6
November 2008
Who's in Charge?
Ervand Abrahamian
- Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader
by Kasra Naji Buy this book
- The Road to Democracy in Iran by Akbar Ganji Buy this book
American
officials – without any trace of irony – label Iran as militaristic, aggressive,
expansionist, interventionist, even as hegemonic and imperialistic. The media
often echo this, depicting Iran
as a cross between the Persian Empire and the
Third Reich, aspiring to=0 Are-establish a Pax Iranica across the region. Neoconservatives go further,
claiming that Iran 'declared war' on the US in 1979; that the two are in a
'life and death struggle'; that this is World War Four (the Cold War was World
War Three); and that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is
at the head of an Islamofascist movement out to
re-create the early Caliphate.
We need to take
a reality check. Iran spends
$6 billion a year on its armed forces; Turkey
and Israel both spend more
than $10 billion, Saudi Arabia
$21 billion, and the Gulf sheikhdoms, which are not so much countries as petrol
stations, together easily outspend Iran. Meanwhile, the US pours more
than $700 billion a year into its war machine. Before the 1979 revolution, Iran allocated
as much as 18 per cent of GDP to the military; the figure is now under 3 per
cent. During his recent tour of the region, Dick Cheney offered to sell $36
billion worth of arms to Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms to counter
the Iranian threat. In a rare candid moment, a former commander of US forces in
the region admitted that Iran
was an 'ant' that could be crushed at any time.
The US and Iran do have a
real conflict of national interest – especially when national interest is
determined by the maximalists rather than the minimalists
in each country. The Bush Doctrine forthrightly declared that the US could
remain the sole superp ower
of the 21st century by, on the one hand, forestalling the rise of other world
powers, and, on the other, resorting to 'regime change' and 'pre-emptive
strikes' to prevent the emergence of regional powers that could threaten 'vital
American interests'. This set America
and Iran on a collision
course, since Iran naturally
considers the Persian Gulf to be on its doorstep, and since no interests are
more vital to the US
than oil, even if the word itself is scrupulously avoided. The Bush Doctrine
may not have been given an official funeral, but Washington
is now making it clear that it is willing to coexist with the Islamic Republic
– so long as it does not actively threaten America's vital interests by trying
to develop nuclear weapons.
Iran is not a totalitarian state: the Islamic
constitution, drafted in the early days of the revolution, is a hybrid,
combining democracy with theocracy, vox populi with vox dei, popular sovereignty with clerical authority, modern
concepts of government with Ayatollah Khomeini's notion of velayat-e
faqih (jurist's guardianship). According to
Khomeini, the clergy – in the absence of the Hidden Imam, the messiah who has yet
to return – were the true guardians of the state. After all, the sharia, or divine law, was handed down to
lead the community on the right path, and since the clergy had the expertise to
understand, interpret and implement the sharia,
it followed that they should=2 0guide the state.
The constitution
gives the clergy extensive powers. It holds that the Rahbar
(guide-leader) – known in the West as the Supreme Leader – has to be a
'suitable cleric' elected by an Assembly of Religious Experts. The Supreme Leader
has the authority not only to 'supervise' and 'guide' the republic, but also to
'determine the interests of Islam'. He appoints the commanders of the armed
forces, the director of the national radio and television network, the heads of
the major religious foundations, the prayer leaders in city mosques, and the
members of national security councils dealing with defence and foreign affairs.
He also appoints the chief judge, the chief prosecutor, special tribunals and,
with the help of the chief judge, the 12 jurists of the Guardian Council – a
glorified supreme court that can both vet electoral candidates and veto
parliamentary bills. The Guardian Council also sets examinations for candidates
to the Assembly of Religious Experts. (Reputable theologians have been known to
fail.) This assembly not only elects the Supreme Leader but can also dismiss
him on grounds of ill-health or incompetence.
The constitution
also incorporates more democratic features. The public – through secret ballots
and universal adult suffrage – has the authority to elect local councils,
parliaments and presidents, as well as the Assembly of Religious Experts. L ocal councils supervise regional administrators. Parliament
has the power to make and unmake ministers, approve government budgets,
investigate questions of national importance and impeach presidents. The
president, as chief executive officer, can choose ambassadors, provincial
governors and, with parliamentary approval, cabinet ministers.
The inherent
contradiction between theocracy and democracy was held in check in the years
when Iran was fighting Iraq and the
charismatic Khomeini dominated the national scene. But the end of the war in
1988 and Khomeini's death a year later paved the way for open competition between
the two wings of the revolutionary movement. The new Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, lacked Khomeini's charisma and clerical standing
– he had been hastily elevated to the rank of ayatollah. Under Khomeini he had
been head of the clerical 'commissar' network inside the armed forces, and an
eloquent and intellectually inclined preacher of Friday sermons at Tehran University.
Khamenei has managed to some extent to continue his
predecessor's policy of balancing one group against another, and making sure
that no single side gains too much power. On becoming Supreme Leader, he put
away his pipe – which smacked too much of the Western intellectual – and
cultivated the clerics who administer the major religious foundations,
especially in the seminaries of Qom
and his home city, Mashhad.
Under him, the regime resembles a clerical oligarchy more than an autocrac y. Maximalists consider
the Islamic Republic a transitional stage on the path towards a full imamate,
in which the Supreme Leader will rule as the sole representative of the Hidden
Imam. Minimalists – often identified as 'reformists' in the West – hope that
the republic will eventually become more democratic as a result of popular
pressure, with the Supreme Leader acting as a figurehead.
In the 1990s,
the minimalists, led by President Mohammad Khatami,
won landslide victories in local, presidential and parliamentary elections.
They promptly passed more than a hundred reform bills, some of which explicitly
contradicted basic concepts in the conventional interpretations of the sharia. They eliminated legal distinctions between
Muslims and non-Muslims, and between men and women. They also raised the
marriageable age; stipulated the equal division of property between divorced
couples; ratified the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (a declaration too radical for the US Congress to
consider); introduced jury trials; strengthened the constitutional ban on
torture by defining sleep deprivation and solitary confinement as torture; set
up a press court to protect newspapers from the conservative judiciary; and,
most daring of all, tried to strip the Guardian Council of the power to vet
electoral candidates. There was even talk of a national referendum aimed at
trimming the powers of the unelected bodies.
Some reformers,
such as Akbar Ganji, a
former revolutionary guard commander turned dissident, and Abdulkarim
Soroush, a leading 'Muslim intellectual', went even
further, arguing that politics and religion belong to different realms and that
the latter should be confined to matters to do with personal ethics and
beliefs. Not surprisingly, conservatives objected, accusing these reformers of
being secularists trying to smuggle in the French Enlightenment under the
pretence of bringing about a Protestant reformation within Islam.
The electoral
landscape, however, shifted drastically early this decade. It did so in part
because Khatami failed to deliver on his promises: the conservatives in the
Guardian Council vetoed many of his reform bills, and he feared that to cross
them would provoke retaliation from the revolutionary guards. But the biggest
cause of the shift was Bush, wh0 in 2002 named Iran
as a member of his Axis of Evil, even though Tehran
had just helped the US
overthrow the Taliban and instal Karzai
in Kabul. This
blow was compounded in 2003, when the Bush administration, riding high after
its quick victory over Saddam, contemptuously dismissed an Iranian offer to
strike a 'grand bargain'. Although the White House denied it, leaks from the
State Department – as well as from the Iranian Foreign Office – confirm that Iran offered to accept additional nuclear
inspections, to help stabilise Iraq,
co-operate in tracking down al-Qaida, and use its
influence to moderate the activities of Hamas and Hizbullah. In return, Tehran
sought guarantees that the US
would accept Iran
as a Gulf power and give up its policy of regime change. In Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader, Kasra Naji provides a detailed
and informative account of the decline of the reform movement, though he tends
to underestimate the inadvertent role played by the Bush administration. Most
observers would agree with Khatami that the White House helped to pull the rug
from under the reformers. Once Washington
refused the bargain, Tehran,
not surprisingly, tried to save face by denying it had ever been offered.
With the
reformers disillusioned and in disarray, Ahmadinejad – the former mayor of Tehran – won the
presidency in 2005. He promised to stand tall against American 'arrogance'
(Khomeini had substituted this term for the Marxist-sounding 'imperialism'), to
strengthen national security, redistribute wealth, eradicate unemployment, pay
due respect to war veterans, and, in general, revive the self-sacrificing
spirit of the Islamic Revolution. For Khatami, the history of Iran had been
'the struggle for democracy'. For Ahmadinejad, it was the struggle to establish
'true' Islam. On the eve of the ballot, Bush helped Ahmadinejad by dismissing
Iranian elections as meaningless. This energised Ahmadinejad's
core constituency – around 25 per cent of the electorate – of war veterans, revolutionar y guards and the truly devout, many of whom
came from the ranks of the urban poor. In the first round, reformers either
stayed at home or split their vote between competing liberal candidates. In the
second round, faced with a choice between Ahmadinejad and the former president,
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani,
who epitomised the establishment, even more stayed at home, especially
professionals and college-educated women. Ahmadinejad won more by default than
because of a genuine shift in public opinion.
Since his
election, Ahmadinejad has taken every opportunity to revive the rhetoric of
1979. But there are limits to his power: he heads the cabinet, but can't pick
his ministers. He holds office for four years, but then must be re-elected, and
spiralling inflation has jeopardised his chances of getting back in next year.
What's more, although he has access to the Supreme Leader, he is far from being
his only adviser. Khamenei also takes advice from
reformers such as Khatami; from foreign ministry experts, many of whom are
moderate conservatives; and from Rafsanjani, the consummate pragmatic
conservative. Although Rafsanjani lost to Ahmadinejad, he remains the country's
second most powerful politician. He chairs the Assembly of Religious Experts as
well as the Council of Expediency, which has the authority to resolve
differences between the three branches of government. Also, as a founding
member of the Islamic Republic and one of Khomeini's closest advisers, he has a
wide network among the generation that made the Revolution.
Ahmadinejad has
used the bully pulpit to resurrect Khomeini's famous slogan, 'The US can't do a
damn thing'; this appears more apt now that the 'Great Satan' is ensnared in
the Iraqi (and Afghan) hell. He has argued that Israel lacks the capability to
strike Iran on its own and insinuated that any such strike would increase his
influence rather than cause him irreparable damage.He
has revived Khomeini's mantra that Israel should never have been established,
and reversed Khatami's position that Iran would
accept a two-state solution if that was agreeable to the Palestinians. To top
it all, he has doubted the reality of the Holocaust and sponsored with much
fanfare an 'international conference' in Tehran
on the topic. This raised as many eyebrows in Iran as in the West. As Naji remarks, 'what he could not see was that by playing
the Holocaust card he was making the American and Israeli hostility to Iran
appear reasonable and justifiable.' The rhetoric, however, helps him
consolidate his electoral base.
He has also used
parades to show off missiles, with the clear intention of sending a message
that they could be aimed at Israel.
Even if these missiles have dubious capabilities, such events allow the regime
to boast of its military prowess to its own citizens. They also provide the
Western media with a perfect opportunity to depict the regime as an
international threat. Ahmadinejad has reversed the adage 'speak softly but
carry a big stick.' He has exaggerated the progress of Iran's nuclear
programme and promised to share nuclear knowledge with other 'Muslim states'.
He sees the nuclear issue as a game of chicken, describing Iran's nuclear
programme as a car with no brakes and no reverse gear speeding down a one-way
street. What is more, he has sent 'inspirational' letters – in the tradition of
Khomeini and the Prophet – to world leaders. The letter to Angela Merkel describes
Germany
as an innocent victim of World War Two. As Naji
shows, such sentiments derive not only from belligerence but from Ahmadinejad's lack of familiarity with the outside world.
His
pronouncements have caused consternation among reformers, moderates and even
conservatives in Iran.
They realise that such statements provide ammunition for neoconservatives in
Washington, isolate Iran from Europe, and prevent access to the technology
needed to develop the country's substantial gas reserves (Western oil companies
have a monopoly over the technology). These untapped reserves could enable Iran to solve
its main long-term problem: creating work for the ever increasing number of
graduates. In the last thirty years, it has made substantial progress in
improving the standard of living, expanding the educational system, lowering
infant mortality, raising life expectancy and bringing electricity, medical
clinics and running water to the countryside. In=2 0the next decades, Iran will need
a substantial infusion of investment and technology to consolidate these
successes.
The decline of
the neocons could well sharpen the differences
between the minimalist and maximalist wings in Tehran. Both remain
highly suspicious of America,
and both are determined to preserve the Islamic Republic, t0 make Iran a consequential power in the region and to
pursue the country's interests, whether over Chechnya,
Kosovo and Afghanistan,
or in the war between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan. What is more,
both wings are equally committed to harnessing nuclear energy, in part for
national prestige – more than 90 per cent of the public supports the programme
– and in part because it would enable them quickly to produce nuclear weapons
in an emergency. For most Iranians, whatever their political leanings,
the formative crisis in recent years was the failure of the
international community to object when Saddam Hussein used chemical and
biological weapons against Iranian troops. The US
facilitated the Europeans as well as the Chinese and Russians in selling these
weapons to Iraq and then,
when Iraq used them, the US spread the lie that Iran was the culprit; it even claimed that Iran was using
these weapons on its own troops to curry international sympathy. This belief in
Iran's
right to nuclear power is held even by Akbar Ganji, who stands far to the left of most minimalists. In The
Road to Democracy in Iran, he writes: 'In dealing with the Muslim world, or
other non-Western countries, the West must avoid policies that betray a double
standard – for instance, ignoring Israel's
nuclear bombs while insisting that Iran does not even have the right
to enrich uranium for nuclear power.'
The nuclear
issue, however, creates a significant difference between minimalists and maximalists. The former would like to proceed as they have
done in the last two decades. They would like to develop the programme slowly,
thus gaining the knowledge and equipment needed to produce weapons in the long
term. In nuclear parlance, this is known as the Japanese option. Some thirty
countries have this option, and it has probably been Iran's unstated
goal for the last twenty years. It would be in the national interest to have
the capability to build a bomb; it would not be in the national interest to
have a bomb. On the contrary, that would damage national security because it
would prompt the US (or Israel) to
attack. In the past the US
has been adamant that Iran
should not even have the capability.
The danger now
is that maximalists like Ahmadinejad may be tempted
by the American debacle in Iraq
to up the nuclear pace, threaten to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
and try to gatecrash the nuclear arms club. Possession of a bomb or two would
flatter the national ego and give the false impression that Ira n is a real
counterweight to Israel and
the US
with their huge arsenal of nuclear weapons. However, it would certainly
alienate Europe, make Israel even more paranoid, lead the US to tighten
sanctions, and could even prompt air strikes, though that would in the long run
make America's task in Iraq and Afghanistan even more impossible. The
minimalists, meanwhile, are increasingly alarmed. Although Khamenei
shares Ahmadinejad's anti-Israeli and anti-American
stance, it isn't clear he would be willing to risk serious US retaliation.
Meanwhile, both
sides appear oblivious to the resemblances between the two presidents. Bush
entered the White House as a 'compassionate conservative', representing
'ordinary folk', distancing himself from the 'Beltway', and describing Jesus Christ
as his favourite 'philosopher', while Ahmadinejad came in as a 'principalist' conservative, promising populist measures and
a return to revolutionary values, criticising establishment figures such as
Rafsanjani, and claiming to feel the actual presence of the Hidden Imam. Bush
knew that to enter the White House he had to reach beyond his evangelical
electoral base; Ahmadinejad realised that to win he had to court those outside
his 'fundamentalist' constituency as well as discourage reformers from voting.
Neither Bush nor Ahmadinejad would have won office without a helping hand from
their supreme courts. Bush cut taxes; Ahmadinejad travels around the country
handing out cash. Ahmadinejad spends time in cabinet meetings mappin g out boulevards to prepare for the return of the
Hidden Imam; the Bush administration spent time assuring supporters that Israel's withdrawal from Gaza would not delay the inevitable return of
the Messiah. As Iran and the
US enter crucial
negotiations in the months to come we can only hope that politicians with a
firmer grip on reality will be in power in both Tehran
and Washington.
Ervand Abrahamian's History of Modern Iran came out in July.