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7	l .	WASHINGTON SUPERIOR COURT
9	STATE OF WASHINGTON,	NO.
10	Plaintiff,	COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE
11	v.	AND ADDITIONAL RELIEF UNDER THE UNFAIR BUSINESS
12	DIGITAL ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a <u>Movieland.com</u> , a California	PRACTICESCONSUMER PROTECTION ACT AND THE
13	Corporation; ALCHEMY COMMUNICATIONS, INC., a	COMPUTER SPYWARE ACT
14	California Corporation;	
15	ACCESSMEDIA NETWORKS, INC., a Delaware Corporation;	
16	INNOVATIVE NETWORKS, INC., a California Corporation; EASTON A.	
17	HERD, individually and on behalf of his marital community; and ANDREW	
18 19	M. GARRONI, individually and on individually and on behalf of his marital	
20	community,	
21	Defendants.	
22		
23	COMES NOW, Plaintiff, State of	Washington ("the State" or "Plaintiff"), by and
24	through its attorneys Rob McKenna, Attorney General; and Paula Selis, Senior Counsel, and	
25	brings this action against Defendants nam	ed herein. The State alleges the following on
26	information and belief:	

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I. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 Plaintiff, State of Washington, brings this action pursuant to RCW 19.270, the Computer Spyware Act ("Spyware Act"). Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and other equitable relief, including damages and attorneys' costs and fees, based on violations of the Spyware Act.
- 1.2 Plaintiff, State of Washington, also brings this action pursuant to RCW 19.86, the Unfair Business Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("Consumer Protection Act"). Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction and other equitable relief, including damages, civil penalties, and attorneys' costs and fees, based on violations of the Consumer Protection Act.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 2.1 This Complaint is filed and these proceedings are instituted under the provisions of RCW 19.86, the Unfair Business Practices--Consumer Protection Act, and RCW 19.270, the Computer Spyware Act.
- **2.2** Jurisdiction of the Attorney General to commence this action is conferred by RCW 19.86.080 and RCW 19.270.060.
- 2.3 The violations alleged herein have been and are being committed in whole or in part in King County, in the State of Washington, by Defendants named herein or their agents.

III. PLAINTIFF

3.1 Plaintiff, State of Washington, is authorized by RCW 19.86.080 to enjoin violations of the Consumer Protection Act, to obtain restitution on behalf of persons harmed by such violations, and to obtain such further and other relief as the Court may deem appropriate, including civil penalties and attorneys' fees. Pursuant to RCW 19.270.060, the Computer Spyware Act, Plaintiff is authorized to seek recovery for actual monetary loss or damages of up to \$100,000 per violation of RCW 19.270 on behalf of the residents of the State of Washington, and to obtain such further and other relief as the Court may deem appropriate, including treble damages and costs and attorneys' fees.

IV. DEFENDANTS

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4.1 Defendant Digital Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter "Digital Enterprises") is a

California corporation that has registered with the California Secretary of State a mail drop of

23705 Vanowen Street #119, West Hills, CA 91307-3030 as its principle place of business. It

has also transacted business at 6300 Canoga Ave, 15th Floor, Woodland Hills, California.

Defendant transacts or has transacted business in the state of Washington.

4.2 Defendant Alchemy Communications, Inc. (hereinafter "Alchemy") is a

- **4.2** Defendant Alchemy Communications, Inc. (hereinafter "Alchemy") is a California corporation with its principal place of business at 1200 W. 7th Street, #L1-100, Los Angeles, 90017. It also transacts or has transacted business at 6300 Canoga Ave., 15th Floor, Woodland Hills, California. Defendant transacts or has transacted business in the state of Washington.
- **4.3** Defendant AccessMedia Networks, Inc. (hereinafter "AccessMedia") is a Delaware corporation that has registered its place of business with the California Secretary of State as 8646 Edwin Drive, Los Angeles, California 90046. Defendant transacts or has transacted business in the state of Washington.
- 4.4 Defendant Innovative Networks, Inc. (hereinafter "Innovative Networks") is a California corporation that transacts or has transacted business through a mail drop address located at 20841 Ventura Boulevard, #357, Woodland Hills, California 91634. Defendant transacts or has transacted business in the state of Washington.
- 4.5 Defendant Easton A. Herd is now, and has been at all times relevant to this action, the sole officer of Digital Enterprises, Inc. In this role, he has formulated, controlled, directed, and participated in the policies, practices, and activities set forth in this Complaint. Defendant Herd resides at 10960 Ashton Avenue, Apt. 303, Los Angeles, CA 90024-4863. Defendant is married to Jane Doe Herd, and together they constitute a marital community. All actions taken by Defendant as alleged in the Complaint herein are for the benefit of his marital community. Defendant transacts or has transacted business in the state of Washington.

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4.6 Defendant Andrew M. Garroni is now, and has been at all times relevant to this action, an officer or director of Defendant Alchemy. In this role, he has formulated, controlled, directed, and participated in the policies, practices, and activities set forth in this Complaint. Defendant resides at 8646 Edwin Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90046. Defendant is married to Catherine Garroni, and together they constitute a marital community. All actions taken by Defendant as alleged in the Complaint herein are for the benefit of his marital community. Defendant transacts or has transacted business in the state of Washington.

V. NATURE OR TRADE OF COMMERCE

- 5.1 Defendants operate an Internet business that sells a subscription-based This business has had various Web domain names, including entertainment service. "movieland.com" and "moviepass.tv" and "popcorn.net." The service includes video files, movie clips, Internet shopping information, Hollywood entertainment reviews, and adult content. Defendants charge between \$85.00 and \$99.00 for an annual subscription, and between \$19.95 and \$34.95 for a monthly subscription depending on the method of payment chosen. As a promotion for their service, Defendants advertise an offer for three days of free access to their members-only content. The advertisement is delivered through a pop-up that appears while the user is on the Internet. Users must download Defendants' software in order to take advantage of this offer. Defendants require users to cancel the service by means of their customer service page on their Web site within the three-day trial period. Defendants' service supposedly uses software called a "download manager," that, once installed on a computer, will allow access to Defendants' download service. Defendants have identified the download manager (the software that supposedly facilitates consumers' access to Defendants' Internet download service) by various names, including "MediaPipe," "FileGrabber" and "Media Assistant."
- 5.2 Installation of Defendants' download manager is merely a smokescreen concealing Defendants' true purpose: to install software and other files onto consumers'

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computers that enable Defendants to launch pop-up windows on consumers' computers demanding payments to Defendants. These pop-up windows, which display both textual and audiovisual payment demands, significantly disrupt consumers' use of their computers. They redisplay again and again. To get these aggressive and persistent pop-ups to stop appearing, many consumers give into Defendants' unfair tactics, and pay Defendants.


- 5.3 To ensure that consumers cannot free their computers from the pop-up payment demands, Defendants install programs and computer code that prevent consumers from using reasonable means to uninstall Defendants' software.
- **5.4** Defendants are in competition with others in the State of Washington engaged in similar business.

VI. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Taking Control of a User's Computer in Violation of the Spyware Act and the Consumer Protection Act

- 6.1 Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1.1 through 5.4 and incorporates them herein as if set forth in full.
- 6.2 Defendants promote their paid service by offering users three days of free access to the members-only content of their online entertainment service. Defendants advertise the offer through pop-ups that appear while the user is on the Internet. The pop-ups tell users that there are "no forms to fill out," "no email (is) required," "3000 XXX movies" are available and that "no credit card is required to begin the free trial."
- 6.3 The button which users must click to obtain the "free" service is situated above any disclosure regarding the terms of the service. The user may simply click on the button, which is placed in a position of prominence and primacy as compared to the terms of the service. Users are not required to personally identify themselves in order to obtain the free trial. To the average user, the sign-up process appears to be completely anonymous. Users must, however, download Defendants' software to use the free trial period. After the three-day

1	period has expired, Defendants remotely install, via the users' Internet service, billing software	
2	that delivers a payment demand to users telling them that the three-day trial has ended and that	
3	immediate payment is required. Defendants transmit the payment demand through a video	
4	pop-up message that takes over both the computer screen and the speakers. The pop-up	
5	window reads "Movieland.com," "Moviepass.tv," or "Popcorn.net" and "3 DAY TRIAL	
6	EXPIRED." A graphic on the left of the pop-up reads "STOP THESE REMINDERS NOW"	
7	and "CLICK CONTINUE." The text inside the pop-up reads substantially the same as	
8	follows:	
9	On 2006-02-18 at XXXXXXXX PST our content access software was installed on your system and your 3 day free trial began.	
10	Your I.P. address at the time was XXXXXXXXX. Your customer ID is XXXXXXX.	
11	Click "Continue" to purchase your license and stop these reminders.	
12	(Information regarding time, I.P. address and customer ID are redacted for security and privacy	
13	purposes.) The date, time, IP address and customer ID listed in the pop-up window varies	
14	from consumer to consumer. Although Defendants have made some minor modifications in	
15	the pop-up window's text during the course of their scheme, the text has remained essentially	
16	the same.	
17	6.4 The pop-up "reminder" (reproduced as Figure 1 below) takes up much of the	
18	computer screen, obstructs consumers from working in other windows, and lacks any obvious	
19	way to permit consumers to minimize or close it, as it lacks the familiar "X" or "_" symbols	
20	that often appears on pop-up windows. The only option this first pop-up offers to consumers is	
21	a button marked "CONTINUE."	
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6.5 Consumers who click on the "CONTINUE" button find their computers launching an audiovisual file that features a woman speaking over background music in front of a display of the words "Movieland.com," "Moviepass.tv," or "Popcorn.net." On the video, a woman calling herself "Kate" (or "Maria," in case of the "reminder" from "Popcorn.net,") explains to users that their "free" trial period has expired, that they did not cancel the service, and that they are now legally obligated to purchase a license for the use of the software that they downloaded for the trial period. See, figure 2.

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
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
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6.6 The video lasts approximately 40 seconds. The user cannot close the video or stop the music that plays both during and after "Kate's" presentation. During that time, the typical user cannot, in fact, effectively use the computer. After the first portion of video is finished, the screen remains on top of the user's computer screen and the music continues to play through the speakers, continuing to make it impossible for the typical user to effectively use the computer. The next video screen that confronts the user contains only two options for

Figure 3



action: either to click on "Close this window. Remind me later," or select a payment method

and continue with the payment process. See, figure 3.

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
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6.7 If the user chooses the option to be reminded later, every time the user goes onto the Internet, Defendants transmit to the computer the exact same series of payment demands that effectively disable the functioning of the computer for their duration. They appear at least once per hour, beginning with a first viewing when the user boots up the

Figure 4



The "Add/Remove" function featured on the control panel of the Windows Operating System provides the user the ability to remove unwanted programs from the computer. After the three-day trial period has expired, the listing for Defendants' software program remains listed in that section. However, when the user clicks to remove the program, an "installation warning" dialogue box appears stating that the user is going to be re-directed to another Web site. The user is given the option to click either "yes" or "no." If the user clicks "no," the dialogue box disappears, but the user cannot uninstall the program. If the user clicks "yes," the user is taken to a payment page. Although Defendants' software appears in the "Add/Remove" section of the computer, which represents to users that they can remove the program, Defendants' software cannot be uninstalled.

7.3 The practices described above constitute violations of RCW 19.270.020(4), which makes it unlawful for a person who is not an owner or operator of a user's computer to misrepresent that computer software will be uninstalled or disabled by an owner's or operator's action.

7.4 The conduct described above constitutes unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce and unfair methods of competition in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020.

VIII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

Unconscionable Business Practices in Violation of the Consumer Protection Act 8.1

Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1.1 through 7.4 and incorporates them herein as if set forth in full.

- **8.2** In the course of doing business, Defendants engage in numerous unconscionable practices, including, but not limited to, the unconscionable practices described in the following paragraphs.
- 8.3 When users agree to accept a three-day trial offer from Defendants, they click on a button on the pop-up advertisement that states "Begin Free Trial." The pop-up advertisement also contains language which discloses that users will receive "payment reminders" if there is no cancellation within the three-day trial period, but fails to disclose the unconscionable tactics that Defendants employ to force users to pay. Additionally, Defendants' Terms of Service state that the consumer will receive pop-up payment notices until the consumer has "satisfied" his alleged legal obligations.
- 8.4 The "payment reminders" used by Defendants are unlike other billing notices sent via the Internet. Unlike emails or other individualized contacts, they take over the user's computer, rendering it useless for periods of time on an hourly basis until the consumer agrees to pay. They essentially hold the consumer's computer hostage until payment is made. Consumers who have never encountered this aggressive and harassing billing method neither intend nor expect that by downloading a free-trial service in a seemingly anonymous context they will be hounded relentlessly for payment and deprived of the use of their computers.

- 8.5 Defendants fail to give consumers a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of their contract, thus unconscionably depriving them of a meaningful choice in entering into its terms. The formation of the contract with consumers is procedurally unconscionable. Additionally, Defendants use an overly harsh billing method that forces payment by completely obstructing users' access to their computers. This method of billing, which constitutes a term of Defendants' Terms of Service, is substantively unconscionable.
- 8.6 When Defendants send repeated payment reminders to consumers who have failed to cancel within the three-day period, they offer a method by which the consumer can pay a reduced amount to avoid being required to pay for an annual subscription. In order to stop the payment reminders, the consumer is given two options, either "purchase the license that was agreed to upon installation of the software and have continued access to the product," 30 software." "purchase the or day license to http://members.movieland.com/customerservice/?spage=explanation1, March 20, 2006. Defendants state that paying for the 30-day option rather than the annual contract will "satisfy (the consumer's) obligation and stop future payment reminders." http://www.movieland.com?join/?tmpl=cancelcontract.tmpl&CID=67280414, March 20, 2006. The least amount a consumer can pay to avoid receiving future payment reminders is \$19.95, with an automatic monthly renewal of \$19.95.
- 8.7 When consumers receive this option from Defendants, they have already been bombarded with payment reminders. They are desperate to stop Defendants from taking control of their computers and are essentially without recourse. Their bargaining power is essentially non-existent; they have no meaningful choice between the various options Defendants offer. They must either make a payment or continue to be harassed. Defendants' voluntary change in the terms of the contract, which purportedly represents a bargain to the consumer, constitutes an unconscionable attempt to extract payment for a debt that was originally based on unconscionable conduct.

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8.8 The acts and practices described above constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce and unfair methods of computation in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020.

IX. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION


Threats, Harassment and Intimidation in Billing Practices

- **9.1** Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1.1 through 8.8 and incorporates them herein as if set forth in full.
- 9.2 In the context of Defendants' attempts to bill consumers for their service, they engage in a number of practices that threaten, harass or intimidate consumers. These practices include, but are not limited to the following:
- Defendants represent that "failure to satisfy (the consumer's) obligation result escalation collection mav in an proceedings that could have adverse effect (the consumer's) credit record." an on http://members.moviepass.tv/customerservice/?spage=explanation3, April 14, 2006. In fact, Defendants are unable to affect the consumer's credit record; they do not know the consumer's name and have no means to personally identify him or her. Their threat is an empty one.
- 9.2.2 Defendants refer to consumers' "contractual obligation" in the text of their payment reminders. In the video portion of their payment reminders, the speaker informs the user that he or she is "legally obligated" to pay. In fact, Defendants' method of "contracting" does not create a legally binding contract between the parties. The terms of the contract are not meaningfully disclosed, and the consumer is not obligated to pay. Additionally, the person who downloaded Defendants' "free trial" offer may not have been legally competent to enter into a supposed "contract" with Defendants, by virtue of being a minor or an unauthorized user of the consumer's computer. The simple fact that the consumer's computer may have been used to download Defendants' "free trial" does not give rise to the consumer's automatic "legal obligation." Defendants' invocation of the consumer's


alleged "legal obligation" attempts to give their unconscionable practices the patina of legal sanction, and impliedly threatens that the law will force the consumer's compliance.

9.2.3 When Defendants send payment reminders to consumers, they present them with a series of screens which purportedly give them various "customer service options" to address specific issues. See, figure 5.

Figure 5



While these options purport to allow the consumer to choose the circumstance which most fits his or her situation, i.e. "I never signed up for this service, I would like to cancel," each of the options, if chosen, directs the consumer to another web page which only gives him or her the option to pay. See, figure 6.



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
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By so limiting consumers' options, Defendants attempt to intimidate them into believing that even if they did not order the service, they are required to pay for it.

Defendants' software, when downloaded and installed on the user's computer, enables Defendants to remotely transmit additional software that executes when the user goes onto the Internet. When the trial period has expired, the first time the user goes onto the Internet, Defendants transmit their payment-demand software onto the user's computer. This software causes payment demands to launch on the user's computer and takes over the user's computer at least once every hour until or unless the user pays the license fee. Defendants' software also disables the user's ability to access the paid subscribers-only features of the service, the very service for which Defendants are attempting to extract payment. Furthermore,

Defendants disable the uninstall function on the user's computer as it pertains to their software. Defendants demand payment for a service that the user no longer can access and continue nevertheless to harass the user by bombarding him or her with pop-up video/audio messages that effectively deny access to the computer.

9.3 The conduct described above constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce and unfair methods of competition in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020.

X. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Failure to Disclose Material Facts in Violation of the Consumer Protection Act

- 10.1 Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1.1 through 9.3 and incorporates them herein as if set forth in full.
- 10.2 Defendants' Terms of Service fail to disclose a material term that accurately describes the means by which they collect payment from the user. The Terms of Service disclose that Defendants will deliver "pop-up windows" to the consumer until he or she pays for Defendants' service, but fail to describe accurately the aggressive, relentless, threatening form of payment demands used by Defendants. Defendants fail to disclose that the "pop-up windows" will be in the form of videos with an audio component. They fail to disclose that the "pop-up windows" will take over the user's computer for periods of time, rendering it temporarily unavailable to the user. They fail to disclose that the user cannot close out of their payment "reminders." Additionally they fail to disclose that the uninstallation option for the software will be disabled.
- 10.3 The Terms of Service additionally fail to disclose the material term describing the significant amount of computer memory Defendants' software will consume on the user's computer at least 27 megabytes of RAM.

- 10.4 Defendants' Terms of Service fail to disclose that they transmit software to the user's computer surreptitiously, and activate it without the consumer's knowledge or permission.
- 10.5 Defendants fail to reveal material facts to consumers, which, if communicated to the consumers, would render Defendants' service substantially less desirable. This constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce and unfair methods of competition in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.020.

XI. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Misrepresentations in Violation of the Consumer Protection Act

- 11.1 Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1.1 through 10.5 and incorporates them herein as if set forth in full.
- 11.2 During the course of doing business, Defendants make numerous misrepresentations, including, but not limited to, the misrepresentations described in the following paragraphs.
- 11.3 Defendants' pop-up advertisements represent that the cost of their service will be \$81.36 if consumers do not cancel the within the three-day trial period. In fact, the actual cost of the service can be as little as \$29.95 and Defendants are always willing to accept this smaller amount in lieu of the \$81.36 they claim will be owed. As a practical matter, the true cost of the service can range from \$29.95 to \$99.00, depending on the method of payment chosen and the term of service ordered
- 11.4 Defendants represent that their software will allow the user to watch videos or other entertainment downloaded from Defendants' web site "at extreme speed." http://www.movieland.com, March 20, 2006. In fact, the speed of the download depends on the type of connection the user has to the Internet. A user with a dial-up connection will not receive downloaded files at "extreme speed."

- 11.5 Defendants represent that their software contains "no spyware". http://www.movieland.com, March 20, 2006. In fact, Defendants' software itself constitutes "spyware," insofar as it places files on the user's computer which send repeated, harassing notices that interfere with use of the computer; prevents the user from uninstalling the offending files; and if, in fact, if the files are uninstalled, leaves parts of Defendants' software on the user's computer.
- 11.6 **Defendants** represent that "failure satisfy (the consumer's) proceedings obligation may escalation of collection that could result an adverse effect credit record." have on (the consumer's) http://members.moviepass.tv/customerservice/?spage=explanation3, April 14, 2006. In fact, Defendants are unable to affect the consumer's credit record; they do not know the consumer's name and have no means to personally identify him or her. Their threat is an empty one.
- 11.7 Defendants refer to consumers' "contractual obligation" in the text of their payment reminders. In the video portion of their payment reminders, the speaker informs the user that he or she is "legally obligated" to pay. In fact, Defendants' method of "contracting" does not create a legally binding contract between the parties. The terms of the contract are not meaningfully disclosed, and the consumer is not obligated to pay. Additionally, the person who downloaded Defendants' "free trial" offer may not have been legally competent to enter into a supposed "contract" with Defendants, by virtue of being a minor or an unauthorized user of the consumer's computer. The simple fact that the consumer's computer may have been used to download Defendants' "free trial" does not give rise the consumer's automatic "legal" or "contractual obligation."
- 11.8 Defendants' initial pop-up advertisement for services represents that the consumer can watch "over 3,000" movies or "download them to keep forever." No limitation on the number of downloads permitted is disclosed in the context of the advertisement. In fact, consumers who attempt to download more than five movies during the three-day trial period are informed that "trial users" are only permitted to download a maximum of five movies.

1	h. Award Plaintiff the costs of bringing this action, pursuant to
2	RCW 19.86.090 and 19.270.060, as well as such other and additional relief as the Court
3	may determine to be just and proper.
4	DATED thisday of August, 2006.
5	
6	Presented by:
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8	Attorney General
9	Vaula Selis
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