

## **Anchoring America's Asian Assets: Why Washington Must Strengthen Guam**

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*Rising threats to American national security in East Asia coincide with declining local support for U.S. basing access there. Yet no alternative access points are currently available. To prevent this contradiction from harming U.S. interests in that strategically vital region, U.S. planners have finally recognized the imperative to build up Guam as a sovereign anchor of America's force posture in East Asia. This article examines regional threats to American interests, Guam's importance as a forward logistics hub, and the infrastructure renaissance and regional access initiatives that will be necessary to help Guam fully realize its new role.*

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All along the Pacific Rim, political and military forces combine to challenge U.S. influence—and the future only looks worse. If America does not better prepare to face the challenges ahead, an inappropriate force posture—or worse, an inadequate deployment of assets to East Asia—will reduce its leverage in peacetime and flexibility in crisis. U.S. naval planners recognize the need to move resources westward to Guam as a first step in a long-term effort to pursue American interests in the region in a flexible way. Such investment should continue, strengthening the sovereign anchor of the American presence in East Asia. As yet, Guam remains a small base, in need of both capital investment and heightened respect from U.S. naval planners. Improving Guam's infrastructure addresses the long-term prospects for East Asia—marked by an increasing need for U.S. naval presence in a region increasingly opposed to American basing rights.

At its core, the George W. Bush administration's national security strategy calls for decisive—and if necessary, preemptive—action to protect primary U.S. interests. Military commanders in the Asia-Pacific theater cannot rely solely upon potentially constrained partners to carry out this mission. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, regional military cooperation was difficult to find (even through coercion), a fact that starkly reminds U.S. policymakers of the need for diplomatic and military flexibility. Washington therefore

needs to be ready to act, as a last resort, with a small coalition of partners, or even alone. To retain freedom of action in East Asia, U.S. planners would do well to establish a presence for strike and deterrence not wholly dependent on outside support. The U.S. must thus increase its capability to use existing access points and bases. One vehicle for such independent presence, though by no means a panacea, is the strategically located island of Guam.

Current basing arrangements and operating patterns in the Pacific Fleet seem to reflect excessive optimism about getting “more from less.” They strain U.S.-based naval assets, slow response time to the region, and rely too heavily on access rights that could evaporate during a crisis. Such problems are hardly unique to East Asia; forces everywhere are stretched thin. But it would be a mistake to underestimate the growing need for increased presence in-theater or to keep asking for more from a burdened Pacific Fleet. American policymakers rightly conceptualize U.S. force posture in East Asia as a chain of overlapping bases and access rights. Fortunately, U.S. planners have committed to reducing long-term dependence on these foreign bases through a significant expansion of Guam’s facilities.

Along with cosmetic and structural improvements on Guam, America needs to expand its portfolio of military assets in East Asia. U.S. force posture should reflect not only a capability to respond without delay to the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and critical sea-lanes in Southeast Asia but also to check the scourge of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These distinct but related tasks require a *layered* military strategy. In the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, for instance, such a strategy would involve the use of bases in Korea as the front line, bases in Japan as the ready reserve, and a base in Guam as the deep reserve.<sup>1</sup>

In a region where basing options are hamstrung by domestic politics, America needs access if it is to have influence. Forward-deployed naval assets, as the chairman of the U.S. Naval War College’s Asia Pacific Studies Group, Jonathan Pollack, told the authors, must not be left “all dressed up with nowhere to go:” operational readiness without support structures cannot be long maintained.<sup>2</sup> But access to the Asia-Pacific theater is not enough. America needs a reliable center of operations—including supply, repair, logistics, and training—to “walk on stage” prepared to act. Deteriorating port facilities and infrastructure in Guam needs to be transformed into an ample and well-appointed “dressing room backstage.”<sup>3</sup> The recent homeporting of three *Los Angeles* class attack submarines on the island is a good first step. Increasing power projection into this vital region, however, will require that the U.S. Navy continue to “move west,” shifting operational and support assets from San Diego and Pearl Harbor closer to their main area of operations.

There are no new islands or new access points in East Asia;<sup>4</sup> that leaves increasing the U.S. capability to use existing access points and bases. Building up the American presence on Guam is the single most important step that can be taken to effect this crucial transition.

In this article we first explain the importance of strengthening port facilities in Guam, to fully transform it into a supply and logistics hub capable of supporting operations throughout East Asia. Second, we examine American interests in this vital region, with particular emphasis on the new national security strategy and potential sources of instability. Third, we critically evaluate the call of the Quadrennial Defense Review for “places, not bases.” Fourth, we review the various political constraints on U.S. action in the region. Finally, we consider the merits of access to specific ports.

## Guam: A Place *and* a Base

Guam finally stands to reclaim its historical position as a strategic American naval hub in the western Pacific. Until World War I, Guam was a coaling stop on the great-circle route to the west. During World War II, Guam served as “the Supermarket of the Pacific,” the Allies’ premier logistics hub in that theater. In the early part of the Cold War, Guam represented for the United States the “Crossroads of the Pacific,” as one of the first Polaris missile support bases, home to Air Force B-52s, and a critical Defense and State Department communications/intelligence link. During the Vietnam War it was a primary B-52 staging area as well as a base for the minesweepers that cleared Haiphong Harbor at the conclusion of that conflict.<sup>5</sup> Following the Vietnam War—the island having, ironically, given its name to President Richard Nixon’s 1969 “Guam Doctrine,” calling upon Asian allies to see to their own defenses—the island’s military presence lessened, and its infrastructure declined.<sup>6</sup>

Thanks to the initiative of Vice Admiral Konetzni while Commander, Submarine Force Pacific, from 1998 until 2001, Guam’s decline was finally reversed. To reduce the strain of long deployments on both personnel and submarines, Vice Admiral Konetzni reestablished Submarine Squadron 15, which two decades before had been disbanded.<sup>7</sup> In September 2002, his lobbying succeeded: attack submarines USS *City of Corpus Christi* (SSN 705), then homeported in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and USS *San Francisco* (SSN 711) then based in Norfolk, Virginia, left for their new homeport in Guam, sovereign American territory 1,200 nautical miles east of the Taiwan Strait. USS *Houston* (SSN 713) joined them in January 2004. The new posture is designed in part to meet Submarine Force commitments and reduce transit time to forward operating zones in East Asia.<sup>8</sup>

The overall goal of these movements was to increase the total number of mission days for each U.S. naval platform in-theater, while giving submariners more time at home with their families. It is not enough, however, to station ships in Guam. One former naval officer stationed on Guam in the 1970s reflected that fewer than half of his peers chose to have their families accompany them on the island.<sup>9</sup> Instead, planners must be careful to make the necessary improvements to the larger complement of services and facilities that sailors and soldiers are accustomed to at more mature bases. Besides additional mission days in the Western Pacific, stationing more submarines in Guam carries two important side benefits. First, it reduces “personnel tempo,” or the rate and duration of military deployments. Second, it minimizes the effective hours of utilization for naval nuclear reactors and other sensitive and expensive components. A larger, better-supported Navy community on Guam would encourage more personnel to bring their dependents along and stay on the island or in the region during periods of leave.

These operational goals support the strategic aim of enhancing American presence in East Asia. To allow for a flexible deployment of critical assets, Guam needs a complete infrastructure renaissance to improve the condition of schools, barracks, hangars, drydocks, ports, and maintenance activities. Such improvements could provide the necessary constellation of facilities to support a second carrier at Yokosuka and avoid transport time from Hawaii for many of its requirements. Further, preparation for antisubmarine warfare would not necessarily require a full battle group. It might be difficult to homeport an aircraft carrier at Guam, as its nuclear reactor would require large and expensive maintenance infrastructure and a shore facility to store low-level nuclear waste, but this possibility should not be rejected out of hand. Given adequate investment, Guam could

serve as an alternative base for a carrier strike group. Additionally, Washington could preposition ships capable of theater missile defense (TMD) as a politically acceptable means of protecting U.S. interests in the region, should China accelerate its missile buildup.

The most important U.S. capabilities to allow rapid regional response would be at-sea prepositioning and air defense. Military commanders need adequate airlift capabilities and tankers ready to quickly deploy in-theater from Guam. For these missions, America needs a secure airfield from which it cannot be denied access; political area denial could allow China to push American forces out of the region before or during a crisis. Guam has the advantage of being American territory, reducing the political difficulty (especially given Guam's pro-military population) of building and using assets of the island. Support for additional military presence on the island is increasing among residents.<sup>11</sup> While it already boasts a deep-water port, revitalized repair dry-dock, and proximity to the region's only live-fire bombing range, Guam is capable of significant physical expansion. U.S. aircraft carriers are capable of entering and docking at Apra Harbor; there are no bridges over harbor entrances to block their 200-foot bridge towers. Extra pier space could be engineered if necessary.<sup>10</sup>

Further improvements could include homeporting elements of an amphibious ready group, combat support ships, and a full squadron of fast-attack submarines. The U.S. Air Force also has an important role to play: "Central to these plans is the Air Force's strategy of using Guam as a main operating base for tactical missions into the region."<sup>13</sup> A contingent of B-52s could be retained at Andersen Air Force Base, perhaps rotated in small groups from Barksdale Air Force Base in Bossier City, Louisiana. Existing Air Force infrastructure and support personnel will require upgrading to sustain the next generation of aircraft after the B-52s are retired; stealth aircraft, for instance, require special hangars.<sup>14</sup> In addition to operational assets, the "dressing room" concept requires bolstering support resources. Repair and maintenance shelters can be augmented to better service carrier strike groups, and training centers would allow personnel to remain on station longer. See Table 1 for a complete list of current and recommended assets.

**Table 1**  
American assets in Guam

Current	Short-term	Long-term
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas (COMNAVMAR)	Already Dedicated	Recommended
U.S. Naval Forces Marianas Support Activity	Upcoming Commands	Attack Submarines
Commander, Submarine Squadron 15	Mobile Security Unit Guam	e.g., USS <i>Olympia</i>
USS <i>Frank Cable</i> (AS 40)	<b>Amphibious Warfare</b>	<b>Amphibious Warfare</b>
USS <i>City Of Corpus Christi</i> (SSN 705)	Bachelor Enlisted Quarters—2 new barracks—\$7M (awarded)	Dry-dock and maintenance for additional elements of Amphibious Group 3
USS <i>San Francisco</i> (SSN 711)	Whole House Revitalization—interior/exterior	[Potentially homeport flag-ship USS <i>Blue Ridge</i> (LCC 19),
USS <i>Houston</i> (SSN 713)	improvements—Phase 2	USS <i>Essex</i> (LHD 2), and
Helicopter Combat Support Squadron 5 (HC 5)	62 units for \$8M; Phase 3, 40 units for \$5M (awarded)	Amphibious Group 3]
U.S. Naval Hospital Guam		

(continued)

**Table 1**  
(Continued)

Current	Short-term	Long-term
U.S. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Guam (NCTS)	Install Marine Loading Arms—<\$10M (pending)	Establish Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity Guam on par with SIMA San Diego
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 5 (EODMU 5)	Fuel Hydrant System Upgrade—\$38M	Associated Infrastructure Upgrades
Naval Special Warfare Unit 1	<b>RECOMMENDED</b>	
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion	<b>Anti-submarine Warfare</b>	
Navy Public Works Center	Homeport elements of Combined Task Force 12 (antisubmarine mission)	
Naval Airborne Weapons Maintenance Unit 1 (NAWMU 1)	Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron 4 (currently NAS North Island)	
Military Mine Assembly Unit 8 (MOMAU 8)		
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 5 Detachment Marianas (EODMU 5 DET MARIANAS)	<b>Amphibious Warfare</b>	
Command Military Pre-positioning Ship Squadron 3 (COMPSRON 3)	Homeport elements of Combined Task Force 76 (LHDs, LPDs, LSDs)	
Personnel Support Detachment Guam (PSD)	<b>Combat Support</b>	
Detachment Civic Action Team Guam (DET CAT)	Establishment of Helicopter Combat Support Squadron similar to Norfolk "Fleet Angels" HC-2	
Naval Legal Services Office Pacific Detachment (NLSOPAC)	Oiler: USS <i>Sacramento</i> (AOE 1)	
Branch Dental Clinic (BRDENCLINIC)	Ordnance Support Ship	
Military Sea Lift Command Office Guam (MSCO)	Elements from Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 2	
U.S. Navy Recruiting Station	<b>Telecommunications Support</b>	
Fleet Imaging Center Pacific (FLTIMAGCENPAC)	Strengthen NCTS Guam (move elements of NCTAMS PAC from Pearl Harbor)	
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Facility Pacific (SPAWARSYSFAC)		
Naval Satellite Operations Center Guam Detachment Charlie (NAVSOC DET)		

The expense of improving Guam's deteriorating infrastructure would be offset by the resulting decreased personnel tempo. "Doing more with less" means that operations tempo will stay the same, even while meeting added requirements in the region. Savings will result from reduced personnel transport and fuel consumption. Navy officials contend that submarines based in Guam will be in theater 88 to 123 days per year, three times as much as the 36-day average of submarines based in the continental United States.<sup>17</sup> To homeport additional ships at the island, total infrastructure improvement costs would

probably come to around 200 million dollars, far below expected procurement costs for U.S.-based ships with less access to this critical operating theater.

Guam is not without its own problems, especially geographic. It is farther from all strategic areas in Northeast Asia than is Japan, Korea, Vietnam, or the Philippines. Guam is three times farther from the Taiwan Strait than is Okinawa. Ships cruising at 25 knots could possibly reach the strait from Guam in two and a half full days, as opposed to one day from the Philippines. However, Guam's distance does offer one benefit: the island is slightly less vulnerable to Chinese missiles, several hundred of which are positioned in Fujian Province opposite Taiwan, and to North Korean missiles, including the Taepodong 2. The island is often affected by adverse weather, including typhoons, which sometimes disrupt operations and damage infrastructure. However, Korea and Japan are equally—if not more—vulnerable in this regard.

### **American Interests: Why Should the Navy Invest?**

Building up Guam is an essential component of a long-term strategy to maintain America's preeminent position in the global security environment. It also addresses key East Asian threats that Washington cannot afford to ignore.

Military bases on sovereign American territory, particularly naval bases, will become increasingly important to America's force posture in coming years. Dr. Owen R. Coté, Jr., associate director of MIT's Security Studies Program, observes that "it is unlikely that access to [foreign] bases will become more predictable in the future because it is unlikely that the U.S. will establish new military alliances as formal as those it established to prosecute the Cold War."<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, "unlike in air warfare, the technical trends in antisubmarine warfare will likely continue to favor stealth. Thus quiet submarines, especially those that deploy in littoral waters, will retain a significant advantage over submarine hunters. Together, these trends will make it more dangerous for U.S. surface combatants, amphibious ships, and sealift vessels to close hostile coastlines early in a conflict when opposing submarines are still extant." Coté foresees "an accompanying U.S. shift toward submarines deploying both overland sensor networks and fast standoff strike weapons" in part because "U.S. submarines will be the most effective means of providing a persistent source of fast standoff weapons close to opposing targets early in a conflict."<sup>19</sup>

Future politics could thus increasingly circumscribe U.S. deployment options even as a U.S. forward presence becomes easier to challenge—making it all the more essential that the U.S. Navy consolidate development of Guam's basing capability without delay. In East Asia, three regional developments make U.S. basing goals increasingly significant. America faces economic and potential military competition from China, political and security challenges associated with the global war on terror, and a military threat from North Korea. Washington can no longer afford to define its priorities by merely reacting to continuing developments. Instead, if military planners will define preferred outcomes, they can position American capabilities to pursue those outcomes. To take advantage of all its military instruments, the United States can establish a flexible force posture. It will then be possible to achieve a host of positive military and foreign policy outcomes—pursuing multiple effects simultaneously. Guam should be at the heart of such "effects-based" initiatives.

First, the growing ambitions of the People's Republic of China (PRC) depend on increasingly assertive naval power. As China moves closer to developing blue-water naval

capability, especially in relation to Taiwanese defensive capability, the U.S. Navy finds it necessary to be ready not only to respond quickly to a contingency in the Taiwan Strait but also to counterbalance Chinese regional influence. Second, localized Southeast Asian terrorist organizations—Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia, among others—have demonstrated their capacity for regional violence. These organs of terror have to be investigated and pursued, in order to disable potential partnerships with al-Qa'ida and other groups with global reach. Third, despite the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework by which North Korea rejoined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in exchange for U.S. delivery of heavy fuel oil, Pyongyang recently revealed its clandestine production of nuclear weapons.<sup>20</sup> This flagrant violation has further destabilized an already fragile political situation in Northeast Asia. In light of these recent events, as Admiral Carlisle Trost emphasized to the authors, "America must assume a strong political posture with the force to back it up."<sup>21</sup>

The U.S. Navy has a critical role to play in East Asia, given the region's extensive coastlines, islands, land barriers, and consequent susceptibility to maritime force projection. As a great power engaged in offshore "balancing" (like Britain in Europe during the 19th century), the United States does not need the capacity to win land wars in East Asia in order to maintain its preponderant position. Instead, its preeminence hinges on control of the sea. Though America is the only power burdened with maintaining a global forward naval presence, it cannot afford to succumb to the Pacific's "tyranny of distance."

In East Asia, naval forces play a preventive role that is of equal importance to their offensive function. These dual processes can be categorized as "shape" and "respond."<sup>22</sup> "You can't influence if you're not there," Lieutenant Colonel Scott Lindsey, U.S. Marine Corps, emphasizes. "Forward presence gives us not only better response, but also better ability to *shape* the security environment."<sup>23</sup> Ships on station are launch pads for the war on terror, platforms for theater missile defense, barriers to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and are themselves stabilizing political forces. The Navy plays a special role in safeguarding American interests: "[Unlike the basing and staging-dependent U.S. Air Force or Army,] . . . the Navy can establish a long-term presence without infringing on anyone's borders. It can be sent at a pace that allows diplomacy to cool a crisis even as the ships proceed."<sup>24</sup> A further advantage of naval presence is that ships can remain indefinitely in international waters, as close as 12 miles to another nation's coastline, to conduct electronic surveillance.

Therefore, according to Mel Labrador, former country director for the Southeast Asia Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate, "there is a real and current need to expand and diversify the level of American military access throughout Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia."<sup>25</sup> To maximize America's ability to gather information, deter hostility, and overcome aggression, the U.S. Navy needs to arrange assets for highest availability in times of crisis. Such a strategy calls for forward presence of ships in areas of greatest political flexibility. Washington would thus improve its capacity to stabilize the Taiwan Strait, in part by deterring Chinese offensives in the first place.

A strengthened position in Guam would also serve as a key center for antiterrorism deployments in Southeast Asia. It would increase American political options and allow America to balance Chinese and domestic pressure on Tokyo, thus strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. This strategy will be far easier to implement now, *before* China could establish a stronger military posture in the South China Sea and develop the political will to challenge a U.S. presence there.

### ***Defeating Terrorism***

The October 12, 2002 terrorist attack that killed 168 civilians in Bali, Indonesia, awakened American observers to the danger of terror cells in Southeast Asia. As yet, explains the Brookings Institution's Michael O'Hanlon, "terrorists based in the Philippines and Indonesia have not demonstrated global capabilities."<sup>26</sup> But this regional focus does not discount the importance of establishing a center to more closely monitor such groups as Jemaah Islamiah in Indonesia and Abu Sayyaf in the southern provinces of the Philippines. Hundreds of special operations soldiers already pursuing terrorists in the Philippines need reinforcement to render terrorist organizations inoperative.

The struggle against terrorism will be a long war of attrition. Prevailing with minimum loss of American life and interests requires simultaneously treating both the symptoms and the condition. Terrorism can be overcome in the long term only by addressing the larger economic, political, and religious factors that cause it; otherwise when one cell is destroyed another will emerge, like a Hydra's head. But in the meantime, reducing the devastation that could harm Americans and reduce international support for the larger effort means targeting local violence.

The U.S. Navy has an important role to play here, from special operations to construction battalions.<sup>27</sup> U.S. Special Operations forces are currently helping to coordinate attacks on Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. Construction battalions can be used in strategic, joint goodwill operations, such as helping the Philippine Air Force build a small airstrip in Mindanao.<sup>28</sup> The continued emphasis on joint operations in the form of Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs) has forced commanders to consider consolidating forces in Guam. JMETLs derive from orders considered vital to foreseeable missions and are normally delegated to regional commands.<sup>29</sup> Guam is therefore well suited to host joint military exercises in support of such JMETLs. Guam has already been used in the 1990s as the premier training ground for the 31<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit exercise True (Training in an Urban Environment).<sup>30</sup>

Of central significance to the economic interests of America and its East Asian allies is the security of *mega-hubs*, deep-water ports that can accommodate the 60-foot drafts of the largest container ships. As of yet, however, safeguarding the world's mega-hubs has not received the attention it deserves. According to Lieutenant Colonel Scott Lindsey, U.S. Marine Corps, "Guam puts [American forces] closer to the four mega-hubs in Southeast Asia (out of the global 14 that run east-west and 'feed' small ports). And 76% of the planet's computer components come through that neighborhood."<sup>31</sup>

### ***Deterring North Korea: It Is No Iraq***

U.S. military force planners now work in the framework of a broad new national security strategy calling for proactive responses to unpredictable threats. Dismantling WMD being among the highest priorities for national defense, the announcement of an ongoing nuclear weapons program in North Korea has drawn the concerted attention of American policy makers to Northeast Asia. Now that Saddam Hussein has been captured and his regime dismantled, decision makers would do well to ask, "Should North Korea be the next target of U.S. pressure?" and plan accordingly.<sup>32</sup> Current U.S. priorities in the Middle East make it unwise to provoke North Korea now, but in the future building a more credible American threat that does not hinge on Japanese or South Korean participation may be essential in attempting to pressure Pyongyang.



North Korean aggression remains a possibility (albeit remote) should détente with the South fail. Of course, a Korean Peninsula conflict would not be as lopsided as America's Iraq campaign, for reasons that go beyond comparative military capabilities. The apparent military ease of Operation Iraqi Freedom should not be allowed to obscure key differences. First, in Iraq a slow diplomatic buildup allowed for massive troop prepositioning. This would not happen in the Koreas. The North, in a time of rising tensions, could preempt major troop deployments, threatening Seoul with artillery or Japan with missiles. Second, the coalition in Iraq had bases in neighboring Kuwait from which to launch an attack, with no restrictions on their use; public opinion in South Korea might not permit similar use of U.S. bases there. Third, North Korea has a far greater potential to inflict a "sea of fire"—unacceptable, even mass casualties among American troops and allied civilians—than Iraq ever did, greatly constraining U.S. options for applying pressure. Moreover, South Korean civilians would probably not embrace even a defensive American military buildup on the peninsula. Another place or base—such as Guam—is necessary to overcome this dilemma.

With further investment, Guam could bring to life the current doctrinal focus on RSOI (reception, staging, onward movement, and integration). The concept of RSOI is to rapidly transport troops into a crisis theater or area of operations and unite them with their equipment. First, in-theater ships would deploy equipment at sea or in Japan, *or* stage the equipment in Guam. The process of arranging combat organizations in-theater depends on further transportation developments, mainly the transport of heavy (e.g., mechanized tanks) and light (such as mechanized infantry) equipment. It makes sense to preposition stocks in Guam and marry these stocks with troops using the RSOI process, rather than a costly yet less dependable prestaged maritime option. All U.S. military services already preposition equipment; it is simply preferable to consolidate and then fly troops in to meet the vessels carrying the equipment.<sup>33</sup>

A large conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula is a high-cost, low-probability prospect. For decades the need for America to respond to a full-scale invasion kept a permanent land force near the demilitarized zone. But the Pentagon is now backing away from this "tripwire" approach, since U.S. forces stationed within range of North Korean artillery undermine the American threat of preemptive strike. Moreover, the more likely contingency of heightened tensions—as opposed to immediate, full-scale war—suggests a rapid-response force. Here, as in much of East Asia, the bulk of U.S. influence lies not on land but at sea.

For all these reasons, Washington needs to lay the groundwork for a flexible buildup designed not to support a bombing campaign or even an "Osirak-style" operation—modeled on Israel's 1981 preemptive attack on Iraq's developing nuclear facility—but rather proliferation containment. Targeted sanctions may be the key. Sanctions could involve a naval quarantine to prevent Pyongyang from exporting missiles (in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime), nuclear material (in violation of the NPT), or related military technologies.

The U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative is a positive step toward stability in the region. Targeted sanctions have an encouraging track record. The U.S. Navy has used them for at least a decade in the Persian Gulf under the maritime-interdiction regime. In one variant, "leadership interdiction operations," allied ships' personnel question and sometimes search merchant vessels for terrorists. Since December 2003, thanks to more effective tactical authorization arrangements, leadership-interdiction forces have seized drug shipments and al-Qa'ida members. Australia has particular expertise, one that could

be capitalized on in the future, in intercepting North Korean drug-smuggling ships. Building up Guam as a homeport for maritime-interdiction ships could greatly strengthen these promising initiatives.<sup>34</sup>

### ***Responding to Taiwan Crises***

Tension in the Taiwan Strait deserves separate consideration here, because it will drive American basing strategy in the middle term. Taiwan is a democratic stronghold, a key trade partner, and a potential technology sieve, which could be forced to capitulate to the mainland.<sup>35</sup>

At present, U.S. military assistance is geographically far removed from Taiwan; rapidity of response depends on what forces happen to be nearby at the time. The transit time for a carrier strike group stationed on the West Coast is roughly two weeks, a week from the Indian Ocean, and approximately the same from Hawaii. If an additional carrier were forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan; or if a CVN were on station in the Pacific, or in port at Guam the transit time would be much reduced. America's ability to respond to a Taiwan Strait crisis is also constrained by political forces in the region. Although many U.S. analysts believe Taiwan could defend itself in a military engagement against China, calamitous economic damage to the island would be a virtual certainty; if the United States failed to respond effectively and early, Taipei might therefore sue for peace.

The most likely course of Chinese action against Taiwan would produce a series of ambiguous indicators that would need to be evaluated up close and early, on the basis of previous assessments of Chinese naval operations at peace and during crises. Such monitoring would be greatly facilitated by a stronger American presence in the region.

Deploying additional U.S. forces to Guam would also generally support growing U.S. interests in Asia and would most likely be far less provocative than selling additional armaments to Taiwan. A stronger American presence might also persuade Beijing to reduce the chance of crises by signing a more effective Military Maritime Agreement specifying appropriate conduct for encounters in or near territorial waters or airspace.<sup>36</sup>

### **The Quadrennial Defense Review**

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) declared that "places, not bases" are necessary to reduce the political restraints on military operations. The QDR makes a compelling case, but in the context of evolving American priorities in East Asia, a more nuanced view is possible.

Some QDR proponents contend that large fixed bases have declining military value and rising disadvantages. Certainly, bases have become increasingly susceptible to terrorism, one of many vulnerabilities that make host nations view the prospect of new U.S. bases with concern. However, this danger already applies to existing land bases, particularly in the Middle East, for which, despite efforts to improve at-sea basing, there is no substitute. But permanent land bases are important military tools during a conflict and are perhaps even more important for their political value. Two excellent examples of the political value of bases, in general, and of Guam in particular, are Joint Task Force Pacific Haven, which received and temporarily housed over 2,000 Kurdish refugees escaping Iraq after government crackdowns in 1997, and the large tent city on Guam that sheltered South Vietnamese refugees in 1973.<sup>37</sup>

Analysts have cited a growing PRC missile threat as a reason not to establish new bases anywhere in East Asia. They argue that China's CSS-3 missiles were designed to destroy facilities on Guam with a nuclear payload. China certainly has "done the math" and has made a concerted effort to acquire offensive capabilities that could be used against U.S. bases. But by this logic, American bases in Japan and Korea are even more vulnerable. As for Guam, China would not be able to trap U.S. forces there with air-to-surface-missiles or tactical nuclear weapons. Air-to-surface missiles lack the range; nuclear cruise missiles need guidance, from either the Global Positioning System or radar. The Pentagon operates GPS, and even the most sophisticated sea-borne radars have a range of approximately 200 miles, within which U.S. aircraft should be able to engage any threat.<sup>38</sup> China is working to acquire improved air-based sensors but apparently has not thus far succeeded. While Guam's target value *would* rise with infrastructure and asset improvement, Beijing knows that attacking a U.S. base—especially on sovereign territory, such as Guam—would invite a devastating American response.

All this points to the usefulness of cooperation and shared crisis response with allies without full-fledged bases. The United States could in this way address concerns in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) about the PRC's territorial claims in the South China Sea. Singapore stands out as the best example of Southeast Asian cooperation—having agreed to upgrade its port facilities to accommodate American aircraft carriers—but Thailand has been another useful partner, in such bilateral exercises as Carat, one of over 40 joint operations conducted annually. With its Utapao naval air base and Sattahip-based mine forces, Bangkok is poised to make a sustained contribution.<sup>39</sup> Finally, the Philippines has been a partner in recent training exercises and joint antiterrorism activities.

Access to infrastructure is thus the key to successful U.S. force deployment in East Asia. The United States needs access *and* infrastructure. Because there are always deficiencies, both forward presence and overlapping access rights are necessary. What is *not* needed—at least for now—is *new* bases. QDR critics underestimate the costs—political and economic—of establishing new bases. Perhaps at some point, if American troops were forced out of Korea or Japan, for instance, a new base in the region might become necessary, but under present circumstances, a new base would be neither available nor worth the cost.

Therefore, the challenge is to improve American capability to project power with minimal reliance on bases. Two major problems arise: rotating crews to forward bases, and deploying units temporarily for exercises. Crews are currently rotated from San Diego and Pearl Harbor, far from the western Pacific. The process generates logistical challenges and expense, and adds stress for the crews, who already face long and demanding deployments. Crews and objectives would be better served by more in-region training, in places like Australia and Guam; American carriers already conduct crew rotation in Singapore.

The "Sea Swap" initiative represents a good start toward a regionwide solution. In this experimental program, three crews are rotated through a single small ship, which in that way remains forward deployed for 18 months. Sea Swap saves "weeks of transit time and millions of dollars in fuel."<sup>40</sup> Keeping more larger ships in the western Pacific and flying crews in on a staggered basis could further this goal. Prerequisites, explains Lieutenant Colonel Scott Lindsey, U.S. Marine Corps, include "standardized configurations, such as an Amphibious Squadron staff that does workups in San Diego in a Landing Force Operations Center/Combined Intelligence Center that looks just like that on the ship they're going to, with all Amphibious Ready Groups the same size."<sup>41</sup> While these initiatives do not necessarily require increased basing, new infrastructure and access in the region would facilitate them.

### **Regional Political Constraints: The Need for Flexibility**

Because of the limitations of geography and politics, there are only a few potential U.S. bases in the Asia-Pacific region. Some—like the southern end of the Japanese Ryukyu Island chain near Taiwan, Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Ranai in Indonesia, or Subic Bay in the Philippines—are geographically desirable but as base locations are either domestically unpalatable, too provocative for China, or both.<sup>42</sup> Others, though well situated and politically permissible—like Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan; Pusan and Chinhae, South Korea; and Sembawang and Changi naval bases in Singapore—might be of only limited use during a crisis because of Chinese pressure or domestic constitutional issues. Still others, like Australia and Diego Garcia, are extremely flexible but are positioned too far from regional flashpoints to allow sufficiently rapid response.

These challenges have prompted analysts to consider creative operational plans. Many analysts now prefer a “portfolio approach” to basing, spreading out supply and repair facilities to maximize commanders’ flexibility in consonance with “security cooperation,” one of the basic objectives of the National Security Strategy of 2002. Old operating ideas become new again—sea basing and crew rotation have moved to the fore in order to overcome reliance on uncertain regional partners.

Formalized agreements to guarantee access to a constellation of “places, not bases” reduce the problem of overdependence.<sup>43</sup> Such ad hoc base usage has obvious advantages in the politically constrained East Asia Pacific region, but it is not fail-safe, especially in a crisis. Permanent bases act as important political tools before and during conflict; in contrast, guarantees of even limited access to foreign facilities could be nullified by outside pressure.<sup>44</sup>

Establishing new bases in East Asia would thus be the most effective U.S. option logistically, but current political and economic hurdles are so high as to make the establishment of new permanent bases impractical. Washington should not forswear such options if domestic political conditions change in potential host nations (several candidates are considered below). However, current realities bear out the QDR-driven movement toward flexible basing.

### ***Japan: Avoiding Tough Choices***

In a Taiwan crisis, resupply from Japan might not work. The U.S.-Japan alliance, despite its strengths, has limitations. Japan is in a difficult position and wants to avoid making controversial decisions. It will honor its commitments to assist American forces under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but would prefer not to become directly involved in a Taiwan crisis. Japan fears economic sanctions and even military retaliation.<sup>45</sup>

Japanese constitutional issues (and the resulting political debate) might prevent any support, particularly air refueling from Kadena Air Force Base.<sup>46</sup> Although U.S. ships and aircraft would not be constrained by such problems, the overall situation could become needlessly complicated. Defensive capability remains a gray area of the Japanese constitution and subject to interpretation. Even preparations for the adoption of TMD against the growing North Korean threat might require extensive constitutional revision.<sup>47</sup>

An issue of special sensitivity for Japan is the homeporting of U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at Yokosuka. With USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63) awaiting decommissioning, *John F. Kennedy* (CV 67) is the last conventionally powered American carrier. The United States now builds only nuclear carriers. During Iraqi Freedom the *Kitty Hawk*

battle group deployed to the Persian Gulf. The nuclear-powered *Carl Vinson* assumed responsibility for the Korean theater and made several port calls at Yokosuka. In 2003, Tokyo reportedly decided to accept a homeported U.S. nuclear carrier in the future. Given historical sensitivities, however, anti-nuclear opposition could develop political traction, making a strong fallback option in Guam all the more imperative.<sup>48</sup>

There are no significant U.S. naval assets in Okinawa, nor the possibility of any. For the Marines, Okinawa is geographically and topographically constrained; the island lacks live-fire artillery ranges and areas for tank-infantry, close air support, battalion, or regimental training.<sup>49</sup> The Sakishima Islands (the southernmost islands of the Ryukyu Group) are geographically attractive but politically challenging. An American presence there would be particularly provocative for China, given the extremely close proximity to Taiwan. Okinawans are already upset with existing U.S. bases; if not for the pressure from Tokyo, local residents would have rejected them long ago. American deployment to Okinawa is also subject to the same domestic political problems as other parts of Japan.

The bottom line is that there is a danger that U.S. regional capabilities could become excessively linked to Japanese politics. In the event of a Taiwan crisis, Washington cannot plan on Tokyo doing very much (even resupply could be contentious). By reducing the importance of Taiwan to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the United States can better safeguard the island's democracy *and* the alliance's continued strength.

### ***South Korea: Developing Domestic Dissent***

Basing in Korea has many significant disadvantages. First, Korea is relatively far from a potential Taiwan Strait conflict. Second, the Korean Peninsula is highly unstable because of uncertainty over the future of North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. Third, South Korea has growing economic interdependence with China, giving Beijing leverage. China also has great control over Pyongyang's future and thus generally serves as a "power broker" on the Korean Peninsula.<sup>50</sup>

Moreover, recent anti-American demonstrations in Seoul and increasing anti-American sentiment across East Asia suggest that the United States cannot forever count on enjoying basing rights in South Korea and Japan. The sooner that Washington begins to restructure its force deployment footprint in East Asia to address both host-country realities and emerging security threats, the more effectively the nation will be able to maintain a strong and stable presence in this vital but volatile region.

### **Access Alternatives**

The focus of naval planners regarding East Asia remains unchanged—concentration on which forces might deploy under what circumstances and why, and to what effect. But comparison of military forces alone is not decisive. Many political factors—most deriving from fear of Chinese retribution—govern the ability of the United States to intervene. Flexible engagement of U.S. forces independent of these competing political interests allows for quick action at the commencement of hostilities—or before. In a new era of defense policy, the transformation of hardware is not enough. New capabilities require new relationships.

Access alternatives need to be considered not as individual "either/or" options but as part of a comprehensive plan to improve America's presence in East Asia. The larger strategy is to prevent Washington from being surprised or politically constrained in a

crisis. The overall question to consider is: What could we do from where? The answer will take the shape of a networked, overlapping division of labor. Because it is potentially expensive and very difficult politically to realize new basing initiatives, policy makers need to hedge their bets in favor of a wide set of access agreements.

China has arguably violated Philippine sovereignty at Mischief Reef in 1994, as well as Vietnamese sovereignty in the Paracel Islands; it has disputed the status of the Senkakus of Japan; and it claims the Spratly Islands (in violation of the UN Convention III on the Law of the Sea) over the competing claims of the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Beijing would therefore find it difficult to assume the moral high ground in protesting a U.S. base in any of these nations. China does not wish to call attention to its long-term territorial ambitions in the South China Sea. Doing so could increase opposition by ASEAN nations, many of which have compelling exclusive economic zone claims that Beijing refuses to recognize by claiming the entire South China Sea for itself. And China does not want to draw America into the dispute.

*The Philippines: Partnership for Port Access.* Reestablishing a U.S. base in the Philippines might seem inviting. A powerful argument can be made that at the very least, agreement could be reached for American strategic entrée into Philippine ports. Such a “strategic partnership” could also include expanded joint exercises and access to training areas. The Philippines’ tactical significance is clear—quick access to the Taiwan Strait and, perhaps most important, a center for vital counterterrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia.

Manila is far more receptive to U.S. military forces than it was 13 years ago, and this receptivity is likely to persist. The domestic political system is also more stable. However, Manila’s position in the region is less stable. America is no longer primarily blamed for its former ally’s problems; terrorism, China, and a fragile economy are.<sup>51</sup>

President Gloria Arroyo has already accepted U.S. antiterrorism assistance and would likely approve a strategic partnership with the U.S. Navy—albeit at locations farther from politically volatile Manila than Subic Bay, which is now being developed as an economic center.<sup>52</sup>

Partnership with the U.S. Navy is in Manila’s interest.<sup>53</sup> Building on the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement by returning periodically to the Philippines would allow Washington to address Manila’s concerns without resorting to potentially controversial explicit defense commitments.

The Philippine populace is largely pro-Taiwan, and the nation’s trade with Mainland China is minimal. In 2000, 5.5 percent of Philippine imports came from Taiwan, while only 2.4 percent came from the PRC.<sup>54</sup> By contrast, the economies of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan are much more closely linked to China’s. Therefore, U.S. partnership with the Philippines is perhaps the most desirable and flexible of America’s regional options involving other nations.

However, although U.S.-Philippine military cooperation continues to broaden, domestic political resistance to a full-fledged base remains fierce. The recently concluded Military Logistics Support Agreement exemplifies this limitation. Signed on November 21, 2002, the five-year agreement “would allow U.S. forces to use the Philippines as a supply center for anti-terror and other military operations” by permitting U.S. forces “to set up storage centers for supplies such as ammunition, water and fuel as well as support and services [including] billeting, transportation, communications, and medical services.”<sup>55</sup> But the support agreement stipulates, “No U.S. military base, facility or permanent structure shall be constructed, established or allowed under the agreement.”<sup>56</sup>

It also limits American ability to improve Manila's autonomous defense capabilities, by "expressly exclud[ing] the transfer of weapons systems and nuclear ammunition."<sup>57</sup>

The Military Logistics Support Agreement furthers both American and Philippine interests, and the above difficulties are minor from the historical perspective. But for these reasons, U.S. policy makers do not now consider a Philippines base to be a realistic option.

*Vietnam: Building on Visitation.* A U.S. return to Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay for refueling and repair might have pitfalls, but it may eventually occur. American naval planners considered the bay, one of the best natural deep-water harbors in Southeast Asia, after the expiration of the Russian lease in early 2004. Though much farther from the Taiwan Strait than Subic Bay and in a country that is more susceptible to Chinese pressure than is the Philippines, Cam Ranh Bay would offer America important geostrategic diversity. Unfortunately, in 2002 a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated officially that Hanoi would not "sign any agreement with any country on using Cam Ranh port for military purposes."<sup>58</sup> On October 21, 2003, however, Hanoi approved the first U.S. naval ship visit since the Vietnam War.<sup>59</sup> Washington need not regard Hanoi's refusal as a final answer but can explore limited port access and other regional options.

*Indonesia: The Need for Independent Access.* As the 2002 Bali bombing demonstrated, Indonesia is both a strategic archipelago and an active hotspot for terrorism.<sup>60</sup> Fighting terror in Southeast Asia may hinge on controlling the waterways between Indonesia's numerous islands. At present, domestic political opinion against even an American access agreement, hostility exacerbated by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, precludes a direct U.S.-Indonesian military partnership. In any case, Indonesia's society is dangerously fragmented, and its political, military, and territorial future is uncertain; the Philippines, Vietnam, and Guam offer nearby points from which to fight terrorism and protect critical sea lanes without relying exclusively on Jakarta's cooperation or establishing U.S. facilities in Indonesia.

Increasing maritime piracy and its potential links to terrorism make it desirable to maintain a U.S. presence near the archipelago and may offer the basis for future U.S.-Indonesian and regional maritime police cooperation. Such cooperation could be combined with a regional military maritime agreement stipulating conduct during encounters and incidents at sea. By requiring that vessels adhere to a specific communications and signaling protocol during close encounters, this instrument could also facilitate distinguishing between legitimate forces' military and commercial vessels—which are vulnerable to attack—and pirate or terrorist vessels, which increasingly ply Southeast Asian sea-lanes.

*Singapore: Star of Southeast Asian Cooperation.* Singapore is in many respects the crown jewel of American port access in the region. Here the United States plays a supporting role, and it should treat Singapore with the respect due to a regional leader if it is to retain access. Singapore boasts two modern ports, Sembawang in the north and the brand-new Changi Naval Facility in the east. Sembawang is a major resupply and logistics headquarters for the Pacific Fleet. Under a U.S. Navy memorandum of understanding with the Port of Singapore Authority Sembawang and Paya Lebar Air Base, Singapore often accepts nuclear aircraft carrier battle groups, including submarines and embarked Marine Expeditionary Forces.

There are ample training areas for U.S. Marines on the western part of the island at Lim Chu Kang, and a special operations facility at Hendon Camp. Also, Paya Lebar is extensive enough to accept large naval aircraft for training and maintenance. The U.S. Navy and Air Force conduct many joint and combined operations with the Republic of Singapore Navy and Air Force. Many U.S. bombing missions over Afghanistan in 2001 passed through Paya Lebar. (Malaysia also provided overflight and refueling during Operation Enduring Freedom but is unlikely to be a full military partner in the future because of domestic political constraints).

For presence in times of peace and crisis, access to Singapore's facilities is critical for U.S. commanders. However, because of domestic political and foreign policy factors, American planners cannot count on substantial increases in available facilities or on unimpeded access in a potential crisis.

*Australia: Accessible Ally.* Australia is far from the Taiwan Strait, but the city of Darwin is closer than Pearl Harbor. Darwin is on the edge of the strategic sea-lanes of Southeast Asia. The U.S.-Australia defense alliance is stable. Canberra is open to virtually any U.S. request and would permit full-time use of a port facility in or near Darwin should Washington want it. In addition, Canberra has offered large training facilities, some in the Outback.

Washington has already started to take advantage of this opportunity. In peacetime, Task Force 70 (the USS *Kitty Hawk* battle group) periodically conducts Spring Fling in Darwin; U.S. forces use air-to-ground and mine ranges there.<sup>61</sup> "Rim of the Pacific" (RimPac) is another major joint exercise involving maritime forces from America, Australia, and other Pacific nations.<sup>62</sup> Also, Tandem Thrust, staged from Guam, is a three-week U.S. Pacific Command-sponsored annual exercise involving Australian and Canadian forces in the western Pacific.

Increased use of Australian facilities could save substantial resources by enabling personnel to train without leaving the region. Australia cannot fulfill U.S. East Asian basing needs alone but Canberra's fine performance as peacemaker and peacekeeper in such conflict zones as East Timor suggest not only its increasing role in the region, but also its potential to be the future major U.S. ally in the western Pacific.<sup>63</sup>

## Go West—To Guam

Several potential dangers could plausibly threaten American interests in East Asia; an effective response will require political and geographical diversification of the U.S. naval presence in the region, with a chain of overlapping bases and access rights. The linchpin can be a strengthened base in Guam.

To maximize its ability to deter hostility, gather information, and overcome aggression, the U.S. Navy should continue to develop Guam as a forward logistics hub. A diversified and expanded American military presence on Guam will offer maximum flexibility in times of crisis and help ensure that future contingencies—such as the rise of a belligerent China, a change in Japanese foreign policy, or a reunification of the Koreas—does not create a "missing link" in the chain of U.S. capabilities. Moving assets westward across the Pacific and maintaining a flexible and growing constellation of facilities and access rights in East Asia would keep that chain strong—and even the most determined enemies would not be able to dislodge its anchor, Guam.



## Notes

1. Cdr. Bruce H. Lindsey, USN, personal interview with Justin Mikolay, U.S. Naval Nuclear Power Training Command, Charleston, South Carolina, September 20, 2003.
2. Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack (Chairman, U.S. Naval War College Asia Pacific Studies Group), personal interview with Andrew Erickson, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., November 18, 2002.
3. For facilities and infrastructure, Capt. Clyde Villemez, USN (former Judge Advocate General, Commander, Naval Forces Marianas staff), telephone interview with the authors, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, November 25, 2002.
4. It might someday be possible to acquire rights to a small island or to create a man-made structure that would be the functional equivalent.
5. Bruce Lindsey interview.
6. Capt. Robert A. Mirick, USN (Commanding Officer, Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, California, and Assistant Chief of Staff for Weapons Navy Region Southwest), e-mail interview with Andrew Erickson, April 14, 2003.
7. "Rear Adm. Konetzni: Changing a Subculture From Inside Out," *Hawaii Navy News*, April 20, 2001, at [www.hnn.navy.mil/Archives/010420/konetzni\\_042001.htm](http://www.hnn.navy.mil/Archives/010420/konetzni_042001.htm).
8. Bureau of Naval Personnel, "Pers-42 Detailer Power Point Presentation, Slide 20," Community Status Brief, 20 September 2002, available at [www.bupers.navy.mil/](http://www.bupers.navy.mil/).
9. Capt. Wesley E. Lindsey, USN (Ret.), e-mail interview with Justin Mikolay, January 23, 2004.
10. Lt. (j.g.) Henry G. Nuzum, e-mail interview with Andrew Erickson, January 23, 2004. Henry Nuzum served as strike officer aboard USS *John S. McCain* (DDG 56), forward deployed in Yokosuka, Japan, from September 2001 through April 2003. During a 2002 deployment in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, he served as a boarding officer. He led an inspection team that ensured that merchant vessels entering and leaving Iraq were in compliance with UN sanctions. During a 2003 deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Nuzum served as Engagement Control Officer overseeing *John S. McCain's* Tomahawk strikes into Iraq.
11. James Brooke, "Guam, Hurt by Slump, Hopes for Economic Help from the Military," *New York Times*, March 10, 2003, p. A14.
12. Ibid.
13. Justin Bernier and Stuart Gold, "China's Closing Window of Opportunity," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003), p. 10.
14. Bruce Lindsey interview.
15. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Submarine Study, Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1999. Also, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Force Structure: Options for Enhancing the Navy's Attack Submarine Force*, Report GAO-02-97 (Washington, D.C.: November 2001), and U.S. Congressional Budget Office [hereafter CBO] *Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force* (Washington, D.C.: March 2002).
16. CBO, table 6, p. 33.
17. Ibid., p. 11.
18. Owen R. Coté, Jr., "The Look of the Battlefield," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, December 15, 2003, p. 72.
19. Ibid., p. 73.
20. Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 117. See also Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 11–49.
21. Carlisle A. H. Trost [Adm., USN (Ret.)], personal interview with the authors, Annapolis, Maryland, November 25, 2002.
22. See Edward Rhodes et al., "Forward Presence and Engagement: Historical Insights into the problem of 'Shaping,'" *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 25–61.

23. Scott A. Lindsey [Lt. Col., USMC (Ret.)], e-mail interview with Justin Mikolay, January 21, 2004. LtCol Lindsey most recently served in the Pentagon's Joint Forces Command and now acts as a defense consultant based in northern Virginia.
24. Philip Shenon, "Gunboat Diplomacy, 96 Model," *New York Times*, March 17, 1996, p. IV-1.
25. Mel Labrador is senior analyst for Cubic Applications, Inc., on contract for the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN). Mr. Labrador's last posting was assistant professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (1999–2000). E-mail review of draft paper, October 30, 2002.
26. Dr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, personal interview with Justin Mikolay, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, October 13, 2002.
27. Bruce Lindsey interview.
28. Nuzum interview.
29. *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995).
30. Scott Lindsey interview.
31. Ibid.
32. For an analysis of the deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles to South Korea in 1994, leading North Korea to fear a Gulf War-type invasion, see "Carrots, Sticks, and Question Marks: Negotiating the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (A)," Kennedy School of Government Case Program C18-95-1297.0 (Cambridge, Mass.: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1995).
33. Robert Rubel, telephone interview with Justin Mikolay, March 25, 2004.
34. Nuzum interview.
35. Ever since the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué acknowledged "One country, two systems" vis-à-vis China, U.S. policy makers have worked to minimize the worrying possibility that China may coerce Taiwanese reunification. U.S. diplomats, careful to minimize the potential for cross-strait conflict, still offer Taiwan conditional security assistance in hope of limiting both pro-independence rhetoric from Taiwan's political leadership and aggressive efforts toward reunification from Beijing. Even as the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act improves Taiwanese defensive arms, Washington rightly heightens naval readiness in the region should a crisis occur.
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37. Mirick interview.
38. Nuzum interview.
39. "Thailand is an important element in the Pentagon's new strategy of 'forward positioning,' establishing sites where American forces can store equipment and from which they can come and go as needed." [Globalsecurity.org](http://Globalsecurity.org), "Utapao Air Base," [www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/utapao.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/utapao.htm).
40. Daniel J. Calder, "Sea Swap Sailors Return Home," *Navy Newsstand*, February 7, 2003, [www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story\\_id=5759](http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=5759).
41. Scott Lindsey interview.
42. Angel Rabasa, "The Changing Political-Military Environment: Southeast Asia," in *The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture*, ed. Zalmay Khalilzad et al. (Washington, D.C.: Project Air Force, RAND, 2001), app. C, 2001.
43. U.S. Defense Dept., *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: 2001), available at [www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf).
44. For instance, if Vietnam offered America access to Cam Ranh Bay but was then threatened by China during a Taiwan Strait crisis, Hanoi might back down, and Washington's position could be greatly complicated.
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46. Japanese support is uncertain, given the fragility of its ruling coalition. The Komeito and Soka Gakkai parties have close ties to China and strained relations with Taiwan. In the event of a crisis, they might seek to place constraints on the operation of U.S. forces and the Japan Self-Defense Forces.
47. David Pilling, "Japan Finds Missile Defense Plans Are Difficult to Launch: Tokyo may be forced to dismantle its postwar constitution if it is to combat North Korea's ambitious nuclear program," *Financial Times*, January 16, 2004.
48. Nuzum interview.
49. Scott Lindsey interview.
50. The future of North Korea is far more important to Seoul than is the future of Taiwan; Beijing could exploit this situation as leverage in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis.
51. Abu Sayyaf terrorists continue to abduct tourists and kill Filipino soldiers, destabilizing the southern Philippines and damaging the national tourist industry. China has aggressively asserted its presence in the South China Sea, seizing what is arguably the Philippines' Mischief Reef in 1994 and denying the existence of the Philippines' 200-mile exclusive economic zone, a claim arguably supported by the UN Convention III on the Law of the Sea.
52. "American Company Conducts Study into Plans for a Dockyard at Subic Bay," *Jane's Asian Infrastructure Monthly*, January 1, 2002.
53. "Of great concern to the Philippines will be retaining a U.S. presence in the region. . . . [T]he threat posed by China has encouraged resumption of meaningful combined training and logistical support facilities through negotiation of a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) forged in 1996 and finally ratified by the Philippine senate in May 1999." "Philippines, External Affairs," *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia*, July 29, 2002.
54. Ibid.
55. Martin P. Marfil and Norman Bordadora, "New Philippine-U.S. Accord Specifies: No Bases Allowed," *Inquirer News Service*, November 22, 2002, [www.inq7.net/nat/2002/nov/22/nat\\_1-1.htm](http://www.inq7.net/nat/2002/nov/22/nat_1-1.htm).
56. "Philippines-United States: Mutual Logistics Support Agreement Signed," *Virtual Information Center*, November 22, 2002, [www.vicinfo.org/RegionsTop.nsf/81e4712fc4dc16ef8a25699f00062d91/bc511006e8d736a30a256c79006b4c0c?OpenDocument](http://www.vicinfo.org/RegionsTop.nsf/81e4712fc4dc16ef8a25699f00062d91/bc511006e8d736a30a256c79006b4c0c?OpenDocument).
57. Luz Baguioro, "Pact Allows U.S. Military to Stay in Philippines," *Straits Times Interactive*, November 21, 2002, [straitstimes.asia1.com.sg](http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg).
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59. "U.S. Navy Ship Will Visit Vietnam for First Time since the War," *Bloomberg News*, October 21, 2003, [quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer=us&sid=aP19cJA5mrZo](http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=71000001&refer=us&sid=aP19cJA5mrZo).
60. The *USS Cole* tragedy is reason for caution and careful planning but not for rejecting the idea of bases outright.
61. Bruce Lindsey interview.
62. Other participant nations include Canada, Chile, Japan, Peru, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
63. Mirick interview.