cannot say how significant that would be.

F
THE INSPECTOR: Is this unit part of the Safety Division of the CAA? A. I am sorry, I did not find that out.

Q. I am sure there is such a thing, because I can remember being concerned, I think it was with Hatfield some time ago.
A. Yes. All they said was the bird strike unit at X, and the letter I saw did not make it clear.

G
Q. They produced some work after that tragic Dunsfold crash.
A. Yes.

H
Mr. WOOD: It is a matter on which we place great importance in the Maplin context, and I might just close by drawing our several attentions to the various extracts on this particular problem contained in the Roskill Report, where they can be found. That is BAA.32, particularly on pages 88, 89 and 90, and there is no real need to look at them, I think. They show generally the position that the Commission arrived at

Mr. S. B. ABRAHAMS:
Cross-exd by Mr. Wood

A
B
with regard to the danger of bird strike, and the quotation can be found in the last sentence of paragraph 88, 8.4.1, on page 90, which shows that, in spite of the various suggestions made to eliminate the vast numbers of birds on the Foulness site, little success was being achieved. The quotation is: "The efforts of the witness called by the three groups of County Councils" - and I see Mr. Keene smiling at the recollection of this - "to persuade us that this risk could be entirely eliminated by means of an extraordinary battery of bird-scaring weapons were not successful."

With that thought, I would leave you to pass that on, if you would, to this bird strike unit to inspire them in their efforts, and thank you. It is quarter-to-one exactly, sir.

C
THE INSPECTOR: Admirable, Mr. Wood. I knew you would not let me down. We will adjourn until 2 o'clock.

(Adjourned for a short time)

STANSTED AIRPORT INQUIRY SECRETARIAT

17/111

Present — Address —
Room
Tollgate House
Houlton Street
Bristol BS2 9DJ
Tel: 0272 218

From 24 September 1981
Quendon Hall
Quendon
Near Saffron Walden
Essex CB11 3XN
Tel: 0799 40266

STANSTED/HEATHROW T5 INQUIRIES
PROGRAMME
WEEK 37

Your Reference

Our Reference

Date 8th July 1982.

PLEASE NOTE THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO ACCELERATE OR OTHERWISE ALTER THIS PROGRAMME WITHOUT NOTICE. PARTICIPANTS ARE THEREFORE ADVISED THAT IT IS THEIR RESPONSIBILITY TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE PROGRAMME OFFICER TO ASCERTAIN PROGRESS.

TUESDAY 13 JULY 1982
10.00-17.00

Appearance of Bowen Wells MP/ The case for Maplin: The appearance of the Town and Country Planning Association.

WEDNESDAY 14th JULY 1982
10.00-17.00

TCPA continues.

THURSDAY 15th JULY 1982
10.00-17.00

TCPA continues / Appearance of Ministry of Defence / The case against Maplin: The Joint case of Rochford District Council and the Defenders of Essex.

FRIDAY 16 JULY 1982
10.00-17.00

Rochford / DEA continue.

Notice of intention to cross-examine the TCPA has been received from the Defenders of Essex / Rochford District Council and the BAA.

Notice of intention to cross-examine the Rochford / DEA group has been received from the TCPA and FHANG.

J.M. BISHOP
Programme Officer

TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ASSOCIATION

Witnesses:

Professor Peter Self - Proof of evidence TCFA 18
Chairman of TCFA Council

Eldon Griffiths MP - Proof of evidence TCFA 23

John E Black - Proof of evidence TCFA 21
Chief Executive, Port of London Authority

Mr F A Sharman - Proof of evidence TCFA 16
Sir William Halerow and Partners

Professor G Schaefer - Proof of evidence TCFA 22
Professor and Head, of Ecological Physics Research Group
Cranfield Institute of Technology

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Witness:

Brigadier E R Shaddock MBE - Proof of evidence MOD 7

ROCHFORD DISTRICT COUNCIL
DEFENDERS OF ESSEX
SHEPPEY GROUP

JOINT SUBMISSION

Witnesses

Councillor Derrick Wood Proof of Evidence RODES1
Mr. I.M. Edwards Proof of Evidence RODES4



Civil Aviation Policy Division 4a

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

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File
17/111
~~105~~

David Michaels Esq
Treasury Solicitors
Stansted Airport Inquiry
Quendon Hall, Quendon
Nr Saffron Walden
Essex CB11 3XN

Your reference

Our reference

111
XQ/17/105

Date

21 June 1982

Dear David

I enclose as promised the suggested covering sheet for the Final Report of the Ornithological Survey Unit. Ms Anderson asked me to check with you the transcript reference, classification and summary which has been supplied by MAFF.

Worplesden were sending 31 copies of the Report but they failed to arrive and the Lab have no spare copies so I suggest that you get 30 copies made of the copy which you said was on the file. Sorry about this mix up, but it seemed cheaper and more expeditious for you to get the copying done at your end. I also enclose a copy of Mr Brough's letter to Ms Anderson which suggests how the reports should be stapled!

Finally, could I just put a market down for you to remember to return file XQ/17/49 Annex 1 to me when you have finished with it.

Yours,

Cathy

MISS C A CARLSON

Map-Ec

MAFF 43

THE MAPLIN AIRPORT PROJECT

Final Report of the Ornithological Survey Unit

by I R Deans

Brief Summary

This report presents the findings of a small team of biologists set up by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1972 to assess the bird life of the Foulness area in view of potential bird strike hazards to aircraft. The Worplesdon Laboratory of the Agricultural Science Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, was responsible for the scientific direction of the work and has reproduced this report with the agreement of the Department of Trade.

Transcript Reference

Day 46 Page 41D-42C (Request by Councillor Wood for official records on bird strike at Maplin.)

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food
Agricultural Science Service
Worplesdon Laboratory
Tangley Place
Worplesdon,
Guildford,
Surrey GU3 3LQ

*Miss Carlson 17/10/82**Please deal with Top Sheet (in connection with Mr M. Housden) to be despatched to IDS (17/10/82)*

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Aviation Bird Unit
 Worplesdon Laboratory Tangle Place Worplesdon Guildford Surrey GU3 3LQ

0483 232581/5

Telephone ~~04831~~ (Worplesdon) ~~232581~~

Miss Anderson
 Department of Trade
 1 Victoria Street Room 607
 London SW1H 0ET

Your reference

Our reference
 SSW 419

Date

14 June, 1982

Dear Miss Anderson,

MAPLIN ORNITHOLOGICAL REPORT FOR STANSTED ENQUIRY

Further to my letter of 3 June 1982 to Mr Douek and the subsequent telephone conversations with him and yourself regarding the means to enable the RSPB to receive a copy of the DTI Ornithological Survey Unit's final report, I have today despatched to you via IDS the 31 copies you requested.

The copies are not stapled because it is perhaps best to undertake this process only once and you wish to provide the front sheet. As some of the figures and tables are printed rather close to the left-hand edge, I would propose the use of only one large staple in the top left corner.

I enclose a copy of the information which we would like to see on the front sheet and I hope you find this appropriate.

I shall be grateful if you will send me a copy of the front sheet in the form in which it will be issued because we have a number of spare copies here which we may wish to annotate accordingly.

I have sent today a copy of the report to Mr Housden of the RSPB. The top right-hand corner was marked 'MAFF 43' as advised by Miss Middleton and I requested that the report should be treated in confidence until copies become generally available.

Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

T Brough

Encs.

THE MAPLIN AIRPORT PROJECT

Final Report of the Ornithological Survey Unit

by I. R. Deans

SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of a small team of biologists set up by the Department of Trade and Industry in 1972 to assess the bird life of the Foulness area in view of potential bird strike hazards to aircraft. The Worplesdon Laboratory of the Agricultural Science Service of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, was responsible for the scientific direction of the work and has reproduced this report with the agreement of the Department of Trade.

Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food
Agricultural Science Service
Worplesdon Laboratory
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SB Abrahamus Esq
 CAA
 Room T419
 CAA House

Your reference

Our reference

Date 11 June 1982

Dear Stan,

Bird strike

Towards the end of the week we will be putting in the final report of the Ornithological Survey Unit (Maplin Airport Project) as MAFF 43. The covering sheet will have a reference to Jack Wood's request for official documentation on bird strike at the end of your evidence have the CAA put in the 1978 DORA study on bird-strike? If not, this might be a good time.

I explained to the chap in MAFF (Trevor Brongel, Aviation Bird Unit, Guildford. Tel 0483 232581) that CAA would probably be in touch re evidence for the Standard

Inquiry, so they will be expecting
you when you get on to that one.

I am copying this to David
Michael for information. Sorry
about the manuscript - it is
Friday p.m. and I am going
on leave.

Yours etc

Rolande



Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Worplesdon Laboratory Aviation Bird Unit,
Tangley Place Worplesdon Guildford Surrey GU3 3LQ
Telephone 048531 (Worplesdon) 232581

Mr. Harris

Mr. I. C. Douek
Civil Aviation Policy Division 4a
Department of Trade
1 Victoria Street
LONDON SW1H 0ET

Your reference

Our reference

Date

3 June 1982

Dear Mr Douek

THIRD LONDON AIRPORT, MAPLIN

You wrote to us on 28 September 1978 kindly agreeing to the release of the final report of the DTI Ornithological Survey Unit to ex-members of the research team so that they could use the data in writing scientific papers for publication. You added the proviso that any subsequent papers arising from this work should be submitted for clearance by your Department before publication. It is now 7 years since the Unit was disbanded and $3\frac{1}{2}$ years since you gave your approval. As the ex-members of the Unit appear to have lost the urge to publish the data, their rights to them seem no longer to be sacrosanct.

We have been approached by the RSPB who would like to obtain a copy of the final report because they wish to compare the data contained therein with those they have obtained more recently themselves. They need the information because they will be presenting evidence in mid-July to the Third London Airport Enquiry at Stansted.

I have explained to the RSPB that the report had not been released generally, nor technically was it ours to release, and that I would make enquiries on their behalf.

We feel here that it would, at this stage, be unreasonable to refuse the RSPB access to the data contained in the report. However, there is concern that by handing over a copy of an unpublished report it could be plagiarized without reference to source. We wonder, therefore, if it would help if the document was issued as a MAFF report under the full name of the team, Ian Deans receiving senior authorship. Copies could then be sent to all interested parties, including the authors, and the RSPB would have less scope for misusing the data. Naturally we would envisage the inclusion of wording such as, "This report is issued by MAFF with the knowledge and agreement of DDT who sponsored the studies" or similar.

We would very much appreciate your views on this matter or any alternative solution. Understandably the RSPB would like to see the data as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely

T Brough

T Brough

Mr. Harris

Please see the attached letter.

The previous correspondence and a copy of the report are on file XQ/17/49

(Annex 1)*

The report deals only with the survey of bird populations in the area. Although it was intended at the time to draw conclusions about bird strike hazards, the work was discontinued.

I agree with MAFS that the best course is to publish the report, thus making it available to all parties at the Inquiry.

Worrell

7/6/82

* I have lent this file to David Michaels who still has it.

Mrs Anderson

Can you please
follow this up?

D 36

R. Pond

It's not clear that when
NABZ speak of "policies"
they mean those at the
Inquiry. I agree that it should
be made available, however.
Can someone check whether the
DOHA study on bird-
strike hazards (1978?)
has also been made
available to the public, if not,
whether it should also
be submitted?

1cc.

17/111



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 Switchboard 01-215 7877

SB Abrahams Esq
 CAA
 Room T419
 CAA House

Your reference

Our reference

Date 11 June 1982

Dear Stan,

Bird strike

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I explained to the chap in MAFF (Trevor Brongel, Aviation Bird Unit, Guildford. Tel 0483 232581) that CAA would probably be in touch re evidence for the Standed

• Inquiring, so they will be expecting
• you when you get on to that one
I am copying this to David
Michael's for information. Sorry
about the manuscript - it is
Friday p.m. and I am going
on leave.

Yours etc

Rolande

Mr Harris

Sir Jack Stewart-Clark, MEP for East Sussex, has written seeking advice on a letter from Mr Hart of the Maplin Movement requesting his support for an airport/seaport complex at Maplin. Mr Hart has previously written to the then Secretary of State for Trade following the 17 December 79 Statement, protesting at the rejection of Maplin and enclosing 20 signatures on a petition. Nothing further has been heard until the attached letter to Sir Jack Stewart-Clark. The membership of the Maplin Movement - if any - is unknown, and the Movement has made no representations to the Stansted Inquiry. As the Inquiry is now in progress, it is difficult to go into the merits of Maplin v. Stansted in the reply to Sir Jack Stewart-Clark. A draft reply is attached which explains the current position and suggests that Sir Jack refer the Maplin Movement to the Inquiry Secretariat; it encloses background material on Government policy.

Ms R J R ANDERSON
CAP4a
V/607 x 3861
17 February 1982

DRAFT

File No.

Addressed to:

Sir Jack Stewart-Clark MEP

Colmsley House
Holtby Common
Nr Cowden
Kent BN9 7EP

Copies to:

Originated by:
(Initials and date)

RJRA

Seen by:
(Initials and date)

Enclosures:

Type for signature of

...PUSS.....
(Initials and date)

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE

Thank you for your letter of 25 January, addressed to David Howell. I am replying in view of my responsibility for the Government's airports policy.

You enclosed a letter from the Maplin Movement, seeking your support for development of an airport/seaport at Maplin. You may be aware that an alternative proposal to develop an airport at Maplin is currently being considered at the Public inquiry into the British Airport's Authority's planning application to develop Stansted. I am enclosing Government submissions to the Stansted Inquiry, to provide you with the background to our policy towards Maplin, together with a copy of John Nott's 17 December 1979 statement as Secretary of State for Trade, which sets out the Government's airports policy.

The Government's view is that the expansion of Stansted provides the best and most flexible solution to the problem

(CONTINUE TYPING HERE)

File No.

of meeting the need for airports capacity as it arises, without premature expenditure; no greenfield site meets this criterion. Accordingly we invited the British Airports Authority to bring forward proposals to expand Stansted to a capacity of 15 mpha. However the Government undertook to hold a wide-ranging inquiry into the proposals to enable objectors to put forward alternatives. The Inquiry is now in progress, considering three alternative sites, a fifth terminal at Heathrow (which is the subject of a planning application), and greenfield sites at Maplin and Sevenside. A final decision will be taken jointly by the Secretaries of State for Trade and the Environment, in the light of the Inspector's report.

The Maplin alternative was originally put forward by the Town and County Planning Association in the form of a planning application to develop an airport at Maplin Sands; however the application has now been withdrawn although the case for Maplin will still be heard. The Greater London Council who have long favoured the proposition of a two-centre airport based on Maplin and East London have taken the view that this is no longer realistic and are supporting the expansion of Stansted. Object to the development of Maplin are being heard from local Councils and amenity groups, as well as from the Ministry of Defence whose Shoeburyness firing ranges are located on the site.

I have no wish to deter you from reaching your own

(CONTINUE TYPING HERE)

File No.

conclusion on the development of Maplin, and hope that the enclosed material is of assistance to you. As the Public Inquiry is now the appropriate forum for consideration of these issues, I would suggest in any case that you refer your constituent to the Inquiry Secretariat if he wishes to make representations. Their address is:

Stansted Inquiry
Quendon Hall
Quendon
New Saffron Walden
Essex CB11 3XN

