Suicide Terrorism: Rationalizing the Irrational
Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 8 (August 2004)
by Julian Madsen
Introduction
The murderous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon re-awakened
the world to the devastating effects of suicide terrorism.[1]
Since the attacks on New York and Washington, these apparently random
and fanatical acts of violence have swept the globe from Rabat to Islamabad
to Jakarta. To date, more than twenty countries have been directly affected
by the phenomena of suicide terrorism.[2]
Yet, this lethal and deadly form of warfare long predates the events
of September 11. Indeed, contrary to popular perceptions, suicide terrorism
is neither a recent phenomena nor is it steeped in religious fervour.
Similarly, the preponderance to associate suicide terrorism as something
that is somehow unique to Islam or the Middle East is wrong; the perpetrators
and organizers of suicide bombings transcend all religious and cultural
traditions. Suicide terrorism has and continues to be employed by religious
and secular groups alike. Its utility is the outcome of crude cost-benefit
analysis; representing the most efficient manner a terrorist organization
can inflict maximum damage whilst incurring the least cost. Put simply,
suicide terrorism represents "value for money"; it is brutally
efficient, cheap, and until recently, has been easy to organize. This
"strategic logic"[3] and the inherent
rationalism of organizations such as al Qaeda, Hamas, and the Tamil
Tigers in employing suicide terrorism, underscores that the perpetrators
are neither irrational nor crazed individuals.
Suicide Terrorism Then and Now
Human history is replete with acts of martyrdom for political and religious
reasons. In the first century A.D., the Zealots and Sicarii, two Jewish
sects, attacked the Roman occupiers of Judea and their allies in public
places with full knowledge that they would be killed themselves. The
Assassins, a cult active in modern Iran and Syria, from the 11th to
the 13th centuries killed their targets at close range and with little
escape routes, seriously threatening the governments of several states.[4]
In the mid-18th century, other groups carried out suicidal attacks against
colonial rule in India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Later, at the
end of the 19th century, Russian anarchists attacked members and upholders
of the Tsarist regime with explosives, killing themselves and their
victims.
In World War II, Japanese Kamikaze "Divine Wind" pilots participated
in suicide attacks against American ships in the Pacific. In the Battle
of Okinawa (April 1945), some 2,000 Kamikaze pilots rammed fully fuelled
planes into more than 300 ships. 5,000 Americans were killed (alongside
the 2000 Kamikaze) in the most costly naval battle in American history.
Researchers of the Kamikaze point out that these individuals were not
suicidal, but rather viewed self-sacrifice as the ultimate enemy against
a powerful enemy.
Over a quarter of a century later, ongoing political stability in the
Middle East saw the revival of martyrdom operations. Hizbullah is believed
to have been behind the devastating attacks against U.S. and French
forces in Lebanon in October 1983, which caused 300 deaths. Indeed,
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seemed to have emulated
Hizbullah's tactics with even more brutality. The New
York Times reported that up until 2002 the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have "dispatched more suicide bombers than
anyone in the world," including Hamas, with more than 220 suicide
bombs attributed to the organization.[5] The
LTTE has directed its attacks primarily against the highest Sri Lankan
and Indian political and military personnel. It is the only organization
that succeeded in killing two heads of state, former Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and Sri Lankan president Prendesa in 1993.
In Turkey, the Marxist-Nationalist Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) has
carried out a total of fourteen suicide attacks against a range of targets.
Its campaign started in June 1996 at time when the organization was
facing heavy military setbacks in the southeast of the country. Suicide
attacks were seen as one way to tilt the playing field in its favor.
So what we can see is that suicide terrorism in all its shades, has
been employed for many years, and has intermittently been used by secular
and religious groups alike, regardless of ethnic origin. It is an attractive
modus operandi to terrorists for a variety of reasons including:
Heavy casualties
Suicide attacks result in many casualties and cause extensive damage.
From 1980 to 2001, suicide attacks worldwide reportedly represented
only 3 percent of all terrorist attacks but accounted for 48 percent
of the total deaths due to terrorism.[6] In
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, martyrdom operations carried out between
2000 and 2002 caused about 44 percent of all Israeli casualties, despite
only representing 1 percent of the total number of attacks during the
period.[7] Underscoring its importance, former
Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi of Hamas described the attacks as the
most important "strategic weapon" of the Palestinian resistance.[8]
Another advocate, Dr. Ramadan Shalah, secretary-general of the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad summarised its utility as follows:
Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and
its army is trained to a very high standard
We have nothing with
which to repel the killing and thuggery against us except the weapon
of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives
human bombs
cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs.[9]
It remains by and large a weapon of the "weak" vis-à-vis
a much stronger and superior enemy. The case of the Kamikaze is illuminating.
Japan only started to employ them in November 1944 towards the end of
the war when the tide was turning against them.
Media Coverage
The perpetrating organization is able to capitalize on widespread media
coverage that the suicide attack attracts. The fate of the bomber or
martyr is part of the story, and the large number of victims, again,
ensures public attention. Since the gruesome effect of the violence
is intended to be impressed upon an audience, the shocking nature of
the attack is part of the calculation. The media coverage conveys an
image of extreme discipline, dedication, and skill on behalf of the
terrorists in carrying out such an audacious and incomprehensible act.[10]
This conversely instills a feeling of fear and helplessness amongst
the target population in the face of a supposed invisible and unstoppable
enemy.
No escape plan required
From an operational perspective, suicide terrorism is appealing, as
the terrorist organization doesn't have to plan an escape route, which
is often the most complicated part of the plan. There is a great risk
of the group being exposed if an individual terrorist is apprehended.
Following the Madrid atrocity, when Spanish police raided an apartment
block to detain others in connection with the attacks, the four terrorists
inside the building blew themselves up, rather than being captured,
and having to assist police in their enquiries. Similarly, Tamil Tigers
rebels have traditionally carried one cyanide pill, which they can swallow
in the event of imminent capture.
Optimum efficiency
An additional tactical advantage of martyrdom operations over conventional
terrorist tactics is the guarantee that the attack will be carried out
at the most appropriate time and place with regard to the terrorists'
objectives. This ensures the maximum number of casualties, which most
likely would not be achieved via other means such as the use of a remote
controlled charge or timer bomb. Similarly, it is extremely difficult
to counter suicide attacks once the terrorist is on way to the target.
Even if the terrorist is apprehended, the explosive device can still
be detonated.
Cost effectiveness
Suicide attacks are cheap with the bomb ingredients widely available,
as they also fill a civilian use. One Palestinian official's prescription
for a successful mission includes:
A willing young man
nails, gunpowder, a light switch and a short
cable, mercury (readily obtainable from thermometers), acetone
The
most expensive item is transportation to an Israeli town. The total
cost is about $150.[11]
Again, underscoring its brutal efficiency, 250 marines were killed
by a single suicide bomber in October 1983 in Lebanon, a single driver
ploughed his truck into a makeshift army camp in Sri Lanka in 1987,
killing 40 soldiers. More recently in Bali, over two hundred tourists
died at the hands of two bombers, while on September 11, nearly three
thousand died at the hands of just nineteen hijackers. Murder on this
scale is unlikely to have been achieved by conventional terrorist means.
Legitimacy and recruitment
Terrorist organisations are able to benefit from the death of a member,
conferring a sense of legitimacy on it. The message is one of no going
back. The group glorifies the act, infusing a culture of martyrdom that
may include posters, songs, and flyers, and in doing so seeks to inspire
others to join its ranks.Indeed, even before the bomber has struck,
he is in many ways a living martyr. The story of Murad is fairly typical.
Before undertaking the martyrdom operation, he was photographed in heroic
poses and video recorded himself explaining his reasoning behind becoming
a martyr. After these events, Murad wrote letters to his family and
friends, explaining to them his aspirations of martyrdom. Merari explains,
"There is no return for him without really losing any self-respect,
the respect of others, but also because his mental state is already
focused on killing himself, on being dead."[12]
This process of conditioning can be found in other groups, too. Typically,
members of the LTTE have their last meal with their leader, Velupillai
Prabhakaran. The Tamil Tigers have gone so far as to actually film some
of the suicide attacks for recruitment and motivation.[13]
The pervasive use of martyrdom operations amongst the Tamil Tigers have
shown that suicide terrorism is not a purely religious phenomenon and
"that under certain extreme political and psychological circumstances,
secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom."[14]
Among Palestinian children, there has been an increased tendency to
idolize suicide bombers. A recent report cited 25 percent of Palestinian
boys between the ages of 12-17 wanted to become suicide bombers.[15]
Dr. Eyad Serraj, a psychiatrist in the Gaza Strip, claims that in the
children's minds, the life of a martyr is one of power and glory.
Palestinian society glorifies the martyr. They are elevated to the
levels of saints and even prophets. Out of the hopelessness and the
inhuman environment they live in, there is the promise that they will
have a better life in heaven.[16]
The ensuing retaliation following a suicide bombing also benefits the
terrorist organization as it further increases a person's sense of victimization
and readiness to behave according to the doctrines and policies of the
organization. This radicalization of opinion increases both supply and
demand for martyrdom operations. In many cases, Hamas and Islamic Jihad
have actually recruited future suicide bombers at the charged processions
of funerals and public commemorations.
Market Share
In some cases, the decision to deploy martyrs reflects the organizations
competition for market share.[17] Mia Bloom
argues that during the deadlock in the peace process in 1996-99, as
Palestinian public support for martyrdom operations rose, Hamas and
Islamic Jihad sought to increase such attacks to augment their own profiles
at the expense of the Palistinian Authority.[18]
Martyrdom operations are so ubiquitous that they have become bases of
mobilization for the organizations that employ it. Since the second
Intifada (September 2000), the number of organizations using the tactic
has proliferated. New groups, as well as older groups who previously
eschewed the tactic, have become the norm. Secular organizations, the
PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), the DFLP (Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
(linked to the secular Fatah organization) are now competing with the
Islamists to capture the Palestinian imagination. All groups now vie
to claim responsibility for the next attack, with the New
York Times reporting, "Several Palestinians groups rushed
forward to claim responsibility for the bus bombing- an indication of
the competition among Palestinians for militant credibility." [19]
This incident saw at least four organizations separately claim responsibility
for the attacks, demonstrative of the competitive nature of the 'martyrdom
business'.
Human Rights Watch also reported the ascension of suicide bombings
by the al Aqsa Brigade as attributable to Fatah's fears that it was
losing political ground to the Islamists. "When the al Aqsa Brigades
started [martyrdom operations], it was the decisions of all districts
the
political leaders feared they would lose their influence in the street."
[20]
Financial rewards
Financial rewards for the individual and groups carrying out suicide
attacks can also be significant. A Saudi telethon reportedly raised
more than $100 million for the al-Quds
(Jerusalem) Intifada following a string a suicide attacks against the
Israeli occupation. Payments and other benefits have also been given
to individual families of dead Palestinian martyrs. Prior to the collapse
of the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein's Baathist party paid $10,000-25,000
per martyr in the Palestinian territories, underscoring the institutionalization
of suicide bombing.[21] Similarly, the Tamil
Tigers receive substantial funds from the 800,000 Tamils living abroad
in Australia, Canada, and Europe who have sent as much as $150 million
annually.[22]
The Role of Women
Increasingly, we have seen more women being used for suicide missions.
Nationalist groups such as the LTTE, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist
Party, and the Kurdish PKK (People Workers Party) have employed women
in martyrdom operations. However, it wasn't until 2002 that the Islamic
group Hamas first employed a woman. A pragmatic decision in light of
the effectiveness of the Israeli security forces identifying suicide
bombers.
The popularity of using women in martyrdom operations can be explained
by "the gentle sex" attracting less suspicion than men do.
Similarly, there is reluctance in many societies to physically search
women. In many cases women can often hide explosives while appearing
pregnant. Abd al-Rantisi of Hamas echoed these sentiments when he stated,
"There is no reason that the perpetration of suicide attacks should
be monopolized by men." [23]
Women have participated in about 30-40 percent of the LTTE's overall
suicide activities, with a female suicide bomber killed Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. In 1999, another bomber from the LTTE's
specialist suicide brigade,The Black Tigers, blew herself up at an election
rally wounding Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga and killing
twenty-three others. Among the PKK, about two-thirds of the attacks,
eleven of fourteen, have been undertaken by women.[24]
Female suicide bombers are similarly frequent actors in the Russian-Chechnyan
conflict. Aside from the theatre seizure in Moscow, in June 2003 a Chechen
female suicide bomber blew herself up on a bus carrying Russian troops
to Chechnya, killing sixteen soldiers.[25]
Conclusion
Organizations will continue to employ martyrdom operations in the face
of stronger and more powerful enemies. The challenge is to remove the
conditions of conflict that foster such acts. Peace talks between the
Sri Lankan government and Tamil Tigers have seen the cessation of such
attacks. However, events in the Middle East remain deeply worrisome.
In the absence of a settlement in either Iraq or Palestine, such violence
is likely to continue. Unless there is substantial and sustained global
engagement that delivers peace and justice, the bloodletting associated
with these conflicts will continue to supply groups such as al Qaeda
and allies with volunteers prepared for martyrdom.
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References
1. The most deadly suicide attack until then had been the two bombings
against U.S. and French army barracks in Lebanon on October 23, 1983,
which killed 241 U.S. marines and 58 French soldiers.
2. These include Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, Croatia, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia Saudi Arabia,
Sri Lanka, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States
and Yemen. Although to date suicide terrorism hasn't been employed on
the British mainland, I have included the United Kingdom in this list
because two Britons were amongst the perpetrators of a suicide bombing,
claimed by Hamas in Israel. There is also the recent incident in which
the Colombian secret police, the DAS, arrested a guerrilla of the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) who had allegedly been setting up a
cell of suicide bombers.
3. This term was coined by Robert Pape of the University of Chicago
in his work, "The
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American
Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343-361.
4. David Rapport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious
Traditions," American Political Science
Review (April 1984): 664.
5. Celia W. Dugger, "After Ferocious Fighting, Sri Lanka Struggles
with Peace", New York Times, April
8, 2002.
6. Robert Pape, "Strategic Logic of Suicide Terror," 143.
7. Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second
Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism 26(2003): 65-92.
8. Abd al-Aziz Rantisi on "Al Jazeera This Morning," Al
Jazeera (Doha), May 20, 2002.
9. Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," Foreign
Policy 120 (September/October 2000): 66-74.
10. M. Taarnby, Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists,
Center for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus (November 27, 2003):
8.
11. Scott Atran, "Genesis of suicide terrorism," Science
299, no. 5612 (March 7, 2003): 1537.
12. 60 Minutes, "Mind
of the Suicide Bomber," CBS News,
May 25, 2003.
13. Amy Waldman, "Masters of Suicide Bombing: Tamil Guerrillas
of Sri Lanka," The New York Times,
January 14, 2003, A1.
14. Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," 69.
15. Amal Shahda, Al Wasat 635 (March
29 2004): 4.
16. Ilene Prusher, "As
life looks bleaker, suicide bombers get younger," Christian
Science Monitor (March 5 2004).
17. Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: the Global Phenomenon
of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
18. Ibid, 13.
19. New York Times, July 17, 2002, A1.
20. "Erased
in A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians,"
Human Rights Watch (October 2002), 29.
21. "Palestinian
gets Saddam funds," BBC News,
March 13 2003.
22. Bruce Hoffman, "The
Logic of Suicide Terrorism," The Atlantic
Monthly (June 2003): 61.
23. "The
Role of Palestinian Women in Suicide Bombing, " Israel Minsitry
of Foreign Affairs, January 2003.
24. Dogu Ergil, "Suicide Terrorism in Turkey: the Workers Party
of Kurdistan," in Countering Suicide Terrorism,
the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary
Center Herzliya, in cooperation with Anti-Defamation League, 2001.
25. For more information on the participation of women in martyrdom
operations, see Clara Beyler, "Messengers
of Death Female Suicide Bombers," Febuary 12, 2003. Ehud Sprinzak,
"Rational Fanatics." Y. Fighel, "Palestinian
Islamic Jihad and Female Suicide Bombers," October 6, 2003.
Audrey Cronin, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks,
CRS Report for Congress, August 2003:
1-14.
About the Author
Julian Madsen received his BA (Hons) in Political Science and Arabic
Studies from the University of Melbourne, Australia. He has obtained
an MA (International Relations) from Deakin University. Mr. Madsen has
been published in numerous journals including the Journal
of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies, Middle East Quarterly
(Australian edition) and the Melbourne Journal
of Politics.
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