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Reconciling Hamas and Fatah

by Michael Bröning

GAZA/JERUSALEM – As representatives of Hamas and Fatah meet for the fourth round of national unity talks in Cairo, not only Palestinians but also Americans and Europeans will be watching closely. The top-level talks, hosted by Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, will be crucial to ending nearly two years of bloody confrontation between Hamas-ruled Gaza and the Fatah-ruled West Bank, governed by Western-backed Mahmoud Abbas. Given previous failures, this round of talks might prove to be the final chance to re-establish Palestinian unity.

The continuing internal schism between the more moderate and secular Fatah and the Islamist Hamas has not only left the Palestinian leadership in disarray, but has also made meaningful peace negotiations with Israel next to impossible. Moreover, continued internal disunity continues to thwart reconstruction efforts in Gaza, which are urgently needed in the aftermath of Israel’s military offensive earlier this year. Thus, the outcome of the negotiations in Cairo will have repercussions for Palestinians and Israelis – and, indeed, for anyone with a stake in the Middle East peace process.

In previous rounds, the different factions agreed in principle on forming a united government for the West Bank and Gaza, and on holding legislative and presidential elections in the Palestinian Territories by January 2010. But Fatah and Hamas still differ fundamentally on how to form a government tasked to prepare elections.

Discussions also center on the control of the security services – a field in which neither Fatah nor Hamas have much room to maneuver. Moreover, disagreement prevails on the type of electoral system to be used.

Whereas Fatah favors a clear majority voting system, Hamas calls for a more personalized approach. Furthermore, the question of including Hamas in the Palestine Liberation Organization is crucial. Contrary to common perception, the PLO has always been the only official negotiating partner with Israel and does not include Hamas. In a rather obscure linguistic debate, Hamas has in previous negotiation rounds refused to “commit’ itself to past PLO agreements with Israel, but has instead offered to “respect” them. Negotiators in Cairo will thus have to discuss if such an indirect recognition of Israel’s right to exist will be acceptable.

Underneath this clear-cut quid pro quo of political bargaining, the representatives from Fatah and Hamas are charged with finding the means to reconcile Hamas’s tremendously popular political ideology with Fatah’s traditional secular aspirations. This is not merely an internal Palestinian affair, for it reflects a conflict raging across the entire Middle East.

Until now, no Arab society has managed to harmonize these opposing trends. Instead, most governments have opted for a more or less confrontational approach of suppression and exclusion, banning Islamists from participating in elections or bullying them into semi-legality. The case of the Palestinian Territories, however, is different.

In the absence of a strong central authority, the predominant divide between secular nationalism and politicized religion has led to the actual geographic disintegration of the Palestinian Territories into two distinct parts. Given the difficulties that even major players in the region face when dealing with the challenge of political Islam, it becomes clear that for the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority, only compromise and dialogue is a feasible way to heal the rift.

Unsurprisingly, the fate of the Cairo talks is anything but certain. Failure to come up with a unified Palestinian position would undoubtedly play into the hands of the newly elected Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu. After all, the Israeli Prime Minister has made it clear that he favors continued conflict management in terms of “economic peace” over far-reaching political processes based on mutual respect and cooperation.

Faced with continued internal division, pressing for a meaningful peace process is very difficult for the Palestinians. As a consequence, Israel’s willy-nilly expansion of West Bank settlements might finally bury comprehensive peace efforts for good.

But success in Cairo might prove even more challenging. If the negotiations lead to the establishment of a Palestinian government supported by both Fatah and Hamas, there will be a tough choice to make – not primarily for Palestinians, but first and foremost for Western decision makers. Will the West continue its policy of boycotting Hamas politically and financially, or will it adopt an alternative approach?

Given Hamas’s belligerent ideology, any change in the West’s approach towards Hamas in the aftermath of successful Palestinian dialogue in Cairo would be difficult. But a modified and more pragmatic stance that focuses on Hamas’s behavior on the ground, rather than on abstract conditions, would not only be demanding for Western decision makers; it would pose a major political challenge for Hamas as well.

Michael Bröning is director of the East Jerusalem office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, a political foundation affiliated with Germany’s Social Democratic Party.

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